JUDGMENT
1. As the appellant did not choose to take the money out of court, he has no right to complain that the plaintiff withdrew it. He is liable for the interest upon the kanom amount. No reference to Exhibit III, as bearing upon the genuine-ness of the Purankadom document II seems to have been urged in the Courts below, and there is nothing to show any negligence on the part of the Vakil. We are unable to accede to the contention that appellant is entitled to the capitalized value of the produce of the cocoanut trees for the period of the life of those trees. See Valia Tamburati v. Parvati (1889) I. L. R. 13 M. 454. We are referred to explanation (a) Section 6 of Madras Act I. of 1887 as showing that the legislature intended the probable life of the trees to be taken into consideration. The enumeration in Section 6 of the matters to be taken into consideration evidently refers to the different classes of improvements specified in Section 3, and the matters to be considered will vary according to the class of the improvement. The Subordinate Judge has properly considered the cost of planting and protecting the trees, and he has also taken into consideration the value of the annual produce. It is not enacted in Section 6 that the whole of the future annual produce shall be considered. The act is very diffi- cult to construe, but in the absence of express words to that effect -we are not prepared to hold that the legislature intended to give to a tenant holding only a 12 years’ lease, the whole value of the produce of the cocoanut trees on his landholder’s paramba for 54 years in addition to his lease (that being said to be the productive life of the cocoanut trees). This is practically what is now contended for. The title of the Act may be “to secure to tenants the market value of their improvements,” made by them, but it does not profess to create for them an interest in the land beyond the period of their leases; and this in effect would be done if such a claim were allowed and it would amount to a virtual confiscation of the jenmi’s property. A reasonable interpretation must be given to the Act and we must assume that if the legislature had intended to give the tenant an interest in the land after his lease had expired they would have said so in plain terms.
2. We dismiss the second appeal with costs of respondents 1 & 2.
