{"id":106038,"date":"2006-02-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-02-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-manager-vs-p-chnnnasamy-1st-on-21-february-2006"},"modified":"2015-11-25T15:13:57","modified_gmt":"2015-11-25T09:43:57","slug":"the-manager-vs-p-chnnnasamy-1st-on-21-february-2006","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-manager-vs-p-chnnnasamy-1st-on-21-february-2006","title":{"rendered":"The Manager vs P.Chnnnasamy .. 1St on 21 February, 2006"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Madras High Court<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">The Manager vs P.Chnnnasamy .. 1St on 21 February, 2006<\/div>\n<pre>       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\nDated: 21\/02\/2006\n\nCoram\n\nThe Hon'ble Mr.JUSTICE S.RAJESWARAN\n\nW.P.No.21813 of 2000\nand W.P.No. 6320 of 2001\n\nThe Manager\nPublic and Industrial Relations\nNuclear Power Corporation\nMadras Atomic Power Station\nKalpakkam\nKancheepuram District                   .. Petitioner,\nW.P.21813\/00\n\n-Vs-\n\n1.P.Chnnnasamy                         .. 1st respondent,<\/pre>\n<p>                                           W.P.No.21813\/00 &amp;<br \/>\n                                           Petitioner,W.P.6320\/01<\/p>\n<p>  The Manager<br \/>\n  Personnel &amp; Industrial Relations<br \/>\n  Nuclear Power Corporation<br \/>\n  Kalpakkam                             .. 1st respondent,W.P.6320\/01<\/p>\n<p>2.Central Government Industrial Tribunal\n<\/p>\n<p>  -cum-Labour Court<br \/>\n  City Civil Court Buildings<br \/>\n  High Court<br \/>\n  Madras.600 104<br \/>\n                                                .. 2nd respondent, W.P.6320\/01<br \/>\n  Central Government Industrial Tribunal\n<\/p>\n<p>  -cum-Labour Court<br \/>\n  Sastri Bhavan, Nungambakkam<br \/>\n  Chennai.                           .. 2nd respondent,W.P.6320\/01<\/p>\n<p>        Writ Petition in W.P.No.21813\/2000 filed  under  Article  226  of  the<br \/>\nConstitution  of India seeking to issue a writ of certiorari as stated therein<br \/>\nand W.P.No.6320\/2001 filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India  for<br \/>\nthe relief of writ of certiorarified mandamus as stated therein.\n<\/p>\n<p>For Petitioner :  Mr.N.Jothi, assisted by<br \/>\n                Mr.L.P.  Shanmugasundaram<\/p>\n<p>For Respondents :  Mr.  M.  Gnanasekar<\/p>\n<p>:COMMON ORDER<\/p>\n<p>        The  management  has  filed the writ petition In W.P.No.21813\/2000 for<br \/>\nthe relief of writ of certiorari to quash the award passed  in  I.D.No.1\/2000,<br \/>\ndated 22.11.2000 by the 2nd respondent.\n<\/p>\n<p>        2.  Writ Petition in W.P.No.6320\/2001 has been filed P.Chinnasamy, the<br \/>\nworkman  for  the  relief  of certiorarified mandamus, to call for the records<br \/>\nrelating to I.D.No.1\/2000, dated 22.11.2000 on the file of the 2nd respondent,<br \/>\nquash  the  same  insofar  as  denying  the  halfbackwages  is  concerned  and<br \/>\nconsequently   seeking  for  reinstatement  with  full  back-wages  and  other<br \/>\nbenefits.\n<\/p>\n<p>        3.  Since the issue involved in both the writ petitions relate to  the<br \/>\naward  passed in I.D.No.1\/2000, dated 22.11.2000 passed by the 2nd respondent,<br \/>\nboth the writ petitions are taken together and common order  is  being  passed<br \/>\nwith the consent of the learned counsel for both sides.\n<\/p>\n<p>        4.   W.P.No.21813\/2000:- This writ petition has been filed against the<br \/>\naward passed in I.D.No.1\/2000, wherein the 2nd respondent has passed an  order<br \/>\nof reinstatement of the first respondent\/workman by setting aside the order of<br \/>\nremoval from service passed by the disciplinary authority, as confirmed by the<br \/>\nappellate  authority and further directions to the management to reinstate the<br \/>\n1st respondent with some  other  benefits.    However  it  is  stated  by  the<br \/>\npetitioner-management  that  no  conditions  have  been  stipulated by the 2nd<br \/>\nrespondent-tribunal that are to be followed.  It is further  stated  that  the<br \/>\n1st  respondentworkman was appointed in the Madras Atomic Power Project (as it<br \/>\nwas called by then) during March 1971.  At the time  of  appointment,  he  has<br \/>\nmade a declaration, in condition No.9 which reads thus:-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;No person who has more than one wife living shall be eligible for appointment<br \/>\nto Government Services.  A declaration to the effect that you are unmarried or<br \/>\nhave  only  one wife living as the case maybe will have to be signed by you at<br \/>\nthe time of appointment (form enclosed).  In the event  of  declaration  being<br \/>\nfound  to  be  incorrect after your appointment in this Department you will be<br \/>\nliable to be dismissed form service.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>Accepting this declaration, the 1st respondent-workman  has  also  signed  the<br \/>\norder on 3.3.1971 and entered into service.  As per this if any declaration is<br \/>\nfound to  be  incorrect,  he could be removed from service.  It is also stated<br \/>\nthat at the time of joining service in the  family  benefit  details,  he  has<br \/>\ndeclared  that  he  got married to one Kalyani and also indicated the names of<br \/>\nP.C.lakshmi as his daughter and P.C.Devan as his son born to him on  10.5.1973<br \/>\nand 15.7.1976  respectively.    His  entire  family availed medical facilities<br \/>\nprovided by the management for all the  family  members.    According  to  the<br \/>\npetitioner,  he  suddenly  introduced  another  woman  by name Mrs.S.Muthu and<br \/>\nfurther introduced the names of C.Premavathy, C.Thilakavathi, as daughters and<br \/>\nC.Magesh as his son.  These two daughters and a  son  were  born  through  the<br \/>\nsecond wife  S.Muthu.   Thus the 1st respondent-workman had performed bigamous<br \/>\nmarriage while his first wife Mrs.Kalyani was alive.   On  the  basis  of  the<br \/>\ninformation  that  the  1st respondent has contracted the second marriage when<br \/>\nthe first wife was alive and  when  the  said  marriage  was  subsisting,  the<br \/>\npetitioner issued  a  charge sheet to the 1 st respondent.  A domestic enquiry<br \/>\nwas conducted by the enquiry officer by absorbing all  the  procedures.    The<br \/>\nfindings of  the enquiry officer stood against the 1st respondent.  On perusal<br \/>\nof the record it was further found that the 1st respondent nominated his first<br \/>\nwife Kalyani as primary nominee, and for the purpose of L.T.C.  and travelling<br \/>\nallowance also, he had declared Mrs.S.Kalyani as his wife, P.C.Lakshmi as  his<br \/>\ndaughter and  Master  Devan  as  his  son.    He had further declared that the<br \/>\ndaughter and son are his legitimate children born to his legally married  wife<br \/>\nKalyani.   While  so,  the  1st  respondent  had submitted a totally different<br \/>\nnomination for Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity declaring one  Mrs.Muthu  as  his<br \/>\nwife   the   primary  nominee  and  introduced  P.C.Lashmi  and  P.C.Devan  as<br \/>\nalternative nominees.  It is also stated that the 1st respondent had  admitted<br \/>\nthe 2nd marriage and the birth of the children through her.  Therefore, on the<br \/>\nbasis  of  the  materials and records available, the enquiry officer found the<br \/>\n1st respondent-workman  was  guilty  of  all  charges.     Consequently,   the<br \/>\ndisciplinary  authority passed an order on 10.10.1998, after observing all the<br \/>\nformalities and fully adopting the principles of natural justice, removing him<br \/>\nfrom service.  An appeal was filed by the  1st  respondent  to  the  appellate<br \/>\nauthority which  also  confirmed  the  order  of  removal.   Thereafter, it is<br \/>\nsubmitted that he raised an industrial dispute in I.D.  No.1\/2000  before  the<br \/>\n2nd  respondent,  who passed an award on 22.11.2000, which is impugned in this<br \/>\nwrit petition in W.P.No.21813\/2000.\n<\/p>\n<p>        5.   It  is  seen  from  the  impugned  award  passed   by   the   2nd<br \/>\nrespondenttribunal  that the enquiry was very fair and proper and there was no<br \/>\ninfirmity or any violation in the manner in  which  the  same  was  conducted.<br \/>\nThereafter,  the 2nd respondent ultimately passed the impugned award directing<br \/>\nreinstatement of the 1st respondent in service with some conditions imposed by<br \/>\nthe  petitioner-management  on  only  one  ground,  namely,   the   Industrial<br \/>\nEmployment  (Standing  Orders) Act 1946 ( hereinafter called as the Act) which<br \/>\ncontains the Rules framed by the Central Government which is  also  called  as<br \/>\nthe  Industrial  Employment ( Standing Orders Central Rules 1946, (hereinafter<br \/>\ncalled as the Rules)  does  not  provide  the  bigamous  marriage  or  getting<br \/>\nchildren through  such  a  marriage  as  a  misconduct.    In  short,  the 2nd<br \/>\nrespondent-tribunal has held that the act of  marrying  and  getting  children<br \/>\nthrough  bigamous  marriage  during  the  lifetime  of the first wife will not<br \/>\namount to any act or omissions so as to treat the  same  as  a  misconduct  in<br \/>\nterms of the standing orders\/rules.\n<\/p>\n<p>        6.   Learned  counsel  for  the  petitioner-management  submitted that<br \/>\nthough the Standing Orders as stated by the second  respondent-tribunal  would<br \/>\nnot  specify  the  bigamous marriage as a misconduct, it is a misconduct and a<br \/>\nserious offence in general law.  The provisions of  the  Hindu  Marriage  Act,<br \/>\n1955 stipulate  that  bigamous  marriage  is  prohibited.    Moreover, he also<br \/>\nreferred to the Criminal Procedure Code, Chapter XIV relating the  prosecution<br \/>\nfor offences  against  marriage  under  Section 198.  Learned counsel has also<br \/>\nreferred to the charge memo dated 1 8.6.1996, which reads thus:-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;ARTICLE I<\/p>\n<p>That the said Shri P.Chinnaswamy, while functioning as Tradesman  had  married<br \/>\nanother woman viz., Smt.  Muthu while his first wife Smt.  Kalyani was living.<br \/>\nAs  per  the details of Master Medical Card, two children were born to him out<br \/>\nof his first wife, the  first  child  in  the  year  1973  and  the  other  on<br \/>\n15.7.1976.   As per the details given by him later on three children were born<br \/>\nto him through Smt.  Muthu, his 2nd wife with their dates of birth as 29.5.74,<br \/>\n3.8.76 and 20.12.78.\n<\/p>\n<p>        That the said Shri P.Chinnaswamy by marrying another woman  while  his<br \/>\nfirst  is  alive  has  acted  in  a  manner  i.e., unbecoming of a Corporation<br \/>\nemployee.\n<\/p>\n<p>ARTICLE II<\/p>\n<p>        That the said Shri P.Chinnaswamy while  functioning  as  Tradesman  in<br \/>\nMAPS  suppressed  the facts of his 2nd marriage with another woman viz., Muthu<br \/>\nand begetting following children while his first wife was also living.\n<\/p>\n<p>        1.C.Premavathy Daughter\n<\/p>\n<p>        2.  C.Thilagavathy -do-\n<\/p>\n<p>        3.  C.Makesh            Son<br \/>\n        Prior to introduction of CHS Scheme in DAE hospital i.e.,  on  16.5.85<br \/>\nhe applied for availing medical facilities for these children whose names were<br \/>\nincluded  in  the Master card by deliberately excluding the name of his second<br \/>\nwife Smt.  Muthu.  Later on when CHSS was introduced in the DAE  hospital,  he<br \/>\napplied for inclusion of the following persons as his dependants who are being<br \/>\nthe first wife and children born out of her:-\n<\/p>\n<pre>1.P.Chinnaswamy Self    15.6.45\n2.Smt.Kalyani   wife 43 years\n3.P.C.Lakshmi   daughter 10.5.73\n4.P.C.Devan     son     15.7.76\n\n<\/pre>\n<p>        That  the  said Shri P.Chinnaswamy has by suppressing the facts of his<br \/>\n2nd marriage with another woman and begetting children has acted in  a  manner<br \/>\nthat is unbecoming of a Corporation employee.\n<\/p>\n<p>ARTICLE III:\n<\/p>\n<p>        That  the  said  Shri  P.Chinnaswamy while functioning as Tradesman in<br \/>\nMAPS had submitted a nomination dated 23.7.73 declaring Smt.Kalyani,  his  1st<br \/>\nwife as primary nominee for the purpose of Provident Fund and had included her<br \/>\nas a  family  member for the purpose of LTC\/TA.  For availing medical facility<br \/>\nat the first instance he declared Smt.  Kalyani as his wife and P.C.Lakshmi as<br \/>\nhis daughter.  Subsequently  for  availing  medical  facilities,  he  included<br \/>\nMs.Thilagavathy,  Ms.Premavathy  and  Master  Makesh  by declaring them as his<br \/>\nlegitimate children although they were born through his second wife.    During<br \/>\nJuly  1987  he submitted a nomination dated 14.7.87 for Death -cum- Retirement<br \/>\nGratuity declaring Smt.Muthu as  his  wife  and  as  primary  nominee  and  C.<br \/>\nPremavathy, C.Thilagavathy,  C.Makesh as alternative nominees.  Later, when he<br \/>\nwas absorbed in NPCIL, he gave nomination  in  favour  of  his  2nd  wife  and<br \/>\nchildren  born out of 2nd wife leaving behind the first wife and children born<br \/>\nout of 1st wife.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>It is further submitted that in the letter dated 26.3.1997 written by the  1st<br \/>\nrespondent-workman  to  the  Department, wherein he has categorically admitted<br \/>\nthe offence committed by him and pleads for  forgiveness  based  on  his  past<br \/>\nexperience in  the  petitioner-department.  Learned counsel for the petitioner<br \/>\nhas also referred to the claim statement made in  I.D.No.1\/2000,  wherein  the<br \/>\n1st  respondent  has  stated  that he has not committed any serious misconduct<br \/>\nlike misappropriation or corruption or embezzlement but suo  motu  action  had<br \/>\nbeen taken  against  the  him  in  this  case.    The  learned counsel for the<br \/>\npetitioner has stated that this contention of the 1st respondent-workman  that<br \/>\naction  has  been  taken against him as per the sweet will and pleasure of the<br \/>\npetitioner-management without any material cannot be considered at all for  he<br \/>\nhas  violated  the  rules of the general law by contracting a second marriage.<br \/>\nTherefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, on  the  basis<br \/>\nof  the Standing Orders and the general law, action has been taken against the<br \/>\n1st respondent and there is no error committed by the  disciplinary  authority<br \/>\nin passing  the  order  of  removal against the 1st respondent.  It is further<br \/>\nstated by the learned counsel that on the basis of the admissions made by  the<br \/>\n1st   respondent   and   the   request   for   lesser   punishment,   the  2nd<br \/>\nrespondent-tribunal has condoned the unbecoming act of the 1st respondent  and<br \/>\npassed an  order  in  his favour.  However, learned counsel for the petitioner<br \/>\nreiterates that while accepting that the enquiry was fair and also that  there<br \/>\nwas  clear  admission  on  the  part  of  the 1st respondent in respect of 2nd<br \/>\nmarriage as contracted by him, the impugned award has been passed mechanically<br \/>\non the ground that there  was  no  clear  provision  in  the  Standing  Orders<br \/>\ntreating the  bigamous  marriage as misconduct.  On that basis, it is his case<br \/>\nthat the same should not be a ground for the 2nd respondent-tribunal  to  have<br \/>\nthe  order  of  removal of the 1st respondent-workman set aside and that it is<br \/>\nexcessive and contrary to the gravity of the misconduct.   Therefore,  learned<br \/>\ncounsel  assails  the  impugned  award  of  the 2nd respondent-tribunal on the<br \/>\nground that it has not applied its mind and the provisions of the general law.<br \/>\nLearned counsel further added that it would only put a premium on the offences<br \/>\nof this nature to be committed by persons.  He has also referred to  the  fact<br \/>\nthat  a  person  who commits murder should not rely upon the provisions of the<br \/>\nStanding Orders to say that it is not one of the misconduct as  enumerated  in<br \/>\nthe  Standing  Orders  thereby,  he  could  be  made  to say that he should be<br \/>\nreinstated in service even after committing murder.  Learned counsel has  also<br \/>\nreferred  to  the  provisions of the Constitution of India, Part IV-A, Article<br \/>\n51-A wherein the fundamental duties have  been  enumerated.    It  is  further<br \/>\nstated  by  the learned counsel that the Standing Orders cannot be taken as an<br \/>\nexhaustive one but it is only an illustrating provision  wherein  it  is  only<br \/>\nused as  a  model conduct for the workers&#8217; behaviour in general.  Whereas that<br \/>\ncannot be taken as a complete and exhaustive code for all  the  behaviour  and<br \/>\nconduct of   the   workers.      It  is  also  stated  by  him  that  the  2nd<br \/>\nrespondent-tribunal ought not to have gone beyond its jurisdiction and decided<br \/>\nthe quantum of punishment imposed by the petitioner-management.  Moreover, the<br \/>\nreasons  for   interfering   with   the   detailed   order   passed   by   the<br \/>\npetitioner-management  has  not  been  given  by the 2 nd respondent-tribunal.<br \/>\nTherefore, it is his contention that the impugned award  challenged  in  these<br \/>\nwrit  petitions  should  be  set  aside and the order of removal passed by the<br \/>\npetitioner-management should be upheld.\n<\/p>\n<p>        7.  In reply to the submissions put forth by the learned  counsel  for<br \/>\nthe  petitioner,  learned counsel for the 1st respondent in W.P.No.2181 3\/2000<br \/>\nand for the petitioner in W.P.No.6320\/2001 submitted as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>According to him, the 1st respondent-workman joined the Department  of  Atomic<br \/>\nEnergy  as Helper-A in1971 which was then a part of Central Government, though<br \/>\nthe Department of Atomic Energy was converted into  a  statutory  corporation,<br \/>\ncalled  Nuclear  Power  Corporation  (NPC) and came into force from 17.9.1994.<br \/>\nAccording to the learned counsel  for  the  first  respondent  (petitioner  in<br \/>\nW.P.No.6320\/2001), though the bigamous marriage is admitted, as long as it has<br \/>\nnot   been   enumerated  as  a  misconduct  in  the  Standing  Orders  of  the<br \/>\npetitioner-management, the same cannot be accepted as a misconduct and so  the<br \/>\norder  of  removal  passed  by  the  petitioner-management  on  the  basis  of<br \/>\nmisconduct is invalid and cannot be accepted.  For that, learned  counsel  has<br \/>\nreferred to various decisions:-\n<\/p>\n<p>(1) 1984(1)LLJ 16 Glaxo Lab.(I) Ltd.  v.  Labour court, Meerut<br \/>\n&amp; Ors.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2) 1984(3) SCC 316 <a href=\"\/doc\/1606318\/\">A.L.Kalra v.  Project and Equipment Corpn.<\/a><br \/>\n(3) 1990(II0) LLJ 96 <a href=\"\/doc\/451351\/\">S.Alamelu v.  S.E.  Elecy System<\/a><br \/>\n(4) 1995(I) LLJ 931 J.Dhanraj v.  T.N.E.B.  &amp; ors.\n<\/p>\n<p>(5) 11.4.1990 Order copy of T.A.No.1322\/1989 (W.P.\n<\/p>\n<p>                No.14665\/88) passed by the Tamil Nadu<br \/>\n                        Administrative Tribunal<\/p>\n<p>(6) 1998 (Vol.93)FJR 147 T.N.E.B.  v.  T.N.E.Employees (Mad.)<\/p>\n<p>        8.  Learned counsel for the 1st respondent-workman also submitted that<br \/>\nthis  fact  of misconduct not being enumerated in the Standing Orders has been<br \/>\nelaborately discussed by the 2nd respondent-tribunal while deciding  the  case<br \/>\nin favour  of  the  1st  respondent-workman.  It is further pointed out by him<br \/>\nthat only on the basis of the  said  decisions  referred  to  above,  the  2nd<br \/>\nrespondent-tribunal  has  passed the impugned award setting aside the order of<br \/>\nremoval passed by the petitionermanagement.    Therefore,  according  to  him,<br \/>\nadequate reasons have been given by the 2nd respondent-tribunal before setting<br \/>\naside the  order  of  removal  of the 1st respondent.  It is further submitted<br \/>\nthat the  petitioner-management  ought  not  to  have  initiated  disciplinary<br \/>\nproceedings  at  all, when the same has not been enumerated as a misconduct in<br \/>\nthe Standing Orders.  It is his further submission that on  facts,  the  first<br \/>\nwife was deserted as early as 1976 and there has been no complaint from her so<br \/>\nas  to  initiate  departmental proceedings as against him, as has been done in<br \/>\nthis case.  Therefore, in the absence of  any  complaint  from  any  quarters,<br \/>\nparticularly    from    his    first   wife,   the   action   taken   by   the<br \/>\npetitioner-management is highly unwarranted and no enquiry ought to have  been<br \/>\nconducted on  that  basis.    According  to  him,  the  first  wife of the 1st<br \/>\nrespondent-workman has not taken steps in any of the forum  available  to  her<br \/>\nagainst him.    Therefore,  when  that has not been done by the affected party<br \/>\nconcerned, it was not necessary for the petitioner-management to initiate  any<br \/>\nsuch action against the 1st respondent.  Though the 1st respondent-workman has<br \/>\nsought  for  the same relief of reinstatement with full backwages in W.P.No.63<br \/>\n20\/2001, he only wants to confine himself to the limited prayer of  confirming<br \/>\nthe  same  award  for  the  reason  that  during the pendency of the said writ<br \/>\npetition, the workman has left the services of the petitioner-management.\n<\/p>\n<p>        9.  In reply to the submissions made by the learned  counsel  for  the<br \/>\n1st respondent-workman learned counsel for the petitioner-management makes the<br \/>\nreply as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>It   is  not  correct  on  the  part  of  the  learned  counsel  for  the  1st<br \/>\nrespondent-workman to state that the petitioner-management did not receive any<br \/>\ncomplaint from his first wife.  He has  referred  to  the  original  complaint<br \/>\ngiven   by   the   1st   wife   of   the   1st   respondent-workman   to   the<br \/>\npetitioner-management.  According to the counsel, only on  the  basis  of  the<br \/>\nsaid  complaint,  action was initiated by the petitionermanagement against the<br \/>\nworkman.  Therefore, it is not correct to state that the petitioner-management<br \/>\nhas suo motu taken action against the 1st respondent.  Moreover, according  to<br \/>\nthe learned counsel for the petitioner-management, though contracting a second<br \/>\nmarriage  has  not  been  enumerated  in  the  Standing  Orders,  it cannot be<br \/>\nconstrued that the same itself is not a misconduct and thereby no action  need<br \/>\nbe taken  for  such an offence being committed by a person or workman.  He has<br \/>\nalso brought to the notice of this court  the  declaration  made  by  the  1st<br \/>\nrespondent-workman  at the time of his entering into service, namely condition<br \/>\nNo.9, which is extracted supra.  Therefore, it is his case that the  rationale<br \/>\nbehind  the  impugned award passed by the 2nd respondent-tribunal cannot stand<br \/>\nthe legal scrutiny and therefore the same is liable to be  set  aside  and  no<br \/>\nrelief could be granted to the 1st respondent-workman as given in the award.\n<\/p>\n<p>        10.  Learned counsel for the 1st respondent-workman has submitted that<br \/>\nthe  impugned  award  passed by the 2nd respondent-tribunal is well within law<br \/>\nand there is no infirmity or illegality in the same warranting this  court  to<br \/>\nset aside the same.\n<\/p>\n<p>        11.   I have given my careful consideration to the submissions made by<br \/>\nboth the learned counsel and the judgments referred to by them.\n<\/p>\n<p>        12.  The only point that is to be decided in these writ  petitions  is<br \/>\nwhether  any  disciplinary  action  could  be  taken  in respect of an act not<br \/>\nenumerated as an act of misconduct under the certified Standing Orders.\n<\/p>\n<p>        13.  <a href=\"\/doc\/1513240\/\">In Glaxo Laboratories (I)Ltd.  v.  Labour Court, Meerut  &amp;  ors.<\/a>,<br \/>\n19  84(I)  LLJ  16 (supra) this question was considered by the Hon&#8217;ble Supreme<br \/>\nCourt and in para 20 of the said judgment, the Hon&#8217;ble Supreme Court  held  as<br \/>\nfollows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;20.  It  was  next contended that while misconduct is enumerated in S.  O.22,<br \/>\nthe punishment is prescribed in S.O.23, and the expression  &#8216;  misconduct&#8217;  in<br \/>\nS.O.23  would comprehend any misconduct irrespective of the fact whether it is<br \/>\nenumerated in S.O.22 or not.  The preamble of S.  O.23 reads as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;23(a) Any workman who is adjudged by the manager  on  examination  of<br \/>\nthe workman, if present, and of the facts to be guilty of misconduct is liable<br \/>\nto be &#8230;&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>The  submission  is  that  the  expression  &#8216;misconduct&#8217;  under  S.O.23 is not<br \/>\nqualified as the one set out  in  S.O.22  and  therefore,  any  other  act  of<br \/>\nomission  or  commission  which would per se be misconduct would be punishable<br \/>\nunder S.O.23 irrespective of the fact whether  it  finds  its  enumeration  in<br \/>\nS.O.22.   The  Act  makes  it obligatory to frame standing orders and get them<br \/>\ncertified.  S.3(2) requires the employers in an industrial establishment while<br \/>\npreparing draft standing orders to make provision  in  such  draft  for  every<br \/>\nmatter  set  out  in  the  Schedule  which  maybe applicable to the industrial<br \/>\nestablishment, and where model standing orders have been prescribed, shall be,<br \/>\nso far as is practicable, in conformity with  such  model.    Item  9  of  the<br \/>\nSchedule  provides  &#8216;suspension  or  dismissal  for  misconduct,  and  acts or<br \/>\nomissions which constitute misconduct&#8217;.  It is therefore, obligatory upon  the<br \/>\nemployer to draw up with precision those acts of omission and commission which<br \/>\nin his  industrial  establishment  would  constitute  misconduct.   Penalty is<br \/>\nimposed for misconduct.  The workmen must therefore, know in advance which act<br \/>\nor omission would constitute misconduct as to be visited with  penalty.    The<br \/>\nstatutory  obligation is to prescribe with precision in the standing order all<br \/>\nthose acts of omission or commission which would constitute  misconduct.    In<br \/>\nthe  face  of  the  statutory provision it would be difficult to entertain the<br \/>\nsubmission that some other act or omission which may be misconduct though  not<br \/>\nprovided for in the standing order would be punishable under standing order 23<br \/>\n.  Upon  a  harmonious  construction,  the expression &#8216;misconduct&#8217; in S.  O.23<br \/>\nmust refer to those acts of omission or commission which constitute misconduct<br \/>\nas enumerated  in  standing  order  22  and  none  else.    However,  in  this<br \/>\nconnection,   Mr.Shanti  Bhushan  drew  our  to  <a href=\"\/doc\/701530\/\">Mahendra  Singh  Dhantwal  v.<br \/>\nHindustan Motors Ltd.  &amp; Ors.<\/a>  (1976 II L.L.J 259).  In that case in a  second<br \/>\nround  of litigation between the parties the Industrial Tribunal set aside the<br \/>\norder of dismissal of the workmen and ordered  reinstatement  with  full  back<br \/>\nwages.   In  a  writ  petition  filed  by  the  Company  under  Art.226 of the<br \/>\nConstitution, a learned Single Judge of the High Court declined  to  interfere<br \/>\nwith  the  award  holding  that  &#8216;the reason might have been the old reason of<br \/>\ndismissal&#8217; and that the &#8220;circumstances relied on by  the  Tribunal  cannot  be<br \/>\ncharacterised as unreasonable.&#8221; The Company carried the matter to the Division<br \/>\nBench  of  the  High  Court  which  accepted  the appeal observing that unless<br \/>\ncontravention of S.33 of the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  is  established,  the<br \/>\nIndustrial  Tribunal  would  have  no jurisdiction to entertain an application<br \/>\nunder S.33A.  In terms it was held that unless it is  established  that  there<br \/>\nhas been discharge for misconduct, the Industrial Tribunal had no jurisdiction<br \/>\nto set  aside  the order of termination in an application under S.33A.  In the<br \/>\nappeal by certificate granted by the High Court, workman contended  that  S.33<br \/>\nmay  be contravened in varieties of ways and the only question that need to be<br \/>\nexamined is whether there was a contravention by the employer in that  it  did<br \/>\nnot  make  any  application  to  the Tribunal for the approval of the order of<br \/>\ntermination of service of the workman.  It  is  in  this  context  that  while<br \/>\nallowing the appeal of the workman this Court observed as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;Standing   orders  of  a  company  only  describe  certain  cases  of<br \/>\nmisconduct and the same cannot be exhaustive of all the species of  misconduct<br \/>\nwhich a  workman  may commit.  Even though a given conduct may not come within<br \/>\nthe specific terms of misconduct described in  the  standing  orders,  it  may<br \/>\nstill  be  a  misconduct,  in the special facts of a case, which it may not be<br \/>\npossible to condone and for which the employer may  take  appropriate  action.<br \/>\nOrdinarily, the standing orders may limit the concept but not invariably so.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>Relying  on these observations, Mr.Shanti Bhushan urged that this Court has in<br \/>\nterms held that there can be some  other  misconduct  not  enumerated  in  the<br \/>\nstanding order  and  for which the employer may take appropriate action.  This<br \/>\nobservation cannot be viewed divorced from the facts of the case.  What stared<br \/>\nin the face of the court in that case was  that  the  employer  had  raised  a<br \/>\ntechnical  objection  ignoring  the  past  history  of  litigation between the<br \/>\nparties that application under S.33A was not maintainable.    It  is  in  this<br \/>\ncontext  that this Court observed that the previous action might have been the<br \/>\noutcome of some misconduct not enumerated in the  standing  order.    But  the<br \/>\nextracted  observation  cannot  be  elevated to a proposition of law that some<br \/>\nmisconduct neither defined nor enumerated and which may  be  believed  by  the<br \/>\nemployer to be misconduct ex post facto would expose the workman to a penalty.<br \/>\nThe   law  will  have  to  move  two  centuries  backward  to  accept  such  a<br \/>\nconstruction.  But it is not necessary to go so far  because  in  <a href=\"\/doc\/804347\/\">Salem  Erode<br \/>\nElectricity Distribution Co.   Ltd.   v.  Salem Erode Electricity Distribution<br \/>\nCo.  Ltd.  Employees Union<\/a> (1966-I L.L.J.  443), this Court in terms held that<br \/>\nthe object underlying the  Act  was  to  introduce  uniformity  of  terms  and<br \/>\nconditions  of employment in respect of workmen belonging to the same category<br \/>\nand discharging the same or similar work under  an  industrial  establishment,<br \/>\nand  that  these  terms  and  conditions  of  industrial  employment should be<br \/>\nwell-established and should be known to the employees before they  accept  the<br \/>\nemployment.   If  such  is the object, no vague undefined notion about any act<br \/>\nmay be innocuous which from the employer&#8217;s point of view may be misconduct but<br \/>\nnot provided for in the standing order for which a  penalty  can  be  imposed,<br \/>\ncannot be  incorporated  in the standing orders.  From certainty of conditions<br \/>\nof employment, we would have to return to the days  of  hire  and  fire  which<br \/>\nreverse movement  is  hardly justified.  In this connection, we may also refer<br \/>\nto <a href=\"\/doc\/31835\/\">Western India Match Company Ltd.  v.  Workmen<\/a> (1973-II  L.L.J.    403),  in<br \/>\nwhich  this  Court  held  that  any  condition of service if inconsistent with<br \/>\ncertified standing orders, the  same  would  not  prevail  and  the  certified<br \/>\nstanding orders  would  have  precedence  over  all such agreements.  There is<br \/>\nreally one interesting observation in this which deserves noticing.  Says  the<br \/>\nCourt:\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;In  the  sunny  days  of  the  market economy theory people sincerely<br \/>\nbelieved that the economic law of demand and supply in the labour market would<br \/>\nsettle a mutually beneficial bargain between the  employer  and  the  workman.<br \/>\nSuch  a  bargain,  they  took  it  for  granted,  would  secure fair terms and<br \/>\nconditions of employment to the workman.  This law they venerated  as  natural<br \/>\nlaw.  They had an abiding faith in the verity of this law.  But the experience<br \/>\nof the working of this law over a long period has belied their faith.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>Lastly we may  refer  to  Workmen of Lakheri Cement Works Ltd.  v.  Associated<br \/>\nCement Companies Ltd.  1970(20) I.F.  &amp; L.R., 243.  This  Court  repelled  the<br \/>\ncontention  that the Act must prescribe the minimum which has to be prescribed<br \/>\nin an  industrial  establishment,  but  it  does  not  exclude  the  extension<br \/>\notherwise.   Relying  upon the earlier decision of this Court in <a href=\"\/doc\/886446\/\">Rohtak Hissar<br \/>\nDistrict Electricity Supply Co.Ltd.   v.    State  of  Uttar  Pradesh  &amp;  Ors.<\/a><br \/>\n(1966-II L.L.J.   330), the Court held that everything which is required to be<br \/>\nprescribed has to  be  prescribed  with  precision  and  no  argument  can  be<br \/>\nentertained  that  something  not  prescribed  can yet be taken into account a<br \/>\nvarying what is prescribed.  In short it cannot be left  to  the  vagaries  of<br \/>\nmanagement  to  say  ex  post  facto  that some acts of omission or commission<br \/>\nnowhere found to be enumerated in the relevant standing order is none the less<br \/>\na misconduct not strictly falling within  the  enumerated  misconduct  in  the<br \/>\nrelevant  standing  order  but  yet a misconduct for the purpose of imposing a<br \/>\npenalty.  Accordingly, the contention of Mr.Shanti Bhushan that some other act<br \/>\nof misconduct which would per se be an act of misconduct though not enumerated<br \/>\nin S.O.22 can be punished under S.O.23 must be rejected.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>        14.  <a href=\"\/doc\/1606318\/\">In A.L.Kalra v.  Project and Equipment Corpn.<\/a>    1984(3)SCC  316,<br \/>\nthe  Hon&#8217;ble  Supreme Court has held that acts of misconduct must be precisely<br \/>\nand specifically stated in the rules or standing orders and it cannot be  left<br \/>\nto be interpreted ex post facto by the management.\n<\/p>\n<p>        15.  This Court in <a href=\"\/doc\/451351\/\">S.Alamelu v.  S.E.  Elecy System<\/a> , 1990(II) LLJ 96,<br \/>\nheld in para 6, as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;6.  One  of  us  (Nainar  Sundaram,  J.)  in  <a href=\"\/doc\/1292224\/\">S.V.Angappan and others v.  The<br \/>\nTamilnadu Electricity Board, Rep.,<\/a> by its Secretary, Madras 2 (W.P.    No.5105<br \/>\nof  1980), order dated 6th January, 1987),adverted to the ratio of the Supreme<br \/>\nCourt in <a href=\"\/doc\/1513240\/\">Glaxo Lab (I)Ltd.  v.  Labour Court, Meerut and  others<\/a>  (supra)  and<br \/>\nopined  that  unless  the  transgression  of  any  of  the Regulations is also<br \/>\nenumerated  as  misconduct  in  the  Standing  Orders,  it  will  not  attract<br \/>\ndisciplinary action  in  respect of such transgression.  It is true Regulation<br \/>\n25(2) as such sets forth an embargo on a woman employee contracting a marriage<br \/>\nwith any person, who has a wife living, without first obtaining the permission<br \/>\nof the Board.  It is admitted that the Regulations do not  by  themselves  say<br \/>\nthat  a  violation  of Regulation 25(2) would amount to misconduct, attracting<br \/>\ndisciplinary action.  Even if such a provision has  been  made,  the  Standing<br \/>\nOrders  under  the Act having got formulated and certified and they having not<br \/>\nprovided for such a misconduct, the Regulations would not  prevail  and  could<br \/>\nnot be  invoked  to  take disciplinary action.  That is the result of sanctity<br \/>\nannexed to the Act and the Rules, and the  Standing  Orders  under  them,  and<br \/>\ntheir overriding  effect  on other service Rules and Regulations.  The learned<br \/>\nsingle Judge, with due respect to him, in our view, has  not  appreciated  the<br \/>\nimplications  of  the  Certified  Standing  Orders  under  the  Act  and their<br \/>\noverriding effect from a proper perspective.  The learned  single  Judge  took<br \/>\nnote of  the  observations  in  <a href=\"\/doc\/1627421\/\">Shri  Rasiklal  Vaghjibhai Patel v.  Ahmedabad<br \/>\nMunicipal Corporation and<\/a> another (1985-I-LLJ-527) as saying that there  could<br \/>\nbe an  action  either  under the Service Regulations or Standing Orders.  With<br \/>\ndue respect to the learned single Judge, we  must  point  out  that  the  said<br \/>\npronouncement  has not at all dealt with the question of the overriding effect<br \/>\nof the Certified Standing Orders under  the  Act  over  a  Regulation  of  the<br \/>\npresent nature.  The Supreme Court in that case, was discountenancing the view<br \/>\nof  the  High  Court  that  even  if  the  allegation  of  misconduct does not<br \/>\nconstitute  misconduct  amongst  those  enumerated  in  the  relevant  service<br \/>\nregulations,  yet  the employer can attribute what would otherwise per se be a<br \/>\nmisconduct though not enumerated and punish him for the same.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>        16.  Yet another Division Bench of this court in J.  Dhanaraj  and  T.<br \/>\nN.E.B.  &amp; Others held in para 9 and 10 as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Para:9.        No  doubt,  the  proposition laid down in that case appears to<br \/>\nsupport the respondents herein.  But it is explained and distinguished by  the<br \/>\nSupreme Court  in  Glaxo Lab (I) Ltd&#8217;s case (cited supra).  The later Judgment<br \/>\nhas taken note of the earlier Judgment.  Apart from that in  so  far  as  this<br \/>\nCourt  is  concerned,  there is already a Division Bench on the said point and<br \/>\nthe Division Bench has considered the  Regulations  and  the  Standing  Orders<br \/>\nwhich are  under  our  consideration  in  the present case.  The ruling of the<br \/>\nDivision Bench will certainly govern the present case also.    As  we  are  in<br \/>\nagreement  with the view taken by the Division Bench, we are not in a position<br \/>\nto accept the contention raised by learned counsel for the respondents.\n<\/p>\n<p>Para 10:        Learned counsel for the respondents invites our  attention  to<br \/>\nthe decision in M.R.Savant  V.   G.M.  Mather &amp; Platt (I) Ltd.  &amp; Others (1992<br \/>\nII LLJ 394) rendered by the Bombay High Court.  After  referring  to  the  two<br \/>\nJudgments  of  the  Supreme Court, the Bombay High Court in that decision held<br \/>\nthat it would not go into  the  controversy  and  by  steering  clear  of  the<br \/>\ncontroversy,  the Court assumed for the purpose of that case that the law laid<br \/>\ndown by the Supreme Court was  that  the  Standing  Orders  must  specifically<br \/>\nenumerated any  act before it can be termed as a misconduct.  Thus, the Bombay<br \/>\nHigh Court proceeded on the footing that  the  law  laid  down  by  the  later<br \/>\nJudgment of the Supreme Court would hold the field.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>        17.  <a href=\"\/doc\/1212438\/\">In Tamil Nadu Electricity Board v.  Central Organisation of Tamil<br \/>\nNadu  Electricity Employees and Another<\/a>(1988 FJR 147) a Division Bench of this<br \/>\nCourt held as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;The apex court, in <a href=\"\/doc\/1513240\/\">Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd.  v.  Labour Court,<\/a> (19\n<\/p>\n<p>84) 64 FJR 16, has held that  a  non-enumerated  misconduct  cannot  form  the<br \/>\nsubject-matter of  a  disciplinary  action.   Following the said view, in <a href=\"\/doc\/914491\/\">U.P.<br \/>\nState Electricity Board v.  Hari Shankar Jain,<\/a> (1978) II LLJ 399 (sic), it has<br \/>\nbeen held that without amendment to  the  certified  standing  orders  and  by<br \/>\nincluding  the  various  misconducts  enumerated in the conduct regulations as<br \/>\napplicable to workmen covered by the standing orders would really  by  passing<br \/>\nthe provisions for amendment to the certified standing orders prescribed under<br \/>\nsection 10  of  the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act.  In that view<br \/>\nof the matter, we have no hesitation to conclude that the circular now  issued<br \/>\nis against  the  provisions  of the Act.  Therefore, we are in conformity with<br \/>\nthe view of the learned single judge  that  a  service  regulation  cannot  be<br \/>\nreplaced  by a circular or a memorandum, introducing series of misconducts not<br \/>\nenumerated in the standing orders.  So as to ensure safeguard to  the  workmen<br \/>\nthey  should  know  what  are  the  service  conditions  and  what constitutes<br \/>\nmisconduct, at the time of entry into service.  In  the  standing  orders,  as<br \/>\nmany as 36 misconducts are enumerated.  To read something else to that, it can<br \/>\nbe  done  only  by  way of restoring to an amendment to the certified standing<br \/>\norders, under section 10 of the Act, which gives  ample  opportunity  for  the<br \/>\nemployees  to  have  their  say and to take the matter finality in the form of<br \/>\njudicial review.  What is not contemplated as a service condition when entered<br \/>\ninto service cannot be upset or re-introduced by way of memorandum, which  has<br \/>\nno  statutory  value,  unless it assumes a statutory significance by way of an<br \/>\namendment in the manner provided by law.  Therefore, the decisions, which have<br \/>\nno binding impact by virtue of the order of the apex court cannot be a  ground<br \/>\nto upset  the  findings  of  the learned single judge.  Since the order of the<br \/>\nlearned single judge based on two decisions of  the  Division  Bench  of  this<br \/>\ncourt in <a href=\"\/doc\/451351\/\">S.    Alamelu  v.    Superintending Engineer, South Arcot Electricity<br \/>\nSystem,<\/a> (1990) II LLJ 96, and Dhanaraj v.  T.N.E.B., (1995) 64 FJR  16,  which<br \/>\ndecisions are based on the view of the Supreme Court in <a href=\"\/doc\/1513240\/\">Glaxo Laboratories (I)<br \/>\nLtd.  v.    Labour  Court,<\/a>  (1984)  I  LLJ 16, we have no other option than to<br \/>\nconfirm the order of the learned single judge, which consequently leads to the<br \/>\ndismissal of the appeal.\n<\/p>\n<p>        Accordingly, the writ appeal is dismissed with cost  of  Rs.2,000\/-  (<br \/>\nRupees two thousand only) payable to respondent No.1.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>        18.   Therefore, I am bound by the judgments of the apex court and the<br \/>\nDivision Bench  of  this  Court  which  decided  the  issue  already  that  no<br \/>\ndisciplinary  action could be taken against an employee for misconduct if such<br \/>\nacts are not enumerated in the misconduct under the standing orders.\n<\/p>\n<p>        19.  In the present case it was admitted by the petitioner\/ respondent<br \/>\nthat bigamy is not enumerated as a misconduct in the standing  orders  holding<br \/>\nthe field.    It is admitted by him that only for the misconduct of committing<br \/>\nbigamy, the respondent workmen was proceeded with and was removed from service<br \/>\nultimately.  The Labour Court has correctly applied the principles and the law<br \/>\nlaid down by the Apex Court and this Court  and  rightly  held  that  the  1st<br \/>\nrespondent-workman is entitled to reinstatement with conditions.\n<\/p>\n<p>        20.   Therefore,  I am unable to accept the contentions of the learned<br \/>\ncounsel for the petitioner-management and  the  writ  petition  filed  by  the<br \/>\nmanagement is  liable  to  dismissed  for  devoid  of  merits.    Accordingly,<br \/>\nW.P.No.21813\/2000  filed  by  the  petitioner-management  is   dismissed   and<br \/>\nW.P.No.6320\/2001  filed by the 1st respondent-workman is also dismissed as the<br \/>\nlearned counsel for the petitioner workman prayed for only the confirmation of<br \/>\naward as given by the labour Court.  However, there will be  no  order  as  to<br \/>\ncosts.\n<\/p>\n<p>sks\/smi<\/p>\n<p>To\n<\/p>\n<p>1.The Manager<br \/>\nPublic and Industrial Relations<br \/>\nNuclear Power Corporation<br \/>\nMadras Atomic Power Station<br \/>\nKalpakkam<br \/>\nKancheepuram District<\/p>\n<p>2.Central Government Industrial Tribunal\n<\/p>\n<p>-cum-Labour Court<br \/>\nSastri Bhavan, Nungambakkam<br \/>\nChennai.\n<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Madras High Court The Manager vs P.Chnnnasamy .. 1St on 21 February, 2006 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated: 21\/02\/2006 Coram The Hon&#8217;ble Mr.JUSTICE S.RAJESWARAN W.P.No.21813 of 2000 and W.P.No. 6320 of 2001 The Manager Public and Industrial Relations Nuclear Power Corporation Madras Atomic Power Station Kalpakkam Kancheepuram District .. Petitioner, W.P.21813\/00 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-106038","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>The Manager vs P.Chnnnasamy .. 1St on 21 February, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-manager-vs-p-chnnnasamy-1st-on-21-february-2006\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Manager vs P.Chnnnasamy .. 1St on 21 February, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; 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