{"id":107372,"date":"2011-07-06T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2011-07-05T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/keshabhai-vs-dahyaji-on-6-july-2011"},"modified":"2018-12-18T02:01:22","modified_gmt":"2018-12-17T20:31:22","slug":"keshabhai-vs-dahyaji-on-6-july-2011","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/keshabhai-vs-dahyaji-on-6-july-2011","title":{"rendered":"Keshabhai vs Dahyaji on 6 July, 2011"},"content":{"rendered":"
Gujarat High Court<\/div>\n
Keshabhai vs Dahyaji on 6 July, 2011<\/div>\n
Author: Mr.S.J.Mukhopadhaya, Honourable K.M.Thaker,<\/div>\n
  \n Gujarat High Court Case Information System \n    \n  \n    \n\n \n \n    \t      \n         \n\t    \n\t\t   Print\n\t\t\t\t          \n\n  \n\n\n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t\n\n\n \n\n\n\t \n\nLPA\/2220\/2010\t 34\tJUDGMENT\n\n \n\nIN\nTHE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD\n \n\n \n\n\n \n\nLETTERS\nPATENT APPEAL No. 2220 of 2010\n \n\nIn\n\n\n \n\nSPECIAL\nCIVIL APPLICATION No. 3553 of 2010\n \n\n \nFor\nApproval and Signature:  \n \nHONOURABLE\nTHE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA  \n \n\n\n \n\nHONOURABLE\nMR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER\n \n \n=========================================================\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n1\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tReporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment ? NO\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n2\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nTo be\n\t\t\treferred to the Reporter or not ? YES\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n3\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\ttheir Lordships wish to see the fair copy of the judgment ? NO\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n4\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tthis case involves a substantial question of law as to the\n\t\t\tinterpretation of the constitution of India, 1950 or any order\n\t\t\tmade thereunder ? NO\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n5\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nWhether\n\t\t\tit is to be circulated to the civil judge ? NO\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\n=========================================================\n\n \n\nKESHABHAI\nPANABHAI SOLANKI - Appellant(s)\n \n\nVersus\n \n\nDAHYAJI\nBABAJI THAKOR & 4 - Respondent(s)\n \n\n=========================================================\n \nAppearance\n: \nMR\nM P SHAH for\nAppellant(s): 1,                                            MS KRUTI\nM SHAH for Appellant(s): 1, \nMR NK MAJMUDAR for Respondent(s) :\n1, \nMR UMESH TRIVEDI ADDL GOVERNMENT PLEADER for Respondent(s) : 2\n- 4. \nMR HS MUNSHAW for Respondent(s) :\n5, \n=========================================================\n\n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nCORAM\n\t\t\t: \n\t\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nHONOURABLE\n\t\t\tTHE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. S.J. MUKHOPADHAYA\n\t\t\n\t\n\t \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n \n\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nand\n\t\t\n\t\n\t \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\n \n\n\t\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nHONOURABLE\n\t\t\tMR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\n \n \n\n\n \n\nDate\n:6\/7\/2011 \t\t\t\n \n\nCAV\nJUDGMENT \n<\/pre>\n
(Per
\n: HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE K.M.THAKER)<\/p>\n
\t1.
\n\tPresent Appeal under Clause 15 of Letters Patent is directed against
\n\tthe judgment and order dated 13.8.2010 whereby the learned Single
\n\tJudge has allowed the petition preferred by present respondent No.1
\n\tand set aside the order dated 20.2.2010 passed by the Additional
\n\tDevelopment Commissioner and restored the order dated 25.6.2009
\n\tpassed by the District Development Officer (“DDO” for
\n\tshort) by virtue of which present petitioner was put under
\n\tsuspension in exercise of the powers under Section (1) of Section 59
\n\tof the Gujarat Panchayats Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as the
\n\t“Act”).\n<\/p>\n
\t1.1
\n\tHaving regard to the rival contentions, Admit.\n<\/p>\n
\t        Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for respondent No.1 and
\n\t               Mr. Trivedi, learned Additional Government Pleader
\n\tand                      Mr. Munshaw, learned advocate for
\n\trespondent No.5 have waived service of admission. With the consent
\n\tand at the request of learned Counsel the appeal is taken up for
\n\tfinal decision.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.
\n\tThe facts leading to and involved in present appeal need to be
\n\tstated at this stage.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.1
\n\tAt the relevant time the appellant herein was holding post of
\n\tSarpanch of village Takodi. During his tenure three complaints viz.\n<\/p>\n
\t(1)<\/span><\/p>\n
\tCR. No. II-83 of 2008 for the offences punishable under Sections
\n\t323, 504, 506(2), 427 and 114 of IPC; (2) CR. No. I-86 of 2008 for
\n\tthe offence punishable under Sections 149, 143, 323, 426 of IPC and
\n\t(3) F.I.R CR. No.I-15 of 2009 dated 27.1.2009 for the offences
\n\tpunishable under Sections 405, 406, 408, 409, 420, 465, 468, 471,
\n\t478, 477(A) and 120(B) of Indian Penal Code were filed against him.
\n\tThe appellant was arrested and was detained in prison until he came
\n\tto be released on bail.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.2
\n\tIt appears that present respondent No.1 (original-petitioner) had
\n\tdemanded before the District Development Officer (“D.D.O.”
\n\tfor short) that necessary and appropriate steps may be taken against
\n\tthe appellant in view of his arrest pursuant to the FIRs. In view of
\n\tsuch complaint and insistence of the respondent No.1 the D.D.O. had
\n\tissued a Notice calling upon the appellant to show cause as to why
\n\the should not be suspended from the post of Sarpanch. The said
\n\tcomplainant is present respondent no.1 and original petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.3
\n\tSubsequently, the DDO passed order dated 25.6.2009 suspending the
\n\tappellant from the post of Sarpanch.  Aggrieved by the said order
\n\tdated 25.6.2009, present appellant preferred appeal before the
\n\tDevelopment Commissioner (present respondent No.2) which was
\n\tregistered as Appeal No.86 of 2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.4
\n\tAt this stage, it is pertinent to note that in the said Appeal No.86
\n\tof 2009 (preferred by present appellant) present respondent No.1 had
\n\tpreferred an application, before the Development Commissioner,
\n\tpraying that he may be impleaded as party respondent. The Appellate
\n\tAuthority  allowed the said application of present respondent No.1
\n\tvide order dated 26.11.2009 and impleaded him as a party to the
\n\tappeal proceedings. Consequently the respondent no.1 was one of the
\n\tparties to the appeal proceedings instituted by present appellant.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.5
\n\tIt is pertinent to note that present appellant never challenged the
\n\tsaid order dated 26.11.2009 and that therefore the said order
\n\tremained unchallanged and has attained finality.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.6
\n\tIn view of the said order dated 26.11.2009, present respondent No.1
\n\tfiled reply against the petitioner’s appeal before the Development
\n\tCommissioner and supported the D.D.O’s order dated 25.06.2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.7
\n\tUltimately, by order dated 20.2.2010 the appeal preferred by present
\n\tappellant was allowed and the order dated 25.6.2009 passed by the
\n\tDDO suspending the appellant was set aside. The Appellate Authority
\n\tfound that the first adjudicating authority had not examined as to
\n\twhether the charges and alleged offence amounted to “moral
\n\tturpitude” or not. He also observed that the charges cannot be
\n\tsaid to be of “moral turpitude”.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.8
\n\tAgainst the said order dated 20.02.2010, present respondent No.1
\n\ti.e. the complainant preferred the writ petition which was opposed
\n\tby present appellant on diverse grounds, including the ground of
\n\tmaintainability of petition and on the ground of complainant’s
\n\tlocus.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.9
\n\tAfter hearing the contesting parties, the learned Single Judge has
\n\tset aside the order dated 20.2.2010 passed by the Appellate
\n\tAuthority in the aforesaid Appeal No. 86 of 2010  (which was filed
\n\tby present appellant) and restored the order dated 25.6.2009 placing
\n\tpresent appellant under suspension. The appellant is aggrieved by
\n\tthe judgment. Hence, present appeal.\n<\/p>\n
\t3.
\n\tHeard Ms. Kruti M Shah learned advocate for the appellant, Mr. N.K.
\n\tMajmudar, learned advocate for the respondent No.1. Mr. Umesh
\n\tTrivedi, learned Additional Government Pleader for respondent No.2
\n\tState, and Mr. Munsha, learned advocate for the DDO (respondent
\n\tNo.5). We have perused the record.\n<\/p>\n
\t4.
\n\tMs. Shah, learned Counsel for the appellant in the first instance
\n\thas challenged the maintainability of the petition at the instance
\n\tof present respondent No.1 and submitted that the order dated
\n\t25.6.2009 placing appellant under suspension was passed by the DDO,
\n\thence the necessary and proper party to the proceedings,
\n\tparticularly in the appeal under Section 59(3) of the Act, would be
\n\tthe Panchayat, the Competent Authority (i.e. the DDO) and the
\n\tappellant, while respondent No.1 would be a third party to the
\n\tappeal proceedings since the dispute is between the concerned member
\n\t(i.e. the appellant), the Panchayat and the Competent Authority. She
\n\tsubmitted that the respondent No.1 had no cause and justification to
\n\tprefer the petition challenging the order passed in the statutory
\n\tappeal preferred by present appellant. She also submitted that the
\n\tappellant’s objection against the maintainability of the petition
\n\tought to have been accepted by the learned Single Judge. She further
\n\tsubmitted that  the respondent No.1 is, in any manner, not the
\n\taffected or aggrieved party. The learned Counsel submitted that it
\n\thas been held that original complainant cannot be said to be “person
\n\taggrieved”. It is also contended that the appellate
\n\tauthority’s order was legal and based on conclusion that the alleged
\n\toffence did not amount to “moral turpitude” and ought
\n\tnot have been set aside.\n<\/p>\n
\t4.1
\n\tPer contra Mr. Majmudar, learned advocate for the respondent No.1
\n\thas submitted that the respondent No.1 is resident of the  village
\n\twhere before his suspension, the appellant was Sarpanch of the
\n\tPanchayat. He has submitted that even if the appellant’s contentions
\n\tregarding scope of Section 59 and\/or against the locus standi of
\n\trespondent No.1 were to be accepted, then also by any stretch of
\n\timagination it cannot be said that he i.e. the respondent No.1
\n\tcannot maintain a writ petition against the order of statutory
\n\tauthority inasmuch as a writ petition by the original complainant
\n\tand\/or by a person who is party to the Appeal proceedings (from
\n\twhich the petition arose) would be maintainable. He submitted that
\n\twhether the alleged offence amount to moral turpitude is required to
\n\tbe considered in light of the position held by the appellant. He
\n\talso submitted that the respondent No.1 is also a member of village
\n\tPanchayat and that therefore it cannot be said that the appellant is
\n\tnot interested and\/or affected party and has no locus to challenge
\n\tthe order passed by the Appellate Authority – Development
\n\tCommissioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t5.
\n\tWhile advancing her submissions the learned advocate for the
\n\tappellant referred to Section 59(3) of the Act and urged that the
\n\trespondent No.1 is not an aggrieved person and therefore has no
\n\tlocus to question any decision of the authority on the issue about
\n\tappellant’s suspension. So as to emphasize her submission she relied
\n\ton Section 57(3).\n<\/p>\n
\t6.
\n\tActually, in the given set of facts in present Letters Patent Appeal
\n\tmaintainability of the said statutory appeal is not the issue but
\n\tthe issues which arise are about the maintainability of petition and
\n\tthe petitioner’s locus to maintain a writ petition under Articles
\n\t226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the order passed by
\n\tstatutory authority in Appeal No.86\/2009 in which the respondent
\n\tno.1 was party. The learned Single Judge entertained the writ
\n\tpetition by the complainant against the appellate authority’s order.
\n\tThe appellant feels aggrieved by the said decision.\n<\/p>\n
\t7.
\n\tIn view of the appellant’s submissions, we may, before proceeding
\n\tfurther take into consideration the said provisions which read
\n\tthus:-\n<\/p>\n
“57(3)
\n\tAny person aggrieved by an order of the competent authority under
\n\tsub-section (1) and (2) may, within a period of thirty days from the
\n\tdate of the communication of such order, appeal to the State
\n\tGovernment.\n<\/p>\n
59(3)
\n\tAn appeal shall lie against an order passed under sub-section (1) to
\n\tthe State Government. Such appeal shall be made within a period of
\n\tthirty days from the date of the order”\n<\/p>\n
7.1
\n Even a cursory glance at the above noted provisions shows that there
\nis a marked difference between the scope and effect of the said two
\nprovisions. On one hand, sub-section (3) of Section 57 does provide
\nfor appeal against the order under sub-sections (1) and (2) of
\nSection 57 i.e. order of Removal of Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch and \/ or
\nthe order disqualifying Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch, but the provision
\nconfers the said right of statutory Appeal only on the “person
\naggrieved by an order” of the competent authority whereas the
\nsub-section (3) of Section 59, on the other hand, is not qualified in
\nlike manner by the words “any
\nperson aggrieved by an order of Competent Authority……”.
\n(as in case of sub-section (3) of Section 57) and it merely
\npostulates that an appeal
\nagainst the order passed under sub-section (1) of Section 59 shall
\nlie to the State.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t7.2
\n\t\t The said omission is deliberate and purposive. The legislature has
\n\t\tconsciously not qualified the provision under sub-section (3) of
\n\t\tSection 59 in the same manner as has been done in case of
\n\t\tsub-section (3) of Section 57. Hence, the said provision must be
\n\t\tallowed its due and complete role.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t7.3
\n\t\t It deserves to be mentioned that the question whether the words
\n\t\t“any person aggrieved” in sub-section (3) of Section 57
\n\t\twould include the original complainant has been considered, upon
\n\t\treference made by learned Single Judge, by the Division Bench in
\n\t\tthe case of Mr. M.H. Patel Vs. Sejalben J. Patel (2010 (2) GLH 757)
\n\t\tin light of and in the perspective of the provision under
\n\t\tsub-section (3) of Section 57. The Division
\n\t\tBench, after considering other
\n\t\tdecisions
\n\t\theld that the meaning of the term may vary according to the context
\n\t\tof the statute and ordinarily a person would be aggrieved if the
\n\t\tdecision is materially adverse to him and
\n\t\tif a legal burden is imposed on him and
\n\t\tthat normally a person is required to establish that he has been
\n\t\tdenied or deprived of something to which he is legally entitled and
\n\t\tthe term “person aggrieved”\n<\/p>\n
\t\tmust be understood  in the context  in which the provisions of the
\n\t\tstatute under consideration have been made. It also deserves to be
\n\t\tmentioned that in
\n\t\tthe matter between S.P. Patel vs. State of Gujarat (SCA No.17427 of<\/a>
\n\t\t2005) the learned Single Judge, while holding that the petitioner
\n\t\thad no locus standi to maintain the petition also took into
\n\t\tconsideration that “he had not taken any active steps to
\n\t\tparticipate in the proceedings before the D.D.O.
\n\t\tand\/or the Commissioner and that he was a fence-sitter.\n<\/p>\n
\t8.
\n\tAnother material
\n\tand vital fact,
\n\twhich is the main distinguishing feature in present case is
\n\tthat unlike in the said
\n\tcase of
\n\tS.P. Patel (supra) wherein the
\n\tcomplainant remained fence-sitter and had not taken any steps, in
\n\tpresent case, the
\n\trespondent no.1 was not
\n\tonly the complainant before the Competent Authority but when
\n\tthe appellant herein
\n\tfiled Appeal, the
\n\trespondent No.1 had immediately filed application for being
\n\timpleaded in the appeal
\n\tand when the
\n\tAppellate Authority, after
\n\tconsidering the objections of present appellant, vide order dated
\n\t26.11.2009, granted the application of present respondent No.1 made
\n\thim \/ allowed him to be
\n\tparty to the appeal proceedings (in the appeal filed by present
\n\tappellant). The
\n\trespondent no.1 also filed his reply\/objections and
\n\this objections were also taken on record and considered by the
\n\tAppellate Authority. The further relevant and vital distinguishing
\n\tfact in present case is that when the application of present
\n\trespondent no.1 was allowed vide order dated 26.11.2009, present
\n\tappellant did not challenge the said order dated 26.11.2009 (and
\n\tthereafter also does not appear  to have challenged the said order
\n\tuntil now) and it has remained unchallenged and has now attained
\n\tfinality. Therefore when the appellate authority passed the order
\n\tpresent respondent No.1, filed the petition. Thus, in present case,
\n\tthe respondent No.1 (original complainant) consistently and
\n\tconstantly remained
\n\tpresent and active in the
\n\tproceedings.\n<\/p>\n
9.
\nIt also emerges from the aforesaid facts that none of the stages \/
\nevents of the Appeal proceedings were challenged by present
\nappellant, at any time, before the final order and until the Court
\nissued Notice in the petition against the Appellate Authority’s
\norder. In any case the order dated 26.11.2009 joining respondent No.
\n1 as party in the Appeal was never challenged by the appellant and it
\nwas only at that stage i.e. in the said respondent’s petition that
\nthe appellant herein raised the objection about complainant’s locus.
\nTherefore, when the appellant herein never challenged the order dated
\n26.11.2009 and accepted the said order, it is now not open to the
\nappellant to challenge the locus of the original complainant in the
\nappeal proceedings and \/ or to contend that the respondent No.1 had
\nno locus to prefer appeal, hence he does not have locus to file the
\npetition.\n<\/p>\n
9.1\tFurthermore,
\nmaintainability of a writ petition
\ninvoking Article 226 and \/ or Article
\n227 of the
\nConstitution of India and\/or the issue about the locus standi of the
\npetitioner to
\nmaintain a writ petition, ordinarily,
\ncannot be
\ndetermined on the basis of the provision conferring right of appeal
\ncontained in a particular statute. Such provision can only determine
\nmaintainability of statutory appeal.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t10.
\n\t\t\tWhile considering the
\n\t\tappellant’s objection against the maintainability of the petition
\n\t\tand against the locus standi of the
\n\t\trespondent No.1 to maintain the petition, it deserves to be noted,
\n\t\tat the outset, that the
\n\t\ttwo issues viz. (a)
\n\t\tmaintainability of a petition  and (b) at whose instance such
\n\t\tpetition would lie are two different matters and one cannot be
\n\t\tconfused with the other. Likewise the issue as to whether the order
\n\t\tsuffers from any error which would or would not warrant examination
\n\t\tby way of judicial review, also stand apart.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t10.1
\n\t\t\t\t\tThe legality,
\n\t\t\t\t\tvalidity and maintainability of the order of statutory authority
\n\t\t\t\t\tcan always be made subject matter of judicial
\n\t\t\t\t\treview, albeit, within the well recognized  limitations
\n\t\t\t\t\tapplicable to the process of judicial review.
\n\t\t\t\t\tIn view of the facts and circumstances discussed above, the
\n\t\t\t\t\tobjection against the
\n\t\t\t\t\tmaintainability of the petition, (wherein the petitioner
\n\t\t\t\t\tchallenged order passed by statutory authority in the
\n\t\t\t\t\tproceedings to which he was party) is unsustainable. Hence,
\n\t\t\t\t\tthe first part of the objection should not detain us and it
\n\t\t\t\t\tbeing without merits, is rejected.\n<\/p>\n
11.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tNow
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tso far as the appellant’s objection against the locus standi of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe respondent No.1 is concerned the said issue is, as
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tobserved by Lord Denning “in administrative law the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tquestion of locus standi is the most vexed question of all”
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t(in “Law
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tof Writs” 5th
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tedition as quoted by Hon’ble Mr. Justice C.K. Thakkar, as his
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlordships then was).\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t11.1
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tThe following factual aspects are in the background of the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsaid objections and need to be taken into account while
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconsidering the said objection.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t(a)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tPresent Respondent No.1 is a resident of the village where the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tappellant, at the relevant time, was Sarpanch.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t(b)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe Respondent No.1 also happened to be one of the members of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe elected body \/ village panchayat of which present appellant
\n\t\t\t\t\t\twas Sarpanch.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t(c)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbefore the appellate authority also the respondent No.1 had
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmade application for being impleaded in the proceedings and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tupon being impleaded prosecuted the appeal proceedings also.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t(d)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe respondent No.1 has, right from inception of the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tproceedings, continuously remained active in the entire
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tproceedings, after having put the things in motion after the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthree FIRs were filed against the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t(e)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe petition preferred by respondent No.1 raised questions, in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlight of and on the strength of the provision contained under
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tSection 59(1) prescribing bar against a person to hold the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\toffice of Sarpanch upon occurrence of any of the specified
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcontingency.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t12.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIf follows that the appellant’s objections are required to be
\n\t\t\t\t\t\texamined in light of the fact that the grievance raised in the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpetition is against the incumbent in public office and about
\n\t\t\t\t\t\this suitability to hold the office.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t12.1
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIn this view of the matter, should we nip such proceedings, in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe bud on the ground of locus alone and thereby allow the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tappellate authority’s order to survive and operate, and that
\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttoo without even examining and testing it, is the question
\n\t\t\t\t\t\twhich arise from the appellant’s objection.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t12.2
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIf we examine the petition, we find that in effect and in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tsubstance what the respondent No.1 did by filing the petition
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tis that he brought to the Notice, initially of the authority
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tand then to the Notice of the Court, the factum about the FIRs
\n\t\t\t\t\t\thaving been filed against the appellant and requested for
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tappropriate action in view of the bar imposed by Section 59(1)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tof the Act. It may be recalled that the Apex Court has observed
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tin the case of K.Anbazhagan vs. Superintendent of Police (AIR<\/a>
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t2004 SC 524) that:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t“In
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmany a cases the political opponents in, democracy, play an
\n\t\t\t\t\t\timportant role both inside and outside the House. They are the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\twatchdogs of the Govt. in power. It will be their effective
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tweapon to counter the misdeeds and mischieves of the Govt. in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpower. They are the mouthpiece to ventilate the grievances of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe public at large, if genuinely and unbiasedly projected.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t12.3
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIn present case the respondent No.1 may be in political
\n\t\t\t\t\t\trivalry with the appellant,  nontheless it is a matter of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\trecord that he happened to be one of the members of the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tPanchayat (in which the appellant was Sarpanch) and his
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tcomplaint before the DDO put the things in motion and his
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpetition questioned the appellant’s continuation in public
\n\t\t\t\t\t\toffice upon 3 FIRs were having been filed against him and that
\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttherefore before deciding as to whether the action in law taken
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tout by the respondent No.1 against the appellant should be
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tnipped in the bud by accepting the appellant’s objection on the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tground of locus of respondent No.1, we would rather take into
\n\t\t\t\t\t\taccount the aforesaid factual aspects and also certain
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tdecisions and precedents on the issue.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t12.4\tNow
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tso far as said respondent’s locus to prefer the petition is
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconcerned, ordinarily the judicial redress by writ petition is
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tavailable to a person who has suffered legal injury and whose
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlegal right is impinged or prejudicially affected. The
\n\t\t\t\t\t\trecognized and settled concept is that a person seeking writ of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmandamus must have legal right and the opposite party must be
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tobliged with corresponding legal duty and the petitioner’s
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tlegal right must have been adversely affected and the demand to
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tremedy the injury is not paid heed to.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t12.5
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tHowever, the said traditional concept of personal injury or the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconcept that the seeker of the judicial redress should be the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\taggrieved person are fast vanishing and law has, as observed by
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthe Apex Court, veered round from genuine grievance against the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\torder effecting prejudicially to “sufficient interest”
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tin the matter. Thus, in certain cases,  demonstration of even
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t“sufficient interest” may make a petition
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tmaintainable, whereas in some case, in view of compelling and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tconscience disturbing facts, a petition  by a person who has
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tgenuine, justified and sincere concern deeper than that of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbusybody can satisfy the court on the said count. In the case
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbetween Jasbhai Motibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumaar, Haji Bashir
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tAhmed and<\/a> other (AIR 1976 SC 578[1]) the Apex Court observed
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthat:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\tThe
\n\t\t\t\t\t\texpression “aggrieved person” denotes an elastic,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tand, to an extent, an elusive concept.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t12.6
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tThen in the case of S.P. Gupta, V.M. Tarkunde J.L. Kalra and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tothers vs. President of India (AIR<\/a> 1982 SC 149) the Apex Court
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tobserved that:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t \t“The
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbasic of entitlement to judicial redress is personal injury
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfrom violation, actual or threatened, of the legal right or
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlegally protected interest of the person seeking such
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tredress.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t12.7
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tThe Apex Court has considered the concept of locus standi by
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcategorizing or classifying the petitioners as “stranger”,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t“busybody”, “interested person”,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t“aggrieved person”. In the case between Jasbhai
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tMotibhai Desai vs. Roshan Kumaar, Haji Bashir Ahmed and<\/a> other
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t(supra) wherein the objection against locus of the appellant
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tto prefer the petition was raised mainly on the ground that
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tappellant’s rights were not in any manner affected. The High
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tCourt dismissed the petition holding that no right  vested in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t the  appellant and appellant was not aggrieved person. In
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthis backdrop the Apex Court considered the issue as to
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twhether the proprietor who was holding licence to exhibit
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfilm was entitled to invoke certiorari jurisdiction ex debito
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tjustitiae (to get a ‘No-objection Certificate” issued
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tin favour of proprietor of Cinema, quashed) on the ground
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthat the order suffered from defect of jurisdiction and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thaving considered the facts the Apex Court in paragraph
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tNo.12, 36, 37 and 38 observed thus:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t“12.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tAccording to  most English\t decisions, in order to have the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlocus standi to  invoke  certiorari  jurisdiction, the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpetitioner should be an “aggrieved person” and, in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ta case of defect of  jurisdiction, such  a petitioner  will
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbe  entitled  to  a  writ  of   certiorari  as   a matter of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcourse, but if he does not  fulfil that  character, and  is a
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t “stranger”, the Court will,  in its  discretion,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdeny him this extraordinary remedy, save in very special
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcircumstances.  This takes us to the  further question: Who
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tis  an “aggrieved  person” And   what  are the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tqualifications requisite for  such a  status ?  The
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\texpression “aggrieved person” denotes\t an elastic,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tand, to  an extent, an elusive concept. It  cannot be
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconfined within the bounds of  rigid, exact and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcomprehensive definition.  At best, its features can be
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdescribed in a broad, tentative manner.  Its scope and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmeaning depends on diverse, variable factors such as the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcontent and intent of the statute of which contravention is
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\talleged, the specific circumstances of the case, the nature
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tand extent of the petitioner’s interest, and the nature and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\textent of the prejudice or  injury suffered by him. English
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tCourts have sometimes put a restricted and sometimes a wide
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconstruction on the expression “aggrieved person”.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tHowever, some general tests have been devised to ascertain
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twhether an applicant is eligible for this category so as to
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thave the necessary locus standi or ‘standing’ to invoke
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcertiorari jurisdiction.”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t“36.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIt will be seen that  in the context of locus standi to
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tapply for a writ of certiorari, an applicant may ordinarily
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfall in any of these categories: (i) ‘person aggrieved’; (ii)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t‘stranger’; (iii) busybody of meddlesome interloper.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tPersons in the last category are easily distinguishable from
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthose coming under the first two categories. Such persons
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tinterfere in things which do not concern them. They
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmasquerade as crusaders for justice. They pretend to act in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthe name of Pro Bono Publico, though they have no interest of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthe public or even of their own to protect. They indulge in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthe past-time of meddling with the judicial process either by
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tforce of habit or from improper motives. Often, they are
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tactuated by a desire to win notoriety or cheap popularity;
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twhile the ulterior intent of some applicants in this
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcategory, may be no more than spoking the wheels of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tadministration. The High Court should do well to reject the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tapplications of such busybodies at the threshold.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t37.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t The distinction between the first and second categories of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tapplicants, though real, is not always well-demarcated.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tThe first category has, as it were, two concentric zones: a
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsolid central zone of certainty, and a grey outer circle of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlessening certainty in a sliding centrifugal scale, with an
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\toutermost nebulous fringe of uncertainty. Applicants falling
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twithin the central zone are those whose legal rights have
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbeen infringed. Such applicants undoubtedly stand in the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcategory of ‘persons aggrieved”. In the grey
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\touter-circle the bounds which separate the first category
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfrom the second, intermix, interfuse and overlap increasingly
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tin a centrifugal direction. All persons in this outerzone may
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnot be “persons aggrieved”.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t38.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tTo distinguish such applicants from ‘strangers’, among them,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsome broad tests may be deduced from the conspectus made
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tabove. These tests are not absolute and ultimate. Their
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tefficacy varies according to the circumstances of the case,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tincluding the statutory context in which the matter falls to
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbe considered. These are: Whether the applicant is a person
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twhose legal right has been infringed? Has he suffered a legal
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twrong or injury, in the sense, that his interest, recognised
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tby law, has been prejudicially and directly affected by the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tact or omission of the authority, complained of? Is he a
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tperson who has suffered as legal grievance, a person “against
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twhom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdeprived him of something or wrongfully refused him
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsomething, or wrongfully affected his title to something? Has
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\the a special and substantial grievance of his own beyond some
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tgrievance or inconvenience suffered by him in common with the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\trest of the public? Was he entitled to object and be heard by
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthe authority before it took the impugned action? If so, was
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\the prejudicially affected in the exercise of that right by
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthe act of usurpation of jurisdiction on the part of the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tauthority? Is the statute, in the context of which the scope
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tof the words “person aggrieved” is being
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconsidered, a social welfare measure designed to lay down
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tethical or professional standards of conduct for the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcommunity? Or is it a statute, dealing with private rights of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tparticular individuals?”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t12.8
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIn the case of Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd.)
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSindri and others v. Union of India and (AIR<\/a> 1981 SC344) the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSupreme Court has observed that:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t“When
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ta citizen belongs to an organization which has special
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tinterest in the subject-matter, if he has some concern deeper
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthan that of a busybody, a writ petition by such a citizen
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\twould have been permissible under Art. 226 of the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tConstitution. ”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t12.9
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tThus, in the matter of filing a writ petition the Apex
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tCourt recognized the right and locus of a citizen who has
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t“special interest” and some deeper concern”
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tin the subject matter. Likewise when some compelling and
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconscience disturbing facts or when an order dealing with
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\talleged act or conduct in the nature of moral turpitude
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\trendering a person unfit to continue to hold public office,
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tor when such conduct by a person holding public office is
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmade the ground for preferring writ petition so as to
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tquestion the respondent’s suitability in the office and to
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbehold the dignity and purity of public office then in such
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tcases, depending on its facts, it may not be proper or
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tjustified to allow the ground of locus standi to be an
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\timpediment and \/ or to deny a writ on the ground of lack of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tlocus standi of the person seeking corrective command by the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tCourt.  In the case of Banglore Medical Trust vs. B.S.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tMuddappa and others<\/a> (1991 (4) SCC 54) the Apex Court has
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tobserved that:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t“35.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tLocus standi to approach by way of grant relief in writ
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpetition and refusal to equity jurisdiction are two
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tdifferent aspects, may be with same result. ……. The
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\trestricted meaning of aggrieved person and narrow outlook of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tspecific injury has yielded in favour of broad and wide
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tconstruction in wake of public interest litigation.  Even
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tin private challenge to executive or administrative action
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\thaving extensive fall  out the dividing line between
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonal injury or loss and injury of a public nature is
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfast vanishing. Law has veered round from genuine  grievance
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tagainst order affecting prejudicially to sufficient interest
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tin, the matter. The rise in exercise of power by the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\texecutive and comparative decline in proper and effective
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tadministrative guidance is forcing citizens to espouse
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tchallenges with Public interest flavour. It is too late in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthe day, therefore, to claim that petition filed by
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tinhabitants of a locality whose park was converted into a
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnursing home had no cause to invoke equity jurisdiction of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tthe High Court. In fact public spirited citizens having
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfaith in rule of law are rendering great social and legal
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tservice by espousing cause of public nature.  They cannot
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbe ignored or overlooked on technical or conservative
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tyardstick of the  rule of locus standi or absence of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonal loss or injury. Present day development of this
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbranch of jurisprudence is towards freer movement both in
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tnature of litigation and. approach of the courts.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t…….”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t12.10
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tIn the case of  Gadde Venkateshwara Rao vs. Govt of A.P.
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t(AIR 1996 SC 828) the Apex Court that:-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t\t“……the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpetitioner  who seeks to file an application under Art.\t 226 of
\n\t\t\t\t\t\t the Constitution should be one who has  a\tpersonal or
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tindividual  right in the subject-matter of the petition.    A
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tpersonal  right  need  not be in respect  of  a\t proprietary
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tinterest  : it can also relate to an interest of            a
\n\t\t\t\t\t\ttrustee. That   apart,  in  exceptional cases,\tas the
\n\t\t\t\t\t\texpression “ordinarily” indicates, a person who has
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tbeen  prejudicially affected  by an act or omission of an
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tauthority can  file  a writ  even  though he has no proprietary
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tor  even  fiduciary interest  in the subject-matter
\n\t\t\t\t\t\tthereof…….”\n<\/p>\n
12.11
\nIn the case between M.S. Jayaraj vs. Commissioner of Excise (AIR<\/a> 2000
\nSC 3266) a bidder in auction of licence of vending foreign liquor
\nwithin the prescribed range was permitted “by the Excise
\nCommissioner” to shift his domain (from Changanassery excise
\nrange to another range called Karukachal) to another range. The
\nhotelier doing business in another range viz. Karukachal (where the
\nbidder was permitted to shift his domain) was distressed by such
\npermission and approached the High Court. Before the learned Single
\nJudge, the hotelier failed, however before the division bench
\nhotelier succeed as the decision of the Excise Commissioner was set
\naside. The bidder claimed that the  Division Bench, in appeal filed
\nby the hotelier, did not seriously address his objection that the
\nhotelier had no locus to challenge the order of the Commissioner as
\nnone of his rights was impinged by the order allowing the bidder to
\nshift his domain from one range to another. The Apex Court in
\nparagraph Nos. 10 and 13 observed thus:-\n<\/p>\n
“10.\n<\/p>\n
…….  the  right of the third respondent  is\t not affected  by the
\norder passed by the Excise Commissioner  as the  licence  granted to
\nher is only for selling  liquor  in small  quantity and that too only
\nto those persons who visit the  hotel  and restaurant, whereas the
\nappellant  is not permitted  to  sell it like that. We too feel that
\nif\t the business of  the  third respondent is to be carried on in
\naccordance  with  the rules such business cannot affect\tthe business
\nof  the  appellant.  In that view  of\tthe matter appellant  would
\nnot be a rival trader or a rival business contender for the third
\nrespondent.   Perhaps bearing in mind this aspect the third
\nrespondent maintained the stand in the counter affidavit  filed in
\nthis Court that  her  objection against the order of the Excise
\nCommissioner is as a citizen of  Karukachal Panchayat and she is
\nentitled to raise such objection.\n<\/p>\n
\t13.
\n\t In the light of the expanded concept of the locus standi and also
\n\tin view of the finding of the Division Bench of the High   Court
\n\t that the order of the Excise  Commissioner\twas passed in violation
\n\tof law, we do not wish  to  nip the motion out  solely  on the
\n\tground of locus standi.  If\t the  Excise Commissioner  has no
\n\tauthority to permit a liquor shop owner to  move  out of the range
\n\t(for which auction was held)\t and have  his business in another
\n\trange  it would be improper  to allow  such  an order to remain
\n\talive and operative  on the sole  ground that the person who filed
\n\tthe writ petition has strictly  no  locus standi.  So we proceed to
\n\tconsider the contentions on merits. ”\n<\/p>\n
12.12
\nIn the aforesaid decision also the Apex Court, while acknowledging
\nthat aspect of locus standi had expanded, approved the decision of
\nthe Division Bench of entertaining the petition. The order passed by
\nthe excise commissioner was found to have been “passed in
\nviolation of law” and therefore, the Apex Court considered it
\nappropriate to not terminate the action in law solely on the ground
\nof locus standi and instead proceeded to consider the contention on
\nmerits.\n<\/p>\n
12.13
\nIn the case between Sai Chalchitra vs. Commissioner, Meerut Mandal
\n(2005 (3) SCC 683) the appellant before the Apex Court was running a
\nCinema Hall. The licence given to respondent No. 3 to run a video
\nparlor was cancelled by the District Magistrate. The said order was
\nset aside by the Commissioner allowing the video parlor to remain in
\noperation. In his writ petition against the Commissioner’s order the
\nappellant contended before the High Court that the  video parlor of
\nrespondent No.3 was situate within 350 mtrs. from the cinema hall and
\nthat therefore such licence could not have been issued in view of the
\nprovision under U.P. Cinema (Regulation of Exhibition by Means of
\nVideo) Rules, 1988. The writ petition was dismissed by the High Court
\non the ground of locus standi of the appellant holding, inter alia,
\nthat the appellant could not raise grievance against his rival in
\ntrade and the appellant had not been denied or deprived of any of his
\nlegal right including right to exhibit film. The matter was carried
\nto the Apex Court. The Apex Court, in the appeal preferred by owner
\nof the cinema hall observed that:-\n<\/p>\n
“5….we
\nare of the opinion that the High Court clearly erred in dismissing
\nthe writ petition filed by the appellant on the ground of locus
\nstandi. The appellant being in the same trade as Respondent No.3 has
\na right to seek the cancellation of the licence granted to Respondent
\nNo.3 being in violation of the Act and the Rules.”\n<\/p>\n
13.
\nHaving regard to the precedents – the above noted decisions –
\nand in light of facts of present case, it emerges that the petitioner\n<\/p>\n
– respondent No.1 would not fall into the category of a
\n“complete stranger” and \/ or a “busybody” as
\nexplained by the Apex Court in the case of J.M. Desai (supra).\n<\/p>\n
13.1
\nWhen the order impugned in the petition is challenged inter alia on
\nthe ground that it is contrary to the decided cases and when the
\nsubject matter of the petition concerns or relates to incumbent in
\npublic office and his suitability to hold the office, in our view it
\ncannot be said that the petition preferred by present respondent No.1
\n(i.e. the complainant) should not have been entertained by the
\nlearned Single Judge or that the respondent No.1 (original
\ncomplainant) had no locus standi to prefer the writ petition under
\nArticles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India against the order
\nof the Appellate Authority  in the appeal proceedings to which he was
\nmade\/impleaded as party  <\/p>\n
13.2
\n\tHaving regard to the facts of present case particularly the fact
\nthat subject matter of the petition, inter alia, raises the issue
\nabout suitability of incumbent in public office, we are not inclined
\nto accept the appellant’s objections against the locus standi
\nof the petitioner (i.e. the original complainant) to prefer the writ
\npetition and\/or against the decision of the learned Single Judge
\nentertaining the petition and we are not inclined to nip the
\nproceedings on the ground of locus standi of the petitioner. The
\nobjection is, therefore, not accepted and is hereby rejected.\n<\/p>\n
14.
\nWe may now turn to the appellant’s challenge against the
\ndecision of the learned Single Judge setting aside the Appellate
\nAuthority’s dated 20.02.2010 and restoring the order dated
\n25.06.2009 by the Competent Authority.\n<\/p>\n
\t15.
\n\tFor the purpose of passing the order of suspension dated 25.6.2009
\n\tagainst present appellant, the Competent Authority took into account
\n\tthe 3 different complaints against the appellant, alleging
\n\tcommission of criminal offence,  under Sections 143, 149, 323, 426
\n\tas well as Sections 405, 406, 408, 409, 420 and 120-B etc. of the
\n\tIndian Penal Code. The Competent Authority recorded that the alleged
\n\toffence constituted \/ were in nature of moral turpitude and since
\n\tthe petitioner was arrested and detained in prison, until he came to
\n\tbe enlarged on bail, there was case for passing order of suspension
\n\tunder sub-section (1) of Section 59.\n<\/p>\n
\t16.
\n\tHowever, in exercise of his powers conferred by the provision under
\n\tsub-section (3) of Section 59 the Appellate Authority, by his order
\n\tdated 20.02.2010, set aside the order of Competent Authority holding
\n\tthat the charges leveled against present appellant did not
\n\tconstitute moral turpitude.\n<\/p>\n
\t16.1
\n\t\tIn its order dated 20.2.2010, the
\n\tAppellate Authority has made reference of the two decisions relied
\n\ton by the appellant one being the case between Narabhai Veljibhai
\n\tChaudhari Vs. R.S. Waghela and others (1997(1)GLR 599) and another
\n\tbeing the case between
\n\tBhikhumiya Sarfumiya Malek Vs. D.D.O., Mehsana (1999(3) GLR 2693).\n<\/p>\n
\t16.2\tTrue
\n\tit is that the learned Single Judge, in the decision in the
\n\tcase of Narabhai Veljibhai Chaudhari (supra) has observed that
\n\tSarpanch cannot be suspended merely on institution of criminal case.
\n\tHowever, it is also
\n\trelevant that in the very same decision,
\n\tthe learned Single Judge has also observed that whether the alleged
\n\tact constitutes offence
\n\tof moral turpitude or not depends on various factors and there
\n\tcannot be straight
\n\tjacket formula and that
\n\tit would not be desirable to express any opinion regarding the
\n\tnature of
\n\talleged offence as it may prejudice the criminal case. Likewise, in
\n\tthe second decision also i.e. in the case of Bhikhumiya Safumiya
\n\tMalek (supra) the
\n\tlearned Single Judge has observed that “I do not wish to
\n\texpress any opinion about the allegations in the criminal case as
\n\tthe matter is yet before the Criminal Court for purpose of framing
\n\tcharge……”.\n<\/p>\n
\t16.3\tDespite
\n\tsuch observations in the said decisions, the Appellate Authority,
\n\twithout any discussion about the nature of alleged offence and
\n\twithout examining the allegations in the 3 FIRs (filed against
\n\tpresent appellant) in the context of the post held by the appellant,
\n\tquashed the order of the Competent Authority, and without recording
\n\tany reasons, the appellate authority also concluded that “it
\n\twas difficult to accept that the allegations constitute offence of
\n\tmoral turpitude”. The Appellate Authority failed to consider
\n\tthat in one of the cited cases i.e. in the case of N.V. Chaudhary
\n\t(supra) the learned Single Judge observed, in the backdrop of the
\n\tfacts of that case recorded in para 4 of the decision, that the
\n\tallegations did not inspire confidence and that the oral version
\n\tdoes not find corroboration from medical evidence and  emphasized
\n\tthe point that the facts should be carefully scrutinized and the
\n\tconclusion must be reached upon proper application of mind and not
\n\tcasually and \/ or mechanically.\n<\/p>\n
\t17.\tThus,
\n\teven according to the judgments  referred to by the Appellate
\n\tAuthority (on which the appellant relied), it was necessary for the
\n\tauthority to independently examine the allegations and determine,
\n\tobjectively, whether the alleged offence were in nature of moral
\n\tturpitude and whether it would constitute offence of moral
\n\tturpitude, or not.\n<\/p>\n
\t17.1\tHowever,
\n\tin the impugned order there is no discussion whatsoever about the
\n\tfactual background and\/or about the nature of alleged offence. It
\n\talso does not come out from the Appellate Authority’s order that the
\n\tauthority had considered the allegations and the nature and gravity
\n\tof alleged offence from the perspective of the office and post held
\n\tby the       accused and from the perspective that the case concerns
\n\t                 public office and the person holding the office.\n<\/p>\n
\t17.2\tThe
\n\tAppellate Authority has only reproduced the numbers of the sections
\n\tprescribing penalty for the alleged offence and after merely
\n\tmentioning the sections stated in the FIR, the Appellate Authority,
\n\twithout any discussion and without recording any reasons, recorded
\n\tthat it was difficult to consider the allegations as offence of
\n\tmoral turpitude. Such approach towards the matter, even according to
\n\tthe decisions referred to by the Appellate Authority in its order,
\n\tis unjustified and unsustainable, and vitiates the order.\n<\/p>\n
17.3\tSo
\nas to further appreciate this aspect it would be appropriate to refer
\nto two earlier decisions viz. the decisions  in the case between
\nPatel Bhogilal Manohrdas vs. Development Commissioner<\/a> (1976 GLR 724)
\nand R.M. Patel vs. Additional Development Commissioner<\/a> (1992 (1) GLH\n<\/p>\n
197). In the case of Patel Bhogilal Manohardas (supra), the learned
\nSingle Judge considered the question whether the information lodged
\nwith police would amount to institution of criminal proceedings or
\nnot and observed that:-\n<\/p>\n
……Now
\nthe question whether the information lodged with the police amounts
\nto institution of criminal proceedings is not difficult to answer. If
\nthe legislature had meant by criminal proceedings in a Court of law
\nor judicial proceedings in a Criminal Court of Law it would have
\nunmistakably said so. The legislature has not used that language in
\nsub-sec.(1) of sec.51. The legislature has used the expression any
\ncriminal proceedings which admits of a very wide connotation.
\nProceedings can be before a Court of law or before a police officer
\nwho is competent to entertain them. If such proceedings whether
\nbefore a Court of law or before a police officer are criminal in
\nnature then their institution enables the District Development
\nOfficer to suspend inter alia a Sarpanch from his office provided
\nthey are in respect of an offence or offences involving moral
\nturpitude. In my opinion the expression any criminal proceedings is
\nwide enough to include within its sweep proceedings before a police
\nofficer in the shape of information of an offence lodged with him……”.\n<\/p>\n
In
\nanother case i.e. in the case of R.M. Patel (supra), another learned
\nSingle Judge considered the view in the above referred case of Patel
\nBhogilal Manohardas (supra) and held that the words “any
\ncriminal proceedings” shall have to be given wide meaning so as
\nto include not only the proceedings before the Court of Law but even
\nthe stage of investigation before the Police Officer.\n<\/p>\n
17.4
\n\tUnfortunately, the aforesaid aspects do not appear to have been
\ngiven due consideration by the Appellate Authority in the impugned
\norder. Actually without independently examining the allegations and
\nwithout taking his own independent and objective decision the
\nAppellate Authority could not have reached the conclusion that it was
\ndifficult to consider the allegations as constituting offence of
\nmoral turpitude. The Appellate Authority’s order is, thus, defective
\nand against the decided cases and also against the spirit and object
\nof the provision.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t18.\tIt
\n\t\t\tis pertinent that the provision empowering the competent authority
\n\t\t\tto suspend a Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch in the event of specified
\n\t\t\tcontingencies is based on the fundamental principle of public
\n\t\t\tpolicy viz. maintaining purity in public office. The provision
\n\t\t\tbarring a person who is facing charge of offence of moral
\n\t\t\tturpitude, from holding public office e.g. to place the incumbent
\n\t\t\tin the office of Sarpach or Up-Sarpanch under suspension if he is
\n\t\t\tcharged with offence of moral turpitude, is incorporated with a
\n\t\t\tview to ensuring fulfillment of the said requirement and object
\n\t\t\tand for realizing the avowed principle of public policy viz.
\n\t\t\tmaintaining purity, dignity and standard of public office.  It is
\n\t\t\tin light of the said principle behind the provision that the
\n\t\t\tquestion as to when and how the power can be and should be
\n\t\t\texercised by the competent authority, can be (and should be)
\n\t\t\tanswered.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t18.1
\n\t\t\t\tThe language of the said subsection (1) of section 59 make it
\n\t\t\t\tclear that the expression “any criminal proceedings is wide
\n\t\t\t\tenough to include within its fold, the proceedings before a
\n\t\t\t\tpolice officer in the shape of information lodged with him (i.e.
\n\t\t\t\tFIR), as well, and indicates the intention of legislature to
\n\t\t\t\tallow the authority sufficient room to exercise the power to
\n\t\t\t\tmaintain purity of the public office.\n<\/p>\n
\t18.2
\n\t\tIt is true that every case does not call for drastic action and
\n\tmere allegation or charge of involvement of Sarpanch or Up-Sarpanch
\n\tin petty offence or offence of trivial nature or offence which is
\n\tnot in the nature of moral turpitude may not justify action under
\n\tsubsection (1) of section 57 or even under subsection (1) of section\n<\/p>\n
\t59.  Likewise, in all cases there may not be sufficient information
\n\tor material or details to satisfy the competent authority to take
\n\taction under subsection (1) of section 59 and the authority may
\n\tconsider it appropriate, in the facts of the case before him, to
\n\twait until investigation, pursuant to the information to the police
\n\tofficer, is over and chargesheet is filed, while in another case the
\n\tcompetent authority may find it appropriate to take action under the
\n\taforesaid provision, upon detention in prison of the incumbent in
\n\tthe office. There cannot be a straight-jacket formula and any rigid
\n\tor inflexible rule cannot be laid down as to in which type of cases
\n\tthe power can be and should be exercised and in which type of cases
\n\tit should not be exercised or in which type of cases the power can
\n\tbe exercised at the stage when the FIR is lodged or chargesheet is
\n\tfiled or charge is framed. Furthermore, while there cannot be a
\n\tstraight-jacket formula, the competent authority must always have
\n\tregard to, and should always keep in focus, the object and purpose
\n\tof the provision.\n<\/p>\n
\t18.3
\n\t\tHaving regard to such aspects the legislature has, in its wisdom,
\n\tconfered the discretion, to take appropriate decisions in light of
\n\tthe facts of each case, on the competent authority. However, the
\n\tguiding factor or the thumb rule which should act as the fundamental
\n\tprinciple and focal point is the object of the said provision  viz.
\n\tthe principle of public policy to maintain purity, and dignity of
\n\tthe public office and to bar a person, against whom there is charge
\n\tof moral turpitude (or in whose case any of the contingencies
\n\tspecified in the section has arisen) from holding the public office.\n<\/p>\n
\t18.4\tAnother
\n\taspect which also should guide the competent authority in exercising
\n\tthe discretion and the power under subsection (1) of section 59 is
\n\tthat the provision has been made in respect of the office of local
\n\tbody where the person holds the office upon being elected by the
\n\telectorate who does not have the power to recall  the elected
\n\tmembers of the local body and that therefore the legislature
\n\trecognized the requirement to provide a safeguard so that such
\n\tmember who is elected for holding the public office of Sarpanch or
\n\tUp-Sarpanch in the        local body, does not misuse the absence of
\n\tright of being recalled by the electorate and upon recognizing the
\n\t      said requirement, the legislature made the provision
\n\tby way of sections 57 and 59 of the Act. At the               same
\n\ttime suspension of elected representative by administrative order
\n\tought to be done cautiously and fine                 balance between
\n\tthe need to maintain purity of public office and tenure of elected
\n\tmember has to be maintained.\n<\/p>\n
\t18.5\tIt
\n\tis trite to say that whether the alleged offence constitutes or
\n\tinvolves the question of moral turpitude or not, has to be judged
\n\talso in light of the post or position or the office held by the
\n\tperson charged with the offence. Diverse factors may have to be kept
\n\tin mind before deciding as to whether the offence is in the nature
\n\tof and \/ or constitutes moral turpitude or not e.g. the person who
\n\tcommitted the offence, the post \/ position held by him, the person
\n\tagainst whom the alleged act was committed, the nature of the
\n\talleged act and the manner and circumstances in which it was
\n\tcommitted, the circumstances in which the alleged act was committed
\n\tetc. and for such purpose it may be necessary to take into account
\n\tthe facts and allegations stated in the complaint \/ FIR or the
\n\tchargesheet and not merely the provisions. The decision by the
\n\tcompetent authority cannot be taken by divorcing the said aspects
\n\tfrom the constituents or the ingredients of the alleged offence.\n<\/p>\n
\t18.6
\n\t\tWhile taking the decision and exercising the discretion and  before
\n\tpassing the order under subsection (1) of section 59, the competent
\n\tauthority has to apply mind to the aforesaid and such other relevant
\n\taspects. The fulcrum, for all decisions will, however, be morality
\n\tor its absence and that is what must act as the beacon light for the
\n\tauthority. In the process of decision making, what applies to and
\n\twhat is true for the competent authority, also applies to and is
\n\ttrue for the appellate authority as well, (i.e. also applies to the
\n\tappellate authority when it examines the order of the competent
\n\tauthority while deciding the appeal).\n<\/p>\n
\t\t19.
\n\t\t\tA person who is detained in prison renders himself incapable of
\n\t\tdischarging duties of the office. When prima facie involvement is
\n\t\tshown and the person in the office is found to be under cloud of
\n\t\tdoubt then the competent authority is required to take appropriate
\n\t\tdecision. True it is that the probability or possibility of
\n\t\tconcocted and frivolous complaints, either out of political rivalry
\n\t\tor personal enimosity, cannot be ignored and that therefore the
\n\t\tcompetent authority has to satisfy himself and exercise the
\n\t\tdiscretion and power judiciously.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t19.1
\n\t\t\tThe competent authority also needs to keep in focus that if the
\n\t\tperson is allowed to hold the office of head of panchayat without
\n\t\tany action under the said provision, while he continues to be
\n\t\tdetained in prison then such inaction may result into and would
\n\t\tamount trivializing the system of local authority and it may uproot
\n\t\tthe very basis of the system viz. the faith, trust and confidence
\n\t\tof people electing their representatives.\n<\/p>\n
\t19.2
\n\t\tA reference of few instances wherein the Court has considered the
\n\talleged act by the sapanch or Up-Sarpanch as moral turpitude, will
\n\tnot be out of place at this stage. In the case of R.M. Patel (supra)
\n\tthe alleged offence was punishable under section 146, 353 and 506 of
\n\tIPC wherein the Court dismissed the petition by the sarpanch who
\n\tmade grievance against the order suspending him from the post of
\n\tsarpanch. In the case between S.P. Shah vs. Kavant Gram Panchayat
\n\tthe division bench, while deciding letters patent appeal (LPA No.680
\n\tof 1997 in SCA No.347 of 1997), considered the alleged offence of
\n\tmisappropriation and the charge under section
\n\t409 of IPC, as an act of moral turpitude. In the case between Mustaq
\n\tAhmed Hasanbhai Mansuri vs V.C. Trivedi<\/a> (2003 1 GLH 572), the Full
\n\tBench while considering a case in which
\n\tthe sarpanch was removed in exercise of power under section 57(1)
\n\tconsidered the act of encroachment by up          Up-Sarpanch as
\n\t“disgraceful” and observed that :-\n<\/p>\n
\t           4.4\t………………….<\/p>\n
\n\tA\n\t  disgraceful   conduct  is\n\n \t much   more   grave   than  a   mere      misconduct.  A\n<\/pre>\n
      disgraceful conduct brings  disrepute  not  only  to  the
\n      Councillor  who is guilty of such conduct, but would also
\n      cast  a  stigma  upon  the   institution,   namely,   the
\n      Municipality.    Webster  gives  the  word  “disgraceful”
\n      meaning  as  synonymous  of   “infamous”,   “detestable”,
\n      “odius”,   “scandalous”,   “base”,  “vile”,  “shamefull”,
\n      ignominious”………………..President, Vice President
\nor Councillor of a Municipality,as the case may  be,  is  a  public  figure  holding  public  post  and  is  supposed to    conduct  himself in such a  manner whether in the discharge      of his duties  or  otherwise,  that his   conduct  does  not  bring   shame   or  dishonour or ignominy to himself or the  institution.  The     decisions  taking  contrary  view  on  this  point  stand overruled.\n<\/p>\n
\t20.
\n\t\tThe appellate authority has not addressed any of the relevant
\n\taspects, discussed above. It is pertinent to note that the appellate
\n\tauthority lost sight of the observations that “the authority
\n\tis required to scrutinize the cases with more care and caution”
\n\tmade in the judgments referred to by it in the impugned order. It is
\n\talso pertinent that in present case the appellate authority set
\n\taside the order of competent authority on the ground that the
\n\tcompetent authority had not considered the relevant aspects and then
\n\tthe appellate authority also committed the same error and without
\n\tany discussion and without recording reasons to justify and support
\n\tits conclusion and by merely taking note of the number of the
\n\tprovisions \/ sections mentioned in the FIRs recorded the finding or
\n\tthe view that the alleged offence in all the three FIR’s (or
\n\tchargesheet) do not constitute moral turpitude.\n<\/p>\n
\t20.1
\n\tIn our view the impugned order cannot be said to be an order passed
\n\tafter addressing the relevant issue. The order merely takes note of
\n\tthe numbers of the  provisions \/ sections mentioned in the FIRs i.e.
\n\tSections 409, 420, 406, 408, 143, 323, 426 etc. and not the facts or
\n\tallegations against the accused (appellant herein) and it also does
\n\tnot discuss as to whether in light of the office and the post held
\n\tby the appellant the facts \/ allegations would constitute offence in
\n\tthe nature of moral turpitude.  The basis and reasons justifying,
\n\tand \/ or in support of, the conclusions are not discernible from the
\n\torder. On careful consideration, and upon overall view of the facts
\n\tand on examination of the order impugned in the petition we are of
\n\tthe considered view that the order dated 20.2.2010 is not
\n\tsustainable and deserves to be set aside. The learned Single Judge
\n\tis right and justified in setting aside the order dated 20.2.2010.\n<\/p>\n
\t21.
\n\t\tTherefore, we are not inclined to interfere with the order of the
\n\tlearned Single Judge setting aside the appellate authority’s order
\n\tdated 20.2.2010 and we confirm the said part of the judgment dated
\n\t13.8.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge by which the learned
\n\tSingle Judge quashed the Appellate Authority’s order dated
\n\t20.2.2010. The decision of the learned Single Judge to treat the
\n\tpetition by respondent No.1, as maintainable, is also confirmed.\n<\/p>\n
\t21.1
\n\tThe appellant has also contended that after setting aside the order
\n\tof the appellate authority, the learned Single Judge has restored
\n\tthe order of the competent authority, however, the order of the
\n\tcompetent authority also is unsustainable and the said order ought
\n\tnot have been restored. On scrutiny of the order dated 25.6.2009 it
\n\tcomes out that notwithstanding or irrespective of the competent
\n\tauthority’s conclusion the said order dated 25.6.2009 by the
\n\tcompetent authority suffers from same defects as in the order dated
\n\t20.2.2010,.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t21.2
\n\t\t\t\tIn this situation and at this stage the options or alternatives
\n\t\t\tbefore us, are two. Either we consider the allegations, nature and
\n\t\t\tgravity of the alleged offence, and other relevant aspects and
\n\t\t\tpronounce as to whether they constitute moral turpitude or not;
\n\t\t\tor, we remand the case for fresh consideration and decision. We
\n\t\t\tare conscious that it is advisable and necessary, as far as
\n\t\t\tpossible, to avoid remand of the case and we are not very happy in
\n\t\t\tremanding the case.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t21.3
\n\t\t\tHowever, we are also alive to the possibility that the conclusion
\n\t\t\tby the statutory authority as to whether the alleged acts
\n\t\t\tconstitute moral turpitude or not; may not have bearing before the
\n\t\t\ttrial Court which would try the case against the appellant;
\n\t\t\thowever even a prima facie view expressed by this Court may
\n\t\t\tprobably affect or influence the proceedings before the trial
\n\t\t\tCourt.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t21.4
\n\t\t\tLest it should happen, we do not see, at this stage and in the
\n\t\t\tfacts of present case, any other option but to remit the case
\n\t\t\tbefore the appellate authority (since the learned Single Judge has
\n\t\t\talready set aside the Appellate Authority’s order, and we have not
\n\t\t\tdisturbed the said part of the order) in view of the inherent
\n\t\t\tdefects in the appellate authority’s order and also to avoid
\n\t\t\tthe above noted eventuality and contingency. We order accordingly.
\n\t\t\tConsequently the said limited part of the judgment dated 13.8.2010
\n\t\t\tto the extent and by which the learned Single Judge restored the
\n\t\t\torder of the competent authority will not survive.\n<\/p>\n
\t22.
\n\tWe have noticed at the outset that the appellate authority had, at
\n\tinitial stage, stayed the operation of the order dated 15.7.2009
\n\tpassed by the DDO. Therefore, also, instead of remanding the case to
\n\tthe competent authority, we deem it proper to remand the case to the
\n\tappellate authority. Thus, on remand, the said order dated 15.7.2009
\n\tand the same status shall stand restored and the case shall be
\n\tdeemed to have been remitted and restored before the Appellate
\n\tAuthority, at that stage. For removal of doubt it is clarified that
\n\tthe proceedings are remitted to the Appellate Authority and shall be
\n\tdeemed to have been restored at the stage when order dated 15.7.2009
\n\tstaying the Competent Authority’s order was passed. In this view of
\n\tthe matter the order by learned Single Judge restoring the order of
\n\tCompetent Authority shall not survive and the Appellate Authority’s
\n\torder dated 15.7.2009 shall stand revived and restored. The
\n\tAppellate Authority shall be at liberty to pass appropriate order in
\n\taccordance with law and after hearing all the parties who were
\n\ttreated as party to the proceedings and were heard while deciding
\n\tthe Appeal No. 86 of 2009.\n<\/p>\n
\t23.
\n\tWe also clarify that we have not expressed any opinion as to whether
\n\tthe alleged offence constitutes moral turpitude or not and it would
\n\tbe for the appellate authority to pass appropriate order in
\n\taccordance with law and the precedence on the point.\n<\/p>\n
\tWith
\nthe aforesaid clarifications and directions the appeal stands
\ndisposed. The appellate authority shall, as aforesaid, take fresh
\ndecision as early as possible and preferably within 3 months from
\nreceipt of the copy of this order. In the facts of the case there
\nshall be no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
Sd\/-\n<\/p>\n
(
\nS. J. MUKHOPADHAYA, C. J. )
\n\tsd\/-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t(
\nK. M. THAKER, J. ) <\/p>\n
Suresh*<\/p>\n
\t\t   \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
\t\t   Top<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Gujarat High Court Keshabhai vs Dahyaji on 6 July, 2011 Author: Mr.S.J.Mukhopadhaya, Honourable K.M.Thaker, Gujarat High Court Case Information System Print LPA\/2220\/2010 34 JUDGMENT IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD LETTERS PATENT APPEAL No. 2220 of 2010 In SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 3553 of 2010 For Approval and Signature: HONOURABLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-107372","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-gujarat-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nKeshabhai vs Dahyaji on 6 July, 2011 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/keshabhai-vs-dahyaji-on-6-july-2011\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Keshabhai vs Dahyaji on 6 July, 2011 - 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