{"id":112241,"date":"2002-05-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-05-09T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/joginder-pal-vs-naval-kishore-behal-on-10-may-2002"},"modified":"2015-04-03T19:59:00","modified_gmt":"2015-04-03T14:29:00","slug":"joginder-pal-vs-naval-kishore-behal-on-10-may-2002","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/joginder-pal-vs-naval-kishore-behal-on-10-may-2002","title":{"rendered":"Joginder Pal vs Naval Kishore Behal on 10 May, 2002"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Joginder Pal vs Naval Kishore Behal on 10 May, 2002<\/div>\n
Author: R Lahoti<\/div>\n
Bench: R.C. Lahoti, B.N. Agrawal<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil) 3494  of  2002\n\n\n\nPETITIONER:\nJOGINDER PAL\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nNAVAL KISHORE BEHAL\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\t10\/05\/2002\n\nBENCH:\nR.C. Lahoti & B.N. Agrawal\n\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
R.C. Lahoti, J.\n<\/p>\n
\tLeave granted.\n<\/p>\n
\tAn eviction petition filed by the landlord-respondent urging the
\nground for eviction under Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab
\nUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 (hereinafter the Act, for short), was
\ndismissed by the Rent Controller but allowed by the Appellate
\nAuthority.  The decree has been maintained in civil revision preferred
\nby the tenant in the High Court of Punjab & Haryana.  The tenant has
\nfiled this appeal by special leave.\n<\/p>\n
The finding of fact arrived at, and immune from challenge
\nbefore this Court, is that the suit premises situated on the ground floor
\nof the building owned by the landlord-respondent is in occupation of
\nthe tenant-appellant for non-residential purpose.  The same is required
\nby the landlord-respondent for the office of his son who is a chartered
\naccountant residing with the landlord-respondent.  On 31.8.2001 Shri
\nS.P. Upadhyay, the learned counsel for the appellant placed forceful
\nreliance on a Division Bench decision of the High Court in Ravinder
\nKumar Pujara Vs. Gian Chand  AIR 1987 Punjab & Haryana 31
\nand successfully persuaded this Court to issue notice limited to the
\nquestion whether the requirement of chartered accountant son of the
\nlandlord is relevant to direct eviction of the tenant under Section
\n13(3)(a)(ii) abovesaid. The provision reads as under :-\n<\/p>\n
13. Eviction of tenants.  (1)  xxx\t   xxx\n\n(2)    xxx\t      xxx\t\t    xxxx\n\n(3) (a)A landlord may apply to the   Controller for\nan order directing the tenant to put the\nlandlord in possession\nxxx\t       xxx\t\t     xxxx\n\n(ii) in the case of a non-residential building or\nrented land, if\n\n(a) he requires it for his own use;\n\n\n<\/pre>\n
Incidentally, it may be mentioned that the East Punjab Urban
\nRent Restriction (Amendment) Act, 1956, by Section 2 thereof
\ndeleted the words “a non-residential building or” from the abovesaid
\nprovision.  However, this amendment was held ultra vires the
\nConstitution  in Harbilas Rai Bansal Vs. State of Punjab and Anr.
\n(1996) 1 SCC 1, and this Court directed that as a consequence of the
\namendment having been declared constitutionally invalid the original
\nprovision of the Act as was operating before the Amendment stands
\nrestored and a landlord\t under the Act\tcan seek eviction of a tenant
\nfrom a non-residential building on the ground that he requires it for
\nhis own use.  Presently, the question to be determined is __ what
\nconstruction should be placed on the phrase ‘his own use’?  Should it
\nbe assigned a narrow meaning that it is the individual requirement of
\nthe landlord or in other words the requirement of the landlord and the
\nlandlord alone which is germane to the provision or should we assign
\na wide and liberal meaning to the expression treating it a vibrant one
\nso as to respect the context in which it has been used feeling the pulse
\nof the object behind the provision.\n<\/p>\n
It will be useful to state the principles relevant for interpretation
\nof a provision contained in a Rent Control Law like the one with
\nwhich we are dealing.  The spurt of provincial rent control legislations
\nis a necessary consequence of population explosion.  In Prabhakaran
\nNair and Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.\t(1987) 4 SCC 238,
\nthe Court noticed craving for a home __ a natural human instinct,
\nintensified by post-war migration of human-beings en block place to
\nplace, the partition of the country and uprooting of the people from
\ntheir hearth and home as vital factors leading to acute housing
\nshortage persuading the Legislatures to act and enact Rent Control
\nLaws.  The Court emphasized the need of making the landlord and
\ntenant laws rational, humane, certain and capable of being quickly
\nimplemented. Benefit of society at large needs an equalistic balance
\nbeing maintained between apparently conflicting interests of the
\nowners of the property and the tenant by inducing and encouraging
\nthe landlords to part with available accommodation for reasonable
\nlength of time to accommodate tenants without unreasonably
\nrestricting their right to have the property being restored to them,
\nmore so, when they genuinely require it.  Such limited safeguarding of
\nlandlords’ interest  ensures a boost to construction activity which in
\nturn results in availability of more houses to accommodate more
\nhuman souls with roof on their heads.  Sabyasachi Mukharji, J., as His
\nLordship then was, articulated the empty truism in such words as have
\nbecome an oft quoted quotation\t“tenants are in all cases not the
\nweaker sections.  There are  those who are weak both among the
\nlandlords as well as the tenants”.\n<\/p>\n
In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Ors. Vs. State of
\nMaharashtra and Anr.  (1998) 2 SCC 1 this Court emphasized the
\nneed of social legislations like the Rent Control Act striking a balance
\nbetween rival interests so as to be just to law.  “The law ought not to
\nbe unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to
\nanother section of the society”.  While the shortage of accommodation
\nmakes it necessary to protect the tenants to save them from
\nexploitation but at the same time the need to protect tenants is coupled
\nwith an obligation to ensure that the tenants are not conferred with a
\nbenefit disproportionately larger than the one needed.\tSocially
\nprogressive legislation must have a holistic perception and not a short-
\nsighted parochial approach.  Power to legislate socially progressive
\nlegislations is coupled with a responsibility to avoid arbitrariness and
\nunreasonability.  A legislation impregnated with tendency to give
\nundue preference to one section, at the cost of constraints by placing
\nshackles on the other section, not only entails miscarriage of justice
\nbut may also result in constitutional invalidity.\n<\/p>\n
In Arjun Khiamal Makhijani Vs. Jamnadas C. Tuliani and
\nOrs.  (1989) 4 SCC 612, this Court dealing with Rent Control
\nLegislation observed that provisions contained in such legislations are
\ncapable of being categorized into two :\t those beneficial to the tenants
\nand those beneficial to the landlord.  As to a legislative provision
\nbeneficial to landlord, an assertion that even with regard to such
\nprovision an effort should be made to interpret it in favour of the
\ntenant, is a negation of the very principle of interpretation of a
\nbeneficial legislation.\n<\/p>\n
The need for reasonable interpretation of Rent Control
\nLegislations was emphasized by this Court in Mst. Bega Begum and
\nOrs. Vs. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by Lrs. And Ors.  (1979) 1 SCC\n<\/p>\n
273. Speaking in the context of reasonable requirement of landlord as
\na ground for eviction the Court guarded against any artificial
\nextension entailing stretching or straining of language so as to make it
\nimpossible or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree for
\neviction.  The Court warned that such a course would defeat the very
\npurpose of the Act which affords the facility of eviction of the tenant
\nto the landlord on certain specified grounds. In Kewal Singh Vs.
\nLajwanti  (1980) 1 SCC 290 this Court has observed, while the rent
\ncontrol legislation has given a number of facilities to the tenants it
\nshould not be construed so as to destroy the limited relief which it
\nseeks to give to the landlord also.  For instance one of the grounds for
\neviction which is contained in almost all the Rent Control Acts in the
\ncountry is the question of landlord’s bona fide personal necessity. The
\nconcept of bona fide necessity should be meaningfully construed so as
\nto make the relief granted to the landlord real and practical.\tRecently
\nin Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta\t(1999) 6 SCC
\n222, the Court has held that the concept of bona fide need or genuine
\nrequirement needs a practical approach instructed by realities of life.
\nAn approach either too liberal or too conservative or pedantic must be
\nguarded against.\n<\/p>\n
The Rent Control Legislations are heavily loaded in favour of
\nthe tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring
\nlegislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices
\nof greedy landlords.  The Legislative intent has to be respected by the
\nCourts while interpreting the laws.  But it is being uncharitable to
\nLegislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only
\nin favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants go to the
\nextent of being unfair to the landlords.  The Legislature is fair to the
\ntenants and to the landlords  both.  The Courts have to adopt a
\nreasonable and balanced approach while interpreting Rent Control
\nLegislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has
\nbeen meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the
\noverall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such
\nof the provisions as take care of the interest of landlord the Court
\nshould not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords.  Such
\nprovisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of
\nthose situations where the landlord too are week and feeble and feel
\nhumble.\n<\/p>\n
Both the learned counsel for the parties submitted that so far as
\nthe expression ‘his own use” as occurring in Section 13(3)(a)(ii)(a) is
\nconcerned no occasion has hitherto before arisen  enabling this Court
\nmaking an authoritative interpretation and pronouncement.  The
\nnearest available decision is Mst. Bega Begum and Ors. (supra)
\nwhich has been referred to by the High Court in its impugned
\njudgment and was relied on by Shri Sudhir Chandra, the learned
\nsenior counsel for the landlord-respondent.  Section 11(1)(h) of J & K
\nHouses and Shops Rent Control Act, 1966 provides for the tenant
\nbeing evicted if the landlord requires the house for ‘his own
\noccupation’.  The Court held that the provision is meant for the
\nbenefit of the landlord and therefore it must be so construed as to
\nadvance the object of the Act.\tThe word “own occupation”
\ncontemplates the actual possession of the landlord whether for his
\nown residence or for his business.  Furthermore, the provision is wide
\nenough to include the necessity of not only the landlord but also of the
\npersons who are living with him as members of the same family.\tThe
\nwords “own occupation” cannot be so narrowly interpreted as to
\nindicate actual physical possession of the landlord personally and
\nnothing more than that.\n<\/p>\n
We may refer to a few decided cases of different High Courts
\nwherein pari materia provisions contained in different legislations
\nwere considered by different High Courts.\n<\/p>\n
In B.Balaiah Vs. Chandoor Lachaiah  AIR 1965 Andhra
\nPradesh 435, Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings
\n(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 came up for
\nconsideration of the Division Bench.  The landlord could seek a
\ndirection for recovery of possession of the building “for the purpose
\nof a business which he is carrying on” or which “the landlord bona
\nfide proposes to commence”.  The Division Bench made a review of
\nthe decisions delivered by different High Courts under local Rent
\nControl Legislations and held that these expressions are not
\nnecessarily confined to the physical requirement of the landlord
\nhimself.  Such expression ought to be construed liberally and not in a
\nnarrow way.  They are susceptible to a wide meaning and include
\nwithin the meaning of “own” not only the members of the landlord’s
\nfamily but also those persons who are socially or economically
\ndependent on him and whose responsibilities he has accepted.  This is
\nbased on the necessity of realizing that the family in India, whether
\njoint or separate, is the social unit of Indian civilization and it is of
\ngreater public importance to keep it together.\tThe Division Bench
\nconcluded by holding that the expression “landlord” or “his” must
\ninclude all normal emanations of the landlord so as to include his wife
\nand children though on a strict construction of the expression they
\nmay not be available to be included within  “landlord himself”.\t The
\nrequirement of a major son and a coparcener in a joint Hindu family
\nintending to start a business was deemed to be the requirement of
\nlandlord himself.  This decision was cited with approval in Mst. Bega
\nBegum and Ors.’s case (supra).\n<\/p>\n
\tSub-Clause (vi) of Clause 13 of C.P. and Berar Letting of
\nHouses and Rent Control Order, 1949 provides one ground for
\neviction as ‘that the landlord needs the house or a portion thereof for
\nthe purpose of his bona fide occupation’.  In V.M. Deshmukh Vs.
\nK.M. Kothari and Ors.  1951 N.L.J. 250, the Division Bench quoted
\nfrom Smith v. Penny – (1946) 2 All England Reports 672 __”the
\nfamily is the unit of our civilization.\t To keep the family together is of
\nhigh public importance” and held that the word “his” must be
\ninterpreted so as to include the family and not in a narrow way and in
\nthe context of business the words __ “his own” of the landlord __
\nshould be defined as meaning something in which the landlord or his
\nfamily have pecuniary interest.\t The need of the landlord’s wife who
\nwas a medical practitioner wanting to run a maternity home was held
\ncovered\t by clause 13(3)(vi) abovesaid.\t On the same principle, in
\nBalabhadra Beharilal Vs. Premchand Lalchand and Ors.  AIR
\n1953 Nagpur 144, the need of a widowed daughter and her children
\nwas held to be ‘his own’ need of the landlord.\tThe Division  Bench
\nobserved that no doubt after marriage the daughter passes out of the
\nfather’s family and goes into that of the  husband but marriage does
\nnot sever the blood relationship which exists between a father and his
\ndaughter.  The existence of this relationship does give rise to certain
\nmoral obligations and in pursuance thereof where a father affords
\nsupport to his daughter and her children, their needs become his
\nneeds.\tIt was held that the phraseology  employed by the Legislature
\ncould not restrict a landlord’s needs to his personal needs and would
\ninclude not only the members of the landlord’s family but also of all
\nthose persons who are dependent on him and whose responsibilities he
\nhas adopted.\n<\/p>\n
Section 21 of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting,
\nRent and Eviction) Act, 1972  provides for the accommodation being
\nreleased if bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by
\nhimself or members of his family or for any person for whose benefit
\nit is held by him.  In Nand Rani Vs. Additional District Judge,
\nMoradabad and Anr.  AIR 1980 Allahabad 148, the need was for
\nsetting up daughter’s son in business.\tThe daughter’s son was not a
\nmember of the family nor the accommodation could be said to be held
\nfor his benefit.  The Court held that the provisions of the Act cannot
\nbe read so as to put an end to the ties of affection, friendship, kinship
\nor sheer necessity.  In appropriate circumstances the landlord may be
\nso much concerned with and interested in the requirement of or for
\nanother person, who is not a member of his family as defined in
\nSection 3(g), that the requirement may be properly regarded as the
\nlandlord’s own requirement depending on the extent of landlord’s
\nidentification with the person concerned to be determined on the
\nevidence and circumstances of the particular case.\n<\/p>\n
Section 13(1)(g) of Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House
\nRates Control Act, 1947 entitles a landlord to recover possession of
\nany premises on the Court being satisfied that “the premises are
\nreasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by
\nhimself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held”.  In
\nNanalal Goverdhandas & Co. & Ors. Vs. Smt. Samratbai Lilachand
\nShah AIR 1981 Bom 1, the High Court construed the import of
\nwords “by himself” and held that “for occupation by himself” do not
\nrestrict the proposed occupation to the occupation of landlord alone
\nbut may include the occupation by member of his family.\t The
\nrequirement of the landlord for occupation by the dependent of the
\nlandlord may be the requirement by the landlord.  In a given case the
\nlandlord may be dependent upon a person and it may be the necessity
\nof the landlord that such other person should occupy the premises.  If
\nemotionally the landlord feels that a relation of his such as daughter or
\nson-in-law should stay with him, it can be regarded as the requirement
\nby the landlord of the premises ‘for occupation by himself’.  This is as
\nregards residential premises.  In case of non-residential premises if the
\nlandlord’s interests are shown to be linked with the occupation of
\nthose premises by some one for whom he is seeking the possession of
\nthe suit premises it can be said that the requirement of the landlord for
\noccupation by himself is established.  The High Court also held that if
\nthere is a moral or legal obligation of the landlord to provide
\naccommodation to a particular person then the requirement by the
\nlandlord for occupation of that person may squarely fall under Section
\n13(1)(g).  Having taken into consideration the several precedents from
\ndifferent High Courts the learned Judge held that the determinative
\ntest underlying the several propositions propounded by the High
\nCourts is the basic fact that the requirement is by the landlord and that
\nthere must be a nexus between the interests of the landlord and the
\none who would physically occupy the premises so as to tantamount to
\noccupation of the premises “by himself”, i.e., the landlord.  In
\nInstitute of Radio Technology and Ors. Vs. Pandurang Baburao
\nAIR 1946 Bombay 212, Section 11 of Bombay Rent Restriction Act,
\n1939 was dealt with by the Division Bench and the words “his own
\noccupation” were held to include occupation by all persons who are
\ndependent on the landlord.\n<\/p>\n
\tA Division Bench of Patna High Court has opined in
\nBidhubhusan Sen Vs. Commissioner, Patna Division, Patna and
\nAnr.  1955 BLJR 654, that the expression “his own occupation” as
\noccurring in sub-Section (3)(a) of Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings
\n(Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1947 does not mean only the
\noccupation of the landlord himself but includes the occupation of
\nother persons who live with the landlord and are economically
\ndependent on him.  The requirement of nephew, who’s maintenance
\nwas responsibility of the landlord was held to be covered by the
\nexpression ‘his own occupation’ of the landlord.\n<\/p>\n
In Puspa Lata Debi Vs. Dinesh Chandra Das  85 C.L.J. 74,
\nP.B. Mukharji, J. (as His Lordship then was) observed that the
\nexpression “for his own occupation” in Section 11(1)(f) of W.B.
\nPremises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1948 does not
\nnecessarily mean of the particular individual alone but must be widely
\ninterpreted to include the family and dependents.  The context of
\nsocial order, the habits and ideas of living and the religious and socio-
\nreligious customs of the community to which the individual concerned
\nbelongs are relevant determining factors.\n<\/p>\n
\tSection 21 (1)(h) of Mysore Rent Control Act, 1961
\ncontemplates an order of eviction being passed only if the premises
\nare reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation
\nby himself.  In K. Govindarajulu Vs. Savithramma  1969 (2) RCJ
\n107, the landlady required the tenancy premises, non-residential in
\nnature, for her husband, a retired doctor, and her daughter, who had
\nresigned her job as a house surgeon, both of them wanting to run a
\nnursing home and a clinic in the tenancy premises.  The husband and
\nthe daughter were living together with the landlady.  The Mysore
\nHigh Court held that the words “occupation by himself” should be
\nunderstood to mean not merely the landlord or the landlady but also
\nthe husband or the wife or the children or the other dependents.  In the
\npredecessor provision the requirement of members of the landlord’s
\nfamily was also included but the same was deleted.  In the opinion of
\nMysore High Court that amendment did not make any difference.\n<\/p>\n
\tSimilar provision is contained in Section 21(1)(h) of Karnataka
\nRent Control Act, 1961. In Dr. Syed Sibgathullah Vs. C.M. Abdul
\nAziz Khan, 1983 (1) RCJ 516, the Division Bench consisting of M.N.
\nVenkatachaliah and M. Rama Jois, JJ. (as their Lordships were then)
\ncited with approval the decision of Court of Appeal of England in
\nRiches v. Wilson, 1963 (2) All England Reports 336, in which
\nWillmer, L.J. interpreting the expression ‘himself’ used in paragraph\n<\/p>\n
(h) of Schedule-I to the English Rent and Mortgage Interest
\nrestrictions (Amendment Act 1933) had held, “quite plainly the
\nexpression “himself” must include all the normal ’emanations’ of
\nhimself”, and concluded to say, __”So, the test by the application of
\nwhich I should decide this case is whether it could be said that when
\nthe sister lives in the premises, the landlord himself lives there
\nthrough his sister.  If he does the sisters occupation is the occupation
\nof the landlord ‘by himself’ and the household would then be a
\ncommon household.  If that be the true position, the landlord should
\nget an order for possession.”  The Division Bench followed the
\nBombay and Mysore view (which we have already referred to) and
\nheld that the submission that ‘himself’ refers to landlord in person or
\nhis dependent who resides with him and not separated is too technical
\nand artificial\ta construction which if accepted would rob the
\nprovision of its real intention and purpose and it does not merit
\nacceptance. The Court proceeded to note a variety of circumstances
\nby reference to which the actual occupation of the premises by
\nanother has to be regarded constructively as the occupation by the
\n’emanation’ of the landlord himself.  “It is not possible to state
\nexhaustively all the circumstances  in which the physical occupation
\nof a person other than the landlord would have to be registered as
\noccupation by the landlord himself.  A few illustrations, however,
\nwould bring home the point.  For instance, the occupation of the
\npremises by a person who is economically dependent on the landlord,
\nthe occupation of the premises by a major son or daughter including a
\nmarried daughter whose residence in the premises is genuinely desired
\nby the landlord, the occupation of the premises out of necessity by
\nthose who are kith and kin of the landlord for the purpose of the Dr.
\n(sick) education or medical treatment as the case may be as genuinely
\ndesired by the landlord, would have to be regarded as occupation by
\nthe landlord himself.”\tThe Division Bench however sounded a note
\nof caution and clarified __ “the Court should be circumspect in finding
\nout as to whether having regard to the facts and circumstances of the
\ncase and the evidence adduced such occupation could be regarded as
\noccupation by the landlord himself or was only a ruse to get an order
\nof eviction.”  The Court further observed that all the relevant factors
\nand attendant circumstances shall have to be taken into consideration
\nbesides (i) the degree of relationship or dependence, (ii) the
\ncircumstances under which the landlord’s claim for the premises
\narises and put forward; (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the claim having
\nregard to the realities of life and the social mores and the like and
\nshall have all to be put into the scales and go into the judicial verdict.
\nSection 10(3)(c) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent
\nControl) Act,  1960 provides for tenant placing the landlord in
\npossession “if he requires additional accommodation for residential
\npurpose or for purposes of a business which he is carrying on”.
\nConsistent view of Madras High Court as noted in R.V. Dharmalinga
\nMudaliar Vs. K. Annamalai  1982 (1) RCJ 699, is that the
\nphraseology employed needs a wider interpretation and includes
\ntherein the requirement of either himself or any other opportunity of
\nhis or her family as such an approach stands to reason, justice, equity
\nand good conscience.  The requirement of the landlord’s first wife’s
\nson working independently so as to set up him and his family was
\nheld covered by the provision.\n<\/p>\n
\tTwo decisions by Delhi High Court though dealing with
\nrequirement for residential purpose may yet be noted for their utility.
\nSection 14(1)(e) of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 contemplates the
\nlandlord requiring the suit premises bona fide ‘for himself’ as a
\nground of eviction.  In Smt. Krishna Devi Vs. Smt. Parmeshwari
\nDevi  1977 (2) RCJ 529, the landlady required the premises for the
\nfamily of her married daughter to come and live with her as she was
\nunable to look after herself and thus the requirement which she
\npleaded was for herself covered within the meaning of the word
\n“himself”.  It was held that the relationship was immaterial so long as
\nthe requirement was a genuine one and was meant to serve the need of
\nthe landlady.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn J.L. Mehta Vs. Smt. Hira Devi  1970 DLT 484, it was held
\nthat assigning a restricted meaning to the word ‘himself’ would lead
\nto anomalous and unreasonable results.\tThe requirement of the sons
\nof the landlady who were married and earning for themselves was
\nheld to be included within the requirement of ‘himself’ for the
\nlandlady.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe preceding reference to several decisions rendered by
\ndifferent High Courts under different State Legislations is not
\nintended by any means to be an exhaustive survey of available case
\nlaw.  We have set out only by way of illustrations the decision on
\nwhich we could lay our hands in the plethora of precedents to show
\nthe meaning assigned to the words “his own” generally by the High
\nCourts in the country dealing with different fact-situations. The
\njudicial opinion leans entirely in favour of assigning the expression
\n‘his own’ requirement of the landlord a liberal, wide and useful  even
\nan extended   meaning as that would advance the purpose of enacting
\nthe provision, discarding a narrow interpretation.\n<\/p>\n
We are of the opinion that the expression ‘for his own use’ as
\noccurring in Section 13(3)(a)(iii) of the Act cannot be narrowly
\nconstrued.  The expression must be assigned a wider, liberal and
\npractical meaning.  The requirement is not the requirement of the
\nlandlord alone in the sense that the landlord must for himself require
\nthe accommodation and to fulfill the requirement he must himself
\nphysically occupy the premises. The requirement of a member of the
\nfamily or of a person on whom the landlord is dependent or who is
\ndependent on the landlord can be considered to be the requirement of
\nthe landlord for his own use.  In the several decided cases referred to
\nhereinabove we have found the pari materia provisions being
\ninterpreted so as to include the requirement of the wife, husband,
\nsister, children including son, daughter, a widowed daughter and her
\nson, nephew, coparceners, members of family and dependents and
\nkith and kin in the requirement of landlord as “his” or “his own”
\nrequirement and user.  Keeping in view the social or socio-religious
\nmilieu and practices prevalent in a particular section of society or a
\nparticular region, to which the landlord belongs, it may be  obligation
\nof the landlord to settle a person closely connected with him  to make
\nhim economically independent so as to support himself and\/or the
\nlandlord.  To discharge such obligation the landlord may require the
\ntenancy premises and such requirement would be the requirement of
\nthe landlord.  If the requirement is of actual user of the premises by a
\nperson other than the landlord himself the Court shall with
\ncircumspection inquire : (i) whether the requirement of such person
\ncan be considered to be the requirement of the landlord, and (ii)
\nwhether there is a close inter-relation or identity nexus between such
\nperson and the landlord so as to satisfy the requirement of the first
\nquery.\tApplying the abovesaid tests to the facts of the present case it
\nis clear that the tenancy premises are required for the office of the
\nlandlord’s son who is a chartered accountant.  It is the moral
\nobligation of the landlord to settle his son well in his life and to
\ncontribute his best to see him economically independent.  The
\nlandlord is not going to let out the premises to his son and though the
\nson would run his office in the premises the possession would
\ncontinue with the landlord and in a sense the actual occupation by the
\nson would be the occupation by the landlord himself.  It is the
\nlandlord who requires the premises for his son and in substance the
\nuser would be by landlord for his son’s office.\t The case squarely falls
\nwithin the scope of Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
\tRavinder Kumar Pujara’s case (supra) relied on by the learned
\ncounsel for the tenant-appellant which holds that setting up of
\nindependent business of the son of the landlord is not covered by
\nSection 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act takes too narrow a view of the
\nprovision; it does not lay down the correct law and is overruled.\n<\/p>\n
\tLearned counsel for the appellant also invited our attention to
\nOnkar Nath Vs. Ved Vyas\t (1980) 4 SCC 270, wherein Section
\n13(3)(a)(i) of this very Act, which is a provision dealing with
\nrequirement of a residential building for own occupation by the
\nlandlord, came up for the consideration of this Court.\tThe Court was
\nnot called up to interpret the expression ‘his own occupation’.\t There
\nwere inadequacies of pleadings and total absence of proof as to non-
\navailability of other residential building and as to non-vacating of any
\nbuilding without sufficient cause by the landlord after the
\ncommencement of the Act.  As the landlord failed to allege and prove
\nthe latter two out of the three requirements of the provision this Court
\nheld the landlord not entitled to any relief and in that context observed
\nthat the Statute beneficially designed to protect tenants from
\nunreasonable evictions has taken care to put restrictions which must
\nbe rigorously constructed to fulfil the purpose of the Statute.\t The case
\nhas no applicability and relevance for resolving the issue arising for
\nour consideration in the present case and observation made by the
\nCourt cannot be read divorced from the context.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
\nlanguage of the provision is plain and simple, not doubtful, and hence
\nthe expression ‘his own use’ should be interpreted literally according
\nto well settled canon of interpretation.  It is true that ordinary rule of
\nconstruction is to assign the word a meaning which it ordinarily
\ncarries.  But the subject of legislation and the context in which a word
\nor expression is employed may require a departure from the rule of
\nliteral construction. The following passage from Statutory
\nInterpretation by Justice G.P. Singh (Eighth Edition, 2001, at pp.81-\n<\/p>\n
82) is an appropriate guide to the case at hand :\n<\/p>\n
\t“”No word”, says Professor H.A. Smith “has
\nan absolute meaning, for no words can be defined
\nin vacuo, or without reference to some context”.\n<\/p>\n
According to Sutherland there is a “basic fallacy”
\nin saying “that words have meaning in and of
\nthemselves”, and “reference to the abstract
\nmeaning of words”, states Craies, “if there be any
\nsuch thing, is of little value in interpreting
\nstatutes”. . . . . . . . .in determining the meaning of
\nany word or phrase in a statute the first question to
\nbe asked is “what is the natural or ordinary
\nmeaning of that word or phrase in its context in the
\nstatute?  It is only when that meaning leads to
\nsome result which cannot reasonably be supposed
\nto have been the intention of the Legislature, that it
\nis proper to look for some other possible meaning
\nof the word or phrase”.\t The context, as already
\nseen, in the construction of statutes, means the
\nstatute as a whole, the previous state of the law,
\nother statutes in para materia the general scope of
\nthe statute and the mischief that was intended to
\nremedy.”\n<\/p>\n
\tWords cannot be construed in vacuo.  In Bidie v. General
\nAccident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation __ (1948) 2 All ER
\n995, 998, Lord Greene observed\t“The first thing one has to do, I
\nventure to think, in construing words in a Section of an Act of
\nParliament is not to take those words in vacuo so to speak, and
\nattribute to them what is sometimes called their natural or ordinary
\nmeaning.  Few words in the English language have a natural or
\nordinary meaning in the sense that they must be so read that their
\nmeaning is entirely independent of their context.  The method of
\nconstruing statutes that I prefer is not to take particular words and
\nattribute to them a sort of prima facie meaning which you may have to
\ndisplace or modify.  It is to read the statute as a whole and ask oneself
\nthe question : ‘In this state, in this context, relating to this subject-
\nmatter, what is the true meaning of that word?'”  In Towne v. Eisner,
\n(1917) 245 US 418m 425, Homes, J. observed “A word is not a
\ncrystal, transparent and unchanged; it is the skin of living thought and
\nmay vary greatly in colour and content according to the circumstances
\nand the time in which is used.”\t Both these decisions were cited with
\napproval by Chief Justice Sikri in Kesavananda Bharti Vs. State of
\nKerala\t(1973) 4 SCC 225, 316.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn Union of India Vs. Sankalchand Himatlal Sheth and Anr.
\n (1977) 4 SCC 193, Bhagwati, J. held that the words used in Statute
\ncannot be read in isolation; their colour and content are derived from
\ntheir context and, therefore, every word in a statute must be examined
\nin its context.\t His Lordship explained what he meant by the word
\n‘context’ and proceeded to say “I mean it in its widest sense as
\nincluding not only other enacting  provisions of the same statute, but
\nits preamble, the existing state of the law, other statutes in pari materia
\nand the mischief which the statute intended to remedy”.\t His Lordship
\ncalled upon the courts faced with the task of assigning meaning to a
\nword to remember that a statute always has some purpose or object to
\naccomplish whose sympathetic and imaginative discovery is the surest
\nguide to its meaning.  The literal construction should not obsess the
\ncourt because it has only prima facie preference.  Krishna Iyer, J. in
\nhis separate opinion emphasized the need of keeping in view “the
\nroots of the past, the foliage of the present and the seeds of the future”
\nwhile understanding and interpreting a statute and held that judicial
\ninterpretation should not be imprisoned in verbalism and words lose
\ntheir thrust when read in vacuo. In Maharaj Singh Vs. State of Uttar
\nPradesh\t (1977) 1 SCC 155, this Court held that the context would
\nquite often provide the key to the meaning of the word and the sense it
\nshould carry.  Its setting would give colour to it and provide a cue to
\nthe intention of the Legislature in using it.\n<\/p>\n
Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes (Twelfth Edition)
\nstates, while dealing with beneficial construction of statute, the Judges
\n“faced with a choice between a wide meaning which carries out what
\nappears to have been the object of the legislature more fully, and a
\nnarrow meaning which carries it out less fully or not at all, they will
\noften choose the former” (at page 92).\tThe rule of construction most
\nagreeable to justice and reason is to presume against intending what is
\ninconvenient or unreasonable. “In determining either the general
\nobject of the Legislature, or the meaning of its language in any
\nparticular passage, it is obvious that the intention which appears to be
\nmost in accord with convenience, reason, justice and legal principles
\nshould, in all cases of doubtful significance, be presumed to be the
\ntrue one” (at page 199).\n<\/p>\n
\tIn providing key to the meaning of any word or expression the
\ncontext in which it is set has significance.  Colour and content
\nemanating from context\tmay permit  sense being preferred to mere
\nmeaning depending on what is sought to be achieved and what is
\nsought to be prevented by the legislative scheme surrounding the
\nexpression.  Requirement of landlord for his own use, is an expression
\ncapable of attributing an intention to the legislature that what was
\nintended to be fulfilled is such requirement as would persuade the
\nlandlord to have the premises vacated by the tenant, to forego the
\nrental income, and to put the premises to such use as the landlord
\nwould deem to be his own use and in the given facts and
\ncircumstances of a case the Court too would  hold it to be so in
\ncontradistinction with a mere ruse to evict the tenant.\t The legislature
\nintending to protect the tenant also intends to lift the protection when
\nit is the requirement of landlord to put the accommodation to such use
\nas he intends, away from leasing it out.\n<\/p>\n
We have already noticed that the purpose of the Act is to
\nrestrict increase of rent and the eviction of tenants in urban areas.  Still
\nthe Legislature has taken care to provide grounds for eviction, one of
\nthem being the requirement of the landlord. We have to strike a
\nbalance between the need of protecting the tenants from unjustified
\nevictions and the need for eviction when ground for eviction is one
\nsuch as the requirement of the landlord.  If we do not meaningfully
\nconstrue the concept of requirement the provision may suffer from the
\nrisk of being branded as unreasonable, arbitrary or as placing uncalled
\nfor and unreasonable restrictions on the right of the owner to hold and
\nuse his property.  We cannot place a construction on the expression
\n‘for his own use’ in such a way as to deny the landlord a right to evict
\nhis tenant when he needs the accommodation for his own son to settle
\nhimself well in his life.  We have to give colour and content to the
\nexpression and provide the skin of a living thought  to the skeleton of
\nthe words which the Legislature has not itself chosen to define.  The
\nIndian society, its customs and requirements and the context where
\nthe provision is set in the legislation are the guides leading to
\nacceptance of the meaning which we have chosen to assign to the
\nwords ‘for his own use’ in Section 13(3)(a)(ii) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
Our conclusions are crystalised as under:\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tthe words ‘for his own use’ as occurring in Section
\n13(3)(a)(ii) of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction
\nAct, 1949 must receive a  wide, liberal and useful
\nmeaning rather than a strict or narrow construction.\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\tThe expression __ landlord requires for ‘his own use’, is
\nnot confined in its meaning to actual physical user by the
\nlandlord personally. The requirement not only of the
\nlandlord himself but also of  the normal ’emanations’ of
\nthe landlord is included therein.  All the cases and
\ncircumstances in which actual physical occupation or
\nuser by\t someone else, would amount to occupation or
\nuser by the landlord himself, cannot be exhaustively
\nenumerated.  It will depend on a variety of factors such
\nas inter-relationship and inter-dependence __ economic or
\notherwise, between the landlord and such person in the
\nbackground of social, socio-religious and local\t customs
\nand obligations of the society or region to which they
\nbelong.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tThe tests to be applied are : (i) whether the requirement
\npleaded and proved may properly be regarded as the
\nlandlord’s own requirement?  and, (ii) Whether on the
\nfacts and in the circumstances of a given case actual
\noccupation and user by a person other than the landlord
\nwould be deemed by the landlord as ‘his own’ occupation
\nor user?  The answer would, in its turn, depend on (i) the
\nnature and degree of relationship  and\/or dependence
\nbetween the landlord pleading the requirement as ‘his
\nown’ and the person who would actually use the
\npremises; (ii) the circumstances in which the claim arises
\nand is put forward, and (iii) the intrinsic tenability of the
\nclaim.\tThe Court on being satisfied of the reasonability
\nand genuineness of claim, as distinguished from a mere
\nruse to get rid of the tenant, will uphold the landlord’s
\nclaim.\n<\/p>\n
(iv)\tWhile casting its judicial verdict, the Court shall adopt a
\npractical and meaningful approach guided by the realities
\nof life.\n<\/p>\n
(v)\tIn the present case, the requirement of landlord of the suit
\npremises for user as office of his chartered accountant
\nson is the requirement of landlord ‘for his own use’
\nwithin the meaning of Section 13(3)(a)(ii).\n<\/p>\n
The appeal is dismissed.  The tenant is allowed four months
\ntime to vacate the premises subject to his clearing all the arrears and
\nfiling the usual undertaking in the Executing Court to deliver vacant
\nand peaceful possession over the suit premises to the landlord-
\nrespondent on expiry of the time allowed.  Compliance in four weeks.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t     …………………J
\n\t\t\t\t\t  ( R.C. LAHOTI )<\/p>\n
\t\t\t………………J.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t\t  ( B.N. AGRAWAL )
\nMay 10, 2002.\n<\/p>\n
32<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Joginder Pal vs Naval Kishore Behal on 10 May, 2002 Author: R Lahoti Bench: R.C. Lahoti, B.N. Agrawal CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 3494 of 2002 PETITIONER: JOGINDER PAL Vs. RESPONDENT: NAVAL KISHORE BEHAL DATE OF JUDGMENT: 10\/05\/2002 BENCH: R.C. Lahoti & B.N. Agrawal JUDGMENT: R.C. Lahoti, J. Leave granted. An eviction […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-112241","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nJoginder Pal vs Naval Kishore Behal on 10 May, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/joginder-pal-vs-naval-kishore-behal-on-10-may-2002\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Joginder Pal vs Naval Kishore Behal on 10 May, 2002 - 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