{"id":112862,"date":"1962-09-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1962-09-26T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/pioneer-traders-and-others-vs-chief-controller-of-imports-on-27-september-1962"},"modified":"2016-08-13T08:48:43","modified_gmt":"2016-08-13T03:18:43","slug":"pioneer-traders-and-others-vs-chief-controller-of-imports-on-27-september-1962","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/pioneer-traders-and-others-vs-chief-controller-of-imports-on-27-september-1962","title":{"rendered":"Pioneer Traders And Others vs Chief Controller Of Imports … on 27 September, 1962"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Pioneer Traders And Others vs Chief Controller Of Imports … on 27 September, 1962<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 734, \t\t 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 349<\/div>\n
Author: K Wanchoo<\/div>\n
Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Gajendragadkar, P.B., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Shah, J.C.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nPIONEER TRADERS AND OTHERS\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nCHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS ANDEXPORTS PONDICHERRY\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n27\/09\/1962\n\nBENCH:\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nBENCH:\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nSINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\nSHAH, J.C.\n\nCITATION:\n 1963 AIR  734\t\t  1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 349\n\n\nACT:\nFrench\t Establishments--Administrative\t  integration\twith\nIndia-Confiscation  of\tgoods  imported\t and  imposition  of\npenalty\t in  the  alternative--Petition\t in  enforcement  of\nfundamental  rights-Maintainability--Constitution of  India,\nArts.  19 (1) (f), 32-French Establishments (Application  of\nLaws) Order  , 1954, S.\t R. O. 3315, para 6-Sea Customs Act,\n1878 (8 of 1878), s.\t 67    (8)-Imports    and    Exports\n(Control) Act, 1947 (18 of 1947), s. 3 (2).\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  petitioners, on patentes issued to them by\t the  French\nAdministration,\t imported  goods to  Pondicherry  after\t its\nadministration had been taken over by the Union of India  on\nNovember 1, 1954.  They had placed orders for the imports in\nEngland\t before\t August 15, 1954,  after  acquiring  foreign\nexchange  by  modes approved by the  French  Administration.\nBefore\tthe goods arrived in Pondicherry, the Government  of\nIndia  had  issued S. R. O. 3315 under s. 4 of\tthe  Foreign\njurisdiction  Act,  1947.   By\tthis  notification  the\t Sea\nCustoms\t Act, 1878, the Imports and Exports  (Control)\tAct,\n1947, and various other Acts mentioned in the schedule\twere\nextended  to French Establishments.  By a  press  communique\nissued\tby the Government of India,  French  license-holders\nwere asked to apply to the Controller of Imports and Exports\nfor  validation\t of their licences before  the\tshipping  of\ngoods.\t As  it\t was too late for the  petitioners  to\tstop\nshipment, they applied to the Controller for the  validation\nof  their authorisation but this was refused and  the  goods\narrived\t after November 1, 1954.  The Collector\t confiscated\nthem under s. 167 (8) of the Sea Customs Act, 1878 read with\ns. 3(2) of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act, 1947,\t and\nimposed penalties in the alternative for clearing them.\t The\npetitioners  preferred\tappeals\t to  the  Central  Board  of\nRevenue\t on  the basis of para 6 of S. R. O.  3315  but\t the\nBoard\tdismissed  the\tappeals\t reducing   the\t  penalties.\nRevision petitions made to the Government of India were also\nrejected.   Relying on the decision of this Court in  Messrs\nUniversal Imports Agency v. The Chief Controller of  Imports\nand  Exports<\/a> that para 6 of S. R. O. 3315 had the effect  of\nprotecting the imports\n350\nmade in similar circumstances such as in the present  cases,\nthe  petitioners came up to this Court under Art. 32 of\t the\nConstitution  for  enforcement of their\t fundamental  rights\nunder Art. 19 (1)   (f).   A  preliminary objection  to\t the\nmaintainability of the writ petitions was taken on behalf of\nthe Union of India on basis of the decision of this Court in\nSmt.  Ujjambai v. The State of Uttar Pradesh.\nHeld  (per Sinha, C. J., Gajendragadkar, Wanchoo  and  Shah,\nJJ.),  that  the decision of this Court in  Ujjambai's\tcase\napplied\t and  the petitions under Art. 32  must\t fail.\t The\nquestions  that\t were raised in Ujjambai's case\t not  having\nbeen  raised in the case of Messrs Universal Imports  Agency\nthis  Court had no occasion to consider in the\tlatter\tcase\nwhether\t the  quasi-judicial  authority\t in  that  case\t had\njurisdiction  to decide the matter.  The  petitioners  could\nnot,  therefore, get out of the decision in Ujjambai's\tcase\non the ground that the tax authorities in the present  cases\nhad no inherent jurisdiction to do so.\nThe observations of Das, J., and Kapurj., in Ujjambai's case\nwith  regard to Messrs Universal Agency's case must be\theld\nto be per incuriam.\nM\/s.   Universal Imports Agency v. The Chief  Controller  of\nImports and Exports,<\/a> [1961] 1 S. C. R. 305, discussed.\nSmt.   Ujjambai\t v.  The State of Uttar\t Pradesh,  [1963]  1\nS.C.R. 778, explained and applied.\nKailash\t Nath v. State of U. P., A.<\/a> 1. R. (1957) S. C.\t790,\nreferred to.\nParagraph  6 of S. R. O. 3315, properly construed,  must  be\ndeemed\tto have been inserted in each one of the  Acts\tmen-\ntioned\tin the Schedule and in the Sea Customs Act  to\thave\ntaken  the  place of original s. 2 of that Act.\t  There\t was\ntherefore  no scope for the contention that Ujjambai's\tcase\nhad  no\t application inasmuch as no misconstruction  of\t any\nprovisions of the Sea Customs Act was involved.\nHeld,  further,\t that  the  order  of  a  Customs  authority\nimposing  confiscation and penalty under s. 167 (8)  of\t the\nSea  Customs Act, 1878, was a quasi-judicial order  and\t the\nCustoms\t authorities  had  the duty  to\t act  judicially  in\ndeciding questions of confiscation and penalty.\nLeo Roy Frey v. The Superintendent District Jail,  Amritsar,<\/a>\n[1958] S. C. R. 822, referred to.\nPer Das Gupta, J.--If the importations in the present  cases\nwere made on the basis of contracts concluded before\n351\nNovember  1.  1954,  the  Sea  Customs\tAct  would  have  no\napplication  because  of  para\t  6 of\tS.  R.\tO.  3315  as\nconstrued  by this Court in M\/s Universal  Agency's  me\t and\nthe customs authorities who derived their jurisdiction\tfrom\nthat Act would have no jurisdiction to make the orders\tthey\ndid,  and  so  the present petitions under Art.\t 32  of\t the\nConstitution would be maintainable.\nAn  inferior tribunal could not give itself jurisdiction  by\nwrongly deciding a collateral fact.\nUniversal Imports Agency v. The Chief Controller of Import's\nJUDGMENT<\/a>:\n<\/pre>\n
State  of  U. P., [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778, The  State  Trading
\nCorporation of India v. The State of Mysore,<\/a> [1963] 3 S.  C.
\nR. 792 and Rex v. Shoreditch Assessment Committee, [1910]  2
\nK. B. 859, relied on.\n<\/p>\n
Where  a judicial or quasi-judicial authority had in law  no
\njurisdiction,  the  omission of the party to  canvass  that
\nquestion  before  the  authority  could\t not  also  give  it
\njurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
&
\nORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Petitions Nos. 314 to 342 of 1961.
\nPetition under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India    for
\nenforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n<\/p>\n
N.   C.\t   Chatterjee,\t R.   Ganapathy\t  Iyer,\t   and\t  G.
\nGopalakrishnan, for the petitioners.\n<\/p>\n
C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor General of India, B.  R.\t  L.
\nIyengar and R.H. Dhebar, for the respondents.
\n1962.\tSeptember  27.\t The  judgment\tof  Sinha,  C.\t J.,
\nGajendragadkar,\t Wanchoo  and Shah, JJ.,  was  delivered  by
\nWanchoo, J., Das Gupta, J., delivered a separate Judgment.
\nWANCHOO, J.-These twenty-nine petitions under Art. 32 of the
\nConstitution  raise common questions and will be dealt\twith
\ntogether.   They have been filed by two firms who  obtained
\npatentes  to carry on business in Pondicherry in  September,
\n1954, for the first time.  As the facts in all the petitions
\nare  similar,  we  shall only give the\tfacts  generally  to
\nunderstand the questions raised before us.  The two firms,
\n352<\/span>
\nit  may\t be  mentioned, did not carry  on  any\tbusiness  in
\nPondicherry before September, 1954, when they got a  patente
\neach and the proprietor of one of them is a resident of\t New
\nDelhi  while  the proprietor of the other is a\tresident  of
\nBombay.\n<\/p>\n
The  administration  of Pondicherry was taken  over  by\t the
\nUnion\tof  India  from\t November  1,  1954.   Before\tthat
\nPondicherry  was under the administration of the  Government
\nof France and was a free port.\tImport into Pondicherry\t was
\nthus  not subject to any restriction, except with regard  to
\ncertain\t goods\twith  which we are  not\t concerned.  in\t the
\npresent\t petitions.   Any  merchant  desiring  to  carry  on
\nbusiness  in  the territory of Pondicherry  had\t however  to
\nobtain a patente before he could do so.\t These patentes were
\nof  five  kinds one of which was a patente  authorising\t the
\ntrader\tto  carry on the business of import of\tgoods  other
\nthan  those  which  were  under\t restriction.\tThough\t the
\nimporters  were entitled by virtue of the patente to  import
\ngoods subject to certain restrictions, this right could only
\nbe exercised by securing foreign exchange which was  subject
\nto certain limitations and was controlled by the  Department
\nof Economic Affairs at Pondicherry.  There were two ways  in
\nwhich foreign exchange could be acquired, namely, (i) at the
\nofficial rate through the Department of Economic Affairs, or\n<\/p>\n
(ii) in the open market at such rate as might be  available;
\nand both these ways were considered valid before November 1,
\n1954.\tFurther\t there\tused to be  authorisations  for\t the
\npurpose of import and the authorisations indicated the limit
\nwithin\twhich foreign exchange could be acquired  either  at
\nthe official rate or through the open market.
\nThe  petitioners’  case\t is that though\t the  patentes\twere
\nsecured\t in September, 1954, orders for import\twere  placed
\nbefore August 15, 1954.\t Thereafter after authorisations had
\nbeen obtained from the French authorities, foreign  exchange
\nwas acquired in the open market for the purpose of financing
\nthe
\n353<\/span>
\nimport.\t  There were in all twenty-nine transactions by\t the
\ntwo firms, which are the subject-matter of these  petitions;
\nand  in certain cases advances were paid, the balance  being
\npayable\t by means of bills of exchange drawn  on  ‘documents
\nagainst\t payment” basis.  But though the orders were  placed
\nbefore\tAugust 15, 1954, and necessary foreign exchange\t had
\nalso been secured in the open market later, shipments  could
\nnot be made because of an unexpected dock strike in  England
\nand  on the Continent and also for want of  shipping  space,
\nand  therefore most of the consignments on the basis of\t the
\ntwenty-nine orders were shipped after November 1, 1954,\t and
\nonly three consignments out of twenty-nine could be  shipped
\nin  October,  1954, that is, before  the  administration  of
\nPondicherry was taken over by the Government of India.\t The
\ngoods  in  all\tthese cases  arrived  at  Pondicherry  after
\nNovember  1, 1954.  In the meantime, the  administration  of
\nPondicherry  was taken over by the Government of India\tfrom
\nNovember  1, 1954, in pursuance of an agreement between\t the
\nGovernment  of India and the Government of France,  and\t two
\nnotifications  were  issued  by\t the  Government  of  India,
\nnamely,\t S. R. O.s. Nos. 3314 and 3315.\t By S. R.  O.  3315,
\nwhich was made under s,4 of the Foreign jurisdiction Act, No
\nXLVII  of 1947, the Sea Customs Act, 1878, the Reserve\tBank
\nof  India Act, 1934, the Imports and Exports (Control)\tAct,
\n1947,  the  Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947,  and\t the
\nIndian Tariff Act, 1934, were extended to Pondicherry.\tThis
\nS.R.O. contained a saving clause which laid down that–\n<\/p>\n
\t      “‘Unless\totherwise specially provided in\t the
\n\t      schedule,\t all  laws in force  in\t the  French
\n\t      Establishments\timmediately    before\t the
\n\t      commencement of this Order., which  correspond
\n\t      to  the enactments specified in the  Schedule,
\n\t      shall  cease to have effect, save as  respects
\n\t      things done or omitted to be done before\tsuch
\n\t      commencement.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
354<\/span><\/p>\n
As a consequence of these two S. R. O.s. a press  communique
\nwas  issued by the Government of India on November 1,  1954,
\nexplaining  the effect of these notifications, in  which  it
\nwas  stated  that imports into and exports from\t the  French
\nEstablishments\twould  be regulated in accordance  with\t the
\nprovisions  of the Imports and Exports (Control) Act,  1947.
\nIt was further stated that as regards orders placed  outside
\nthe Establishments  and finalized through grant of a licence
\nby competent French authorities in accordance with the\tlaws
\nand regulations in force prior to November 1, 1954, licence-
\nholders\t were advised to apply to the Controller of  Imports
\nand  Exports  for  validation  of  licences  held  by  them.
\nLicence-holders\t were  further advised not  to\tarrange\t for
\nshipment  of goods until the licences held by them had\tbeen
\nvalidated by the Controller of Imports and Exports.  In view
\nof  this  press communique, the petitioners  tried  to\tstop
\nshipment   until  the  authorisations  held  by\t them\twere
\nvalidated  by the Chief Controller of Imports  and  Exports,
\nPondicherry.  But their suppliers told them that this  could
\nnot  be done,, as the goods were in the course\tof  shipment
\nand  it was too late to stop the shipment.  The\t petitioners
\nthen  applied for validation of the authorisations, but\t the
\nChief Controller of Imports and Exports, Pondicherry refused
\nto  validate  them.   The petitioners’\tcase  is  that\tthis
\nrefusal\t was arbitrary.\t Eventually, when the goods  arrived
\nat  Pondicherry\t after\tNovember 1,  1954,  the\t petitioners
\napproached the Collector of Customs at Pondicherry to permit
\nclearance of the goods.\t They were not, however, allowed  to
\nclear  them, and notices were issued to them to\t show  cause
\nwhy the goods should not be forfeited on the ground that the
\nimport\thad  been made in contravention of the\tImports\t and
\nExports\t (Control) Act, 1947 and the Sea Customs Act,  1878.
\nThe  petitioners thereupon showed cause and their  case\t was
\nthat orders had been placed before August 15, 1954, and\t the
\nimports had been made strictly in accordance with the law in
\nforce in,
\n355<\/span>
\nPondicherry before November 1, 1954, and therefore could not
\nbe  said  to  be unauthorised.\t The  Collector\t of  Customs
\nhowever\t refused  to  accept this  explanation\tand  ordered
\nconfiscation  of the goods, and in the\talternative  imposed
\npenalties  for clearing them.  These penalties\tamounted  to
\nover  Rs. 64,000\/- in the case of one of the firms and\tover
\nRs. 96,000\/- in the case of the other firm, There were\tthen
\nappeals\t by  the  petitioners before the  Central  Board  of
\nRevenue\t against  the  orders  imposing\t penalties.    These
\nappeals\t were dismissed, though the penalty was\t reduced  to
\nover Rs.35,000\/- in the case of one firm and Rs. 60,000\/- in
\nthe  case  of  other firm.  The\t petitioners  then  went  in
\nrevision to the Government of India but their revisions were
\nrejected   on  January\t23,  1957.   It\t appears  that\t the
\npetitioners  paid  the penalty though the date is not  clear
\nfrom  the petitions and cleared the goods.  The\t petitioners
\nwere  apparently  satisfied with the orders  passed  against
\nthem  for  they\t took  no steps to go  to  Court  after\t the
\nrevisions  had been dismissed by the Government of India  in
\nJanuary,  1957, though they say that they have\tbeen  making
\nrepresentations\t to the Government of India in\tthat  behalf
\nwithout any effect and that the last communication from\t the
\nGovernment of India was received by them in this  connection
\nin August, 1961.\n<\/p>\n
In  the\t meantime, certain impotrers  of  Pondicherry  filed
\npetitions  in  this Court in 1959 challenging the  order  of
\nconfiscation and the alternative order imposing penalties on
\nthem  by the Collector of Customs, Pondicherry, in  somewhat
\nsimilar\t circumstances\t: (see\tMessrs.\t  Universal  Imports
\nAgency v. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports<\/a>  (1)).
\nThose  petitions  were decided on August 23, 1960  and\tthis
\nCourt held that in view of para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315, already
\nreferred to, which saved the effect of all laws in force  in
\nthe    French\tEstablishments\t immediately   before\t the
\ncommencement  of  the  order even  though  those  laws\twere
\nrepealed  by  the  order, with respect\tto  things  done  or
\nomitted to be
\n(1)  [1961] 1 S.C.R. 305.\n<\/p>\n
356<\/span><\/p>\n
done before such commencement, the authorisations granted by
\nthe  French authorities before November 1, 1954, for  import
\nwere  sufficient to protect the goods imported on the  basis
\nof  those  authorisations whether the exchange\twas  secured
\nofficially  or from the open market, from the  operation  of
\nthe  Imports  and  Exports (Control) Act,  1947,  and  other
\nprovisions  to the same effect.\t This view was taken on\t the
\nground\tthat para. 6 saved “things done” before November  1,
\n1954  and  as  firm  contracts had  been  entered  into\t and
\nauthorisations\t granted  before  November  1,\t 1954,\t the
\nsubsequent arrival of goods in Pondicherry after November 1,
\n1954,\tas  the\t consequence  of  the  contracts   and\t the
\nauthorisations\twas a “thing done” under para. 6  of  S.R.O.
\n3315.\tIt  was held that the words “‘things done”  must  be
\nreasonably  interpreted and if so interpreted they not\tonly
\nmeant  things  done but also the legal\tconsequence  flowing
\ntherefrom.   Consequently,  it was held\t that  the  imported
\ngoods  in those cases were not liable to confiscation  under
\nthe Imports and Exports (Control) Act and similar provisions
\nof  any\t other law, as firm contracts had been\tmade  before
\nNovember  1,  1954  and exchange had  been  arranged  either
\nofficially or through the open marketin\t full or in  part
\nunder authorisations granted by the French Government  and
\nthe   subsequent  import  after\t November  1,  1954  was   a
\nconsequence of these things which had\tbeen  done   before
\nNovember  1, 1954 an was therefore protected by para. 6.  In
\nthe result the penalty collected was ordered to be refunded.
\nThis  decision was given in August 1960, and it\t seems\tthat
\nafter this decision, the petitioners wrote to the Government
\nof  India  in September, 1960, for refund  of  penalties  in
\ntheir cases also; they were informed in February, 1961, that
\nno  refund  could  be made.  The petitioners  seem  to\thave
\nwritten again to the Government of India in June, 1961,\t and
\nto this the Government of India gave a final reply in
\n 357<\/span>
\nAugust,\t 1961.\tThereafter the present writ  petitions\twere
\nfiled  in  October,  1961.   The  petitioners  rely  on\t the
\ndecision of this Court in Messrs. Universal Imports  Agency
\n(1) and contend that they are entitled to refund of  penalty
\nas  their cases are exactly similar to the case\t of  Messrs.
\nUniversal Imports Agency. (1) They pray for a writ, order or
\ndirection  in the nature of certiorari quashing\t the  orders
\nresulting  in the imposition of penalty beginning  with\t the
\norders of the Collector of Customs.  Pondicherry, and ending
\nwith  those of the Government of India in revision and\talso
\nfor  a direction requiring the respondents to refund to\t the
\npetitioners the sum realised as penalty.\n<\/p>\n
The  petitions have been opposed on behalf of the Union of
\nIndia on a number of grounds.  It is however unnecessary for
\nus  to detail all the grounds raised on behalf of the  Union
\nof India in view of an objection that has been taken to\t the
\nmaintainability of these petitions based on the decision  of
\nthis  Court  in\t Smt.\tUjjambai  v.  The  State  of   Uttar
\nPradesh.(2)  We shall therefore refer only to such parts  of
\nthe counter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of  India
\nas will suffice to explain the preliminary objection  raised
\non its behalf.\n<\/p>\n
The Union’s case is that the talks for the de facto transfer
\nof  the\t French-Indian Establishments to the  Government  of
\nIndia  were resumed in August 1954, and that as a result  of
\nthese  talks, an agreement dated October 20,  1954,  between
\nthe Government of India and the Government of France for the
\nsettlement  of\tthe  question of the future  of\t the  French
\nEstablishments\tin India was arrived at.  Pursuant  to\tthis
\nagreement,  the administration of the French  Establishments
\n(including Pondicherry) was transferred to the Government of
\nIndia from November 1, 1954.  In consequence, the Government
\nof India promulgated two orders, namely, S. R. O’s 3314\t and
\n3315  on October 30, 1954, to come into force from  November
\n1, 1954.  The first of these orders was known as the
\n(1) [1961] 1 S.C.R. 305.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 770,
\n358<\/span>
\nFrench\tEstablishments\t(Administration)  Order\t while\t the
\nsecond\t order\twas  known  as\tthe  French   Establishments
\n(Applications of laws) Order, 1954, by which the Sea Customs
\nAct, 1878, and the Imports and Exports (Control) Act,  1947,
\nand  certain  other Acts were made applicable  to  the\tsaid
\nsettlements.   Some persons, including the petitioners,\t who
\nhad  no business in Pondicherry from before mala  fide\twith
\nintent to defeat the laws in force in the Indian Union which
\nwere  legally  to be extended to the  French  Establishments
\nwhen  their administration was taken over by the  Government
\nof  India, managed to procure some colourable  documents  on
\nthe strength of which they claimed that they had placed firm
\norders\twith  foreign firms for import of goods\t which\twere
\nrestricted  under  the Indian  Import  Control\tRegulations.
\nAfter the Government of India had applied S. R. O’s 3314 and
\n3315  to  the  French Establishments and  taken\t over  their
\nadministration from November 1, 1954, a press communique was
\nissued\ton November 1, 1954, that orders placed outside\t the
\nFrench\tEstablishments\tand  finalised through\ta  grant  of
\nlicence\t by the competent French authorities  in  accordance
\nwith the laws and regulations in force prior to November  1,
\n1954  should be got validated by the Controller\t of  Imports
\nand   Exports  appointed  for  Pondicherry.   Further,\t the
\nlicence-holders were advised not to arrange for shipments of
\ngoods until the licences held by them were validated.  Later
\non January 5, 1955, the Union of India issued another  press
\ncommunique  in view of certain representations\treceived  on
\nthe  basis of Art. 17 of the Indo-French Agreement  and\t the
\npublic was informed that import of goods against open market
\ntransactions  after  November 1, 1954, would be\t treated  as
\nunauthorised.\tBut having regard to the hardship likely  to
\nbe  caused  to genuine importers who had  placed  orders  in
\npursuance  of their normal trading operations against  which
\ngoods  were  in the normal course shipped by  the  suppliers
\nprior-to the date of merger, the Collector of Customs,
\n 359<\/span>
\nPondicherry   was   being  authorised  to   accord   certain
\nconcessions  to genuine importers.  One of these  concession
\nwas that goods shipped before November 1, 1954, but  ordered
\nbefore\tAugust\t15, 1954, would be cleared  without  penalty
\nirrespective of origin and value.  The petitioners tried  to
\ntake  advantage\t of this concession and therefore  tried  to
\nshow before the Collector of Customs, Pondicherry that\tthey
\nhad  placed  firm  orders before  August  15,  1954,  though
\nshipments could only be made in three cases before  November
\n1,  1954, and were delayed in others because of dock  strike
\nin  England  and in Continental countries.   This  case\t was
\nscrutinised  by the Collector of Customs and he pointed\t out
\nin his order that though the orders for these goods are said
\nto  have been placed before August 15, 1954, the  two  firms
\ncould  only start functioning in Pondicherry from the  month
\nof  September  in which month they had obtained\t patent\t for
\nconducting  business  there  legally.\tThe  Collector\talso
\npointed\t out  that  in\tthe  ordinary  course  of  business,
\ncommitments   were   not   made\t  without   entering\tinto
\ncorrespondence\twith  the suppliers  regarding\tthe  prices,
\nterms  of payment etc., but in these cases, the\t petitioners
\nproduced no such correspondence.  It was also found that the
\npetitioners  had not done any business of this kind even  in
\nthe Indian Union before this.  The Collector therefore\theld
\nthat it had not been proved that the goods had in fact\tbeen
\nordered before August 15, 1954, and therefore ordered  their
\nconfiscation and imposed penalty in lieu thereof The appeals
\nof  the Petitioners to the Central Board of  Revenue  failed
\nexcept\tto  the extent that the penalty\t was  reduced.\t The
\nBoard’s order was silent on the point whether the goods\t had
\nin fact been ordered before August 15, 1954.  But the  Board
\nheld  that as the goods were imported without licence  at  a
\ntime  when  a  licence was required for\t their\timport,\t the
\nappeal must fail.  The petitioners then went in revision  to
\nthe Government of India but failed there also.\n<\/p>\n
360<\/span><\/p>\n
The  preliminary  objection  is\t that  the  orders  imposing
\npenalty\t are  quasi-judicial orders passed  by\ta  competent
\nauthority having jurisdiction under a taxing statute.  It is
\nnot the case of the petitioners that the statute under which
\nthe orders had been made read with S.R.O. 3315 of 1954 is in
\nany  way ultra vires.  The sole basis of these petitions  is
\nthat  para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315 has been misconstrued by\t the
\nauthorities  concerned\tand thus a penalty has\tbeen  levied
\nwhich  could  not  be  levied  if  para.  6  had  not\tbeen
\nmisconstrued.\t The  petitioners  therefore  question\t the
\nvalidity  of  the  order imposing penalty based\t on  a\tmis-
\nconstruction of para. 6 of S.R.O. 3315 of 1954 and this they
\ncannot do by petition under Art. 32, whatever other remedies
\nthey  might  have  against such an order,  in  view  of\t the
\ndecision  of  this  Court  in  Ujjambai’s  case.(1)  It\t  is
\ntherefore  contended  on behalf of the Union of\t India\tthat
\nthese  petitions under Art. 32 of the Constitution  are\t not
\nmaintainable and should be dismissed on this ground alone.
\nIn reply, it is submitted on behalf of the petitioners\tthat
\nUjjambai’s  case.(1) does not apply in the circumstances  of
\nthese  petitions.   It is not seriously\t disputed  that\t the
\norders\timposing penalty were quasi-judicial orders; but  it
\nis urged that these orders were passed without\tjurisdiction
\nand infringe the fundamental right of the petitioners  under
\nArt. 19 (1) (f) and Art. 19 (1) (g), and would be liable  to
\nchallenge by petition under Art. 32 and the actual  decision
\nin Ujjambai’s case(1) will not be applicable.
\nIt  is\ttherefore necessary to consider the  effect  of\t the
\ndecision  in  Ujjambai’s case.(1) That case was heard  by  a
\nBench  of seven learned judges of this Court, and the  final
\ndecision  was by a majority of five to two.   The  following
\ntwo questions came up for decision in that case
\n\t      “1.   Is\tan order of assessment\tmade  by  an
\n\t      authority under a taxing statute which is
\n\t      (1)   [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778.\n<\/p>\n
\t       361<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      intra vires, open to challenge as repugnant to
\n\t      Art. 19 (1) (g), on the sole ground that it is
\n\t      based  on a misconstruction of a provision  of
\n\t      the   Act\t  or  of   a   notification   issued
\n\t      thereunder?\n<\/p>\n
\t      2.    Can\t the  validity of such an  order  be
\n\t      questioned in a petition under Art. 32 of\t the
\n\t      Constitution?”\n<\/p>\n
As  was\t pointed out by Das, J., in  that  case,  the  two
\nquestions were inter-connected and substantially related  to
\none  matter, namely, “is the validity of an order made\twith
\njurisdiction under an Act which is intra vires and good\t law
\nin   all  respects,  or\t a  notification   properly   issued
\nthereunder, liable to be questioned in a petition under Art.
\n32  of\tthe  Constitution  on  the  sole  ground  that\t the
\nprovisions  of\tthe Act, or the terms  of  the\tnotification
\nissued\tthereunder,  have  been misconstrued?”\tIt  was\t not
\ndisputed in that case that where the statute or a  provision
\nthereof\t is ultra vires, any action taken under\t such  ultra
\nvires provision by a quasi-judicial authority which violates
\nor  threatens to violate a fundamental right does give\trise
\nto  a question of enforcement of that right and\t a  petition
\nunder Art. 32 of the Constitution will lie.  Further, it was
\nnot disputed that when the assessing authority sought to tax
\na  transaction\tthe  taxation  of  which  came\twithin\t the
\nconstitutional\tprohibition,  the violation  of\t fundamental
\nright must be taken to have been established and such  cases
\nwere  treated  as  on  a par  with  those  cases  where\t the
\nprovision itself was ultra vires.  It was also not  disputed
\nthat where the statute was intra vires but the action  taken
\nunder it was without inherent jurisdiction, a petition under
\nArt.  32  would lie.  Finally, it was also not\tdisputed  in
\nthat case that where the action taken is procedurally  ultra
\nvires, the case is assimilated to a case of an action  taken
\nwithout inherent jurisdiction and would be open to challenge
\nby a petition under Art. 32,
\n362<\/span>
\nThe controversy was “”what is the position with regard to an
\norder  made by a quasi-judicial authority in  the  undoubted
\nexercise of its jurisdiction in pursuance of a provision  of
\nlaw  which  is\tadmittedly intra vires ?”  It  was  in\tthat
\nconnection where the authority has inherent jurisdiction  to
\ndecide\tthe  matter and the law under which it\tproceeds  is
\nintra vires that the question arose whether the decision  of
\nsuch  an authority could be challenged by a  petition  under
\nArt.  32  on  the  sole\t ground\t that  it  was\tbased  on  a
\nmisconstruction\t  of  the  provision  of  law  or   of\t the
\nnotification  properly\tissued\tthereunder.   Five  of\t the
\nlearned\t judges\t composing  the\t Bench\tanswered  both\t the
\nquestions  raised  in that case in the negative.   Das,\t J.,
\nheld as follows :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “‘An order of assessment made by an  authority
\n\t      under  a taxing statute which is\tintra  vires
\n\t      and   in\t the  undoubted\t exercise   of\t its
\n\t      jurisdiction cannot be challenged on the\tsole
\n\t      ground that it is passed on a  misconstruction
\n\t      of a provision of the Act or of a notification
\n\t      issued  thereunder.  Nor can the validity\t ‘of
\n\t      such  an\torder be questioned  in\t a  petition
\n\t      under Art. 32 of the Constitution.”
\n\t      Kapur, J., held as follows
\n\t      “‘If the statute and its constitutionality  is
\n\t      not  challenged  then  every  part  of  it  is
\n\t      constitutionally\t  valid\t   including\t the
\n\t      provisions  authorising the levying of  a\t tax
\n\t      and the mode and procedure for assessment\t and
\n\t      appeals etc.  A determination of a question by
\n\t      a\t  Sales-Tax   Officer  acting\twithin\t his
\n\t      jurisdiction must be equally valid and  legal.
\n\t      In  such\ta case, an  erroneous  construction,
\n\t      assuming\tit is erroneous, is in respect of  a
\n\t      matter   which  the  statute  has\t given\t the
\n\t      authority\t complete  jurisdiction\t to  decide.
\n\t      The   decision  is  therefore  a\t valid\t act
\n\t      irrespective of its being erroneous,
\n\t       363<\/span>
\n\t      An  order\t of assessment passed  by  a  quasi-
\n\t      judicial\ttribunal  under a statute  which  is
\n\t      ultra   vires  cannot  be\t equated   with\t  an
\n\t      assessment order passed by that tribunal under
\n\t      an intra vires statute even though  erroneous.
\n\t      The  former being without authority of law  is
\n\t      wholly  unauthorised and has no  existence  in
\n\t      law and therefore the order is an infringement
\n\t      of  fundamental rights under Art. 19  (1)\t (f)
\n\t      and  (g) and can be challenged under Art.\t 32.
\n\t      The latter is not unconstitutional and has the
\n\t      protection of law being under the authority of
\n\t      a valid law and therefore it does not infringe
\n\t      any  fundamental right and cannot be  impugned
\n\t      under Art. 32.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Sarkar, J., agreed with Das and Kapur, JJ.
\n\t      Hidayatullah, J., held as follows:-
\n\t      “But  where  the law is made  validly  and  in
\n\t      conformity with the fundamental rights and the
\n\t      officer  enforcing it acts with  jurisdiction,
\n\t      other considerations arise.  If, in the course
\n\t      of  his duties, he has to construe  provisions
\n\t      of  law  and miscarries, it gives a  right  of
\n\t      appeal  and revision, where such lie and\tin
\n\t      other appropriate cases, resort can be had  to
\n\t      the  provisions  of Arts. 226 and 227  of\t the
\n\t      Constitution,  and the matter  brought  before
\n\t      this  Court  by  further\tappeals.   This\t  is
\n\t      because  every  erroneous decision  “does\t not
\n\t      give  rise to a breach of fundamental
\n\t      rights.\tEvery  right of appeal\tor  revision
\n\t      cannot be said to merge in the enforcement  of
\n\t      fundamental  rights.  Such errors can only  be
\n\t      corrected\t by  the processes  of\tappeals\t and
\n\t      revisions.   Art.\t 32  does  not,\t as  already
\n\t      stated,  confer  an  appellate  or  revisional
\n\t      jurisdiction on this Court, and if the law  is
\n\t      valid and the decision with jurisdiction,\t the
\n\t      protection of Art. 265 is
\n\t      364<\/span>
\n\t      not destroyed.  There is only one exception to
\n\t      this,  and  it lies  within  extremely  narrow
\n\t      limits.\t That  exception  also\tbears\tupon
\n\t      jurisdiction,  where by a misconstruction\t the
\n\t      State  Officer  or a  quasi-judicial  tribunal
\n\t      embarks upon an action wholly outside the pale
\n\t      of  the  law  he is enforcing.  if,  in  those
\n\t      circumstances.,\this  action  constitutes   a
\n\t      breach of fundamental rights, then a  petition
\n\t      under Art. 32 may lie.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Mudholkar,  J., summarised his conclusions  as
\n\t      below:-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      The  question of enforcement of a\t fundamental
\n\t      right will arise if a tax is assessed under  a
\n\t      law which is (a) void under Art. 13 or (b)  is
\n\t      ultra vires the Constitution, or (c) where  it
\n\t      is subordinate legislation, it is ultra  vires
\n\t      the law under which it is made or inconsistent
\n\t      with any other law in force.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      2.    A  similar question will also  arise  if
\n\t      the  tax\tis  assessed  and\/or  levied  by  an
\n\t      authority (a) other than the one empowered  to
\n\t      do so under the taxing law or (b) in violation
\n\t      of the procedure prescribed by the law or (c)in
\n\t      colourable exercise of the powers conferred by
\n\t      the law.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      3.    No\tfundamental  right is  breached\t and
\n\t      consequently no question of enforcing a funda-
\n\t      mental  right arises where a tax\tis  assessed
\n\t      and levied bona fled by a competent  authority
\n\t      under  a valid law by following the  procedure
\n\t      laid down by that law, even though it be based
\n\t      upon  an\terroneous construction\tof  the\t law
\n\t      except  when  by reason  of  the\tconstruction
\n\t      placed  upon  the law a tax  is  assessed\t and
\n\t      levied  which is beyond the competence of\t the
\n\t      legislature or is violative of the  provisions
\n\t      of Part III
\n\t       365<\/span>
\n\t      or  of any other provisions of  the  Constitu-
\n\t      tion.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      4.    A mere misconstruction of a provision of
\n\t      law  does not render the decision of a  quasi-
\n\t      judicial\ttribunal void (as being\t beyond\t its
\n\t      jurisdiction).   It is a good and valid  deci-
\n\t      sion  in law until and unless it is  corrected
\n\t      in  the appropriate manner.  So long  as\tthat
\n\t      decision stands, despite its being  erroneous,
\n\t      it  must be regarded as one authorised by\t law
\n\t      and  where, under such a decision a person  is
\n\t      held  liable top pay a tax that person  cannot
\n\t      treat  the decision as a nullity\tand  contend
\n\t      that  “what  is demanded of him  is  something
\n\t      which is not authorised by law.  The  position
\n\t      would  be the same even though upon  a  proper
\n\t      construction, the law under which the decision
\n\t      was given did not authorise such a levy.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Mudholkar,  J., therefore, agreed with Das, J., and  was  of
\nthe  view  that the two questions must be  answered  in\t the
\nnegative.\n<\/p>\n
The  other two learned judges, Subha Rao and Ayyangar,\tJJ.,
\ntook  the contrary view.  They were of the view\t that  there
\ncould be no valid distinction between an order passed by  an
\nauthority  without  jurisdiction,  in  the  sense  that\t the
\nauthority  is not duly constituted under the Act or that  it
\nhas inherent want of jurisdiction, and a wrong order  passed
\nby the authority on a misconstruction of the relevant provi-
\nsions  of  the Act; in either case if the  order  affects  a
\nfundamental  right it will be open to challenge by  petition
\nunder Art. 32 on the ground that by a wrong construction,  a
\nfundamental right either under Art. 19 (1) (f) or under Art.
\n19 (1) (g) is violated.\n<\/p>\n
It  will be seen from the above summary of the views of\t the
\nlearned Judges who constituted the majority that, though the
\nreasons given for coming to
\n366<\/span>
\ntheir  conclusion  were\t slightly different  they  were\t all
\nagreed\tthat  where  an order of assessment is\tmade  by  an
\nauthority with jurisdiction under a taxing statute which  is
\nintra  vires,  it is not open to challenge as  repugnant  to
\nArt.  19  (1) (g) on the sole ground that it is based  on  a
\nmisconstruction\t  of  a\t provision  of\tthe  Act  or  of   a
\nnotification issued thereunder and the validity of such ail
\norder  cannot be questioned in a petition under Art.  32  of
\nthe Constitution, though it may be open to question such  an
\norder on appeal or in revision in case’ the statute provides
\nfor that remedy or by a petition under Arts. 226 and 227  in
\nappropriate cases.\n<\/p>\n
The contention on behalf of the Union is that the orders  in
\nthe   present\tcase  are  orders  of  an   authority\twith
\njurisdiction  acting quasi-judicially and even if  they\t are
\nbased  on a misconstruction of para. 6 of S.R.O.  3315\tthey
\nwill  not be open to challenge by petition under Art. 32  of
\nthe  Constitution, whatever other remedies  the\t petitioners
\nmight  have  against them.  It is urged\t that  in  principle
\nthere is no difference between an order of assessment  under
\na  taxing  statute  and an order of  confiscation,  with  an
\nalternative penalty, for both are orders of a quasi-judicial
\nauthority  under a taxing statute which is intra vires;\t and
\nif  orders are passed with jurisdiction in either case\tthey
\nwill  not  be open to challenge under Art. 32  on  the\tsole
\nground\tthat  they  are passed on  a  misconstruction  of  a
\nprovision of an Act or a notification issued thereunder.
\nIt  has\t not  been  disputed that the  order  of  a  customs
\nauthority  imposing confiscation and penalties under s.\t 167
\n(8) of the Sea Customs Act (No. 8 of 1878) is quasi-judicial
\nand the customs authority has the duty to act judicially  in
\ndeciding the question of confiscation and penalty: (see\t Leo
\nRoy  Frey v. The Superintendent District Jail,\tAmritsar<\/a>(1).
\nBut it is urged on behalf of the petitioners that the orders
\nin this case were passed without inherent jurisdiction and
\n(1)  [1958] S. C. R. 822.\n<\/p>\n
 367<\/span><\/p>\n
would  thus  be\t open to challenge and\tin  this  connection
\nreliance  was  placed on the observations of Kapur,  J.,  in
\nUjjambai’s  case()  in connection with the decision  in\t the
\ncase  of  Messrs.  Universal Imports Agency.(2)\t Kapur,\t J.,
\nobserved  with\trespect to this decision that “in  any\tcase
\nthis  is  an  instance\tof  want  of  jurisdiction  to\t tax
\ntransactions  which the law excludes from the taxing  powers
\nof  the\t authority levying the tax”, though he\tpointed\t out
\nfurther that the question of the applicability of Art. 32 to
\nquasi-judicial\tdeterminations was not raised in that  case.
\nWith respect, it may be pointed out that as the question  of
\nthe  applicability  of Art. 32\tto  quasi-judicial  determi-
\nnations\t was  not  raised  at all in  the  case\t of  Messrs.
\nUniversal  Imports  Agency(), the Court had no\toccasion  to
\nconsider the question whether the authority in that case had
\ninherent  jurisdiction to decide the matter.   The  majority
\njudgment   on  which  the  petitioners\trely   has   nowhere
\nconsidered  the question whether the authority in that\tcase
\nsuffered from inherent lack of jurisdiction when it  decided
\nto  confiscate the goods imported and levy penalties in\t the
\nalternative.\tAll  that  the\tlearned\t counsel   for\t the
\npetitioners  could draw our attention to was a\tsentence  in
\nthe majority judgment to the following effect :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “We would, therefore, hold that paragraph 6 of
\n\t      the Order saves the transactions entered\tinto
\n\t      by  the petitioners and that  the\t respondents
\n\t      had no right to confiscate their goods on\t the
\n\t      ground   that  they  were\t  imported   without
\n\t      licence.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It is urged that when the majority said that the authorities
\nhad no right to confiscate the goods, it was meant that they
\nhad  no\t inherent  jurisdiction to do so.  As  we  read\t the
\nmajority  judgment, however, we do not find any warrant\t for
\ncoming\tto the conclusion that it was decided in  that\tcase
\nthat   the  authorities\t in  that  case\t had   no   inherent
\njurisdiction to confiscate the goods or impose penalties  in
\nlieu  thereof.\tIt is true that it was said in the  majority
\njudgment that
\n(1) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 305.\n<\/p>\n
368<\/span><\/p>\n
the  respondents  had no right to confiscate the  goods\t but
\nthat  was because just before in that very sentence  it\t was
\nheld  that  para.  6 of the Order  saved  the  transactions.
\nTherefore,  when  the majority in that case  said  that\t the
\nauthorities  had no right to confiscate the goods, all\tthat
\nwas meant was that the authorities had misconstrued para.  6
\nand  so\t confiscated  the  goods,  but\tthat  on  a  correct
\nconstruction  of  para. 6 they could not do so.\t  It  cannot
\ntherefore  he said that the majority decision in  that\tcase
\nwas based on lack of inherent jurisdiction.  The petitioners
\ntherefore  cannot  get\tout of the  decision  in  Ujjambai’s
\ncase(1)\t on the ground that the authorities who\t confiscated
\nthe  goods  and levied penalties in the alternative  in\t the
\npresent cases had no inherent jurisdiction to do so.
\nAs we have just indicated, the decision of this Court in the
\ncase  of Messrs.  Universal Imports Agency(2) was not  based
\non the ground that the appropriate authority who confiscated
\nthe  goods  lacked  inherent jurisdiction  to  do  so.\t The
\ndecision,  in  substance, proceeded on the  ground  that  in
\nexercising   the  said\tjurisdiction,  the   authority\t had
\nmisconstrued S.R.O. 3315.  The question as to whether a writ
\npetition under Art. 32 can lie on that ground was not raised
\nbefore the Court and has not been considered.  Therefore, it
\nseems  to  us, with respect, that the  observation  made  by
\nKapur J. in the case of Ujjambai(1) that the decision in the
\ncase  of  Messrs. (universal Imports  Agency(2)\t affords  an
\ninstance  of want of jurisdiction to tax transactions  which
\nthe  law  excludes from the taxing powers of  the  authority
\nlevying the tax, is not very accurate.\tSimilarly, it may be
\nadded that the inclusion of the said decision ‘~m the Est of
\njudgments  cited  by  ~Das,  J.,  which,  in  his   opinion,
\nillustrated categories of cases where executive\t authorities
\nhave  acted  without jurisdiction, is  also  not  justified.
\nSince  the point about the competence of the  writ  petition
\nwas  not  raised  or  considered  in  the  case\t of  Messrs.
\nUniversal Imports Agency,(2) it would
\n(1) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 30.\n<\/p>\n
 369<\/span><\/p>\n
not be accurate or correct to hold that that decision turned
\non the absence of jurisdiction of the appropriate authority.
\nIt is well known that after the decision of the Court in the
\ncase  of  Kailash  Nath\t v. State of  U.  P.,<\/a>(1)  some\twrit
\npetitions   were   entertained\ton  the\t ground\t  that\t the
\njurisdiction  of the Court under Art. 32 could\tbe  invoked
\neven  if a tribunal exercising quasi-judicial authority\t had
\nmisconstrued  the  law\tunder which  it\t purported  to\tact.
\nHaving\tregard to the decision of the Special Bench  in\t the
\ncase  of Ujjambai(2), these precedents have now\t lost  their
\nvalidity.\n<\/p>\n
Then  we  come\tto the question whether this is\t a  case  of
\nmisconstruction\t of  a provision of the law which  is  intra
\nvires by an authority acting under a taxing statute.  It  is
\ncontended  on  behalf  of the petitioners  that\t the  taxing
\nstatute\t in  this  case was the Sea a Customs  Act  and\t the
\nmisconstruction,  if  any, would be of para. 6 of S.  R.  O.
\n3315.  This in our opinion is not correct.  The Sea  Customs
\nAct was applied to Pondicherry by S. R. O. 3315.  This\tS.R.
\nO.  has six paragraphs.\t The first paragraph gives the\tname
\nof  the S. R. O. and the date from which it will  come\tinto
\nforce.\t The  second  paragraph\t defines  what\tare  “French
\nEstablishments”\t to which the S. R. O. was applicable.\t The
\nthird paragraph lays down that certain Acts mentioned in the
\nSchedule  which are twenty-two in number would apply to\t the
\nFrench\tEstablishments subject to certain  conditions  which
\nare not material.  Sub-paragraph (2) of para. 3 applies\t all
\nrules  under the various enactments in the Sehedule  to\t the
\nFrench Establishments.\tParagraph 4 lays down how references
\nin  any enactment, notification, rule, order  or  regulation
\napplied\t to the French Establishments have to be  construed.
\nParagraph 5 gives power to any Court, tribunal or  authority
\nrequired   or\tempowered   to\t enforce   in\tthe   French
\nEstablishments\tany enactment specified in the\tschedule  to
\nconstrue enactment with such alterations, not affecting the
\n(1) A. 1. R. (1957) S. C. 790.\t(2) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778.\n<\/p>\n
370<\/span><\/p>\n
substance, as may be necessary or proper.  Then comes  para.
\n6 which we have already set out.  It will be seen  therefore
\nthat  S. R. O. 3315 applied the Sea Customs Act and  certain
\nother\tActs   to  the\tFrench\t Establishments,   including
\nPondicherry,  and  para.  6 in particular is  similar  to  a
\nrepealing  and saving provision to be found in an Act  which
\nrepeals\t and  reenacts\tan  earlier  enactment.\t  It   would
\ntherefore  be  not  improper to read para. 6 as\t if  it\t was
\nincorporated  in each one of the twenty-two Acts which\twere
\nextended to the French Establishments by S. R. O. 3315.\t The
\nconstruction therefore of para. 6 of the S. R. O. which must
\nbe  deemed  to have been inserted in each one  of  the\tActs
\nmentioned in the Schedule would be a construction of the Sea
\nCustoms\t Act itself.  Original s. 2 in the Sea\tCustoms\t Act
\nprovided  for repeal of earlier enactments and\tfor  saving,
\n(though it no longer exists in the Act as it was repealed by
\nthe  Repealing\tAct No. 1 of 1938).  In\t effect,  therefore,
\npara. 6 of the S. R. O. would take the place of original  s.
\n2  of the Sea Customs Act.  Therefore, an interpretation  of
\npara.  6 of the S. R. O. which must be deemed to  have\tbeen
\ninserted  in the Sea Customs Act in place of original  s.  2
\nwould  be an interpretation of the Sea Customs Act.  So\t the
\ncontention that Ujjambai’s case(1) does not apply, for there
\nhas been no misconstruction of any of the provisions of\t the
\nSea  Customs Act, has no force.\t It may be added that it  is
\nnot disputed in this case that the Collector of Customs\t had
\ninherent jurisdiction to deal with this matter and the\tonly
\nattack\ton his order aid on the subsequent orders passed  in
\nappeal\tand revision is that they misconstrue the  provision
\nof para. 6 of the S. R. O.\n<\/p>\n
Finally,   it\tis  urged  that\t there\twas   in   fact\t  no
\nmisconstruction of the provisions of para. 6 of S.R.O.\t3315
\nin  these  cases and Ujjambai’s case(1) will  not  apply  to
\nthese  petitions.  Literally speaking, it masbe\t correct  to
\nsay that there was no actual miscoyn
\n(1)  [1963] 1 S. O. R. 778.\n<\/p>\n
 371<\/span><\/p>\n
truction  of para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315 in these cases by\t the
\nCollector  of  Customs.\t What had happened was, as  we\thave
\nalready indicated, that the petitioners tried to bring their
\ncase before him within the terms of the press communique  of
\nJanuary 5, 1955, by which certain concessions were  extended
\nto  genuine importers.\tThey therefore tried to\t prove\tthat
\nthey had placed firm orders before August 15, 1954, and\t had
\nalso  provided for foreign exchange to the extent  necessary
\nafter  receiving  authorisations  and  that  three  of\t the
\nconsignments  had  been shipped before the 1st\tof  November
\nwhile the other twenty-six could not be shipped before\tthat
\ndate for reasons beyond their control.\tThe petitioners thus
\nwanted\tto  take advantage of the concessions in  the  press
\ncommunique.   They  do not seem to have\t raised\t before\t the
\nCollector of Customs the question that even if they had\t not
\nplaced\tthe  orders before August 15, they  would  still  be
\nentitled to the benefit of para. 6 of S. R. O. 3315 if\tthey
\nhad  placed  the  orders before November  1,  1954  and\t had
\nreceived  authorisations from the French authorities  before
\nNovember  1, 1954, and had made arrangements to\t the  extent
\nnecessary  for\tforeign\t exchange  either  through  official
\nchannels  or through open market.  The Collector  considered
\nthe  case put forward by the petitioners namely,  that\tthey
\nhad placed firm orders before August 15, 1954, and held, for
\nreasons which we have already indicated, that that could not
\nbe  true.   The\t Collector therefore  refused  to  give\t the
\npetitioners  the  benefit of the press communique.   In\t the
\ncircumstances  the  Collector could not proceed\t further  to
\nconsider  that even if the orders were placed  after  August
\n15,  the petitioners would be protected by para. 6 of S.  R.
\nO. 3315.\n<\/p>\n
The  Board  in appeal however did not rest its\tdecision  on
\nthis.\tIt  held that as-the goods  were  actually  imported
\nafter  November\t 1, 1954, when\tlicence’  restrictions\twere
\nactually in force, the goods would be liable to confiscation
\nas imported,without licence.\n<\/p>\n
372<\/span><\/p>\n
This  decision,\t in effect, refused to give the\t benefit  of
\npara.  6  of S. R. O. 3315 to the petitioners. and  to\tthat
\nextent the paragraph can by implication be said to have been
\nmisconstrued by the Board.\n<\/p>\n
This  matter can therefore be looked at in two ways.  If  it
\nis  held that the petitioners rested their case on only\t the
\nground\tthat  they had placed the orders for  import  before
\nAugust\t15, 1954, and were thus entitled to the\t benefit  of
\nthe  press communique, the finding of the Collector  to\t the
\neffect\tthat  he was not prepared to believe that  case\t for
\nthree  reasons\tgiven  by him cannot be said  to  justify  a
\nprayer\tfor  a writ because it is a finding of fact;  and  a
\nwrit  cannot  issue even if the said finding  is  erroneous.
\nIf,  there.  fore,  that  was all that\twas  raised  by\t the
\npetitioners  before  the  authorities  concerned,  and\t the
\nauthorities concerned have found against the petitioners  on
\nthe  main  question of fact involved  in  their\t contentions
\nbefore\tthem,  it cannot be said that the  authorities\twere
\nwrong  in the view they took for the reasons given  by\tthem
\nand there would therefore be no question of any interference
\nunder Art. 32.\tFurther, if a petition under Art. 32 is\t not
\nmaintainable  when  a provision of law is  misconstrued,  it
\nwould  be much less maintainable when there is a mistake  of
\nfact though as we have indicated already, it cannot be\tsaid
\nin this case that the Collector was wrong in his  conclusion
\non the facts.\n<\/p>\n
The  petitioners’  case, as put forward in, this  Court,  is
\nthat even if firm orders were not placed be. fore August 15,
\n1954,  they were entitled to take advantage of the  judgment
\nof this Court in Messrs. Universal Imports Agency’s(1)\tcase
\nif  they had placed orders after obtaining the\tpatentes  in
\nSeptember  and had received authorisations and had  arranged
\nfor foreign exchange to the extent necessary before November
\n1,  1954.  If this is the case of the petitioners  now,\t and
\nthey want to succeed on it, it must
\n(1)[1961] 1 S. C. R. 305.\n<\/p>\n
 373<\/span><\/p>\n
be  held  that\tthe Board by  implication  negatived  it  in
\nappeal.\t  This\tcould only be done by a\t misconstruction  of
\npara.  6 of S. R. O . 3315, for if that paragraph  had\tbeen
\nrightly\t construed,  as\t held  by  this\t Court\tin   Messrs.
\nUniversal  Imports  Agency’s case, (1) the goods  would\t not
\nhave been confiscated.\n<\/p>\n
Therefore  the\tposition is this.  If the  petitioners\tonly
\nraise the claim based on the press communique that they\t had
\nplaced\tfirm orders before August 15, 1954, their claim\t has
\nbeen negatived on facts and we see no reason to differ\tfrom
\nthe conclusion of the Collector on the facts.  On the  other
\nhand, if the petitioners seem to have raised the case  which
\nthey  are  now\traising before us on the  basis\t of  Messrs.
\nUniversal  Imports Agency’s case (1) before the\t Board,\t the
\nBoard must be deemed to have turned down that claim and that
\ncould only be on the basis of the misconstruction of para  6
\nof  S.\tR. O. 3315.  The case, therefore, that\tis  now\t put
\nforward\t on  behalf of the petitioners before  us  would  be
\nabsolutely  analogous to the position in Ujjambai’s  case(2)
\nIn   that   case  the  assessing   authority   acting\twith
\njurisdiction upon a. misconstruction of a statute which\t was
\nintra  vires  or a notification properly  issued  thereunder
\nassessed  the  tax and it was held that such  an  assessment
\ncannot\tbe impugned as repugnant to Art. 19 (1) (f) and\t (g)
\non the sole ground that it was based on a misconstruction of
\na  provision  of the Act and the validity of such  an  order
\ncannot\tbe questioned in a petition under Art. 32.   In\t the
\npresent case, a similar quasi-judicial authority i. e.,\t the
\nBoard  acting  judicially within its  jurisdiction  must  be
\ndeemed\tto  have turned down by implication  the  contention
\nraised\ton  the\t basis\tof para 6  of  S.R.O.  3315  by\t the
\npetitioners  before  it and this could only be done  on\t the
\nmisconstruction of that paragraph in view of the decision in
\nMessrs.\t   Universal   Imports\tAqency’s  case\t (1).\t The
\npetitioners  however cannot question the validity  of  those
\norders\tby petition under Art. 32 of the  Constitution,\t for
\nthe Act under
\n(1) [ 1661] 1 S, C.  R. 305.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1963] 1 S. C. R, 778
\n374<\/span>
\nwhich  the orders were passed read with S.R.O. 3315  is\t not
\nassailed  as ultra, vires and the only ground on   which  it
\nis said that a fundamental right has been    violated\t  is
\nthat  there  has been by implication  a\t misconstruction  of
\npara.  6  of S. R. O. 3315 by the Board.  In that  view\t the
\ndecision  in Ujjambai’s case (1) will apply with full  force
\nto  the\t present  petitions.  We  therefore  hold  that\t the
\nvalidity.  of the orders impugned cannot be questioned in  a
\npetition  under Art. 32 of the Constitution.  The  petitions
\nare hereby dismissed with costs-one set of hearing costs.
\nDASs  GUPTA, J.–In sixteen petitions under Art. 32  of\t the
\nConstitution the petitioner, a merchant carrying on business
\nunder\tthe  name  and\tstyle,\tMessrs.\t  Eastern   Overseas
\n(Pondicherry), seeks relief against the orders by which\t the
\nCollector  of Customs purporting to act under s. 167 (8)  of
\nthe  Sea  Customs Act read with s. 3 (2) of the\t Import\t and
\nExport\tControl\t Act, 1947 directed  confiscation  of  goods
\nwhich  he  had imported into Pondicherry, at the  same\ttime
\ngiving\thim  option to pay in lieu  of\tconfiscation,  fines
\naggregating  in all 16 cases to Rs. 96,400\/-.\tThe  appeals
\nagainst\t these- orders to the Central Board of Revenue\twere
\nunsuccessful  except  that the penalty of fine\tpayable\t was
\nreduced to a total sum of Rs. 60,235\/-.\t The petitioner then
\nmoved  the Government of India for revision of these  orders
\nbut the revision applications were rejected.
\nShortly\t stated,  the petitioner’s case is that in  all\t the
\nsixteen cases he had concluded before November 1, 1954, firm
\ncontracts  with foreign suppliers for supply of these  goods
\nby  shipment  to Pondicherry and it was on  these  contracts
\nthat  the  goods in question were imported by him.   By\t the
\ndate the goods reached Pondicherry, the Sea Customs Act\t had
\nbecome\tapplicable  to Pondicherry as a result of  an  order
\nmade by the Government of India on October 30, 1954, the S..
\nR.  O.\tNo.  3315.  This order was made under s.  4  of\t the
\nForeign Jurisdiction
\n(1)  [1963] 1.S. C. R. 778,
\n375<\/span>
\nAct,  1947,in pursuance of the Indo-French  Agreement  under
\nwhich the administration of Pondicherry was vested with\t the
\nGovernment  of India from November 1, 1954.  Paragraph 6  of
\nthat order however contained a saving clause.  By reason  of
\nthat  the Sea Customs Act did not apply to the imports\tmade
\nby him.\t That paragraph is in these words :-\n<\/p>\n
“Unless otherwise specifically provided in the Schedule, all
\nlaws  in  force\t in the\t French\t Establishments\t immediately
\nbefore\tthe commencement of the order, which  correspond  to
\nenactments  specified in the Schedule, shall cease  to\thave
\neffect,\t save as respect things done, or omitted to be\tdone
\nbefore such commencement.”\n<\/p>\n
It was held by this Court in Universal Imports Agency v. The
\nChief Controller of Imports & Exports<\/a> (1) that\timportations
\nof goods into Pondicherry after November 1, 1954, would have
\nthe benefit of this saving clause, if the importation is  in
\npursuance of a contract concluded prior to November 1, 1954.
\nThe Court petitioner bases his case on the law as settled by
\nthis Court in the case mentioned above and contends that  as
\nthe  Sea Customs Act was not applicable to the\timportations
\nof the goods, in these sixteen cases, the importations being
\nin pursuance of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954,
\nthe orders of confiscation of his property and the orders of
\npenalty made upon him were illegal.  There has thus been  by
\nthese  orders  an invasion of the  petitioner’s\t fundamental
\nright under Art. 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution and for the
\nprotection of that right these petitions have been made.
\nThe  respondent contends that the basis of the\tpetitioner’s
\ncase  that the importations were in pursuance of a  contract
\nconcluded before November 1, 1954, has not been established.
\nApart  from this defence on merits, a preliminary  objection
\nis raised at the hearing on the authority of the decision of
\nthis
\n(1)..[1961] 1 S. C. R. 305,
\n376<\/span>
\nCourt  in  Smt.\t Ujjam Bai v. The State of U.P.<\/a>\t ()  that  a
\npetition  under Art. 32 does not lie.  The argument is\tthat
\nthe  order of confiscation and penalty has been made  by  an
\nauthority  under a statute which is intra vires and  in\t the
\nundoubted  exercise  of its jurisdiction.  The\tvalidity  of
\nsuch  an order cannot therefore be called in question  in  a
\npetition  under Art. 32 of the Constitution even though\t the
\nauthority may have misconstrued the provisions of Para. 6 of
\nS.R.O. 3315.\n<\/p>\n
In resisting the preliminary objection, Mr. N.C.  Chatterjee
\nhas  argued  on behalf of the petitioner that all  these  16
\ncases are cases of a quasi-judicial authority acting without
\nJurisdiction  and so, the decision in Ujjam Bai’s Case\t(1),
\nfar from creating any difficulty in the way of the issue  of
\na writ, definitely helps the petitioner.  It is not disputed
\nthat in deciding the preliminary objection the Court has  to
\nproceed on the basis that the petitioner’s allegations about
\nthe importations having been made on the basis of  contracts
\nconcluded  before  November  1,\t 1954,\tare  correct.\t The
\nnecessary consequence of this fact it is argued, is that the
\nSea   Customs  Act  would  not\tapply  to  these  cases\t  of
\nimportations  and consequently the Collector of Customs,  an
\nofficer,  who derives his jurisdiction from the Sea  Customs
\nAct,  would  have  no jurisdiction to  make  any,  order  in
\nrespect of them.  In my opinion, there is considerable force
\nin  the\t argument and the preliminary  objection  raised  on
\nbehalf of the respondent should fail.\n<\/p>\n
The  majority  decision\t in Ujjam Bai’s case  (1)  is  clear
\nauthority for the proposition, that an order of confiscation
\nor penalty made by an authority under a statutory  provision
\nwhich  is  intra vires cannot be questioned  in\t a  petition
\nunder Art. 32 of the Constitution on the ground that it\t has
\nbeen passed under a misconstruction of the provision of law,
\nprovided  the order is made “‘in the undoubted\texercise  of
\nits
\n(1)  [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778,
\n 377<\/span>
\njurisdiction.”\tUjjam Bai’s case also appears however to  be
\nequally\t clear\tauthority for the proposition  that  “‘if  a
\nquasi-judicial\t authority  acts  without  jurisdiction\t  or
\nwrongly assumes jurisdiction by committing an error as to  a
\ncollateral  fact  and  the  resultant  action  threatens  or
\nviolates a fundamental right the question of enforcement  of
\nthat  right arises and a petition under Art. 32\t will  lie.”
\nThis proposition has been recently reiterated by a Bench  of
\nfive  judges of this Court in The State Trading\t Corporation
\nof India v. The State of Mysore (Writ Petitions Nos.<\/a> 65\t and
\n66  of 1960.) In that case also an objection was  raised  on
\nthe authority of Ujjam Bai’s Case to the maintainability  of
\nwrit   petitions  under\t Art.  32  of\tthe   Constitution’.
\nRepelling the objection, Sarkar, J., speaking for the Court,
\nobserved :-.\n<\/p>\n
“It was however said that the petitions were incompetent  in
\nview of our decision in Ujjam Bai v. State of Uttar  Pradesh<\/a>
\n(1)  in as much as the Taxing Officer under the Mysore\tActs
\nhad  jurisdiction to decide whether particular sale  was  an
\ninter-State sale or not and any error committed by them as a
\nquasi-judicial\ttribunals in exercise of  such\tjurisdiction
\ndid  not  offend any fundamental right.\t But we\t think\tthat
\ncase is clearly distinguishable.  Das, J., there stated that
\n“‘if a quasi-judicial authority acts without jurisdiction or
\nwrongly assumes jurisdiction by committing an error as to  a
\ncollateral  fact  and  the  resultant  action  threatens  or
\nviolates a fundamental right, the question of enforcement of
\nthat right arises and a petition under Art. 32 will lie.” He
\nalso said that where a statute is intra vires but the action
\ntaken is without jurisdiction, then a petition under Art. 32
\nwould  be  competent.  That is the case here.  There  is  no
\ndispute\t that the taxing officer had no jurisdiction to\t tax
\ninter-State sales, there being a constitutional\t prohibition
\nagainst\t a  State taxing them.\tHe could  not  give  himself
\njurisdiction to do so by deciding a collateral fact wrongly.
\nThat is what he seems to
\n(1)..[1963] 1 S. C. R. 778.\n<\/p>\n
378<\/span><\/p>\n
have  done  here.,  Therefore,\twe  think  the\tdecision  in
\nUjjambai’s  case is not applicable to the present  case\t and
\nthe petitions are fully competent.”\n<\/p>\n
It is hardly necessary to cite any further authority for the
\nproposition that an inferior tribunal cannot give to  itself
\njurisdiction  by  deciding a collateral\t fact  wrongly.\t  I;
\nshall  only  refer  to the decision  in\t Rex  v.  Shoreditch
\nAssessment  Committee (1) where the matter was discussed  in
\npicturesque  language  thus  :\t“No  tribunal  of   inferior
\njurisdiction  can by its own decision finally decide on\t the
\nquestion  of  the existence or extent of  such\tjurisdiction
\n;……………     ………………\t  a    Court\twith
\njurisdiction  confined to the city of London  cannot  extend
\nsuch  jurisdiction  by\tfinding as a  fact  that  Piccadilly
\nCircus is in the ward of Chepe.”\n<\/p>\n
What  has  happened in the cases now before us is  that\t the
\nCollector  who has jurisdiction only in cases  coming  under
\nthe  Sea  Customs Act has assumed jurisdiction, on  a  wrong
\nfinding\t that  the Sea Customs Act applies to  these  cases,
\neven though in law it does not.\n<\/p>\n
There is no escape from the conclusion that on the authority
\nof  this  Court’s  decision in\tMessrs.\t  Universal  Imports
\nAgency\tv. The Chief Controller of Imports and Exports<\/a>\t(2),
\nthe  Sea Customs Act will not apply and the law formerly  in
\nforce  in  the\tFrench\tEstablishments,\t immediately  before
\nNovember   1,\t1954,  would  apply,  in  respect   of\t all
\nimportations into Pondicherry made on the basis of contracts
\nconcluded before November 1, 1954.  On the assumption which,
\nas   already  stated,  must  be\t made  in  considering\t the
\npreliminary objection, that the importations in these  cases
\nwere  made  on\tthe  basis  of\tcontracts  concluded  before
\nNovember  1, 1954, the irresistible conclusion is  that\t the
\nSea  Customs  Act  had no application to  these\t cases.\t  It
\nnecessarily  follows that the Collector of Customs had,,  on
\nthe
\n(1) [1910] 2 K. B. 859.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 305.\n<\/p>\n
 379<\/span><\/p>\n
above assumption of facts, no jurisdiction to make any order
\nin respect of these.  The fact that the Collector of Customs
\nthought,  in  exercising his functions as  a  quasi-judicial
\nauthority,  that  the  Sea  Customs  Act  did  apply  cannot
\npossibly affect this question.\n<\/p>\n
It appears that before the Collector the petitioner did\t not
\nseek to make the case which he now wants to make, viz., that
\nthe  contract for supply of the goods was made in all  these
\ncases  before  November 1, 1954.  Before the  Collector\t the
\npetitioner’s  case was that the contracts in all  the  cases
\nhad  been concluded before August 15, 1954.   The  collector
\ncame  to  the  conclusion that this  case,  viz.,  that\t the
\ncontracts had been concluded before August 15, 1954, had not
\nbeen  established.   It was in that view that  he  made\t the
\norders\tof  confiscation  with\tan  option  to\tpay  penalty
\ninstead.   It seems probable that in the appeals before\t the
\nCentral\t Board\tof Revenue and the  revisional\tapplications
\nbefore\tthe Government of India also the  petitioner’s\tcase
\nwas that the contracts had been concluded before August\t 15,
\n1954, and the case that the contracts were concluded  before
\nNovember  1,  1954, was not pleaded.   The  Member,  Central
\nBoard  of Revenue, in disposing of the appeals recorded\t his
\nview  that  it was not in doubt that the goods\tin  question
\nwere imported into Pondicherry at a time when a licence\t was
\nrequired  for  their import and that the appellant  did\t not
\nhave  such  a  licence.\t  In  that  view  he  affirmed\t the
\nCollector’s orders with a modification that the fine in lieu
\nof  confiscation be reduced.  The Government of\t India\talso
\nfound  no reason to interfere with the orders passed by\t the
\nCentral Board of Revenue.\n<\/p>\n
These  facts can however make no difference to the  position
\nin  law\t that if in fact the importations were made  on\t the
\nbasis  of contracts concluded before November 1,  1954,\t the
\nSea Customs Act would not
\n380<\/span>
\napply  and  the Collector or the Central  Board\t of  Revenue
\nwould have no jurisdiction to make any order of confiscation
\nor  penalty.  Where an authority whether judicial or  quasi-
\njudicial  has  in law no jurisdiction to make an  order\t the
\nomission  by  a\t party to raise\t before\t the  authority\t the
\nrelevant  facts for deciding that question cannot clothe  it
\nwith jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
The  substance of the matter is that the  Collector  assumed
\njurisdiction on the view that the Sea Customs Act applied to
\nthese  cases,  if  the importations were  on  the  basis  of
\ncontracts  concluded  before  November 1,  1954-as  we\thave
\nassumed,-the Sea Customs Act does not however apply to these
\ncases.\tTherefore, the Collector acted without\tjurisdiction
\nand  the fact that the assumption of jurisdiction was  based
\non  the\t Collector’s wrong decision, does  not\tchange\tthat
\nposition.    The   writ\t  petitions   would   therefore\t  be
\nmaintainable,  if the petitioner can satisfy the Court\tthat
\nthe  importations  were\t made  on  the\tbasis  of  contracts
\nconcluded before November 1, 1954.  I would therefore reject
\nthe preliminary objection.\n<\/p>\n
When  the Universal Imports Agency Case was decided by\tthis
\nCourt,\tno  objection  to the maintainability  of  the\twrit
\npetition was raised; and consequently, the Court had not  to
\nconsider  the  question\t whether the  action  taken  by\t the
\nCollector  of Customs was with or without jurisdiction.\t  So
\nlong  as  however  the\tlaw as laid  down  by  the  majority
\njudgment  in that case remains good law, we must  hold\tthat
\nthe  Sea  Customs Act would not apply to  imports  in  these
\ncases  also  if\t they were made on the\tbasis  of  contracts
\nconcluded  before November 1, 1954; and as explained  above,
\nthat in my opinion compels the conclusion that the Collector
\nof  Customs acted without jurisdiction, if the imports\twere
\non the basis of contracts concluded before November 1, 1954.
\nIt may be mentioned here in this connection that S.    K.
\nDas, J., in his judgment in Ujjam Bai’s Case (2)
\n(1) [1962] 1 S. C. R. 305.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1963] 1 S. C. R. 778
\n 381<\/span>
\nreferred to the decision of this Court in Universal  Imports
\nAgency\tv. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports<\/a> (1) as  a
\ncase  where  a quasi-judicial authority\t has  acted  without
\njurisdiction.  Kapur, J., has also referred to this case and
\nsaid   in  any\tcase,  this  is\t an  instance  of  want\t  of
\njurisdiction to tax transactions which the law excludes from
\nthe taxing powers of the authority levying the tax.”
\nComing now to the merits of the petitions, I need only state
\nthat the materials that have been produced by the petitioner
\nare  by no means sufficient to establish the case  that\t the
\ncontracts  in  these  several cases  were  concluded  before
\nNovember 1, 1954.  Mr. Chatterjee prayed to the Court for an
\nopportunity  to\t adduce\t further  documentary  evidence\t  to
\nconvince  us of the truth of the petitioner’s case  on\tthis
\npoint.\t I  might perhaps have been inclined to\t grant\tthis
\nprayer.\t  No  useful purpose will however be  served  by  my
\ndiscussing  Chat question, or the materials already  on\t the
\nrecord, as my learned brethren,. having come to a conclusion
\nthat  the  preliminary objection should\t succeed,  have\t not
\nconsidered the merits of the petition.\n<\/p>\n
The  position  is  exactly similar  in\tthe  other  thirteen
\npetitions  filed by M\/s.  Pioneer Traders which\t were  heard
\nalong with the petitions already discussed and my conclusion
\nin regard to those petitions is also the same.
\nBY  COURT : In accordance with the judgment of the  majority
\nof the Court, the petitions are dismissed with costs.  There
\nwill be one set of hearing costs.\n<\/p>\n
Petitions dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1961] 1 S. C. R. 305.\n<\/p>\n
382<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Pioneer Traders And Others vs Chief Controller Of Imports … on 27 September, 1962 Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 734, 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 349 Author: K Wanchoo Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Gajendragadkar, P.B., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Shah, J.C. PETITIONER: PIONEER TRADERS AND OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: CHIEF CONTROLLER OF IMPORTS […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-112862","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nPioneer Traders And Others vs Chief Controller Of Imports ... on 27 September, 1962 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/pioneer-traders-and-others-vs-chief-controller-of-imports-on-27-september-1962\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Pioneer Traders And Others vs Chief Controller Of Imports ... on 27 September, 1962 - 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