{"id":113120,"date":"1963-04-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1963-04-04T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963"},"modified":"2017-09-03T06:47:20","modified_gmt":"2017-09-03T01:17:20","slug":"the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963","title":{"rendered":"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) … vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) … vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 152, \t\t 1964 SCR (2) 859<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nTHE NEW MARINE COAL CO. (BENGAL) PRIVATE LTD.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n05\/04\/1963\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\n\nCITATION:\n 1964 AIR  152\t\t  1964 SCR  (2) 859\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1964 SC1714\t (10)\n R\t    1966 SC 580\t (9)\n R\t    1980 SC1285\t (18)\n RF\t    1980 SC1330\t (5)\n F\t    1987 SC1603\t (43)\n\n\nACT:\nGoods  delivered under illegal contract-Party receiving\t the\nsame  and  enjoying the benefit-Bound to  pay  compensation-\nEstoppel   by  negligence-Should  be   pleaded-Elements\t  of\nEstoppel by negligence-There must be a legal duty-Negligence\nmust be the proximate course-Government of India Act,  1935,\n(25  & 26, Geo. 5, ch. 42) s. 175 (3)-Indian  Contract\tAct,\n1872  (IX  of 1872), s. 70-Indian Evidence Act, 1872  (1  of\n1872), s. 115.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  appellant\tfiled  a suit on the Original  Side  of\t the\nCalcutta High Court against the respondent for the  recovery\nof a certain amount representing the price of coal  supplied\nto  the\t respondent.  The appellant's case was that  if\t the\ncontract  under which the coal was supplied was illegal\t by,\nreason\tof  it being in contravention of s. 175 (3)  of\t the\nGovernment of India Act, 1935, the respondent was liable  to\npay  compensation  under s. 70 of the Indian  Contract\tAct,\nsince  the  Coal  was  not  supplied  gratuitously  and\t the\nrespondent had enjoyed the benefit thereof.\nThe respondent's case was that the contract was illegal\t and\ns. 70 of the Indian Contract Act was not attracted.  It\t was\nfurther\t alleged  that the respondent had  issued  and\tsent\nbills to cover the amount and intimation cards in accordance\nwith  the  usual practice and ordinary course  of  dealings.\nThe  respondent, it was allowed paid the amount by a  cheque\nto a person authorised by the appellant and on\tpresentation\nof proper receipts.  It was therefore alternatively  pleaded\nthat the appellant's claim having been satisfied, he had  no\ncause of action.\nIt  was\t established  in the course of the  trial  that\t the\nappellant had not in fact authorised any person to issue the\nreceipts  but  a  certain  person  not\tconnected  with\t the\nappellant\n860\nfirm, without the consent or knowledge of the appellant\t got\nhold  of  the intimation cards and bills  addressed  to\t the\nappellant forged the documents and fraudulently received the\ncheque\tfrom the respondent and appropriated the amount\t for\nhimself.   The\trespondent had not pleaded  in\tits  written\nstatement that it was due to the negligence of the appellant\nthat the third person was able to get hold of the intimation\ncard and perpetrate the fraud.\tNeither was it proved in the\ncase that the appellant was in fact negligent.\nThe  Trial Judge found that the respondent was bound to\t pay\ncompensation  under  s. 70 of the Indian  Contract  Act\t and\nrejected the alleged payment of the bills and in the  result\ndecreed\t the  amount  prayed  for  by  the  appellant.\t The\nrespondent thereupon appealed to a Division Bench.  Both the\njudges agreed that the appeal should be allowed.   Regarding\nthe  invalidity of the agreement and the inapplicability  of\ns.  70 of the Contract Act both the Judges agreed in  favour\nof the present respondent.  But while one of the Judges\t was\nnot  prepared to consider the plea of negligence  which\t was\nraised\tby the present respondent for the first time in\t the\nappeal the other judge held that there was negligence on the\npart of the present appellant.\tThe present appeal was filed\non a certificate granted by the High Court.\nIn this Court, apart from the questions of the invalidity of\nthe contract under s. 175 (3) of the Government of India Act\nand  the applicability of s: 70 of the Contract Act, it\t was\nargued on behalf of the appellant that a plea of  negligence\nshould\thave been raised by the respondent in its  pleadings\nand that the appellate court was in error in allowing such a\nplea  to  be raised for the first time in  appeal.   It\t Was\ncontended further that in support of the plea of  negligence\nit  must  be shown that the party against whom the  plea  is\nraised owed a duty to the party who raises the plea and that\nthe  negligence must not be merely or  indirectly  connected\nwith  the misleading effect but must be the proximate  cause\nof the result.\nHeld that the contract is illegal and void.\nIf  in\tpursuance of the void contract,\t the  appellant\t has\nperformed  his\tpart  and the respondent  has  received\t the\nbenefit of the performance of the contract by the appellant,\ns.  70 of the Contract Act would justify the claim  made  by\nthe appellant against the respondent.\nState of West Bengal v, B. K . Mondal, [1962] Supp 1, S.  C.\nR. 876, referred to.\n 861\nSince a plea of negligence was not raised by the  respondent\nin the trial court the appellant is entitled to contend that\nit had no opportunity to meet this plea and dealing with  it\nin appeal has, therefore, been unfair to it.\nBefore\tinvoking  a  plea  of  estoppel\t on  the  ground  of\nnegligence,  some  duty must be shown to exist\tbetween\t the\nparties\t and negligence must be proved in relation  to\tsuch\nduty.\nThe Arnold v, The Cheque Bank, (1876) 1 C.P.D. 578, referred\nto.\nThe negligence alleged must be proved to be the proximate or\nthe immediate cause of the loss.\nBexendale v. Bennett, (1878) 3 Q. B. D. 525, referred to.\nThe  broad  proposition \"that whenever one of  two  innocent\npersons\t must suffer by the acts of a third, he who  enables\nsuch  third  person to occasion the loss, must\tsustain\t it\"\nlaid  down by Ashhurst, J., in Lickbarrow v. Mason, 2 T.  R.\n63,  on\t which one of the,Judges of the Division  Bench\t has\nbased his decision cannot be sustained as valid in law.\nCommonwealth  Trust  Ltd.  v.  Akotey,\t[1926]\tA.  C.\t 72,\nMercantile Bank of India Ltd. v. Central Bank of  India Ltd.\n(1937)\tL.  R.\t65 I. A. 75, R. E. Jones Ltd.  v.  Waring  &\nGillow Ltd., [1926] A. C. 670 and Farquharson Bros. & Co. v.\nKing & Co., [1902] A. C. 325, referred to.\nThe  appellant cannot be charged with negligence. which,  in\nturn,  can  be held to be the proximate cause  of  the\tloss\ncaused\tto the respondent.  The appellant is entitled to  be\ncompensated under s. 70 of the Contract Act.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 421 of 1961.
\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated December 24,\t1959
\nof  the Calcutta High Court in Appeal from  Original  Decree
\nNo. 181 of 1956.\n<\/p>\n
 M.  C. Setalvad, S. C. Ghose, J. B. Dadachanji, O.C. Mathur
\nand Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
862<\/span><\/p>\n
Bishan Narain and P. D, Xenon, for the respondent.
\n1963.  April 5. The judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nGAJENDRAGADKAR J.–This appeal arises out of a suit filed by
\nthe  appellant,\t the New Marine Coal (Bengal)  Private\tLtd.
\nagainst the respondent, the Union of India, on the  original
\nside  of the Calcutta High Court to recover Rs.\t 20,343\/8\/-.
\nThe  appellant’s case was that it had supplied coal  to\t the
\nBengal\tNagpur Railway Administration in the month  of.June,
\n1949, and the amount claimed by it represented the price  of
\nthe said coal and salestax thereon.  The appellant also made
\nan  alternative\t case, because it was apprehended  that\t the
\nrespondent  may urge that the contract sued on\twas  illegal
\nand  invalid since it did not comply with s.175 (3)  of\t the
\nGovernment  of\tIndia  Act, 1935.   Under  this\t alternative
\nclaim, the appellant alleged that the coal had been supplied
\nby  the appellant not intending so to do  gratuitously,\t and
\nthe respondent had enjoyed the benefit thereof, and so,\t the
\nrespondent  was bound to make compensation to the  appellant
\nin the form of the value of the said Coal under s. 70 of the
\nIndian\tContract Act.  The appellant’s case was\t that  since
\nthe said amount had to be paid to it at its Esplanade office
\nin  Calcutta, the original side of the Calcutta\t High  Court
\nhad  jurisdiction to entertain the said suit.  Since a\tpart
\nof the cause of action had accrued outside the limits of the
\noriginal  jurisdiction\tof  the\t Calcutta  High\t Court,\t the
\nappellant obtained leave to see under cl. 12 of the  Letters
\nPatent.\n<\/p>\n
In  its\t written  statement,  the  respondent  admitted\t the
\ndelivery   of  the  coal  to  the  Bengal   Nagpur   Railway
\nAdministration and did not dispute the appellant’s case that
\nit had forwarded to the
\n 863<\/span>
\nrespondent  bills  in  regard to the amount  alleged  to  be
\npayable\t  to  the  appellant  for  the\tsaid  supply.\t The
\nrespondent, however, pleaded that the contract on which\t the
\nsuit  was based was illegal inasmuch as it had been  entered
\ninto  in contravention of the provisions of s. 175  (3)\t of’
\nthe Government of India Act, 1935; and it was urged that  s.
\n70 of the Indian Contract Act had no application.   Besides,
\nthe respondent alleged that following the usual practice and
\ncourse\tof dealings between the parties, an intimation\tcard
\nwas  issued  and  sent to the appellant\t by  the  respondent
\nrequesting  the appellant to obtain payment on\tpresentation
\nof  a  proper  receipt and authority against  its  bills  in
\nquestion.   Thereafter,\t the respondent, on receipt  of\t the
\nsaid intimation card and a proper receipt executed on behalf
\nof the appellant, paid the amount covered by the said  bills
\nby  an ‘account payee’ cheque on the Reserve Bank  of  India
\ndrawn in favour of the appellant which was delivered to\t the
\nperson\tpurporting to have authority to receive\t payment  on
\nbehalf of the appellant.  The respondent thus  alternatively
\npleaded\t satisfaction of the claim, and so, urged  that\t the
\nappellant had no cause of action for the suit.
\nOn these pleadings, seven substantive issues were framed  by
\nthe learned trial judge.  Issues I & 2 which were framed  in
\nrespect of the jurisdiction of the Court were not pressed by
\nthe  respondent, and so, no findings were recorded on  them.
\nOn  issue  No.\t3 the learned trial  judge  found  that\t the
\ncontract on which the appellant based his claim was  invalid
\nand  unenforceable.   Issue No. 4 in regard to\tthe  alleged
\npayment\t of the bills was found against the respondent.\t  On
\nissue  No. 5, the trial Court held that the  respondent\t was
\nbound to pay -to the appellant the amount claimed by way  of
\ncompensation.\tIssue No. 6 which was raised by the  respon-
\ndent  under  s. 80 of the Code of Civil\t Procedure  was\t not
\npressed, and therefore, no finding was recorded
\n864<\/span>
\non  it,\t Issue\tNo. 7 which was framed\ton  the\t appellant’s
\nallegation   that  its\tclaim  had  been  admitted  by\t the
\nrespondent  was\t answered  against the\tappellant.   In\t the
\nresult, the main finding on issue No. 5 decided the fate  of
\nthe  suit  and since the said finding was in favour  of\t the
\nappellant,  a decree was passed directing the respondent  to
\npay to the appellant Rs. 20,030\/81-.  This amount, according
\nto  the\t decree,  had to carry interest at  the\t rate  of  6
\nPercent per annum.\n<\/p>\n
This  decree was challenged by the respondent by  an  appeal
\nbefore a Division Bench of the said High Court.\t The  appeal
\nwas  heard by P. B. Mukarji and Bose JJ.  Both\tthe  learned
\njudges agreed that the respondent’s appeal should be allowed
\nand  the appellant’s claim dismissed with costs,  but  their
\ndecision was based on different grounds.  Bose J. held\tthat
\nthe contract sued on was invalid and that the claim made  by
\nthe  appellant\tfor compensation under s. 70 of\t the  Indian
\nContract  Act was not sustainable.  He also found  that\t the
\nappellant’s  contention\t that the said\tcontract  which\t was
\ninitially  invalid  had\t been duly ratified,  had  not\tbeen
\nproved.\t it  is on these grounds that Bose J.  came  to\t the
\nconclusion that the appellant’s claim could not be  granted.
\nIncidentally, it may be added that Bose J., was not prepared
\nto  consider the plea of negligence which was raised by\t the
\nrespondent for the first time in appeal.\n<\/p>\n
Mukarji,  J.,  who delivered the principal judgment  of\t the
\nAppeal\tCourt  agreed  with  Bose J.  in  holding  that\t the
\ncontract  was  invalid\tand s.\t70  was\t inapplicable.\t He,
\nhowever, took the view that the said contract had been\tduly
\nratified and so, he proceeded to examine the question as  to
\nwhether\t the appellant’s claim was justified on the  merits.
\nOn  this part of the case, the learned judge took  the\tview
\nthat  even  if both the appellant and the  respondent.\tdent
\nwere held to be innocent, since the respondent
\nAppeal dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
 865<\/span><\/p>\n
had  actually parted with the money, the appellant  was\t not
\nentitled  to  require the respondent to pay  over  the\tsaid
\nmoney again, because he thought that as held by Ashhurst  J.
\nin  Lickbarrow\tv.  Mason  (1), it  was\t a  well  recognised
\nprinciple of law “that whenever one of two innocent per-sons
\nmust  suffer  by the acts of a third, he  who  enables\tsuch
\nthird  person to occasion the loss must sustain it.” In\t the
\nopinion\t of the learned judge, the intimation card had\tbeen
\nduly sent by post by the respondent to the appellant and the
\nfact  that the said intimation card went  into\tunauthorised
\nhands of dishonest persons who used it fraudulently for\t the
\npurpose\t of  obtaining a cheque for the amount\tin  question
\nfrom  the respondent, showed that the appellant had  by\t his
\nnegligence enabled the said fraudulent persons to secure the
\ncheque,\t and so, it was not open to the appellant  to  claim
\nthe amount from the respondent.\t It is on these grounds that
\nMukharji,   J.,\t allowed  the  appeal  and   dismissed\t the
\nappellant’s  suit with costs.  It is against  this  judgment
\nand -degree that the appellant has come to this Court with a
\ncertificate granted by the said High Court.
\n In the courts below, elaborate arguments were urged by\t the
\na  ties\t on  the question as to whether\t the  contract,\t the
\nsubject-matter of the Suit, was invalid and if yes,  whether
\na  claim  for compensation made by the\tappellant  could  be
\nsustained  under  s. 70 of the Indian  Contract\t Act.\tBoth
\nthese  questions are concluded by a recent decision of\tthis
\nCourt in the State of We,-RI Bengal v. MIS.  B. K. Mondal  &
\nSons<\/a>  (2).   As a result of this decision, there can  be  no
\ndoubt  that the contract on which the suit is based is\tvoid
\nand unenforceable, and this part of the decision is  against
\nthe appellant.\tIt is also clear under this decision that if
\nin  pursuance of the said void contract, the  appellant\t has
\nperformed  his\tpart  and the respondent  has  received\t the
\nbenefit of the performance of the contract by the appellant,
\n(1) 2 T. R. 63, 70.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1962] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 876.\n<\/p>\n
866<\/span><\/p>\n
section\t 70  would justify the claim made by  the  appellant
\nagainst\t the  respondent.  This part of the decision  is  in
\nfavour\tof  the appellant.  It is therefore  unnecessary  to
\ndeal with this aspect of the matter at length.
\nAssuming  then that the appellant is entitled to  claim\t the
\namount from the respondent, two questions still remain to be
\nconsidered.   The first question is whether  the  intimation
\ncard  on  the  production of  which  the  respondent  always
\nproceeded  to’ issue a cheque against the bills received  by
\nit from the appellant, was received by the appellant or not,
\nand  if\t this question is answered in the  affirmative,\t the
\nother  question which will call for our decision is  whether
\nby  virtue  of the fact that after the intimation  card\t had
\nbeen duly posted by the respondent to the appellant it\tfell
\ninto  dishonest\t hands\tand was fraudulently  used  by\tsome
\npersons, that would create an impediment -in the way of\t the
\nappellant’s  claim  on\tthe ground that\t the  appellant\t was
\nnegligent  and\this  negligence\t creates  estoppel.   Before
\naddressing  ourselves  to  these  questions,  it  would\t  be
\nnecessary  to set out the material facts as to the  dispatch
\nof the intimation card and the fraudulent use which was made
\nof  it\tby persons in whose hands the said card\t appears  to
\nhave  fallen.\tIt appears that according  to  the  ordinary
\ncourse\tof  business,  on  receiving  the  bills  from\t the
\nappellant, the respondent used to send an intimation card to
\nthe  appellant and the said card had to be sent back by\t the
\nappellant  with\t a  person  having  the\t authority  of\t the
\nappellant to receive the payment and when it was so produced
\nbefore\tthe respondent, a cheque used to be issued.  In\t the
\npresent\t case, it is common ground that a bill was  sent  by
\nthe appellant to the respondent making a total claim of\t Rs.
\n20,343\/8\/-  on August 18, 1949.\t Thereafter, on October\t 10,
\n1949,  the  respondent\tsent  the  intimation  card  to\t the
\nappellant  addressed at its place of business  135,  Canning
\nStreet, Calcutta.  This card intimated to the appellant
\n 867<\/span>
\nthat its claim for the amount specified in its bill would be
\npaid  on  presentation\tof a proper  receipt  and  authority
\nbetween\t 11 A.M. to 3 P.M. on ordinary days and\t between  11
\nA.M.  to 1 P. M. on Saturdays.\tAlong with the card, a\tform
\nof the receipt was sent and the appellant was asked to\tsign
\nit.   This intimation card was duly posted.  Later, one\t Mr.
\nB.  L,\tAggarwal  produced the intimation  card\t before\t the
\nrespondent.   In doing so he produced an  endrosement  which
\npurported  to show that the appellant had authorised him  to
\nreceive the payment on its behalf.  When the intimation card
\nwith the appropriate authority was shown to the\t respondent,
\nMr.  Aggarwal  was  asked to pass a  receipt  and  when\t the
\nreceipt\t was  passed in the usual form, an  ‘account  payee’
\ncheque\tfor  the amount in question was given to  him.\t Mr.
\nAggarwal took the cheque and left the respondent’s office.
\nMeanwhile,  it appears that some persons had entered into  a
\nconspiracy  to\tmake fraudulent use of the  intimation\tcard
\nwhich  had gone into their custody.  In order to  carry\t out
\nthis  conspiracy, they purported to form a  limited  company
\nbearing\t the  same  name  as  that  of\tthe  appellant.\t   A
\nresolution purported to\t have  been passed by the  Directors
\nof  this fictitious company on October 17,  1949  authorised
\nthe  opening of an account in favour of the Company  in\t the
\nUnited\tCommercial  Bank Ltd.,\tCalcutta.   This  resolution
\npurported  to  be  signed by the Chairman of  the  Board  of
\nDirectors  Mr. Abinash Chander Chatterji.  Armed  with\tthis
\nresolution  an, application was made to open an\t account  in
\nthe  United  Commercial Bank Ltd., and while doing  so,\t the
\nArticles of Association purporting to be the Articles of the
\nsaid  fictitious Company were produced and the\taccount\t was
\nopened\twith a cheque of Rs. 500\/- on October 27, 1949.\t  On
\nOctober 26, 1919, the cheque received from the
\n868<\/span>
\nrespondent  was credited in the said account, and as was  to
\nbe  expected, withdrawals from this account, began in  quick
\nsuccession,  with the result that by November 1, 1949,\tonly
\nRs. 68\/- were left in this account.  That, in brief, is\t the
\nstory  of the fraud which has been committed in\t respect  of
\nthe cheque issued by the respondent to the appellant for the
\nbill dated August 18, 1949.\n<\/p>\n
In  the\t Courts\t below, the appellant  denied  that  it\t had
\nreceived the intimation card from the respondent,and it\t was
\nalleged\t on its behalf that in delivering the cheque to\t the
\nperson\twho  presented\tthe said  card\twith  the  authority
\npurporting  to have been issued by the appellant, it  cannot
\nbe  said  that the respondent bad given the  cheque  to\t any
\nperson\tauthorised by the appellant, and so,  the  appellant
\nwas justified in saying that it had not received the payment
\nfor  its  bill.\t  In  support of  its  case,  the  appellant
\nexamined  its  Director., Mr. Parikh and  its  officer,\t Mr.
\nBhat.\tThe  respondent led no oral evidence;  it,  however,
\nrelied on the fact that the intimation card bore the  postal
\nmark  which showed that it had been posted and it was  urged
\nthat the said postal mark raised a presumption that the card
\nwhich had been duly posted in the Post office must have,  in
\nordinary  course,  reached the addressee.  The\ttrial  Court
\nnoticed\t the fact that the intimiation card did not  bear  a
\ncorresponding  delivery mark as it should have, and it\ttook
\nthe  view that the onus was on the respondent to  show\tthat
\nthe  said card had in fact been delivered to the  appellant.
\nIt  then considered the oral evidence adduced by  the  appe-
\nllant  and having regard to the fact that. no  evidence\t had
\nbeen  led by the respondent, it came to the conclusion\tthat
\nthe  respondent\t had failed in showing that  the  intimation
\ncard   had   been   duly   delivered   to   the\t  appellant.
\nSubstantially ‘ it is on the basis of this finding that\t the
\ndecree\twas  passed  by the trial Court\t in  favour  of\t the
\nappellant.\n<\/p>\n
 869<\/span><\/p>\n
In  appeal,  Mukarji,  J.  took the  view,  and\t we  think.,
\nrightly,  that\tthe  posting of the card  having  been\tduly
\nproved, a presumption arose that it must have been delivered
\nto the addressee in ordinary course.  He also considered the
\noral  evidence given by Mr. Parikh and Mr. Bhat and was\t not
\nsatisfied  that\t it  was trustworthy.\tIn  particular,\t the
\nlearned\t judge\twas  inclined  to take\tthe  view  that\t Mr.
\nParikh’s  statement  that  his office  did  not\t employ\t any
\ndispatch clerk and did not keep any Chiti note-book like the
\nInward\tand  Outward  Register\twas  unbelievably.   In\t the
\nresult,\t he made a finding that the appellant was  negligent
\nin receiving, arranging, recording and dealing with  letters
\naddressed to it.\n<\/p>\n
The position of the evidence in respect of this point is  no
\ndoubt unsatisfactory.  It appears that Mr. Parikh who is the
\nDirector  of  the appellant Company since 1948 is  also\t the
\nDirector of K. Wara Ltd. which manages eight collieries like
\nthat of the appellant.\tK. Wara Ltd., has its office at 135,
\nCanning\t Street.  The appellant Company also has one  office
\nat the said place.  A Post Box in which letters addressed to
\nthe  appellant\tand K. Wara Ltd. could be dropped  has\tbeen
\nkept  on the ground floor of the building in which the\tsaid
\noffices\t are  situated.\t  The said Post Box  is\t locked\t and
\nnaturally the key is given to one or the other of the  Peons
\nto  open the said Box and take out the letters\tand  deliver
\nthem  to  Mr. Parikh Mr. Parikh’s evidence  shows  that\t his
\ndenial that be had received any intimation card could not be
\naccepted  at its face value for two reasons; the  first\t was
\nthat  even if the intimation card had been received  by\t the
\nPeon  and had not been delivered by him to Mr.\tParikh,\t Mr.
\nParikh\twould not know that the card had been  received\t and
\nthough\this  statement that he did not get the card  may  be
\nliterally true,, it would not be true in the sense that\t the
\ncard had not been delivered to the
\n870<\/span>
\nappellant Company.  Besides., Mr. Parikh’s statement that he
\ndid  not  employ  any dispatch clerk and kept no  inward  or
\noutward\t register  is  prima  facie  unbelievable,  and\t so,
\nMukarji J.was inclined to hold that the intimation card\t may
\nhave been received by the appellant Company.Having     made
\nthis finding,  Mukarji J. proceeded to examine the  true
\nlegal position in regard to the appellant’s claim, and as we
\nhave already observed,he held that since the appellant\twas
\nguilty of negligence which facilitated\tthe  commission\t  of
\nthe offence by some strangers,it was precluded from making a
\nclaim against the  respondent.As we have already seen, Bose,
\nJ.  has\t put  his decision on the  narrow  ground  that\t the
\ncontract  was invalid and s. 7o did not help the  appellant.
\nThat   ground,\thowever,  cannot  now  sustain\t the   final
\nconclusion  of\tBose,J., in view of the recent\tdecision  of
\nthis  Court  in the case of M\/s.  B. K. Mondal\t&  Son’s(1).
\nTherefore, in dealing with the present appeal,we will assume
\nthat  the  finding recorded by Mukarji J.,  is\tcorrect\t and
\nthat  the  intimation  card sent by the\t respondent  to\t the
\nappellant  can\tbe  deemed to have  been  delivered  to\t the
\nappellant.  The question which arises for our decision\tthen
\nis:if the intimation  card was thereafter taken by  somebody
\nelse  and  fraudulently used,does that\tcreate\tan  estoppel
\nagainst\t the appellant in regard to the claim made by it  in
\nthe present case ?\n<\/p>\n
In dealing with this point, it is necessary to bear in\tmind
\nthat  though  the  evidence  given  by\tMr.  Parikh  may  be
\nunsatisfactory\tand may.justify the conclusion that  despite
\nhis  denial, the intimation card may have been delivered  to
\nMr. Parikh, it is not the respondent’s case that Mr.  Parikh
\ndeliberately allowed either one of his employees or somebody
\nelse to make fraudulent use of the said intimation card.  In
\nother  words, we must deal with the point of law  raised  by
\nthe appellant on the basis that Mr. Parikh had no connection
\nwhatever with the
\n(1)  [1962] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 876.\n<\/p>\n
 871<\/span><\/p>\n
fraud committed on the respondent and that whoever  obtained
\nthe intimation card from Mr. Parikh’s office and used it for
\na fraudulent purpose acted on his own without the  knowledge
\nor consent of Mr. Parikh.  The short question which falls to
\nbe  considered\tis  if\tthe  arrangement  for  keeping\t the
\nintimation  card  in  safe  custody  was  not  as  good\t and
\neffective  as  it should have been and somebody\t managed  to
\npilfer the said card, does it justify the respondent’s\tcase
\nthat  the  appellant  was negligent and\t by  virtue  of\t its
\nnegligence, it is estopped from making the present claim ?
\nIn  dealing with this question, it is necessary to  remember
\nthat the plea of negligence on which estoppel was pleaded by
\nthe respondent against the appellant had not been alleged in
\nthe written statement.\tIt is remarkable that the  pleadings
\nof  both  the parties completely ignored the fact  known  to
\nboth of them before the present suit was filed that a cheque
\nhad been issued by the respondent and had been\tfraudulently
\nused  by some strangers.  The appellant in its\tplaint\tdoes
\nnot  refer to the issue of the cheque and its fradulent\t use
\nand makes a claim as though the respondent had not  honoured
\nthe  bill  submitted  to it by the  appellant;\twhereas\t the
\nrespondent  in its written statement ignores the  fact\tthat
\nthe  cheque had not been received by the appellant  but\t had
\nbeen  fraudulently  obtained  and  encashed  by\t some  other
\npersons.   That being the nature of the pleadings  filed  by
\nthe  parties in the Trial Court, neither party\tpleaded\t any
\nnegligence  against  the other.\t It is true  that  both\t the
\nparties argued the point of negligence against each other in
\nthe   appellate\t Court.\t  The  appellant  urged\t  that\t the
\nrespondent  should  not\t have delivered the  cheque  to\t the
\nperson\twho  presented\tthe bill  and  the  intimation\tcard
\nbecause a stamped receipt had not been produced by the\tsaid
\nperson as it should have been; the appellant’s case was that
\nit was usual that
\n872<\/span>
\na   stamped  receipt  had  to  be  produced  alongwith\t the
\nintimation card by a person duly authorised by the appellant
\nbefore\tthe cheque was delivered to him and since without  a
\nstamped\t  receipt  the\tcheque\thad  been   delivered,\t the
\nrespondent  was guilty of negligence.  This point  has\tbeen
\nrejected by Mukarji J., but that is another matter.
\nOn the other hand, the respondent pleaded that the appellant
\nwas negligent inasmuch as the intimation card which had been
\nsent to it and which must be presumed to have been delivered
\nto  it\tfell  into  the hands  of  strangers  owing  to\t the
\nnegligent  manner  in  which it was  handled  after  it\t was
\ndelivered in the Letter Box of the appellant in 135, Canning
\nStreet,\t Calcutta.   As we have already noticed,  Bose,\t J.,
\nrefused\t to entertain the plea of negligence urged  by\tboth
\nthe  parties, whereas Mukarji J., considered it and  made  a
\nfinding\t in  favour  of\t the  respondent  and  against\t the
\nappellant.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. Setalvad contends that a plea of negligence should\thave
\nbeen  raised  by  the respondent in its\t pleadings  and\t the
\nappellate Court was, therefore, in error in allowing such  a
\nplea  to  be raised for the first time in  appeal.   In\t our
\nopinion, there is some force in this contention.  Negligence
\nin  popular  language and in common sense means\t failure  to
\nexercise  that\tcare and diligence which  the  circumstances
\nrequire.  Naturally what amounts to negligence would  always
\ndepend\tupon the circumstances and facts in  any  particular
\ncase.\tThe  nature of the contract,  the  circumstances  in
\nwhich  the performance of the contract by one party  or\t the
\nother  was  expected,  the degree  of  diligence,  care\t and
\nattention  which,  in ordinary course, was  expected  to  be
\nshown  by  the parties to the  contract,  the  circumstances
\nunder  which  and the reason for which failure to  show\t due
\ndiligence  occurred  are all facts which would\tbe  relevant
\nbefore a judicial finding can be made on the plea
\n 873<\/span>
\nof negligence.\tSince a plea of negligence was not raised by
\nthe respondent in the trial Court, the appellant is entitled
\nto contend that it had no opportunity to meet this plea\t and
\ndealing with it in appeal has, therefore, been unfair to it.
\nApart.\tfrom  this aspect of the matter,  there\t is  another
\nserious\t objection  which  has been taken  by  Mr.  Setalvad
\nagainst the view which prevailed with Mukarji, J. He  argues
\nthat when a plea of estoppel on the ground of negligence  is
\nraised, negligence to which reference is made in support  of
\nsuch  a\t plea  is not the negligence  as  is  understood  in
\npopular\t language  or in common sense ; it has\ta  technical
\ndenotation.  In support of a plea of estoppel on the  ground
\nof negligence, it must be shown that the party against\twhom
\nthe  plea is raised owed a duty to the party who raises\t the
\nplea.  just  as\t estoppel can be pleaded on  the  ground  of
\nmisrepresentation  or  act or omission, so can\testoppel  be
\npleaded on the ground of negligence ; but before such a plea
\ncan   succeed,\tnegligence  must  be  established  in\tthis
\ntechnical sense . As Halsbury has observed : “before  anyone
\ncan be estopped by a representation inferred from  negligent
\nconduct,  there must be a duty to use due care\ttowards\t the
\nparty  misled, or towards the general public of which he  is
\none  (1).”  There  is another requirement which\t has  to  be
\nproved before a plea of estoppel on the ground of negligence
\ncan  be upheld and that requirement is that “the  negligence
\non  which it is based should not be indirectly\tor  remotely
\nconnected with the misleading effect assigned to it but must
\nbe  the\t proximate  or\treal  cause  of\t that  result  (2).”
\nNegligence, according to Halsbury, which can sustain a\tplea
\nof estoppel must be in the transaction itself and it  should
\nbe  so connected with the result to which it led that it  is
\nimpossible to treat the two separately.\t This aspect of\t the
\nmatter has not been duly examined by Mukarji J. when he made
\nhis finding against the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
(1)  Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 15, page 243. par& 451.
\n(2)  Halsbury’s Laws of England Vol. 15 page 245 para 453,
\n874<\/span>
\nMukarji,  J.  thought  that  the  principle  laid  down\t  by
\nAshhurst, J. in the case of Lackbarrow (1), was a broad\t and
\ngeneral principle which applied to the facts in the  present
\ncase.\tIt  may\t be conceded that as  it  was  expressed  by
\nAshhurst, J., in the case of Lickbarrow, the proposition  no
\ndoubt  has  been  stated  in a\tbroad  and  general  manner.
\nIndeed,\t the same proposition has been affirmed in the\tsame
\nbroad  and general way by the Privy Council in\tCommonwealth
\nTrust Ltd. v. Akotey (2).  In that case, the respondent\t who
\nwas a grower of cocoa in the Gold Coast Colony, consigned by
\nrailway 1050 bags of cocoa to L., to whom he had  previously
\nsold  cocoa.  Before a difference as to the price  had\tbeen
\nsettled\t L. sold the cocoa to the appellants and handed\t the
\nconsignment notes to their agent, who reconsigned the  cocoa
\nto the appellants.  The appellants bought in good faith\t and
\nfor the full price.  The respondent then sued the appellants
\nfor  damages  for  conversion.\tIt was\theld  by  the  Privy
\nCouncil\t that  by his conduct the respondent  was  precluded
\nfrom setting up his title against the appellants, and so his
\nclaim  was  rejected.  In support of the view taken  by\t the
\nPrivy  Council,\t reliance  was\tplaced\ton  the\t  well-known
\nstatement  of Ashhurst, J., in the case of  Lickbarrow)\t 1),
\nand  so,  it  may  be  conceded\t that  the  broad  principle
\nenunciated by Ashhurst,J., received approval from the  Privy
\nCouncil.\n<\/p>\n
Subsequently,  however, this question has  been\t elaborately
\nexamined  by the Privy Council in Mercantile Bank  of  India
\nLtd. v. Central Bank of India Ltd., (1), and the validity of
\nthe  broad  and general proposition to which  we  have\tjust
\nreferred  has been seriously doubted by the  Privy  Council.
\nLord  Wright  who  delivered  the  judgment  of\t the  Board,
\nreferred to the decision in the case of Lickbarrow (1),\t and
\nobserved “‘that it may well be that there were facts in that
\ncase not fully elucidated in the report which would  justify
\nthe decision; but on the
\n(1) 2 T.R. 63, 70.  (2) [1926] A.C. 72.\n<\/p>\n
(3) (1937) L.R. 65 I.A. 75, 86,
\n 875<\/span>
\nface of it their Lordships do not think that the case is one
\nwhich  it would be safe to follow.” Then reference was\tmade
\nto  the opinion of Lord Sumner in the case of R .  E.  Jones
\nLtd.  v.  Waring  & Gillow Ltd.,  (1)  where  the  principle
\nenunciated  by Ashhurst J. was not accepted, because it\t was
\nheld  that the principle of estoppel must ultimately  depend
\nupon a duty.  Lord Lindley similarly in Farquharson Bros.  &
\nCo.  v.\t King  & Co. (2), pointed out  that  the  dictum  of
\nAshhurst  J. was too wide.  A similar comment has been\tmade
\nas  to\tthe said observation by other judges to\t which\tLord
\nWright has referred in the course of his judgment.  It would
\nthus  be  seen that in the case of The\tMercantile  Bank  of
\nIndia Ltd. (3 ) the Privy Council has seriously doubted\t the
\ncorrectness of the broad observations made by Ashhurst J, in
\nthe  case  of  Lickbarrow  (4), and  has  not  followed\t the
\ndecision  in  the  care\t of  Commonwealth  Trust  Ltd.\t(5).
\nTherefore,  it must be held that the decision of Mukarji  J,
\nwhich  proceeded on the basis of the broad  and\t unqualified
\nproposition  enunciated\t by  Ashhurst, J., in  the  case  of
\nLickbarrow cannot be sustained as valid in law.
\nThere  arc  two\t other\tdecisions  to  which  reference\t may
\nusefully  be made in considering this point.  In  Arnold  v.
\nThe Cheque Bank, (6), Lord Coleridge, C.J., in dealing\twith
\nthe  question  of negligence, observed\tthat  “no  authority
\nwhatever had been cited before them for the contention\tthat
\nnegligence  in the custody of the draft will disentitle\t the
\nowner of it to recover it or its proceeds from a person\t who
\nhas  wrongfully\t obtained  possession of it.   In  the\tcase
\nbefore\tthem,  there  was  nothing  in\tthe  draft  or\t the
\nendorsement  with  which the plaintiff had anything  to\t do,
\ncalculated  in\tany way to mislead the defendants.   It\t was
\nregularly endorsed and was then enclosed in a letter to\t the
\nplaintiffs  correspondents,  to be sent\t through  the  post.
\nThere  could be no negligence in relying on the\t honesty  of
\ntheir
\n(1)  (1926) A.C. 670.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  [1902] A.C. 325.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  (1937) L.R, 65 I.A. 75, 86.\n<\/p>\n
(4)  2 T. If. 63, 70.\n<\/p>\n
(5)  [1926] A.C. 72.\n<\/p>\n
(6)  (1876) C P.D. 578, 588,
\n876<\/span>
\nservants  in the discharge of their ordinary duty,  that  of
\nconveying letters to the post; nor can there be any duty  to
\nthe general public to exercise the same care in transmission
\nof  the\t draft as if any or every servant  employed  were  a
\nnotorious  thief.” These observations illustrate how  before
\ninvoking  a  plea of estoppel on the ground  of\t negligence,
\nsome  duty  must be shown to exist between the\tparties\t and
\nnegligence must be proved in relation to such duty.
\nSimilarly, in Baxendale v. Bennett, (1) Bramwell, L.J.,\t had
\noccasion  to  consider the same point.\tIn  that  case,\t the
\ndefendant  gave H. his blank acceptance on a  stamped  paper
\nand  authorised\t H.  to\t fill in his  name  as\tdrawer.\t  H.
\nreturned  the blank acceptance to the defendant in the\tsame
\nstate in which he received it.\tThe defendant put it into  a
\ndrawer\tof  his\t writing table at his  chambers,  which\t was
\nunlocked,  and it was lost or stolen.  C. afterwards  filled
\nin  his own name without the defendant’s authority,  and  an
\naction\twas brought on it by the plaintiff as  endorsee\t for
\nvalue.\tThe court of Appeal held that the defendant was\t not
\nliable on the bill.  Dealing with the question of negligence
\nattributed  to\tthe defendant, Bramwell L.J.  observed\tthat
\n“the  defendant may have been negligent, that is to say,  if
\nhe  had the paper from a third person, as a bailee bound  to
\nkeep  it with ordinary care, he would not have kept it in  a
\ndrawer\t unlocked.”  But,  said\t the  learned  judge,\tthis
\nnegligence  is not the proximate or effective cause  of\t the
\nfraud.\tA crime was necessary for its completion, and so, it
\nwas  held  that the defendant was not liable  on  the  bill.
\nThis decision shows that negligence must be based on a\tduty
\nowed  by one party to the other and must, besides, be  shown
\nto  have  been the proximate or the immediate cause  of\t the
\nloss.\n<\/p>\n
It is in the light of this legal position that the  question
\nabout estoppel raised by the respondent
\n(1)) (1878) 3 Q,.  B. D. 525, 530.\n<\/p>\n
 877<\/span><\/p>\n
against\t the  appellant\t in  the  Appellate  Court  may\t  be
\nconsidered.  Can it be said that when the appellant received
\nthe  intimation\t card, it owed a duty to the  respondent  to
\nkeep  the said card in a locked drawer maintaining  the\t key
\nall  the  time with its Director?  It would not be  easy  to
\nanswer\tthis question in the affirmative; but assuming\tthat
\nthe  appellant\thad a kind of duty  towards  the  respondent
\nhaving\tregard to the fact that the intimation card  was  an
\nimportant  document  the  presentation\tof  which  with\t  an
\nendorsement  as to authorisation duly made would induce\t the
\nrespondent  to issue a cheque to the person  presenting\t it,
\ncan  the Court say that in trusting its employees  to  bring
\nletters\t from the letter box to the Director, the  appellant
\nhad been negligent ? As we have already observed, in dealing
\nwith  the present dispute on the basis that  the  intimation
\ncard bad been dropped in the letter box of the appellant, it
\nis possible to hold either that the said card was  collected
\nby the Peon and given over to Mr. Parikh, or it was not.  In
\nthe former case, after Mr. Parikh got the said card, it\t had
\nbeen  removed from Mr. Parikh’s table by someone, either  by
\none of the employees of Mr. Parikh or some stranger.  In the
\nlatter\t case,\tthough,\t technically,  the  card  had\tbeen
\ndelivered  in  the latter box of the appellant, it  had\t not
\nreached Mr. Parikh.  In the absence of any collusion between
\nMr.  Parikh  and the person who made fraudulent use  of\t the
\nintimation card, can the respondent be heard to say that Mr.
\nParikh\tdid not show that degree of diligence  in  receiving
\nthe  card  or  in keeping it in safe custody  after  it\t was
\nreceived  as  he should have ? In our opinion, it  would  be
\ndifficult   to\tanswer\tthis  question\tin  favour  of\t the
\nrespondent.   In ordinary course of business,  every  office
\nthat  receives\tlarge  correspondence  keeps  a\t letter\t box
\noutside\t the premises of the office.  The box is locked\t and
\nthe  key  is  invariably given to the Peon  to\tcollect\t the
\nletters\t after\tthey are delivered by  Postal  Peons.\tThis
\ncourse
\n878<\/span>
\nof business proceeds on the assumption which must inevitably
\nbe made by all businessmen that the servants entrusted\twith
\nthe  task  of  collecting the letters  would  act  honestly.
\nSimilarly,  in\tordinary  course of business,  it  would  be
\nassumed\t by a businessman that after letters are  placed  on
\nthe  table or in a file which is kept at some  other  place,
\nthey would not be pilferred by any of his employees.   Under
\nthese circumstances, if the intimation card in question\t was
\ntaken away by some fraudulent person, it would be  difficult
\nto  hold that the appellant can be charged  with  negligence
\nwhich, in turn, can be held to be the proximate cause of the
\nloss  caused to the respondent.\t In our opinion,  therefore,
\nMukarji.J. was in error in holding that the respondent could
\nsuccessfully  plead  estoppel  by  negligence  against\t the
\nappellant.  As we have already observed, the question as  to
\nwhether\t the  claim  made  by  the  appellant  against\t the
\nrespondent under S. 70 is concluded by the decision of\tthis
\nCourt  in  the\tcase of M\/s.  B. K. Mondal &  Sons  (1),  in
\nfavour\tof the appellant, and so, it must be held  that\t the
\nDivision  Bench\t of the High Court erred in  dismissing\t the
\nappellant’s claim.\n<\/p>\n
The result is, the appeal is allowed., the decree passed  by
\nthe appellate Court is set aside and that of the trial Court
\nrestored with costs throughout.\n<\/p>\n
Appeal allowed.\n<\/p>\n
[1962] Supp.  I. S.  R. 876 .\n<\/p>\n
 879<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) … vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963 Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 152, 1964 SCR (2) 859 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B. PETITIONER: THE NEW MARINE COAL CO. (BENGAL) PRIVATE LTD. Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05\/04\/1963 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-113120","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nThe New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) ... vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) ... vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1963-04-04T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-09-03T01:17:20+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"34 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) … vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963\",\"datePublished\":\"1963-04-04T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-09-03T01:17:20+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963\"},\"wordCount\":5778,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963\",\"name\":\"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) ... vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1963-04-04T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-09-03T01:17:20+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) … vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) ... vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) ... vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1963-04-04T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2017-09-03T01:17:20+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"34 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) … vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963","datePublished":"1963-04-04T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-09-03T01:17:20+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963"},"wordCount":5778,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963","name":"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) ... vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1963-04-04T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-09-03T01:17:20+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-new-marine-coal-co-bengal-vs-union-of-india-on-5-april-1963#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"The New Marine Coal Co. (Bengal) … vs Union Of India on 5 April, 1963"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/113120","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=113120"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/113120\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=113120"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=113120"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=113120"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}