{"id":11359,"date":"1989-08-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1989-08-15T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989"},"modified":"2018-09-29T08:20:15","modified_gmt":"2018-09-29T02:50:15","slug":"municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989","title":{"rendered":"Municipal Corporation Of The City &#8230; vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Municipal Corporation Of The City &#8230; vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_citations\">Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 2091, \t\t  1989 SCR  (3) 862<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: G Oza<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: Oza, G.L. (J)<\/div>\n<pre>           PETITIONER:\nMUNICIPAL  CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BARODA\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nBABUBHAI HIMATLAL\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT16\/08\/1989\n\nBENCH:\nOZA, G.L. (J)\nBENCH:\nOZA, G.L. (J)\nSAIKIA, K.N. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1989 AIR 2091\t\t  1989 SCR  (3) 862\n 1989 SCC  (4) 103\t  JT 1989 (3)\t437\n 1989 SCALE  (2)305\n\n\nACT:\n    The\t Bombay provincial Corporations Act, 1949:  Sections\n147  and 466(1)(A)(f) and Standing Order No.  3--Payment  of\nsupervision fee by transporter--Whether reasonable--Optional\nto  transporter-Avoidance  of  claiming\t refund\t on   octroi\nduty--Standing Order held valid, legal and enforceable.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The  respondent  who was carrying on  the\tbusiness  of\ntransporting  goods  challenged before the  High  Court\t the\nimposition  of supervision fee levied under  Standing  Order\nNo.  3\ton the goods in transit through the  limits  of\t the\nMunicipal  Corporation\tof  Baroda. Before  the\t framing  of\nStanding  Order\t No. 3, a transporter was  required  to\t pay\noctroi\tat the point of entry in the city and  claim  refund\nthereof at the point of exit after satisfying the  authority\nthat  the  goods  which had entered were  being\t taken\tout.\nStanding Order No. 3 framed under section 466(1)(A)(f)\tread\nwith  section 147 of the Bombay provincial Corporations\t Act\n1949,  provided\t that when a transporter  entered  into\t the\ncorporation limits with goods which were only in transit, he\ncould on payment of supervision fee carry the goods  through\nthe corporation limits under the supervision of the staff of\nthe  Corporation without payment of octroi at the  point  of\nentry.\n    The High Court held Standing Order No. 3 as illegal\t and\nwithout\t the authority of law. The High Court observed\tthat\nunder section 466(1)(A)(f) the Commissioner had the authori-\nty  to\tframe standing orders only in respect  of  goods  on\nwhich  octroi was payable and as octroi was not\t payable  on\nthe goods which were in transit, no standing orders could be\nframed\tunder the Section- The High Court further held\tthat\nquid pro quo was not satisfied as no service was rendered to\nthe   transporter.\n    Before  this  Court it was contended on  behalf  of\t the\nappellant that the levy of supervision fee was optional; the\nprocedure under Standing Order No. 3 was introduced to avoid\nhardship  to the transporter; it was open to him  to  follow\nthe  normal  procedure of paying the octroi  and    claiming\nrefund; the requirement of quid pro quo was in substance\n563\nsatisfied,  and the fee was charged only to  facilitate\t the\ntransporter in carrying the goods in transit.\nAllowing the appeal, this Court,\n    HELD:  (1) The procedure under Standing Order No.  3  is\nnot  compulsory and it is the option of the  transporter  to\ntake  advantage\t of  this Standing Order if  he\t so  chooses\notherwise  follow normal procedure of payment of octroi\t and\nclaiming refund. [868H-869A]\n    (2)\t Clause (f) of section 466(1)(A)  contemplates\tthat\nthe Commissioner may by standing order prescribed the proce-\ndure for the goods which are introduced in the city  limits.\nfor  immediate exportation and also the fees which could  be\ncharged.  It is clear that this provision which confers\t the\nauthority on the Commissioner to frame standing orders\tdoes\nnot  talk of goods on which octroi is payable.\tThe  Commis-\nsioner\ttherefore had the authority under section  466,\t and\nthe Standing Orders have been framed in accordance with\t the\nprocedure prescribed under that section. [867D-E; 869D]\n    (3) It appears that while taking the view that the\tlevy\ncould  not  be justified under Entry 52 of  the\t State\tList\nwhich  authorises the State Legislature to impose a  tax  on\nentry of goods into a local area, the High Court was examin-\ning  the fees prescribed as a tax, and it was on that  basis\nthat the High Court took the view that no such tax could  be\nlevied\ton goods on which no octroi was payable. But, as  it\nis not a tax, the imposition could not be said to be bad  on\nthe  ground that the State Legislature had no  authority  to\nimpose it. [869E-870A]\n    (4)\t In order to establish a quid pro quo concept it  is\nnot necessary to establish exactly that the amount collected\nis spent on the services rendered. [872A]\n    Sourthen Pharmaceuticals &amp; Chemicals Trichur &amp; Ors. etc.\nv. State of Kerala &amp; Ors. etc., [1982] 1 SCR 519 and Sreeni-\nvasa  General  Traders &amp; Ors. v. State of Andhra  Pradesh  &amp;\nOrs., [1983] 3 SCR 843, referred to.\n    (5)\t So far as the charging of supervision fee  is\tcon-\ncerned,\t it reasonably appears to be a charge for the  serv-\nices  rendered. The High Court was, therefore, not right  in\ncoming\tto  the conclusion that this fee was  not  justified\nbecause, according to the High Court, it was not established\nthat the fee was in consideration of the services or  privi-\nlege conferred on the transporter. [872F]\n864\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>    CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1086  of<br \/>\n1971.\n<\/p>\n<p>    From the Judgment and Order dated 28.4.71 of the Gujarat<br \/>\nHigh Court in S.C.A. No. 671 of 1970.\n<\/p>\n<p>R.F. Nariman, A.K. Verma and D.N. Misra for the Appellant.<br \/>\n    V.J.  Francis, (N.P.), Krishan Kumar, Vimal Dave &amp;\tCo.,<br \/>\nM.N. Shroff, (N.P.) and Girish Chandra for the Respondent.<br \/>\nThe Judgment of,the Court was delivered by<br \/>\n    OZA, J. This appeal on certificate by the High Court  of<br \/>\nGujarat\t is filed against the judgment of the  Gujarat\tHigh<br \/>\nCourt  dated 28th April, 1971 holding Standing Order  No.  3<br \/>\nframed\tunder Section 466(1)(A)(f) read with Section 147  of<br \/>\nThe  Bombay  Provincial Corporations Act,  1949\t (&#8216;Act&#8217;\t for<br \/>\nshort) as illegal and without the authority of law.<br \/>\n    This  Act applies to the city of Baroda and the  present<br \/>\nappellant  the Municipal Corporation, Baroda is governed  by<br \/>\nthis Act. It is not in dispute that octroi on the import  of<br \/>\ngoods is chargeable under the scheme of the Act. Before this<br \/>\nStanding  Order\t which is the subject  matter  of  challenge<br \/>\nbefore\tthe High Court and before us, was framed,  a  trans-<br \/>\nporter who brought the goods within the limits of the Munic-<br \/>\nipal  Corporation in view of Section 147 of this Act was  to<br \/>\npay  the octroi duty chargeable on the goods on the  assump-<br \/>\ntion that the goods have been imported for sale, consumption<br \/>\nor use in the limits of the city of Baroda. Under the scheme<br \/>\nas  it was in force if the goods were not consumed  or\tsold<br \/>\nwithin the limits of the Municipal Corporation and are taken<br \/>\nout  on the other end, and if the octroi post authority\t was<br \/>\nsatisfied  that the goods which had entered are being  taken<br \/>\nout  then  the transporter had to get the tax which  he\t had<br \/>\npaid at the octroi post refunded. According to the appellant<br \/>\ncorporation  this procedure took time at both the  ends\t and<br \/>\nfor  those transporters who were carrying goods\t which\tonly<br \/>\nwere  in transit in the city of Baroda still had  to  suffer<br \/>\nthe  inconvenience of paying the octroi duty when  they\t en-<br \/>\ntered  the city limits and then satisfy the  authorities  at<br \/>\nthe  post from where they went out of town and also  had  to<br \/>\npay first the tax and then claim a refund, in order to avoid<br \/>\ninconvenience and the burden on the transporter this  Stand-<br \/>\ning Order was provided so that when a transporter enters the<br \/>\ncorporation limits with goods which are only in transit\t and<br \/>\nnot to be<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">865<\/span><br \/>\nunloaded  for  sale or consumption  within  the\t corporation<br \/>\nlimits\tand  if\t the transporter so chooses  on\t payment  of<br \/>\nsupervision fees the transporter can carry the goods through<br \/>\nthe  corporation limits without payment of octroi under\t the<br \/>\nsupervision  of\t the staff of the corporation and  for\tthis<br \/>\npurpose\t under\tthis Standing Order fee of  Rs.2  per  heavy<br \/>\nvehicle\t was prescribed. It is alleged that  originally\t the<br \/>\nfee  suggested was Rs.5 but on a representation made by\t the<br \/>\nrespondent  association itself this was reduced to Rs.2\t per<br \/>\nvehicle.\n<\/p>\n<p>    By the impugned judgment, the High Court of Gujarat came<br \/>\nto the conclusion that under Section 466(1)(A)(f) of the Act<br \/>\nno doubt the Commissioner had the authority to frame  stand-<br \/>\ning orders but he can only frame standing orders in  respect<br \/>\nof   goods  on\twhich  octroi  was  payable  under   Section<br \/>\n466(1)(A)(f) and as the goods admittedly for which this\t fee<br \/>\nwas  prescribed\t were goods not to be imported for  sale  or<br \/>\nconsumption the octroi was not payable thereon and therefore<br \/>\nno   standing\torders\tcould  be   framed   under   Section<br \/>\n466(1)(A)(f) and therefore standing order providing for fees<br \/>\nas  discussed above was beyond the authority of the  Commis-<br \/>\nsioner under this Act.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The\t High Court also accepted the second  contention  of<br \/>\nthe respondent that although the Corporation claim to charge<br \/>\nthe fee as a fee for the convenience of the transporter\t but<br \/>\nafter  examining the scheme, the learned Judges of the\tHigh<br \/>\nCourt  came to the conclusion that there is no quid pro\t quo<br \/>\nestablished  nor it is established that the charge  and\t the<br \/>\ncollection made on the basis of this charge had any  ration-<br \/>\nale  ratio with the  services rendered by  the\tcorporation.<br \/>\nAggrieved  by this decision of the High Court the  Municipal<br \/>\nCorporation has come up in appeal.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The main contention advanced on behalf of the  appellant<br \/>\nwas that imposition of this fee by the Corporation could not<br \/>\nbe  said to be an imposition as it was optional, as  when  a<br \/>\ntransporter  brings  goods and enters into  the\t Corporation<br \/>\nlimits it was open to him either to choose to take advantage<br \/>\nof this Standing Order by paying supervision fees and taking<br \/>\nthe goods straight under the supervision of the\t Corporation<br \/>\nauthorities  without&#8217;  the payment of octroi duty but  if  a<br \/>\ntransporter  chooses not to take advantage of this  Standing<br \/>\nOrder  it was not compulsory and it was open to\t the  trans-<br \/>\nporter to pay the octroi in accordance with the normal\trule<br \/>\nand follow the normal procedure by satisfying the  checkpost<br \/>\nauthorities  on\t the other end and claim refund and  get  it<br \/>\nafter following the due procedure. It was therefore contend-<br \/>\ned that in fact this was an option given to the\t transporter<br \/>\nso that if they so<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">866<\/span><br \/>\nchoose\tthey may follow this Standing Order and\t save  them-<br \/>\nselves\tfrom  the  hardship of paying the  octroi  and\tthen<br \/>\nclaiming  the  refund and for that purpose stopping  at\t the<br \/>\nentry checkpost and again at the exit checkpost and also  to<br \/>\nsatisfy\t the checkpost authorities that the goods which\t had<br \/>\nentered\t the corporation limits are being taken out  in\t the<br \/>\nsame  state  and  it also involved handling of\tsum  by\t the<br \/>\ntransporter  so that it may be possible for him to  pay\t the<br \/>\noctroi\ton  the\t entry checkpost itself.  It  was  therefore<br \/>\ncontended  firstly  that  it being an option  given  to\t the<br \/>\ntransporter,  it could not be said to be an imposition or  a<br \/>\ntax  and the question of the authority of  the\tCommissioner<br \/>\ndoes  not  arise.  That\t in  view  of  language\t of  Section<br \/>\n466(1)(A)(f) it is clearly with the authority of the Commis-<br \/>\nsioner to frame Standing Orders, and the Standing Orders had<br \/>\nthe approval of the Standing Committee and also of the State<br \/>\nGovernment  and\t therefore  it could not be  said  that\t the<br \/>\nStanding  Orders are not framed in accordance  with  Section\n<\/p>\n<p>466.<br \/>\n    It\twas also contended that the affidavit filed  in\t the<br \/>\nHigh Court by the appellant clearly shows that how this\t fee<br \/>\nis collected and spent for the purpose of giving a  facility<br \/>\nto  the transporter for carrying the goods in transit  under<br \/>\nthe supervision of the corporation authorities so that\tthey<br \/>\nhave  not to suffer the inconvenience and it  was  contended<br \/>\nthat in substance therefore the requirement of quid pro\t quo<br \/>\nis satisfied and in fact the fee is charged only to  facili-<br \/>\ntate the transporter in carrying the goods in transit  with-<br \/>\nout  payment  of octroi and without undue detention  in\t the<br \/>\nprocess\t of  payment  of octroi at the\tentry  and  claiming<br \/>\nrefund\tat the exit. It is alleged that a notice was  issued<br \/>\nsuggesting this procedure as prescribed in Standing  Orders,<br \/>\na  representation  was made by\tthe  respondent\t association<br \/>\naccepting  the suggestion of the Corporation  but  suggested<br \/>\nthat Rs.5 per vehicle suggested by the Corporation would  be<br \/>\ntoo much and it should be reduced to Rs.2 and it was on this<br \/>\nrepresentation\tthat  in fact the Corporation,\tthe  present<br \/>\nappellant,  chose to reduce the supervision charges to\tRs.2<br \/>\nper vehicle. It was therefore contended that now this is not<br \/>\nopen  to the respondent association to say that this is\t not<br \/>\nin accordance with law.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Learned counsel for the respondent stated that  although<br \/>\na  representation about the supervision fee was made by\t the<br \/>\nassociation  but  it could not be said that  there  was\t any<br \/>\nagreement  entered into by the association nor it  could  be<br \/>\nsaid that the Association could enter into such an agreement<br \/>\nwith  the corporation. It was contended that the High  Court<br \/>\nwas  right in reaching the conclusion that the\tCommissioner<br \/>\nhad  no authority under Section 466, and that in  fact\tquid<br \/>\npro  quo is not satisfied as no service is rendered  to\t the<br \/>\ntransporter. Learned counsel<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">867<\/span><br \/>\nfor  the parties referred to the decision of this  Court  on<br \/>\nthe question of fee and the principle of quidpro quo.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t      Section 466(1)(A)(f) reads:\n<\/p>\n<p>\t      &#8220;466(1)  The  Commissioner may  make  standing<br \/>\n\t      orders consistent with the provisions of\tthis<br \/>\n\t      Act  and the rules and by-laws in\t respect  of<br \/>\n\t      the following matters namely:\n<\/p>\n<pre>\t\t    (A) (a) xxx\t       xxx\t   xxx\n\t\t\t    xxx\t       xxx\t   xxx\n<\/pre>\n<p>\t      (f)  determining the supervision under  which,<br \/>\n\t      the routes by which and the time within  which<br \/>\n\t      goods intended for immediate exportation shall<br \/>\n\t      be  conveyed  out\t of the City  and  the\tfees<br \/>\n\t      payable by persons so conveying the goods;&#8221;<br \/>\nThis  contemplates  the authority with the  Commissioner  to<br \/>\nmake Standing orders consistent with this Act, rules or\t by-<br \/>\nlaws in respect of the Act. Clause (f) talks of\t supervision<br \/>\nunder which and the routes by which and the time when  goods<br \/>\nintroduced  for immediate exportation shall be conveyed\t out<br \/>\nof  the city and the fee is payable by the  person  carrying<br \/>\nthe  goods. It is therefore clear that this clause (f)\tcon-<br \/>\ntemplates that Commissioner may by Standing Order  prescribe<br \/>\nthe procedure for the goods which are introduced in the city<br \/>\nlimits,\t for immediate exportation and also the\t fees  which<br \/>\ncould be charged. It is therefore clear that this  provision<br \/>\nwhich  confers\tthe authority on the Commissioner  to  frame<br \/>\nStanding  Orders  do not talk of goods on  which  octroi  is<br \/>\npayable.  But Section 466 pertains t9 collection of  octroi.<br \/>\nSub-section (2) of this Section provides:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\t      &#8220;(2)  No order made by the Commissioner  under<br \/>\n\t      clause  (A) of sub-section (1) shall be  valid<br \/>\n\t      unless it is approved by the Standing  Commit-<br \/>\n\t      tee and confirmed by the State Government, and<br \/>\n\t      no order made by the Commissioner under clause<br \/>\n\t      (B)  or  paragraph (e) of clause (c)  of\tsub-<br \/>\n\t      section  (1) shall be valid unless it  is\t ap-<br \/>\n\t      proved by the Standing Committee.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It  is not in dispute that these .Standing Orders have\tbeen<br \/>\napproved  by  the Standing Committee and  confirmed  by\t the<br \/>\nState Government which is clear from the Notification  which<br \/>\nreads as under:\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">868<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\t      BARODA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION<br \/>\n\t\t       &#8220;The  Standing  Orders  made  by\t the<br \/>\n\t      Municipal\t  Commissioner,\t  Baroda   Municipal<br \/>\n\t      Corporation, Baroda under Section 466(1)(A)(f)<br \/>\n\t      of the Bombay Provincial Municipal Corporation<br \/>\n\t      Act,  1949  vide\this  order  No.\t 2441  dated<br \/>\n\t      16.8.69 and approved by the Standing Committee<br \/>\n\t      under its Resolution No. 882 dated 28th Novem-<br \/>\n\t      ber,  1969 and confirmed by  Government  under<br \/>\n\t      their  Resolution P.H.D. No. BMC\t4470-160  P.<br \/>\n\t      Dated the I2th March, 1970.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>\t      Section 147 of this Act reads:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>\t      &#8220;Until  the contrary is proved any  goods\t im-<br \/>\n\t      ported into the City shall be presumed to have<br \/>\n\t      been imported for the purpose of\tconsumption,<br \/>\n\t      use  or  sale therein unless  such  goods\t are<br \/>\n\t      conveyed from the place of import to the place<br \/>\n\t      of  export, by such routes, within such  time,<br \/>\n\t      under such supervision and on payment of\tsuch<br \/>\n\t      fees  therefore as shall be determined by\t the<br \/>\n\t      standing orders.&#8221;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>    It\tis clear from this Section that when any  goods\t are<br \/>\nbrought\t within the corporation limits a presumption  arises<br \/>\nthat  they have been brought in for the purposes or sale  or<br \/>\nconsumption  and the burden lies on the person\twho  imports<br \/>\nthe goods to prove that they are not for sale or consumption<br \/>\nand  it is on the basis of language of Section 147 that\t the<br \/>\nnormal procedure before this Standing Order was\t introduced,<br \/>\nwas that the goods when entered into the corporation limits,<br \/>\nhave  to  stop at the checkpost and pay octroi duty  on\t the<br \/>\ngoods as provided by the rules. For getting out of the local<br \/>\nlimits, the transporter has to satisfy the checkpost author-<br \/>\nities that the goods on which he has paid octroi and import-<br \/>\ned  are being exported out of the city and it is only  after<br \/>\nsatisfying  the authorities about the goods on which  octroi<br \/>\nis paid being exported that the transporter can claim refund<br \/>\nof the octroi duty already paid. It is therefore clear\tthat<br \/>\nthe  language  of Section 147 in the scheme  of\t the  Octroi<br \/>\nclearly\t indicates a presumption which is a rebuttable\tpre-<br \/>\nsumption. Burden however lay on the transporter to establish<br \/>\nthat  the goods are not for consumption or sale. So  far  as<br \/>\nthis  scheme  before the introduction of  disputed  Standing<br \/>\nOrder  is concerned, there is no controversy. The only\tcon-<br \/>\ntroversy is the Standing Order which has been introduced. It<br \/>\nis  also clear that so far as this Standing Order No.  3  is<br \/>\nconcerned  wherein the transporter is to pay  a\t supervision<br \/>\nfees it is not compulsory as it is the option of the  trans-<br \/>\npor-\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">869<\/span><\/p>\n<p>ter  to\t take  advantage of this Standing  Order  if  he  so<br \/>\nchooses otherwise follow the normal procedure of payment  of<br \/>\noctroi\tand claiming refund as is clear from  the  affidavit<br \/>\nfiled before the High Court by the appellant&#8217;s officer\ti.e.<br \/>\nOctroi Superintendent. Paragraph 14 of this affidavit reads:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\t      &#8220;Thus  the  system  of  clearing\tthe  through<br \/>\n\t      traffic on charging normal supervision fees is<br \/>\n\t      really  in the larger interest of the  import-<br \/>\n\t      ers. As I have pointed out hereinabove this is<br \/>\n\t      not  obligatory but purely voluntary  and\t op-<br \/>\n\t      tional. Those who do not want to avail of this<br \/>\n\t      facility need not avail it and allow the other<br \/>\n\t      procedure already indicated hereinabove.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It  is\ttherefore clear that there is no compulsion  on\t the<br \/>\ntransporter  to pay a supervision fee. It is only an  option<br \/>\nso that if the transporter wishes to take advantage of\tthis<br \/>\nscheme and save time he can choose to follow it.<br \/>\n    It\tis  thus clear that so far as the authority  of\t the<br \/>\nCommissioner  under Section 466 of the Act is concerned\t and<br \/>\nthe  manner in which the Standing Orders are framed,  it  is<br \/>\nclear that the Commissioner had the authority and the Stand-<br \/>\ning  Orders  have been framed in accordance  with  procedure<br \/>\nprescribed under Section 466 and therefore on that count the<br \/>\njudgment of the High Court could not be sustained.<br \/>\n    The High Court took the view that the State\t Legislature<br \/>\ncould enact Section 466 only if it can be brought within the<br \/>\nambit  of Entry 52 of this State list as, that is  the\tonly<br \/>\nentry which authorises the State Legislature to impose a tax<br \/>\non  entry of goods into a local area and the learned  Judges<br \/>\nfelt that as under Section 466 and under the standing  order<br \/>\nin question a supervision fee is charged on goods which\t are<br \/>\nnot for sale or consumption in the local limits. This  could<br \/>\nnot  be justified under Entry 52. The learned Judges  there-<br \/>\nfore  took the view that Standing Orders which\tthe  Commis-<br \/>\nsioner could frame under Section 466 could be in respect  of<br \/>\ngoods  on which octroi is payable and not pertaining to\t the<br \/>\ngoods  on which the octroi is not payable. It  appears\tthat<br \/>\nwhile  taking  this view the High Court was  examining\tthis<br \/>\nfees prescribed as a tax and it is on the basis of this that<br \/>\nthe  High  Court  took the view that no such  tax  could  be<br \/>\nlevied on goods on which no octroi is payable. So far as the<br \/>\nquestion  as to whether this fees could be said to be a\t tax<br \/>\nis  concerned,\tthere is no difficulty as even\tthe  learned<br \/>\ncounsel\t appearing for the appellant do not contend that  it<br \/>\ncan  be said to be a tax and as it is not a tax the  imposi-<br \/>\ntion could not be said to be<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">870<\/span><br \/>\nbad because the State Legislature had no authority to impose<br \/>\nit. It was contended by the learned counsel that in view  of<br \/>\nSection 147 quoted above any import within the local  limits<br \/>\nwould draw a presumption that it is for consumption or\tsale<br \/>\nand  therefore octroi duty on the goods becomes payable.  By<br \/>\nthis  Standing Order, the Corporation has attempted to\tmake<br \/>\nit  convenient\tto  the transporter not to  involve  in\t the<br \/>\npayment of octroi duty at the entry and after satisfying the<br \/>\nauthorities  at the exit end claim the refund of the  octroi<br \/>\npaid,  thereby the Corporation intended to help\t the  trans-<br \/>\nporter\tin saving time and also in payment of the octroi  at<br \/>\none end and later on claiming a refund. This in fact was the<br \/>\nservice\t rendered by the corporation to the benefit  of\t the<br \/>\ntransporter and this fees which was charged was just to meet<br \/>\nthe  approximate expenses that the Corporation may  have  to<br \/>\nincur to provide this facility as has been clearly stated by<br \/>\nthe  corporation  officer in his affidavit before  the\tHigh<br \/>\nCourt and in fact even the corporation accepted the  sugges-<br \/>\ntion  of  the petitioner association  when  the\t association<br \/>\nsuggested  to the appellant corporation to reduce this\tfees<br \/>\nfrom Rs.5 to Rs.2 which is clear from the letter written  by<br \/>\nthe  Association to the Corporation dated 31st March,  1970.<br \/>\nAs regards this aspect of the matter, the learned Judges  of<br \/>\nthe High Court came to the conclusion that there was no quid<br \/>\npro  quo  established which could justify the levy  of\tthis<br \/>\nfees  as fees for the services rendered in the\tinterest  of<br \/>\nthe  transporter.  In Southern Pharmaceuticals\t&amp;  Chemicals<br \/>\nTrichur &amp; Ors. etc. v. State of Kerala &amp; Ors. etc., [1982] 1<br \/>\nSCR  519 this Court after considering the  various  decision<br \/>\ndistinguished fees from tax in these words.\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\t      &#8220;&#8216;Fees&#8217; are the amounts paid for a  privilege,<br \/>\n\t      and are not an obligation, but the payment  is<br \/>\n\t      voluntary.  Fees are distinguished from  taxes<br \/>\n\t      in that the chief purpose of a tax is to raise<br \/>\n\t      funds,for the support of the Government or for<br \/>\n\t      a\t public purpose, while a fee may be  charged<br \/>\n\t      for  the\tprivilege or benefit  conferred,  or<br \/>\n\t      service  rendered\t or  to\t meet  the  expenses<br \/>\n\t      connected\t therewith. Thus, fees\tare  nothing<br \/>\n\t      out payment for some special privilege granted<br \/>\n\t      or service rendered.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>\t      As regards the principle of quid pro quo\trule<br \/>\n\t      in the same judgment it was observed:<br \/>\n\t      &#8220;That  is\t because the  Constitution  did\t not<br \/>\n\t      contemplate it to be an essential element of a<br \/>\n\t      fee  that it should be credited to a  separate<br \/>\n\t      fund  and not to the consolidated fund. It  is<br \/>\n\t      also<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">\t      871<\/span><br \/>\n\t      increasingly realised that the element of quid<br \/>\n\t      pro quo stricto senso is not always a sine qua<br \/>\n\t      non  of a fee. It is needless to\tstress\tthat<br \/>\n\t      the element of quid pro quo is not necessarily<br \/>\n\t      absent in every tax.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>In the light of these observations if the affidavit filed on<br \/>\nbehalf\tof the appellant Corporation explaining\t the  amount<br \/>\nexpected to be collected and spent in the process of  super-<br \/>\nvision is examined it could not be said as was stated by the<br \/>\nHigh Court that it did not satisfy the quid pro quo  princi-<br \/>\nple.  It is in this background that the question  that\tthis<br \/>\nStanding Order does not impose a compulsory levy but it only<br \/>\ngives an option to the transporter to take advantage of this<br \/>\nprovision makes it further clear that it is not a levy or an<br \/>\nimposition  of tax but merely a fees charged for the  privi-<br \/>\nlege or services rendered to the payer. In Sreenivasa Gener-<br \/>\nal  Traders  &amp; Ors. etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh  &amp;\tOrs.<br \/>\netc.,  [1983]  3  SCR 843 this Court  considered  series  of<br \/>\ndecisions on the question and observed:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\t      &#8220;There is no generic difference between a\t tax<br \/>\n\t      and  a fee. Both are compulsory  exactions  of<br \/>\n\t      money  by public authorities. Compulsion\tlies<br \/>\n\t      in the fact that payment is enforceable by law<br \/>\n\t      against a person inspite of his  unwillingness<br \/>\n\t      or want of consent. A levy in the nature of  a<br \/>\n\t      fee  does\t not cease to be of  that  character<br \/>\n\t      merely because there is an element of  compul-<br \/>\n\t      sion or coerciveness present in it, nor is  it<br \/>\n\t      a postulate of a fee that it must have  direct<br \/>\n\t      relation to the actual service rendered by the<br \/>\n\t      authority\t to each individual who obtains\t the<br \/>\n\t      benefit of the service. It is now increasingly<br \/>\n\t      realized\tthat merely because the\t collections<br \/>\n\t      for the service rendered or grant of a  privi-<br \/>\n\t      lege or licence are taken to the\tconsolidated<br \/>\n\t      fund of the State and not separately appropri-<br \/>\n\t      ated towards the expenditure for rendering the<br \/>\n\t      service is not by itself decisive.  Presumably<br \/>\n\t      the attention of the Court in the Shirur\tMutt<br \/>\n\t      case was not drawn to Art. 266 of the  Consti-<br \/>\n\t      tution. The Constitution nowhere\tcontemplates<br \/>\n\t      it  to be an essential element of fee that  it<br \/>\n\t      should be credited to a separate fund and\t not<br \/>\n\t      to the consolidated fund. It is also  increas-<br \/>\n\t      ingly  realized that the element of  quid\t pro<br \/>\n\t      quo  in the strict sense is not always a\tsine<br \/>\n\t      qua  non for a fee. It is needless  to  stress<br \/>\n\t      that the element of quid pro quo is not neces-<br \/>\n\t      sarily absent in every tax: Constitutional Law<br \/>\n\t      of India by H.M. Seervail Vol. 2, 2nd Edn.  p.<br \/>\n\t      1252, para 22.39.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">872<\/span><\/p>\n<p>It is therefore clear that in order to establish a quid\t pro<br \/>\nquo  concept it is not necessary to establish  exactly\tthat<br \/>\nthe amount collected is spent on the services rendered as it<br \/>\nwas further observed in this decision:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>\t      &#8220;The  traditional\t view  that  there  must  be<br \/>\n\t      actual quid pro quo for a fee has under gone a<br \/>\n\t      sea  change in the subsequent  decisions.\t The<br \/>\n\t      distinction  between  a  tax and\ta  fee\tlies<br \/>\n\t      primarily in the fact that a tax is levied  as<br \/>\n\t      part  of a common burden, while a fee  is\t for<br \/>\n\t      payment  of  a specific benefit  or  privilege<br \/>\n\t      although the special advantage is secondary to<br \/>\n\t      the primary motive of regulation in public  in<br \/>\n\t      public interest. If the element of revenue for<br \/>\n\t      general purpose of the State predominates, the<br \/>\n\t      levy  becomes a tax. In regard to\t fees  there<br \/>\n\t      is,  and must always be,\tcorrelation  between<br \/>\n\t      the fee collected and the service intended  to<br \/>\n\t      be rendered. In determining whether a levy  is<br \/>\n\t      a\t fee,  the  true test must  be\twhether\t its<br \/>\n\t      primary  and  essential purpose is  to  render<br \/>\n\t      specific\tservices  to  a\t specified  area  or<br \/>\n\t      class;  it may be of no consequence  that\t the<br \/>\n\t      State  may ultimately and indirectly be  bene-<br \/>\n\t      fitted by it. The power of any legislature  to<br \/>\n\t      levy a fee is conditioned by the fact that  it<br \/>\n\t      must be &#8216;by and large&#8217; a quid pro quo for\t the<br \/>\n\t      services\trendered.  However,  co-relationship<br \/>\n\t      between  the  levy and the  services  rendered<br \/>\n\t      expected is lone of the general character\t and<br \/>\n\t      not  of mathematical exactitude. All  that  is<br \/>\n\t      necessary is that there should be a  &#8220;reasona-<br \/>\n\t      ble relationship&#8221; between the levy of the\t fee<br \/>\n\t      and the services rendered.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It is therefore clear that so far as the charging of  super-<br \/>\nvision\tfees  is  concerned it reasonably appears  to  be  a<br \/>\ncharge for the services rendered from the affidavit filed by<br \/>\nthe Officers of the Appellant Corporation and therefore\t the<br \/>\nHigh  Court was not right in coming to the  conclusion\tthat<br \/>\nthis fees was not justified as it is not established that it<br \/>\nreasonably  satisfies  that it is in  consideration  of\t the<br \/>\nservices or privilege conferred on the transporter on  goods<br \/>\nin transit.\n<\/p>\n<p>    In\tour  opinion, therefore, the judgment  of  the\tHigh<br \/>\nCourt  could not be sustained. The appeal is  therefore\t al-<br \/>\nlowed. The judgment of the High Court is set aside and it is<br \/>\nheld  that the Standing Order No. 3 passed by the  appellant<br \/>\nMunicipal  Corporation is valid and enforceable. The  appel-<br \/>\nlant  shall also be entitled to costs of this appeal.  Costs<br \/>\nquantified at Rs.5,000.\n<\/p>\n<pre>R.S.S.\t\t\t\t\tAppeal allowed.\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">873<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India Municipal Corporation Of The City &#8230; vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989 Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 2091, 1989 SCR (3) 862 Author: G Oza Bench: Oza, G.L. (J) PETITIONER: MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF THE CITY OF BARODA Vs. RESPONDENT: BABUBHAI HIMATLAL DATE OF JUDGMENT16\/08\/1989 BENCH: OZA, G.L. (J) BENCH: OZA, G.L. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11359","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Municipal Corporation Of The City ... vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Municipal Corporation Of The City ... vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1989-08-15T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-09-29T02:50:15+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"23 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Municipal Corporation Of The City &#8230; vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989\",\"datePublished\":\"1989-08-15T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-09-29T02:50:15+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989\"},\"wordCount\":3905,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989\",\"name\":\"Municipal Corporation Of The City ... vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1989-08-15T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-09-29T02:50:15+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Municipal Corporation Of The City &#8230; vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Municipal Corporation Of The City ... vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Municipal Corporation Of The City ... vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1989-08-15T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-09-29T02:50:15+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"23 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Municipal Corporation Of The City &#8230; vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989","datePublished":"1989-08-15T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-09-29T02:50:15+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989"},"wordCount":3905,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989","name":"Municipal Corporation Of The City ... vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1989-08-15T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-09-29T02:50:15+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/municipal-corporation-of-the-city-vs-babubhai-himatlal-on-16-august-1989#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Municipal Corporation Of The City &#8230; vs Babubhai Himatlal on 16 August, 1989"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11359","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=11359"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/11359\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=11359"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=11359"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=11359"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}