{"id":11498,"date":"2001-04-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2001-04-16T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ms-somaiya-organics-india-ltd-vs-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-on-17-april-2001"},"modified":"2018-01-12T00:06:25","modified_gmt":"2018-01-11T18:36:25","slug":"ms-somaiya-organics-india-ltd-vs-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-on-17-april-2001","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ms-somaiya-organics-india-ltd-vs-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-on-17-april-2001","title":{"rendered":"M\/S Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. &#8230; vs State Of Uttar Pradesh &amp; Anr on 17 April, 2001"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">M\/S Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. &#8230; vs State Of Uttar Pradesh &amp; Anr on 17 April, 2001<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: Kirpal<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: B.N. Kirpal, Syed Shah Quadri, M.B. Shah, K.G. Balakrishnan<\/div>\n<pre>           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil) 4093  of  1991\n\n\n\nPETITIONER:\nM\/S SOMAIYA ORGANICS (INDIA) LTD. &amp; ANR.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSTATE OF UTTAR PRADESH &amp; ANR.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\t17\/04\/2001\n\nBENCH:\nB.N. Kirpal, Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, M.B. Shah &amp;K.G. Balakrishnan\n\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>W I T HL&#8230;I&#8230;T&#8230;&#8230;.T&#8230;&#8230;.T&#8230;&#8230;.T&#8230;&#8230;.T&#8230;&#8230;.T&#8230;&#8230;.T..J<\/p>\n<p>    SLP\t (C)  No.  20018 of 1991, C.A.\tNos.  324  of  1981,<br \/>\n455,  2795, 1604 of 1980, 624, 625, 125, 2049 of 1981,\tI.A.<br \/>\nNos.   1 &amp; 3 in W.P (C) No.  1892 of 973, C.A.\tNos.   1122,<br \/>\n181  of\t 1981, SLP (C) Nos.  4181, 4297- 4298 of 1980,\tC.A.<br \/>\nNos.   215,  341  of 1981, T.C.\t Nos.  37-39 of\t 1989,\tC.A.<br \/>\nNos.  2777 of 1981 and 1607 of 1980<\/p>\n<p>J U D G M E N T<\/p>\n<p>KIRPAL, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>Civil Appeal No. 4093 of 1991 and<br \/>\nC.A. No. 2853 of 2001<br \/>\n( Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20018 of 1991)<\/p>\n<p>Leave granted in SLP (C) No. 20018 of 1991.\n<\/p>\n<p>    These  appeals are sequel to a judgment of this Court in<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/1246561\/\">Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.  and Others vs.  State of U.P.<br \/>\nand Others<\/a> wherein it was held that in respect of industrial<br \/>\nalcohol\t the States were not authorised to impose the impost<br \/>\nthey  had  purported to do.  By that judgment  delivered  on<br \/>\n25th  October, 1989 the Court overruled its earlier decision<br \/>\nin  <a href=\"\/doc\/1488034\/\">State of U.P.  and Others vs.  Synthetics and  Chemicals<br \/>\nLtd.   and Others<\/a> wherein the validity of such an impost had<br \/>\nbeen  upheld.  By the second Synthetics case it was declared<br \/>\nthat the impugned provisions were illegal prospectively.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The\t question  which arises for consideration  in  these<br \/>\nappeals is whether the vend fee which had been levied by the<br \/>\nappropriate  State enactments, but not collected whether  by<br \/>\nreasons\t of  the  orders of the Court or otherwise,  can  be<br \/>\ncollected  now when the said provisions by the said judgment<br \/>\ndated  25th  October,  1989  have been held  to\t be  invalid<br \/>\nprospectively.\n<\/p>\n<p>    For\t the sake of convenience, we shall briefly refer  to<br \/>\nthe  facts  in\tC.A.   No.  4093 of  1991  Somaiya  Organics<br \/>\n(India)\t Ltd.  vs.  State of U.P.  &amp; Anr.  The said  company<br \/>\nhad  established  a  plant at Barabanki for  manufacture  of<br \/>\nintermediaries\tout  of\t industrial alcohol.   Its  promoter<br \/>\ncompany\t had sold and transferred to the appellant  industry<br \/>\ndistillery  located at Captainganj.  The industrial  alcohol<br \/>\nmanufactured  by the distillery at Captainganj was captively<br \/>\nconsumed.   On\t8th  October, 1970 the\tappellant  had\tbeen<br \/>\nexempted  from paying vend fee which was leviable under\t the<br \/>\nU.P.   Excise Act, 1910.  On 9th October, 1979, the State of<br \/>\nU.P.\twithdrew   the\texemption   from  payment  of\tvend<br \/>\nfee\/purchase tax on industrial alcohol.\t This was challenged<br \/>\nby  the appellant by filing writ petitions in the  Allahabad<br \/>\nHigh  Court.   During  the pendency of\tthe  writ  petitions<br \/>\ninterim\t orders\t were passed by the High Court\twhereby\t the<br \/>\npetitioners before it were required to give a bank guarantee<br \/>\nand\/or\tpay  to the State the amounts directed by the  Court<br \/>\nwhich, in an earlier order, the High Court had directed that<br \/>\nit should be kept by the State in a separate account.\n<\/p>\n<p>    As\tnoticed\t hereinabove,  vide decision of\t a  Division<br \/>\nBench  of  this Court in first Synthetics &amp;  Chemicals\tcase<br \/>\nrendered  on 19th December, 1979 the validity of the  impost<br \/>\nwas upheld.  Subsequently, on the matter being referred to a<br \/>\nBench  of  Seven  Judges,  by  the  second  Synthetics\tcase<br \/>\ndecision in 1989, the validity of the provisions of the said<br \/>\nActs  permitting levy of excise duty in the form of vend fee<br \/>\nwas struck down prospectively.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The\t High  Court  by the impugned  judgment\t dated\t29th<br \/>\nAugust,\t 1990 in Somaiyas case interpreted the direction in<br \/>\nthe   second  Synthetics  case\t relating   to\t prospective<br \/>\ndeclaration  to\t mean  that  for the period  prior  to\t25th<br \/>\nOctober, 1989 the amount payable in respect thereto could be<br \/>\nrecovered.   It held that once the levy for the period prior<br \/>\nto  25th  October, 1989 was saved further  steps  consequent<br \/>\nupon such levy were equally saved and recovery in respect of<br \/>\nthe  dues  prior to 25th October, 1989 could be effected  by<br \/>\nthe State.  The State was held to be entitled to realise the<br \/>\nvend fee for the period prior to 25th October, 1989.\n<\/p>\n<p>    When these appeals against the said decision came up for<br \/>\nhearing\t in this Court a Division Bench vide its order dated<br \/>\n26th  April, 1994 in <a href=\"\/doc\/1135944\/\">Hindustan Sugar Mills Ltd.\t vs.   State<br \/>\nof  U.P.   &amp;  Others<\/a>  observed\t that  the  directions\t and<br \/>\nobservations  made  in the second Synthetics case  had\tbeen<br \/>\ndifferently  construed by Benches of this Court.  In view of<br \/>\nthis  apparent\tconflict  these appeals were referred  to  a<br \/>\nlarger Bench.  It is in pursuance thereto that these appeals<br \/>\nhave been heard.\n<\/p>\n<p>    It was contended by Shri K.K.  Venugopal, learned senior<br \/>\ncounsel\t for  the appellants, that in respect of  industrial<br \/>\nalcohol\t the State Legislature had no legislative competence<br \/>\nto  levy excise duty or any tax in that nature.\t Drawing our<br \/>\nattention  to  Entry 8 and 51 of List II, he submitted\tthat<br \/>\nthe  State  can impose excise duty only on  potable  liquor.<br \/>\nCorresponding  to  that is Entry 84 in List I which  enables<br \/>\nthe Parliament to levy excise duty except in regard to those<br \/>\nitems referred to in Entry 51 of List II.  Furthermore under<br \/>\nEntry  52 of List I the I.D.R.\tAct had been promulgated  by<br \/>\nthe  Parliament\t and  in  the First Schedule  Item  No.\t  26<br \/>\nrelated\t to  fermentation  industries.\tIn  respect  of\t the<br \/>\nindustries  referred to in the First Schedule to the  I.D.R.<br \/>\nAct it is only the Parliament which has jurisdiction to levy<br \/>\ntaxes  in  respect  thereto.  As such levy of  vend  fee  on<br \/>\nindustrial alcohol by the States was not valid.\n<\/p>\n<p>    It\tis also submitted that Article 162 provides that the<br \/>\nexecutive  power  of  a\t State\t is  co-extensive  with\t its<br \/>\nlegislative  power.  Inasmuch as a State cannot levy  excise<br \/>\nduty  on industrial alcohol being outside the ambit of Entry<br \/>\n51  of List II, the State Government cannot, in exercise  of<br \/>\nits  executive\tpower, recover the excise duty.\t After\t25th<br \/>\nOctober,  1989\tlaw ceased to exist in respect of  levy\t and<br \/>\ncollection of excise duty on industrial alcohol by reason of<br \/>\nwant   of  legislative\tcompetence.   As  such\t the   State<br \/>\nGovernment  could  not exercise executive power and  collect<br \/>\nexcise duty on industrial alcohol.\n<\/p>\n<p>    It\twas  contended\tthat  under   Article  265  of\t the<br \/>\nConstitution  no tax can be levied or collected without\t the<br \/>\nauthority  of law.  The submission was that authority of law<br \/>\nmeans  that  there  should  be\t a  lawful  enactment  which<br \/>\nauthorised  the\t levy and collection of tax.  Tax cannot  be<br \/>\nlevied\tand collected by virtue of a decision of a Court  in<br \/>\nthe  absence  of  any statutory provision.  It\twas  further<br \/>\nsubmitted  that in series of decisions of this Court, one of<br \/>\nthe  examples being that of <a href=\"\/doc\/1291316\/\">M.P.V.  Sundararamier &amp; Co.\t vs.<br \/>\nThe  State of Andhra Pradesh &amp; Another<\/a> it had been held that<br \/>\nthe  law  which\t is  declared ultra vires  due\tto  lack  of<br \/>\nlegislative  competence would be void ab initio and the same<br \/>\ncould  not  be\tmade operative.\t The effect  of\t the  second<br \/>\njudgment  in  Synthetics case was that after  25th  October,<br \/>\n1989  no levy or collection could take place.  In respect of<br \/>\nthe  period prior to 25th October, 1989 even if tax had been<br \/>\nlevied\tand\/or\tdemand raised the contention of the  learned<br \/>\ncounsel was that the same could not be collected.\n<\/p>\n<p>    On\tbehalf\tof the respondents it was contended by\tShri<br \/>\nRakesh\tDwivedi that declaration of the provisions as  being<br \/>\nillegal prospectively meant that prior to 25th October, 1989<br \/>\nall the provisions were valid.\tHe submitted that this meant<br \/>\nthat  the said provisions were capable of being enforced for<br \/>\nthe  period  prior  to\tthe said date.\t He  contended\tthat<br \/>\nliability  to  pay  vend  fee\tgets  attracted\t the  moment<br \/>\nindustrial  alcohol is issued.\tSince this was issued during<br \/>\nthe  period  31st  May,\t 1979 and  25th\t October,  1989\t the<br \/>\nappellants  had\t become liable to pay vend fee.\t  Once\tthis<br \/>\nliability  prior  to 25th October, 1989 is held to be  valid<br \/>\nthen  the  State  was  entitled to  collect  the  same.\t  He<br \/>\nstrongly relied on the reasoning of the High Court which had<br \/>\nobserved  that it would be unreasonable if the\tobservations<br \/>\nin  the second Synthetics case were understood as  entitling<br \/>\nthe  appellants\t to retain the vend fee despite\t prospective<br \/>\noverruling  because those who have paid the vend fee for the<br \/>\nsame  period would stand in a disadvantageous position\twhen<br \/>\ncompared  to  those who did not pay the vend fee in view  of<br \/>\nthe  interim orders although in both the cases liability  to<br \/>\ntax  arises at the time of issuance of the alcohol.  Such an<br \/>\ninterpretation,\t it  was contended, would be  arbitrary\t and<br \/>\nviolative of Article 14 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The\t doctrine of prospective overruling was simply based<br \/>\non  equity  and\t full effect must be given thereto  and\t the<br \/>\nState  should  be  permitted to recover the unpaid  levy  in<br \/>\nrespect\t of  the period prior to 25th October,\t1989.\tShri<br \/>\nDwivedi\t further  submitted that in any case payments  which<br \/>\nhave  been  made under the interim orders of the High  Court<br \/>\ncould  be retained by the State and this clearly flows\tfrom<br \/>\nthe directions of this Court in paragraph 89 of the judgment<br \/>\nin  second Synthetics case.  The learned counsel, of course,<br \/>\ncontended  that\t even in respect of amounts secured by\tbank<br \/>\nguarantee the State would be entitled to collect the same.\n<\/p>\n<p>    In\tthe  present case the State of Uttar  Pradesh,\tlike<br \/>\nsome  other  States,  had  levied vend\tfee  in\t respect  of<br \/>\nindustrial  alcohol  under the U.P.  Excise Act, 1910.\t The<br \/>\nvalidity  of the same was challenged and a Division Bench of<br \/>\nthis  Court in State of U.P.  and Others (supra) had  upheld<br \/>\nits  validity.\tSubsequently a review petition was filed  in<br \/>\nrespect\t of the said judgment and another Writ Petition\t No.<br \/>\n182  of\t 1980 was also filed by Synthetics &amp; Chemicals\tLtd.<br \/>\nchallenging a notification dated 31st August, 1979 whereby a<br \/>\nnew rule was introduced, in place of existing one, providing<br \/>\nfor  levy  of vend fee.\t This was challenged and a Bench  of<br \/>\nSeven  Judges  in Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.\t and  Others<br \/>\n(supra)\t in  paragraph 82 recorded its conclusion  that\t the<br \/>\nrelevant  provisions  of the U.P.  Act and similar  Acts  of<br \/>\nAndhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Bombay were unconstitutional<br \/>\ninsofar\t as  these purported to levy a tax or charge  impost<br \/>\nupon industrial alcohol, namely, alcohol used and usable for<br \/>\nindustrial purposes.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Having  come  to  the  conclusion\tthat  the  levy\t was<br \/>\nunconstitutional  the  Court,  as  far\tas  the\t relief\t was<br \/>\nconcerned, observed as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>    89.\t  We must, however, observe, that these imposts and<br \/>\nlevies\thave been imposed by virtue of the decision of\tthis<br \/>\nCourt  in Synthetics &amp; Chemicals Ltd.  case.  The States  as<br \/>\nwell  as  the  petitioners and manufacturers  have  adjusted<br \/>\ntheir  rights and their position on that basis except in the<br \/>\ncase of State of Tamil Nadu.  In that view of the matter, it<br \/>\nwould  be  necessary  to  state that  these  provisions\t are<br \/>\ndeclared  to be illegal prospectively.\tIn other words,\t the<br \/>\nrespondents  States  are restrained from enforcing the\tsaid<br \/>\nlevy  any further but the respondents will not be liable for<br \/>\nany  refund and the tax already collected and paid will\t not<br \/>\nbe  refunded.  We prospectively declare these imposts to  be<br \/>\nillegal\t and  invalid,\tbut do not affect  any\trealisations<br \/>\nalready\t made.\t The  writ  petitions and  the\tappeals\t are<br \/>\ndisposed of accordingly.  The review petitions, accordingly,<br \/>\nsucceed\t though\t strictly no grounds as such have been\tmade<br \/>\nout  but  in  view  we\thave  taken,  the  decision  in\t the<br \/>\nSynthetics  &amp; Chemicals Ltd.  case cannot be upheld.  In the<br \/>\nview we have taken also, it is not necessary to decide or to<br \/>\nadjudicate  if the levy is valid as to who would be  liable,<br \/>\nthat  is  to  say, the manufacturer or the producer  or\t the<br \/>\ndealer.\n<\/p>\n<p>    90.\t  With\tregard\tto Writ Petition No.  4051  of\t1978<br \/>\n(Chemicals  &amp; Plastics India Ltd.  v.  State of Tamil Nadu),<br \/>\ncertain\t orders\t were  passed by this Court on\tNovember  1,<br \/>\n1978,  September  1, 1986, October 1, 1986 and\tOctober\t 10,<br \/>\n1986.\tIt is stated that the present demand of the  Central<br \/>\nExcise Department from March 1, 1986 on alcohol manufactured<br \/>\nby  the\t company in their captive distillery is over Rs.   4<br \/>\nCrores.\t  This\tCourt by its order dated October 1, 1986  as<br \/>\nconfirmed  on  October\t16,  1986 had  permitted  the  State<br \/>\nGovernment  to\tcollect the levy on alcohol manufactured  in<br \/>\ncompany&#8217;s  captive  distillery\tsubject\t  to  adjustment  of<br \/>\nequities  and restrained the central excise authorities from<br \/>\ncollecting  any\t excise\t duty  on   such  alcohol.   It\t is,<br \/>\ntherefore,  necessary  to declare that in future no  further<br \/>\nrealisation  will  be made in respect of this by  the  State<br \/>\nGovernment  from  the  petitioners.   So  far  as  the\tpast<br \/>\nrealisations  made  are\t concerned,  we\t direct\t that\tthis<br \/>\napplication  for  that\tpart  of the  direction,  should  in<br \/>\naccordance  with  our  decision herein be  placed  before  a<br \/>\nDivision  Bench\t for disposal upon notice both to the  State<br \/>\nGovernment and the Central Government.\n<\/p>\n<p>    It\tis  contended on behalf of the appellants  that\t the<br \/>\ndeclaration  in\t paragraph 82 of the said judgment that\t the<br \/>\nimpugned  provisions of the said Acts were  unconstitutional<br \/>\nwas  a\tdeclaration by this Court under Article 141  of\t the<br \/>\nConstitution.  The observations and the directions contained<br \/>\nin  paragraphs 89 and 90 supra indicated the exercise of the<br \/>\nCourts jurisdiction under Article 142.\n<\/p>\n<p>    In\tthe  present case in respect of the period prior  to<br \/>\n25th  October,\t1989,  when the second Synthetics  case\t was<br \/>\ndecided in respect of the appellants, demand had been raised<br \/>\nunder the impugned Acts and for some period payment had been<br \/>\nmade  and  in respect of other periods payment to the  State<br \/>\nGovernments  had  not  been  made.  The\t contention  of\t the<br \/>\nappellants is that in view of the observations of this Court<br \/>\nin  paragraph 89 the appellants may not be entitled to claim<br \/>\nrefund\tof the taxes already paid but, at the same time, the<br \/>\nState  Government  is not entitled to collect the  taxes  in<br \/>\nrespect of the period prior to 25th October, 1989, i.e.\t the<br \/>\ndate  on which the judgment was delivered.  It was, however,<br \/>\nsubmitted that in those cases where money was deposited with<br \/>\nthe  State on the condition that the same will be kept in  a<br \/>\nseparate  account and would be subject to the outcome of the<br \/>\nwrit  petition,\t the appellants would be entitled to  refund<br \/>\nthereof.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Shri  R.F.\t Nariman,  learned senior  counsel  for\t the<br \/>\nappellants  referred  to <a href=\"\/doc\/1912923\/\">Supreme Court Bar  Association\t vs.<br \/>\nUnion  of India and Another<\/a> (at page 430) and contended that<br \/>\nunder Article 142 of the Constitution this Court cannot pass<br \/>\nany  order  which  is  contrary\t to  any  constitutional  or<br \/>\nstatutory   provision.\t The  effect  of  the  decision\t  in<br \/>\nSynthetics  case  being that the impugned Acts were  without<br \/>\nlegislative  competence\t and those laws must be regarded  as<br \/>\nnonest\tas if they did not exist.  The validity of the\tsaid<br \/>\nlaws  which had earlier been upheld in the first  Synthetics<br \/>\ncase  got wiped out with a review petition against the first<br \/>\nSynthetics  case being allowed and the declaration of law in<br \/>\nthe Synthetics case.  He contended that the directions given<br \/>\nin  paragraph  89 was to do complete justice in exercise  of<br \/>\nthe  power  under Article 142 and the effect of\t prospective<br \/>\noverruling  was clearly specified in the said para where  it<br \/>\nis observed that in other words, the respondents States are<br \/>\nrestrained  from enforcing the said levy any further but the<br \/>\nrespondents  will  not be liable for any refund and the\t tax<br \/>\nalready collected and paid will not be refunded.\n<\/p>\n<p>    It\twas also submitted by Shri Nariman that there is  no<br \/>\njurisprudential\t  basis\t for  applying\t the   doctrine\t  of<br \/>\nprospective  overruling\t in India.  He submitted  that\tthis<br \/>\ndoctrine  was first invoked in I.C.  Golak Nath &amp; Ors.\t vs.<br \/>\nState  of Punjab &amp; Anrs.  where Chief Justice K.  Subba\t Rao<br \/>\nfor  himself  and  five\t other judges  invoked\tan  American<br \/>\ndoctrine  to  that effect.  Shri Nariman contended that\t the<br \/>\nother six judges did not subscribe to this and in fact three<br \/>\nof  the\t judges\t through  the judgment\tof  Justice  Wanchoo<br \/>\nexpressly  came\t to  the  conclusion that  the\tdoctrine  of<br \/>\nprospective overruling was against the provisions of Article<br \/>\n13(2)  of  the\tConstitution.\tIn our\topinion\t it  is\t not<br \/>\nnecessary  nor appropriate for us to go into this  question.<br \/>\nWe  are only concerned with the interpretation and effect of<br \/>\nthe  Second judgment in Synthetics case and not with  regard<br \/>\nto the correctness of the same.\n<\/p>\n<p>    It was contended by Shri Nariman that the vend fee which<br \/>\nwas  deposited\tin  Court consequent on\t the  interim  order<br \/>\npassed\tin respect thereto clearly stipulated that the\tsame<br \/>\nshould\tbe  kept  in  a separate  account.   He,  therefore,<br \/>\nsubmitted  that\t this  cannot be regarded as a\tpayment\t the<br \/>\nrefund\tof which the appellant was not entitled to by reason<br \/>\nof  the\t aforesaid observations in the second  Synthetics  &amp;<br \/>\nChemicals  judgment.  He contended that the direction,\tthat<br \/>\nthe  amount  received  by  the State should  be\t kept  in  a<br \/>\nseparate  account,  entitled the appellants to get back\t the<br \/>\nsaid  amount  once  it was held that the  State\t Legislature<br \/>\nlacked\tlegislative  competence to impose such a  levy.\t  He<br \/>\nfurther\t submitted that in any case the High Court was wrong<br \/>\nin  coming  to\tthe  conclusion that there  was\t any  unjust<br \/>\nenrichment  and, therefore, there should be no refund of the<br \/>\nlevy in question.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Shri  Sunil\t Gupta\tappearing  on  behalf  of  Hindustan<br \/>\nPolymers  Ltd.\t while reiterating the submissions of  other<br \/>\ncounsel\t  further  contended  that   furnishing\t of  a\tbank<br \/>\nguarantee does not tantamount to payment of tax.  He invited<br \/>\nour  attention to the decision of this Court in the case  of<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/983604\/\">Oswal Agro Mills Ltd.  and Another vs.\tAsstt.\tCollector of<br \/>\nCentral\t Excise,  Division  Ludhiana and Others<\/a> .   In\tthat<br \/>\ncase,  pursuant\t to  an interim order passed by\t this  Court<br \/>\nstaying\t the  recovery of excise duty a bank  guarantee\t had<br \/>\nbeen  furnished.   The assessees appeal was allowed and\t it<br \/>\nclaimed\t the refund of the bank guarantee which had  already<br \/>\nbeen  encashed\tby  the\t excise\t authorities.\tThe  Revenue<br \/>\ncontended  that the bank guarantee should be deemed to\thave<br \/>\nbeen  an equivalent to money deposited in Court and as\tsuch<br \/>\nSection\t 11-B  of  the Excise Act stood\t attracted  and\t the<br \/>\nappellants having failed to establish before the authorities<br \/>\nconcerned  that they had not passed on the incidence thereof<br \/>\nto  the\t customers, the authorities were entitled to  encash<br \/>\nthe  bank guarantee and retain the amount thereof.  Allowing<br \/>\nthe  appeal and holding that the provisions of Section\t11-B<br \/>\nwere  not  applicable in the case of furnishing of the\tbank<br \/>\nguarantee, this Court observed as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>    9.\tSection 11-B applies when an assessee claims refund<br \/>\nof  excise  duty.   A  claim  for  refund  is  a  claim\t for<br \/>\nrepayment.   It\t presupposes that the amount of\t the  excise<br \/>\nduty  has  been paid over to the excise authorities.  It  is<br \/>\nthen  that the excise authorities would be required to repay<br \/>\nor refund the excise duty.\n<\/p>\n<p>    10.\t  The question, therefore, is whether it can be said<br \/>\nthat  the furnishing of a bank guarantee for all or part  of<br \/>\nthe  disputed excise duty pursuant to an order of the  court<br \/>\nis  equivalent to payment of the amount of the excise  duty.<br \/>\nIn  our\t view,\tthe  answer is in  the\tnegative.   For\t the<br \/>\npurposes of securing the revenue in the event of the revenue<br \/>\nsucceeding  in\tproceedings before a court, the court, as  a<br \/>\ncondition  of  staying\tthe demand for the disputed  tax  or<br \/>\nduty,  imposes a condition that the assessee shall provide a<br \/>\nbank  guarantee\t for the full amount of such tax or duty  or<br \/>\npart  thereof.\t The bank guarantee is required to be  given<br \/>\neither\tin favour of the principal administrative officer of<br \/>\nthe  court or in favour of the revenue authority  concerned.<br \/>\nIn  the\t event\tthat the revenue fails\tin  the\t proceedings<br \/>\nbefore the court the question of payment of the tax or duty,<br \/>\nthe  amount of which is covered by the bank guarantee,\tdoes<br \/>\nnot  arise and, ordinarily, the court, at the conclusion  of<br \/>\nits  order,  directs  that the bank  guarantee\tshall  stand<br \/>\ndischarged.   Where  the revenue succeeds the amount of\t the<br \/>\ntax  or duty becomes payable by the assessee to the  revenue<br \/>\nand  it is open to the revenue to invoke the bank  guarantee<br \/>\nand  demand payment thereon.  The bank guarantee is security<br \/>\nfor  the revenue, that in the event the revenue succeeds its<br \/>\ndues will be recoverable, being backed by the guarantee of a<br \/>\nbank.\tIn the event, however unlikely, of the bank refusing<br \/>\nto  honour  its\t guarantee  it would be\t necessary  for\t the<br \/>\nrevenue\t or,  where the bank guarantee is in favour  of\t the<br \/>\nprincipal  administrative officer of the court, that officer<br \/>\nto  file a suit against the bank for the amount due upon the<br \/>\nbank guarantee.\t The amount of the disputed tax or duty that<br \/>\nis secured by a bank guarantee cannot, therefore, be held to<br \/>\nbe  paid to the revenue.  There is no question of its refund<br \/>\nand Section 11-B is not attracted.\n<\/p>\n<p>    When  this Court decided in I.C.  Golak Naths case that<br \/>\nthe power of amendment under Article 368 of the Constitution<br \/>\ndid  not allow Parliament to abridge the fundamental  rights<br \/>\nin  Part  III  of  the Constitution, it\t made  the  decision<br \/>\noperative  with\t prospective  effect.\t This  was  done  in<br \/>\nrecognition  of the fact that between the coming into  force<br \/>\nof the Constitution on 26th January 1950 and the date of the<br \/>\njudgment,  Parliament  had  in fact exercised the  power  of<br \/>\namendment  in  a  way which, according to  the\tdecision  in<br \/>\nGolaknath  was void.  If retrospectivity were to be given to<br \/>\nthe  decision,\tit  would  introduce  chaos  and  unsettled<br \/>\nconditions  in\tour  country.  On the other  hand  it  also<br \/>\nrecognised   that  such\t possibility  of  chaos\t  might\t  be<br \/>\npreferable  to the alternative of a totalitarian rule.\t The<br \/>\nCourt,\t therefore,  sought  to\t  evolve  some\t reasonable<br \/>\nprinciple  to  meet  this   extraordinary  situation.\tThe<br \/>\nreasonable  principle which was evolved was the doctrine  of<br \/>\nprospective overruling.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Although  the doctrine of prospective overruling,  was<br \/>\ndrawn from American jurisprudence, it has\/had, of necessity,<br \/>\nto  develop  indigenous characteristics.  The parameters  of<br \/>\nthe power as far as this country is concerned were sought to<br \/>\nbe laid down in Golaknath itself when it was said:\n<\/p>\n<p>    As\tthis Court for the first time has been called  upon<br \/>\nto  apply the doctrine evolved in a different country  under<br \/>\ndifferent circumstances, we would like to move warily in the<br \/>\nbeginning.   We\t would lay down the following  propositions:<br \/>\n(1)  The doctrine of prospective over-ruling can be  invoked<br \/>\nonly  in matters arising under our Constitution;  (2) it can<br \/>\nbe  applied only by the highest court of the country,  i.e.,<br \/>\nthe  Supreme Court as it has the constitutional jurisdiction<br \/>\nto  declare law binding on all the courts in India;  (3) the<br \/>\nscope  of  the retroactive operation of the law declared  by<br \/>\nthe  Supreme Court superseding its earlier decisions is left<br \/>\nto  its\t discretion  to be moulded in  accordance  with\t the<br \/>\njustice of the cause or matter before it.\n<\/p>\n<p>The parameters have not been adhered to in practice.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The\t word  prospective overruling implies  an  earlier<br \/>\njudicial  decision  on\tthe same issue which  was  otherwise<br \/>\nfinal.\t That  is  how\tit   was  understood  in  Golaknath.<br \/>\nHowever, this Court has used the power even when deciding on<br \/>\nan issue for the first time.  Thus in <a href=\"\/doc\/1907642\/\">India Cement Ltd.\t and<br \/>\nOthers vs.  State of Tamil Nadu and Others<\/a> , when this Court<br \/>\nheld  that the cess sought to be levied under Section 115 of<br \/>\nthe  Madras Panchayats Act, 1958 as amended by Madras Act 18<br \/>\nof  1964, was unconstitutional, not only did it restrain the<br \/>\nState  of Tamil Nadu from enforcing the same any further, it<br \/>\nalso  directed\tthat the State would not be liable  for\t any<br \/>\nrefund of cess already paid or collected.\n<\/p>\n<p>    This direction was considered in <a href=\"\/doc\/1018059\/\">Orissa Cement Ltd.\t vs.<br \/>\nState  of  Orissa and Others<\/a> at page 498 where it  was\theld<br \/>\nthat:\n<\/p>\n<p>    .\tThe  declaration  regarding the invalidity  of\ta<br \/>\nprovision and the determination of the relief that should be<br \/>\ngranted\t in consequent thereof are two different things and,<br \/>\nin  the\t latter sphere, the Court has, and must be  held  to<br \/>\nhave,  a certain amount of discretion.\tIt is a well settled<br \/>\nproposition  that it is open to the Court to grant, mould or<br \/>\nrestrict  the  relief  in a manner most appropriate  to\t the<br \/>\nsituation  before  it  in  such\t a way\tas  to\tadvance\t the<br \/>\ninterests of justice.  It will be appreciated that it is not<br \/>\nalways\tpossible  in  all situations to give a\tlogical\t and<br \/>\ncomplete effect to a finding..\n<\/p>\n<p>    Again  in  <a href=\"\/doc\/727248\/\">Union of India and Others vs.  Mohd.   Ramzan<br \/>\nKhan<\/a>  ,\t it  was held that non-furnishing of a copy  of\t the<br \/>\ninquiry\t report to an employee amounted to violation of\t the<br \/>\nprinciples  of\tnatural justice and any disciplinary  action<br \/>\ntaken  without\tfurnishing such report was liable to be\t set<br \/>\naside.\t However, it was made clear that the decision  would<br \/>\nhave  prospective application so that no punishment  already<br \/>\nimposed would be open to challenge on this count.  (See also<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/1190519\/\">Managing  Director,  ECIL,  Hyderabad  and  Others  vs.\t  B.<br \/>\nKarunakar and Others<\/a> .\n<\/p>\n<p>    In\t the  ultimate\t analysis,  prospective\t overruling,<br \/>\ndespite\t the  terminology,  is\tonly a\trecognition  of\t the<br \/>\nprinciple  that the court moulds the reliefs claimed to meet<br \/>\nthe  justice of the case  justice not in its logical but in<br \/>\nits  equitable sense.  As far as this country is  concerned,<br \/>\nthe power has been expressly conferred by Article 142 of the<br \/>\nConstitution which allows this Court to pass such decree or<br \/>\nmake  such order as is necessary for doing complete  justice<br \/>\nin  any cause or matter pending before it.  In exercise\t of<br \/>\nthis  power, this Court has often denied the relief  claimed<br \/>\ndespite\t holding  in  the claimants favour in  order  to  do<br \/>\ncomplete justice.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Given  this\t constitutional discretion, it\twas  perhaps<br \/>\nunnecessary  to\t resort\t to  any  principle  of\t prospective<br \/>\nover-ruling  a\tview which was expressed in <a href=\"\/doc\/1070043\/\">Narayanibai\t vs.<br \/>\nState of Maharashtra &amp; Others<\/a> at page 470 and in Ashok Kumar<br \/>\nGupta  and Another vs.\tState of U.P.  and Others .  In\t the<br \/>\nlatter case, while dealing with the doctrine of prospective<br \/>\noverruling, this Court said that it was a method evolved by<br \/>\nthe  Courts  to adjust competing rights of parties so as  to<br \/>\nsave transactions whether statutory or otherwise, that were<br \/>\neffected  by the earlier law.  According to this Court,\t it<br \/>\nwas  a\trule of judicial craftsmanship with pragmatism\tand<br \/>\njudicial  statesmanship\t as a useful outline to bring  about<br \/>\nsmooth\ttransition  of the operation of law  without  unduly<br \/>\naffecting  the\trights of the people who acted upon the\t law<br \/>\noperated  prior\t to the date of the judgment overruling\t the<br \/>\nprevious  law. Ultimately, it is a question of this Courts<br \/>\ndiscretion  and\t is, for this reason, relatable directly  to<br \/>\nthe words of the Court granting the relief.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Reading  the  two paragraphs 89 and 90 together it\tdoes<br \/>\nappear\tthat  this  Court regarded the\tdeclaration  of\t the<br \/>\nprovisions  being illegal prospectively as only meaning that<br \/>\nif  the States had already collected the tax they would\t not<br \/>\nbe liable to pay back the same.\t It is the States which were<br \/>\nprotected  as  a result of the declaration for otherwise  on<br \/>\nthe  conclusion\t that the impugned Acts\t lacked\t legislative<br \/>\ncompetence the result would have been that any tax collected<br \/>\nwould  have  become refundable as no State could retain\t the<br \/>\nsame  because levy would be without the authority of law and<br \/>\ncontrary  to  Article 265 of the Constitution.\tAt the\tsame<br \/>\ntime,  it  was\tclearly\t stipulated  that  the\tStates\twere<br \/>\nrestrained  from enforcing the levy any further.  The  words<br \/>\nused  in  Article 265 are levy and collect.   In  taxing<br \/>\nstatute\t the  words levy and collect are not  synonymous<br \/>\nterms,\t(refer\tto  <a href=\"\/doc\/6759\/\">Assistant Collector of  Central  Excise,<br \/>\nCalcutta  Division vs.\tNational Tobacco Co.  of India\tLtd.<\/a><br \/>\nat  page  572,\twhile levy would mean  the  assessment\tor<br \/>\ncharging  or  imposing tax, collect in Article\t265  would<br \/>\nmean  the physical realisation of the tax which is levied or<br \/>\nimposed.   Collection of tax is normally a stage  subsequent<br \/>\nto the levy of the same.  The enforcement of levy could only<br \/>\nmean  realisation of the tax imposed or demanded.  That\t the<br \/>\nStates\twere  prevented to recover the tax, if\tnot  already<br \/>\nrealised,  in  respect of the period prior to 25th  October,<br \/>\n1989  is further evident from paragraph 90 of the  judgment.<br \/>\nThe said paragraph shows that as on the date of the judgment<br \/>\nfor  the period subsequent to 1st March, 1986 the demand  of<br \/>\nthe  Central  Excise Department on the alcohol\tmanufactured<br \/>\nwas  over  Rs.\t4 Crores.  The Court referred to its  orders<br \/>\ndated  1st October, 1986 and 16th October, 1986 whereby\t the<br \/>\nState  Government  was\tpermitted  to collect  the  levy  on<br \/>\nalcohol\t manufactured  in the companys distilleries.   With<br \/>\nrespect to the said amount of Rs.  4 Crores, it was observed<br \/>\nthat  it is, therefore, necessary to declare that in future<br \/>\nno  further  realisation will be made in respect of this  by<br \/>\nthe State Government from the petitioners.  The implication<br \/>\nclearly\t was  that  if\tout  of\t Rs.   4  Crores  the  State<br \/>\nGovernment  had collected some levy the balance\t outstanding<br \/>\ncannot be collected after 25th October, 1989.\n<\/p>\n<p>    After  the\tdecision  in  second  Synthetics  case\tWrit<br \/>\nPetition  Nos.\t 7452  of  1981 and 3571 of  1982  &#8211;  Sachid<br \/>\nHussain\t &amp;  Anr.  vs.  The State of U.P.  &amp; Ors.  &#8211; came  up<br \/>\nfor hearing.  A Bench of Three Judges presided over by Chief<br \/>\nJustice\t Mukherji, who had delivered the judgment in  second<br \/>\nSynthetics  case  vide\torder\tdated  26th  February,\t1990<br \/>\ndisposing of the said writ petitions observed as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>    In\tview  of the judgement of this Court in\t Synthetics<br \/>\nand Chemicals Limited and Others vs.  State of Uttar Pradesh<br \/>\n1990  (1)  SCC\t109,  these   writ  petitions  are   allowed<br \/>\nprospectively\tand  the  levy\tis   declared  to   be\t bad<br \/>\nprospectively.\tSince no refund is claimed, there will be an<br \/>\norder  in terms of prayers (1) and (2) of the writ petitions<br \/>\nviz.   the  recovery  order issued by the  Excise  Inspector<br \/>\ndated  14th September, 1981 for a sum of Rs.68,200\/- against<br \/>\nthe petitioners are quashed and the respondents are directed<br \/>\nnot to recover the amount of Rs.68,200\/- from the petitioner<br \/>\ntowards vend fee for the period from 9.4.75 to 11.7.78.\n<\/p>\n<p>    To\tthe  same effect is another order dated 12th  March,<br \/>\n1990  again  by\t a  Bench presided  over  by  Chief  Justice<br \/>\nMukherji  in Writ Petition No.\t8435 of 1981 &#8211; Yawar Ali vs.<br \/>\nThe  State of U.P.  &amp; Ors.  By these two orders the State of<br \/>\nU.P.   was  directed not to recover the amounts\t outstanding<br \/>\ndespite\t recovery notices having been issued on a date prior<br \/>\nto  25th  October,  1989.  These two  orders  are  important<br \/>\ninasmuch  as the author of the judgment in second Synthetics<br \/>\ncase  understood his own decision of prospective  overruling<br \/>\nto  imply  that if a levy in respect of the  period  earlier<br \/>\nthan 25th October, 1989 has not been recovered by the excise<br \/>\nauthorities  then  notwithstanding a recovery  order  having<br \/>\nbeen  issued  the  State  was not entitled  to\trecover\t the<br \/>\namount.\t It can be said that in 1990 Chief Justice Mukherji,<br \/>\nalong  with  two  companion Judges interpreted\this  earlier<br \/>\ndecision  in a manner which clearly showed that paragraph 89<br \/>\nof  the\t judgment  in the second Synthetics case  could\t not<br \/>\nentitle\t the  State  to\t physically receive  any  amount  in<br \/>\nrespect\t of  the levy for the period prior to 25th  October,<br \/>\n1989  even though it could be said that the levy before that<br \/>\ndate  was not invalid because of the doctrine of prospective<br \/>\noverruling.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The\t doctrine  of prospective overruling was applied  in<br \/>\nBelsund\t Sugar\tCo.  Ltd.  vs.\tState of Bihar and Others  .<br \/>\nThe question which arose for consideration there was whether<br \/>\nmarket\tfee  could  be levied under  the  Bihar\t Agriculture<br \/>\nProduce\t Markets  Act,\t1960 in respect to  transactions  of<br \/>\npurchase  of  sugarcane, sugar and molasses by sugar  mills.<br \/>\nIn view of the provisions of the Bihar Sugarcane (Regulation<br \/>\nof  Supply and Purchase) Act, 1981 read with Sugar (Control)<br \/>\nOrder,\t1966 issued under the Essential Commodities Act,  it<br \/>\nwas  held  that the provisions of the Sugarcane Act and\t the<br \/>\nSugarcane  Order, on the one hand, and the Bihar Market\t Act<br \/>\non  the other could not operate harmoniously and, therefore,<br \/>\nthe Sugarcane Act and the Sugarcane Order prevailed over the<br \/>\nMarket\tAct.   It  was then contended  that  the  appellants<br \/>\ntherein\t should\t be allowed to get refund of the market\t fee<br \/>\nwhich  they  had paid under the Market Act subject to  their<br \/>\nshowing\t that  they  had  not passed on the  burden  on\t the<br \/>\nprinciple  of  unjust  enrichment.  Dealing with  the  above<br \/>\ncontentions, it was observed as follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>    112.  .Under these circumstances, keeping in view the<br \/>\npeculiar  facts and circumstances of these cases, we deem it<br \/>\nfit  to\t direct in exercise our powers under Article 142  of<br \/>\nthe  Constitution  of India that the present  decision\twill<br \/>\nhave  only a prospective effect.  Meaning thereby that after<br \/>\nthe  pronouncement of this judgment all future\ttransactions<br \/>\nof purchase of sugarcane by the sugar factories concerned in<br \/>\nthe  market areas as well as the sale of manufactured  sugar<br \/>\nand  molasses  produced\t by   therefrom\t by  utilising\tthis<br \/>\npurchased sugarcane by these factories will not be subjected<br \/>\nto the levy of market fee under Section 27 of the Market Act<br \/>\nby  the Market Committees concerned.  All past\ttransactions<br \/>\nup to the date of this judgment which have suffered the levy<br \/>\nof  market fee will not be covered by this judgment and\t the<br \/>\ncollected  market  fees on these past transactions prior  to<br \/>\nthe  date  of  this  judgment will not\tbe  required  to  be<br \/>\nrefunded  to  any of the sugar mills which might  have\tpaid<br \/>\nthese market fees.\n<\/p>\n<p>    113.   However,  one  rider\t has to\t be  added  to\tthis<br \/>\ndirection.   If\t any  of  the  Market  Committees  has\tbeen<br \/>\nrestrained   from  recovering  market\tfee  from  the\twrit<br \/>\npetitioners  in\t the  High  Court  or if  any  of  the\twrit<br \/>\npetitioners  in\t the High Court has, as an appellant  before<br \/>\nthis Court, obtained stay of the payment of market fee, then<br \/>\nfor  the  period  during which such stay  has  operated\t and<br \/>\nconsequently  market  fee was not paid on  the\ttransactions<br \/>\ncovered\t by such stay orders, there will remain no  occasion<br \/>\nfor  the  Market Committee concerned to recover such  market<br \/>\nfee  from  the sugar mill concerned after the date  of\tthis<br \/>\njudgment  even for such past transactions.  In other  words,<br \/>\nmarket\tfees  paid  in\tthe  past  shall  not  be  refunded.<br \/>\nSimilarly  market fees not collected in the past also  shall<br \/>\nnot  be collected hereafter.  The impugned judgments of\t the<br \/>\nHigh  Court  in this group of sugar matters will  stand\t set<br \/>\naside as aforesaid.  The writ petition directly filed before<br \/>\nthis  Court  also  will\t be required to be  allowed  in\t the<br \/>\naforesaid terms.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The\t aforesaid observations make clear what was implicit<br \/>\nin  paragraph 89 of the second Synthetics case, namely, that<br \/>\nwhere  payment\thas  not actually been made  to\t the  Market<br \/>\nCommittee  for\ta  period prior to the announcement  of\t the<br \/>\njudgment,  by reason of the assessee having obtained a stay,<br \/>\nthe  Market Committee was not entitled to recover the market<br \/>\nfee,  payment of which had been stayed.\t It was pithily\t put<br \/>\nin  Belsund  Sugar Co.\tLtd.s case (supra) that\t &#8220;in  other<br \/>\nwords  market fees paid in the past was not to be  refunded.<br \/>\nSimilarly  market fees not collected in the past was not  to<br \/>\nbe   collected\thereafter.   These   observations  are\t in<br \/>\nconsonance  with the directions given in paragraph 89 of the<br \/>\njudgment  in  second Synthetics case and applying  the\tsaid<br \/>\nprinciples  to the present appeals the only conclusion which<br \/>\ncan be arrived at is that this Court intended the status quo<br \/>\nas  on 25th October, 1989 to be maintained as regards actual<br \/>\npayment or levy was concerned.\tWhat had gone to the coffers<br \/>\nto  the Government with or without any string attached,\t was<br \/>\nto  remain  with it and what was not received could  not  be<br \/>\nrealised by the Government.\n<\/p>\n<p>    It\tis,  of\t course, true that in respect  of  the\tsame<br \/>\nperiod\ti.e.   prior to 25th October, 1989 persons  who\t had<br \/>\nobtained  stay\torders\tor had otherwise not paid  the\tlevy<br \/>\nwould  be better off than those who have deposited the\tsums<br \/>\nwith  the  Government  and are not entitled to\treceive\t any<br \/>\nrefund.\t  This\tsituation, however, is unavoidable  for\t the<br \/>\nsimple reason that Article 265 does not permit collection of<br \/>\ntax without the authority of law.  Even though levy prior to<br \/>\n25th  October,\t1989  may  be  valid but  when\tin  fact  no<br \/>\ncollection  was\t made pursuant to the said levy,  then\tpost<br \/>\njudgment  in  the second Synthetics case collection  is\t not<br \/>\npermissible.   After  25th October, 1989 there was no  valid<br \/>\nlaw  in\t existence  which permitted the collection  of\ttax.<br \/>\nShri  Venugopal\t is  right  in contending  that\t after\t25th<br \/>\nOctober,  1989\tthe  provisions of Section 39  of  the\tU.P.<br \/>\nExcise\tAct,  1910  which provides for\trecovery  of  excise<br \/>\nrevenue\t would be inapplicable.\t The said section inter alia<br \/>\nstates\tthat  all excise revenue may be recovered  from\t the<br \/>\nperson\tprimarily liable to pay the same, as arrears of land<br \/>\nrevenue or in the manner provided for the recovery of public<br \/>\ndemands\t by  any law for the time being in  force.   Section<br \/>\n3(1)  defines excise revenue as meaning revenue derived or<br \/>\nderivable  from\t any  duty  if the taxes  etc.\t imposed  or<br \/>\nordered\t under the provisions of the Act or of any other law<br \/>\nfor  the time being in force.  Section 3(3a) defines excise<br \/>\nduty  and countervailing duty as meaning any such  excise<br \/>\nduty or countervailing duty, as may be mentioned in Entry 51<br \/>\nof  List  II  of the Seventh Schedule of  the  Constitution.<br \/>\nThere  can  be no excise duty under the U.P.  Excise Act  on<br \/>\nindustrial  alcohol because that would be outside the  ambit<br \/>\nof  Entry  51 of List II of the Seventh Schedule.  Vend\t fee<br \/>\nbeing regarded as excise duty on industrial alcohol which is<br \/>\nnot valid as not falling under Entry 51 of List II cannot be<br \/>\nregarded  as  excise revenue and, therefore, at least  after<br \/>\n25th  October, 1989 it would be unrecoverable being  outside<br \/>\nthe purview of the Section 39 of the U.P.  Excise Act, 1910.<br \/>\nThis  would clearly be the position as a result of the Court<br \/>\nhaving\tdeclared  relevant  provisions of the U.P.   Act  as<br \/>\nbeing  ultra  vires insofar as it enables the imposition  of<br \/>\nexcise duty on industrial alcohol.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Furthermore\t in  view of the enunciation of the  law  by<br \/>\nthis  Court  in Oswal Agro Mills Ltd.  case (supra), a\tbank<br \/>\nguarantee  which is furnished cannot be regarded as  payment<br \/>\nof  excise levy which the Government is entitled to  retain.<br \/>\nThe  furnishing\t of a bank guarantee is ordered normally  in<br \/>\norder  to  ensure collection of dues.  Where,  however,\t the<br \/>\nState,\tas  in\tthe present case, has been held\t not  to  be<br \/>\nentitled  to collect or realise vend fee after 25th October,<br \/>\n1989  it cannot be allowed to invoke the bank guarantee\t and<br \/>\nrealise\t the  amount  of  vend fee.   What  cannot  be\tdone<br \/>\ndirectly  cannot  be done indirectly either.  Furnishing  of<br \/>\nbank  guarantee is only a promise by the bank to pay to\t the<br \/>\nbeneficiary the amount under certain circumstances contained<br \/>\nin  the bank guarantee.\t Furnishing of bank guarantee cannot<br \/>\ntantamount  to\tmaking of payment as it was to avoid  making<br \/>\npayment\t of  the vend fee that bank guarantees were  issued.<br \/>\nThe  respondents, in other words, are not entitled to encash<br \/>\nthe  bank guarantees and realise vend fee in respect of\t the<br \/>\nperiod prior to 25th October, 1989.\n<\/p>\n<p>    It\tis  true  that the effect of a\tlegislation  without<br \/>\nlegislative  competence is that it is nonest.  [See:  <a href=\"\/doc\/68666\/\">Behram<br \/>\nKhurshed  Pesikaka  vs.\t  The State of Bombay<\/a> at  652,\t653,<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/725224\/\">R.M.D.\t Chamarbaugwalla  vs.\tThe Union of India<\/a>  at\t940,<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/1291316\/\">M.P.V.\t Sundararamier\t&amp;  Co.\t vs.  The  State  of  Andhra<br \/>\nPradesh &amp; Another<\/a> (supra) at 1468 and <a href=\"\/doc\/1718426\/\">Mahendra Lal Jaini vs.<br \/>\nThe State of Uttar Pradesh and Others<\/a> at 937-941.]<\/p>\n<p>    Nevertheless   a   law   enacted   without\t legislative<br \/>\ncompetence  remains  on\t the statute book till\ta  Court  of<br \/>\ncompetent  jurisdiction adjudicates thereon and declares  it<br \/>\nto  be\tvoid.  When the Court declares it to be void  it  is<br \/>\nonly  then  that  it can be said that it is nonest  for\t all<br \/>\npurposes.   In Synthetics and Chemicals case the  invalidity<br \/>\nof the provisions was a declaration under Article 141 of the<br \/>\nConstitution.\tIt  was for doing complete justice that\t the<br \/>\nCourt  in  exercise  of its jurisdiction under\tArticle\t 142<br \/>\nmoulded\t the  relief in such a way as to give effect to\t its<br \/>\ndeclaration  prospectively.   It is not possible  to  accept<br \/>\nthat  such an order of prospective overruling is contrary to<br \/>\nlaw.   An  invalid law has not been held to be\tvalid.\t All<br \/>\nthat  has happened is that the declaration of invalidity  of<br \/>\nthe  legislation  was directed to take effect from a  future<br \/>\ndate.\n<\/p>\n<p>    The\t principle  of prospective over-ruling is  too\twell<br \/>\nenshrined  in  our  jurisprudence for it  to  be  disturbed.<br \/>\nTherefore,  by\treason of the decision in second  Synthetics<br \/>\ncase   what   has  actually   happened\tis  collection\t and<br \/>\nnon-collection\tof  vend fee prior to 25th October, 1989  is<br \/>\nleft untouched.\t However, the Court in the second Synthetics<br \/>\ncase did not specifically deal with the question of deposits<br \/>\nmade  pursuant\tto interim orders of Courts.  The word\tused<br \/>\nthere  was realisation.\t It might have been arguable  that<br \/>\nthe deposits were not realisations in the sense the word<br \/>\nhas  been  used\t in  taxation statutes in  general  and\t the<br \/>\nU.P.Excise  Act,  1910 in particular.  However, the  interim<br \/>\norders passed by the High Court show that deposits were made<br \/>\nof vend fee and the purchase tax.  Although these deposits<br \/>\nwere  to be kept in a separate account, nevertheless in\t the<br \/>\ncircumstances  of  this case, it would be mere sophistry  to<br \/>\nhold  that  the monies so deposited were not  realisations<br \/>\nfor  the purposes of the U.P.  Excise Act.  Therefore,\twhat<br \/>\nwas  deposited by the appellants with the State would remain<br \/>\nwith  it notwithstanding, the interim orders which  required<br \/>\nthe  State to keep it in a separate account but, at the same<br \/>\ntime,  what  has not been collected by the State  cannot  be<br \/>\nrealised  by it, even in those cases where a bank  guarantee<br \/>\nhad been furnished.\n<\/p>\n<p>    Lastly,  while relying on <a href=\"\/doc\/1065691\/\">Mafatlal Industries Ltd.\t and<br \/>\nOthers\tvs.   Union  of\t India and  Others<\/a>  ,  Shri  Dwivedi<br \/>\nsubmitted  that\t the appellants had realised the  amount  of<br \/>\nvend  fee  payable by taking that figure into account  while<br \/>\ndetermining  their  sale price and, therefore, the State  is<br \/>\nentitled to recover the same as it would otherwise result in<br \/>\nunjust enrichment to the appellants.\n<\/p>\n<p>    In\tMafatlals  case\t (supra) the  principle\t of  unjust<br \/>\nenrichment was invoked as refund was claimed even though the<br \/>\namount of excise duty paid had already been recovered.\tThis<br \/>\nprinciple  resulted in the court declining to order  refund.<br \/>\nThe  principle\tof unjust enrichment does not apply  in\t the<br \/>\npresent\t case,\tin  view of the direction  given  in  second<br \/>\nSynthetics case (supra) that no refund be given.  This is in<br \/>\nline  with  the\t principle of unjust enrichment.   But\tthat<br \/>\nprinciple cannot be extended to give a right to the State to<br \/>\nrecover\t or  realise  vend fee after the  statute  has\tbeen<br \/>\nstruck\tdown and it has been categorically stated that\tthe<br \/>\nrespondent  States  are restrained from enforcing  the\tsaid<br \/>\nlevy  any further..  The contention of the respondents\tin<br \/>\nthe  teeth of the aforesaid direction cannot, therefore,  be<br \/>\naccepted.   This  is  apart from the fact that there  is  no<br \/>\nfactual\t basis\ton  which this Court can conclude  that\t the<br \/>\nappellants  have in fact realised the amount of vend fee and<br \/>\nallowing  them\tto  retain it will result in  their  getting<br \/>\nenriched unjustly.\n<\/p>\n<p>    For\t the  aforesaid reasons, C.A.  No.  4093 of 1991  is<br \/>\nallowed.   Civil Appeal No.  2853 of 2001 is dismissed.\t  It<br \/>\nis  declared that the vend fee realised by the States is not<br \/>\nto  be refunded to the appellants and, at the same time, the<br \/>\nState  cannot  collect any vend fee for the period prior  to<br \/>\n25th  October,\t1989  or   thereafter  notwithstanding\tthat<br \/>\nnotices\t of  demand  may  have\t been  issued  or   recovery<br \/>\nproceeding initiated.  Parties to bear their own costs.\n<\/p>\n<p>    C.A.   Nos.\t 324 of 1981, 455, 2795, 1604 of 1980,\t624,<br \/>\n625,  125, 2049 of 1981, C.A.  Nos.  1122, 181 of 1981,\t SLP<br \/>\n(C)  Nos.  4181, 4297-4298 of 1980, C.A.  Nos.\t215, 341  of<br \/>\n1981,  T.C.   Nos.  37-39 of 1989, C.A.\t Nos.  2777 of\t1981<br \/>\nand 1607 of 1980<\/p>\n<p>    In\tthese  appeals apart from the points decided by\t the<br \/>\njudgment in Somaiyas case (Civil Appeal No.  4093 of 1991),<br \/>\none  of the issues which arises pertains to the validity  of<br \/>\nthe  export pass fee sought to be levied and realised by the<br \/>\nState.\t Counsel  for the parties agree that this and  other<br \/>\nissues,\t not covered by the judgment in Somaiyas case,\tcan<br \/>\nnow be decided by an appropriate Bench.\n<\/p>\n<p>I.A. Nos. 1 &amp; 3 in W.P (C) No. 1892 of 1973<\/p>\n<p>I.A. Nos. 1 and 3 in W.P (C) No. 1892 are dismissed.\n<\/p>\n<p>      .J.  ] [ B.N.  Kirpal@@<br \/>\n\t\t       IIIIIIIIIIIIII<\/p>\n<p>    .J.\t [Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri]<\/p>\n<p>    .J.\t [ M.B.\t Shah ]<\/p>\n<p>    .J.\t  [K.G.Balakrishnan ]<\/p>\n<p>    April 17, 2001<\/p>\n<p>  (1990) 1 SCC 109<br \/>\n  (1980) 2 SCC 441<br \/>\n  (1994) 4 SCC 149<br \/>\n  1958 SCR 1422<br \/>\n  (1998) 4 SCC 409<br \/>\n  [1967] 2 SCR 762<br \/>\n  (1994) 2 SCC 546<br \/>\n  (1990) 1 SCC 12<br \/>\n   1991 Supp (1) SCC 430<br \/>\n  (1991) 1 SCC 588<br \/>\n  (1993) 4 SCC 727<br \/>\n  (1969) 3 SCC 468<\/p>\n<p>  (1997) 5 SCC 201<br \/>\n  (1972) 2 SCC 560<br \/>\n  (1999) 9 SCC 620<br \/>\n  [1955] 1 SCR 613<\/p>\n<p>  [1957] SCR 930<\/p>\n<p>  [1963] Supp. 1 SCR 912<br \/>\n  (1997) 5 SCC 536<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">2<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India M\/S Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. &#8230; vs State Of Uttar Pradesh &amp; Anr on 17 April, 2001 Author: Kirpal Bench: B.N. Kirpal, Syed Shah Quadri, M.B. Shah, K.G. Balakrishnan CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4093 of 1991 PETITIONER: M\/S SOMAIYA ORGANICS (INDIA) LTD. &amp; ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH &amp; [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-11498","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>M\/S Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. ... vs State Of Uttar Pradesh &amp; Anr on 17 April, 2001 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ms-somaiya-organics-india-ltd-vs-state-of-uttar-pradesh-anr-on-17-april-2001\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"M\/S Somaiya Organics (India) Ltd. ... vs State Of Uttar Pradesh &amp; 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