{"id":129491,"date":"1979-10-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1979-10-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kewal-singh-vs-lajwanti-on-4-october-1979"},"modified":"2017-11-07T22:13:14","modified_gmt":"2017-11-07T16:43:14","slug":"kewal-singh-vs-lajwanti-on-4-october-1979","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kewal-singh-vs-lajwanti-on-4-october-1979","title":{"rendered":"Kewal Singh vs Lajwanti on 4 October, 1979"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Kewal Singh vs Lajwanti on 4 October, 1979<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1980 AIR 161, \t\t 1980 SCR (1) 854<\/div>\n
Author: S M Fazalali<\/div>\n
Bench: Fazalali, Syed Murtaza<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nKEWAL SINGH\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nLAJWANTI\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT04\/10\/1979\n\nBENCH:\nFAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA\nBENCH:\nFAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA\nSHINGAL, P.N.\nSEN, A.P. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1980 AIR  161\t\t  1980 SCR  (1) 854\n 1980 SCC  (1) 290\n CITATOR INFO :\n C\t    1980 SC 315\t (3)\n R\t    1982 SC1518\t (9)\n R\t    1984 SC 967\t (7,10)\n D\t    1990 SC 560\t (32)\n\n\nACT:\n     Frame of  Suit-Whether earlier  giving up\ta  cause  of\naction by deletion from the plaint and later on again re for\ninclusion of  the same\tcause is  barred by the principle of\nOrder II of Rule 2 C.P.C.\n     Doctrine of  constructive Res-judicata-When it applies-\nWhether deletion  of a\tcause of  action from the plaint and\nagain a\t request for inclusion would amount to a bar of Res-\njudicata.\n     Delhi Rent\t Control Act,  Section 25B-Whether violative\nof Art. 14 of the Constitution.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The appellant  was the  tenant of respondent in Quarter\nNo. IV-H\/46  Lajpat Nagar  from 1-7-1967.  On 2-6-1976,\t the\nrespondent filed  an application  under\t   sections  14A(1),\n14(1)(e) and  14(1)(f) of  the Delhi  Rent Control  Act, for\neviction of  the appellant firstly on the ground that as her\nhusband\t was  required\tby  the\t Government  to\t vacate\t the\nGovernment quarters  or pay  the penal\trent, the husband of\nthe respondent\thad to\tshift to the house of his wife which\nwas in\tthe tenancy of the defendant. A prayer was also made\nthat  even  otherwise  the  premises  were  required  for  a\nbonafide necessity  of the landlord and also as the premises\nhad  become   unfit  for  human\t habitation  the  respondent\nrequired the  same for\tcarrying out repairs which could not\nbe done\t unless the  premises  were  vacated.  On 3-6-76 the\nrespondent filed  an application  withdrawing the  cause  of\naction mentioned  by her  regarding bonafide  necessity\t and\nrepairs as  contemplated by Section 14(1)(e) and 14(1)(f) of\nthe  Act.   The\t Rent  Controller  accordingly\tallowed\t the\nplaintiff to  withdraw the two causes of action mentioned in\nthe application\t since no  notice was served at this time on\nthe  appellant.\t  Thereafter  notice   was  served   on\t the\nappellant. On  4-6-1976, the plaintiff again sought to amend\nher petition by deleting the cause of action mentioned under\nsection 14A(1) of the Act i.e. requirement of the respondent\nbecause\t her   husband\thad  been  directed  to\t vacate\t the\nGovernment Quarter.  On\t 13-8-1976  the\t appellant  appeared\nbefore the  Rent Controller  and filed\tan application under\nsection 25B,  sub sections  4  and  5  requesting  the\tRent\nController to give him permission to defend the suit, on the\nground that as the landlady was not a Government servant she\nwas not\t entitled to  maintain the  eviction petition  under\nSection 14A(1)\tof the\tAct. On\t 6-10-76 the  husband of the\nrespondent filed  an application  for being  impleaded as  a\nparty, but  this application  was rejected  on 22-11-76. The\nrespondent   thereafter again  filed another  application on\n27-1-77 praying for amendment of her eviction application by\nre-inserting  the  cause  of  action  contained\t in  section\n14(1)(e) of  the Act  and sought  to claim  eviction on\t the\nground\tof   bonafide  requirement.   This  application\t was\ncontested by  the appellant  but was  allowed  by  the\tRent\nController by  his order  dated 19-2-77\t leaving open to the\nappellant to file his objection by a fresh application if he\nwanted to  defend the  suit. The appellant accordingly filed\nan application\ton 9-3-77  for permission to defend the suit\non the ground that the amendment sought for by the plaintiff\nwas uncalled  for and  illegal and  could  not\tbe  allowed.\nUltimately, the Rent\n855\ncontroller  by\t his  order   dated  27-7-77   rejected\t the\napplication for\t leave to  appear and  defend the  suit\t and\npassed an  order evicting  the appellant  from the premises.\nThe revision  petition filed  by the appellant under Section\n25B(8) in the Delhi High Court was dismissed on 6-4-1978 and\nhence the appeal by special leave of the Court.\n     It was contended: (a) that the second application given\nby the\trespondent for\tre-amending her\t plaint by inserting\nthe relief  under section 14(1)(e) which she had given up at\na prior\t occasion when\tshe had based her suit under section\n14A(1) was  barred by  the principles  of Order\t II  Rule  2\nC.P.C. (b)  that even  if order\t II Rule  2 C.P.C.,  had  no\napplication, the  second application filed by the respondent\nwas barred  by the doctrine of constructive res-judicata and\n(c) Section  25B which lays down the procedure for disposing\nof  the\t  applications\tfiled  by  the\tlandlord  under\t the\nprovisions of  Section 14A  and 14(1)(e)  are  violative  of\nArticle 14  of the Constitution in as much as the provisions\nare arbitrary  and discriminatory  in nature,  and  seek  to\nprovide\t two  different\t procedures  for  tenants  similarly\nsituated.\n     Dismissing the appeal by special leave, the Court\n^\n     HELD: 1.  A perusal  of order  II Rule  2 C.P.C.  would\nclearly reveal\tthat this provision applies to cases where a\nplaintiff omits\t to sue\t a portion of the cause of action on\nwhich the  suit is  based either by relinquishing, the cause\nof action  or by  omitting a  part of it. The provision has,\ntherefore, no  application to  cases where the plaintiff has\nbased his suit on separate and distinct causes of action and\nchooses to  relinquish one  or the  other of  them. In\tsuch\ncases, it  is always  open to  the plaintiff to file a fresh\nsuit on the basis of a distinct cause of action [860 E-F]\n     In the  instant case,  the second amendment application\nwas rot\t barred by the principles of order II, Rule 2 C.P.C.\nThe respondent\thad first  based her  suit on three distinct\ncauses of  action, but\tlater confined\tthe suit only to the\nfirst cause  of action,\t namely the one mentioned in Section\n14A(1) of  the Act  and gave up the cause of action relating\nto section  14(1) (e)  and (f). Subsequently by virtue of an\namendment she relinquished the first cause of action arising\nout of\tsection 14A(1)\tand sought  to revive  her cause  of\naction based  on section  14(1)(e). At\tthe  time  when\t the\nrespondent relinquished\t the cause  of action arising out of\nSection 14(1)(e),  the applicant  was not  in the picture at\nall. Therefore it was not open to the appellant to raise any\nobjection to  the amount sought by the respondent. 1861 G-H.\n862 A-C]\n     Mohammed Khalil  Khan and\tOrs. v.\t Mahbub Alikhan\t and\nOrs. 75 I.A 121 P.C.; applied.\n     2. One  of the  essential conditions of res judicata is\nthat there must be a normal adjudication between the parties\nafter full  hearing. In\t other words,  the  matter  must  be\nfinally decided between the parties. [862 C]\n     In the  instant case, the doctrine of constructive res-\njudicata has  no application  whatsoever, since\t at the time\nwhen the  respondent relinquished her first cause of action,\nthe appellant  was no  where in the picture and there was no\nadjudication  between  the  parties.  The  second  amendment\napplication was\t made in  the same  proceedings on a case of\naction that she was allowed to insert with the permission of\nthe Court.  Although both  the parties\twent to the Court on\nthe basis of\n856\nthese facts,  neither the  bar of  res judicata\t nor that of\nOrder  II   Rule  2   C.P.C.  was  raised  before  the\tRent\nController. [862 C, E]\n     3. It  is well  settled that what Article 14 forbids is\nhostile discrimination\tand not\t reasonable  classification.\nDiscrimination may  take place in many ways and what Article\n14 requires  is that equals must be treated alike. If equals\nand unequals  one also treated alike then also Article 14 is\nclearly attracted and discrimination results. [862 F-G]\n     (b) A reasonable classification based on grounds having\na clear nexus with the objective to be achieved and grouping\ncertain persons\t in a  separate category  in view  of  their\nspecial peculiarities is undoubtedly permissible. Of course,\nclassification should  not be  purely a\t class\tlegislation.\n[862 G-H]\n     (c) It  is also  well settled  that there\tis always  a\npresumption in\tfavour of tho constitutionality of a statute\nand any\t party who seeks to challenge the legislation on the\nground of  applicability of  Article 14 must plead and prove\ntho necessary  facts. In  making a classification, the Court\nmust presume  matters of  common knowledge,  common  report,\nhistory of  the time  and every other relevant fact. [862 H,\n863 A]\n     Chiranjit Lal  Chowdhari v.  Union of  India  and\tOrs.<\/a>\n[1950] S.C.R.  869, State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar<\/a>\n[1952] S.C.R.  284; Sri\t Ramkrishna Dalmia  v. Shri  Justice\nS.R. Tandolkar and Ors. [1959] S.C.R. 279 Mahant Moti Das v.\nS. P.  Sahi the Special Officer<\/a> in charoe of Hindu Religious\nTrust and  Ors., [1959]\t 2 Supp.  S.C.R. 563, A. C. Aggarwal\nSub Divisional\tMagistrate Delhi  and Anr.  v. Mst. Ram Kali<\/a>\netc. [1968] 1 S.C.R. 205; referred to.\n     4.\t The   Rent  Control   Act  is\ta  piece  of  social\nlegislation and\t is meant mainly to protect the tenants from\nfrivolous evictions.  At the  same  time,  in  order  to  do\njustice to  the landlords  and to avoid such restrictions on\ntheir right to evict the tenant so as to destroy their legal\nright to property certain salutary provisions have been made\nby the legislature which give relief to the landlord. In the\nabsence of  such a  legislation a  landlord has a common law\nright to evict the tenant either on the determination of the\ntenancy by  efflux of time or for default in payment cf rent\nor other  grounds after\t giving notice under the Transfer of\nProperty Act.  Their broad  right has  been curtailed by the\nRent Control  Legislation with\ta view to give protection to\nthe tenants  having regard  to their genuine and dire needs.\n[864 C-E]\n     While the\trent control  legislation has given a number\nof facilities  to the tenants, it should not be construed so\nas to  destroy the  limited relief which it seeks to give to\nthe landlord  also, like the question of landlord's bonafide\npersonal necessity. The concept of bonafide necessity should\nbe meaningfully\t construed so  as to make the relief granted\nto the landlord real and practical. [864 E-G]\n     Bega Begum and Ors. v. Abdul Ahmed Khan<\/a> (dead) by 1. rs\nand Ors. [1979] 2 S.C.R. 1; referred to.\n     Section 25B  of the Delhi Rent Control Act was inserted\nin the statute by Act 18 of 5976 and was given retrospective\neffect from 1-12-75, with the sole object of simplifying the\nprocedure for  eviction of  tenants  in\t case  the  landlord\nrequires the  premises bonafide for his personal occupation.\nThe Legislature\t in its\t wisdom thought\t that  a  short\t and\nsimple procedure should be provided\n857\nfor those  landlords who  generally want  the  premises\t for\ntheir bonafide\tnecessity   so that  they may be able to get\nquick and expeditious relief. [865 G-H, 866 A-B]\n     Section 25B  does not  govern all\tgrounds\t open  to  a\nlandlord for  evicting the tenant but it is confined only to\nthe ground  in section\t14A and proviso to section 14(1)(e).\nIn other  words, the  bonafide necessity of the landlord has\nbeen put  in a\tseparate class\tor category having regard to\nthe peculiar  incidents\t of  his  right.  Section  14A\talso\nrelates to  a special situation where the landlord under the\nGovernment Rules  is asked  to shift to his own house, if he\nhas one\t or in\ta house\t that belongs to his spouse, failing\nwhich he  has to  pay a penal rent which almost takes away a\nmajor part  of his  salary. Thus,  such a landlord becomes a\nclass by  himself. The\tstatute thus puts personal necessity\nof  the\t landlord  as  a  special  class  requiring  special\ntreatment for  quick eviction  of the  tenant and  cuts\t out\ndelays and plugs all the loopholes, which may cause delay in\ngetting the  relief by the landlord. The classification made\nby the\tlegislature is in public interest and is in complete\nconsonance with\t the objectives\t sought to  be achieved. The\nlandlords  having   personal  necessity\t have  been  brought\ntogether as  a separate class because of their special needs\nand such  a classification cannot be said to be unreasonable\nparticularly where  the legislature  in its  obvious  wisdom\nfeels that  the Landlords  should get this relief as quickly\nas possible. [868 A-E]\n     Even though  a summary  procedure has  been evolved the\ntenant has  been afforded  full opportunity  to\t defend\t the\napplication  provided  he  can\tdisclose  good\tgrounds\t for\nnegating the  case of  the landlord. No litigant has a right\nto protract  the  legal\t proceedings  by  taking  frivolous,\nirrelevant, irrational\tor uncalled  for pleas. This is what\nSection 25B seeks to prevent. [869 E-F]\n     An appeal\tis purely a creature of the statute and this\nright has  not been  given in  order to\t cut out unnecessary\ndelay. Indeed  the highest Court of the state has been given\na wide\tpower of  revision where  the said Court can examine\nthe case  of the tenant and the landlord and the validity of\nthe order passed by the Controller. The right of the tenant,\ntherefore, is  sufficiently safeguarded\t by the\t proviso  to\nsub- section  8 of  Section 25B of the Act. In order to give\nthe relief  to the  tenant against any apparent error of law\nor fact\t where no revision has been filed in the High Court,\nthe statute  confers power of review on the Controller. [869\nG-H, 870 A]\n     Thus, taking  an overall  picture of the situation, the\ncircumstances under  which the\tlandlord's needs  have\tbeen\nclassified and the safeguards given by the statute it cannot\nbe said\t by any\t stretch of imagination that Section 25B and\nits  sub  sections  are\t violative  of\tArticle\t 14  of\t the\nConstitution. In  fact, Section\t 25B contains  valuable\t and\nsufficient guidelines  which completely exclude the exercise\nof uncanalised\tor arbitrary  powers of the Rent Controller.\n[870 A-B]\n     Section 25B  is constitutionally valid. The legislature\nhas not\t taken, away  the right of the tenant at all but has\nmerely simplified  the procedure  for eviction of the tenant\nin cases  falling within  the  ambit  of  sections  14A\t and\n14(1)(e) of  the Act. A tenant cannot challenge the validity\nof such\t a provision  enacted by  the legislature from which\nthe tenant  itself derive  such rights.\t If the\t legislature\nconsidered  in\tits  wisdom  to\t confer\t certain  rights  or\nfacilities  on\t that  tenants,\t it  could  due\t to  changed\ncircumstances curtail,\tmodify, alter or even take away such\nrights or  the procedure enacted for the purpose of eviction\nand leave  the tenants to seek their remedy under the common\nlaw. [870 G-H, 871 A, B-C]\n858\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1291 of
\n1970.\n<\/p>\n
     Appeal by\tSpecial Leave  from the\t Judgment and  Order
\ndated 6-4-1978 of the Delhi High Court in Civil Revision No.
\n822\/77.\n<\/p>\n
     Madan Mohan,  V.J.\t Francis  and  D.K.  Garg  for\tthe,
\nAppellant.\n<\/p>\n
     R.P.H. Parekh, C.B. Singh, M. Mudgal and B.L. Verma for
\nthe Respondent,
\n     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n      FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed
\nagainst the judgment and order of The Delhi High Court dated
\nthe 6th\t April, 1978  dismissing the revision petition filed
\nby the\tappellant against  an order  of the Rent Controller.
\nFor the\t purpose of  brevity  and  to  avoid  confusion\t the
\nappellant shall\t hereafter be  referred to  as the defendant
\nand the respondent as the Plaintiff.\n<\/p>\n
     The defendant appellant was inducted as a tenant by the
\nplaintiff in Quarter No. IV-H\/46, Lajpat Nagar, New Delhi on
\n1-7-1967.  On\t2nd  June,   1976  the\tplaintiff  filed  an
\napplication under  sections 14A(1)  14(1)(e) and 14(j)(l) of
\nthe Delhi  Rent Control\t Act, hereinafter referred to as the
\nAct, for  eviction of  the tenant firstly on the ground that
\nas  the\t husband  of  the  plaintiff  was  required  by\t the
\nGovernment to vacate the Government quarter or pay the penal
\nrent the husband  of the plaintiff had to shift to the house
\nof his\twife which  was in  the tenancy\t of the defendant. A
\nprayer was  also made  by the  plaintiff that even otherwise
\nthe premises  were required  for a bonafide necessity of the
\nland-lady and  also as\tthe premises  had become  unfit\t for
\nhuman  habitation   the\t plaintiff  required  the  same\t for
\ncarrying out  repairs which   could  not be  done unless the
\npremises were  vacated. On  the next  date, that  is on\t 3rd
\nJune, 1976  the plaintiff  filed an application with drawing
\nthe cause  of action  mentioned by  her\t regarding  bonafide
\nnecessity and  repairs as  contemplated by sections 14(1)(e)
\nand 14(1)  (f) of  the Act.  The defendant appellant at this
\ntime was  nowhere in  the picture and no notice had yet been
\nserved on  him. The  Rent Controller accordingly allowed the
\nplaintiff to  withdraw the two causes of action mentioned in
\nthe  application.   Thereafter\tnotice\twas  issued  to\t the
\ndefendant. On  the 4th June, 1976 the plaintiff again sought
\nto amend  her petition\tby  deleting  the  cause  of  action
\nmentioned under\t section 14-A(l)  of the Act, that is to say
\nrequirement of\tthe plaintiff  because her  husband had been
\ndirected to  vacate the Government quarter. This was perhaps
\nnecessitated because  there  were  some\t amendments  in\t the
\nGovernment Rules  on the  subject. On  the 13th August, 1976
\nthe defendant appeared before the Rent Controller
\n859<\/span>
\nand filed  an application  under section  25B sub-sections 4
\nand 5  requesting the  Rent Controller to give the defendant
\npermission to  defend the  suit, on  the ground\t that as the
\nland-lady was  not a Government servant she was not entitled
\nto maintain  the eviction  petition under  section 14A(1) of
\nthe Act.  The defendant\t also raised some other contentions.
\nOn  6-10-1976\tthe  husband   of  the\tplaintiff  filed  an
\napplication  for  being\t impleaded  as\ta  party,  but\tthis
\napplication  was   rejected  on\t 22-11-1976.  The  plaintiff
\nthereafter again  filed\t another  application  on  27-1-1977
\npraying for  amendment of  her eviction\t application by\t re-
\ninserting the  cause of action contained in section 14(1)(e)
\nof the\tAct and\t sought to  claim eviction  on the ground of
\nbonafide requirement.  This application was contested by the
\ndefendant but  was allowed  by the  Rent Controller  by\t his
\norder dated  19-2-1977. The  Rent Controller however left it
\nopen to\t the defendant\tto file\t his objection\tby  a  fresh
\napplication if\the wanted  to defend the suit. The defendant
\naccordingly filed  an application on the 9th March, 1977 for
\npermission to  defend  the  suit  on  the  ground  that\t the
\namendment sought  for by  the plaintiff was uncalled for and
\nillegal and  could  not\t be  allowed.  Ultimately  the\tRent
\nController by  his order  dated 27th July, 1977 rejected the
\napplication of\tthe defendant for leave to appear and defend
\nthe suit and passed an order evicting the defendant from the
\npremises. Being\t aggrieved by  this order the defendant went
\nup in  revision to  the Delhi  High Court  as no  appeal  or
\nsecond\tappeal\t against  the\torder  passed  by  the\tRent
\nController was\tmaintainable under  sub-section 8 of section
\n25B of\tthe Act.  The revision petition was heard by Justice
\nPrakash Narain\tof the\tDelhi High  Court who  by his  order
\ndated 6th  April, 1978\tdismissed the revision petition with
\ncosts. Thereafter,  the petitioner approached this Court and
\nobtained special leave. Hence this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     On a perusal of the judgment of the Rent Controller and
\nthat of\t the High  Court prima facie it seems to us that the
\nappeal was  clearly concluded by findings of fact in as much
\nas both\t the Courts  had found that the plaintiff had proved
\nthat she  required the\tpremises for her bonafide necessity.
\nLearned counsel\t for the  appellant, however,  raised  three
\npoints of  law before  us. In the first place, it was argued
\nthat the  second application  given by the plaintiff for re-
\namending her  plaint by\t inserting the\trelief under section
\n14(1)(c) which she had given up at a prior occasion when she
\nhad based  her suit  under section  14A(1) was barred by the
\nprinciples of order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\n<\/p>\n
     It was  next contended  that even\tif order  2  Rule  2
\nC.P.C.\thad  no\t application,  the  second  application\t for
\namendment filed by the plaintiff 20-625 SCI\/79
\n860<\/span>
\nwas barred  by the  doctrine of\t constructive res  judicata.
\nFinally, it  was argued that section 25B which lays down the
\nprocedure  for\t disposing  of\tapplications  filed  by\t the
\nlandlord under\tthe provisions\tof sections 14A and 14(1)(e)
\nare violative  of Article  14 of the Constitution in as much
\nas  the\t provisions  are  arbitrary  and  discriminatory  in
\nnature, and  seek to  provide two  different procedures\t for
\ntenant similarly situate.\n<\/p>\n
     So far  as the  first two contentions are concerned, we
\nare  of\t  the  opinion\t that  do   not\t merit\tany  serious
\nconsideration. Regarding  the question\tof the applicability
\nof order  2 Rule  2, C.P.C.  the  argument  of\tthe  learned
\ncounsel for  the appellant is based on serious misconception
\nof law. Order 2 Rule 2 C.P.C. runs thus:-\n<\/p>\n
     “2 (1)    Every suit  shall include  the whole  of\t the
\n\t       claim which the plaintiff is entitled to make
\n\t       in respect  of the  cause  of  action  but  a
\n\t       plaintiff may  relinquish any  portion of his
\n\t       claim in\t order to  bring the suit within the
\n\t       jurisdiction of any Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t(2)    Where a plaintiff omits to sue in respect of,
\n\t       or intentionally relinquishes, any portion of
\n\t       his claim,  he shall  not afterwards  sue  in
\n\t       respect\tof   the  portion   so\tomitted\t  or
\n\t       relinquished”.\n<\/p>\n
A perusal  of Order  2 Rule 2 would clearly reveal that this
\nprovision applies  to cases where a plaintiff omits to sue a
\nportion of  the cause  of action  on which the suit is based
\neither by relinquishing the cause of action or by omitting a
\npart of\t it. The provision has, therefore, no application to
\ncases where  the plaintiff  basis his  suit on\tseparate and
\ndistinct causes\t of action  and chooses to relinquish one or
\nthe other  of them.  In such cases, it is always open to the
\nplaintiff to  file a  fresh suit  on the basis of a distinct
\ncause of action which he may have relinquished.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  case of  Mohammad Khalil Khan & Ors. v. Mahabub
\nAli Mian & Ors. the Privy Council observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “That the  right and its infringement, and not the
\n     ground or\torigin of  the right  and its  infringement,
\n     constitute the cause of action, buy the cause of action
\n     for the  Oudh suit (No. 8 of 1928) so far as the Mahbub
\n     brothers are  concerned was  only a  denial of title by
\n     them as  that suit\t was mainly  against Abadi Begum for
\n     possession of  the Oudh property; whilst in the present
\n     suit the cause, of action was wrongful
\n861<\/span>
\n     possession by  the Mahbub\tbrothers of the Shahjahanpur
\n     property, and  that the  two causes of action were thus
\n     different.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “Their Lordships  are satisfied  that there  is no
\n     force in  the contention  that the\t plaintiffs  in\t the
\n     present suit could not reasonably commence an action in
\n     respect of\t the Shahjahanpur property while their right
\n     to mutation in the Revenue registers was the subject of
\n     an appeal\tto  the\t Commissioner  which  had  not\tbeen
\n     decided, or,  in other  words, that  it was not open to
\n     them  to\tsue  the   defendants  in   respect  of\t the
\n     Shahjahanpur property  at a  date earlier\tthan October
\n     29, 1928  and to  include the  Shahjahanpur property in
\n     the earlier  suit No.  8 instituted  on  September\t 14,
\n     1928”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “The principles  laid down  in the  cases thus far
\n     discussed may  be thus summarized; (1) the correct test
\n     in cases falling under O. 2. r. 2 is “whether the claim
\n     in the  new suit  is, in  fact, founded  on a  cause of
\n     action distinct  from that which was the foundation for
\n     the   former   suit.   Moonshee   Buzloor\t Ruheem\t  v.
\n     Shamsoonnissa Begum.  (2) The  cause  of  action  means
\n     every fact which will be necessary for the plaintiff to
\n     prove, if\ttraversed, in  order to support his right to
\n     the judgment  Read v.  Brown. (3)\tIf the\tevidence  to
\n     support the  two claims is different then the causes of
\n     action are also different Brunsden v. Humphery. (4) The
\n     causes of\taction in the two suits may be considered to
\n     be\t the  same  if\tin  substance  they  arc  identical.
\n     (Brunsden v.  Humphery). (5) The cause of action has no
\n     relation whatsoever  to the  defence that may be set up
\n     by the  defendant, nor  does it depend on the character
\n     of the relief prayed of by the plaintiff. It refers “to
\n     the media\tupon which  the plaintiff  asks the court to
\n     arrive at a conclusion in his favour.” Muss. Chand Kour
\n     v. Partab\tSingh. This  observation was  made  by\tLord
\n     Watson in\ta case\tunder s.  43  of  the  Act  of\t1882
\n     (corresponding to 0.2.r.2) where plaintiff made various
\n     claims in the same suit”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Applying the  aforesaid principles\t laid  down  by\t the
\nPrivy Council  we find that none of the conditions mentioned
\nby the\tPrivy Council  are  applicable\tin  this  case.\t The
\nplaintiff had first based her suit on
\n862<\/span>
\nthree distinct\tcauses of action but later confined the suit
\nonly to the first cause of action, namely, the one mentioned
\nin section 14A(1) of the Act and gave up the cause of action
\nrelating to  section 14(1)  (e) and  (f).  Subsequently,  by
\nvirtue of  an amendment\t she relinquished the first cause of
\naction arising\tout of\tsection 14A(1)\tand sought to revive
\nher cause  of action  based on section 14(1)(e). At the time
\nwhen the  plaintiff relinquished the cause of action arising
\nout of\tsection 31  14(1)(e) the  defendant was\t not in\t the
\npicture at  all. Therefore, it was not open to the defendant
\nto raise  any objection\t to  the  amendment  sought  by\t the
\nplaintiff. For\tthese reasons,\twe are\tsatisfied  that\t the
\nsecond\tamendment   application\t was   not  barred   by\t the
\nprinciples of  0.2 r.2\tC.P.C. and  the\t contention  of\t the
\nlearned counsel for the appellant must fail.\n<\/p>\n
     Secondly, as  regards the\tquestion of constructive res
\njudicata it  has no  application whatsoever  in the  instant
\ncase.  It   is\twell  settled  that  one  of  the  essential
\nconditions of  res judicata  is that  there must be a formal
\nadjudication between  the parties  after  full\thearing.  In
\nother words,  the matter must be finally decided between the
\nparties. Here also at a time when the plaintiff relinquished
\nher first  cause of action the defendant was no where in the
\npicture, and there being no adjudication between the parties
\nthe doctrine  of res  judicata does  not apply.\t The  second
\namendment application  was made in the same proceedings on a
\ncause of  action that  she was\tallowed to  insert with\t the
\npermission of  the court.  Although both the parties went to
\nthe court  on the  basis of  these facts, neither the bar of
\nres judicata  nor that\t0.2 r.2\t appear to  have been raised
\nbefore the  Rent Controller.  For these\t reasons, therefore,
\nthe second  plank of the argument put forward by counsel for
\nthe appellant also must be rejected.\n<\/p>\n
     Lastly, we\t come to  the question of the application of
\nArticle 14 to the provisions of the Act. This is undoubtedly
\na  question   which  merits  serious  consideration.  Before
\napproaching this  question we  might observe that it is well
\nsettled\t that\twhat   Article\t 14   forbids\tis   hostile
\ndiscrimination\t and\tnot    reasonable    classification.
\nDiscrimination may take place in many ways, and what Article
\n14 requires  is that equals must be treated alike. If equals
\nand unequals  are also treated alike then also Article 14 is
\nclearly attracted  and discrimination  results. A reasonable
\nclassification based  on grounds  having a  clear nexus with
\nthe objective to be achieved and grouping certain persons in
\na separate  category in\t view of their special peculiarities
\nis undoubtedly permissible. Of course, classification should
\nnot be\tpurely a  class legislation. It is also well settled
\nthat  there  is\t always\t a  presumption\t in  favour  of\t the
\nconstitutionality of a statute and any
\n863<\/span>
\nparty who  seeks to  challenge the legislation on the ground
\nof applicability  of Article  14 must  plead and  prove\t the
\nnecessary facts.  In making  a classification the court must
\npresumed matters of common knowledge, common report, history
\nof the time and every other relevant fact.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  case of Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. The Union of
\nIndia & Ors.<\/a> this Court observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The legislature  undoubtedly has  a wide field of
\n     choice in\tdetermining and\t classifying the  subject of
\n     its laws,\tand if\tthe law\t deals alike  with all\tof a
\n     certain class,  it is  normally not  obnoxious  to\t the
\n     charge  of\t  denial  of   equal  protection,   but\t the
\n     classification  should  never  be\tarbitrary.  It\tmust
\n     always rest  upon some real and substantial distinction
\n     bearing a reasonable and just relation to the things in
\n     respect  to  which\t the  classification  is  made;\t and
\n     classification  made   without  any  substantial  basis
\n     should be regarded as invalid”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Same view  was taken in the case of The State of West Bengal
\nv. Anwar Ali Sarkar.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice
\nS.R. Tendolkar\t& Ors.<\/a>\tit  was\t held  that  in\t determining
\nwhether there  is any intelligible differential on the basis
\nof which the petitioners and their companies could have been
\ngrouped together  it is\t permissible to\t look to  the  facts
\nappearing in  the notification\tas also those brought to the
\nnotice of the court.\n<\/p>\n
     In the  case of  Mahant Moti  Das v.  S. P.  Sahi,\t The
\nSpecial Officer<\/a>\t in charge  of Hindu Religious Trusts & Ors.
\nthis Court held that apart from there being a presumption in
\nfavour of  the constitutionality of all enactment the burden
\nis upon\t the party  who alleges\t that there has been a clear
\ntransgression  of   the\t constitutional\t guarantee.  It\t was
\nfurther\t pointed   out\tthat   the   legislature   correctly
\nappreciated the\t needs of  its own  people and that its laws
\nare directed  to problems  made manifest  by experience\t and
\nthat any  discrimination made  are based on adequate grounds
\nas the\tlegislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and
\nmay confine  its restrictions  to those cases where the need
\nis deemed to be the clearest.\n<\/p>\n
     These observations\t clearly justify  the classification
\nmade by\t the legislature  in enacting the Delhi Rent Control
\nAct as we shall show later.\n<\/p>\n
864<\/span><\/p>\n
     To the  same effect is the decision in the case of Shri
\nA.C. Aggarwal,\tSub-Divisional Magistrate,  Delhi &  Anr. v.
\nMst. Ram Kali<\/a> etc.
\n     In the  light  of\tthe  principles\t enunciated  by\t the
\ndecisions of  this Court  we would  now briefly approach the
\nrelevant provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act which have
\nbeen applied to the facts of the present case.\n<\/p>\n
     To begin  with, it is not necessary for us to deal with
\nsection 14A(1) because the cause of action contained in this
\nsection has  been given\t up by\tthe plaintiff-respondent. We
\nwould, therefore,  confine  ourselves  to  the\tvalidity  of
\nsection 14(1)  (e) and\tthe  procedure\tprescribed  to\tgive
\nrelief mentioned  in the  aforesaid section  in section 25B.
\nBefore discussing  the relevant provisions of the Act it may
\nbe necessary to observe that the Rent Control Act is a piece
\nof social  legislation and  is meant  mainly to\t protect the
\ntenants from  frivolous evictions. At the same time in order
\nto do  justice to  the landlords  and to  avoid placing such
\nrestrictions on\t their right  to  evict\t the  tenant  as  to
\ndestroy their  legal  right  to\t property  certain  salutary
\nprovisions have\t been made  by the  legislature\t which\tgive
\nrelief to the landlord. In the absence of such a legislation
\na landlord  has a common law right to evict the tenant other
\nin the determination of the tenancy by efflux of time or for
\ndefault in  payment of\trent or\t other grounds\tafter giving
\nnotice under  the Transfer of Property Act. This broad right
\nhas been  curtailed by\tThe Rent  Control Legislation with a
\nview to\t give protection  to the  tenants having  regard  to
\ntheir  genuine\tand  dire  needs.  While  the  rent  control
\nlegislation has\t given a number of facilities to the tenants
\nit should,  not be  construed so  as to\t destroy the limited
\nrelief which  it seeks\tto give\t to the\t landlord also.\t For
\ninstance one  of the grounds for eviction which is contained
\nin almost  all the  Rent Control  Acts in the country is the
\nquestion of  landlord’s\t bonafide  personal  necessity.\t The
\nconcept\t of   bonafide\tnecessity   should  be\tmeaningfully
\nconstrued so  as to  make the relief granted to the landlord
\nreal and  practical. In\t the case  of Bega  Begum &  Ors. v.
\nAbdul Ahmed Khan<\/a> (dead) by L.Rs and Ors. this Court to which
\none of\tus (Fazal  Ali, J.)  was a  party and  spoke for the
\nCourt observed as follows :-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Moreover, section  11(h)  of\t the  Act  uses\t the
\n     words’  reasonable\t  requirement’\t which\t undoubtedly
\n     postulate that
\n865<\/span>
\n     there must\t be an\telement of need as opposed to a mere
\n     desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need
\n     should doubtless  be kept in mind but not so as to make
\n     even the  genuine need  as nothing\t but a desire as the
\n     High Court\t has done  in this case. It seems to us that
\n     the connotation  of the  term ‘need’  or  ‘requirement’
\n     should not be artificially extended nor its language so
\n     unduly stretched  or strained  as to make it impossible
\n     or extremely difficult for the landlord to get a decree
\n     for eviction.  Such a  course  would  defeat  the\tvery
\n     purpose of\t the  Act  which  affords  the\tfacility  of
\n     eviction of  the tenant  to  the  landlord\t on  certain
\n     specified grounds. This appears to us to be the general
\n     scheme of\tall the Rent Control Acts prevalent in other
\n     States in\tthe country.  This Court  has considered the
\n     import of\tthe word  ‘requirement’ and pointed out that
\n     it merely\tconnotes that  there should be an element of
\n     need”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Coming back  to the  Delhi Rent  Control Act it appears
\nthat section  25B was  inserted in  the statute by Act 18 of
\n1976 and  was given retrospective effect from 1-12-1975. The
\nstatement of  objects and  reasons which  formed part of the
\nDelhi Rent Control Act run thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “There has been a persistent demand for amendments
\n     to the  Delhi Rent\t Control Act,  1958 with  a view  to
\n     conferring\t a   right  of\t tenancy  on  certain  heirs
\n     successors of  a deceased statutory tenant so that they
\n     may be  protected from  eviction by  landlords and also
\n     for simplifying  the procedure  for eviction of tenants
\n     in case  the landlord  requires the  premises bona fide
\n     for  his\tpersonal  occupation.\tFurther,  Government
\n     decided on\t the 9th  September, 1975  that a person who
\n     owns his  own house  in his place of work should vacate
\n     the Government accommodation allotted to him before the
\n     31 st December, 1975. Government considered that in the
\n     circumstances, the Act requires to be amended urgently.
\n\t  As the  Parliament was  not in  session the  Delhi
\n     Rent Control (Amendment) Ordinance 1975 was promulgated
\n     on the  1st December,  1975. The  Bill seeks to replace
\n     the said Ordinance”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (Emphasis ours)
\nThis  Act   actually  replaced\t the  ordinance\t  which\t was
\npromulgated on\t1st December,  1975. The objects and reasons
\nclearly\t reveal\t  that\tthe  amendment\thas  been  made\t for
\nsimplifying the\t procedure for\teviction of  tenants in case
\nthe landlord requires the premises bona fide for
\n866<\/span>
\nhis personal  occupation. It is a matter of common knowledge
\nthat even  though the  landlord may  have an  immediate\t and
\nimperative necessity  for vacating  the\t house\tgiven  to  a
\ntenant he  is compelled\t to resort to the time consuming any
\ndilatory procedure  of a  suit which  takes years before the
\nlandlord is  able to  obtain the decree and in most cases by
\nthe time  the decree  is passed\t either the landlord dies or
\nthe need  disappears and the landlord is completely deprived
\nof getting  any relief.\t It appears  to us  that it  was for
\nthese reasons  that the\t legislature in\t its wisdom  thought
\nthat a\tshort and  simple procedure  should be\tprovided for
\nthose landlords\t who generally\twant the  premises for their
\nbona fide  necessity so\t that they  may be able to get quick
\nand expeditious relief. Section 25B of the Act runs thus:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “25.B (1)  Every application by a landlord for the
\n     recovery of  possession of\t any premises  on the ground
\n     specified in  clause (e)  of the proviso to sub-section
\n     (1) of section 14, or under section 14A, shall be dealt
\n     with in accordance with the procedure specified in this
\n     section.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (2)  The   Controller\t shall,\t issue\tsummons,  in
\n     relation to  every application  referred in sub-section
\n     (1) in the form specified in the Third Schedule.
\n\t  (3)(a) The  Controller shall,\t in addition to, and
\n     simultaneously with,  the issue  of summons for service
\n     on the  tenant, also direct the summons to be served by
\n     registered post,  acknowledgement due. addressed to the
\n     tenant or\this agent empowered to accept the service at
\n     the place\twhere the  tenant or  his agent actually and
\n     voluntarily  resides   or\tcarries\t  on   business\t  or
\n     personally works for gain and may, if the circumstances
\n     of the  case so require, also direct the publication of
\n     the summons  in a newspaper circulating in the locality
\n     in which  the tenant  is last  known to have resided or
\n     carried on business or personally worked for gain.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (b)  When  an\t acknowledgement  purporting  to  be
\n     signed by\tthe tenant  or his  agent is received by the
\n     Controller or  the registered  article  containing\t the
\n     summons is received back with an endorsement purporting
\n     to have  been made\t by a  postal employee to the effect
\n     that the  tenant or  his  agent  had  refused  to\ttake
\n     delivery of  the registered article, the Controller may
\n     declare that there has been a valid service of summons.
\n\t  (4) The tenant on whom the summons is duly served,
\n     (whether in  the ordinary way or by registered post) in
\n     the
\n867<\/span>
\n     form specified  in the Third Schedule shall not contest
\n     the prayer\t for eviction  from the\t premises unless  he
\n     files an  affidavit stating  the grounds  on  which  he
\n     seeks to  contest\tthe  application  for  eviction\t and
\n     obtains  leave   from  the\t Controller  as\t hereinafter
\n     provided; and in default of his appearance in pursuance
\n     of\t the  summons  or  his\tobtaining  such\t leave,\t the
\n     statement made  by the  landlord in the application for
\n     eviction shall  be deemed\tto be admitted by the tenant
\n     and the  applicant shall  be entitled  to an  order for
\n     eviction on the ground aforesaid.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (5) The  Controller shall give to the tenant leave
\n     to contest\t the application  if the  affidavit filed by
\n     the tenant discloses such facts as would disentitle the
\n     landlord from  obtaining an  order for  the recovery of
\n     possession of  the premises  on the ground specified in
\n     clause (e) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section
\n     14 or under section 14A.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (6) Where  leave  is\tgranted\t to  the  tenant  to
\n     contest the  application, the Controller shall commence
\n     the hearing of the application as early as practicable.
\n\t  (7) Notwithstanding  anything\t contained  in\tsub-
\n     section (2)  of section 37, the Controller shall, while
\n     holding an\t inquiry  in  a\t proceeding  to\t which\tthis
\n     Chapter applies, follow the practice and procedure of a
\n     Court of  Small  Causes,  including  the  recording  of
\n     evidence.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (8) No  appeal or  second appeal shall lie against
\n     an order for the recovery of possession of any premises
\n     made by the Controller in accordance with the procedure
\n     specified in this section;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Provided that\t the High Court may, for the purpose
\n     of\t satisfying   itself  that  an\torder  made  by\t the
\n     Controller under this section is according to law, call
\n     for the  records of  the case  an(l pass  such order in
\n     respect thereto as it thinks fit
\n\t  (9) Where no application has been made to the High
\n     Court on  revision, the  Controller  may  exercise\t the
\n     powers of\treview in  accordance with the provisions of
\n     order XLVII  of the First Schedule to the Code of Civil
\n     Procedure, 1908.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (10) Save  as otherwise  provided in this Chapter,
\n     the procedure  for the  disposal of  an application for
\n     eviction on  the ground  specified in clause (e) of the
\n     proviso to\t sub-section (1)  of section  14,  or  under
\n     section 14A, shall be the same
\n868<\/span>
\n     as the  procedure for  the disposal  of applications by
\n     Controllers”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It is  obvious that this section does not govern all grounds
\nopen to\t a landlord  for evicting the tenant but is confined
\nonly to\t the ground  in section\t 14A and  proviso to section
\n14(1)(e). In  other words,  the bona  fide necessity  of the
\nlandlord has been put in a separate class or category having
\nregard to  the peculiar incidents of this right. Section 14A
\nwith which we are not concerned in this case also relates to
\na special  situation where the landlord under the Government
\nRules is asked to shift to his own house if he has one or in
\na house\t that belongs  to his spouse failing which he has to
\npay a penal rent which almost takes away a major part of his
\nsalary. Thus,  such a  landlord be comes a class by himself.
\nThe statute  thus puts personal necessity of the landlord as
\na  special  class  requiring  special  treatment  for  quick
\neviction of the tenant and cuts out all delays and plugs all
\nthe loopholes which may cause delay in getting the relief by
\nthe  landlord.\t It  is\t  obvious,   therefore,\t  that\t the
\nclassification made by the legislature is in public interest
\nand is\tin complete consonance with the objectives sought to
\nbe achieved.  The landlords  having personal  necessity have
\nbeen brought  together as  a separate class because of their
\nspecial needs and such a classification cannot be said to be
\nunreasonable particularly when the legislature in its wisdom
\nfeels that  the landlords  should get this relief as quickly
\nas possible.  Sub-section (2)  of section 25B enjoins on the
\nController to  issue summons  as soon  as an application for
\neviction has  been filed  before the  Rent Controller.\tSub-
\nsection 3(a)  further provides\tthat along with the issue of
\nsummons in the ordinary way summons should also be served by
\nregistered post\t acknowledgement due addressed to the tenant
\nor his\tagent empowered\t to accept  the service. Sub-section
\n3(b) provides  that when  the acknowledgement due purporting
\nto be  signed by  the tenant or his agent is received by the
\nController with\t an endorsement\t made by  a postal  employee
\nthat the tenant or his agent has refused to take delivery of
\nthe registered article the Controller may declare that there
\nhas been  a valid  service of  summons.\t This  provision  is
\ndesigned to  cut out  delays by the conduct of the defendant
\nin trying  to evade service of summons in a variety of ways.
\nSub-section (4) provides that the tenant on whom the summons
\nis served shall not be allowed to contest an application for
\neviction unless he files ah affidavit stating the grounds on
\nwhich he  seeks to  contest the application for eviction and
\nhe has\tto obtain  leave from  the Controller to contest the
\napplication.  In   case\t the  tenant  does  not\t appear\t the
\nController can\tpresume that  the application  for  eviction
\nshall be  deemed to  have been\tadmitted by the tenant. Sub-
\nsection (5) provides that the Controller shall give
\n869<\/span>
\nto the tenant leave to contest the application if the tenant
\ndiscloses such\tfacts as  would disentitle the landlord from
\nobtaining an  order for\t the recovery  of possession  of the
\npremises. This is also a very salutary provision in order to
\nprevent frivolous  pleas  taken\t by  the  tenants  to  avoid
\neviction. Sub-section  (6)  provides  that  where  leave  to
\ndefend is granted to the tenant the Controller shall proceed
\nto hear\t the application  and in  order to  ensure  a  quick
\ndecision sub-section  (7) enjoins  that the Controller shall
\nfollow the  practice and  procedure of\tthe Court  of  Small
\nCauses including  recording of evidence. Subsection (8) bars
\nappeal or  second appeal  against an  order  passed  by\t the
\nController for\trecovery  of  possession  of  the  premises.
\nNevertheless the  proviso to  sub-section (8) confers on the
\nHigh Court a power of revision for satisfying itself whether
\nor not the order made by the Controller is according to law.
\nSubsection (9)\tconfers a  power of review on the Controller
\nwhere no  application for revision has been filed before the
\nHigh  Court.   Sub-section  (10)   provides  that  procedure
\nmentioned above\t shall apply  also  to\tan  application\t for
\neviction on  the ground\t as specified  in clause  (e) of the
\nproviso\t to   section  14(1);  That  is\t to  say  bona\tfide
\nrequirement of\tthe landlord  in  respect  of  the  tenanted
\npremises.\n<\/p>\n
     The comments  by the  learned counsel for the appellant
\nare first  that there  was no  reason  to  discriminate\t the
\nlandlord  suing\t  for  personal\t  necessity  by\t trying\t his
\napplication in\ta summary  fashion. We\thave already pointed
\nout that  the  classification  made  by\t section  25B  is  a
\nreasonable classification  and cannot  be said\tto be in any
\nway discriminatory  or\tarbitrary.  Even  though  a  summary
\nprocedure has been evolved the tenant has been afforded full
\nopportunity  to\t defend\t the  application  provided  he\t can
\ndisclose  good\tgrounds\t for  negativing  the  case  of\t the
\nlandlord. No  litigant has  a right  to protract  the  legal
\nproceedings by\ttaking frivolous,  irrelevant, irrational or
\nuncalled for  pleas. This  is  what  the  section  seeks  to
\nprevent.\n<\/p>\n
     It was  then argued  by counsel  for the appellant that
\nwhere an  application has  been allowed\t for eviction of the
\ntenant, no  appeal or  second appeal is provided by the Act.
\nAn appeal is purely a creature of the statute and this right
\nhas not\t been given  in order  to cut out unnecessary delay.
\nInstead the highest Court of the State has been given a wide
\npower of  revision where the said Court can examine the case
\nof the tenant and the landlord and the validity of the order
\npassed\tby   the  Controller.\tThe  right  of\tthe  tenant,
\ntherefore, is  sufficiently safeguarded\t by the\t proviso  to
\nsub-section (8) of section 25B of the Act referred to above.
\nIn order to give relief to the tenant
\n870<\/span>
\nagainst any  apparent error of law or fact where no revision
\nhas been  filed in  the High Court the statute confers power
\nof review on the Controller.\n<\/p>\n
     Thus taking  an overall  picture of  the situation, the
\ncircumstances under  which the\tlandlord’s needs  have\tbeen
\nclassified and the safeguards given by the statute it cannot
\nbe said\t by any\t stretch of imagination that section 25B and
\nits  sub-sections   are\t violative  of\tArticle\t 14  of\t the
\nConstitution of\t India, or that section 25B suffers from the
\nvice of\t excessive delegation of powers. In fact section 25B
\ncontains valuable and sufficient guidelines which completely
\nexclude the  exercise of  uncanalised or arbitrary powers by
\nthe Rent  Controller. As  discussed above  the rights of the
\ntenants are  sufficiently protected.  For  instance  if\t the
\ntenant presents a plausible defence the plaintiff can be non
\nsuited if  the defence\tis accepted  by the  Controller. The
\ntenant however\tcannot claim a legal right to take all sorts
\nof frivolous,  baseless or  irrelevant pleas which alone the
\nstatute\t bars.\t We  have  already  indicated  that  summary
\nprocedure relates  only to  a particular ground on the basis
\nof which  the landlord\tcan seek eviction and does not apply
\nto other grounds on which the tenant can be evicted.\n<\/p>\n
     There is  yet another  important aspect  of the  matter
\nwhich may  be mentioned\t here. Prior to the enactment of the
\nRent Control legislation in our country, the relationship of
\nlandlord and  tenant was governed by our common law viz. the
\nTransfer of  Property Act  (Sections 107 to 111). The tenant
\nwas inducted  with this\t tacit agreement  to be regulated by
\nthe conditions\tembodied in  the contract  and could  not be
\nallowed to  repudiate the  agreement reached between him and
\nthe landlord  during that period. The tenant was, therefore,
\nbound in  law to  vacate the  premises either voluntarily or
\nthrough a  suit after  he was  given a notice as required by
\nthe Transfer  of Property Act under the terms and conditions
\nof the\tlease. However, as a piece of social reform in order
\nto  protect   the  tenants  from  capricious  and  frivolous
\neviction, the  legislature stepped  in and  afforded special
\nprotection to  the tenant by conferring on him the status of
\na statutory tenant who could not be evicted except under the
\nconditions specified  and the  procedure prescribed  by\t the
\nRent Control  Acts. Thus  to this  extent. the\tagreement of
\nlease and  the provisions  of the  Transfer of\tProperty Act
\nstood superseded.  At the  same time,  the Rent Control Acts
\nprovided the  facilities of  eviction  to  the\tlandlord  on
\ncertain specified  grounds like bona fide personal necessity
\nor default  in payment\tof rent etc. Thus any right that the
\ntenant possessed after the expiry of the lease was conferred
\non him\tonly by\t virtue of  the Rent  Control  Act.  It\t is,
\ntherefore, manifest  that if  the legislature  considered in
\nits wisdom  to confer  certain rights  or facilities  on the
\ntenants,
\n871<\/span>
\nit could due to changed circumstances curtail, modify, alter
\nor even\t  take away such rights or the procedure enacted for
\nthe purpose  of eviction and leave the tenants to seek their
\nremedy under the common law.\n<\/p>\n
     Thus, we  do not  see how\tcan the tenant challenge the
\nvalidity of such a provision enacted by the legislature from
\nwhich the tenant itself derived such rights.\n<\/p>\n
     In the instant case, the legislature has not taken away
\nthe right of the tenant at all but has merely simplified the
\nprocedure for eviction of the tenant in cases falling within
\nthe ambit  of Sections\t14A  &\t14(1)  (e)  of\tthe  Act  as
\ndiscussed  in\tthe  judgment.\t In   these   circumstances,
\ntherefore,   any    challenge\tby   the   tenant   to\t the
\nconstitutionality of the Act must necessarily fail and hence
\nSection 25B is constitutionally valid.\n<\/p>\n
     For  these\t reasons,  therefore,  all  the\t contentions
\nraised by  the appellant  fail and  the appeal is dismissed.
\nBut in\tthe peculiar circumstances of the case there will be
\nno order  as to\t costs. Time  till 31-5-1980 is given to the
\ntenant to  hand over  peaceful and  vacant possession to the
\nlandlord on  filing an\tundertaking to\tthis Court  within a
\nmonth accompanied by an affidavit that he would do so on the
\ndate fixed  and shall  not induct  any other  person on\t the
\npremises. The  tenant will,  during this period, continue to
\npay the\t compensation  for  wrongful  use  of  the  premises
\nequivalent to the amount of the rent and clear all arrears.
\nV.D.K.\t  Appeal dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
872<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Kewal Singh vs Lajwanti on 4 October, 1979 Equivalent citations: 1980 AIR 161, 1980 SCR (1) 854 Author: S M Fazalali Bench: Fazalali, Syed Murtaza PETITIONER: KEWAL SINGH Vs. RESPONDENT: LAJWANTI DATE OF JUDGMENT04\/10\/1979 BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA BENCH: FAZALALI, SYED MURTAZA SHINGAL, P.N. SEN, A.P. (J) CITATION: 1980 AIR 161 […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-129491","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nKewal Singh vs Lajwanti on 4 October, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kewal-singh-vs-lajwanti-on-4-october-1979\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Kewal Singh vs Lajwanti on 4 October, 1979 - 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