{"id":132035,"date":"2005-08-03T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-08-02T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/l-s-asokan-vs-state-on-3-august-2005"},"modified":"2014-06-01T20:53:52","modified_gmt":"2014-06-01T15:23:52","slug":"l-s-asokan-vs-state-on-3-august-2005","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/l-s-asokan-vs-state-on-3-august-2005","title":{"rendered":"L.S.Asokan vs State on 3 August, 2005"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Kerala High Court<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">L.S.Asokan vs State on 3 August, 2005<\/div>\n<pre>       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM\n\nCRL A No. 534 of 1992\n\n\n1. L.S.ASOKAN\n                      ...  Petitioner\n\n                        Vs\n\n\n1. STATE\n                       ...       Respondent\n\n                For Petitioner  :SRI.V.N.ACHUTHA KURUP\n\n                For Respondent  :PUBLIC PROSECUTOR\nThe Hon'ble MR. Justice K.PADMANABHAN NAIR\nThe Hon'ble MR. Justice V.RAMKUMAR\nThe Hon'ble MR. Justice M.N.KRISHNAN\n\n Dated :     03\/08\/2005\n O R D E R\n<\/pre>\n<p>.PL 56<br \/>\n.TM 2<br \/>\n.SP 2<br \/>\n.BM 2<br \/>\n          K.PADMANABHAN NAIR , V.RAMKUMAR,@@<br \/>\n        j<br \/>\n         &amp; M.N.KRISHNAN, JJ.@@<br \/>\n        j\n<\/p>\n<p>         &#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-@@<br \/>\n        j<br \/>\n         Crl.Appeal  Nos.  534\/92,  537\/92, @@<br \/>\n        j<br \/>\n         597\/92,   686\/92, 697\/92, 9\/1993, 22\/93, 100\/93@@<br \/>\n        j<br \/>\n         114\/93, 118\/93, 119\/93, 125\/1993, 126\/93 &amp; 136\/1993@@<br \/>\n        j\n<\/p>\n<p>         &#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;&#8212;-@@<br \/>\n        j<br \/>\n         Dated, this the 3rd   day of August   2005@@<br \/>\n        j<\/p>\n<p>         ORDER@@<br \/>\n        jEEEEE<br \/>\n        Ramkumar, J.@@<br \/>\n        EEEEEEEEEEEE<br \/>\n((HDR 0<br \/>\nCrl.Appeal Nos. 534, 537, 597, 686, 697\/1992<br \/>\nCrl.Appeal Nos.9\/93, 22\/93, 100\/93, 114\/93<br \/>\n118\/93, 119\/93, 125\/93, 126\/93 &amp; 136\/93.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t\t:#:\n<\/p>\n<p>))<br \/>\n.HE 1<br \/>\n        \tThe  interesting  question  which  comes  up  for<br \/>\n        consideration  before  us  upon a reference by a Division<br \/>\n        Bench is the following:-\n<\/p>\n<p>         &#8220;Whether the statement of  an  approver  examined@@<br \/>\n        i<br \/>\n                before  the  appropriate  Magistrate under clause\n<\/p>\n<p>                (a) of sub Sec.    (4)  of  Sec.306  Cr.P.C.,  is<br \/>\n                relevant and  admissible  under  Sec.   33 of the<br \/>\n                Evidence Act during the subsequent trial in which<br \/>\n                he is not available for examination by reason  of<br \/>\n                his death in the meanwhile ?&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>        The  referring Bench was of the opinion that in the light<br \/>\n        of divergent views expressed by two Division  Benches  of<br \/>\n        this Court  in  Kurian v.  State &#8211; 1989 (1) KLT (SN) 37 -@@<br \/>\n                        <a href=\"\/doc\/1694398\/\">AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Case No.60 and State of Kerala v.  Monu Surendran<\/a> &#8211;  1990@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        (1)  KLT  53,  regarding  the  right  to cross-examine an@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        approver, an authoritative pronouncement must come from a<br \/>\n        larger Bench.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t2.\tThe appellants in this batch  of  appeals<br \/>\n        were the accused in the same or different cases popularly<br \/>\n        known  as  &#8220;the  mark  list  cases&#8221;  tried by the Special<br \/>\n        Sessions Court, Thiruvananthapuram upon a committal.  For<br \/>\n        recording the  conviction  against  the  appellants,  the<br \/>\n        trial  court  had,  inter  alia,  relied on the statement<br \/>\n        recorded under Sec.  306(4)(a) Cr.P.C.   of  one  Anandan<br \/>\n        who was made an approver.  The said Anandan died prior to<br \/>\n        the trial of the cases before the Special Sessions Court.<br \/>\n        The main argument on behalf of the appellants is that the<br \/>\n        evidence given  by  the deceased approver under Sec.  306<br \/>\n        (4)(a) Cr.P.C.  should not have been  relied  on  by  the<br \/>\n        trial  court  since  the same was inadmissible under Sec.<br \/>\n        33 of the Evidence Act because the  appellants  who  were<br \/>\n        the   adverse   party   in  the  proceedings  before  the<br \/>\n        Magistrate taking cognizance of  the  offences,  did  not<br \/>\n        have  the  right and the opportunity to cross-examine the<br \/>\n        approver within the  meaning  of  the  2nd  limb  of  the<br \/>\n        proviso to Sec.    33  of  the Evidence Act.  There is no<br \/>\n        dispute that some of the  appellants  had  cross-examined<br \/>\n        the approver  during  his  examination  under  Sec.   306<br \/>\n        (4)(a) Cr.P.C.  pursuant to a remit from  this  Court  at<br \/>\n        the instance of the State (and not at the instance of the<br \/>\n        accused)  which  contended  that  the  committal of those<br \/>\n        cases to the Sessions Court and subsequent making over of<br \/>\n        the same to the Assistant Sessions Court for  trial  were<br \/>\n        bad  inter-alia  for  the  failure  to  cross-examine the<br \/>\n        approver by the accused.  It is  the  contention  of  the<br \/>\n        appellants  that  in  those  cases  where the accused had<br \/>\n        cross-examined the approver,  it  was  not  as  of  right<br \/>\n        within  the  meaning of the second limb of the proviso to<br \/>\n        Sec.  33 of the Evidence Act  and  that  in  those  cases<br \/>\n        where  the  accused  had  not cross-examined the approver<br \/>\n        they  had  neither  the  right  nor  the  opportunity  to<br \/>\n        cross-examine  the  approver  within  the  meaning of the<br \/>\n        above provision.\n<\/p>\n<pre>        \t3.\tWe       heard       Senior      Advocate\n        Sri.M.K.Damodaran, Senior  Advocate  Sri.G.    Janardhana\n<\/pre>\n<p>        Kurup  and  Advocate  Sri.Surendra Mohan representing all<br \/>\n        the appellants and Advocate Sri.  Sujith Mathew Jose, the<br \/>\n        learned Public Prosecutor who represented the State.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t4.\tThe learned Public  Prosecutor  made  the<br \/>\n        following  submissions  before us opposing the appellants<br \/>\n        on the above issue:-\n<\/p>\n<p>        \tThe decision of the Division  Bench  reported  in<br \/>\n        1990 (1)  KLT 53 &#8211; <a href=\"\/doc\/1694398\/\">State of Kerala v.  Monu Surendran<\/a> was@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        rendered in one of the cases arising from the  very  same<br \/>\n        batch.   It  has  correctly laid down the law that during<br \/>\n        the examination of the approver as a witness  under  Sec.<br \/>\n        306(4)(a)   in   the   court  of  the  Magistrate  taking<br \/>\n        cognizance, the accused has a right to cross-examine  the<br \/>\n        approver.  Sec.   273  Cr.P.C.    states  that &#8220;except as<br \/>\n        otherwise expressly provided, all evidence taken  in  the<br \/>\n        course of the trial or other proceeding shall be taken in<br \/>\n        the  presence  of  the  accused,  or,  when  his personal<br \/>\n        attendance is dispensed with,  in  the  presence  of  his<br \/>\n        pleader&#8221;.  Sec.    137 of the Evidence Act indicates that<br \/>\n        examination   of   a   witness    not    only    includes<br \/>\n        examination-in-chief but  also  cross-examination.  There<br \/>\n        is a subtle distinction between  the  examination  of  an<br \/>\n        approver as  a  witness  under  Sec.    306(4)(a) and the<br \/>\n        examination of a witness under Secs.  200 and 202 Cr.P.C.<br \/>\n        While in the case of the former, the approver is examined<br \/>\n        at the post-cognizance stage, in the case of  the  latter<br \/>\n        the examination is at the pre-cognizance stage.  When the<br \/>\n        Chief Judicial Magistrate tenders pardon to an accomplice<br \/>\n        during  the  stage  of  an investigation he is not taking<br \/>\n        cognizance of an offence.  But when the Magistrate taking<br \/>\n        cognizance of the offence  examines  the  approver  under<br \/>\n        Sec.   306(4)(a) the accused has a right to cross-examine<br \/>\n        the approver unlike in the case of a witness examined  in<br \/>\n        an enquiry under Sec.  202 Cr.P.C.  It is true that there<br \/>\n        are observations  in  (Suresh  Chandra Bahri v.  State of@@<br \/>\n                              AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Bihar &#8211; 1995 SCC (Crl) 60, Ranadhir Basu  v.    State  of@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        West  Bengal  (2000)  3  SCC  161  and  State of Himachal@@<br \/>\n        <a href=\"\/doc\/648931\/\">AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Pradesh v.  Surinder Mohan and Others<\/a> &#8211; (2000) 2 SCC 396)@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        to  the  effect  that  the  accused  have  no  right   of<br \/>\n        cross-examination  of  the  approver  examined under Sec.<br \/>\n        306 (4) Cr.P.C.  But every decision has to be  understood<br \/>\n        with  reference  to  the facts situation obtained in such<br \/>\n        case, as has been held in Padma Sundara Rao v.  State  of@@<br \/>\n                                  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        T.N.   2002 (3) SCC 533 and Haryana Financial Corporation@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        v.  Jagdamba Oil Mills 2002 (3) SCC  496.    Hence  those@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        accused  who  had  cross-examined  the  approver  had the<br \/>\n        opportunity to do so and the cross-examination  was  also<br \/>\n        as   of   right  making  the  evidence  of  the  approver<br \/>\n        admissible under  Sec.    33   of   the   Evidence   Act.<br \/>\n        Opportunity   to   cross-examine  does  not  mean  actual<br \/>\n        cross-examination  but  only  providing   a   chance   to<br \/>\n        cross-examine  and  it is for the accused to avail of the<br \/>\n        same.   Hence,  those  accused  persons   who   did   not<br \/>\n        cross-examine  the  approver,  were  not  availing of the<br \/>\n        opportunity to do so in spite  of  having  been  given  a<br \/>\n        right  to  cross-examine the approver and the evidence of<br \/>\n        the approver,  in  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  is<br \/>\n        admissible under Sec.  33 of the Evidence Act in the case<br \/>\n        of those accused persons as well.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t5.\tWe  are  afraid that we cannot agree with<br \/>\n        the above submissions made on behalf of the State.  It is<br \/>\n        common ground that the statement of the approver examined<br \/>\n        under Sec.  306(4)(a) Cr.P.C.    would  be  relevant  and<br \/>\n        admissible under Sec.  33 of the Evidence Act only if the<br \/>\n        accused  persons  not  only  had the &#8220;right&#8221; but also the<br \/>\n        &#8220;opportunity&#8221; to cross-examine the approver at that stage<br \/>\n        within the meaning of the second limb of the  proviso  to<br \/>\n        Sec.    33   which   has   used   the   said  expressions<br \/>\n        conjunctively and not disjunctively.  The argument of the<br \/>\n        learned  Public  Prosecutor  that  the   examination   of<br \/>\n        witnesses under Secs.    200  and  202 Cr.P.C.  is at the<br \/>\n        pre-cognizance stage stems from a  misconception  of  the<br \/>\n        law.   There  is  indeed  a  popular misconception that a<br \/>\n        Magistrate is supposed to take cognizance  only  when  he<br \/>\n        actually  records  the sworn statement of the complainant<br \/>\n        and his witnesses if  any,  and  issues  process  to  the<br \/>\n        accused.   The  correct  legal  position  is  that when a<br \/>\n        Magistrate on receiving a complaint applies his mind  and<br \/>\n        decides  to  proceed under the various provisions such as<br \/>\n        Secs.  200 or 202 of Chapter XV Cr.P.C.,  the  Magistrate<br \/>\n        must  be  held  to  have  taken cognizance of the offence<br \/>\n        mentioned in the complaint.  If, however, the Magistrate,<br \/>\n        instead of proceeding under Chapter XV  Cr.P.C.,  decides<br \/>\n        to  forward the complaint to the police for investigation<br \/>\n        under Sec.  156 (3) Cr.P.C.  or issues a  search  warrant<br \/>\n        for  the  purpose  of investigation, he cannot be said to<br \/>\n        have taken cognizance of any offence.  (See R.R.    Chari@@<br \/>\n                                               AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        v.  State of U.P.  &#8211; AIR 1951 SC 207, Gopal Das Sindhi v.@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        State of  Assam and Anr.  &#8211; AIR 1961 SC 986, Jamuna Singh@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        v.  Bhadai Shah AIR 1964 SC 1541 and  D.Laxminarayana  v.@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        V.Narayana &#8211;  AIR  1976  SC 1672.  Thus, if a Magistrate,@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        upon receiving  a  complaint,  after  applying  his  mind<br \/>\n        decides  to record the sworn statement of the complainant<br \/>\n        he can be said to have taken cognizance of  the  offence.<br \/>\n        It  is  not the requirement of law to actually record the<br \/>\n        sworn statement  or  proceed  to  issue  summons  to  the<br \/>\n        accused   to  conclude  that  the  Magistrate  has  taken<br \/>\n        cognizance of the offence  mentioned  in  the  complaint.<br \/>\n        Hence   the   examination  of  the  complainant  and  his<br \/>\n        witnesses under Sec.200 and  the  subsequent  inquiry  if<br \/>\n        any, under Sec.   202 Cr.P.C.  after postponing the issue<br \/>\n        of process against the accused, are all  steps  taken  in<br \/>\n        the proceedings at the post-cognizance stage.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t6.\tIt  is  now  well settled that during the<br \/>\n        course of inquiry under Sec.  202 Cr.P.C.    the  accused<br \/>\n        has  no right to take part in the proceedings nor has the<br \/>\n        Magistrate any jurisdiction to permit the accused  to  do<br \/>\n        so and that it would not be open to the Magistrate to put<br \/>\n        any  question  to  those witnesses at the instance of the<br \/>\n        person shown as the accused against whom process has  not<br \/>\n        been issued.   (See the decision of a four-judge Bench of<br \/>\n        the Supreme Court  in  Chandra  Deo  Singh  v.    Prokash@@<br \/>\n                               AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Chandra Bose @ Chabi Bose &#8211; AIR 1963 SC 1430).  The scope@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        of inquiry under Sec.  202 Cr.P.C.  is a very limited one<br \/>\n        and  that  is  to  find  out whether there are sufficient<br \/>\n        ground for proceeding against  the  accused  who  has  no<br \/>\n        right  to  participate  therein  much  less  a  right  to<br \/>\n        cross-examine any witness examined  by  the  prosecution,<br \/>\n        but he may remain present only with a view to be informed<br \/>\n        of what is  going on.  <a href=\"\/doc\/1795168\/\">(See Sashi Jena v.  Khadal Swain<\/a> -@@<br \/>\n                               AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        AIR 2004 SC 1492).@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t7.\tEven though reliance was  placed  by  the<br \/>\n        counsel  for  the  appellants on the decision reported in<br \/>\n        2001 (2) KLT 767 &#8211; <a href=\"\/doc\/1156904\/\">Gopalakrishnan v.  State of Kerala<\/a>  to@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        contend   for   the  position  that  in  a  warrant  case<br \/>\n        instituted on a private  complaint  the  accused  has  no<br \/>\n        right  to  cross-examine  the prosecution witnesses whose<br \/>\n        evidence is recorded under Sec.  244  Cr.P.C.,  the  said<br \/>\n        provision is  not  similarly worded as Secs.  200, 202 or<br \/>\n        306 (4)(a) Cr.P.C.  and, therefore,  no  analogy  can  be<br \/>\n        drawn therefrom.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t8.\tBoth  under  Sections 200 and 202 Cr.P.C.<br \/>\n        what  is  contemplated  is  examination   of   witnesses.<br \/>\n        Likewise, under Sec.  306(4)(a) also what is envisaged is<br \/>\n        examination of the approver as a witness.  It has already<br \/>\n        been  seen  that  during  the  course  of  examination of<br \/>\n        witnesses under Sec.  200 and 202 Cr.P.C.    the  accused<br \/>\n        has no  right  to cross-examine them.  What is to be seen<br \/>\n        now is as to whether the examination of the approver as a<br \/>\n        witness under Sec.    306  (4)(a)  Cr.P.C.    is   anyway<br \/>\n        different  from  the  examination of a witness under Sec.<br \/>\n        202 Cr.P.C.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t9.\tIt may be relevant  in  this  context  to<br \/>\n        examine  the  mechanics behind the tender of pardon to an<br \/>\n        accomplice and his  examination  before  the  Magistrate.<br \/>\n        While  the  Chief Judicial Magistrate or the Metropolitan<br \/>\n        Magistrate as well as a Magistrate of  First  Class  have<br \/>\n        the  power  to  tender pardon to an accomplice under Sec.<br \/>\n        306(1) Cr.P.C.  a close reading  of  the  said  provision<br \/>\n        will  indicate  that  in  the  case  of  a Chief Judicial<br \/>\n        Magistrate or a Metropolitan  Magistrate,  the  power  to<br \/>\n        tender  pardon  to  an  accomplice  is available not only<br \/>\n        during the stage of inquiry or trial but also during  the<br \/>\n        stage of investigation and such Chief Judicial Magistrate<br \/>\n        or  Metropolitan Magistrate, as the case may be, need not<br \/>\n        be himself enquiring into or trying the offence.  But  in<br \/>\n        the  case  of  a  Magistrate of First Class, the power to<br \/>\n        tender pardon to an accomplice can be exercised  only  by<br \/>\n        the  Magistrate  enquiring into or trying the offence and<br \/>\n        the power is available to be exercised only at the  stage<br \/>\n        of  such  inquiry  or trial and no such power is given at<br \/>\n        the stage of investigation.  (Vide A.Devendran v.   State@@<br \/>\n                                     AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        of T.N.   1997  (11)  SCC 720).  The above provision will@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        further show that  the  person  to  whom  the  pardon  is<br \/>\n        tendered need  not  be an accused.  It is enough if he is<br \/>\n        directly or  indirectly  concerned  in  or  privy  to  an<br \/>\n        offence of the category falling under Sec.  306(2).  That<br \/>\n        is  presumably why the title of the Section only mentions<br \/>\n        the word &#8220;accomplice&#8221; and not &#8220;accused&#8221;.  Sec.   306  (2)<br \/>\n        indicates  the  category  of  offences to which tender of<br \/>\n        pardon to an accomplice could be  given  under  the  said<br \/>\n        provision.  Sec.    306  (3)  lays down the procedure for<br \/>\n        tender of pardon.  Every Magistrate who tenders a  pardon<br \/>\n        under sub Sec.  (1) of Sec.  306 is bound to record -@@<br \/>\n                                                     CCCCCC\n<\/p>\n<p>         a) his reason for so doing@@<br \/>\n        i  i\n<\/p>\n<p>         b) whether   the   tender  was  or  was  not@@<br \/>\n        i  i<br \/>\n                        accepted by the person  to  whom  it  was<br \/>\n                        made.\n<\/p>\n<p>        Sub Section (2) of Sec.  308 indicates that the statement<br \/>\n        of  the  person  accepting  the  tender  pardon  is to be<br \/>\n        recorded by the Magistrate under Sec.  164  Cr.P.C.    By<br \/>\n        virtue of  Sec.  306(1) tender of pardon to an accomplice<br \/>\n        can only be on condition that he will  make  a  full  and<br \/>\n        true  disclosure  of  the entire circumstances within his<br \/>\n        knowledge relating  to  the  offence.    Thus,  when  the<br \/>\n        accomplice in  his  statement  under  Sec.    164 Cr.P.C.<br \/>\n        accepts the tender of pardon made by the  Magistrate,  it<br \/>\n        is  subject to the condition that he will make a full and<br \/>\n        true disclosure of the entire  circumstances  within  his<br \/>\n        knowledge.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t10.\tThe object of the provision for tendering<br \/>\n        pardon  to  an  accomplice  is  to  get evidence in cases<br \/>\n        involving grave offences alleged to have  been  committed<br \/>\n        by   several   persons   under  circumstances  making  it<br \/>\n        difficult to get any evidence  otherwise.    No  clue  or<br \/>\n        trace  of  the offence might have been left behind by the<br \/>\n        perpetrators of the  crime.    The  dominant  purpose  of<br \/>\n        pardon is that the culprits behind such heinous and grave<br \/>\n        crimes  do  not  go unpunished if a co-participant of the<br \/>\n        crime comes forward offering to make a clean brest of his<br \/>\n        own complicity  as  also  the  complicity  of  the  other<br \/>\n        offenders.    Evidence   is   accordingly   collected  by<br \/>\n        tendering pardon  to  a  person  supposed  to  have  been<br \/>\n        directly  or  indirectly  concerned  in  or  privy to the<br \/>\n        offence.  What is tendered is a conditional pardon.   The<br \/>\n        condition is that he will make a full and true disclosure<br \/>\n        of   the   entire   circumstances  within  his  knowledge<br \/>\n        concerning the offence and concerning every other  person<br \/>\n        involved in   the   commission   of  the  offence.    The<br \/>\n        conditional pardon so tendered is thus a contract between<br \/>\n        the accomplice and the State and  the  consideration  for<br \/>\n        the  same  qua  the  accomplice  is  the exoneration from<br \/>\n        liability and the consideration  qua  the  State  is  the<br \/>\n        agreement to  make  a  full and true disclosure.  (See In@@<br \/>\n                                                          AAAAAAA<br \/>\n        re.   Chief  Judicial  Magistrate,  Trviandrum   &#8211;   1988@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Crl.L.J.  812  and Narayan Chethanram Chaudhary v.  State@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAA      AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        of Maharashtra &#8211; 2000 (8)  SCC  457).    Once  pardon  is@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        granted  to  an accused he ceases to be an accused person<br \/>\n        and becomes a witness  for  the  prosecution  (See  State@@<br \/>\n                                                      <a href=\"\/doc\/48778\/\">AAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        (Delhi Administration)  v.    Jagjit  Singh<\/a> &#8211; AIR 1989 SC@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\n<\/p>\n<p>        598.  When the approver resiles from  the  agreement  and@@<br \/>\n        AAAA<br \/>\n        breaks the conditional pardon, the contract is broken and<br \/>\n        the  State  becomes entitled to prosecute him by recourse<br \/>\n        to Sec.  308 Cr.P.C.  (Vide para 6 of 1988 Crl.L.J.   812@@<br \/>\n                                              AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        (Supra)).   It  is  to  ensure  that the approver who has@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        accepted the conditional pardon, makes a  full  and  true<br \/>\n        disclosure of the entire facts within his knowledge, that<br \/>\n        he  is examined as a witness before the Magistrate taking<br \/>\n        cognizance of  the  offence  under  Sec.    306(4)(a)  of<br \/>\n        Cr.P.C.   The  said  provision  further mandates that the<br \/>\n        approver shall be examined in the subsequent trial also.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t11.\tWhat now falls to be considered is as  to<br \/>\n        whether  there is any difference in the nature of enquiry<br \/>\n        under Sec.  202 Cr.P.C.  and Sec.  306(4)  Cr.P.C.    and<br \/>\n        whether the accused persons have a right to cross-examine<br \/>\n        the  approver  during his examination as a witness before<br \/>\n        the Magistrate taking cognizance under Sec.   306  (4)(a)<br \/>\n        Cr.P.C.   If the said examination of the approver is akin<br \/>\n        to the examination of witnesses under Sec.  200  and  202<br \/>\n        Cr.P.C., then, as has already been seen, the accused have<br \/>\n        no  right  to  cross-examine  the approver at that stage.<br \/>\n        That was the view taken by a learned Single Judge of this<br \/>\n        Court in 1988 Crl.L.J.  812 (Supra)  referred  to  above.@@<br \/>\n                 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        The  said  decision  was  relied  on  and  followed  by a<br \/>\n        Division Bench of this Court in Kurian v.  State  &#8211;  1989@@<br \/>\n                                        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        (1) KLT S.N.    Case  No.60.    However,  in a subsequent@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Division Bench in <a href=\"\/doc\/1694398\/\">State of Kerala v.  Monu Surendran<\/a> 1990@@<br \/>\n                          AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        (1) KLT 53, the very same learned  Judge  (U.L.Bhat,  J.)@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        who  rendered  the  decision  for  the Bench in Kurian v.@@<br \/>\n                                                        AAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        State, speaking for the Bench in  Monu  Surendran&#8217;s  case@@<br \/>\n        AAAAA                             AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        observed  that  in  the  light of the decisions in Sanjay@@<br \/>\n                                                           AAAAAA<br \/>\n        Gandhi v.  Union of India &#8211; AIR 1978  SC  514  and  State@@<br \/>\n        <a href=\"\/doc\/1553291\/\">AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        (Delhi Administration)  v.    Jaggit  Singh<\/a> &#8211; AIR 1989 SC@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        598, the  accused  have  a  right  to  cross-examine  the@@<br \/>\n        AAAA<br \/>\n        approver examined  under  Sec.    306 (4)(a) and that the<br \/>\n        above decisions of the Apex Court were not brought to the<br \/>\n        notice of the Division Bench in Kurian v.   State.    The@@<br \/>\n                                        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        later  Division Bench also held that the decisions of the<br \/>\n        Single Judge in In re.  Chief Judl.Magistrate, Trivandrum@@<br \/>\n                        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        and that of the Division Bench in Kurian V.   State  were@@<br \/>\n                                          AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        per  incuriam  and  directed  the Chief Judl.Magistrate ,@@<br \/>\n                                          AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Trivandrum (who had committed some of the  cases  to  the@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Sessions Court without examining the approver) to examine<br \/>\n        the  approver  giving  an  opportunity  to the accused to<br \/>\n        cross-examine the approver and  then  to  deal  with  the<br \/>\n        matter in  accordance  with  law.  It was pursuant to the<br \/>\n        above direction that the approver  was  examined  by  the<br \/>\n        Chief  Judl.Magistrate  and  some  of  the appellants had<br \/>\n        cross-examined the approver also.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t12.\t<a href=\"\/doc\/1503218\/\">In Sanjay Gandhi v.  Union of India<\/a>  &#8211;  a@@<br \/>\n             AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        two  Judges  Bench  of  the  Supreme  Court  observed  as<br \/>\n        follows:\n<\/p>\n<p>         &#8221;\tWe have heard counsel on both  sides  and@@<br \/>\n        i<br \/>\n                proceed  to  elucidate certain clear propositions<br \/>\n                under the new Code bearing upon the committal  of<br \/>\n                cases where the offence is triable exclusively by<br \/>\n                the Court  of Session.  The Committing Magistrate<br \/>\n                in such cases  has  no  power  to  discharge  the<br \/>\n                accused.   Nor has he power to take oral evidence<br \/>\n                save  where  a  specific  provision  like   S.306<br \/>\n                enjoins.   From this it follows that the argument<br \/>\n                that the accused has to cross-examine is  out  of<br \/>\n                bounds  for  the  Magistrate  save in the case of<br \/>\n                approvers.     No    examination-in-chief,     no<br \/>\n                cross-examination&#8221;.\n<\/p>\n<p>        The  above  observation  was  made  in  the backdrop of a<br \/>\n        grievance raised by the accused therein that he  did  not<br \/>\n        get sufficient time before the committal court to inspect<br \/>\n        the  voluminous  police  records running into about 20000<br \/>\n        pages and the thrust of the argument was that the accused<br \/>\n        has a  right  of  cross-examination  of  the  prosecution<br \/>\n        witnesses before  the  committal  court.  Eventhough some<br \/>\n        breathing time was granted to the  accused  by  the  Apex<br \/>\n        Court, the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses was<br \/>\n        not granted.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t13.\tIn Devendran v.    State  of T.N.  &#8211; 1997@@<br \/>\n         AAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        (11) SCC  720,  the  Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  granted@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        pardon  to  one of the accused after the committal of the<br \/>\n        case to the Court of Sessions  which  court  alone  could<br \/>\n        grant pardon  to the accused in view of Sec.  307 Cr.P.C.<br \/>\n        This was held to be an  irregularity  not  curable  under<br \/>\n        Sec.  465  Cr.P.C.    While  evaluating the evidence, the<br \/>\n        Supreme Court eschewed the evidence of the approver  from<br \/>\n        consideration.  Hence, on facts, the said decision has no<br \/>\n        application to the present cases.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t14.\tIn   State   (Delhi   Administration)  v.@@<br \/>\n         AAA AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Jaggit Singh &#8211; AIR 1989 SC 598 = 1989 Suppl.  (2) SCC 770@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        what has been held is that examination  of  the  approver<br \/>\n        both in the committal court as well as the trial court is<br \/>\n        mandatory.    Both   sides   do  not  dispute  the  above<br \/>\n        proposition.  The only  dispute  is  as  to  whether  the<br \/>\n        expression &#8220;examination&#8221; would include cross-examination.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t15.\tIn Suresh  Chandra  Bahri  v.    State of@@<br \/>\n                AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Bihar (1995 Suppl.  (1) SCC 80) a reading of paragraph 31@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        thereof will show that the defect of  non-examination  of<br \/>\n        the   approver   before  the  Chief  Judl.Magistrate  was<br \/>\n        rectified by a remand from  the  Sessions  Court  to  the<br \/>\n        Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  who thereafter complied with<br \/>\n        the requirement under Sec.    306(4)  Cr.P.C.    It  was,<br \/>\n        therefore,   held  that  the  subsequent  trial  was  not<br \/>\n        vitiated  for  the   alleged   non-compliance   of   Sec.<br \/>\n        306(4)(a) Cr.P.C.  the compliance of which was held to be<br \/>\n        mandatory.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t16.\tIn  Narayan  Chetanram Cahdhary &amp; Another@@<br \/>\n                 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        v.   State  of  Maharashtra  &#8211;  2000  (8)  SCC  457   the@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        application for  pardon was filed under Sec.  307 Cr.P.C.<br \/>\n        after the committal and before trial.  Hence there was no<br \/>\n        obligation on the trial court or a right in favour of the<br \/>\n        accused in insist  on  compliance  with  the  requirement<br \/>\n        under Section 306 (4).\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t17.\t<a href=\"\/doc\/406498\/\">In Ranadhir Basu v.  State of West Bengal<\/a>@@<br \/>\n                AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        (2000)  3  SCC  161  the  question  pointedly arose as to@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        whether the accused have a right of cross-examination  of<br \/>\n        the approver  during  his  examination  under  Sec.   306<br \/>\n        (4)(a) of Cr.P.C.  This is what the apex  court  held  in<br \/>\n        paragraph 7:\n<\/p>\n<p>         &#8220;It  was  contended  by  Mr.Muralidhar,   learned@@<br \/>\n        i<br \/>\n                counsel  appearing  for the appellant that Sudipa<br \/>\n                was not &#8220;examined as a witness&#8221;  as  contemplated<br \/>\n                by Section  306(4)  Cr.P.C.    He  submitted that<br \/>\n                Sudipa was examined  by  the  Magistrate  in  his<br \/>\n                chamber  and  not  in  the open court and at that<br \/>\n                time the accused were  not  kept  present.    Her<br \/>\n                evidence was  subjected to cross-examination.  In<br \/>\n                support of his  submission  he  relied  upon  the<br \/>\n                decision of this Court in Suresh Chandra Bahri v.@@<br \/>\n                                          AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n                State of  Bihar.    In that case this Court after@@<br \/>\n                AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n                pointing out the object and purpose  of  enacting<br \/>\n                Section 306(4)  Cr.P.C.  had ruled that since the<br \/>\n                provision had been made for the  benefit  of  the<br \/>\n                accused it must be regarded as mandatory.  It had<br \/>\n                observed therein that :(SCC p.101,para 30).<br \/>\n          \t&#8220;The  object   and   purpose   in@@<br \/>\n        ii<br \/>\n                        enacting   this  mandatory  provision  is<br \/>\n                        obviously intended to provide a safeguard<br \/>\n                        to the accused in as much as the approver<br \/>\n                        has to make a  statement  disclosing  his<br \/>\n                        evidence  at the preliminary stage before<br \/>\n                        the  committal  order  is  made  and  the<br \/>\n                        accused  not  only  becomes  aware of the<br \/>\n                        evidence  against  him  but  he  is  also<br \/>\n                        afforded  an opportunity to meet with the@@<br \/>\n                        CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                        evidence  of  an  approver   before   the@@<br \/>\n                        CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                        committing   court  itself  at  the  very@@<br \/>\n                        CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                        threshold&#8230;.&#8221;@@<br \/>\n                        CCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t(emphasis supplied)<br \/>\n         From this observation it does not follow that the@@<br \/>\n        i<br \/>\n                person who is granted pardon must be examined  in<br \/>\n                the  presence of the accused and that the accused<br \/>\n                has a right to appear and  cross-examine  him  at<br \/>\n                that stage also.  As pointed out by this Court in<br \/>\n                that case the object is to provide an opportunity<br \/>\n                to  the  accused  to  show  to the Court that the<br \/>\n                approver&#8217;s evidence at the trial is untrustworthy<br \/>\n                in view of  the  contradictions  or  improvements<br \/>\n                made  by  him  during  his evidence at the trial.<br \/>\n                Considering the object and purpose  of  examining<br \/>\n                the  person  accepting  tender  of  pardon  as  a<br \/>\n                witness is thus limited.  The  proceedings  which<br \/>\n                takes  place  before the Magistrate at that stage<br \/>\n                is neither an inquiry nor a  trial.    Therefore,<br \/>\n                the submission of the learned counsel that Sudipa<br \/>\n                should  have  been  examined as a witness in open<br \/>\n                court and not in the chamber and that  while  she<br \/>\n                was  examined the Magistrate should have kept the<br \/>\n                accused  present  and   afforded   to   them   an<br \/>\n                opportunity  to  cross-examine  Sudipa  cannot be<br \/>\n                accepted.  The phrase &#8220;examination of a  witness&#8221;@@<br \/>\n                           CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                does   not   necessarily   mean  examination  and@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                cross-examination of that witness.  What type  of@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                examination  of  a  witness is contemplated would@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                depend  upon  the  object  and  purpose  of  that@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                provision.  Section    202    Cr.P.C.        also@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                contemplates examination of witness  yet  it  has@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                been  held, considering the object and purpose of@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                that provision, that the  accused  has  no  locus@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n                standi at that stage&#8221;.@@<br \/>\n                CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t(Emphasis supplied)\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t18.\t<a href=\"\/doc\/648931\/\">In State of Himachal Pradesh v.  Surinder<\/a>@@<br \/>\n                AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Mohan  and  others  ((2000)  2  SCC 396) the approver was@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        examined under Sec.  306 (4)  (a)  Cr.P.C.    before  the<br \/>\n        Chief  Judl.Magistrate  and  he was subsequently examined<br \/>\n        and cross-examined  during  trial  before  the  Court  of<br \/>\n        Session.   At  the stage of arguments before the Sessions<br \/>\n        Court, it was contended for the first time  that  failure<br \/>\n        to  give  an opportunity for the accused to cross-examine<br \/>\n        the approver before committal  court  would  vitiate  the<br \/>\n        trial.   The  said contention was repelled by the Supreme<br \/>\n        Court  holding  that  the  said  contention  was   raised<br \/>\n        belatedly  and  that even if the accused had the right to<br \/>\n        cross-examine  the  approver  when  examined  under  Sec.<br \/>\n        306(4)(a) Cr.P.C, the defect would stand cured under Sec.<br \/>\n        465 Cr.P.C.    Dealing with the contention of the accused<br \/>\n        regarding the alleged right of cross-examination, this is<br \/>\n        what the apex court held in para 11 :\n<\/p>\n<p>         &#8220;From the aforesaid ingredients, it is abundantly@@<br \/>\n        i<br \/>\n                clear that at the stage of investigation, inquiry<br \/>\n                or trial of  the  offence,  the  person  to  whom<br \/>\n                pardon  is  to  be granted, is to be examined for<br \/>\n                collecting  the  evidence  of  a  person  who  is<br \/>\n                directly  or  indirectly concerned in or privy to<br \/>\n                an offence.  At  the  time  of  investigation  or<br \/>\n                inquiry into an offence, the accused cannot claim<br \/>\n                any right under law to cross-examine the witness.<br \/>\n                The  right  to cross-examination would arise only<br \/>\n                at the time of  trial.    During  the  course  of<br \/>\n                investigation  by  the  police,  the  question of<br \/>\n                cross-examination by the accused does not  arise.<br \/>\n                Similarly, under Sec.    200  Cr.P.C.    when the<br \/>\n                Magistrate  before  taking  cognizance   of   the<br \/>\n                offence,  that  is,  before issuing process holds<br \/>\n                the inquiry, the  accused  has  no  right  to  be<br \/>\n                heard,    and,   therefore,   the   question   of<br \/>\n                cross-examination does not arise.   Further,  the<br \/>\n                person to whom pardon is granted, is examined but<br \/>\n                is   not   offered   for   cross-examination  and<br \/>\n                thereafter during trial if  he  is  examined  and<br \/>\n                cross-examined  then  there is no question of any<br \/>\n                prejudice caused to the accused.  In such  cases,<br \/>\n                at  the  most  the accused may lose the chance to<br \/>\n                cross-examine the approver twice, that is to say,<br \/>\n                once before committal and the other at  the  time<br \/>\n                of trial&#8221;.\n<\/p>\n<p>        It is pertinent to note that in paragraph 12 of the above<br \/>\n        decision  the  apex court has adverted to the decision of<br \/>\n        the learned Single Judge of this Court  reported  in  In.@@<br \/>\n                                                              AAA<br \/>\n        re:    Chief   Judicial  Magistrate,  Trivandrum  &#8211;  1988@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Crl.L.J.  812 and what is important to  observe  is  that@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        the  apex  court  has  not  disapproved the said decision<br \/>\n        which was held to be one rendered  per  incuriam  by  the<br \/>\n        Division Bench of this Court in Monu Surendran.@@<br \/>\n                                        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t19.\tGoing  by  the  observations  in Ranadhir@@<br \/>\n                                              AAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        Basu and Surindra Mohan particularly Ranadhir  Basu,  the@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA              AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        apex  court  had  pointedly considered the question as to<br \/>\n        whether the expression &#8220;examination&#8221; in Sec.    306(4)(a)<br \/>\n        would  include  cross-examination  and  held that at that<br \/>\n        stage  the  accused  has   no   right   to   appear   and<br \/>\n        cross-examine  the  approver  and  the legal position was<br \/>\n        treated akin to an inquiry under Sec.  202  Cr.P.C.    In<br \/>\n        the  case  of  a witness examined during an inquiry under<br \/>\n        Sec.  202 Cr.P.C., the question  pointedly  arose  before<br \/>\n        the Supreme Court as to whether his statement recorded by<br \/>\n        the magistrate and favourable to the prosecution would be<br \/>\n        admissible under  Sec.    33  of the Evidence Act if such<br \/>\n        witness had turned hostile to the prosecution during  the<br \/>\n        subsequent trial.   After holding that the accused had no<br \/>\n        right and  opportunity  to  cross-examine  a  prosecution<br \/>\n        witness  examined during the course of inquiry under Sec.<br \/>\n        202 Cr.P.C.  the apex court held as follows in  Paragraph\n<\/p>\n<p>        10.<br \/>\n         &#8220;Thus,  we  have no difficulty in holding that as@@<br \/>\n        i<br \/>\n                during the course of inquiry under Sec.   202  of<br \/>\n                the  Code  an  accused  has  no  right  much less<br \/>\n                opportunity  to   cross-examine   a   prosecution<br \/>\n                witness,  statement  of  such  a witness recorded<br \/>\n                during  the  course  of  the   inquiry   is   not<br \/>\n                admissible in  evidence under Sec.  33 of the Act<br \/>\n                and, consequently, the same cannot form the basis<br \/>\n                of conviction of an accused&#8221;.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t20.\tIn the light of the decisions of the apex<br \/>\n        court adverted to above, we are of  the  considered  view<br \/>\n        that  Monu  Surendran  has not been correctly decided and@@<br \/>\n              AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        with due respect we overrule the same and  hold  that  In@@<br \/>\n                                                               AA<br \/>\n        re.   Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  (Supra)  and Kurian v.@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        State of Kerala were correctly  decided.    There  is  no@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        dispute    that    those   appellants\/accused   who   had<br \/>\n        cross-examined the approver during his examination  under<br \/>\n        Section 306(4)(a)  Cr.P.C.  was pursuant to the direction<br \/>\n        given  to  the  Chief   Judicial   Magistrate   in   Monu@@<br \/>\n                                                             AAAA<br \/>\n        Surendran&#8217;s  case  wherein  it was the State which sought@@<br \/>\n        AAAAAAAAAAA<br \/>\n        for  the  direction  to  examine  the   approver   giving<br \/>\n        opportunity to  the  accused to cross-examine him.  Thus,<br \/>\n        cross-examination   was   virtually   thrust   upon   the<br \/>\n        appellants\/accused without  their asking for it.  In such<br \/>\n        situation, the cross-examination conducted by them cannot<br \/>\n        be said to be as of right.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t21.\tWe accordingly answer this  reference  as<br \/>\n        follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>         Since  the  appellants\/accused  had  no  right to@@<br \/>\n        i<br \/>\n                cross-examine the approver while he was  examined<br \/>\n                before   the   Chief  Judicial  Magistrate  under<br \/>\n                Section 306(4)(a) Cr.P.C., even if  any  of  them<br \/>\n                had  an opportunity to cross-examine the approver<br \/>\n                at that stage,  the  statement  of  the  approver<br \/>\n                examined under Sec.    306 (4)(a) Cr.P.C.  is not<br \/>\n                relevant or admissible under  Sec.    33  of  the<br \/>\n                Evidence Act during the subsequent trial in which<br \/>\n                the approver was not available for examination by<br \/>\n                reason of his death in the meanwhile.<br \/>\n.PA\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t22.\tWe, however, make it clear that  we  have<br \/>\n        not examined  the  admissibility under Sec.  32(3) of the<br \/>\n        Evidence Act of the aforesaid statement of the  approver.<br \/>\n        That  is  a  matter  to  be considered by the appropriate<br \/>\n        Bench which finally hears these appeals.    The  Registry<br \/>\n        shall   take   steps  to  post  the  appeals  before  the<br \/>\n        appropriate Court as per the roster for disposal  of  the<br \/>\n        same on merits.\n<\/p>\n<p>.JN<\/p>\n<p>        \t\t\t\t    V.RAMKUMAR,<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t      (JUDGE)<\/p>\n<p>        \t\t\t\t K.PADMANABHAN NAIR,<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t      (JUDGE)<\/p>\n<p>        \t\t\t\t     M.N.KRISHNAN<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t\t(JUDGE)<\/p>\n<p>.JY<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t\t(Continued&#8230;)<br \/>\n.JY<br \/>\n.PA<br \/>\n.JN<\/p>\n<p>        \t\t\t\t&amp; V.  RAMKUMAR, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t\t\t\t\t&amp;<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\tM.N.KRISHNAN, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>        \t\t\t\tORDER<\/p>\n<p>        \t\t\t\tCrl.Appeal Nos.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t\t\t        534\/92, 537\/92,<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t597\/92,   686\/92, 697\/92,<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t9\/1993, 22\/93, 100\/93<br \/>\n         \t114\/93, 118\/93, 119\/93,@@<br \/>\n        j<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t125\/1993, 126\/93 &amp;<br \/>\n        \t\t\t\t136\/1993<\/p>\n<p>        \t\t\t\tDATED:\n<\/p>\n<p>.JY<\/p>\n<p>.JY<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Kerala High Court L.S.Asokan vs State on 3 August, 2005 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM CRL A No. 534 of 1992 1. L.S.ASOKAN &#8230; Petitioner Vs 1. STATE &#8230; Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.V.N.ACHUTHA KURUP For Respondent :PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Hon&#8217;ble MR. Justice K.PADMANABHAN NAIR The Hon&#8217;ble MR. Justice V.RAMKUMAR The Hon&#8217;ble MR. [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-132035","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-kerala-high-court"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>L.S.Asokan vs State on 3 August, 2005 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/l-s-asokan-vs-state-on-3-august-2005\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"L.S.Asokan vs State on 3 August, 2005 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; 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