{"id":132569,"date":"1998-02-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1998-02-04T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/colour-chem-limited-vs-a-l-alaspurkar-ors-on-5-february-1998"},"modified":"2017-12-12T20:18:19","modified_gmt":"2017-12-12T14:48:19","slug":"colour-chem-limited-vs-a-l-alaspurkar-ors-on-5-february-1998","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/colour-chem-limited-vs-a-l-alaspurkar-ors-on-5-february-1998","title":{"rendered":"Colour-Chem Limited vs A.L. Alaspurkar &amp; Ors on 5 February, 1998"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Colour-Chem Limited vs A.L. Alaspurkar &amp; Ors on 5 February, 1998<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: S Majmudar.J.<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: S.B. Majmudar, M. Jagannadha Rao, A.P. Misra<\/div>\n<pre>           PETITIONER:\nCOLOUR-CHEM LIMITED\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nA.L. ALASPURKAR &amp; ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\t05\/02\/1998\n\nBENCH:\nS.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO, A.P. MISRA\n\n\n\n\nACT:\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>\t\t      J U D G M E N T<br \/>\nS.B. Majmudar.J.\n<\/p>\n<p>     The appellant-management  by obtaining special leave to<br \/>\nappeal under  Article 136  of the  Constitution of India has<br \/>\nbrought in challenge the order of High Court of Bombay dated<br \/>\n13th September\t1991 dismissing\t the writ  petition  of\t the<br \/>\nappellant and  confirming the  order of\t the Labour Court as<br \/>\nfurther confirmed  in  revision\t by  the  Industrial  Court,<br \/>\nBombay. By  the impugned order respondent nos.3 and 4 herein<br \/>\nwho were  workmen in  the  concern  of\tthe  appellant\twere<br \/>\nordered to  be reinstated  in service  with 40% and 50% back<br \/>\nwages respectively  till the date of the award of the Labour<br \/>\nCourt and  thereafter with  cent per  cent back\t wages\ttill<br \/>\nreinstatement.\n<\/p>\n<p>     A few  relevant facts  leading to these proceedings are<br \/>\nrequired to  be noted  to highlight  the  grievance  of\t the<br \/>\nappellant-management against the impugned order.<br \/>\nBackground Facts<br \/>\n     Respondent nos.3  and 4  were working  the plant of the<br \/>\nappellant as  Plant Operators.\tOn the night between 5th and<br \/>\n6th May\t 1982 when  they were on duty in the night shift, at<br \/>\nabout  03.30   a.m.  when   the\t Plant\tIn-charge  one\tShri<br \/>\nChandrahasan made  a surprise  visit,  he  found  respondent<br \/>\nnos.3 and  4 and 10 mazdoors as well as the Shift Supervisor<br \/>\nsleeping though\t the machine  was kept\tworking.  The  Shift<br \/>\nSupervisor was\tfound sleeping in the cabin while respondent<br \/>\nnos.3 and 4 operators and 10 mazdoors were found sleeping on<br \/>\nthe terrace  of the  factory.  For  the\t said  misconduct  a<br \/>\ndomestic enquiry  was held,  after chargesheeting respondent<br \/>\nnos.3 and  4 charge-sheets  of even date were issued on 18th<br \/>\nMay 1982.  After the domestic enquiry both these respondents<br \/>\nby order  dated 04th  June 1983 were dismissed from service.<br \/>\nRespondent nos.3 and 4 field complaints before respondent no<br \/>\n2-authority  under   the  provisions   of  the\t Maharashtra<br \/>\nRecognition of\tTrade Union  &amp; Prevention  of Unfair  Labour<br \/>\nPractices Act.\t1971 [hereinafter referred to as &#8216;the act&#8217;].<br \/>\nThe connection\tof these  complainants was  that  they\twere<br \/>\nvictimised  and\t  the  appellant-management   had  committed<br \/>\ndiverse unfair\tpractices as contemplated under Clauses (a),\n<\/p>\n<p>(b), (d),  (f) and (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV\t of the Act.<br \/>\nThe appellant  contested these\tcomplaints. The Labour Court<br \/>\nin the light of the evidence recorded came to the conclusion<br \/>\nthat the  appellant-company had proved that the complainants<br \/>\nhad committed  misconducts alleged  against them  as per the<br \/>\ncharge-sheets dated  18th May  1982. It\t also held  that the<br \/>\ncomplainants failed to prove that they were dismissed by way<br \/>\nof unfair  labour practices covered by Clauses (a), (b), (d)<br \/>\nand (f)\t of Item  1 of\tSchedule IV  of the Act. However, it<br \/>\nheld that the appellant had committed unfair labour practice<br \/>\nas per Clause (g) of Item 1 of the said Schedule. Contention<br \/>\nof the complainants that they were discriminated against was<br \/>\nrejected. It  was also\tfound that  the appellant  failed to<br \/>\nprove that  the complainants  were gainfully  employed since<br \/>\ntheir dismissals  on 04th  June 1983.  The Labour  Court  in<br \/>\nshort found  that looking  to the  nature of  the misconduct<br \/>\nalleged and  proved against  the complainants the punishment<br \/>\nof dismissal was grossly disproportionate and, therefore, it<br \/>\namounted to  unfair labour  practice  on  the  part  of\t the<br \/>\nappellant as  covered by Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV<br \/>\nof the Act. As a result, the Labour Court passed an order of<br \/>\nreinstatement with  appropriate back  wages as seem earlier.<br \/>\nThe  said   order  of  the  Labour  Court  resulted  in\t two<br \/>\nrevisions. one\ton behalf  of the  workmen  and\t another  on<br \/>\nbehalf of  the management.  The revisional  court namely the<br \/>\nIndustrial Court  dismissed both  the revision\tapplications<br \/>\nand confirmed  the order  of the Labour Court. The appellant<br \/>\ncarried the  matter in\twrit petition  before the High Court<br \/>\nwhich as noted earlier came to be dismissed. That is how the<br \/>\nappellant is before us.\n<\/p>\n<p>     We have  heard learned senior counsel for the appellant<br \/>\nas well as learned senior counsel for respondent nos.3 and 4<br \/>\nwho are\t the only contesting parties, respondent nos.1 and 2<br \/>\nbeing the authorities under the Act who have adjudicated the<br \/>\ndispute are only formal parties.\n<\/p>\n<p>Rival Contentions<br \/>\n     Learned senior  counsel Shri Narayan B. Shetye, for the<br \/>\nappellant submitted  that the Labour  Court as\twell as\t the<br \/>\nIndustrial Court and also the High Court have patently erred<br \/>\nin applying  the provisions of Item 1 Clause (g) of Schedule<br \/>\nIV of  the Act in the present case. It was submitted that on<br \/>\na proper  construction of the said provision the said clause<br \/>\nwould  apply   only  if\t  the misconduct  committed  by\t the<br \/>\nrespondents was\t a  minor  misconduct  or  is  of  technical<br \/>\nnature. That  the Labour Court had found that the misconduct<br \/>\nof respondent  nos.3 and 4 was major misconduct and the said<br \/>\nfinding was to disturbed or dissented from by the revisional<br \/>\nauthority or  by the  High Court.  Under these circumstances<br \/>\nthe Labour  Court was  not justified in taking the view that<br \/>\nthe appellant  was guilty  of unfair labour practice covered<br \/>\nby the\tsaid clause  and when  the Labour Court held that on<br \/>\nother alleged  unfair labour  practices the complainants had<br \/>\nmade out  no case,  the complaints  filed by the respondents<br \/>\nwere liable to be dismissed. He alternatively submitted that<br \/>\neven assuming  that the said clause was attracted looking to<br \/>\nthe nature  of the misconduct and the past service record of<br \/>\nthe respondents\t it could not be said that the punishment of<br \/>\ndismissal was  shockingly  disproportionate.  Even  on\tthat<br \/>\nground the  complaints were  liable to\tbe dismissed. It was<br \/>\nlastly contended that in any view of the matter this was not<br \/>\na fit  case where  reinstatement could have been ordered and<br \/>\ninstead\t compensation\tcould  have   been  awarded  to\t the<br \/>\nrespondents in\tlieu of\t reinstatement as  their  misconduct<br \/>\nlaid created  a situation  in which  the  machine  was\tkept<br \/>\nworking and the respondents had gone to sleep while on duty.<br \/>\nThe  result  was  that\tapart  from  lesser  production\t the<br \/>\nunattended machine  in working state had created a hazardous<br \/>\nsituation wherein the plant would have been blown off and an<br \/>\nexplosion would\t have resulted,\t as the chemical industry of<br \/>\nthe appellant  where  the  respondents\twere  working  is  a<br \/>\nhazardous industry.\n<\/p>\n<p>     Refuting these contentions learned senior counsel. Smt,<br \/>\nIndira Jaising,\t for respondent\t nos. 3 and 4 contended that<br \/>\non a proper construction of Clause (g) of Item I of Schedule<br \/>\nIV of  the Act it is rightly held by the High Court that the<br \/>\nsaid clause  is squarely  attracted  to\t the  facts  of\t the<br \/>\npresent case as it covered apart from misconduct of minor or<br \/>\ntechnical character  all other\tmisconducts where looking to<br \/>\nthe nature  of the  misconduct or the past record of service<br \/>\nit appeared  to the  Court that\t the punishment\t imposed was<br \/>\nshockingly  disproportionate  to  the  charges\theld  proved<br \/>\nagainst the  delinquent workmen.  She further contended that<br \/>\nin any\tcase shockingly\t disproportionate punishment  in the<br \/>\nlight of  the nature  of the  misconduct alleged  and proved<br \/>\nwould  itself\tamount\tto   unfair   labour   practice\t  or<br \/>\nvictimisation as  held by  this Court  in the  case of\t<a href=\"\/doc\/1523242\/\">Hind<br \/>\nConstruction &amp;\tEngineering Co Ltd. v. Their Workmen<\/a> [(1965)<br \/>\n2 SCR  85]. She also submitted that while considering Clause\n<\/p>\n<p>(g) of\tItem 1\tof Schedule  IV of  the Act the Court should<br \/>\nadopt beneficial  rule of  construction as  this is a labour<br \/>\nwelfare legislation.  In  this\tconnection  she\t pressed  in<br \/>\nservice two  decisions of this Court to which we will make a<br \/>\nreference   hereinafter.    She\t   also\t   submitted\tthat<br \/>\nproportionality of the punishment could always be considered<br \/>\nby courts dealing with labour legislations and the court had<br \/>\nample jurisdiction  in appropriate  cases to  set aside such<br \/>\ndisproportionate punishment in the light of the charges held<br \/>\nproved against the delinquents concerned. She next submitted<br \/>\nthat as\t the Labour  Court had\tfound that  the respondent &#8211;<br \/>\ncomplainants were  not shown to have been gainfully employed<br \/>\nin the\tmeantime there\twas no\treason for not awarding full<br \/>\nback wages at least from the date of the award of the Labour<br \/>\nCourt as  the award  of 40% and 50% back wages to respondent<br \/>\nnos.3 and  4 respectively  till the  date of  the award\t had<br \/>\nremained final\tas the\tcomplainants had  not challenged the<br \/>\nsaid award  of back  wages before  the High  Court. She also<br \/>\nsubmitted that\tonce the  punishment is\t found to be grossly<br \/>\ndisproportionate to  the charges levelled and proved against<br \/>\nthe delinquents,  the order  of reinstatement  was perfectly<br \/>\njustified and  there was  no question  of  appellant  losing<br \/>\nconfidence in  the respondent-complainants  and consequently<br \/>\nthis is\t not a fit case in which compensation can be awarded<br \/>\nin lieu\t of  reinstatement  as\tthat  would  spell  economic<br \/>\ndisaster to  these workmen  who are already out of job since<br \/>\n1983 that is, for more than 14 years.\n<\/p>\n<p>     In rejoinder it was contended by learned senior counsel<br \/>\nfor the\t appellant that\t the same  learned Judge of the High<br \/>\nCourt who  decided the\tpresent case  had subsequently taken<br \/>\nthe view  of the  construction of  Clause (g)  of Item\t1 of<br \/>\nSchedule IV  of the Act that the same would cover only minor<br \/>\nmisconducts. He\t also relied  upon another  judgment of\t the<br \/>\nHigh Court  on the  same lines.\t He also  contended that the<br \/>\nLabour Court  had repelled  the contention  on behalf of the<br \/>\nrespondent-complainants that  the management  had  committed<br \/>\nunfair labour  practice of  victimisation covered  by Clause\n<\/p>\n<p>(a) of\tItem 1\tof Schedule  IV of the Act and if Clause (g)<br \/>\nthereof did  not apply\tto such major misconducts complaints<br \/>\nwere required to be dismissed.\n<\/p>\n<p>Points for Determination<br \/>\n     In\t view\tof  the\t  aforesaid  rival  contentions\t the<br \/>\nfollowing points arise for our determination.\n<\/p>\n<p>1.   Whether Clause (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act<br \/>\n     is applicable to the facts of the present case.\n<\/p>\n<p>2.   If not,  whether the appellant can be said to have been<br \/>\n     guilty of\thaving committed  unfair labour\t practice as<br \/>\n     per Clause\t (a) of\t Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act of<br \/>\n     the basis\tof which  the order  of the  order Court  as<br \/>\n     confirmed by the higher courts can be supported.\n<\/p>\n<p>3.   Whether the  order of  reinstatement with back wages as<br \/>\n     passed by\tthe Labour  Court and  as confirmed  by\t the<br \/>\n     higher  courts   is  justified   on   the\t facts\t and<br \/>\n     circumstances of the court.\n<\/p>\n<p>     We shall deal with these points seriatim,<br \/>\nPoint No.I<br \/>\n     For resolving  the\t controversy  centering\t round\tthis<br \/>\npoint it  is  necessary\t to  have  a  look  at\tthe relevant<br \/>\nstatutory provisions  of the  Act. The Act was passed by the<br \/>\nMaharashtra Legislature\t in 1971  as  Act  No.\t1  of  1972.<br \/>\nAmongst its  diverse objects  and reasons one of the reasons<br \/>\nfor enacting the said Act was for defining and providing for<br \/>\nprevention of  certain unfair labour practices to constitute<br \/>\ncourts (as  independent\t machinery)  for  carrying  out\t the<br \/>\npurposes mentioned  therein one\t of  which  being  enforcing<br \/>\nprovisions  relating  to  unfair  labour  practices.  Unfair<br \/>\nlabour practices is defined by Section 3 sub-section (16) of<br \/>\nthe Act\t to mean,  unfair labour  practices  ad\t defined  in<br \/>\nsection 26&#8242;.  Section 26  of the Act lays down that, &#8220;unless<br \/>\nthe context  required otherwise,  `unfair  labour  practices<br \/>\nmean any  of the  practices listed  in Schedules II, III and<br \/>\nIV&#8221;. We\t are not  concerned with  Schedules II and III which<br \/>\ndeal with  unfair  labour  practices  on  the  part  of\t the<br \/>\nemployer and  trade unions.  We are  directly concerned with<br \/>\nSchedule IV which deals with general unfair labour practices<br \/>\non the\tpart of\t the employers.\t The relevant  provisions of<br \/>\nItem 1 of Schedule IV of the Act read as under:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>     &#8220;1.   To\tdischarge   or\t dismiss<br \/>\n     employees\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>     (a) by way of victimisation:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>     (b) &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>     (c) &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>     (d) &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>     (e) &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>     (f) &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>     (g) for  misconduct of  a minor  or<br \/>\n\t  technical  character\t without<br \/>\n\t  having  any\tregard\tto   the<br \/>\n\t  nature   of\tthe   particular<br \/>\n\t  misconduct or\t the past record<br \/>\n\t  of service  of the employee so<br \/>\n\t  as to\t amount to  a shockingly<br \/>\n\t  disproportionate punishment.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>So far\tas the\taforesaid Clause (g) is concerned the Labour<br \/>\nCourt has  held that  the  misconduct  alleged\tagainst\t the<br \/>\nrespondent and held proved before it was not a misconduct of<br \/>\nminor or  technical character as they were found sleeping on<br \/>\nduty and  were also  guilty of\tnegligence  in\tkeeping\t the<br \/>\nmachine in  working  state  without  putting  necessary\t raw<br \/>\nmaterial therein.  As the  aforesaid finding  of the  Labour<br \/>\nCourt about  the nature\t of misconduct\tof respondent nos. 3<br \/>\nand 4  was confirmed  by the  revisional court\tand  a\tthat<br \/>\nfinding was  not challenged  by the  respondents before\t the<br \/>\nHigh Court  we shall  proceed for  the present discussion on<br \/>\nthe basis  that respondent nos. 3 and 4 were guilty of major<br \/>\nmisconduct. The\t moot question\ttherefore, which  falls\t for<br \/>\nconsideration is  whether on  the express language of Clause\n<\/p>\n<p>(g) the\t said provision\t gets attracted\t or not.  A conjoint<br \/>\nreading of  different sub-parts\t of the aforesaid provision,<br \/>\nin our\tview, leaves no room for doubt that it deals with an<br \/>\nunfair labour  practice said  to have  been committed  by an<br \/>\nemployer  who\tdischarges  or\tdismisses  an  employee\t for<br \/>\nmisconduct of a minor or technical character and while doing<br \/>\nso no regard is kept to the nature of the misconduct alleged<br \/>\nand proved  against the\t delinquent or without having regard<br \/>\nto the\tpast service  record of\t the employee  so that under<br \/>\nthese circumstances  the ultimate punishment  imposed on the<br \/>\ndelinquent would  be found  by the  Court  be  a  shockingly<br \/>\ndisproportionate punishment.  It is  not possible  to  agree<br \/>\nwith the  contention  of  learned  senior  counsel  for\t the<br \/>\nrespondent-workmen that\t the said  clause would\t also  cover<br \/>\neven major  misconducts if for such misconducts the order of<br \/>\ndischarge or  dismissal are  passed by\tthe employer without<br \/>\nhaving regard  to the  nature of  the misconduct or the past<br \/>\nrecord of  the employees and if under these circumstances it<br \/>\nis found  by  the  court  that\tthe  punishment\t imposed  is<br \/>\nshockingly disproportionate  one. It  is true that after the<br \/>\nwords `for  misconduct of  a minor  or technical  character&#8217;<br \/>\nthere is  found a comma in Clause (g), but if the contention<br \/>\nof learned  senior counsel  is to be accepted the comma will<br \/>\nhave to\t be replaced  by `or&#8217;.\tThat cannot  be done  in the<br \/>\ncontext and  setting s\tof  the\t said  clause  as  the\tsaid<br \/>\nexercise apart\tfrom being  impermissible would\t not make  a<br \/>\nharmonious reading of the provision. Even that apart, in the<br \/>\nsaid Clause (g) the Iegislature has used the word `or&#8217; while<br \/>\ndealing with  the topic of non-consideration by the employer<br \/>\nwhile imposing\tthe punishment\tthe relevant  factors to  be<br \/>\nconsidered, namely,  either  the  non-consideration  of\t the<br \/>\nnature of  the particular  misconduct or  the past record of<br \/>\nservice of  the employee,  which would\tmake the  punishment<br \/>\nappear to  be shockingly  disproportionate to  the charge of<br \/>\nmisconduct held proved against the delinquent. Thus the term<br \/>\n`or&#8217; as employed by he Legislature in the said clause refers<br \/>\nto the\tsame topic,  namely  non-consideration\tof  relevant<br \/>\naspects by  the\t employer  while  imposing  the\t punishment.<br \/>\nConsequently it\t cannot be said to have any reference to the<br \/>\nnature of  the misconduct,  whether minor or major. It must,<br \/>\ntherefore, be  held that  the comma  as found  in the clause<br \/>\nafter providing\t for  the  nature  of  the  misconduct\tonly<br \/>\nindicated how  the same nature of the misconduct referred to<br \/>\nin the\tfirst part  of the  clause results  in a  shockingly<br \/>\ndisproportionate punishment  if certain relevant factors, as<br \/>\nmentioned in  the subsequent  part of  the clause,  are\t not<br \/>\nconsidered by  the employer.  If the  contention of  learned<br \/>\nsenior counsel\tfor the\t respondents was  right all the sub-<br \/>\nparts of  clause (g)  have to  be read disjunctively and not<br \/>\nconjunctively.\tThat   would  result  in  a  very  anomalous<br \/>\nsituation. In such an eventuality the discharge or dismissal<br \/>\nof an  employee in case of a major misconduct without regard<br \/>\nto the nature of the particular misconduct or past record of<br \/>\nservice may  by itself amount to shockingly disproportionate<br \/>\npunishment. Consequently  for a\t proved major  misconduct if<br \/>\npast service  record is not seen the punishment of discharge<br \/>\nor  dismissal\tby  itself   may  amount   to  a  shockingly<br \/>\ndisproportionate punishment.  Such an  incongruous result is<br \/>\nnot contemplated  by Clause  (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of<br \/>\nthe Act.  Such type  of\t truncated  operation  of  the\tsaid<br \/>\nprovision  is  contra-indicated\t by  the  very\ttexture\t and<br \/>\nsettings of  the said clause. One the said clause deals with<br \/>\nthe topic of misconduct of a minor or technical character it<br \/>\nis difficult  to appreciated  how the  said  clause  can  be<br \/>\ncentured as  covering also major misconducts for which there<br \/>\nis not\teven a\twhisper in  the said clause. On a harmonious<br \/>\nconstruction of\t the said  clause  with\t all  it  sub-parts,<br \/>\ntherefore,  it\t must  be  held\t that  the  Legislature\t had<br \/>\ncontemplated while  enacting the  said clause  punishment of<br \/>\ndischarge or  dismissal for misconduct of minor or technical<br \/>\ncharacter which\t when seen in the light of the nature of the<br \/>\nparticular minor  or technical misconduct or the past record<br \/>\nof the\temployee would\tamount to  inflicting of  shockingly<br \/>\ndisproportionate  punishment.  In  this\t connection  we\t may<br \/>\nmention that  the same learned Judge B.N. Srikrishna. J., in<br \/>\na latter decision in the case of Pandurang Kashinath Want v.<br \/>\nDivisional Controller,\tM.S.R.T.C. Dhule  &amp; Ors [1995(1) CLR<br \/>\n1052] has  taken the  view that\t Clause (g)  of\t Item  1  of<br \/>\nSchedule  IV  of  the  Act  refers  to\tminor  or  technical<br \/>\nmisconduct only.  The same  view was  also taken  by another<br \/>\nlearned Judge  Jahagirdar. J.,\tin the\tcase of\t <a href=\"\/doc\/1113844\/\">Maharashtra<br \/>\nState Road  Transport Corporation  v. Niranjan\tSridhar Gade<br \/>\nand<\/a> another [1985 (50) FLR (Bom.))]. So far as this Court is<br \/>\nconcerned the same Act came for consideration in the case of<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/1353651\/\">Hindustan Lever Ltd. v. Ashok Vishnu Kate and others<\/a> [(1995)<br \/>\n6 SCC  326]. It\t is, of\t course, true that the question with<br \/>\nwhich this  Court was  concerned was a different one, namely<br \/>\nwhether before\tany final  discharge or\t dismissal order  is<br \/>\npassed, a  complaint could  be filed  under the\t Act on\t the<br \/>\nground that  the employer  was contemplating  to commit such<br \/>\nunfair\tlabour\tpractice,  if  ultimately  the\tdepartmental<br \/>\nproceedings were  likely to  result  into  final  orders  of<br \/>\ndismissal or discharge attracting any of the clauses of Item<br \/>\n1 of  Schedule IV  of the Act. However while considering the<br \/>\nscheme of  the Act  especially\tthe  very  same\t Item  1  of<br \/>\nSchedule IV  of the  Act a Bench of this Court consisting of<br \/>\nG.N. Ray.J.  and one  of us S.B. Majmudar.J. in paragraph 26<br \/>\nof the Report assumed that the said clause would cover minor<br \/>\nmisconducts.\n<\/p>\n<p>     Learned senior  counsel for  the respondents  was right<br \/>\nwhen  she   contended  that  this  being  a  labour  welfare<br \/>\nlegislation liberal  construction should  be placed  on\t the<br \/>\nrelevant provisions  of the  Act. She  rightly\tinvited\t our<br \/>\nattention to  paragraph 41  of the  Report of  the aforesaid<br \/>\ncase in this connection. She also invited our attention to a<br \/>\ndecision of  this Court\t in the\t case of The Workmen of M\/s.<br \/>\nFirestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt) Ltd. etc v. The<br \/>\nManagement and others etc. [(1973) 1 SCC 813] especially the<br \/>\nobservations made in paragraph 35 of the Report. It has been<br \/>\nobserved therein  that if  two constructions  are reasonably<br \/>\npossible to  be placed\ton the section, it followed that the<br \/>\nconstruction which furthers the policy and object of the Act<br \/>\nand is more beneficial to the employee, has to be preferred.<br \/>\nBut it\tis further  observed in the very said paragraph that<br \/>\nthere is  another canon\t of interpretation that a Stature or<br \/>\nfor  that  matter  even\t a  particular\tsection\t has  to  be<br \/>\ninterpreted according  to its  plain words and without doing<br \/>\nviolence to  the language  used by  the legislature.  In our<br \/>\nview, Clause  (g) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the Act is not<br \/>\nreasonably capable of two constructions. Only one reasonable<br \/>\nconstruction is\t possible on  the express language of Clause\n<\/p>\n<p>(g), namely,  that it  seeks to\t cover only  those types  of<br \/>\nunfair labour practices where minor misconducts or technical<br \/>\nmisconducts have  resulted  in\tdismissal  or  discharge  of<br \/>\ndelinquent workmen  and such  punishment in the light of the<br \/>\nnature of  misconduct or  past record  of the  delinquent is<br \/>\nfound to  be shockingly\t disproportionate to  the charges of<br \/>\nminor misconduct  or charges  of technical  misconduct\theld<br \/>\nproved against\tthe delinquent.\t One and only subject-matter<br \/>\nof Clause  (g) is  the\tmisconduct  of\tminor  or  technical<br \/>\ncharacter. The remaining parts of the clause do not indicate<br \/>\nany separate  subject-matter like  the major misconduct. But<br \/>\nthey are  all adjuncts\tand corollaries or appendages of the<br \/>\nprincipal subject,  namely, minor  or  technical  misconduct<br \/>\nwhich in  given set  of cases  may amount  to  resulting  in<br \/>\nshockingly disproportionate  punishment if they are followed<br \/>\nby discharge  or dismissal  of\tthe  delinquent.  The  first<br \/>\npoint, therefore,  will have  to be answered in the negative<br \/>\nin favour  of the  appellant  and  against  the\t respondent-<br \/>\ndelinquents.\n<\/p>\n<p>Point No.2<br \/>\n     However this  is not  the end of the matter. Looking to<br \/>\nthe nature  of the  charges levelled against the delinquent-<br \/>\nrespondents it\thas to\tbe appreciated\tthat  all  that\t was<br \/>\nalleged against\t them was  that they  were found sleeping in<br \/>\nthe were  hours of the night shift almost near dawn at 03.30<br \/>\na.m. having  kept the machine in a running condition without<br \/>\nseeing to  it that proper raw material was inserted therein.<br \/>\nEven on\t the basis  that it was a major misconduct which was<br \/>\nalleged and  proved, looking  to  the  past  record  of\t the<br \/>\nservice of the delinquents no reasonable employer could have<br \/>\nimposed punishment  of dismissal. The past record was to the<br \/>\neffect\tthat   respondent  no.3\t was  once  found  allegedly<br \/>\ngambling in the factory premises but was in fact found to be<br \/>\nplaying cards on a Diwah day which was public holiday, whole<br \/>\nthe only past misconduct alleged against respondent no.4 was<br \/>\nthat on\t one occasion  he was warned for negligent discharge<br \/>\nof duty.  Looking to  the nature  of  the  charges  levelled<br \/>\nagainst them, therefore, and even in the light of their past<br \/>\nservice\t record\t  it  could   not  be  said  that  for\tsuch<br \/>\nmisconducts they  were liable  to be dismissed from service.<br \/>\nSuch   punishments    patently\t appear\t   to\tbe   grossly<br \/>\ndisproportionate to  the nature\t of the\t charges held proved<br \/>\nagainst them.  That finding  reached by\t the Labour Court on<br \/>\nfacts remains  unassailable. Once that conclusion is reached<br \/>\neven apart  from non-application  of Clause (g) of Item 1 of<br \/>\nSchedule IV  of the  Act. Clause  (a) of  Item 1 of the said<br \/>\nSchedule of  the Act  gets squarely  attracted as  it  would<br \/>\namount to  victimisation on the part of the management which<br \/>\ncan be\tsaid to\t have imposed a most unreasonable punishment<br \/>\non  these  employees.  In  this\t connection  learned  senior<br \/>\ncounsel for  the respondent-workmen  has rightly  pressed in<br \/>\nservice a  decision of\ta Bench\t of three  learned Judges of<br \/>\nthis Court in the case of Hind Construction (supra). In that<br \/>\ncase this  Court was  considering the jurisdiction and power<br \/>\nof the Industrial Court during the time when Section 11-A of<br \/>\nthe Industrial\tDisputes Act.  1947 was\t not on\t the Statute<br \/>\nBook. Considering  the nature  of the  punishment imposed on<br \/>\nthe workmen,  who had  gone on\tstrike, because they had not<br \/>\nreported for duty on a day which otherwise was a holiday but<br \/>\nwhich was  declared by\tthe management\tto be a working day,<br \/>\nthis  Court   speaking\tthrough\t  Hidayatullah.J.  made\t the<br \/>\nfollowing pertinent observations at page 88 of the Report :\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>     &#8220;&#8230;But  where  the  punishment  is<br \/>\n     shockingly disproportionate, regard<br \/>\n     being had to the particular conduct<br \/>\n     and the  past record or is such, as<br \/>\n     no reasonable  employer would  ever<br \/>\n     impose in\tlike circumstances,  the<br \/>\n     Tribunal may  treat the  imposition<br \/>\n     of\t such\tpunishment   as\t  itself<br \/>\n     showing  victimization   or  unfair<br \/>\n     labour practice&#8230;&#8230;&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>It has\tto be kept in view that these observations were made<br \/>\nby this\t Court at  a time  when unfair labour practices were<br \/>\nnot codified  either by\t the Industrial Disputes Act or even<br \/>\nby the\tpresent Act.  The present Act tried to codify unfair<br \/>\npractices on the part of the employer by enacting the Act in<br \/>\n1972 and  even the Industrial Disputes Act being the Central<br \/>\nAct also followed the Maharashtra Act and taking a leaf from<br \/>\nthe book  of Maharashtra  Legislature, Parliament introduced<br \/>\nthe concept  of unfair labour practices by inserting Chapter<br \/>\nV-C by\tAct No, 46 of 1982 w.e.f. 21st August 1984. Sections<br \/>\n25-T and  25-U of  the Industrial  Disputed  Act  deal\twith<br \/>\n`Prohibition of\t unfair labour\tpractice&#8217; and  `Penalty\t for<br \/>\ncommitting unfair  labour practices&#8217;  respectively. The term<br \/>\n`unfair labour\tpractice&#8217;  was\tdefined\t by  the  Industrial<br \/>\nDisputes Act by inserting Section 2(ra) with effect from the<br \/>\nvery same  date i.e.  21st August 1984 by the very same Act,<br \/>\ni.e. Act  No. 46  of 1982  to mean,  `any of  the  practices<br \/>\nspecified in  the Fifth Schedule&#8217;. The Fifth Schedule of the<br \/>\nIndustrial Dispute  Act, which\tsaw the\t light\tof  the\t day<br \/>\npursuant the  very same\t Amending Act,\tdeals  with  `unfair<br \/>\nlabour practices&#8217;  which are  a mirror\timage and replica of<br \/>\nthe unfair labour practices contemplated and codified by the<br \/>\npresent Maharashtra  Act. But  apart from  these  subsequent<br \/>\nstatutory provisions  which tried  to codify  unfair  labour<br \/>\npractices on the part of the employers, the basic concept of<br \/>\nvictimisation  as   laid  down\t by  this   Court  in\tHind<br \/>\nConstruction&#8217;s case  (supra) holds  the\t field\tand  is\t not<br \/>\nwhittled down  by any  subsequent statutory  enactments. Not<br \/>\nonly it\t is not\t given a  go-by but  it is reiterated by the<br \/>\npresent Act  by enacting Clause (a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV<br \/>\nof the\tAct meaning thereby any discharge or dismissal of an<br \/>\nemployee by  way of  victimisation would  be  unfair  labour<br \/>\npractice.\n<\/p>\n<p>     The term  `victimisation&#8217; is not defined by the present<br \/>\nAct. Sub-section  (18) of  Section 3 of the Act which is the<br \/>\nDefinition Section  lays down  that, `words  and expressions<br \/>\nused in this Act and not defined therein, but defined in the<br \/>\nBombay Act,  shall, in\trelation to an industry to which the<br \/>\nprovisions of  the  Bombay  Act\t apply,\t have  the  meanings<br \/>\nassigned to  them by  the Bombay Act; and in any other case,<br \/>\nshall\thave the  meanings assigned  to them  by the Central<br \/>\nAct&#8217;. Bombay  Act is  the Bombay  Industrial Relations\tAct.<br \/>\n1946 and  the Central  Act is  the Industrial  Disputes Act,<br \/>\n1947 as laid down by Definition Section 3(1) and 3(2) of the<br \/>\nAct. The  term `victimisation&#8217;\tis defined  neither  by\t the<br \/>\nCentral Act  nor by  the Bombay\t Act.  Therefore,  the\tterm<br \/>\n`victimisation&#8217; has  to be given general dictionary meaning.<br \/>\nIn  Concise   Oxford  Dictionary,   7th\t  Edn.,\t  the\tterm<br \/>\n`victimisation&#8217; is defined at Page 1197 as follows :\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>     &#8220;make a  victim; cheat; make suffer<br \/>\n     by dismissal  or other  exceptional<br \/>\n     treatment&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>Thus if\t a person  is made  to suffer  by  some\t exceptional<br \/>\ntreatment  it\twould  amount  to  victimisation.  The\tterm<br \/>\n`victimisation&#8217;\t is  of\t comprehensive\timport.\t It  may  be<br \/>\nvictimisation in  fact or  in law. Factual victimisation may<br \/>\nconsist of  diverse acts  of employers\twho are out to drive<br \/>\nout and\t punish an  employee for  no real  reasons  and\t for<br \/>\nextraneous reasons.  As for  example a\tmilitant trade union<br \/>\nleader who  is a  thorn in the side of the management may be<br \/>\ndischarged or  dismissed for that very reason camouflaged by<br \/>\nanother ostensibly different reason. Such instances among to<br \/>\nunfair labour  practices n account of factual victimisation.<br \/>\nOnce that happens Clause (a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the<br \/>\nAct would  get attracted.  even apart from the very same act<br \/>\nbeing  covered\tby  unfair  labour  practices  envisaged  by<br \/>\nClauses (b),  (c), (d)\tand (e)\t of the\t very same Item 1 of<br \/>\nSchedule IV. But is cannot be said that Clause (a) of Item 1<br \/>\nwhich  deals   with  victimisation   covers   only   factual<br \/>\nvictimisation. There  can be in addition legal victimisation<br \/>\nand it\tis this\t type of victimisation which is contemplated<br \/>\nby the\tdecision of this Court in Hind Construction (supra).<br \/>\nIt must,  therefore, be\t held  that  if\t the  punishment  of<br \/>\ndismissal or  discharge is found shockingly disproportionate<br \/>\nby the\tCourt regard  being  had  to  the  particular  major<br \/>\nmisconduct and\tthe past service record of the delinquent or<br \/>\nis such\t as no reasonable employer could ever impose in like<br \/>\ncircumstances, it  would be unfair labour practice by itself<br \/>\nbeing  an   instance  of   victimisation  in  law  or  legal<br \/>\nvictimisation independent  of factual victimisation, if any.<br \/>\nSuch an unfair labour practice is covered by the present Act<br \/>\nby enactment  of Clause\t (a) of Item 1 of Schedule IV of the<br \/>\nAct as it would be an act of victimisation in law as clearly<br \/>\nruled by  this Court  in the aforesaid decision. On the same<br \/>\nlines is  a latter  decision of\t this Court  in the  case of<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/77506\/\">Bharat Iron Works v. Bhagubhai Balubhai Patel &amp; Ors.<\/a> [(1976)<br \/>\n2 SCR 280] wherein a Bench  of three learned Judges speaking<br \/>\nthrough Goswami.  J. laid  down the  parameters of  the term<br \/>\n`victimisation&#8217;\t as   understood  in   labour  laws  and  as<br \/>\ncontemplated  by   industrial  jurisprudence.  It  has\tbeen<br \/>\nobserved that  ordinarily a  person is\tvictimised if  he is<br \/>\nmade  a\t  victim  or   a  scapegoat   and  is  subjected  to<br \/>\npersecution, prosecution  or punishment for no real fault or<br \/>\nguilt  of  his\town.  If  actual  fault\t or  guilt  meriting<br \/>\npunishment is  established. Such  action will  be rid of the<br \/>\ntaint of victimisation. The aforesaid observations obviously<br \/>\nrefer to  factual victimisation.  But then  follows  further<br \/>\nclucidation of\tthe term  `victimisation&#8217; to  the  following<br \/>\neffect :\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>     &#8220;Victimisation   may   partake   of<br \/>\n     various  types,   as  for\texample,<br \/>\n     pressurising all  employee to leave<br \/>\n     the  union\t  or  union  activities,<br \/>\n     treating\tan    employee\t in    a<br \/>\n     discriminatory manner or inflicting<br \/>\n     a\tgrossly\t  monstrous   punishment<br \/>\n     which  no\t national  person  would<br \/>\n     impose upon  an  employee\tand  the<br \/>\n     like&#8230;.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The aforesaid  observations in\tthis decision  fall in\tline<br \/>\nwith the  observations in the earlier decision of this Court<br \/>\nin Hind\t Construction (supra).\tConsequently it must be held<br \/>\nthat when  looking to the nature of the charge of even major<br \/>\nmisconduct which  is  found  proved  if\t the  punishment  of<br \/>\ndismissed or  discharge as  imposed is\tfound to  be grossly<br \/>\ndisproportionate  in   the  light   of\tthe  nature  of\t the<br \/>\nmisconduct or  the past\t record of  the\t employee  concerned<br \/>\ninvolved in  the misconduct  or is  such which no reasonable<br \/>\nemployer would ever impose in like circumstances, inflicting<br \/>\nof  such   punishment  itself  could  be  treated  as  legal<br \/>\nvictimisation. On  the facts  of the present case there is a<br \/>\nclear finding  reached by  the Labour Court and as confirmed<br \/>\nby the\tIndustrial Court  that the  charges levelled against<br \/>\nthe  respondent-delinquents  which  were  held\tproved\teven<br \/>\nthough reflecting  major misconducts,  were not\t such in the<br \/>\nlight of their past service record as would merit imposition<br \/>\nof punishment  of  dismissal.  This  factual  finding  would<br \/>\nobviously attract  the\tconclusion  that  by  imposing\tsuch<br \/>\npunishment  the\t  appellant-management\thad  victimised\t the<br \/>\nrespondent-delinquent.\tImposition   of\t such\t  shockingly<br \/>\ndisproportionate punishment  by itself, therefore, has to be<br \/>\ntreated as  legal victimisation apart from not being factual<br \/>\nvictimisation as  on the  latter aspect the Labour Court has<br \/>\nheld against  the respondent-workmen  and that\tfinding\t has<br \/>\nalso remained well sustained on record. Thus it must be held<br \/>\nthat the  management  even  though  not\t guilty\t of  factual<br \/>\nvictimisation was guilty of legal victimisation in the light<br \/>\nof the\tproved facts  which squarely  attracted the ratio of<br \/>\nthe decisions  of this\tCourt in   Hind Construction (supra)<br \/>\nand Bharat Iron, Works (supra). It is easy to visualise that<br \/>\nno reasonable  management could\t have punished\ta delinquent<br \/>\nworkman who  in the  late hours\t of the night shift by about<br \/>\n03.30 a.m.  had gone  to sleep\tkeeping\t the  machine  in  a<br \/>\nworking condition  especially in  the absence  of any  gross<br \/>\nmisconduct reflected  by the  past service  record, with the<br \/>\nextreme penalty of dismissal. It is also interesting to note<br \/>\nthat this  was a  peculiar case in which the Plant In-charge<br \/>\nfound during  his surprise  visit at 03.30 a.m. in the early<br \/>\nhours of  the dawn  entire work\t force of  10 mazdoors and 2<br \/>\noperators  like\t the  respondents  and\tthe  supervisor\t all<br \/>\nasleep. It  is pertinent  to note that so far as 10 mazdoors<br \/>\nwere concerned they were let off for this very misconduct by<br \/>\nmere warning  while  the  respondents  were  dismissed\tfrom<br \/>\nservice. It  is of  course, true  that the  respondents were<br \/>\nassigned more  responsible duty as compared to mazdoors, but<br \/>\nin  the\t  background  of   surrounding\t circumstances\t and<br \/>\nespecially in  the light  of their past service record there<br \/>\nis no  escape from  the conclusion  that the  punishment  of<br \/>\ndismissal imposed  on them  for such  misconduct was grossly<br \/>\nand shockingly\tdisproportionate, as  rightly  held  by\t the<br \/>\nLabour Court  and as  confirmed by  the revisional court and<br \/>\nthe High  Court. By  imposing such  grossly disproportionate<br \/>\npunishment on  the respondents\tthe appellant-management had<br \/>\ntried to  kill the fly with a sledge hammer. Consequently it<br \/>\nmust be\t held that the appellant was guilty of unfair labour<br \/>\npractice. Such\tan act was squarely covered by Clause (a) of<br \/>\nItem 1\tof Schedule IV of the Act being legal victimisation,<br \/>\nif not\tfactual victimisation.\tThe ultimate  finding of the<br \/>\nLabour Court  about maintainability  of the complaint can be<br \/>\nsupported on  this ground.  The second\tpoint is answered in<br \/>\nthe affirmative\t against the  appellant and in favour of the<br \/>\nrespondent-workmen.\n<\/p>\n<p>Point No.3<br \/>\n     So far  as this  point is\tconcerned it  has to be held<br \/>\nthat  when   the  punishment  of  dismissal  was  shockingly<br \/>\ndisproportionate to  the charges  held proved  against\tthem<br \/>\nreinstatement with  continuity of service was the least that<br \/>\ncould have  been  ordered  in  their  favour.  There  is  no<br \/>\nquestion of  appellant losing  confidence in  them. In\tthis<br \/>\nconnection learned senior counsel for the appellant tried to<br \/>\nsubmit that  apart from going to sleep in the early hours of<br \/>\nthe morning  when the  night shift was coming to a close the<br \/>\nmachine was  kept working  and that  would  have  created  a<br \/>\nhazard for  the working\t of the\t plant\tand  possibility  of<br \/>\nexplosion was  likely to arise. So far as this contension is<br \/>\nconcerned it  must be  stated that  this was not the case of<br \/>\nthe management\twhile framing  the charge-sheets against the<br \/>\nworkmen. Not  only that,  there is  not a  whisper about the<br \/>\nsaid eventuality  and possibility in the evidence led by the<br \/>\nmanagement before  the Labour  Court. But that apart no such<br \/>\ncontention, even  though mentioned in the written objections<br \/>\nbefore the  Labour Court,  was ever  pressed in\t service for<br \/>\nconsideration before  the  Labour  Court  at  the  stage  of<br \/>\narguments, nor\tany decision  was invited on this aspect. No<br \/>\nsuch contention\t was also  canvassed  by  the  appellant  in<br \/>\nrevision before\t the industrial\t Court or  before  the\tHigh<br \/>\nCourt. This  contention, therefore,  must be  treated  to be<br \/>\nclearly an  afterthought and  appears to  have been  rightly<br \/>\ngiven up in subsequent stages of the trial by the management<br \/>\nitself. All that was alleged by its witness before the Court<br \/>\nwas that  because of  the respondents  going  to  sleep\t and<br \/>\nallowing the  machine to  work without\tpouring raw material<br \/>\ntherein the  production went  down to  some extent. That has<br \/>\nnothing to  do with  the working  of the  unattended machine<br \/>\nbecoming a  hazard or inviting possibility of any explosion.<br \/>\nUnder these circumstances and especially looking to the past<br \/>\nservice record\tof the respondents it could not be said that<br \/>\nthe  management\t  would\t lose  confidence  nature  which  an<br \/>\noperator has to carry out in the plant. It was a manual work<br \/>\nwhich could be an operator has to carry out in the plant. It<br \/>\nwas a  manual work  which  could  be  entrusted\t to  anyone.<br \/>\nConsequently the  submission of\t learned senior\t counsel for<br \/>\nthe appellant,\tthat in\t lieu of  reinstatement compensation<br \/>\nmay be\tawarded to  the respondents, cannot be countenanced.<br \/>\nIt must,  therefore, be held that the Labour Court was quite<br \/>\njustified in  ordering reinstatement  of  respondent-workmen<br \/>\nwith  continuity   of  service.\t  However  because   of\t the<br \/>\nmisconduct committed  by them,\tof sleeping while on duty in<br \/>\nthe night  shift the Labour court has imposed the penalty of<br \/>\ndepriving the workmen, respondent nos. 3 and 4 respectively,<br \/>\nof 60%\tand 50% of the back wages. After the award they have<br \/>\nbeen granted 100% back wages till reinstatement. But, in our<br \/>\nview, as  respondent nos.3 and 4 went to sleep while on duty<br \/>\nand that too not alone but in company of the entire staff of<br \/>\n10 mazdoors,  they deserve  to be  further punished by being<br \/>\ndeprived of  at least some part of back wages even after the<br \/>\naward  of   the\t Labour\t Court\ttill  actual  reinstatement.<br \/>\nInterest  of  justice  would  be  served  in  our  view,  if<br \/>\nrespondent no.3\t is directed to be paid only 40% of the back<br \/>\nwages even  after the  award of the Labour Court till actual<br \/>\nreinstatement  pursuant\t to  our  present  order.  Similarly<br \/>\nrespondent no.4 will be entitled to only 50% back wages even<br \/>\nafter the  date of  the Labour\tCourt&#8217;s\t award\ttill  actual<br \/>\nreinstatement as  per the present order. In addition thereto<br \/>\nthe appellant-management  will be  entitled to\tgive written<br \/>\nwarnings to  both these respondents when they are reinstated<br \/>\nin service  not to  repeat such\t misconducts in\t future. The<br \/>\nimposition of  this type of additional penalty, in our view,<br \/>\nwould be  sufficient in\t the facts  and circumstances of the<br \/>\ncase  and  will\t operate  as  suitable\tcorrective  for\t the<br \/>\nrespondent-employees. They  have suffered  enough since more<br \/>\nthan 14\t years. They  are out  of service  for all  these 14<br \/>\nyears. At  the time  when they\twent to\t sleep in  the night<br \/>\nshift they  were pretty young. Now they have naturally grown<br \/>\nup in  age and with passage of years more maturity must have<br \/>\ndawned on  them., Under\t these circumstances  the cut in the<br \/>\nback wages  as imposed\tby the\tLabour Court  and as further<br \/>\nimposed by  us would be quite sufficient to act as deterrent<br \/>\nfor them  so that  such misconducts  may not be committed by<br \/>\nthem in\t future. The third point is answered as aforesaid by<br \/>\nholding that the order of reinstatement is justified but the<br \/>\norder of  back wages as ordered by the Labour Court requires<br \/>\nto be modified to the aforesaid extent.\n<\/p>\n<p>     In the  result this  appeal is dismissed subject to the<br \/>\nslight modification  that respondent  nos. 3  and 4  will be<br \/>\nentitled to  reinstatement and\tcontinuity of service but so<br \/>\nfar as back wages are concerned, even after the order of the<br \/>\nLabour Court  instead of 100% of back wages, respondent no.3<br \/>\nwill be\t entitled to  40% back\twages till reinstatement and<br \/>\nrespondent no.4\t will be  entitled to  50% back\t wages\ttill<br \/>\nactual reinstatement  pursuant to  the present\torder.\tThey<br \/>\nwill also  be suitably warned in writing by the appellant as<br \/>\naforesaid.  We\t direct\t the   appellant  to  reinstate\t the<br \/>\nrespondents concerned  within four  weeks from\tthe date  of<br \/>\nreceipt of a copy of this order at its end. The office shall<br \/>\nsend a\tcopy of\t this order to the appellant for information<br \/>\nand necessary  action. Pursuant to the interim order of this<br \/>\nCourt pending  this appeal  the appellant  was\tdirected  to<br \/>\ndeposit Rs.  78.000\/- for  being  paid\tto  the\t respondent-<br \/>\nworkmen towards\t their claim of back wages as awarded by the<br \/>\nLabour Court  and as  confirmed by  higher courts. Deducting<br \/>\nthe said  amount the balance of back wages as payable to the<br \/>\nrespondents concerned pursuant to the present order shall be<br \/>\nworked out  and this  amount of\t back wages  with all  other<br \/>\nconsequential monetary\tbenefits flowing  from the  order of<br \/>\nreinstatement shall  be made  available by  the appellant to<br \/>\nthe respondents\t concerned within  a period  of eight  weeks<br \/>\nfrom the  receipt of  a copy of this order at its end. It is<br \/>\nalso made  clear that  because of the grant of continuity of<br \/>\nservice to  the respondents  all other\tfuture benefits like<br \/>\npromotion, retiral  benefits etc,  according  to  rules\t and<br \/>\nregulations  of\t  appellant-management\twill  also  be\tmade<br \/>\navailable to  the respondent-workmen. Orders accordingly. In<br \/>\nthe facts  and circumstances  of the  case there  will be no<br \/>\norder as to costs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India Colour-Chem Limited vs A.L. Alaspurkar &amp; Ors on 5 February, 1998 Author: S Majmudar.J. Bench: S.B. Majmudar, M. Jagannadha Rao, A.P. Misra PETITIONER: COLOUR-CHEM LIMITED Vs. RESPONDENT: A.L. ALASPURKAR &amp; ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05\/02\/1998 BENCH: S.B. MAJMUDAR, M. JAGANNADHA RAO, A.P. MISRA ACT: HEADNOTE: JUDGMENT: J U D G M [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-132569","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Colour-Chem Limited vs A.L. 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