{"id":135444,"date":"2007-03-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-03-08T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/all-bengal-excise-licensees-vs-raghabendra-singh-ors-on-9-march-2007"},"modified":"2018-08-10T15:21:24","modified_gmt":"2018-08-10T09:51:24","slug":"all-bengal-excise-licensees-vs-raghabendra-singh-ors-on-9-march-2007","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/all-bengal-excise-licensees-vs-raghabendra-singh-ors-on-9-march-2007","title":{"rendered":"All Bengal Excise Licensees &#8230; vs Raghabendra Singh &amp; Ors on 9 March, 2007"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">All Bengal Excise Licensees &#8230; vs Raghabendra Singh &amp; Ors on 9 March, 2007<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: . A Lakshmanan<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan, Altamas Kabir<\/div>\n<pre>           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  1246 of 2007\n\nPETITIONER:\nAll Bengal Excise Licensees Association\n\nRESPONDENT:\nRaghabendra Singh &amp; Ors\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 09\/03\/2007\n\nBENCH:\nDr. AR. Lakshmanan &amp; Altamas Kabir\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>J U D G M E N T<br \/>\n(Arising Out of SLP (C) NO. 15224 OF 2006)<\/p>\n<p>Dr. AR. Lakshmanan, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>Leave granted.\n<\/p>\n<p>The above appeal was filed by All Bengal Licensees<br \/>\nAssociation, Kolkata against 1) Raghabendra Singh,<br \/>\nPrincipal Secretary, Excise Department, Govt. of West<br \/>\nBengal 2) Tallen Kumar, Excise Commissioner, Excise<br \/>\nDepartment, 3) Manoj Kumar Panth, District Magistrate<br \/>\nand Collector, 24-Parganas 4) Parvez Siddique, Addl.<br \/>\nDistrict Magistrate, 24-Parganas as contesting<br \/>\nrespondents and 5) Pradyut Kumar Saha, General<br \/>\nSecretary of All Bengal Excise Licensees Association,<br \/>\nKolkata as proforma respondent.\n<\/p>\n<p>The above appeal is directed against the final<br \/>\njudgment and order dated 29.08.2006 of the Calcutta<br \/>\nHigh Court passed in CC No. 62 of 2005 arising out of<br \/>\nWrit Petition No. 2248 of 2004 whereby a learned Single<br \/>\nJudge of the said High Court has dismissed the<br \/>\napplication for contempt filed by the appellant herein.<br \/>\nAccording to the appellant, the contesting respondents<br \/>\nhave deliberately and willfully violated and were in utter<br \/>\ndisregard of the solemn order dated 04.01.2005,<br \/>\n19.01.2005 and 20.01.2005 passed by Hon&#8217;ble Mr.<br \/>\nJustice Pranab Kumar Chattopadhyay in Writ Petition<br \/>\nNo. 2248 of 2004 filed by All Bengal Excise Licensees<br \/>\nAssn. &amp; Anr. Vs. State of West Bengal &amp; Ors.<br \/>\nThe background facts are as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>By an order dated 04.01.2005, a learned Single<br \/>\nJudge passed an interim order to the effect that the<br \/>\nrespondent-authorities will be at liberty to process the<br \/>\napplications in respect of grant of licenses for excise<br \/>\nshops but no final selection in respect of such shops<br \/>\nshall be made without obtaining specific leave of the<br \/>\nCourt.  The High Court made it clear that the<br \/>\nrespondent-authorities will not hold any lottery for the<br \/>\npurpose of final selection of the excise shops in question<br \/>\nwithout obtaining further orders from the High Court.<br \/>\nThe said order dated 04.01.2005 was passed after<br \/>\nhearing and in the presence of the learned advocate for<br \/>\nthe respondents.\n<\/p>\n<p>The said interim order dated 04.01.2005 was<br \/>\nextended by the order dated 19.01.2005 until further<br \/>\norders by the High Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>Thereafter, on 28.01.2005 a learned Single Judge<br \/>\ngave direction for filing the affidavit and the said interim<br \/>\norder was further extended until further orders and the<br \/>\nsaid interim order is still continuing.\n<\/p>\n<p>The said orders dated 04.01.2005, 19.01.2005 and<br \/>\n20.01.2005 were communicated by the appellant&#8217;s<br \/>\nadvocate&#8217;s letter dated 15.03.2005 enclosing therewith<br \/>\nthe Xerox copies of the signed copies of the said dictated<br \/>\norder.  In spite of full knowledge about the said order<br \/>\neach of the respondents, in deliberate and wilful<br \/>\ndisregard of the orders, caused an advertisement to be<br \/>\npublished in the newspapers for holding lottery for final<br \/>\nselection of excise shops to be held on 20.03.2005,<br \/>\n21.03.2005 and 22.03.2005.\n<\/p>\n<p>Pursuant to the said advertisement, a lottery has<br \/>\nbeen held on 20.03.2005 for the purpose of final selection<br \/>\nof the excise shops.  It was submitted by the appellants<br \/>\nthat from the act and conduct of the respondents, it is<br \/>\nevident that each of them have no regard for the orders<br \/>\ndated 04.01.2005, 19.01.2005 and 20.01.2005 passed by<br \/>\nthis Court and are deliberately violating the said orders<br \/>\npassed by the High Court and are thus guilty of contempt<br \/>\nof Court.  With these allegations, the appellants filed CC<br \/>\nNo. 62 of 2005 in the High Court.\n<\/p>\n<p> The appellant is an Association of Excise Licensees<br \/>\nincluding the country spirit shop owners.  Challenging<br \/>\nthe policy decisions for issuance of thousands of excise<br \/>\nlicenses for opening of new foreign liquor off shop and<br \/>\ncountry spirit shops in the State of West Bengal in<br \/>\nviolation of the provisions of the Bengal Excise Act, 1909<br \/>\nand the rules framed thereunder, the appellant, amongst<br \/>\nothers, moved a writ petition being No. 1982 of 2004 in<br \/>\nthe High Court upon notice to the respondents.  A copy of<br \/>\nthe writ petition was also filed and marked as annexures<br \/>\nin this civil appeal.  The High Court (Hon&#8217;ble Mr. Justice<br \/>\nPinaki Chander Ghosh), after hearing the advocates for<br \/>\nthe parties on 24.11.2004 passed an order, inter alia as<br \/>\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;that the respondent authorities will process the<br \/>\nmatter but will not finalise and issue the licence<br \/>\nwithout the leave of the court.\n<\/p>\n<p>The matter will appear on 9th December, 2004.\n<\/p>\n<p>Thereafter, the above-mentioned matter appeared in<br \/>\nthe list on 09.12.2004 before the very same Judge.  The<br \/>\nlearned Judge, after hearing the advocates for the<br \/>\nparties, gave a direction to file affidavit and the matter<br \/>\nwas directed to appear 4 weeks after vacation and also<br \/>\nfurther directed that the interim order already passed in<br \/>\nthe matter will continue.\n<\/p>\n<p>Although there was no direction for making any<br \/>\nfurther advertisement by the respondent-authorities<br \/>\ninviting any application for obtaining excise licenses for<br \/>\nthe new excise shops proposed to be give on or about<br \/>\n20.12.2004, some of the members of the appellant came<br \/>\nto know that an advertisement was published on<br \/>\n30.11.2004 in the Bengali Daily newspaper Janashakti<br \/>\nby the Excise Department, Government of West Bengal,<br \/>\nwhereby applications had been invited for giving new<br \/>\nlicenses for excise including country spirit shops within<br \/>\nthe Districts of Coochbehar, Jalpaiguri, North 24<br \/>\nParganas and Hooghly.  The members also came to know<br \/>\nthat the Excise Authorities have issued a memo No. 23-<br \/>\n5(XX)\/2003-04 3268 (21E) dated 07.12.2004 and rest to<br \/>\nthe District Magistrates and Collectors that there has<br \/>\nbeen a proposal for granting supplementary country<br \/>\nspirit license to the existing tari shop owners.  The<br \/>\nappellants made representations before the Excise<br \/>\nAuthorities and contended that since the matter is sub-<br \/>\njudice, the respondent authorities cannot publish the<br \/>\nsaid advertisement on 30.11.2005 and cannot issue the<br \/>\nsaid memo.  However, the Excise Authorities have further<br \/>\ndecided to hold lottery on 05.01.2005 for allotment of<br \/>\nexcise shops including the country spirit and foreign<br \/>\nliquor shops.  Immediately after coming to know about<br \/>\nthe above-mentioned fact, the North 24 Parganas Excise<br \/>\nLicenses Assn. have moved a writ petition on 30.12.2004<br \/>\nbefore the vacation Judge of the High Court.  In the said<br \/>\nwrit petition, the appellant No.1 herein was made a party<br \/>\nrespondent.  The vacation Judge did not pass any interim<br \/>\norder on the said writ petition against the said order<br \/>\ndated 30.12.2004.  The North 24 Parganas Excise<br \/>\nLicencees Assn. preferred an appeal on 30.12.2004 and<br \/>\nthe Division Bench of the High Court passed an interim<br \/>\norder on 30.12.2004 to the effect that the processing in<br \/>\nrespect of grant of issuance of country spirit license will<br \/>\ncontinue but finalization and selection will not be made<br \/>\ntill 3 weeks after the vacation.  However, they made it<br \/>\nclear that finalisation include holding of lottery.  The said<br \/>\norder was restricted to only in the case of District North<br \/>\n24 Parganas.  It was submitted that the subject-matter of<br \/>\nwrit petition No. 2248 of 2004 is that during the<br \/>\npendency of earlier writ petition, the respondent-<br \/>\nauthorities cannot issue any advertisement for inviting<br \/>\napplications for obtaining new excise license including<br \/>\nthe country spirit shops and foreign liquor shops and<br \/>\ncannot hold any lottery and further they cannot give the<br \/>\neffect to the proposal for giving supplementary excise<br \/>\nlicensees to the tari shops.  It was submitted that in<br \/>\norder to frustrate the order dated 24.11.2004, the<br \/>\nrespondent authorities have made an advertisement<br \/>\ndated 30.11.2004 and thereby invited applications from<br \/>\nintending candidates from obtaining new licenses in<br \/>\nrespect of 4 Districts and further making attempt to hold<br \/>\nlottery in respect of applications already received.  In<br \/>\nspite of repeated requests, the respondents have pre-<br \/>\ndetermined to hold the lottery on 05.01.2005 which<br \/>\namounts to finalization of the applications for granting of<br \/>\nlicenses and they are also trying to issue supplementary<br \/>\nlicenses to the existing shop owners.\n<\/p>\n<p>On 04.01.2005, the Court passed the following<br \/>\norder:-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Let this matter be listed before the regular bench one<br \/>\nweek after the Christmas vacation.\n<\/p>\n<p>In the meantime, let there be an interim order only to<br \/>\nthe effect that the respondent authorities herein will be<br \/>\nat liberty to process the applications in respect of<br \/>\ngrant of licence for excise shops but no final selection<br \/>\nin respect of such shops shall be made without<br \/>\nobtaining specific leave of this court.\n<\/p>\n<p>I also make it clear that the respondent authorities will<br \/>\nalso not hold any lottery for the purpose of final<br \/>\nselection of the aforesaid excise shops in question<br \/>\nwithout obtaining further orders from this court.<br \/>\nAll parties are to act on a Xerox signed copy of this<br \/>\ndictated order on the usual undertaking.&#8221;<br \/>\nAgain, the interim order was directed to continue<br \/>\nuntil further orders on 28.01.2005.  As already stated,<br \/>\nthe counsel for the appellant communicated the said<br \/>\norders and served upon the respondents the Xerox copies<br \/>\nof the signed copies of the order dated 04.01.2005,<br \/>\n19.01.2005 and 20.01.2005.  Although the said interim<br \/>\norder dated 04.01.2005 which has been extended from<br \/>\ntime to time and is still continuing the respondents in<br \/>\nutter disregard caused publication of the advertisement<br \/>\nof the newspapers for holding lottery for the purpose of<br \/>\nfinal selection of excise shops in question.  It is also<br \/>\npertinent to mention here that both the Division Bench of<br \/>\nthe High Court order dated 15.03.2005 in APOT No.<br \/>\n770\/2004 vacated the interim order passed in the appeal<br \/>\npreferred by the North 24 Parganas Excise Licensees<br \/>\nAssn. but the interim order passed in the writ petition<br \/>\nbeing No. 2248 of 2004 is relating to any proposed new<br \/>\nexcise licenses through out the State of West Bengal is<br \/>\nstill continuing.  However, in pursuance to the<br \/>\nadvertisement, the respondent authorities on 20th March<br \/>\nheld lottery for final selection of the aforesaid excise<br \/>\nshops and shall hold further lottery on 22nd and 23rd<br \/>\nMarch, 2005.  It was, therefore, submitted that each of<br \/>\nthe respondents deliberately and willfully and in utter<br \/>\ndisregard to the orders dated 04.01.2005 held lottery for<br \/>\nfinal selection of excise shops.  It is further submitted<br \/>\nthat the respondents are guilty of deliberate and willful<br \/>\nviolation of the 3 orders passed by this Court and<br \/>\ncommitted contumacious act and in spite of full<br \/>\nknowledge about the orders.  It was further submitted<br \/>\nthat the respondents have scant respect for the orders<br \/>\npassed on all the 3 days in January, 2005 and are<br \/>\ndeliberately ignoring the said orders and are thus guilty<br \/>\nof contempt of court.  According to the appellant, by the<br \/>\nabove-mentioned act and conduct of the<br \/>\ncontemnors\/respondents the majesty and dignity of the<br \/>\nHigh Court have been lowered down and, therefore, the<br \/>\nrespondents should be suitably dealt with and punished.<br \/>\nIt was also further submitted that having regard to the<br \/>\nfacts and circumstances of the case, the respondents<br \/>\nshould be restrained from holding any further lottery<br \/>\nand\/or from giving any effect and\/or further effect of the<br \/>\nlottery already held and\/or from taking any further steps<br \/>\nfor issuance of any excise license to any person so that<br \/>\nthe majesty and dignity of the High Court is not lowered<br \/>\ndown.  In the circumstances, they requested the High<br \/>\nCourt to issue rule nisi calling upon the respondents and<br \/>\neach of them to show cause as to why the respondents<br \/>\nand each of them should not be committed to prison or<br \/>\notherwise be suitably dealt with and\/or punished for<br \/>\ndeliberate and willful violation and utter disregard of the<br \/>\nsolemn orders dated 04\/19 and 20.01.2005 passed in<br \/>\nwrit petition No. 2248 of 2004.\n<\/p>\n<p>In the contempt petition, rule was issued on<br \/>\n23.03.2005.  The respondents filed an application<br \/>\npraying for discharge of the rule issued in the contempt<br \/>\nproceedings on 02.05.2005 North 24 Parganas Excise<br \/>\nLicensees Assn. filed SLP (C) No. 10820 of 2005 against<br \/>\nthe order dated 15.03.2005 passed by the Division Bench<br \/>\nof the High Court.  The State of West Bengal filed an<br \/>\napplication for vacating the interim order dated<br \/>\n04.01.2005 passed in writ petition No. 2248 of 2004.  On<br \/>\n26.07.2005, a learned Single Judge allowed the<br \/>\napplication and vacated the interim order but, however,<br \/>\ndirected the Government that they would be free to take<br \/>\nsteps in issuing license in terms of the policy but it will<br \/>\nbe mentioned in the license that it is subject to the result<br \/>\nof the writ petition and further directed that all steps<br \/>\ntaken for issuing excise license would abide by the result<br \/>\nof the writ petition.\n<\/p>\n<p>Being aggrieved by the order of the learned Single<br \/>\nJudge dated 26.07.2005, the appellant preferred an<br \/>\nappeal being APOT No. 494 of 2005 on 10.08.2005.  A<br \/>\nDivision Bench of the High Court dismissed the said<br \/>\nappeal and confirmed the order of the single judge dated<br \/>\n26.07.2005.  The Appellant&#8217;s Assn. preferred SLP No.<br \/>\n17371 of 2005 against the said judgment.  This Court on<br \/>\n29.08.2005 issued notice with an interim direction to the<br \/>\neffect that no license be issued in terms of the circular<br \/>\ndated 20.01.2004 and the matter was directed to be<br \/>\nlisted along with SLP No. 10820 of 2005.  Both the SLPs<br \/>\nwere dismissed by this Court on 07.11.2005.<br \/>\nIn the contempt application filed by the appellants,<br \/>\nthe learned Advocate General appearing for the<br \/>\ncontemnors submitted that there is a violation of the<br \/>\norder passed earlier on 04.01.2005 but the said violation<br \/>\nis not willful as the contemnor wrongly understood the<br \/>\nimplications of the orders passed by the High Court on<br \/>\n04.01.2005 and extended subsequently on 19th and 20th<br \/>\nJanuary, 2005 and also by the Division Bench on<br \/>\n15.03.2005, 18.03.2005 in two other different<br \/>\nproceedings.  It was further submitted that in order to<br \/>\nhold a person guilty of contempt of court two things have<br \/>\nto be proved. Firstly, disobedience of the order passed by<br \/>\nthe court and secondly such disobedience must be<br \/>\nwillful.  The Advocate-General submitted that in the<br \/>\ninstant case there is no willful violation and, therefore,<br \/>\nthe contempt application should be dismissed.  Some<br \/>\nrulings were relied on by the learned Advocate General in<br \/>\nsupport of his aforesaid contention.\n<\/p>\n<p>A learned Single Judge of the High Court was of the<br \/>\nopinion that the contemnors did not understand the<br \/>\nimplications and consequences of a prohibitory order<br \/>\npassed in an independent proceedings and by sheer mis-<br \/>\nconception thought that there is no bar to issue excise<br \/>\nlicense in view of the orders dated 15.03.2005 and<br \/>\n18.05.2005 and that failure to understand the<br \/>\nimplications and\/or consequences of the order passed by<br \/>\nthe High Court cannot be construed as an act of<br \/>\ncontempt.\n<\/p>\n<p>In the light of the decisions cited, the High Court<br \/>\nexamined whether the alleged contemnors have<br \/>\ncommitted any contempt of the High Court.  While<br \/>\nexamining so, the High Court has observed as follows:-<br \/>\n&#8220;Undisputedly this Bench on 4th January, 2005 passed<br \/>\nan interim order restraining the alleged contemnors<br \/>\nfrom holding any lottery for the purpose of final<br \/>\nselection of the excise shops in question without<br \/>\nobtaining further order from this court but the alleged<br \/>\ncontemnors published an advertisement in the daily<br \/>\nnewspaper for holding lottery for the purpose of final<br \/>\nselection of excise shops in question. Therefore, there<br \/>\nis no doubt that the alleged contemnors have<br \/>\ndisobeyed the specific direction passed earlier by this<br \/>\nBench.\n<\/p>\n<p>The Division Bench of this Hon&#8217;ble court in two<br \/>\ndifferent proceedings passed two separate orders on<br \/>\n15th March, 2005 and 18th March, 2005 respectively<br \/>\nwhereby and whereunder the alleged contemnors<br \/>\nherein were permitted to grant excise licenses. The<br \/>\nalleged contemnors herein reasonably understood that<br \/>\nthe orders passed by the Division Bench will have<br \/>\noverriding effect on the order passed by the learned<br \/>\nSingle Judge of this Hon&#8217;ble court and thus committed<br \/>\nmistake by not realising the implication of the order<br \/>\npassed by this Bench which remained operative at the<br \/>\nrelevant time.\n<\/p>\n<p>If there is any doubt regarding interpretation and\/or<br \/>\nunderstanding of the orders passed by the courts of<br \/>\nlaw, the alleged contemnors are entitled to have the<br \/>\nbenefit or advantage of such a doubt, as the act of<br \/>\ncontempt must be established beyond all reasonable<br \/>\ndoubt.\n<\/p>\n<p>In the aforesaid circumstances, it cannot be said that<br \/>\nthe alleged contemnors herein willfully and<br \/>\ndeliberately violated the solemn order passed by this<br \/>\nBench on 4th January, 2005. Mere disobedience of an<br \/>\norder is not sufficient to hold any one guilty under the<br \/>\nContempt of Courts Act unless such obedience is<br \/>\ndeliberate and willful.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>The High Court also observed as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Although the alleged contemnors in their respective<br \/>\naffidavits have tendered unqualified apology after<br \/>\ncategorically stating therein that they had no intention<br \/>\nto willfully or deliberately violate the order passed<br \/>\nearlier by this Bench but in view of the observations<br \/>\nmade hereinbefore, I am not inclined to go into the<br \/>\nquestion of apology.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>For the aforementioned reasons, the contempt<br \/>\npetition was dismissed by the High Court. Aggrieved by<br \/>\nthe dismissal of the contempt petition, the appellant<br \/>\npreferred the above appeal arising out of SLP No. 15224<br \/>\nof 2006.  This Court on 18.09.2006 issued notice and in<br \/>\nthe meanwhile directed that no license shall be granted<br \/>\non the basis of the lottery and pursuant to the circular<br \/>\ndated 20.01.2004.\n<\/p>\n<p>We heard Mr. K.K.Venugopal, Mr. L.N. Rao, Mr.<br \/>\nPradip Ghosh, Mr. Joydip Gupta, learned senior counsel<br \/>\nfor the appellant and Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned<br \/>\nAddl. Solicitor General and Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta,<br \/>\nlearned senior counsel for R1-R4 and Mr. Aman Vachher<br \/>\nfor R5 and Mr. P.N. Misra and Mr. M.N. Krishnamani,<br \/>\nlearned senior counsel in I.A. 3 and I.A.4.<br \/>\nWe dismissed all applications for<br \/>\nimpleadments\/intervention on 21.02.2007 and heard the<br \/>\narguments of the appellants on merits.  Elaborate and<br \/>\nlengthy submissions were made by the respective parties<br \/>\nwith reference to the entire pleadings and various orders<br \/>\npassed by the High Court and of this Court and also<br \/>\nother annexures and case laws.  Learned senior counsel<br \/>\nappeared for the appellant submitted that in view of the<br \/>\nfinding of the learned Judge &#8220;that there is no doubt that<br \/>\nalleged contemnor have disobeyed the specific direction<br \/>\npassed earlier by this Bench&#8221;, the learned Judge of the<br \/>\nHigh Court was not justified in holding that the alleged<br \/>\ncontemnor committed mistake by not realising the<br \/>\nimplication of the order passed by the High Court which<br \/>\nremain operative at the relevant time and on that basis<br \/>\ndismissing the application for contempt without making<br \/>\nany order for restoration of the status quo ante to undo<br \/>\nthe mischief caused by such violation of the interim<br \/>\norder.  According to the learned senior counsel for the<br \/>\nappellant, the impugned order is not sustainable in law<br \/>\nand should not be allowed to operate as a precedent and<br \/>\nthe wrong perpetrated by the respondent\/contemnors in<br \/>\ncontumacious disregard of the orders of the High Court<br \/>\nshould not be permitted to hold.  Likewise, the High<br \/>\nCourt also committed a grievous error of law in holding<br \/>\nthat the alleged contemnors did not understand the<br \/>\nimplication and consequences of a prohibitory order<br \/>\npassed in an independent proceedings and by sheer mis-<br \/>\nconception thought that there is no bar to issue excise<br \/>\nlicenses in view of the order dated 15.03.2005 and<br \/>\n18.03.2005 by two different Division Benches of the High<br \/>\nCourt.  In support of their contention, they cited the<br \/>\nfollowing rulings:\n<\/p>\n<p>1. Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. Vs. State of<br \/>\nBihar &amp; Ors., (1999) 7 SCC 569\n<\/p>\n<p>2) Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. Vs. Hind<br \/>\nRubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. &amp; Ors., (1997) 3 SCC<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">443<\/span>\n<\/p>\n<p>3) Eastern Trust Company vs. MaKenzie Mann &amp;<br \/>\nCo., Ltd., AIR 1915 Privy Council 106\n<\/p>\n<p>4) Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. Vs. Hirak Ghosh &amp;<br \/>\nOrs., (2002) 4 SCC 21\n<\/p>\n<p>5) All India Regional Rural Bank Officers<br \/>\nFederation &amp; Ors. Vs. Govt. of India and Ors.<br \/>\n(2002) 3 SCC 554\n<\/p>\n<p>6) <a href=\"\/doc\/554446\/\">Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India &amp; Ors.<\/a> 1994<br \/>\nSupp (2) SCC 641\n<\/p>\n<p>7) Surjit Singh and Ors. Vs. Harbans Singh and<br \/>\nOrs. (1995) 6 SCC 50\n<\/p>\n<p>8) T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. Vs. State of<br \/>\nKarnataka &amp; Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 1\n<\/p>\n<p>9) Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic<br \/>\nAssn. &amp; Anr. AIR 1991 Madras 323\n<\/p>\n<p>10) Century Flour Mills Ltd. vs. S. Suppiah and<br \/>\nOrs. AIR 1975 Madras 270<br \/>\nMr. Gopal Subramanium and Mr. Bhaskar P. Gupta<br \/>\nappearing for the contesting respondent Nos. 1-4<br \/>\nreiterated the same contentions which have been urged<br \/>\nbefore the High Court and since the learned single Judge<br \/>\nclearly found that there was no willful and deliberate<br \/>\nviolation of the order of the learned Single Judge<br \/>\npursuing the same in the further appeal does not arise<br \/>\nand inasmuch as it was held that there was no deliberate<br \/>\nand willful violation as such, this Court may not issue<br \/>\ndirection of setting aside the lottery already held.  It was<br \/>\nalso denied that lottery was held in breach of the interim<br \/>\norders passed as alleged or at all.  On the contrary, the<br \/>\nlearned single Judge held that there was no willful and<br \/>\ndeliberate violation of the order.  It was further submitted<br \/>\nthat the entire judgment of the single Judge is required<br \/>\nto be read and not in bits and pieces and that it would<br \/>\nappear from the judgment that the single Judge has<br \/>\nunequivocally held that there was no deliberate and<br \/>\nwillful violation of the order and thus has rightly<br \/>\ndismissed the contempt application.\n<\/p>\n<p>We have carefully considered the rival submissions<br \/>\nmade by learned senior counsel appearing for the<br \/>\nrespective parties.  It is not in dispute that an injunction<br \/>\norder was passed on 04.01.2005 and on subsequent<br \/>\nextension is still subsisting.  Respondent Nos.1-4<br \/>\nadmittedly are highly qualified and highly placed<br \/>\ngovernment officials.  Admittedly, by advocate&#8217;s letter<br \/>\ndated 15.03.2005, it was pointed out to them that the<br \/>\ninjunction order dated 04.01.2005 and its subsequent<br \/>\nextensions are still subsisting.  They have also<br \/>\nacknowledged the receipt of the communication dated<br \/>\n15.03.2005.  Under such circumstances, the High Court<br \/>\nis not justified in holding that the highly qualified and<br \/>\nwell placed government officials did not understand the<br \/>\nimplication and\/or consequence of prohibitory order in<br \/>\nan independent proceedings and by sheer mis-conception<br \/>\nthough that there is no bar to issue excise licenses as<br \/>\nwas held by the learned Judge in the impugned order.<br \/>\nThis Court can only say it is rather unfortunate that<br \/>\nsuch officers who are not capable of or not able to<br \/>\nunderstand the implication of the prohibitory orders<br \/>\npassed by the High Court should be allowed to hold such<br \/>\nhigh offices.  During the course of the hearing of the<br \/>\ncontempt application, the matter was adjourned by the<br \/>\nHigh Court to enable the respondent to consider whether<br \/>\nthe contemnors was prepared to cancel the lottery held<br \/>\non 20, 21 and 22.03.2005 in violation of the Court&#8217;s<br \/>\norders and on such adjourned date, the contemnors did<br \/>\nnot agree to cancel the lottery.  Under such<br \/>\ncircumstances, the plea of mistake of understanding the<br \/>\norder cannot at all be accepted.  Likewise, the High Court<br \/>\nalso was not justified in not directing the contemnors to<br \/>\ncancel the lottery held on 20, 21 and 22.03.2005 in<br \/>\nviolation of the solemn orders passed by the very same<br \/>\nJudge and in view of the clear finding of the Court that<br \/>\nthey had acted in clear violation of the said interim order<br \/>\nmade by the High Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>Even assuming that there was any scope for bona<br \/>\nfide misunderstanding on the part of the respondents,<br \/>\nonce it was found that the respondent had disobeyed the<br \/>\nspecific order passed earlier by the Court, the High Court<br \/>\nshould have directed the contemnors to undo the wrong<br \/>\ncommitted by them which was done in clear breach of the<br \/>\norder of the Court by restoring the status quo ante by<br \/>\ncanceling the lottery wrongfully held by them.  The<br \/>\nlearned Judge found that the respondent-contemnors<br \/>\nhad held the lottery in violation of the Court&#8217;s order and<br \/>\nthe results of the said lottery should not be permitted to<br \/>\ntake effect and should be treated as unlawful and invalid<br \/>\nfor the purpose of grant of license.  The learned Single<br \/>\nJudge for the purpose of upholding the majesty of law<br \/>\nand the sanctity of the solemn order of the court of law<br \/>\nwhich cannot be violated by the executive authority<br \/>\neither deliberately or unwittingly  should have set aside<br \/>\nthe lottery held and should not have allowed the<br \/>\nrespondents to gain a wrongful advantage thereby.<br \/>\nIn our opinion, a party to the litigation cannot be<br \/>\nallowed to take an unfair advantage by committing<br \/>\nbreach of an interim order and escape the consequences<br \/>\nthereof.  By pleading misunderstanding and thereafter<br \/>\nretaining the said advantage gained in breach of the<br \/>\norder of the Court and the wrong perpetrated by the<br \/>\nrespondent-contemnors in contumacious disregard of the<br \/>\norder of the High Court should not be permitted to hold<br \/>\ngood.  In our opinion, the impugned order passed by the<br \/>\nHigh court is not sustainable in law and should not be<br \/>\nallowed to operate as a precedent and the wrong<br \/>\nperpetrated by the respondent-contemnors in utter<br \/>\ndisregard of the order of the High Court should not be<br \/>\npermitted to hold good.  The High Court has committed a<br \/>\ngrievous error of law in holding that failure to understand<br \/>\nthe implication and consequences of the order passed by<br \/>\nthe High Court by highly placed government officers<br \/>\ncannot be construed as an act of contempt.  The High<br \/>\nCourt has failed to understand that the highly educated<br \/>\nand highly placed government officials have competent<br \/>\nlegal advisors and it was not open to them to allege and<br \/>\ncontend that the respondent-contemnors did not<br \/>\nunderstand the implication of the order dated<br \/>\n04.01.2005.  In our opinion, such officers are required to<br \/>\nbe dealt with effectively to uphold the dignity of the High<br \/>\nCourt and the efficiency of the system itself.  The High<br \/>\nCourt committed a grave error of law by not taking into<br \/>\nconsideration the most important fact that in the course<br \/>\nof the hearing of the contempt application the matter was<br \/>\nadjourned in order to enable the contemnor to consider<br \/>\nwhether they were prepared to cancel the lottery held on<br \/>\n20, 21 and 22.03.2005 and on the adjourned date, the<br \/>\nrespondents did not agree to cancel the lottery.  In such<br \/>\nview of the matter, the significant stand being the plea of<br \/>\nmistake of understanding cannot, in our opinion, prevail.<br \/>\nThe High Court in that view of the matter committed a<br \/>\ngrave mis-carriage of justice by not taking into<br \/>\nconsideration another most important fact that if actually<br \/>\nthe lottery was held by mistake or by misunderstanding<br \/>\nof the orders, then the respondent would have<br \/>\nimmediately rectified it and would have cancelled the<br \/>\nlottery but in the instant case, instead of canceling the<br \/>\nlottery, the respondents have justified their conduct from<br \/>\nwhich the determined declination of obeying the order is<br \/>\nclearly proved.  In other words, if there was a doubt<br \/>\nabout the implication of the order of the Court, the<br \/>\nrespondents should have approached the Court and<br \/>\nshould have clarified their alleged confusion.  But in the<br \/>\ninstant case, the respondents have not only violated the<br \/>\norder but when the contempt application was moved and<br \/>\nopportunity was given by the Court to cancel the lottery<br \/>\nthey refused to cancel the said lottery from which it is<br \/>\nproved that they deliberately held the lottery in clear<br \/>\nviolation of the order dated 04.01.2005 having regard to<br \/>\nthe admissions made on behalf of the contemnors that<br \/>\nthere is violation of the order dated 04.01.2005 and also<br \/>\nhaving regard to the learned Single Judge&#8217;s own finding<br \/>\nthat &#8220;there is no doubt that the alleged contemnor<br \/>\ndisobeyed the specific directions passed earlier by this<br \/>\nBench&#8221;.  The High Court should have directed the<br \/>\ncontemnor to cancel the lottery held on these 3 dates.<br \/>\nThe High Court also failed to consider the effect of the<br \/>\nappellant&#8217;s learned advocate&#8217;s letter dated 15.03.2005<br \/>\nwhereby it was clearly pointed out about the subsistence<br \/>\nof the order dated 04.01.2005 and its subsequent<br \/>\nextension.  By the said letter, the appellant&#8217;s advocate<br \/>\ncategorically pointed out further that in spite of the above<br \/>\nif the lottery is held or further action is taken for issue of<br \/>\nexcise license, the appellant shall be compelled to take<br \/>\nlegal action.\n<\/p>\n<p>In our opinion, the judgment and order passed by<br \/>\nthe High court are bad in law and is liable to be set aside.<br \/>\n\tLAW ON THE SUBJECT:\n<\/p>\n<p>1. Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. Vs. State of Bihar &amp;<br \/>\nOrs., (1999) 7 SCC 569<br \/>\n&#8220;For holding the respondents to have committed<br \/>\ncontempt, civil contempt at that, it has to be shown<br \/>\nthat there has been willful disobedience of the<br \/>\njudgment or order of the court.  Power to punish for<br \/>\ncontempt is to be resorted to when there is clear<br \/>\nviolation of the court&#8217;s order.  Since notice of contempt<br \/>\nand punishment for contempt is of far-reaching<br \/>\nconsequence, these powers should be invoked only<br \/>\nwhen a clear case of willful disobedience of the court&#8217;s<br \/>\norder has been made out.  Whether disobedience is<br \/>\nwillful in a particular case depends on the facts and<br \/>\ncircumstances of that case.  Judicial orders are to be<br \/>\nproperly understood and complied with.  Even<br \/>\nnegligence and carelessness can amount to<br \/>\ndisobedience particularly when the attention of the<br \/>\nperson is drawn to the court&#8217;s orders and its<br \/>\nimplications.  Disobedience of the court&#8217;s order strikes<br \/>\nat the very root of the rule of law on which Indian<br \/>\nsystem of governance is based.  Power to punish for<br \/>\ncontempt is for the maintenance of effective legal<br \/>\nsystem.  It is exercised to prevent perversion of the<br \/>\ncourse of justice.  Jurisdiction to punish for contempt<br \/>\nexists to provide ultimate sanction against the person<br \/>\nwho refuses to comply with court&#8217;s order or disregards<br \/>\nthe order continuously. No person can defy court&#8217;s<br \/>\norder.  Wilful would exclude casual, accidental, bona<br \/>\nfide or unintentional acts or genuine inability to<br \/>\ncomply with the terms of the order.  A petitioner who<br \/>\ncomplains breach of the court&#8217;s order must allege<br \/>\ndeliberate or contumacious disobedience of the court&#8217;s<br \/>\norder.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>2) Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and Anr. Vs. Hind<br \/>\nRubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. &amp; Ors., (1997) 3 SCC 443<br \/>\n&#8220;16. According to this section, if an objection is raised<br \/>\nto the jurisdiction of the court at the hearing of an<br \/>\napplication for grant of, or for vacating, interim relief,<br \/>\nthe court should determine that issue in the first<br \/>\ninstance as a preliminary issue before granting or<br \/>\nsetting aside the relief already granted. An application<br \/>\nraising objection to the jurisdiction to the court is<br \/>\ndirected to be heard with all expedition. Sub-rule (2),<br \/>\nhowever, says that the command in Sub-rule (1) does<br \/>\nnot preclude the court from granting such interim<br \/>\nrelief as it may consider necessary pending the<br \/>\ndecision on the question of jurisdiction. In our opinion,<br \/>\nthe provision merely states the obvious. It makes<br \/>\nexplicit what is implicit in law. Just because an<br \/>\nobjection to the jurisdiction is raised, the court does<br \/>\nnot become helpless forthwith &#8211; nor does it become<br \/>\nincompetent to grant the interim relief. It can. At the<br \/>\nsame time, it should also decide the objection to<br \/>\njurisdiction at the earlier possible moment. This is the<br \/>\ngeneral principle and this is what Section 9-A<br \/>\nreiterates. Take this very case. The plaintiff asked for<br \/>\ntemporary injunction. An ad-interim injunction was<br \/>\ngranted. Then the defendant came forward objecting to<br \/>\nthe grant of injunction and also raising an objection to<br \/>\nthe jurisdiction of the court. The court over-ruled the<br \/>\nobjection as to jurisdiction and made the interim<br \/>\ninjunction absolute. The defendants filed an appeal<br \/>\nagainst the decision on the question of jurisdiction.<br \/>\nWhile that appeal was pending, several other interim<br \/>\norder were passed both by the Civil Court as well as by<br \/>\nthe High Court. Ultimately, no doubt, High Court has<br \/>\nfound that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to<br \/>\nentertain the suit but all this took about six years.<br \/>\nCan it be said that orders passed by the Civil Court<br \/>\nand the High Court during this period of six years were<br \/>\nall non-est and that it is open to the defendants to<br \/>\nflout them merrily, without fear of any consequence.<br \/>\nAdmittedly, this could not be done until the High<br \/>\nCourt&#8217;s decision on the question of jurisdiction. The<br \/>\nquestion is whether the said decision of the High Court<br \/>\nmeans that no person can be punished for flouting or<br \/>\ndisobeying the interim\/interlocutory orders while they<br \/>\nwere in force, i.e., for violations and disobedience<br \/>\ncommitted prior to the decision of the High Court on<br \/>\nthe question of jurisdiction Holding that by virtue of<br \/>\nthe said decision of the High Court (on the question of<br \/>\njurisdiction, no one can be punished thereafter for<br \/>\ndisobedience or violation of the interim orders<br \/>\ncommitted prior to the said decision of the High Court,<br \/>\nwould indeed be subversive of rule of law and would<br \/>\nseriously erode the dignity and the authority of the<br \/>\ncourts. We must repeat that this is not even a case<br \/>\nwhere a suit was filed in wrong court knowingly or<br \/>\nonly with a view to snatch an interim order. As pointed<br \/>\nout hereinabove, the suit was filed in the Civil Court<br \/>\nbonafide. We are of the opinion that in such a case the<br \/>\ndefendants cannot escape the consequences of their<br \/>\ndisobedience and violation of the interim injunction<br \/>\ncommitted by them prior to the High Court&#8217;s decision<br \/>\non the question of jurisdiction.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>3) Eastern Trust Company vs. MaKenzie Mann &amp; Co.,<br \/>\nLtd., AIR 1915 Privy Council 106<br \/>\n&#8220;There is a well-established practice in England in<br \/>\ncertain cases where no petition of right will lie, under<br \/>\nwhich the Crown can be sued by the Attorney -General,<br \/>\nand a declaratory order obtained, as has been recently<br \/>\nexplained by the Court of Appeal in England in Dyson v.<br \/>\nAttorney-General, 1911 (1) KB 410 and in Burghes v.<br \/>\nAttorney-General 1912 (1) Ch. 173 . It is the duty of the<br \/>\nCrown and of every branch of the Executive to abide by<br \/>\nand obey the law. If there is any difficulty in<br \/>\nascertaining it, the courts are open to the Crown to sue,<br \/>\nand it is the duty of the Executive in cases of doubt to<br \/>\nascertain the law, in order to obey it, not to dis-regard<br \/>\nit. The proper course in the present case would have<br \/>\nbeen either to apply to the Court to determine the<br \/>\nquestion of construction of the contract, and to pay<br \/>\naccordingly, or to pay the whole amount over to the<br \/>\nReceiver and to obtain from the Court an order on the<br \/>\nReceiver to pay the sums properly payable for labour<br \/>\nand supplies, as to the construction of which their<br \/>\nLordships agree with Supreme Court of Nova Scotia.\n<\/p>\n<p>The duty of the Crown in such a case is well<br \/>\nstated by Lord Abhinger Chief Barren in Deare v.<br \/>\nAttorney General 1835 (1) y. &amp; C.197.  After pointing out<br \/>\nthat the Crown always appears (in England) by the<br \/>\nAttorney- General in a Court of Justice-especially in a<br \/>\nCourt of Equity- where the interest of the Crown is<br \/>\nconcerned, even perhaps in a bill for discovery, he goes<br \/>\non to say:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;It has been the practice, which I hope never will be<br \/>\ndiscontinued, for the officers of the Crown to throw no<br \/>\ndifficulty in the way of any proceeding for the purpose of<br \/>\nbringing matters before a court of Justice where any<br \/>\nreal point of difficulty that requires judicial decision has<br \/>\noccurred.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>4) Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. Vs. Hirak Ghosh &amp; Ors.,<br \/>\n(2002) 4 SCC 21<br \/>\n&#8220;20. Similar is the situation in the counter-affidavit filed<br \/>\npresently in this matter as well : Is this fair ? The<br \/>\nanswer having regard to the factual backdrop cannot<br \/>\nbut be in the negative. It is neither fair nor reasonable<br \/>\non the part of a senior Civil Service Personnel to feign<br \/>\nignorance or plead understanding when the direction of<br \/>\nthis Court stands crystal clear in the judgment.<br \/>\nGovernment employees ought to be treated on a par<br \/>\nwith another set of employees and this Court on an<br \/>\nearlier occasion lent concurrence to the view of the<br \/>\nlearned Single Judge that the Circulars issued by the<br \/>\nState Government cannot but be ascribed to be<br \/>\narbitrary : Government is not a machinery for<br \/>\noppression and ours being a welfare State as a matter of<br \/>\nfact be opposed thereto. It is the people&#8217;s welfare that<br \/>\nthe State is primarily concerned with and avoidance of<br \/>\ncompliance with a specific order of the Court cannot be<br \/>\ntermed to be a proper working of a State body in terms<br \/>\nof the wishes and aspirations of the founding fathers of<br \/>\nour Constitution. Classless, non- discriminate and<br \/>\negalitarian society are not meaningless jargons so that<br \/>\nthey only remain as the basic factors of our socialistic<br \/>\nstate on principles only and not to have any application<br \/>\nin the realities of every-day life : one section of the<br \/>\nemployees would stand benefited but a similarly placed<br \/>\nemployee would not be so favoured why this attitude ?<br \/>\nObviously there is no answer. Surprisingly, this attitude<br \/>\npersists even after six rounds of litigation travelling from<br \/>\nCalcutta to Delhi more than once the answer as appears<br \/>\nin the counter-affidavit is an expression of sorrow by<br \/>\nreason of the understanding cannot be countenanced in<br \/>\nthe facts presently under consideration. A plain reading<br \/>\nof the order negates the understanding of the<br \/>\nRespondent State and the conduct in no uncertain<br \/>\nterms can be ascribed to be the manifestation of an<br \/>\nintent to deprive one section of the employees being<br \/>\nequally circumstanced come what may and this state of<br \/>\nmind is clearly expressed in the counter-affidavit though<br \/>\nhowever in temperate language. The question of bona<br \/>\nfide understanding thus does not and cannot arise in<br \/>\nthe facts presently. Is it a believable state of affairs that<br \/>\nthe order of the learned Single Judge as early as the<br \/>\nfirst writ petition, has not been properly understood by<br \/>\nthe senior most bureaucrat of the State Government :<br \/>\nthe same misunderstanding continues in terms of the<br \/>\nappellate Court&#8217;s order and the third in the line of order<br \/>\nis that of the apex Court. The understanding again<br \/>\ncontinues even after the second writ petition was filed<br \/>\nbefore the learned Single Judge in the High Court and<br \/>\nthe similar understanding continues even after the so to<br \/>\nsay clarificatory order by this Court, as appears from<br \/>\nthe order dated 20th April, 2001. Even in the counter-<br \/>\naffidavit, filed in Contempt Petition, the understanding<br \/>\nstill continues we are at a loss as to what is this<br \/>\nunderstanding about : the defence of &#8216;understanding&#8217;<br \/>\nundoubtedly is an ingenious effort to avoid the rigours<br \/>\nof an order of Court but cannot obliterate the action the<br \/>\nattempted avoidance through the introduction of the so-<br \/>\ncalled concept of lack of understanding cannot,<br \/>\nhowever, be a permanent avoidance, though there may<br \/>\nbe temporary and short-lived gains. The order of this<br \/>\nCourt cannot possibly be interpreted as per the<br \/>\nunderstanding of the Respondents, but as appears from<br \/>\nthe plain language used therein. Neither the order is<br \/>\ncapable of two several interpretations nor there is any<br \/>\nambiguity and the same does not require further clarity.<br \/>\nThe order is categorical and clear in its context and<br \/>\nmeaning. The Court&#8217;s orders are to be observed in its<br \/>\nobservance, rather than in its breach.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>5) All India Regional Rural Bank Officers Federation &amp;<br \/>\nOrs. Vs. Govt. of India and Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 554<br \/>\n&#8220;4. Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, the learned Additional Solicitor<br \/>\nGeneral, however tried to impress upon us the<br \/>\ncircumstances under which the notification had been<br \/>\nissued, the same being severe financial crisis and the<br \/>\nlearned Additional Solicitor General further urged that<br \/>\nthe monetary benefits of the employees of the banks will<br \/>\nhave to be so modulated so that the banks should be<br \/>\nultimately be closed down by merely paying the salary of<br \/>\nthe employees. Even though the financial position of the<br \/>\nbanks may not be disputed, but having regard to the<br \/>\ndirections issued by this Court, while disposing of the<br \/>\ncivil appeal and having regard to the circumstances<br \/>\nunder which such directions had been given, it would be<br \/>\ndifficult for us to sustain the plea of the union<br \/>\nGovernment that the Notification is in compliance with<br \/>\nthe judgment and directions of this Court. The financial<br \/>\ncapacity of the Government cannot be pleaded as a<br \/>\nground for non-implementation of the directions of the<br \/>\nCourt inasmuch as even in the matter of determination<br \/>\nof the pay-scale of the employees of the Regional Rural<br \/>\nBanks and maintenance of parity with their<br \/>\ncounterparts, serving under the sponsorer commercial<br \/>\nbanks, Justice Obul Reddi had not accepted the said<br \/>\nplea and that award reached its finality. Since the<br \/>\nfinancial capacity of the employer cannot be held to be a<br \/>\ngermane consideration for determination of the wage<br \/>\nstructure of the employees and the Parliament enacted<br \/>\nthe Act for bringing into existence these regional rural<br \/>\nbanks with the idea of helping the rural mass of the<br \/>\ncountry, the employees of such rural banks cannot<br \/>\nsuffer on account of financial incapacity of the<br \/>\nemployer. We have no hesitation in coming to the<br \/>\nconclusion that the issuance of notification dated<br \/>\n1.4.2001, by the Government of India cannot be held to<br \/>\nbe in compliance with the judgment and directions of<br \/>\nthis Court in S.M.G. Bank.  But at the same time, we<br \/>\nare of the opinion that the appropriate authority need<br \/>\nnot be punished under the provisions of the Contempt<br \/>\nof Courts Act, even if the notification is in direct<br \/>\ncontravention of the judgment of this Court, as we do<br \/>\nnot find a case of deliberate violation. While, therefore,<br \/>\nwe do not propose to take any action against the alleged<br \/>\ncontemnors, we direct that the employees of the<br \/>\nRegional Rural Banks should be paid their current<br \/>\nsalaries on the basis of determination made under the<br \/>\nnotification dated 11.4.2001, the new basic pay having<br \/>\narrived at, as on 1.4.2000 forthwith Paragraph (i) of the<br \/>\naforesaid notification dated 11.4.2001 should be<br \/>\nimmediately implemented and the employees should be<br \/>\npaid accordingly. Paragraphs (ii) and (iii) of the<br \/>\nnotification are quashed and the Central Government is<br \/>\ndirected to issue a fresh notification for proper<br \/>\nimplementation of the Judgment of this Court. We make<br \/>\nit clear that the period of moratorium with regard to the<br \/>\npayment of arrears, since is going to be over on<br \/>\n31.3.2002, the arrear salary accruing to the employees<br \/>\nbe paid to them in three equal annual installments, the<br \/>\nfirst being on 30th of April, 2002, the second on 30th of<br \/>\nApril, 2003 and the third on 30th April, 2004. This<br \/>\npayment has to be made as aforesaid without being any<br \/>\nway dependant upon any other considerations and there<br \/>\ncannot be any distinction between the regional rural<br \/>\nbanks incurring loss and the regional rural banks,<br \/>\nmaking profit. Further, the question of anticipated cash<br \/>\nout-flow on account of increase in salary if exceeds 50%<br \/>\nof the operating profit, then the current payment would<br \/>\nbe restricted only upto 50% is absolutely of no<br \/>\nrelevance, which was indicated in the impugned<br \/>\nnotification dated 11.4.2001. Having regard to the<br \/>\nfinancial condition of the Government as well as these<br \/>\nbanks, the installment to be paid on 30.4.2002,<br \/>\npursuant to this order of ours, the same may be<br \/>\ndeposited in the employees&#8217; provident fund account. But<br \/>\nall other installments will have to be paid in cash.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>6) <a href=\"\/doc\/554446\/\">Ravi S. Naik vs. Union of India &amp; Ors.<\/a> 1994 Supp<br \/>\n(2) SCC 641<br \/>\n&#8220;40. We will first examine whether Bandekar and<br \/>\nChopdekar could be excluded from the group on the<br \/>\nbasis of order dated December 13, 1990 holding that<br \/>\nthey stood disqualified as members of the Goa<br \/>\nLegislative Assembly. The said two members had filed<br \/>\nWrit Petition No. 321 of 1990 in the Bombay High Court<br \/>\nwherein they challenged the validity of the said order of<br \/>\ndisqualification and by order dated December 14, 1990<br \/>\npassed in the said writ petition the High Court had<br \/>\nstayed the operation of the said order of disqualification<br \/>\ndated December 13, 1990 passed by the Speaker. The<br \/>\neffect of the stay of the operation of the order of<br \/>\ndisqualification dated December 13, 1990 was that with<br \/>\neffect from December 14, 1990 the Declaration that<br \/>\nBandekar and Chopdekar were disqualified from being<br \/>\nmembers of Goa Legislative Assembly under order dated<br \/>\nDecember 13, 1991 was not operative and on December<br \/>\n24, 1990, the date of the alleged split, it could not be<br \/>\nsaid that they were not members of Goa Legislative<br \/>\nAssembly. One of the reasons given by the Speaker for<br \/>\nnot giving effect to the stay order passed by the High<br \/>\nCourt on December 14, 1990, was that the said order<br \/>\ncame after the order of disqualification was issued by<br \/>\nhim. We are unable to appreciate this reason. Since the<br \/>\nsaid order was passed in a writ petition challenging the<br \/>\nvalidity of the order dated December 13, 1990 passed by<br \/>\nthe Speaker it, obviouly, had to come after the order of<br \/>\ndisqualification was issued by the Speaker. The other<br \/>\nreason given by the Speaker was that Parliament had<br \/>\nheld that the Speaker&#8217;s order cannot be a subject-<br \/>\nmatter of court proceedings and his decision is final as<br \/>\nfar as Tenth Schedule of the Constitution is concerned.<br \/>\nThe said reason is also unsustainable in law. As to<br \/>\nwhether the order of the Speaker could be a subject<br \/>\nmatter of court proceedings and whether his decision<br \/>\nwas final were questions involving the interpretation of<br \/>\nthe provisions contained in Tenth Schedule to the<br \/>\nConstitution. On the date of the passing of the stay<br \/>\norder dated December 14, 1990, the said questions were<br \/>\npending consideration before this Court. In the absence<br \/>\nof an authoritative pronouncement by this Court the<br \/>\nstay order passed by the High Court could not be<br \/>\nignored by the Speaker on the view that his order could<br \/>\nnot be a subject-matter of court proceedings and his<br \/>\ndecision was final. It is settled law that an order, even<br \/>\nthough interim in nature, is binding till it is set aside by<br \/>\na competent could and it cannot be ignored on the<br \/>\nground that the Court which passed the order had no<br \/>\njurisdiction to pass the same. Moreover the stay order<br \/>\nwas passed by the High Court which is a Superior Court<br \/>\nof Record and &#8220;in the case of a superior Court of Record,<br \/>\nit is for the court to consider whether any matter falls<br \/>\nwithin its jurisdiction or not. Unlike a court of limited<br \/>\njurisdiction, the superior Court is entitled to determine<br \/>\nfor itself questions about its own jurisdiction.&#8221; (See:<br \/>\nSpecial Reference No. 1 of 1964, [1965] 1 S.C.R. 413 at<br \/>\np. 499).\n<\/p>\n<p>42. <a href=\"\/doc\/190579\/\">In Mulraj v. Murti Raghonathji Maharaj,<\/a> this Court<br \/>\nhas dealt with effect of a stay order passed by a court<br \/>\nand has laid down:\n<\/p>\n<p>In effect therefore a stay order is more or less in<br \/>\nthe same position as an order of injunction with one<br \/>\ndifference. An order of injunction is generally issued to a<br \/>\nparty and it is forbidden from doing certain acts. It is<br \/>\nwell settled that in such a case the party must have<br \/>\nknowledge of the injunction order before it could be<br \/>\npenalised for before disobeying it. Further it is equally<br \/>\nwell-settled that the injunction order not being<br \/>\naddressed to the court, if the court proceeds in<br \/>\ncontravention of the injunction order, the proceedings<br \/>\nare not a nullity. In the case of a stay order, as it is<br \/>\naddressed to the court and prohibits it from proceeding<br \/>\nfurther, as soon as the court has knowledge of the order<br \/>\nit is bound to obey it and if it does not, it acts illegally,<br \/>\nand all proceedings taken after the knowledge of the<br \/>\norder would be a nullity. That in our opinion is the only<br \/>\ndifference between an order of injunction to a party and<br \/>\nan order of stay to a court.\n<\/p>\n<p>This would mean that the Speaker was bound by<br \/>\nthe stay order passed by the High Court on December<br \/>\n14, 1990 and any action taken by him in disregard of<br \/>\nthe said stay order was a nullity. In the instant case the<br \/>\nSpeaker, in passing the order dated February 15, 1991<br \/>\nrelating to disqualification, treated Bandekar and<br \/>\nChopdekar as disqualified members. This action of the<br \/>\nSpeaker was in disregard of the stay order dated<br \/>\nDecember 14, 1990 passed by the Bombay High Court.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>7) Surjit Singh and Ors. Vs. Harbans Singh and Ors.<br \/>\n(1995) 6 SCC 50<br \/>\n&#8220;4. As said before, the assignment is by means of a<br \/>\nregistered deed.  &#8216;The assignment had taken place after<br \/>\nthe passing of the preliminary decree in which Pritam<br \/>\nsingh has been allotted 1\/3rd share. His right to<br \/>\nproperty to that extent stood established. A decree<br \/>\nrelating to immovable property worth more than<br \/>\nhundred rupees, if being assigned, was required to be<br \/>\nregistered, that has instantly been done. It is per se<br \/>\nproperty, for it relates to the immovable property<br \/>\ninvolved in the suit. It clearly and squarely fell within<br \/>\nthe ambit of the restraint order. In sum, it did not make<br \/>\nany appreciable-difference whether property per se had<br \/>\nbeen alienated or a decree pertaining to that property.<br \/>\nIn defiance of the restraint order, the<br \/>\nalienation\/assignment was made. If we were to let it go<br \/>\nas such, it would defeat the ends of justice and the<br \/>\nprelavent public policy, When the court intends a<br \/>\nparticular state of affairs to exist while it is in seizin of a<br \/>\nlis, that state of affairs is not only required to be<br \/>\nmaintained, but it is presumed to exist till the Court<br \/>\norders otherwise. The Court, in these circumstances has<br \/>\nthe duty, as also the right, to treat the<br \/>\nalienation\/assignment as having not taken place at all<br \/>\nfor its purposes. Once that is so, Pritam singh and his<br \/>\nassignees, respondents herein, cannot claim to be<br \/>\nimpleaded as parties on the basis of assignment.<br \/>\nTherefore, the assignees-respondents could not have<br \/>\nbeen impleaded by the trial court as parties to the suit,<br \/>\nin disobedience of its orders. The principles of lis<br \/>\npendens are altogether on a different footing. We do not<br \/>\npropose to examine their involvement presently. All<br \/>\nwhat is emphasised is that the assignees in the present<br \/>\nfacts and circumstances had no cause to be impleaded<br \/>\nas parties to the suit. On that basis, there was no cause<br \/>\nfor going into the question of interpretation of<br \/>\nparagraphs 13 and 14 of the settlement deed. The path<br \/>\ntreated by the courts below was, in our view, out of their<br \/>\nbounds. Unhesitatingly, we upset all the three orders of<br \/>\nthe courts below and reject the application of the<br \/>\nassignees for impleadment under Order 22 Rule 10<br \/>\nC.P.C.}\n<\/p>\n<p>8) <a href=\"\/doc\/805461\/\">Delhi Development Authority vs. Skipper<br \/>\nConstruction Co. (P) Ltd. and Anr.<\/a> (1996) 4 SCC 622<br \/>\n&#8220;17. The principle that a contemnor ought not to be<br \/>\npermitted to enjoy and\/or keep the fruits of his<br \/>\ncontempt is well-settled. In Mohd. Idris v. R.J. Babuji,<br \/>\nthis Court held clearly that undergoing the punishment<br \/>\nfor contempt does not mean that the Court is not<br \/>\nentitled to give appropriate directions for remedying and<br \/>\nrectifying the things done in violation of its Orders. The<br \/>\npetitioners therein had given an undertaking to the<br \/>\nBombay High Court. They acted in breach of it. A<br \/>\nlearned Single Judge held them guilty of contempt and<br \/>\nimposed a sentence of one month&#8217;s imprisonment. In<br \/>\naddition thereto, the learned Single Judge made<br \/>\nappropriate directions to remedy the breach of<br \/>\nundertaking. It was contended before this Court that the<br \/>\nlearned Judge was not justified in giving the aforesaid<br \/>\ndirections in addition to punishing the petitioners for<br \/>\ncontempt of court. The argument was rejected holding<br \/>\nthat &#8220;the Single Judge was quite right in giving<br \/>\nappropriate directions to close the breach (of<br \/>\nundertaking)&#8221;.\n<\/p>\n<p>18. The above principle has been applied even in the<br \/>\ncase of violation of orders of injunction issued by Civil<br \/>\nCourts. In Clarke v. Chadbum [1985] 1 All. E.R. 211, Sir<br \/>\nRobert Megarry V-C observed :\n<\/p>\n<p>I need not cite authority for the proposition that it is of<br \/>\nhigh importance that orders of the court should be<br \/>\nobeyed. Willful disobedience to an order of the court is<br \/>\npunishable as a contempt of court, and I feel no doubt<br \/>\nthat such disobedience may properly be described as<br \/>\nbeing illegal. If by such disobedience the persons<br \/>\nenjoined claim that they have validly effected some<br \/>\ncharge in the rights and liabilities of others, 1 cannot<br \/>\nsee why it should be said that although they are liable<br \/>\nto penalties for contempt of court for doing what they<br \/>\ndid, nevertheless those acts were validly done. Of<br \/>\ncourse, if an act is done, it is not undone merely by<br \/>\npointing out that it was done in breach in law. If a<br \/>\nmeeting is held in breach of an injunction, it cannot be<br \/>\nsaid that the meeting has not been held. But the legal<br \/>\nconsequences of what has been done in breach of the<br \/>\nlaw may plainly be very much affected by the illegality.<br \/>\nIt seems to me on principle that those who defy a<br \/>\nprohibition ought not to be able to claim that the fruits<br \/>\nof their defiance are good, and not tainted by the<br \/>\nillegality that produced them.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>9) Vidya Charan Shukla vs. Tamil Nadu Olympic<br \/>\nAssn. &amp; Anr. AIR 1991 Madras 323 (FB)<br \/>\n&#8220;56-57. Adverting to the facts of this case, we knew that<br \/>\nthe main relief in the suit to declare that the notice dated<br \/>\n26-5-1990 issued by the first and second defendants on<br \/>\nthe basis of the requisition notices convening a Special<br \/>\nGeneral Meeting of the Association on 15-6-1990 is<br \/>\nillegal, null and void cannot be said to have become<br \/>\ninfructuous merely because the Court instead of granting<br \/>\nan injunction to hold the meeting on 15-6-1990, gave a<br \/>\ndirection to consider an agenda of no-confidence against<br \/>\nthe Executive Council and election of new President and<br \/>\nmembers of the Council in a particular manner. It can<br \/>\nstill be found in the suit that the notice was illegal, null<br \/>\nand void and as a consequence, the Court may suitably<br \/>\nmodulate the relief or permit the plaintiffs to amend the<br \/>\nrelief. Besides this the trial Court will have jurisdiction to<br \/>\nconsider the grant of a mandatory injunction even in a<br \/>\nsuit which stood disposed of if its decree is found to have<br \/>\nbeen violated or frustrated. The trial Court being a Court<br \/>\nof Record will have special jurisdiction\/inherent power to<br \/>\npass such orders as are deemed necessary to meet the<br \/>\nends of justice since this power is saved for it under<br \/>\nSections 4 and 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure and<br \/>\nArticles 215 and 225 of the Constitution. The instant suit<br \/>\nwhich is still pending, shall give to the Court power to<br \/>\nconsider the desirability to grant a mandatory injunction,<br \/>\nfor the reason of its interim injunction having been<br \/>\nviolated, to remove the violation and until the suit is<br \/>\nfinally decided to preserve the property in dispute in<br \/>\nStatus Quo.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>10) Century Flour Mills Ltd. vs. S. Suppiah and<br \/>\nOrs. AIR 1975 Madras 270 (FB)<br \/>\n&#8220;9. In our opinion, the inherent powers of this court<br \/>\nunder Section 151 C.P.C. are wide and are not subject<br \/>\nto any limitation. Where in violation of a stay order or<br \/>\ninjunction against a party, something has been done in<br \/>\ndisobedience, it will be the duty of the court as a policy<br \/>\nto set the wrong right and not allow the perpetuation of<br \/>\nthe wrong doing. In our view, the inherent power will<br \/>\nnot only be available in such a case, but it is bound to<br \/>\nbe exercised in that manner in the interests of justice.<br \/>\nEven apart from Section 151, we should observe that as<br \/>\na matter of judicial policy, the court should guard<br \/>\nagainst itself being stultified in circumstances like this<br \/>\nby holding that it is powerless to undo a wrong done in<br \/>\ndisobedience of the court&#8217;s orders. But in this case it is<br \/>\nnot necessary to so to that extent as we hold that the<br \/>\npower is available under Section 151. C.P.C.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>11) T.M.A. Pai Foundation and Ors. Vs. State of<br \/>\nKarnataka &amp; Ors. (1995) 4 SCC 1<br \/>\nIn this case, suo motu contempt proceedings was<br \/>\ninitiated by the Court against Secretary, Deputy<br \/>\nSecretary and Under Secretary to Medical Education<br \/>\nDepartment and few other officers of the State.<br \/>\nExplanation was given by these officers admitting bona<br \/>\nfide error made in interpreting this Court&#8217;s order.  This<br \/>\nCourt having regard to the sequence of events,<br \/>\nextraordinary speed in processing the representation of<br \/>\nthe Association and conduct of the officers, held,<br \/>\nexplanation not acceptable.  Since the order of this Court<br \/>\nwas explicit and clear but it was subverted on an ex facie<br \/>\nfaulty and deliberately distorted interpretation at the<br \/>\ninstance of the Association.  Hence, this Court felt that to<br \/>\naccept their unconditional apology would be travesty of<br \/>\njustice and officers were thus held guilty of contempt of<br \/>\nCourt and their conduct censured by the Court.  This<br \/>\nCourt also held that unconditional apology is not a<br \/>\ncomplete answer to violations and infractions of the<br \/>\norders of this Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>12) Satyabrata Biswas and Ors. Vs. Kalyan Kumar<br \/>\nKisku and Ors. (1994) 2 SCC 266 This Court held thus:\n<\/p>\n<p>4.From the above it is seen that in relation to the properties an<br \/>\norder of status quo as of today, that is, 15th September, 1988,<br \/>\nhad been passed by the court. It is complained that there is a<br \/>\nviolation of these three orders by the six respondents,<br \/>\nSatyabrata Biswas, Rev. Bilash Chandra Das, Salil Biswas,<br \/>\nSushil Sharma, Rt. Rev. Dinesh Chandra Gorai and Rt. Rev.<br \/>\nJohn E. Ghosh. The contempt was for: (1) putting a padlock to<br \/>\nthe main entrance of the premises on 3.7.1993; (2)<br \/>\ndisconnecting water supply, (3) obstructing sewerage line; and<br \/>\n(4) preventing the appellants from getting the rooms repaired.\n<\/p>\n<p>10. Under these circumstances the present civil appeal by<br \/>\nspecial leave has come to be preferred. It is urged on behalf of<br \/>\nthe appellants that in view of status quo order dated 15th<br \/>\nSeptember, 1982 regarding the fixed property in possession of<br \/>\nthe Durgapur Diocese no tenancy or sub-tenancy rights could<br \/>\nbe created. It was also urged that the said Somani Builders<br \/>\nbecame sub-tenant under an agreement dated 10th May, 1993.<br \/>\nSuch a sub-tenancy cannot be valid in view of the status quo<br \/>\norder. It is somewhat strange that Somani Builders should<br \/>\nmade an oral application before the learned Single Judge. On<br \/>\nthe basis of the oral application, the order came to be passed<br \/>\nin favour of the Somani Builders directing the Special Officer to<br \/>\nremove the padlock. As to what was the nature of the prayer,<br \/>\nthat too by a person who was not a party to any one of these<br \/>\nproceedings, is not known. Therefore, the removal of padlock<br \/>\non its instance, as directed by the learned Single Judge, was<br \/>\nnot warranted. As though to add insult to injury when the<br \/>\nappellant was complaining about this order, the Division<br \/>\nBench goes one step further and directs possession be given to<br \/>\nSomani Builders. This direction would amount to putting a<br \/>\npremium on the illegality committed by the former alleged<br \/>\ntenant A.K. Ghosh.\n<\/p>\n<p>23. Apart from the fact whether A.K. Ghosh had a legal<br \/>\nauthority to sub-lease or not it was not open to him to grant a<br \/>\nsub-lease in violation of the order. It is no use contending as<br \/>\nMr. Chidambaram, learned Counsel for the respondents does,<br \/>\nthat there was a bar to such a sub-lease under the terms of the<br \/>\nstatus quo order. It has the effect of violating the preservation<br \/>\nof status of the property. This will all the more be so when this<br \/>\nis done without the leave of the court to disturb the state of<br \/>\nthings as they then stood. It would amount to violation of the<br \/>\norder. The principle contained in the maxim: &#8216;Actus Curiae<br \/>\nNeminem Gravabit&#8217; has no application at all to the facts of this<br \/>\ncase when in violation of status quo order a sub-tenancy has<br \/>\nbeen created. Equally, the contention that even a trespasser<br \/>\ncannot be evicted without recourse to law is without merit,<br \/>\nbecause the state of affairs in relation to property as on<br \/>\n15.9.1988 is what the Court is concerned with. Such an order<br \/>\ncannot be circumvented by parties with impunity and expect<br \/>\nthe court to confer its blessings. It does not matter that to the<br \/>\ncontempt proceedings Somani Builders was not a party. It<br \/>\ncannot gain an advantage in derogation of the rights of the<br \/>\nparties, who were litigating originally. If the right of sub-<br \/>\ntenancy is recognised, how is status quo as of 15.9.1988<br \/>\nmaintained? Hence, the grant of sub-lease is contrary to the<br \/>\norder of status quo. Any act done in the teeth of the order of<br \/>\nstatus quo is clearly illegal. All actions including the grant of<br \/>\nsub-lease are clearly illegal.\n<\/p>\n<p>In our opinion, the respondent Nos.1-4 had<br \/>\ndeliberately and with mala fide motive have committed<br \/>\ncontempt of the High Court in conducting the lottery<br \/>\nquite contrary to the order of injunction passed by the<br \/>\nHigh Court on 04.01.2005 and its subsequent<br \/>\nextensions.  When the auction was held, the order passed<br \/>\nby the High Court remain operative at the relevant time.<br \/>\nThe High Court has miserably failed in not issuing<br \/>\ndirection to the contemnors to cancel the lottery held on<br \/>\n20, 21 and 22.03.2005 in violation of the solemn order<br \/>\npassed by the High Court.  In view of the clear finding of<br \/>\nthe Court that the respondent had acted in clear violation<br \/>\nof the order made by the High Court.  It is settled law<br \/>\nthat a party to the litigation cannot be allowed to take an<br \/>\nunfair advantage by committing breach of an interim<br \/>\norder and escape the consequences thereof by pleading<br \/>\nmisunderstanding and thereafter retain the said<br \/>\nadvantage gained in breach of the order of the Court.<br \/>\nSuch violations should be put an end with an iron hand.<br \/>\nWe are unable to accept the argument advanced by<br \/>\nlearned Addl. Solicitor General that the respondents did<br \/>\nnot understand the implication and consequences of a<br \/>\nprohibitory order passed by the High Court.  We have<br \/>\nalready explained their conduct and the refusal to cancel<br \/>\nthe order when they were advised to do so by the High<br \/>\nCourt during the pendency of the contempt proceedings.<br \/>\nThe act of the respondent is not only willful but also<br \/>\ndeliberate and contumacious.  The High Court committed<br \/>\na grave error of law by not holding that if there was a<br \/>\ndoubt about the implication of the order of the Court, the<br \/>\nalleged contemnors should have approached the Court<br \/>\nand have clarified their alleged confusion.  Likewise, this<br \/>\nCourt while ordering notice in the present appeal @ SLP<br \/>\nNo. 15224 of 2006 have clearly directed on 18.09.2006<br \/>\nthat no license shall be granted on the basis of the lottery<br \/>\nand pursuant to the circular dated 20.01.2004.  Even<br \/>\nafter the receipt of the order, the respondents have not<br \/>\ncancelled the license, but allowed them to continue the<br \/>\nbusiness.  The reason is obvious.  The respondents<br \/>\nthough tendered unqualified apology before the High<br \/>\nCourt, the High Court was not inclined to go into the<br \/>\nquestion of apology in view of the observations made by it<br \/>\nin the order impugned in this civil appeal.  Even before<br \/>\nus no apology whatsoever was tendered by respondent<br \/>\nNos.1-4.  We, therefore, hold them guilty of willful and<br \/>\ndeliberate act of contempt.  As it is evident that<br \/>\nrespondent Nos.1-4 have no regard for the orders passed<br \/>\nby this Court on 4, 19 and 20.01.2005 and have scant<br \/>\nrespect for the Court&#8217;s orders and have deliberately and<br \/>\nwillfully and with utter disregard violated all the 3 orders<br \/>\nand are thus guilty of contempt of Court.  However,<br \/>\ntaking a lenient view and taking into consideration of the<br \/>\nfuture prospects of the officers, respondent Nos. 1-4 we<br \/>\nare not imposing any punishment for their willful<br \/>\nviolation of the order of the High Court and accept the<br \/>\nunqualified apology filed before the High Court.<br \/>\nRespondent Nos. 1-4 are severely warned that they shall<br \/>\nnot involve themselves or violate the order passed by any<br \/>\nCourt of law and will not resort to the unacceptable plea<br \/>\nthat the said highly placed and highly qualified<br \/>\ngovernment officials did not understand the implication<br \/>\nand\/or consequences of a prohibitory order passed by<br \/>\nthe Courts of law.  They shall not hereafter also take the<br \/>\nplea of inventing an innovative defence that they did not<br \/>\nrealise the implications of the order passed by the High<br \/>\nCourt which remained operative at the relevant time.<br \/>\nIn the instant case, the respondents have conducted<br \/>\nthe auction quite contrary to and in violation of an<br \/>\ninjunction order passed by the High Court.  Courts have<br \/>\nheld in a catena of decisions that where in violation of a<br \/>\nrestraint order or an injunction order against a party,<br \/>\nsomething has been done in disobedience, it will be the<br \/>\nduty of the Court as a policy to set the wrong right and<br \/>\nnot allow the perpetuation of the wrong doing.  In our<br \/>\nopinion, the inherent power will not only be available<br \/>\nunder Section 151 CPC as available to us in such a case<br \/>\nbut it is bound to be exercised in that manner in the<br \/>\ninterest of justice and public interest.  As rightly<br \/>\nobserved by the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in<br \/>\nAIR 1975 Madras 270, that as a matter of judicial policy<br \/>\nthe Court should guard against itself being stultified in<br \/>\ncircumstances like this by holding that it is powerless to<br \/>\nundo a wrong done in disobedience of the Court&#8217;s orders.<br \/>\nWe, therefore, cancel all the auctions held on 20, 21 and<br \/>\n22.03.2005 and direct the respondent Nos.1-4 not to<br \/>\nallow the successful bidders to continue the business<br \/>\nand shall stop them forthwith and submit a report to this<br \/>\nCourt of strict compliance.  We make it clear that we are<br \/>\nnot expressing any opinion on the merits of the claim<br \/>\nmade by the appellant Association in the writ petition<br \/>\nfiled by them before the High Court which is pending.  All<br \/>\nthe respondent Nos.1-4 are senior and experienced<br \/>\nofficers and must be presumed to know that under the<br \/>\nconstitutional scheme of this country orders of the High<br \/>\nCourt have to be obeyed implicitly and that orders of this<br \/>\nCourt  for that matter any Court should not be trifled<br \/>\nwith.  We have already found hereinabove that they have<br \/>\nacted deliberately to subvert the orders of the High Court<br \/>\nevidently.  It is equally necessary to erase an impression<br \/>\nwhich appears to be gaining ground that the mantra of<br \/>\nunconditional apology is a complete answer to violations<br \/>\nand infractions of the orders of the High Court or of this<br \/>\nCourt.  We, therefore hold them guilty of contempt of<br \/>\nCourt and do hereby censure their conduct. Though a<br \/>\ncopy of this order could be sent which shall form part of<br \/>\nthe annual confidential record of service of each of the<br \/>\nsaid officers, we refrain from doing so by taking a lenient<br \/>\nview of the matter considering the future prospects of the<br \/>\nofficers.  As already stated, the officers shall not indulge<br \/>\nin any adventurous act and strictly obey the orders<br \/>\npassed by the Courts of law.  The civil appeal stands<br \/>\nallowed.  Though this is a fit case for awarding exemplary<br \/>\ncosts, again taking a lenient view, we say no costs.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India All Bengal Excise Licensees &#8230; vs Raghabendra Singh &amp; Ors on 9 March, 2007 Author: . A Lakshmanan Bench: Dr. Ar. Lakshmanan, Altamas Kabir CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 1246 of 2007 PETITIONER: All Bengal Excise Licensees Association RESPONDENT: Raghabendra Singh &amp; Ors DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09\/03\/2007 BENCH: Dr. AR. Lakshmanan &amp; [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-135444","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>All Bengal Excise Licensees ... vs Raghabendra Singh &amp; Ors on 9 March, 2007 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/all-bengal-excise-licensees-vs-raghabendra-singh-ors-on-9-march-2007\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"All Bengal Excise Licensees ... vs Raghabendra Singh &amp; 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