{"id":137084,"date":"1999-09-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1999-09-07T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/balraj-taneja-anr-vs-sunil-madan-anr-on-8-september-1999"},"modified":"2017-04-11T03:09:32","modified_gmt":"2017-04-10T21:39:32","slug":"balraj-taneja-anr-vs-sunil-madan-anr-on-8-september-1999","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/balraj-taneja-anr-vs-sunil-madan-anr-on-8-september-1999","title":{"rendered":"Balraj Taneja & Anr vs Sunil Madan & Anr on 8 September, 1999"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Balraj Taneja & Anr vs Sunil Madan & Anr on 8 September, 1999<\/div>\n
Author: S Ahmad<\/div>\n
Bench: D.P.Mohapatro, S.Saghir Ahmad<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nBALRAJ TANEJA & ANR.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSUNIL MADAN & ANR.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\t08\/09\/1999\n\nBENCH:\nD.P.Mohapatro, S.Saghir Ahmad\n\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
      S.SAGHIR AHMAD, J.\n<\/p>\n
      Leave granted.\n<\/p>\n
      Respondent  No.1,\t Sunil\tMadan, filed a suit  in\t the
\nDelhi  High Court against the appellants and respondent No.2
\nfor specific performance of an agreement for sale in respect
\nof  property No.W-118, First Floor, Greater Kailash-II,\t New
\nDelhi.\tThe suit was filed in May, 1996.  Summons which were
\nissued\tto  the\t appellants and respondent  No.2  were\tduly
\nserved\tupon  them  and\t in response thereto,  they  put  in
\nappearance  before  the\t Court on 20th September,  1996\t and
\nprayed for eight weeks’ time to file written statement which
\nwas  allowed and the suit was adjourned to 22nd of  January,
\n1997.  Written Statement was not filed even on that date and
\nan  application\t was  filed  for further time  to  file\t the
\nwritten statement which was allowed as a last chance and the
\nwritten\t statement  was\t directed  to be  filed\t by  7th  of
\nFebruary,  1997.   The suit was fixed for 10th of  February,
\n1997.\n<\/p>\n
      Since  the written statement was still not filed,\t the
\nCourt decreed the suit for specific performance in favour of
\nrespondent  No.1  under Order 8 Rule 10\t C.P.C.\t  Respondent
\nNo.1  was directed to deposit a sum of Rs.3 lakhs, being the
\nbalance\t amount of sale consideration, within six weeks\t and
\non  the amount being so deposited, he was given the  liberty
\nto  apply to the court for appointment of a Commissioner for
\nexecuting  the\tsale  deed  in\t his  favour.\tThe   review
\napplication  filed  by the appellants  including  respondent
\nNo.2  was dismissed by the High Court on 13th of May,  1997.
\nAn  appeal,  which  was filed by the  appellants,  including
\nrespondent  No.2,  thereafter,\tbefore\tthe  Division  Bench
\n(R.F.A.(OS)  NO.36\/97) was dismissed on 29.4.1998.  It is in
\nthese  circumstances that the present appeal has been  filed
\nin this Court.\n<\/p>\n
      Mr.   Rakesh  Dwivedi,  Sr.   Advocate,  appearing  on
\nbehalf of the appellants has contended that having regard to
\nthe  circumstances  of\tthe  case, the High  Court  was\t not
\njustified  in  passing\tthe decree against  the\t appellants,
\nincluding  respondent No.2, for specific performance  merely
\non  the ground that written statement was not filed by\tthem
\non  the\t date fixed for that purpose.  It is also  contended
\nthat the High Court had rejected the application for time to
\nfile written statement on the ground that there was a change
\nof  counsel  appearing\ton behalf of the appellants  and  no
\nreason\twas  indicated\tby them for not filing\tthe  written
\nstatement  by  7th  of\tFebruary, 1997 or even\ton  10th  of
\nFebruary,  1997 when the suit was decreed under Order 8 Rule
\n10  C.P.C., which indicates that the attitude adopted by the
\nHigh  Court  in\t decreeing the suit under Order\t 8  Rule  10
\nC.P.C.\t was wholly punitive in nature resulting in  serious
\nmiscarriage  of justice.  Mr.  Rakesh Dwivedi also contended
\nthat  even  if the Court had decreed the suit under Order  8
\nRule  10  C.P.C., it ought to have written a  “judgment”  by
\nstating\t clearly  the facts of the case and the reasons\t for
\ndecreeing  the\tsuit.  The suit, it is contended, could\t not
\nhave  been  decreed  merely for not filing  of\tthe  written
\nstatement  unless  facts  set out in the plaint\t were  found
\nproved by the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
      Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.1
\nhas  contended\tthat  the appellants,  including  respondent
\nNo.2, had adopted dilatory tactics and their intention, from
\nthe very beginning, was to delay the disposal of the suit so
\nas  to harass respondent No.1 who had agreed to purchase the
\nproperty in question and had also paid substantial amount by
\nway of earnest money.  It is also contended that the conduct
\nof  the\t appellants and respondent No.2 was not\t proper\t and
\nthey  were  negligent throughout, inasmuch as not only\tthat
\nthey  did  not\tfile the written statement,  they  filed  an
\nappeal before the Division Bench which also was beyond time.
\nIt  is\talso  contended\t that while applying  for  time\t for
\nwritten\t statement as also for review of the judgment passed
\nby  the\t Court under Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C., the  appellants
\nand  respondent No.2 had not given any reason for not filing
\nthe  written statement on the dates fixed by the High  Court
\nand,  therefore,  having  regard  to   the  conduct  of\t the
\nappellants  as\talso  the vital fact that the owner  of\t the
\nproperty,  namely,  respondent\tNo.2,  had not\tcome  up  in
\nSpecial\t Leave Petition, this Court should not exercise\t its
\ndiscretion  under Article 136 of the Constitution in  favour
\nof  the appellants.  Since the suit has been decreed by\t the
\nHigh  Court  under  Order 8 Rule 10 C.P.C.,  we\t will  first
\nexamine the provisions contained in various Rules of Order 8
\nto  find out whether the jurisdiction was properly exercised
\nby  the High Court in decreeing the suit under Order 8\tRule
\n10  C.P.C.  Order 8 Rule 1 provides that the defendant shall
\nfile  a\t Written  Statement of his defence.  It\t is  further
\nprovided  by  Rule  3  of  Order 8  that  it  shall  not  be
\nsufficient  for a defendant in his Written Statement to deny
\ngenerally   the\t grounds  alleged  by  the  plaintiff,\t but
\ndefendant  must\t deal specifically with each  allegation  of
\nfact  of  which\t he does not admit the truth.\tThe  further
\nrequirement  as set out in Rule 4 is that if the  allegation
\nmade  in  the plaint is denied by the defendant, the  denial
\nmust  not be evasive.  It is, inter alia, provided in Rule 5
\nof  Order 8 that every allegation of fact in the plaint,  if
\nnot  denied  specifically  or by  necessary  implication  or
\nstated to be not admitted in the written statement, shall be
\ntaken to be admitted.\n<\/p>\n
      This Rule provides as under :\n<\/p>\n
      “Order 8 Rule 5 – Specific denial<\/p>\n
      (1)  Every  allegation of fact in the plaint,  if\t not
\ndenied\tspecifically or by necessary implication, or  stated
\nto  be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant,  shall
\nbe  taken  to be admitted except as against a  person  under
\ndisability :\n<\/p>\n
      Provided\tthat the Court may in its discretion require
\nany  fact  so admitted to be proved otherwise than  by\tsuch
\nadmission.\n<\/p>\n
      (2)  Where the defendant has not filed a pleading,  it
\nshall  be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on\t the
\nbasis  of  the\tfacts  contained in the\t plaint,  except  as
\nagainst\t a person under a disability, but the Court may,  in
\nits discretion, require any such fact to be proved.\n<\/p>\n
      (3)  In exercising its discretion under the proviso to
\nsub-  rule  (1) or under sub-rule (2), the Court shall\thave
\ndue  regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or
\nhas, engaged a pleader.\n<\/p>\n
      (4) Whenever a judgment is pronounced under this rule,
\na  decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment
\nand  such  decree shall bear the date on which the  judgment
\nwas pronounced.”\n<\/p>\n
      The  scheme of this Rule is largely dependent upon the
\nfiling\tor  non-filing\tof the pleading\t by  the  defendant.
\nSub-rule  (1) of Rule 5 provides that any fact stated in the
\nplaint,\t  if  not  denied   specifically  or  by   necessary
\nimplication  or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of
\nthe  defendant, shall be treated as admitted.  Under Rule  3
\nof  Order 8, it is provided that the denial by the defendant
\nin  his written statement must be specific with reference to
\neach  allegation  of  fact made in the\tplaint.\t  A  general
\ndenial\tor  an evasive denial is not treated  as  sufficient
\ndenial\tand,  therefore, the denial, if it is not  definite,
\npositive  and unambiguous, the allegations of facts made  in
\nthe plaint shall be treated as admitted under this Rule.\n<\/p>\n
      The  proviso appended to this Rule is important in the
\nsense that though a fact stated in the plaint may be treated
\nas admitted, the Court may, in its discretion, still require
\nsuch  “admitted\t fact” to be proved otherwise than  by\tsuch
\nadmission.   This  is  an exception to the general  rule  of
\nevidence that a fact which is admitted need not be proved.\n<\/p>\n
      Sub-rule\t(2)  provides that if the defendant has\t not
\nfiled  his  written  statement, it would be lawful  for\t the
\nCourt  to  pronounce  judgment\ton the basis  of  the  facts
\ncontained  in the plaint.  The rule further proceeds to\t say
\nthat notwithstanding that the facts stated in the plaint are
\ntreated\t as admitted, the Court, though it can lawfully pass
\nthe  judgment, may before passing the judgment require\tsuch
\nfact  to be proved.  The rule is thus in consonance with the
\nProviso which also requires the fact, even though treated as
\nadmitted, to be proved.\t Thus, the Proviso and Sub- rule (2)
\nread together indicate that where<\/p>\n
      (i)  an  allegation of fact made in the plaint is\t not
\ndenied specifically, or<\/p>\n
      (ii) by necessary implication, or<\/p>\n
      (iii)  stated to be “not admitted” in the pleading  of
\nthe defendant, or<\/p>\n
      (iv)   the  defendant  has   not\tfiled  the   written
\nstatement,<\/p>\n
      such   allegations  of  facts   shall  be\t treated  as
\nadmitted.  The Court in this situation can either proceed to
\npronounce judgment on such admitted facts or may require the
\nplaintiff, in spite of such admission, to prove such facts.\n<\/p>\n
      Sub-rule\t (2)  quoted  above  is\t thus  an   enabling
\nprovision  which enables the Court to pronounce judgment  on
\nthe  basis  of\tthe facts contained in the  plaint,  if\t the
\ndefendant  has\tnot  filed  a Written  Statement.   What  is
\nimportant to note is that even though a Written Statement is
\nnot  filed  by the defendent, the court may still require  a
\nfact pleaded in the plaint to be proved.\n<\/p>\n
      We  may now consider the provisions of Order 8 Rule  9
\nas  also the provisions contained in the other Rule,  namely
\nRule  10,  under which the instant suit has been decreed  by
\nthe High Court.\t These Rules are quoted below:\n<\/p>\n
      “Rule   9.   Subsequent  pleadings   —  No   pleading
\nsubsequent  to\tthe written statement of a  defendant  other
\nthan  by way of defence to a set-off or counter-claim  shall
\nbe  presented except by the leave of the Court and upon such
\nterms as the Court thinks fit, but the Court may at any time
\nrequire\t a written statement or additional written statement
\nfrom  any  of the parties and fix a time for presenting\t the
\nsame.\n<\/p>\n
      Rule  10.\t  Procedure  when  party  fails\t to  present
\nwritten\t statement  called for by Court — Where  any  party
\nfrom  whom  a written statement is required under rule 1  or
\nrule  9 fails to present the same within the time  permitted
\nor  fixed by the Court, as the case may be, the Court  shall
\npronounce  judgment  against  him  or  make  such  order  in
\nrelation  to  the  suit\t as  it\t  thinks  fit  and  on\t the
\npronouncement of such judgment, a decree shall be drawn up.”
\n.lm10<\/p>\n
      This  Rule,  namely Rule 10, was also amended  by\t the
\nCode  of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 (Act No.\t 104
\nof  1976).  Prior to its amendment, it was held in a  number
\nof  decisions  that  the rule can be invoked only  in  those
\nsituations  where  the Court has required the  defendant  to
\nfile the Written Statement in terms of Rule 9 of Order 8.  A
\nfew  other  High  Courts had taken the view that  this\tRule
\nwould  be  applicable  even to those cases where  a  Written
\nStatement was required to be filed under Order 8 Rule 1 CPC.
\nThe  conflict of decisions has been set at rest by providing
\nspecifically  under this rule that where a party from whom a
\nWritten\t Statement is required either under Rule 1 or Rule 9
\nof  Order  8  fails  to present the  same  within  the\ttime
\npermitted  or fixed by the Court, the Court shall  pronounce
\njudgment  against him or make such order in relation to\t the
\nsuit  as  it  thinks  fit.  Rule 10 thus  governs  both\t the
\nsituations  where a Written Statement is required under Rule
\n1  of Order 8 as also where it has been demanded under\tRule\n<\/p>\n
9.  In both the situations, if the Written Statement has not
\nbeen filed by the defendant, it will be open to the Court to
\npronounce  judgment  against  him  or  make  such  order  in
\nrelation  to the suit as it thinks fit.\t It is to be noticed
\nthat  if  the Written Statement is not filed, the  Court  is
\nrequired  to pronounce judgment against the defendant.\t The
\nwords  “against\t him” are to be found in Rule 10 of Order  9
\nwhich  obviously  means that the judgment will be  pronouced
\nagainst\t the  defendant.  This rule also gives a  discretion
\neither\tto pronounce judgment against the defendant or “make
\nsuch  order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.” These
\nwords  are of immense significance, inasmuch as they give  a
\ndiscretion  to\tthe Court not to pronounce judgment  against
\nthe  defendant\tand instead pass such order as it may  think
\nfit in relation to the suit.\n<\/p>\n
      There  are  thus two separate and distinct  provisions
\nunder  which the Court can pronounce judgment on the failure
\nof the defendant to file Written Statement.  The failure may
\nbe  either under Order 8 Rule 5(2) under which the Court may
\neither\tpronounce judgment on the basis of the facts set out
\nin  the\t plaint or require the plaintiff to prove  any\tsuch
\nfact;  or the failure may be under Order 8 Rule 10 CPC under
\nwhich  the  Court is required to pronounce judgment  against
\nthe  defendant or to pass such order in relation to the suit
\nas it thinks fit.\n<\/p>\n
      This  Court,  in Sangram Singh v.\t Election  Tribunal,
\nKotah  & Anr.  AIR<\/a> 1955 SC 425 = 1955 (1) SCR 1, observed on
\npage 432 of the report as under :\n<\/p>\n
      “(32)  We\t have  already seen that when a\t summons  is
\nissued to the defendant it must state whether the hearing is
\nfor  the settlement of issues only or for the final disposal
\nof  the\t suit (O.5, R.5).  In either event, O.8,  R.1  comes
\ninto  play  and if the defendant does not present a  written
\nstatement  of  his  defence, the Court can  insist  that  he
\nshall;\t and  if,  on being required to do so, he  fails  to
\ncomply —\n<\/p>\n
      “the Court may pronounce judgment against him, or make
\nsuch  order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit.” (O.8,
\nR.10).\n<\/p>\n
      This  invests  the  Court\t with  the  widest  possible
\ndiscretion  and\t enables it to see that justice is  done  to
\n`both’ sides;  and also to witnesses if they are present:  a
\nmatter on which we shall dwell later.\n<\/p>\n
      (33)  We\thave  seen that if the\tdefendant  does\t not
\nappear\tat  the\t first hearing, the Court  can\tproceed\t `ex
\nparte’,\t which\tmeans that it can proceed without a  written
\nstatement;   and  O.9, R.7 makes it clear that\tunless\tgood
\ncause  is  shown  the defendant cannot be relegated  to\t the
\nposition  that\the would have occupied if he  had  appeared.
\nThat  means that he cannot put in a written statement unless
\nhe  is allowed to do so, and if the case is one in which the
\nCourt considers a written statement should have been put in,
\nthe consequences entailed by O.8, R.10 must be suffered.\n<\/p>\n
      What  those consequences should be in a given case  is
\nfor  the Court, in the exercise of its judicial\t discretion,
\nto  determine.\tNo hard and fast rule can be laid down.\t  In
\nsome  cases, an order awarding costs to the plaintiff  would
\nmeet  the ends of justice:  an adjournment can be granted or
\na written statement can be considered on the spot and issues
\nframed.\t  In  other cases, the ends of justice may call\t for
\nmore drastic action.”\n<\/p>\n
      This  decision  was followed by the J&K High Court  in
\nChuni  Lal Chowdhry vs.\t Bank of Baroda and Others, AIR 1982
\nJ&K 93 in which it was laid down as under :\n<\/p>\n
      “On  the authority of these observations, Rule 10\t can
\nbe  taken  to  relate  to  Rule 1 of  Order  8\tand  on\t the
\ndefendant’s  failure  to  file\t written  statement  of\t his
\ndefence,  when so required, the court has the power,  either
\nto  pronounce the judgment against him or make such order in
\nrelation to the suit as it thinks fit depending upon whether
\nthe suit was for the final disposal or for the settlement of
\nthe  issues  only.  In the latter case, the court has  ample
\ndiscretion  to\tgrant  more  time  for\tfiling\tthe  written
\nstatement  or to proceed to hearing of the suit without such
\nwritten\t statement.   The  discretion  cannot,\thowever,  be
\nexercised  arbitrarily.\t  In  determining  which  course  to
\nadopt,\tthe  court  will always be guided by the  facts\t and
\ncircumstances  of  each\t case.\tWhere the court\t decides  to
\nproceed\t to  hearing  of  the\tsuit  without  the   written
\nstatement,  that  would not debar the defendant from  taking
\npart  in further proceedings of the case.  His participation
\nwould,\thowever,  be hedged in by several  limitations.\t  He
\nwill  not  be able either to cross-examine  the\t plaintiff’s
\nwitnesses  or to produce his own evidence with regard to any
\nquestions of fact which he could have pleaded in the written
\nstatement.   He will, however, be competent to cross-examine
\nthe plaintiff’s witnesses in order to demolish their version
\nof the plaintiff’s case.\n<\/p>\n
      To  the same effect is the decision of the Patna\tHigh
\nCourt  in  Siai\t Sinha v.  Shivadhari Sinha, AIR  1972\tPat.\n<\/p>\n
81.”\n<\/p>\n
      In Dharam Pal Gupta vs.  District Judge, Etah 1982 All
\nRent Cases 562, the Allahabad High Court held as under :\n<\/p>\n
      “Therefore,  reading  Order VIII, R.10, C.P.C.   along
\nwith  O.VIII,  R.5,  C.P.C., it seems that even\t though\t the
\nfiling of written statement has been made obligatory and the
\nCourt has now been empowered to pass a judgment on the basis
\nof  the\t plaint on the ground that no written statement\t has
\nbeen  filed  by the defendant still, the discretion  of\t the
\nCourt  has been preserved and despite the non-filing of\t the
\nwritten\t statement the Court may pass any other order as  it
\nmay  think  fit (as laid down in O.  VII R.10) or the  Court
\nmay  in its discretion require any particular fact mentioned
\nin  the plaint to be proved as laid down in Order VIII,\t R.5
\nsub-rule (2) C.P.C.”\n<\/p>\n
      This  decision  was followed in State of U.P.  &\tAnr.
\nvs.  Dharam Singh Mahra AIR<\/a> 1983 Allahabad 130.\n<\/p>\n
      In  Smt.\t Sushila  Jain\t vs.   Rajasthan   Financial
\nCorporation  Jaipur,  AIR 1979 Raj 215 and also\t in  Rosario
\nSantana\t Vaz  vs.  Smt.\t Joaquina Natividate  Fernandes\t AIR
\n1981  Goa  61,\tit was laid down that if the  defendant\t was
\ndeliberately  delaying\tthe  proceedings and had  failed  to
\nassign\tgood and sufficient cause for not filing the Written
\nStatement, the Court could forfeit his right of defence.\n<\/p>\n
      There  is\t yet  another provision under  which  it  is
\npossible  for the Court to pronounce judgment on  admission.
\nThis  is  contained in Rule 6 of Order 12 which provides  as
\nunder :\n<\/p>\n
      “R.6 Judgment on admissions.\n<\/p>\n
      (1)  Where admissions of fact have been made either in
\nthe  pleadings\tor otherwise, whether orally or in  writing,
\nthe  Court  may\t at  any stage of the suit,  either  on\t the
\napplication  of\t any party or of its own motion and  without
\nwaiting\t for the determination of any other question between
\nthe parties, make such order or give such judgment as it may
\nthink fit, having regard to such admissions.\n<\/p>\n
      (2)  Whenever a judgment is pronounced under  sub-rule
\n(1),  a\t decree\t shall be drawn up in  accordance  with\t the
\njudgment  and  the decree shall bear the date on  which\t the
\njudgment was pronounced.”\n<\/p>\n
      This  Rule was substituted in place of the old Rule by
\nthe  Code  of  Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act,\t 1976.\t The
\nobjects and reasons for this amendment are given below:-\n<\/p>\n
      “Under  rule  6, where a claim is admitted, the  Court
\nhas  jurisdiction to enter a judgment for the plaintiff\t and
\nto  pass a decree on the admitted claim.  The object of\t the
\nrule  is  to enable a party to obtain a speedy\tjudgment  at
\nleast to the extent of the relief to which, according to the
\nadmission  of the defendant, the plaintiff is entitled.\t The
\nrule  is wide enough to cover oral admissions.\tThe rule  is
\nbeing  amended\tto  clarify that oral  admissions  are\talso
\ncovered by the rule.”\n<\/p>\n
      Under  this  Rule, the Court can, at an  interlocutory
\nstage  of  the proceedings, pass a judgment on the basis  of
\nadmissions  made by the defendant.  But before the Court can
\nact  upon  the\tadmission,  it\thas to\tbe  shown  that\t the
\nadmission  is  unequivocal, clear and positive.\t  This\tRule
\nempowers the Court to pass judgment and decree in respect of
\nadmitted  claims pending adjudication of the disputed claims
\nin the suit.\n<\/p>\n
      In  Razia Begum vs.  Sahebzadi Anwar Begum & Ors.\t AIR<\/a>
\n1958  SC 886 = 1959 SCR 1111, it was held that Order 12 Rule
\n6  has\tto be read along with Proviso to Rule 5 of Order  8.
\nThat  is  to say, notwithstanding the admission made by\t the
\ndefendant  in his pleading, the Court may still require\t the
\nplaintiff to prove the facts pleaded by him in the plaint.\n<\/p>\n
      Thus, in spite of admission of a fact having been made
\nby  a  party  to the suit, the Court may still\trequire\t the
\nplaintiff  to prove the fact which has been admitted by\t the
\ndefendant.   This is also in consonance with the  provisions
\nof Section 58 of the Evidence Act which provides as under :\n<\/p>\n
      “58.  Facts admitted need not be proved – No fact need
\nbe  proved  in any proceeding which the parties\t thereto  or
\ntheir agents agree to admit at the hearing, or which, before
\nthe  hearing, they agree to admit by any writing under their
\nhands, or which by any rule of pleading in force at the time
\nthey are deemed to have admitted by their pleadings:\n<\/p>\n
      Provided\tthat  the  Court  may,\tin  its\t discretion,
\nrequire\t the  facts admitted to be proved otherwise than  by
\nsuch admissions.”\n<\/p>\n
      The  Proviso  to\tthis Section  specifically  gives  a
\ndiscretion  to the Court to require the facts admitted to be
\nproved\totherwise  than\t by  such  admission.\tThe  Proviso
\ncorresponds to the Proviso to Rule 5(1) Order 8 CPC.\n<\/p>\n
      In  view of the above, it is clear that the Court,  at
\nno  stage, can act blindly or mechanically.  While  enabling
\nthe  Court  to\tpronounce judgment in a situation  where  no
\nWritten\t Statement is filed by the defendant, the Court\t has
\nalso  been given the discretion to pass such order as it may
\nthink  fit  as\tan alternative.\t This is also  the  position
\nunder  Order  8\t Rule  10 CPC where  the  Court\t can  either
\npronounce  judgment against the defendant or pass such order
\nas it may think fit.\n<\/p>\n
      Having  regard  to the provisions of Order 12 Rule  6;
\nOrder  5 Rule 8, specially Proviso thereto;  as also Section
\n58  of\tthe Evidence Act, this Court in Razia  Begum’s\tcase
\n(supra) observed as under :  .lm15<\/p>\n
      “In  this connection, our attention was called to\t the
\nprovisions  of\tR.6 of O.12 of the Code of Civil  Procedure,
\nwhich lays down that, upon such admissions as have been made
\nby  the\t Prince in this case, the Court would give  judgment
\nfor  the  plaintiff.  These provisions have got to  be\tread
\nalong  with R.5 of O.8 of the Code with particular reference
\nto the proviso which is in these terms:\n<\/p>\n
      “Provided that the Court may in its discretion require
\nany  fact  so admitted to be proved otherwise than  by\tsuch
\nadmission”.\n<\/p>\n
      The  proviso  quoted  above,  is\tidentical  with\t the
\nproviso\t to S.\t58 of the Evidence Act, which lays down that
\nfacts  admitted\t need  not  be proved.\t Reading  all  these
\nprovisions  together,  it is manifest that the Court is\t not
\nbound  to grant the declarations prayed for, even though the
\nfacts alleged in the plaint, may have been admitted.”\n<\/p>\n
      The Court further observed:-\n<\/p>\n
      “Hence,  if  the Court, in all the circumstances of  a
\nparticular  case,  takes the view that it would insist\tupon
\nthe  burden of the issue being fully discharged, and if\t the
\nCourt,\tin pursuance of the terms of S.\t 42 of the  Specific
\nRelief\tAct, decides, in a given case, to insist upon  clear
\nproof of even admitted facts, the Court could not be said to
\nhave exceeded its judicial powers.”\n<\/p>\n
      As  pointed  out\tearlier, the Court has\tnot  to\t act
\nblindly\t upon the admission of a fact made by the  defendant
\nin  his\t Written Statement nor the Court should\t proceed  to
\npass judgment blindly merely because a Written Statement has
\nnot been filed by the defendant traversing the facts set out
\nby  the\t plaintiff in the plaint filed in the Court.   In  a
\ncase, specially where a Written Statement has not been filed
\nby  the defendant, the Court should be a little cautious  in
\nproceeding  under  Order 8 Rule 10 CPC.\t Before passing\t the
\njudgment  against the defendant it must see to it that\teven
\nif  the facts set out in the plaint are treated to have been
\nadmitted,  a judgment could possibly be passed in favour  of
\nthe  plaintiff\twithout\t requiring  him to  prove  any\tfact
\nmentioned  in  the  plaint.   It  is  a\t matter\t of  Court’s
\nsatisfaction  and,  therefore, only on being satisfied\tthat
\nthere  is no fact which need be proved on account of  deemed
\nadmission,  the\t Court\tcan  conveniently  pass\t a  judgment
\nagainst\t the  defendant\t who  has   not\t filed\tthe  Written
\nStatement.   But  if the plaint itself indicates that  there
\nare  disputed  questions  of  fact   involved  in  the\tcase
\nregarding  which  two different versions are set out in\t the
\nplaint\titself, it would not be safe for the Court to pass a
\njudgment  without requiring the plaintiff to prove the facts
\nso  as to settle the factual controversy.  Such a case would
\nbe  covered  by\t the  expression  “the\tCourt  may,  in\t its
\ndiscretion, require any such fact to be proved” used in sub-
\nrule  (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8, or the expression “may\tmake
\nsuch order in relation to the suit as it thinks fit” used in
\nRule 10 of Order 8.\n<\/p>\n
      Applying\tthese tests to the instant case, it will  be
\nnoticed\t that  in  a  suit for specific\t performance  it  is
\nmandatorily  required  by Section 16 of the Specific  Relief
\nAct  to plead readiness and willingness of the plaintiff  to
\nperform\t his part of the contract.  The Court, before acting
\nunder Order 8 Rule 10 has to scrutinise the facts set out in
\nthe  plaint  to\t find  out  whether  all  the  requirements,
\nspecially  those  indicated  in Section 16 of  the  Specific
\nRelief\tAct, have been complied with or not.  Readiness\t and
\nwillingness  of\t the  plaintiff to perform his part  of\t the
\ncontract is a condition precedent to the passing of a decree
\nfor specific performance in favour of the plaintiff.\n<\/p>\n
      We may now examine the facts of this case.\n<\/p>\n
      A copy of the plaint which is on record indicates that
\nrespondent  No.1  had entered into an agreement on  6.8.1992
\nwith  respondent No.2 as also the present appellants for the
\nsale of property bearing No.W-118, Greater Kailash, Part-II,
\nNew  Delhi,  on the first floor (rear portion consisting  of
\none drawing room, two bed rooms, one kitchen, two bath rooms
\nand  one  servant quarter with toilet along with  impartible
\nand indivisible proportionate rights in the land underneath)
\nfor  a sum of Rs.  7 lakhs out of which a sum of Rs.4  lakhs
\nwas  paid  at the time of the signing of the agreement\twith
\nthe stipulation that a further sum of Rs.2.25 lakhs would be
\npaid  by  respondent No.1 on receipt of permission from\t the
\nIncome\tTax Department and Rs.75,000\/- would be paid at\t the
\ntime  of  the  registration of sale deed.   It\twas  further
\npleaded\t in  the  plaint  that possession of  the  flat\t was
\ndelivered  to respondent No.1 in pursuance of the  agreement
\ndated  6th  of August, 1992 in which it was further set\t out
\nthat all expenses for execution and registration of the sale
\ndeed  would  be borne exclusively by respondent\t No.1.\t The
\nplaint\t further  recites  that\t  till\tFebruary  19,  1996,
\nrespondent  No.1  was not informed by any of the  defendants
\nabout  permission,  if\tany,  taken   from  the\t Income\t Tax
\nDepartment  in\tspite of several requests made by  him\tfrom
\ntime to time.  It was also pleaded as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
      “Even  the  permission  under the Income\tTax  Act  to
\nenable\tthe agreement to sell and execution of the sale deed
\nin  favour  of the Plaintiff was to be obtained not only  by
\nDefendant  No.1\t but  also  by Defendant Nos.  2  and  3  as
\nmentioned in Clause 12 of the agreement to sell.”\n<\/p>\n
      In  respect  of  the  permission\tof  the\t Income\t Tax
\nDepartment,  referred  to  above,  para\t 12  of\t the  plaint
\nmentioned as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
      “That  vide letter\/reply dated 1st of March 1996,\t the
\nDefendant  No.1\t had replied to the notice of the  Plaintiff
\ndated 13th February 1996, wherein a vague and evasive denial
\nwas made by the Defendant No.1 to the contents of the notice
\ndated  13th  February 1996 of the Plaintiff.  The  Plaintiff
\nwas  informed  for  the\t first time  about  the\t income\t tax
\ncertificate alongwith the said reply by Defendant No.1 which
\nwas obtained by the Defendant No.1.  However, no certificate
\nwas obtained by the Defendant Nos.  2 and 3 as was requisite
\nunder  the  terms and conditions of agreement to sell  dated
\n6th of August, 1992.”\n<\/p>\n
      In  para\t16 of the plaint, it was further pleaded  as
\nunder:-\n<\/p>\n
      “That vide reply dated 16th March, 1996, the Plaintiff
\nhad brought it to the notice of the Defendants that the copy
\nof  certificate\t alleged to have been obtained\tin  December
\n1995  was  never  given\t or sent to  the  Plaintiff  by\t the
\nDefendants.  The Plaintiff had called upon the Defendants to
\nsend  forward  the original certificate obtained by them  in
\nDecember  1995 to enable the Plaintiff to proceed further in
\nthe  matter.   The  Plaintiff  had   also  called  upon\t the
\nDefendant  Nos.\t  2  and 3 to obtain  requisite\t certificate
\nunder  the Income Tax Act as per terms of agreement to\tsell
\ndated 6th August 1992.”\n<\/p>\n
      The  case of respondent No.1, as set out in the plaint
\nitself,\t was  that  while defendants,  namely,\tthe  present
\nappellants  as also respondent No.2 maintained that they had
\nobtained  the  necessary  permission  from  the\t Income\t Tax
\nDepartment  and\t had sent the same to him, respondent  No.1,
\ndisputed  that fact and maintained that this was not correct
\nand no Certificate (Permission) of the Income Tax Department
\nwas  ever sent to him by the appellants or respondent  No.2.
\nOn  the own pleadings of respondent No.1, as set out in\t his
\nplaint,\t there\twas a dispute between the  parties,  namely,
\nplaintiff and defendants, whether permission from the Income
\nTax  Department\t had  been obtained by the  defendants\t(the
\npresent\t  appellants  and  respondent\tNo.2)  and  sent  to
\nplaintiff  (present respondent No.1) or the said  permission
\nwas,  at  no  time, obtained by the defendants nor  had\t the
\ndefendants sent it to the plaintiff (respondent No.1).\tThis
\nwas  a\tvital fact which had an important bearing  upon\t the
\nconduct\t of  respondent\t No.1.\tThat is to say,\t if  it\t was
\nestablished  that  the\tCertificate  (permission)  from\t the
\nIncome\tTax  Department\t had already been  obtained  by\t the
\ndefendants  and\t sent  to him, the denial of  the  plaintiff
\nwould  be  reflective of his attitude that he was not  ready
\nand  willing  to perform his part of the contract.   On\t the
\ncontrary,  if it was found that defendants had not  obtained
\nthe  Certificate, the question whether specific\t performance
\ncould  still  be  decreed   would  have\t immediately  arisen
\nparticularly  because  of  the relevant\t provisions  of\t the
\nIncome\tTax Act.  Now, the agreement in question  stipulated
\nthat  the defendants would obtain permission from the Income
\nTax  Department and send the same to the plaintiff whereupon
\nthe  plaintiff\twould  pay  a sum of Rs.2.25  lakhs  to\t the
\ndefendants  and\t the balance amount of Rs.75,000\/- would  be
\npaid  at  the  time of the registration of  the\t sale  deed.
\nSince,\ton  the own showing of the plaintiff, as set out  in
\nthe  plaint, the defendants had been asserting that they had
\nobtained  the permission and sent the same to the plaintiff,
\nwhich was not accepted by the plaintiff, there arose between
\nthe  parties  a\t disputed question of fact which had  to  be
\ninvestigated  and  decided particularly as it was likely  to
\nreflect\t upon  the conduct of the plaintiff whether  he\t was
\nwilling to perform his part of the contract or not.  It had,
\ntherefore,  to\tbe proved as a fact that permission  of\t the
\nIncome\tTax  Department\t had  not   been  obtained  by\t the
\ndefendants  nor had that Certificate (permission) been\tsent
\nto the plaintiff.  If the said Certificate had been obtained
\nand sent to the plaintiff, the latter, namely, the plaintiff
\nshould\thave  immediately  paid\t the  stipulated  amount  of
\nRs.2.25 lakhs to the defendants and required them to execute
\nthe  sale  deed in his favour.\tThe plaintiff, according  to
\nfacts  set out in the plaint, waited till February 19,\t1996
\nwhich  is quite evident from the exchange of notices between
\nthe  parties  which  indicated the existence  of  a  serious
\ndispute\t whether the Income Tax Certificate (permission) had
\nbeen  obtained\tby  the\t defendants   from  the\t Income\t Tax
\nDepartment  and\t sent  to  the\t plaintiff  as\talleged\t  by
\ndefendants  in their notices or it was wrong as asserted  by
\nthe  plaintiff in his notices or the replies to\t defendants’
\nnotices.\n<\/p>\n
      This  suit has been decreed by the Delhi High Court by
\nthe following judgment:-\n<\/p>\n
      “SUIT NO.\t 1124\/96 & I.A.\t No.  4303\/96.\n<\/p>\n
      On  the  20th  of September, 1996, Mr.   Lalit  Kumar,
\nlearned\t counsel  for defendant 1 to 3 sought time  to\tfile
\nwritten\t statement  and\t reply.\t Time was  granted  but\t the
\nwritten\t statement  and reply have not been filed.   On\t the
\n22nd  of  January,  1997, Mr.  Aseem Mohar for\tcounsel\t for
\ndefendant  appeared and sought time to file vakalatnama\t and
\nwritten statement\/reply and the matter had been adjourned to
\nthis  date.  Today Mr.\tKamal Mehta putting in appearance on
\nbehalf\tof  defandant  No.2 and 3 and  represents  that\t Mr.
\nRajiv  Nayar  has  been\t engaged by  the  second  and  third
\ndefendants  this  morning and he seeks time to file  written
\nstatement\/reply.\n<\/p>\n
      The  defendants  are  adopting  this  tactic  only  to
\nprotract  the  proceedings  and have not filed\tthe  written
\nstatement and reply to the application inspite of sufficient
\nopportunity having been given.\n<\/p>\n
      Accordingly,   the  suit\tis   decreed  for   specific
\nperformance  in\t favour\t of the plaintiff  and\tagainst\t the
\ndefendants  with the directions to the plaintiff to  deposit
\nthe  balance amount of Rs.3,00,000\/- (Rupees Three Lakhs) in
\nthis  court  within six weeks from today.  If the amount  is
\ndeposited  within  six\tweeks,\tit  will  be  open  for\t the
\nplaintiff to apply for the appointment of a Commissioner for
\nthe  execution\tof the sale deed.  The defendants  are\talso
\ndirected to pay the cost of the suit.\n<\/p>\n
      February 10, 1997.  Sd\/- JUDGE.”\n<\/p>\n
      A perusal of the above judgment will indicate that the
\nsuit  had  been decreed only because of the failure  of\t the
\ndefendants  in filing the written statement.  This  exhibits
\nthe  annoyance\tof  the Court which is natural as  no  Court
\nwould allow the proceedings to be delayed or procrastinated.
\nBut  this  should not disturb the judicial  composure  which
\nunfortunately  is  apparent  in\t the  instant  case  as\t the
\njudgment  neither sets out the facts of the case nor does it
\nrecord the process of reasoning by which the Court felt that
\nthe case of the plaintiff was true and stood proved.\n<\/p>\n
      As  will be evident from the facts set out above,\t the
\nplaint\titself\tshowed a serious disputed question  of\tfact
\ninvolved between the parties with regard to the obtaining of
\nCertificate  (permission) from the Income Tax Department and
\nits  communication  by\tthe   defendants  to  the  plaintiff
\n(Respondent No.\t 1).  Since this<\/p>\n
      question of fact was reflective of the attitude of the
\nplaintiff,  whether he was ready and willing to perform\t his
\npart of the contract, it had to be proved as a fact that the
\nCertificate  (permission) from the Income Tax Department had
\nnot  been  obtained by the defendants and, therefore,  there
\nwas  no occasion of sending it to him.\tIf the pleadings  of
\nrespondent  No.\t  1  were limited in character that  he\t had
\npleaded\t only this much that the defendants had not obtained
\nthe  Certificate (permission) from the Income Tax Department
\nand  had  not  sent it to him, this fact  would\t have  stood
\nadmitted  on account of non-filing of the Written  Statement
\nby  the\t defendants.  But Respondent No.  1,  as  plaintiff,
\nhimself\t pleaded  that\t“defendants insisted that  they\t had
\nobtained  the  Certificate (permission) from the Income\t Tax
\nDepartment  and sent it to him”.  He denied its having\tbeen
\nobtained  or  sent  to\thim.\tNon-filing  of\tthe  Written
\nStatement  would  not resolve this controversy.\t The  plaint
\nallegations,  even  if treated as admitted, would  keep\t the
\ncontroversy  alive.  This fact, therefore, had to be  proved
\nby  the\t plaintiff  and\t the Court could  not  have  legally
\nproceeded  to  pass  a judgment unless\tit  was\t established
\nclearly\t that  the defendants had committed default  in\t not
\nobtaining  the Certificate (permission) from the Income\t Tax
\nDepartment and sending the same to the plaintiff.\n<\/p>\n
      The  agreement between the parties was entered into in
\n1992 and for four years the plaintiff had kept quiet and not
\ninsisted  for the execution of the sale deed in his  favour.
\nWhen he did raise that question, the defendants informed him
\nthat  the  certificate\thad already been obtained  from\t the
\nIncome Tax Authorities and sent to him.\n<\/p>\n
      Unfortunately,  the  High Court did not consider\tthis
\nfact and proceeded almost blindly to pass a decree in favour
\nof  the\t plaintiff merely because Written Statement had\t not
\nbeen  filed  in the case.  Learned Single Judge, who  passed
\nthe decree, did not consider any fact other than the conduct
\nof  the\t defendants in seeking adjournments of the case\t for
\npurposes of filing Written Statement.  So also, the Division
\nBench did not consider any fact other than the fact that the
\ndefendants  had\t been trying to prolong the  proceedings  by
\nseeking\t adjournments,\tand  that  too,\t by  changing  their
\ncounsel.   The\tDivision Bench also took into  consideration
\nthe fact that the appeal filed by the defendants against the
\ndecree\tpassed\tby  the Single Judge was beyond\t time  which
\nagain  indicated their negligence.  No other fact was  taken
\ninto consideration and the decree passed by the Single Judge
\nwas affirmed.\n<\/p>\n
      There  is\t yet  another infirmity in  the\t case  which
\nrelates\t to  the “judgment” passed by the Single  Judge\t and
\nupheld by the Division Bench.\n<\/p>\n
      “Judgment”  as defined in Section 2(9) of the Code  of
\nCivil  Procedure  means the statement given by the Judge  of
\nthe  grounds for a decree or order.  What a judgment  should
\ncontain is indicated in Order 20, Rule 4 (2) which says that
\na judgment :\n<\/p>\n
      “shall  contain  a concise statement of the case,\t the
\npoints\tfor  determination,  the decision  thereon  and\t the
\nreasons for such decision.”\n<\/p>\n
      It  should be a self-contained document from which  it
\nshould appear as to what were the facts of the case and what
\nwas  the  controversy which was tried to be settled  by\t the
\nCourt and in what manner.  The process of reasoning by which
\nthe  Court  came to the ultimate conclusion and decreed\t the
\nsuit should be reflected clearly in the judgment.\n<\/p>\n
      In  an  old case, namely, Nanhe vs.   Saiyad  Tasadduq
\nHusain\t(1912) 15 Oudh Cases 78, it was held that passing of
\na  mere decree was material irregularity within the  meaning
\nof Section 115 of the Code and that even if the judgment was
\npassed\ton the basis of the admission made by the defendant,
\nother  requirements which go to constitute “judgment” should
\nbe complied with.\n<\/p>\n
      In Thippaiah and others vs.  Kuri Obaiah, ILR 1980 (2)
\nKarnataka  1028, it was laid down that the Court must  state
\nthe  grounds  for  its conclusion in the  judgment  and\t the
\njudgment  should  be  in confirmity with the  provisions  of
\nSection\t 2(9) of the Code of Civil Procedure.  In  Dineshwar
\nPrasad\tBakshi vs.  Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, AIR 1989  Patna
\n139,  it was held that the judgment pronounced under Order 8
\nRule  10  must\tsatisfy the requirements  of  “judgment”  as
\ndefined in Section 2(9) of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
      Learned  counsel for respondent No.  1 contended\tthat
\nthe  provisions of Order 20, Rule 1 (2) would apply only  to
\ncontested  cases  as  it is only in those  cases  that\t“the
\npoints\tfor  determination” as mentioned in this  Rule\twill
\nhave to be indicated, and not in a case in which the written
\nstatement has not been filed by the defendants and the facts
\nset  out in the plaint are deemed to have been admitted.  We
\ndo  not\t agree.\t Whether it is a case which is contested  by
\nthe  defendants\t by  filing a written statement, or  a\tcase
\nwhich  proceeds\t ex-parte  and is ultimately decided  as  an
\nex-parte  case, or is a case in which the written  statement
\nis  not filed and the case is decided under Order 8 Rule 10,
\nthe  Court  has\t to  write  a  judgment\t which\tmust  be  in
\nconformity  with the provisions of the Code or at least\t set
\nout the reasoning by which the controversy is resolved.\n<\/p>\n
      An  attempt was made to contend that the definiton  of
\njudgment as set out in Section 2(9) of the Code would not be
\napplicable to the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in
\nits  original  jurisdiction  wherein   the  proceedings\t are
\nregulated  by  the provisions of the Delhi High\t Court\tAct,
\n1966.\tIt is contended that the word “judgment” used in the
\nDelhi  High  Court Act, 1966 would not take its colour\tfrom
\nthe  definition\t of “judgment” contained in Section 2(9)  of
\nthe Code of Civil Procedure.  We do not intend to enter into
\nthis  controversy,  fortunately as it is not contended\tthat
\nthe  Code  of Civil Procedure does not apply, but we  cannot
\nrefrain\t from expressing that even if it were so, the  Delhi
\nHigh  Court  is\t not absolved of its obligation to  write  a
\njudgment  as  understood  in common parlance.  Even  if\t the
\ndefinition  were  not  contained  in  Section  2(9)  or\t the
\ncontents  thereof were not indicated in Order 20 Rule 1\t (2)
\nCPC,  the judgment would still mean the process of reasoning
\nby  which a Judge decides a case in favour of one party\t and
\nagainst the other.  In judicial proceedings, there cannot be
\narbitrary  orders.  A Judge cannot merely say “Suit decreed”
\nor  “Suit dismissed”.  The whole process of reasoning has to
\nbe set out for deciding the case one way or the other.\tThis
\ninfirmity  in  the present judgment is glaring and for\tthat
\nreason also the judgment cannot be sustained.\n<\/p>\n
      Learned  counsel\tfor respondent No.  1 then tried  to
\ninvoke\tour discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136  of
\nthe  Constitution  and\tcontended  that on  account  of\t the
\nconduct\t of  the  appellants as also respondent No.   2,  we
\nshould\tnot  grant leave in this case, particularly  as\t the
\nsale-deed  has\talready been executed in his favour  by\t the
\nCommissioner  appointed by the High Court.  It is true\tthat
\nthe  jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution is a
\ndiscretionary\tjurisdiction  and   notwithstanding  that  a
\njudgment  may  not be wholly correct or in  accordance\twith
\nlaw, this Court is not bound to interfere in exercise of its
\ndiscretionary  jurisdiction.  But in the instant case, as we
\nhave  already  seen above, it is not merely a matter of\t the
\ndefendants’  conduct in not filing the Written Statement but
\nthe question of law as to what the Court should do in a case
\nwhere  Written Statement is not filed, is involved, and this
\nquestion  has  to  be decided so as to provide for  all\t the
\nlower  courts  as  to  how the court  should  proceed  in  a
\nsituation  of this nature.  We, therefore, allow the appeal,
\nset  aside the judgment dated 10.2.1997 passed by the Single
\nJudge  as  also the judgment dated 29.4.1998 passed  by\t the
\nDivision  Bench of the Delhi High Court and remand the\tcase
\nback to the Delhi High Court for a fresh decision.  We allow
\nthe  appellants and Respondent No.  2 to file their  Written
\nStatement by 15th of October, 1999, with a clear stipulation
\nthat if the Written Statement is not filed by that date, the
\ndecree passed by the High Court shall stand.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Balraj Taneja & Anr vs Sunil Madan & Anr on 8 September, 1999 Author: S Ahmad Bench: D.P.Mohapatro, S.Saghir Ahmad PETITIONER: BALRAJ TANEJA & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: SUNIL MADAN & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08\/09\/1999 BENCH: D.P.Mohapatro, S.Saghir Ahmad JUDGMENT: S.SAGHIR AHMAD, J. Leave granted. Respondent No.1, Sunil Madan, filed a […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-137084","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nBalraj Taneja & Anr vs Sunil Madan & Anr on 8 September, 1999 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/balraj-taneja-anr-vs-sunil-madan-anr-on-8-september-1999\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Balraj Taneja & Anr vs Sunil Madan & Anr on 8 September, 1999 - 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