{"id":137870,"date":"2008-05-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-05-07T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008"},"modified":"2015-05-10T11:51:05","modified_gmt":"2015-05-10T06:21:05","slug":"p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008","title":{"rendered":"P.Venugopal vs Union Of India on 8 May, 2008"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
P.Venugopal vs Union Of India on 8 May, 2008<\/div>\n
Author: T Chatterjee<\/div>\n
Bench: Tarun Chatterjee, Harjit Singh Bedi<\/div>\n
                                                    REPORTABLE\n\n            IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n             CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION\n\n\n\n        WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.656 OF 2007\n\nP.VENUGOPAL                              ...Petitioner\n\nVERSUS\n\nUNION OF INDIA                           ...Respondent\n\n\n\n                       J U D G M E N T\n<\/pre>\n
TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.    In this writ application under Article 32<\/p>\n
of the Constitution moved at the instance of<\/p>\n
Dr.P.Venugopal, a renowned and internationally<\/p>\n
famed     Cardio     Vascular    Surgeon,       calls   in<\/p>\n
question    the     constitutional    validity    of    the<\/p>\n
proviso to sub-section (1A) of Section 11 of<\/p>\n
the   All   India    Institute   of   Medical    Sciences<\/p>\n
(Amendment) Act, 2007.\n<\/p>\n
\n                                                    1<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
2.    The    writ           petitioner       was   admittedly            the<\/p>\n
Director         of    All        India    Institute      of    Medical<\/p>\n
Sciences         (in    short       the     “AIIMS”)      immediately<\/p>\n
prior       to        the     commencement         of     the       added<\/p>\n
provisions        and        by    virtue     of   the    legislative<\/p>\n
command contained in the added provision he had<\/p>\n
been made to demit his office as Director of<\/p>\n
the said Institute from the date of coming into<\/p>\n
force of this added provision.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
3.    The writ petitioner claims and it does not<\/p>\n
appear      to    be        disputed       that    he    was    a       Gold<\/p>\n
Medalist in his batch of MBBS, passed out from<\/p>\n
the   AIIMS       itself          and     thereafter     he    acquired<\/p>\n
qualification of MS and MCH in cardio vascular<\/p>\n
surgery and that he served the Institute for<\/p>\n
about     three\/four              decades     with       honesty         and<\/p>\n
respect without any blemish. It is also not in<\/p>\n
dispute      that           the     writ     petitioner         was       to<\/p>\n
complete his five-year term in the Office of<\/p>\n
the Director on 2nd of July, 2008, but due to<\/p>\n
this added provision in the Act, had to suffer<\/p>\n
                                                                    2<\/span>
\na pre-mature termination and consequent removal<\/p>\n
from    the   office      of     the   Director     on    30th      of<\/p>\n
November, 2007. It is alleged that this adverse<\/p>\n
affectation has been brought about directly by<\/p>\n
the added provision.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
4.     In the Statement of Objects and Reasons of<\/p>\n
the Amendment Act of 1987 being Act XXX of<\/p>\n
1987, as stated herein above, AIIMS and the<\/p>\n
Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education<\/p>\n
and     Research,         Chandigarh,         are     statutory<\/p>\n
autonomous     bodies          wholly     financed        by       the<\/p>\n
Government      of        India.       Sub-Section        (2)      of<\/p>\n
Section 3 of the All India Institute of Medical<\/p>\n
Sciences      Act,         1956,       provides       for          the<\/p>\n
incorporation        of    the     Institute    and      declares<\/p>\n
“that the Institute shall be a body corporate<\/p>\n
by     the    name        aforesaid       having      perpetual<\/p>\n
succession and a common seal with a power to<\/p>\n
acquire, hold and dispose of property, both<\/p>\n
moveable and immoveable, and to contract, and<\/p>\n
shall    by   the    said      name     sue   and    be     sued”.<\/p>\n
                                                               3<\/span>
\nSection 5 of the Parent Act declares “that the<\/p>\n
Institute        shall   be     an     Institute         of   National<\/p>\n
Importance.” Section 4 of the Act deals with<\/p>\n
the     composition        of        the     Institute        and        the<\/p>\n
Director of the Institute has been made an Ex-<\/p>\n
officio Member of the Institute and under sub-<\/p>\n
section 2 of Section 6, he is to continue as<\/p>\n
such so long as he holds office in virtue of<\/p>\n
which, he is such a Member. The Act provides<\/p>\n
for Constitution of a Governing Body by the<\/p>\n
Institute        from    amongst           its    members      in       such<\/p>\n
manner as may be prescribed by the Regulations<\/p>\n
to    exercise      such       power        and    discharge            such<\/p>\n
functions as the Institute may, by Regulation,<\/p>\n
make in this behalf confer or impose upon it.<\/p>\n
Under Regulation 25, the Institute is required<\/p>\n
to carry out such directions as may be issued<\/p>\n
to    it    from    time        to     time       by    the    Central<\/p>\n
Government        for    the     efficient             administration<\/p>\n
under      the    Act.     Section          26    deals       with       the<\/p>\n
dispute between the Institute and the Central<\/p>\n
Government in the matter of exercise of its<\/p>\n
                                                                    4<\/span>
\npower and discharge of its function under the<\/p>\n
Act   and   makes   the   decision    of   the   Central<\/p>\n
Government    final.   Thus   the    Act   designed   the<\/p>\n
Institute to be an autonomous statutory body of<\/p>\n
national importance subject to limited control<\/p>\n
in respect of specified matters. Sub-section<\/p>\n
(1A) with its proviso added to Section 11 of<\/p>\n
the   AIIMS   (Amendment)     Act,     2007   reads    as<\/p>\n
follows:-\n<\/p>\n
      (1A) – The Director shall hold office
\n      for a term of five years from the date
\n      on which he enters upon his office or
\n      until he attains the age of sixty-five
\n      years, whichever is earlier.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Provided that any person holding
\n      office   as   a   Director   immediately
\n      before the commencement of the All
\n      India Institute of Medical Sciences
\n      and the Post-Graduate Institute of
\n      Medical     Education    and      Research
\n      (Amendment) Act, 2007, shall in so far
\n      as his appointment is inconsistent
\n      with the provisions of this sub-
\n      section, cease to hold office on such
\n      commencement as such Director and
\n      shall     be    entitled     to      claim
\n      compensation    not   exceeding      three
\n      months’ pay and allowances for the
\n      premature termination of his office or
\n      of any contract of service……”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                  5<\/span><\/p>\n
5.     As   noted    herein        earlier    in   this         writ<\/p>\n
petition, the challenge has been confined only<\/p>\n
to the proviso of the added sub-section (1A) of<\/p>\n
Section 11 of the Act. Mr.Arun Jaitley, learned<\/p>\n
senior counsel appearing on behalf of the writ<\/p>\n
petitioner submitted at the first instance that<\/p>\n
the     provisions,         no     doubt,    acquire        their<\/p>\n
operational significance from the added sub-<\/p>\n
section but manifestly, it makes a significant<\/p>\n
departure      from        the     substantive     part         and<\/p>\n
proceeds     to     deal    only     with    the   particular<\/p>\n
Director holding office immediately prior to<\/p>\n
its coming into force and is not concerned with<\/p>\n
any other officer or member of the Institute,<\/p>\n
nor to any other person who may be coming to<\/p>\n
hold the same office of Director in future.\n<\/p>\n
6.     We have carefully examined the proviso to<\/p>\n
the added sub-section (1A) to Section 11 of the<\/p>\n
Act.    Reading     the     proviso     in   the   manner         as<\/p>\n
aforesaid, the writ petitioner has challenged<\/p>\n
its    constitutional            validity    mainly    on        the<\/p>\n
following grounds:\n<\/p>\n
\n                                                            6<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
(i)     The proviso is patently a\n        single-man   legislation    and\n        intended to affect the writ\n        petitioner only and none else\n        thus   introduces    a   \"naked\n        discrimination\"    to   deprive\n        the writ petitioner of the\n        constitutional       protection\n        under   Article   14   of   the\n        Constitution.\n\n(ii)    The writ petitioner has been\n        singled out to be deprived of\n<\/pre>\n
        the two protective conditions
\n        in respect of curtailment of
\n        his tenure. The benefit of
\n        notice     and     justifiable
\n        reasons being the two such
\n        conditions will continue to
\n        be available to all future
\n        Directors   but  the   proviso
\n        makes them non-available to
\n        the writ petitioner being the
\n        Director presently in office
\n        and requires him to move out
\n        of   the  office   under   the
\n        legislative command.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)   In      the      facts      and\n        circumstances of the case and\n        in   view   of    the   pending\n        proceedings    with   different\n        orders passed therein, such\n        calculated steps to force the\n        writ petitioner out of his\n        office        offend        the\n        constitutional           scheme\n        envisaging fair, reasonable\n        and equal treatment on the\n        part of the State in its\n        dealing with the individual\n        in general and with people in\n        public      employment       in\n        particular.\n\n                                      7<\/span>\n     (iv)          The writ petitioner claims\n                   the protection of Articles 14\n                   and 16 of the Constitution of\n                   India.\n\n     (v)           In the factual context of the\n                   case,   there     has   been    a\n                   violation    of     the    orders\n                   issued in favour of the writ\n                   petitioner    passed    by    the\n                   learned Single Judge of the\n                   High   Court     of   Delhi    in\n                   W.P.No.10687\/2006              in\n                   connection      with     interim\n                   applications                  CMP\n<\/pre>\n
                   NOs.8169\/2006 and 12471\/2006
\n                   and by the Division Bench in
\n                   W.P.)No.8485\/2006      and    LPA
\n                   NOs.2045-46\/2006.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
7.   It    is    true       that    in    establishments            like<\/p>\n
AIIMS,     there       is    an     age    of     superannuation<\/p>\n
governing the length of service of its officers<\/p>\n
and employees. Such age of superannuation may<\/p>\n
be suitably altered by way of reducing the age<\/p>\n
so   as   to    affect       even    the       serving    employees<\/p>\n
under      appropriate             circumstances          and         no<\/p>\n
exception       can     be    taken       to    such     course       of<\/p>\n
action.     Similarly         under       the    Service     Rules,<\/p>\n
there may be provision for extension of service<\/p>\n
after      the        attainment          of      the     age         of<\/p>\n
                                                                8<\/span>
\nsuperannuation and it is well settled that in<\/p>\n
the event of refusal by an employer to grant an<\/p>\n
extension,        the    employee       cannot     justifiably<\/p>\n
claim to be deprived of any right or privilege.<\/p>\n
The   view   taken       is     that   the    employer     has   a<\/p>\n
discretion        to    grant     or   not    to   grant       such<\/p>\n
extension having regard to the interest of the<\/p>\n
employer     or    the    establishment.        This   view      is<\/p>\n
expressed by this Court in the Case of State<\/p>\n
Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur and Ors. vs. Jag<\/p>\n
Mohan Lal (AIR<\/a> 1989 SC 75).                  In this case, at<\/p>\n
para 12, this Court observed as follows :<\/p>\n
      “The Bank has no obligation to extend
\n      the services of all officers even if
\n      they are found suitable in every
\n      respect. The interest of the Bank is
\n      the primary consideration for giving
\n      extension of service. With due regard
\n      to exigencies of service, the Bank in
\n      one year may give extension to all
\n      suitable retiring officers. In another
\n      year, it may give extension to some
\n      and not to all. In a subsequent year,
\n      it may not give extension to any one
\n      of the officers. The Bank may have a
\n      lot of fresh recruits in one year. The
\n      Bank may not need the services of all
\n      retired persons in another year. The
\n      Bank may have lesser workload in a<\/p>\n
                                                           9<\/span>
\n      succeeding year. The retiring persons
\n      cannot   in  any   year   demand   that
\n      “extension to all or none”. If we
\n      concede   that   right   to    retiring
\n      persons, then the very purpose of
\n      giving extension in the interest of
\n      the Bank would be defeated. We are,
\n      therefore, of opinion that there is no
\n      scope for complaining arbitrariness in
\n      the matter of giving extension of
\n      service to retiring persons.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   Top of Form<\/p>\n
 0<\/span><\/p>\n
Bottom of Form<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
8.    In the instant case, the material facts<\/p>\n
and    circumstances   bring    into    focus      other<\/p>\n
consideration.    In   the     case    of   the        writ<\/p>\n
petitioner, a Division Bench of the Delhi High<\/p>\n
Court by its judgment and order dated 29th of<\/p>\n
March, 2007 (Pages 119 to 181 of Volume I of<\/p>\n
Writ Petition No.656 of 2007) has considered<\/p>\n
the right of the writ petitioner to hold the<\/p>\n
office of the Director for five years from the<\/p>\n
age of 61 years to 66 years. There can be no<\/p>\n
dispute with regard to the contentions raised<\/p>\n
by Mr. K. A. Parasaran, learned senior counsel<\/p>\n
                                                  10<\/span>
\nappearing     for      the    respondent,    that    a   person<\/p>\n
appointed       in     Government      service     acquires     a<\/p>\n
status    and        his    service    conditions    will     be<\/p>\n
determined by the Service Rules or Statutory<\/p>\n
Rules and not by the contrary or inconsistent<\/p>\n
terms    of   the      contract,      and   such    terms     and<\/p>\n
conditions       of        service    may   be   unilaterally<\/p>\n
altered by the Government. This view has been<\/p>\n
candidly expressed in paragraph 6 of a decision<\/p>\n
of this Court, namely, Roshan Lal Tandon vs.<\/p>\n
Union of India and Anr. (AIR<\/a> 1967 SC 1889)<\/p>\n
which, in our view, should be required to be<\/p>\n
reproduced. Accordingly, we reproduce para 6 of<\/p>\n
the aforesaid decision which is as under :<\/p>\n
    “We pass on to consider the next
\n    contention of the petitioner that
\n    there was a contractual right as
\n    regards   the   condition   of   service
\n    applicable to the petitioner at the
\n    time he entered Grade ‘D’ and the
\n    condition of service could not be
\n    altered to his disadvantage afterwards
\n    by the notification issued by the
\n    Railway Board. It was said that the
\n    order of the Railway Board dated
\n    January 25, 1958, Annexure ‘B’, laid
\n    down that promotion to Grade ‘C’ from
\n    Grade   ‘D’   was   to   be   based   on<\/p>\n
                                                         11<\/span>
\nseniority-cum-suitability    and    this
\ncondition of service was contractual
\nand could not be altered thereafter to
\nthe prejudice of the petitioner. In
\nour opinion, there is no warrant for
\nthis argument. It is true that the
\norigin   of   Government   service    is
\ncontractual. There is an offer and
\nacceptance in every case. But once
\nappointed to his post or office the
\nGovernment servant acquires a status
\nand his rights and obligations are no
\nlonger determined by consent of both
\nparties, but by statute or statutory
\nrules which may be framed and altered
\nunilaterally by the Government. In
\nother words, the legal position of a
\nGovernment servant is more one of
\nstatus than of contract. The hall-mark
\nof status is the attachment to a legal
\nrelationship of rights and duties
\nimposed by the public law and not by
\nmere agreement of the parties. The
\nemolument of the Government servant
\nand his terms of service are governed
\nby statute or statutory rules which
\nmay be unilaterally altered by the
\nGovernment without the consent of the
\nemployee. It is true that Art. 311
\nimposes   constitutional   restrictions
\nupon the power of removal granted to
\nthe President and the Governor under
\nArt. 310. But it is obvious that the
\nrelationship between the Government
\nand its servant is not like an
\nordinary contract of service between a
\nmaster    and   servant.    The    legal
\nrelationship   is  something    entirely
\ndifferent, something in the nature of
\nstatus. It is much more than a purely
\ncontractual relationship voluntarily<\/p>\n
                                      12<\/span>
\nentered into between the parties. The
\nduties of status are fixed by the law
\nand in the enforcement of these duties
\nsociety   has   an    interest.  In   the
\nlanguage of jurisprudence status is a
\ncondition of membership of a group of
\nwhich    powers      and    duties    are
\nexclusively determined by law and not
\nby   agreement    between   the   parties
\nconcerned.    The   matter   is   clearly
\nstated by Salmond and Williams on
\nContracts as follow :\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
“So we may find both contractual and
\nstatus-obligations     produced   by   the
\nsame transaction. The one transaction
\nmay result in the creation not only of
\nobligations defined by the parties and
\nso   pertaining    to    the  sphere    of
\ncontract but also and concurrently of
\nobligations defined by the law itself,
\nand so pertaining to the sphere of
\nstatus. A contract of service between
\nemployer and employee, while for the
\nmost part pertaining exclusively to
\nthe sphere of contract, pertains also
\nto that of status so far as the law
\nitself has been fit to attach to this
\nrelation compulsory incidents, such as
\nliability to pay compensation for
\naccidents. The extent to which the law
\nis content to leave matters within the
\ndomain of contract to be determined by
\nthe    exercise    of    the    autonomous
\nauthority of the parties themselves,
\nor thinks fit to bring the matter
\nwithin    the   sphere    of  status    by
\nauthoritatively determining for itself
\nthe contents of the relationship, is a
\nmatter depending on considerations of<\/p>\n
                                       13<\/span>
\n     public policy. In such contracts as
\n     those of service the tendency in
\n     modern times is to withdraw the matter
\n     more and more from the domain of
\n     contract into that of status.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
9.   Similarly in N.Lakshmana Rao and Ors vs.<\/p>\n
State of Karnataka and Ors. (1976) 2 SCC 502 in<\/p>\n
paras 20 and 21, it was observed as follows :-<\/p>\n
          “As a result of the exercise of
\n     option by the teachers of the local
\n     bodies     they     became     Government
\n     servants. The term that the service
\n     conditions would not be varied to
\n     their disadvantage would mean that
\n     they    would   be    like    all    other
\n     Government servants subject to Article
\n     310(1) of the Constitution. This could
\n     mean that under the law these teachers
\n     would be entitled to continue in
\n     service     up    to    the      age    of
\n     superannuation. The exercise of option
\n     does not mean that there was a
\n     contract whereby a limitation was put
\n     on     prescribing      an      age     of
\n     superannuation. It has been held by
\n     this Court that prescribing an age of
\n     superannuation does not amount to an
\n     action   under   Article   311    of   the
\n     Constitution.    Article    309    confers
\n     legislative     power      to      provide
\n     conditions of service. The Legislature
\n     can regulate conditions of service by<\/p>\n
                                            14<\/span>
\n    Law which can impair        conditions       or
\n    terms of service.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
        This Court in Roshan Lal Tandon v.
\n    Union of India<\/a> said that there is no
\n    vested contractual right in regard to
\n    the   terms  of   service.   The  legal
\n    position of a Government servant is
\n    one of status than of contract. The
\n    duties of status are fixed by law. The
\n    terms of service are governed by
\n    statute or statutory rules which may
\n    be   unilaterally    altered   by   the
\n    Government without the consent of the
\n    employee.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
10. A   further   decision   relied    upon     in    this<\/p>\n
connection   by   Mr.Parasaran,       learned    senior<\/p>\n
counsel appearing for the respondent, is the<\/p>\n
decision of this Court reported in Union of<\/p>\n
India and Anr. vs. Dr.S.Baliar Singh,<\/a> [(1998) 2<\/p>\n
SCC 208], particularly learned senior counsel<\/p>\n
has relied on paragraph 12 of the said decision<\/p>\n
in support of his contention. Relying on this<\/p>\n
decision of this Court, it was contended that<\/p>\n
the rules which were in force on the date of<\/p>\n
retirement would govern the employee concerned.<\/p>\n
                                                 15<\/span>
\nOn this aspect of the matter, there cannot be<\/p>\n
any dispute as such aspect is well settled by a<\/p>\n
series of decisions of this Court as referred<\/p>\n
to herein above. But the problem arises when<\/p>\n
the constitutional validity of the statutory<\/p>\n
provisions is called in question on the ground<\/p>\n
of violation of fundamental rights. A person<\/p>\n
entering into a Government service is no doubt<\/p>\n
liable to be dealt with by the relevant Act or<\/p>\n
the Rules but it ceases to be so in the event<\/p>\n
of   his      success         in      challenging           the<\/p>\n
constitutional     validity        of    the        same.     A<\/p>\n
Government servant entering into a Government<\/p>\n
service does not forego his fundamental rights.<\/p>\n
On the other hand, because of his status as a<\/p>\n
person   in    public    employment,          he    acquires<\/p>\n
additional    rights    constitutionally           protected.<\/p>\n
The State or other public authorities are not,<\/p>\n
therefore,    entitled   to    make     and   impose       laws<\/p>\n
governing the service conditions of an employee<\/p>\n
which manifestly deprive him of the privileges<\/p>\n
of that status. A person in public employment<\/p>\n
                                                      16<\/span>
\nis endowed with a status not merely subjecting<\/p>\n
him   to    liabilities          and   obligation              but       also<\/p>\n
protecting          him      against          any            arbitrary,<\/p>\n
unreasonable         and    unequal         treatment.          Such        a<\/p>\n
person      is     also    entitled          to     constitutional<\/p>\n
remedies      whether      under       Article          32     or    under<\/p>\n
Article      226     of    the    Constitution.               The        next<\/p>\n
contention on behalf of the respondent is that<\/p>\n
the constitutionality of law cannot be judged<\/p>\n
on    the    basis    of    its    peculiar             operation          in<\/p>\n
special     or     individual      cases          and    it     must       be<\/p>\n
judged on the basis of its ordinary effect and<\/p>\n
use of operation. It was pointed out that a few<\/p>\n
freak instances of hardship may arise at a time<\/p>\n
or    at    different      times       but    the        same       cannot<\/p>\n
invalidate the order or the policy. In this<\/p>\n
connection,          Mr.Parasaran,            learned               senior<\/p>\n
counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent,<\/p>\n
had    placed      reliance       on    a     decision          of        the<\/p>\n
Federal      Court    reported         in    AIR        1939    Federal<\/p>\n
Court P.1 (Central Provinces and Berar Sales<\/p>\n
                                                                    17<\/span>
\nof    Motor     Spirit      and        Lubricants            Taxation<\/p>\n
Act,1938.)<\/p>\n
11. While     examining         the    legality         of     Central<\/p>\n
Provinces and Berar Sales of Motor Spirit and<\/p>\n
Lubricants         Taxation        Act,          1938,         Justice<\/p>\n
Sulaiman,     as    His     Lordship         then       was,       in     a<\/p>\n
concurring         judgment           referred            to            the<\/p>\n
observations       of     Lord     Herschell        in       Attorney<\/p>\n
General for Canada vs. Attorney General for<\/p>\n
Ontario      (1898)     A   C    700        to    the     following<\/p>\n
effect:-\n<\/p>\n
          “The Supreme Legislative power in
\n      relation to any subject matter is
\n      always capable of abuse, but it is not
\n      to   be  assumed   that  it   will  be
\n      improperly used, if it is, the only
\n      remedy is an appeal to those by whom
\n      the Legislature is elected.” (See AIR
\n      1939 PC 1 at page 30.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
12. Reliance        can     also       be    placed          in        this<\/p>\n
connection on the case of R.S.Joshi, Sales Tax<\/p>\n
Officer, Gujarat and Ors. vs. Ajit Mills Ltd.<\/p>\n
and   Anr.    [(1977)       4    SCC    98].        Mr.Parasaran,<\/p>\n
                                                                  18<\/span>
\nlearned     senior      counsel       had    also    relied      on<\/p>\n
another      decision          reported       in      Tamilnadu<\/p>\n
Education    Department         Ministerial         and   General<\/p>\n
Subordinate Services Association and Ors. vs.<\/p>\n
State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.<\/a> [(1980)3 SCC 97].<\/p>\n
Reliance was also placed by the learned senior<\/p>\n
counsel for the respondent on the decision in<\/p>\n
the matter of State of Himachal Pradesh and<\/p>\n
Anr. vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan and Ors.<\/a> (1992<\/p>\n
Suppl.2 SCC 351) and Virender Singh Hooda and<\/p>\n
Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Anr.<\/a>(2004) 12 SCC<\/p>\n
588.<\/p>\n
13. On a close examination of the aforesaid<\/p>\n
decisions,       it     appears       that    the     questions<\/p>\n
involved     in       the   aforesaid        decisions          were<\/p>\n
significantly different.               So far as AIR 1939<\/p>\n
(Federal     Court      page     1)    is    concerned,         the<\/p>\n
question of constitutional invalidity, as in<\/p>\n
the    present    case,     was       not    in    issue.        In<\/p>\n
R.S.Joshi’s case, the law in question did not<\/p>\n
                                                           19<\/span>
\nlack in generality in respect of its operation.<\/p>\n
But exception was sought to be taken on the<\/p>\n
basis   of      the          hardship        or     injustice        in<\/p>\n
particular cases.             So far as 1980 (3) SCC 197<\/p>\n
(Tamilnadu      Education            Department           case)      is<\/p>\n
concerned, the law was general in its operation<\/p>\n
and freak instances of hardship were held not<\/p>\n
relevant to determine its validity.<\/p>\n
14. So far as the last decision of this Court,<\/p>\n
as referred to by Mr. Parasaran, namely, State<\/p>\n
of Himachal Pradesh vs. Kailash Chand Mahajan<\/a><\/p>\n
(1992   Supp.2          SCC     351)     is       concerned,        the<\/p>\n
impugned     law        in     the      decision          being     the<\/p>\n
Ordinance     of      1990      was      a    law     of     general<\/p>\n
application     and      it     applied       not    only    to     the<\/p>\n
Chairman-cum-Managing                Director        of     Himachal<\/p>\n
Pradesh State Electricity Board, but also to<\/p>\n
all   members      of    the     Electricity         Board.        This<\/p>\n
Court, accordingly, held that this was not a<\/p>\n
one-man legislation and consequently upheld it<\/p>\n
on merit. Therefore, the respective contentions<\/p>\n
                                                              20<\/span>
\nare   to    be     examined    in     the    context   of   the<\/p>\n
Constitutional Scheme of India having a written<\/p>\n
constitution         with          guaranteed    fundamental<\/p>\n
rights. In India, under Article 13(2) of the<\/p>\n
Constitution “the State shall not make any law<\/p>\n
which      takes     away     or     abridges    the   rights<\/p>\n
conferred by this part and any law made in<\/p>\n
contravention        of     this    Clause    shall,   to   the<\/p>\n
extent of the contravention, be void.” Thus in<\/p>\n
India, a law cannot be accepted merely because<\/p>\n
it purports to be a law falling within the<\/p>\n
legislative field of the maker thereof. Each<\/p>\n
such provision of law is required to stand the<\/p>\n
test of Article 13(2) of the Constitution and<\/p>\n
survive.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
15. Mr.Arun        Jaitley,        learned   senior    counsel<\/p>\n
appearing on behalf of the writ petitioner laid<\/p>\n
stress on the following three judgments of this<\/p>\n
Court. The first decision is the case of Ram<\/p>\n
Prasad Narayan Sahi and Anr. vs. The State of<\/p>\n
Bihar and Ors. (AIR 1953 SC 215). Mr.Jaitley<\/p>\n
                                                       21<\/span>
\nhad drawn our attention to a passage of this<\/p>\n
judgment rendered by the former Chief Justice<\/p>\n
of   this     Court,     Justice   Patanjali    Sastri,   in<\/p>\n
which the Chief Justice, after referring to the<\/p>\n
facts of the earlier case of Ameerunissa Begum<\/p>\n
and Ors. vs. Mahboob Begum and Ors. (AIR<\/a> 1953<\/p>\n
SC 91), in which the Legislature intervened in<\/p>\n
a private dispute in respect of succession to<\/p>\n
an estate,observed:-\n<\/p>\n
                “Legislation      based     upon
\n       mismanagement or other misconduct as
\n       the differentia and made applicable to
\n       a specified individual or corporate
\n       body is not far removed from the
\n       notorious     parliamentary     procedure
\n       formerly   employed    in    Britain   of
\n       punishing individual delinquents by
\n       passing bills of attainder, and should
\n       not,   I    think,    receive    judicial
\n       encouragement.” (See Page 217 of this
\n       decision).\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
16. Chief       Justice       Patanjali   Sastri   further<\/p>\n
referred      to   his    own   dissenting     judgment   in<\/p>\n
Charanjit Lal Chowdhury vs. Union of India and<\/p>\n
Ors. (AIR<\/a> 1951 SC 41) and observed that similar<\/p>\n
view    was    taken     in   Ameerunnissa   Begum’s     case<\/p>\n
                                                    22<\/span>
\n(Supra).     The    former       Chief   Justice   Patanjali<\/p>\n
Sastri,      in    the    same    decision     proceeded     to<\/p>\n
observe :\n<\/p>\n
          “Whenever, then, a section of the
\n      people in a locality, in assertion of
\n      an adverse claim, disturb a person in
\n      the quiet enjoyment of his property,
\n      the Bihar Government would seem to
\n      think that it is not necessary for the
\n      police to step in to protect him in
\n      his enjoyment until he is evicted in
\n      due course of law, but the Legislature
\n      could intervene by making a “Law” to
\n      oust the person from his possession.
\n      Legislation such as we have now before
\n      us is calculated to draw the vitality
\n      from the Rules of Law which our
\n      Constitution      so       unmistakably
\n      proclaims, and it is to be hoped that
\n      the democratic process in the country
\n      will not function along these lines.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
17. In Ameerunnissa Begum’s case (Supra), the<\/p>\n
former Chief Justice of India,                   Mr. Justice<\/p>\n
Bijon   Kumar      Mukherjee,      as    His   Lordship    then<\/p>\n
was, also applied the principles laid down in<\/p>\n
the   case    of    Ram   Prasad     Narayan    Sahi’s     case<\/p>\n
(Supra) and at page 220 observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
          “What the legislature has done is
\n      to single out these two individuals
\n      and deny them the right which every
\n      Indian citizen possesses to have his<\/p>\n
                                                      23<\/span>
\n      rights adjudicated upon by a judicial
\n      tribunal in accordance with law which
\n      applied to his case. The meanest of
\n      citizens has a right of access to a
\n      court of law for the redress of his
\n      just grievances and it is from his
\n      right that the appellants have been
\n      deprived,    by  this    Act.   It  is
\n      impossible to conceive of a worse form
\n      of discrimination than the one which
\n      differentiates a particular individual
\n      from all his fellow subjects and
\n      visits him with a disability which is
\n      not imposed upon anybody else and
\n      against   which  even   the   right of
\n      complaint is taken away. The learned
\n      attorney general who placed his case
\n      with his usual fairness and ability,
\n      could not put forward any convincing
\n      or satisfactory reason upon which this
\n      legislation could be justified.” (See
\n      Page 220 of this decision).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
18. The observation made by His Lordship in<\/p>\n
the   aforesaid   decision   is   also   material   and<\/p>\n
therefore we reproduce the same:\n<\/p>\n
          “It is true that the presumption
\n      is in favour of the constitutionality
\n      of a legislative enactment and it has
\n      to be presumed that a legislature
\n      understands and correctly appreciates
\n      the needs of its own people. But when
\n      on the face of a statute, there is no
\n      classification at all and no attempt
\n      has been made to select any individual
\n      or   group  with   reference  to   any<\/p>\n
                                               24<\/span>
\n       differentiating attribute peculiar to
\n       that individual or group and not
\n       possessed by others, this presumption
\n       is of little or no assistance to the
\n       State.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
19. Let us now look into the facts of the case<\/p>\n
in hand. In the instant case it was submitted<\/p>\n
that     the    impugned        proviso      was        manifestly<\/p>\n
designed to apply and was in fact applied only<\/p>\n
against      the    writ       petitioner        and     was     not<\/p>\n
intended       to   and    could       not   apply      even,     in<\/p>\n
principle or otherwise, to anybody else because<\/p>\n
there was only one AIIMS in the country, there<\/p>\n
was only one Director of the AIIMS on the date<\/p>\n
of commencement of the Amending Act, and there<\/p>\n
could be none else who could conceivably be<\/p>\n
effected by its operation. It is claimed that<\/p>\n
reference to a similar proviso introduced in<\/p>\n
the    PGI     Chandigarh       Act,     1956,     is    somewhat<\/p>\n
misleading as the term of appointment of the<\/p>\n
present      Director     of    PGI    Chandigarh        was    only<\/p>\n
upto the age of 68 years and accordingly there<\/p>\n
was no question under the PGI Chandigarh Act as<\/p>\n
                                                           25<\/span>
\nthe     proviso is affecting the present incumbent<\/p>\n
or his successor.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
20. It was further submitted on behalf of the<\/p>\n
writ     petitioner        that      the      proviso          itself<\/p>\n
declares that “any person holding office as a<\/p>\n
Director       immediately      before       the    commencement<\/p>\n
of the All India Institute of Medical Sciences<\/p>\n
and    the     Post     Graduate     Institute           of    Medial<\/p>\n
Education and Research (Amendment) Act of 2007<\/p>\n
shall     in     so     far     as   his      appointment            is<\/p>\n
inconsistent with the provisions of this sub-<\/p>\n
section        ceases     to     hold        office       on        such<\/p>\n
commencement       as    such     Director         and    shall       be<\/p>\n
entitled to claim compensation not exceeding<\/p>\n
three     months’       pay    and   allowances           for        the<\/p>\n
premature termination of his office or of any<\/p>\n
contract of service.”            (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
21. This         submission,            as      advanced              by<\/p>\n
Mr.Jaitley, learned senior counsel appearing on<\/p>\n
behalf of the writ petitioner, in our view, has<\/p>\n
                                                               26<\/span>
\nmerit    that the impugned proviso does not at<\/p>\n
all deal with the alteration of the age of<\/p>\n
superannuation.        On     the   contrary,        it    really<\/p>\n
modifies the initial appointment on the ground<\/p>\n
of    alleged    inconsistency         with    a     subsequent<\/p>\n
enactment       and         makes    him       entitled          to<\/p>\n
compensation for premature termination of his<\/p>\n
office. To equate the impugned proviso with the<\/p>\n
simple alteration of the age of superannuation<\/p>\n
is to ignore the clear language of the proviso<\/p>\n
itself. The proviso brings about a premature<\/p>\n
termination and provides for compensation. A<\/p>\n
superannuation in usual course gives rise to<\/p>\n
ordinary      retiral       benefits    and        not    to    any<\/p>\n
compensation. Again it is impossible to ignore<\/p>\n
the   force     in    the    submission       of    Mr.Jaitley,<\/p>\n
learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of<\/p>\n
the writ petitioner, that a person is being<\/p>\n
singled out for premature termination without<\/p>\n
any question of his being justifiably treated<\/p>\n
as a Member of a separate and distinct class on<\/p>\n
any     rational        basis,       any       question          of<\/p>\n
                                                           27<\/span>
\nintelligible differentia having a nexus to the<\/p>\n
object of classification cannot arise. It was<\/p>\n
contended by Mr.Jaitley that in reality there<\/p>\n
is no legislation in respect of any class but<\/p>\n
there    is    legislation            in    respect       of   an<\/p>\n
individual, a living human being requiring him<\/p>\n
to move out of office. The Delhi High Court in<\/p>\n
its judgment dated 29th of March, 2007 has held<\/p>\n
that    the   writ       petitioner        was    entitled      to<\/p>\n
continue as a Director upto 2nd of July, 2008<\/p>\n
and issued a Writ of Mandamus that premature<\/p>\n
termination could only be made for justifiable<\/p>\n
reasons and in compliance with the principles<\/p>\n
of natural justice. By a Writ in the nature of<\/p>\n
Prohibition    issued           by   the   High       Court,   the<\/p>\n
respondent was prohibited from implementing any<\/p>\n
adverse decision against the writ petitioner<\/p>\n
without giving him a period of two weeks for<\/p>\n
approaching        the    High       Court.      It    would    be<\/p>\n
appropriate    at        this    stage     to    refer    to   the<\/p>\n
Statement     of     Objects         and   Reasons       of    the<\/p>\n
Amendment Act of 2007. It declares that with a<\/p>\n
                                                          28<\/span>
\nview to comply with the directions of the High<\/p>\n
Court of Delhi in the judgment dated 29th of<\/p>\n
March,        2007,         the    amendments          are      being<\/p>\n
introduced. It is difficult to conceive how the<\/p>\n
amendments are in compliance or in consonance<\/p>\n
with    the    directions          of   the     High    Court.     On<\/p>\n
behalf of the writ petitioner, it was contended<\/p>\n
and    not    without        reason,     that    the    amendments<\/p>\n
were made precisely to frustrate the judgment<\/p>\n
of    the    High     Court       reducing      his    search     for<\/p>\n
justice to an exercise in futility.<\/p>\n
22. It appears that the direction No.13 in the<\/p>\n
judgment      of      the     Delhi     High    Court     was     not<\/p>\n
confined or related to the particular case of<\/p>\n
the writ petitioner as regards his right to<\/p>\n
continue as a Director until he attains the age<\/p>\n
of 66 years, i.e., upto 2nd of July, 2008. It<\/p>\n
was otherwise and independently upheld in the<\/p>\n
same     judgment.          It    is    also    true    that      the<\/p>\n
impugned proviso does not lay down any policy<\/p>\n
or principle at all, but deals only with the<\/p>\n
                                                             29<\/span>
\ncase of the writ petitioner and seeks to affect<\/p>\n
him in isolation. After the order of the Delhi<\/p>\n
High    Court      dated      29th   of      November,      2002,       in<\/p>\n
Health India (Registered) vs. Union of India<\/p>\n
and Ors. [102 (2003) Delhi Law Times 19], the<\/p>\n
writ petitioner was appointed with the approval<\/p>\n
of the ACC as the Director at the age of 61<\/p>\n
years on 3rd of July, 2003 for a term of five<\/p>\n
years expiring on 2nd of July, 2008, i.e., on<\/p>\n
attainment         of     the    age        of    66    years.        Shri<\/p>\n
R.L.Malhotra, Under Secretary to the Government<\/p>\n
of India, in fact, by a letter to the Director,<\/p>\n
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Ansari<\/p>\n
Nagar, New Delhi, conveyed the approval of the<\/p>\n
Appointments            Committee       of       the    Cabinet       for<\/p>\n
appointment of Prof. P.Venugopal as Director,<\/p>\n
All India Institute of Medical Sciences, New<\/p>\n
Delhi    in   the       pay     scale       of   Rs.26,000\/-          with<\/p>\n
Non- Practicing Allowance for a period of five<\/p>\n
years from the date he assumes charge of the<\/p>\n
post and until further orders. He will also<\/p>\n
continue      as    Professor          in    the       Department      of<\/p>\n
                                                                 30<\/span>
\nCardiovascular and Thoracic Surgery, AIIMS, New<\/p>\n
Delhi. The appointment of the Director, PGI,<\/p>\n
Chandigarh,        was    restricted     upto   the    age    of<\/p>\n
62 years and his appointment does not bear any<\/p>\n
comparison with the instant case.<\/p>\n
23. The learned Single Judge of the Delhi High<\/p>\n
Court   in    the        writ     Petition   being     W.P.[C]<\/p>\n
No.10687\/2006 on 7th of July, 2006, inter alia,<\/p>\n
observed     that    “the       petitioner   has     not    been<\/p>\n
given   any   notice        and    according    to    him    his<\/p>\n
tenure of five years could not be curtailed on<\/p>\n
the grounds which are not justifiable…”and then<\/p>\n
proceeded     to    injunct       the   respondent    against<\/p>\n
premature termination of the term of the writ<\/p>\n
petitioner. The learned Single Judge reiterated<\/p>\n
and re-emphasized the prohibition against the<\/p>\n
respondent by subsequent order dated 18th of<\/p>\n
October, 2006 (See Pages 89-118 of Vol.1)<\/p>\n
24. The Division Bench of the Delhi High Court<\/p>\n
by its judgment dated 29th of March, 2007 has<\/p>\n
                                                       31<\/span>
\nrendered an effective and binding determination<\/p>\n
of the right of the writ petitioner to continue<\/p>\n
as Director for five years upto 2nd of July,<\/p>\n
2008. In the said judgment (at P.127 of Vol.I),<\/p>\n
the    learned     Judge     of     the       High    Court     has<\/p>\n
referred      to    the       AIIMS       Regulations           and<\/p>\n
particularly to Clause 5 thereof which provides<\/p>\n
for fixed tenure of five years for the Member<\/p>\n
of the Governing Body as the Director being<\/p>\n
full fledged Member of the Governing Body and<\/p>\n
not an Ex-officio Member and was entitled to<\/p>\n
the benefit of his tenure as a Member, and<\/p>\n
could not justifiably be deprived of the same.<\/p>\n
The writ petitioner is, however, being singled<\/p>\n
out and treated differently from other Members<\/p>\n
of    the   Governing       Body.   In    this       connection,<\/p>\n
reference can be made to Sections 4, 6 and 10<\/p>\n
of the AIIMS Act, 1956 which are relevant for<\/p>\n
our   purpose.     Accordingly,          we    quote      relevant<\/p>\n
provisions as indicated herein above:-<\/p>\n
      Section   4       -    Composition             of   the\n      Institute -\n\n\n\n                                                           32<\/span>\n<\/pre>\n
    The Institute shall consist of the
\nfollowing members, namely :-\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
(a)   the Vice-Chancellor of the Delhi
\n      University, ex-officio;\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
(b)   the Director General of Health
\n      Services, Government of India, ex
\n      officio;\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
(c)   the Director of the Institute, ex
\n      officio;<\/p>\n
\n\n\n(d)   two   representatives    of   the\n      Central    Government    to    be\n<\/pre>\n
      nominated by that Government, one
\n      from the Ministry of Finance and
\n      one   from    the   Ministry   of
\n      Education;\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
(e)   five persons of whom one shall be
\n      a      non-medical       scientist
\n      representing the Indian Science
\n      Congress    Association,   to   be
\n      nominated     by    the    Central
\n      Government;<\/p>\n
\n\n\n(f)   four    representatives    of    the\n      medical    faculties    of    Indian\n<\/pre>\n
      Universities to be nominated by
\n      the Central Government in the
\n      manner prescribed by rules; and<\/p>\n
(g)   three members of Parliament of
\n      whom two shall be elected from<\/p>\n
                                       33<\/span>
\n      among themselves by the members
\n      of the House of the People and
\n      one from among themselves by the
\n      members of the Council of States.<\/p>\n
Section 6 – Term of office of, and
\nvacancies among, members –\n<\/p>\n
\n(1)   Save as otherwise provided in the
\n      section, the term of office of a
\n      member shall be five years from
\n      the date of his nomination or
\n      election:\n<\/p>\n
\nProvided that the term of office of a
\nmember elected under clause (g) of
\nsection 4 shall come to an end as soon
\nas he [becomes a Minister or Minister
\nof State or Deputy Minister, or the
\nSpeaker or the Deputy Speaker of the
\nHouse of the People, or the Deputy
\nChairman of the Council of States or]
\nceases to be a member of the House
\nfrom which he was elected.\n<\/p>\n
\n(2)   The term of office of an ex
\n      officio member shall continue so
\n      long as he holds the office in
\n      virtue of which he is such a
\n      member.\n<\/p>\n
\n(3)   The term of office of a member
\n      nominated or elected to fill a
\n      casual vacancy shall continue for<\/p>\n
                                     34<\/span>
\n      the remainder of the term of the
\n      member in whose place he is
\n      nominated or elected.\n<\/p>\n
\n(4)   An outgoing member shall, unless
\n      the Central Government otherwise
\n      directs, continue in office until
\n      another person is nominated or
\n      elected as a member in his place.<\/p>\n
(5)   An   outgoing  member   shall  be
\n      eligible for re-nomination or re-
\n      election.\n<\/p>\n
\n(6)   A member may resign his office by
\n      writing under his hand addressed
\n      to the Central Government but he
\n      shall continue in office until
\n      his resignation is accepted by
\n      that Government.\n<\/p>\n
\n(7)   The manner of filing vacancies
\n      among members shall be such as
\n      may be prescribed by rules.\n<\/p>\n
Section 10 – Governing Body and other
\nCommittees of the Institute _<\/p>\n
(1) There shall be a Governing Body
\n    of the Institute which shall be
\n    constituted by the Institute from
\n    among its members in such manner<\/p>\n
                                     35<\/span>
\n    as    may    be    prescribed     by
\n    regulations.<\/p>\n
\n\n\n(2) The Governing Body shall be      the\n    executive    committee   of      the\n    Institute and shall exercise    such\n    powers    and    discharge      such\n    functions as the Institute      may,\n    by   regulations   made  in     this\n<\/pre>\n
    behalf, confer or impose upon   it.<\/p>\n
(3) The President of the Institute
\n    shall be the Chairman of the
\n    Governing Body and as Chairman
\n    thereof   shall   exercise   such
\n    powers    and   discharge    such
\n    functions as may be prescribed by
\n    regulations.\n<\/p>\n
\n(4) The procedure to be followed in
\n    the exercise of its powers and
\n    discharge of its functions by the
\n    Governing Body, and the term of
\n    office of, and the manner of
\n    filling   vacancies   among,  the
\n    members of the Governing Body
\n    shall   be   such    as   may  be
\n    prescribed by regulations.\n<\/p>\n
\n(5) Subject   to  such    control   and
\n    restrictions as may be prescribed
\n    by   rules,  the    Institute   may
\n    constitute   as    many    standing
\n    committees and as many ad hoc
\n    committees as it thinks fit for
\n    exercising    any      power     or
\n    discharging any function of the
\n    Institute or for inquiring into<\/p>\n
                                      36<\/span>
\n          or reporting or advising upon,
\n          any matter which the Institute
\n          may refer to them.\n<\/p>\n
\n      (6) A    standing   committee   shall
\n          consist exclusively of members of
\n          the Institute; but an ad hoc
\n          committee may include persons who
\n          are not members of the Institute
\n          but the number of such persons
\n          shall not exceed one half of its
\n          total membership.\n<\/p>\n
\n      (7) The Chairman and members of the
\n          Governing body and the Chairman
\n          and   members   of   a   standing
\n          committee or an ad hoc committee
\n          shall receive such allowances, if
\n          any, as may be prescribed by
\n          regulations.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
25. Keeping   the   provisions,     as     noted    herein<\/p>\n
above, in our mind, we now proceed to take up<\/p>\n
the question in hand. The tenure of the writ<\/p>\n
petitioner as a Director to act as a Member of<\/p>\n
the   Governing   Body   is   for   five    years    which<\/p>\n
expires on 2nd of July, 2008 on the basis of<\/p>\n
his initial appointment and, therefore, it is<\/p>\n
not in dispute that it was a tenure appointment<\/p>\n
which could not be otherwise dealt with. It was<\/p>\n
                                                    37<\/span>
\nseriously   contended    by    Mr.Parasaran,     learned<\/p>\n
senior   counsel     appearing    on   behalf    of     the<\/p>\n
respondent,   that    reliance    on   the    Delhi    High<\/p>\n
Court’s judgment and orders particularly those<\/p>\n
of the learned Single Judge dated 7th of July,<\/p>\n
2006 and 18th of October, 2006 and the order<\/p>\n
dated 29th of March, 2007 of the Division Bench<\/p>\n
was wholly misconceived as the two orders of<\/p>\n
the Single Judge were interim orders and the<\/p>\n
special leave petition against the orders of<\/p>\n
the   Division   Bench   was     pending     before    this<\/p>\n
Court. It was also contended by Mr.Parasaran,<\/p>\n
learned senior counsel for the respondent that<\/p>\n
the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner<\/p>\n
in the Delhi High Court is still pending before<\/p>\n
the learned Single Judge and therefore, it was<\/p>\n
pointed out on behalf of the respondent that in<\/p>\n
such view of the matter, no reliance could be<\/p>\n
placed upon the decision in Madan Mohan Pathak<\/p>\n
and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors.<\/a> [(1978) 2<\/p>\n
SCC 50] and in the case of A.V.Nachane and<\/p>\n
Anr. vs. Union of India and Anr.<\/a> [(1982)1 SCC<\/p>\n
                                                  38<\/span>
\n205]. It is true that respondent has, no doubt,<\/p>\n
raised     the    plea        that    the       judgment      of      the<\/p>\n
Division Bench is under challenge before this<\/p>\n
Court and, therefore, it has not yet attained<\/p>\n
the kind of finality which was there in Madan<\/p>\n
Mohan Pathak’s case. In Madan Mohan Pathak’s<\/p>\n
case    (Supra),     the       question         of    finality       was<\/p>\n
taken into consideration only for the purpose<\/p>\n
of     enforceability         of     the      direction       of     the<\/p>\n
Calcutta High Court in respect of payment of<\/p>\n
bonus under the settlement of Class III and<\/p>\n
Class     IV     employees         and     it    was     held        that<\/p>\n
irrespective             of          the          question            of<\/p>\n
Constitutionality          of      the     Amendment         Act,    the<\/p>\n
Calcutta High Court judgment operating inter<\/p>\n
parties and becoming final was enforceable. In<\/p>\n
this    connection,       Para       8   of     the    decision        in<\/p>\n
Madan Mohan Pathak’s case is important for the<\/p>\n
purpose of the present case. Accordingly, we<\/p>\n
reproduce      the   said       paragraph            which   runs     as<\/p>\n
under :-\n<\/p>\n
       “It is significant to note that there
\n       was no reference to the judgment of<\/p>\n
                                                                39<\/span>
\nthe   Calcutta    High   Court    in  the
\nStatement of Objects and Reasons, nor
\nany non-obstante clause referring to a
\njudgment of a court in Section 3 of
\nthe impugned Act. The attention of
\nParliament does not appear to have
\nbeen drawn to the fact that the
\nCalcutta High Court has already issued
\na writ of Mandamus commanding the Life
\nInsurance    Corporation    to   pay  the
\namount of bonus for the year 1st
\nApril, 1975 to 31st March, 1976. It
\nappears    that     unfortunately     the
\njudgment of the Calcutta High Court
\nremained almost unnoticed and the
\nimpugned Act was passed in ignorance
\nof that judgment. Section 3 of the
\nimpugned    Act    provided    that   the
\nprovisions of the Settlement in so far
\nas they relate to payment of annual
\ncash bonus to Class III and Class IV
\nemployees shall not have any force or
\neffect and shall not be deemed to have
\nhad any force or effect from 1st
\nApril, 1975. But the writ of Mandamus
\nissued by the Calcutta High Court
\ndirecting      the     Life     Insurance
\nCorporation to pay the amount of bonus
\nfor the year 1st April, 1975 to
\n31st March, 1976 remained untouched by
\nthe impugned Act. So far as the right
\nof Class III and Class IV employees to
\nannual cash bonus for the year 1st
\nApril, 1975 to 31st March, 1976 was
\nconcerned, it became crystallised in
\nthe   judgment    and   thereafter   they
\nbecame entitled to enforce the writ of
\nMandamus granted by the judgment and
\nnot any right to annual cash bonus
\nunder the settlement. This right under
\nthe judgment was not sought to be<\/p>\n
                                      40<\/span>
\ntaken away by the impugned Act. The
\njudgment continued to subsist and the
\nLife Insurance Corporation was bound
\nto pay annual cash bonus to Class III
\nand Class IV employees for the year
\n1st April, 1975 to 31st March, 1976 in
\nobedience to the writ of Mandamus. The
\nerror committed by the Life Insurance
\nCorporation was that it withdrew the
\nLetters Patent Appeal and allowed the
\njudgment of the learned Single Judge
\nto become final. By the time the
\nLetters Patent Appeal came up for
\nhearing, the impugned Act had already
\ncome into force and the Life Insurance
\nCorporation    could,   therefore,  have
\nsuccessfully contended in the Letters
\nPatent    Appeal     that,   since   the
\nSettlement, in as far as it provided
\nfor payment of annual cash bonus, was
\nannihilated by the impugned Act with
\neffect from 1st April, 1975, Class III
\nand   Class   IV   employees   were  not
\nentitled to annual cash bonus for the
\nyear 1st April, 1975 to 31st March,
\n1976 and hence no writ of Mandamus
\ncould    issue    directing   the   Life
\nInsurance Corporation to make payment
\nof such bonus. If such contention had
\nbeen raised, there is little doubt,
\nsubject      of     course     to    any
\nconstitutional     challenge    to   the
\nvalidity of the impugned Act, that the
\njudgment of the learned Single Judge
\nwould have been upturned and the Writ
\npetition dismissed. But on account of
\nsome inexplicable reason, which is
\ndifficult to appreciate, the Life
\nInsurance Corporation did not press
\nthe Letters Patent Appeal and the
\nresult was that the judgment of the<\/p>\n
                                      41<\/span>
\n    learned Single Judge granting writ of
\n    Mandamus became final and binding on
\n    the parties. It is difficult to see
\n    how in these circumstances the Life
\n    Insurance Corporation could claim to
\n    be   absolved   from  the   obligation
\n    imposed by the judgment to carry out
\n    the Writ of Mandamus by relying on the
\n    impugned Act.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
26. Mr.   Justice      P.N.     Bhagwati,    former    Chief<\/p>\n
Justice of India in that decision at Para 8<\/p>\n
pointed   out   that     Life    Insurance    Corporation<\/p>\n
(Modification     and    Settlement)    Act,    1976       was<\/p>\n
enacted apparently in ignorance of the Calcutta<\/p>\n
High Court judgment and the attention of the<\/p>\n
Parliament was not drawn to that judgment at<\/p>\n
all. It was also pointed out in that decision<\/p>\n
at para 8 that there was no reference to the<\/p>\n
said judgment in the Statement of Objects and<\/p>\n
Reasons     nor         any      non-obstante         clause<\/p>\n
incorporating in Section 3 of the impugned Act<\/p>\n
in that case to override the judgment. This<\/p>\n
Court has been moved by the respondent in the<\/p>\n
writ application challenging the propriety of<\/p>\n
                                                      42<\/span>
\ncertain    directions    issued        by   the   Delhi        High<\/p>\n
Court requiring the respondent to take approval<\/p>\n
of ACC for any adverse decision against the<\/p>\n
writ    petitioner      and     for     giving      the        writ<\/p>\n
petitioner     two   weeks’     time    against     any        such<\/p>\n
adverse    decision.     This     Court      has,    however,<\/p>\n
declined to pass any interim order in the SLP<\/p>\n
filed     by   the   respondent.            Therefore,          the<\/p>\n
interim order or final order of the Delhi High<\/p>\n
Court would remain binding upon the parties for<\/p>\n
the time being and they cannot be ignored or<\/p>\n
disregarded unless they are modified or leave<\/p>\n
is granted to take any step contrary thereto.<\/p>\n
It may not be out of place to mention that the<\/p>\n
SLP of the respondent indicates that the term<\/p>\n
of office of five years of the writ petitioner<\/p>\n
as Director was not really in dispute. In the<\/p>\n
Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act<\/p>\n
introducing the impugned proviso, it is stated<\/p>\n
that the same is being introduced with a view<\/p>\n
to comply with the direction of the High Court<\/p>\n
in the judgment and order dated 29th of March,<\/p>\n
                                                          43<\/span>
\n2007. It, however, appears that the Division<\/p>\n
Bench of the Delhi High Court has determined<\/p>\n
the question of tenure of the writ petitioner<\/p>\n
to be five years and there are writs in the<\/p>\n
nature of Mandamus and Prohibition issued by<\/p>\n
the Delhi High Court directing the right of the<\/p>\n
writ    petitioner    indicated      in    the    respective<\/p>\n
orders. As in Madan Mohan Pathak’s case(para 8),<\/p>\n
as quoted herein above, in the instant case<\/p>\n
also the Parliament does not seem to have been<\/p>\n
apprised about the pendency of the proceedings<\/p>\n
before the Delhi High Court and this Court and<\/p>\n
declaration made and directions issued by the<\/p>\n
Delhi High Court at different stages. In the<\/p>\n
impugned amendment, there is no non-obstante<\/p>\n
clause. The impugned amendment introducing the<\/p>\n
proviso, therefore, cannot be treated to be a<\/p>\n
validating     Act.   This    Court       in   the   case     of<\/p>\n
Dr.L.P.Agarwal       vs.    Union    of   India      and    Ors.<\/a><\/p>\n
[(1992)    3   SCC    526    (Para    16)]     observed       as<\/p>\n
follows :-\n<\/p>\n
           “We have given our thoughtful
\n       consideration to the reasoning and the<\/p>\n
                                                       44<\/span>
\nconclusions reached by the High Court.
\nWe are not inclined to agree with the
\nsame. Under the Recruitment Rules the
\npost of Director of the AIIMS is a
\ntenure post. The said rules further
\nprovide    the    method    of    direct
\nrecruitment for filling the post.
\nThese service-conditions make the post
\nof Director a tenure post and as such
\nthe question of superannuating or
\nprematurely retiring the incumbent of
\nthe said post does not arise. The age
\nof 62 years provided under Proviso to
\nRegulation 30(2) of the Regulations
\nonly shows that no employee of the
\nAIIMS can be given extension beyond
\nthat age. This has obviously been done
\nfor maintaining efficiency in the
\nInstitute-Services. We do not agree
\nthat simply because the appointment
\norder of the appellant mentions that
\n“he is appointed for a period of five
\nyears or till he attains the age of 62
\nyears”, the appointment ceases to be
\nto a tenure-post. Even an outsider
\n(not an existing employee of the
\nAIIMS) can be selected and appointed
\nto the post of Director. Can such
\nperson    be     retired     prematurely
\ncurtailing his tenure of five years?
\nObviously not. The appointment of the
\nappellant was on a Five Years Tenure
\nbut it could be curtailed in the event
\nof his attaining the age of 62 years
\nbefore completing the said tenure. The
\nHigh Court failed to appreciate the
\nsimple   alphabet    of   the    service
\njurisprudence.    The    High    Court’s
\nreasoning is against the clear and
\nunambiguous     language      of     the
\nRecruitment Rules. The said rules<\/p>\n
                                      45<\/span>
\nprovide    “Tenure    for    five    years
\ninclusive of one year probation” and
\nthe post is to be filled “by direct
\nrecruitment”. Tenure means a term
\nduring which an office is held. It is
\na condition of holding the office.
\nOnce a person is appointed to a tenure
\npost, his appointment to the said
\noffice begins when he joins and it
\ncomes to an end on the completion of
\nthe   tenure     unless    curtailed    on
\njustifiable grounds. Such a person
\ndoes not superannuate, he only goes
\nout of the office on completion of his
\ntenure. The question of prematurely
\nretiring him does not arise. The
\nappointment order gave a clear tenure
\nto the appellant. The High Court fell
\ninto error in reading “the concept of
\nsuperannuation” in the said order.
\nConcept of superannuation which is
\nwell    understood    in    the    service
\njurisprudence    is   alien    to   tenure
\nappointments which have a fixed life
\nspan.    The    appellant     could    not
\ntherefore     have    been    prematurely
\nretired and that too without being put
\non any notice whatsoever. Under what
\ncircumstances can an appointment for a
\ntenure be cut short is not a matter
\nwhich     requires      our      immediate
\nconsideration in this case because the
\norder impugned before the High Court
\nconcerned itself only with premature
\nretirement and the High Court also
\ndealt with that aspect of the matter
\nonly.    This    court’s    judgment    in
\nDr. Bool Chand v. The Chancellor
\nKurukshetra University<\/a> relied upon by
\nthe High Court is not on the point
\ninvolved in this case. In that case<\/p>\n
                                       46<\/span>
\n      the tenure of Dr. Bool Chand was
\n      curtailed as he was found unfit to
\n      continue   as  Vice-Chancellor   having
\n      regard to his antecedents which were
\n      not disclosed by him at the time of
\n      his appointment as Vice-Chancellor.
\n      Similarly the judgment in Dr. D.C.
\n      Saxena v. State of Haryana<\/a> has no
\n      relevance to the facts of this case”.<\/p>\n
27. From the above quotation, as made in para<\/p>\n
16 of the said decision of this Court, it is<\/p>\n
evident that this Court has laid down that the<\/p>\n
term of 5 years for a Director of AIIMS is a<\/p>\n
permanent     term.     Service     Conditions       make   the<\/p>\n
post of Director a tenure post and as such the<\/p>\n
question      of   superannuating           or     prematurely<\/p>\n
retiring the incumbent of the said post does<\/p>\n
not arise at all. Even an outsider (not an<\/p>\n
existing employee of the AIIMS) can be selected<\/p>\n
and   appointed    to    the    post      of   Director.    The<\/p>\n
appointment is for a tenure to which principle<\/p>\n
of    superannuation      does      not    apply.     “Tenure”<\/p>\n
means a term during which the office is held.<\/p>\n
It is a condition of holding the office. Once a<\/p>\n
person   is    appointed       to   a     tenure    post,   his<\/p>\n
                                                       47<\/span>
\nappointment to the said post begins when he<\/p>\n
joins and it comes to an end on the completion<\/p>\n
of     tenure     unless        curtailed          on     justifiable<\/p>\n
grounds. Such a person does not superannuate,<\/p>\n
he only goes out of the office on completion of<\/p>\n
his    tenure.     It    was     in       1958    that     AIIMS      had<\/p>\n
framed its regulations under Section 29 of the<\/p>\n
Act.    Regulation       30-A       was     brought       into    AIIMS<\/p>\n
Regulation by an amendment dated 25th of July,<\/p>\n
1981     notified        in     the        Gazette       on   10th     of<\/p>\n
October, 1981 coming into force w.e.f. 1st of<\/p>\n
August, 1981. The provision of Regulation 30-A<\/p>\n
was very much in existence when this court had<\/p>\n
decided the case of Dr.L.P.Agarwal on 21st of<\/p>\n
July,     1992.     It     is       the     same        provision      of<\/p>\n
Regulation 30-A which was brought into force<\/p>\n
w.e.f.     1st    of     August,           1981    in     the     AIIMS<\/p>\n
Regulations        and        had     been        re-numbered          as<\/p>\n
Regulation 31, when the AIIMS 1958 Regulations<\/p>\n
had     been     substituted          by    AIIMS        Regulations,<\/p>\n
1999. Therefore, it is incorrect on the part of<\/p>\n
the respondent to contend that Regulation 31<\/p>\n
                                                                 48<\/span>
\nwas introduced in the AIIMS Regulations only<\/p>\n
after     the        judgment     of   this     Court       in<\/p>\n
Dr. L.P.Agarwal’s case.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
28. This question was specifically deliberated<\/p>\n
upon by Justice Kuldip Singh, as His Lordship<\/p>\n
then     was,    in    Dr.L.P.Agarwal’s       case    and    a<\/p>\n
question was formulated on this aspect at page<\/p>\n
530 of the said decision.              After formulating<\/p>\n
the aforesaid question, a submission on behalf<\/p>\n
of the respondent was also considered by this<\/p>\n
Court in the aforesaid decision at paragraph 13<\/p>\n
page    532     of   the   said   decision    which   is    as<\/p>\n
follows:-\n<\/p>\n
       “The respondent argued before the High
\n       Court that the appellant was retired
\n       by the AIIMS under Regulation 30(3) of
\n       the Regulations in public interest
\n       after he attained the age of 55 years.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       It   was    further    contended     that\n       fundamental   Rule    56(j)    was   also\n<\/pre>\n
       applicable to the AIIMS employees by
\n       virtue   of   Regulation    35   of   the
\n       Regulations. It was argued that even
\n       if Regulation 30(3) was not attracted
\n       the   Institute   had   the    power   to
\n       prematurely retire the appellant, in
\n       public   interest,   under   fundamental
\n       Rule 56(j) applicable to the Central<\/p>\n
                                                      49<\/span>
\n    Government employees. It was contended
\n    that   despite  the   fact   that  the
\n    appellant was on a tenure post there
\n    was no bar to prematurely retire him
\n    by invoking either Regulation 30(3) or
\n    Fundamental Rule 56(j).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
29. After formulating the question and after<\/p>\n
considering the submission made on behalf of<\/p>\n
the parties, this Court in that decision at<\/p>\n
para 16 of page 531 concluded in the following<\/p>\n
manner:-\n<\/p>\n
    “We   have     given    our   thoughtful
\n    consideration to the reasoning and the
\n    conclusions reached by the High Court.
\n    We are not inclined to agree with the
\n    same. Under the Recruitment Rules the
\n    post of Director of the AIIMS is a
\n    tenure post. The said rules further
\n    provide    the     method   of    direct
\n    recruitment for filling the post.
\n    These service-conditions make the post
\n    of Director a tenure post and as such
\n    the question of superannuating or
\n    prematurely retiring the incumbent of
\n    the said post does not arise. The age
\n    of 62 years provided under Proviso to
\n    Regulation 30(2) of the Regulations
\n    only shows that no employee of the
\n    AIIMS can be given extension beyond
\n    that age. This has obviously been done
\n    for maintaining efficiency in the
\n    Institute-Services. We do not agree
\n    that simply because the appointment
\n    order of the appellant mentions that<\/p>\n
                                          50<\/span>
\n“he is appointed for a period of five
\nyears or till he attains the age of 62
\nyears”, the appointment ceases to be
\nto a tenure-post. Even an outsider
\n(not an existing employee of the
\nAIIMS) can be selected and appointed
\nto the post of Director. Can such
\nperson     be     retired     prematurely
\ncurtailing his tenure of five years?
\nObviously not. The appointment of the
\nappellant was on a Five Years Tenure
\nbut it could be curtailed in the event
\nof his attaining the age of 62 years
\nbefore completing the said tenure. The
\nHigh Court failed to appreciate the
\nsimple    alphabet    of   the    service
\njurisprudence.     The    High    Court’s
\nreasoning is against the clear and
\nunambiguous      language      of     the
\nRecruitment Rules. The said rules
\nprovide    “Tenure    for   five    years
\ninclusive of one year probation” and
\nthe post is to be filled “by direct
\nrecruitment”. Tenure means a term
\nduring which an office is held. It is
\na condition of holding the office.
\nOnce a person is appointed to a tenure
\npost, his appointment to the said
\noffice begins when he joins and it
\ncomes to an end on the completion of
\nthe    tenure   unless    curtailed    on
\njustifiable grounds. Such a person
\ndoes not superannuate, he only goes
\nout of the office on completion of his
\ntenure. The question of prematurely
\nretiring him does not arise. The
\nappointment order gave a clear tenure
\nto the appellant. The High Court fell
\ninto error in reading “the concept of
\nsuperannuation” in the said order.
\nConcept of superannuation which is<\/p>\n
                                      51<\/span>
\n       well   understood     in    the    service
\n       jurisprudence     is  alien    to   tenure
\n       appointments which have a fixed life
\n       span.    The    appellant     could    not
\n       therefore     have    been    prematurely
\n       retired and that too without being put
\n       on any notice whatsoever. Under what
\n       circumstances can an appointment for a
\n       tenure be cut short is not a matter
\n       which     requires      our      immediate
\n       consideration in this case because the
\n       order impugned before the High Court
\n       concerned itself only with premature
\n       retirement and the High Court also
\n       dealt with that aspect of the matter
\n       only. This court’s judgment in Dr.
\n       Bool    Chand      v.   The     Chancellor
\n       Kurukshetra University<\/a> relied upon by
\n       the High Court is not on the point
\n       involved in this case. In that case
\n       the tenure of Dr. Bool Chand was
\n       curtailed as he was found unfit to
\n       continue   as    Vice-Chancellor    having
\n       regard to his antecedents which were
\n       not disclosed by him at the time of
\n       his appointment as Vice-Chancellor.
\n       Similarly the judgment in Dr. D.C.
\n       Saxena v. State of Haryana<\/a> has no
\n       relevance to the facts of this case”.<\/p>\n
30. From      the     aforesaid   discussion,        the<\/p>\n
principle of law stipulated by this Court that<\/p>\n
curtailment of the term of five years can only<\/p>\n
be made for justifiable reasons and compliance<\/p>\n
with     principles    of   natural    justice       for<\/p>\n
                                                52<\/span>
\npremature termination of the term of a Director<\/p>\n
of AIIMS –       squarely applied also to the case<\/p>\n
of the writ petitioner as well and will also<\/p>\n
apply to any future Director of AIIMS. Thus<\/p>\n
there   was     never   any   permissibility      for    any<\/p>\n
artificial      and     impermissible     classification<\/p>\n
between the writ petitioner on the one hand and<\/p>\n
any future Director of AIIMS on the other when<\/p>\n
it relates to the premature termination of the<\/p>\n
term    of    office    of    the   Director.    Such     an<\/p>\n
impermissible over classification through a one<\/p>\n
man legislation clearly falls foul of Article<\/p>\n
14 of the Constitution being an apparent case<\/p>\n
of   “naked    discrimination”      in   our    democratic<\/p>\n
civilized society governed by Rule of Law and<\/p>\n
renders the impugned proviso as void, ab initio<\/p>\n
and unconstitutional.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
31. Such being our discussion and conclusion,<\/p>\n
on   the     constitutionality      of   the   proviso    to<\/p>\n
Section 11A, we must, therefore, come to this<\/p>\n
conclusion without any hesitation in mind, that<\/p>\n
                                                   53<\/span>
\nthe instant case is squarely covered by the<\/p>\n
principles of law laid down by this Court in<\/p>\n
the   various   pronouncements       as   noted      herein<\/p>\n
above including in the case of D.S.Reddy vs.<\/p>\n
Chancellor,     Osmania      University        and        Ors.<\/a><\/p>\n
[1967 (2) SCR 214). In the case of D.S.Reddy<\/p>\n
(supra), the facts of that case are somewhat<\/p>\n
similar to that of the writ petitioner. In that<\/p>\n
decision,     D.S.Reddy     was     already     a     Vice-<\/p>\n
Chancellor for the past seven years and had not<\/p>\n
challenged the fixation of term from five years<\/p>\n
to three years. He was aggrieved by the second<\/p>\n
amendment in the University Act whereby Section<\/p>\n
13A was introduced to make the provision of<\/p>\n
Section 12(2) providing for inquiry by an Hon.<\/p>\n
Judge of High Court\/Supreme Court and hearing<\/p>\n
before premature termination of the term of the<\/p>\n
Vice-Chancellor inapplicable to the incumbent<\/p>\n
to the office of the Vice-Chancellor on the<\/p>\n
commencement    of   the   2nd    Amendment.    The       core<\/p>\n
contention of D.S.Reddy was that this amendment<\/p>\n
was only for his removal and therefore was a<\/p>\n
                                                     54<\/span>
\ncase     of    “naked           discrimination”           as      it      also<\/p>\n
deprived the protection of Section 12(2) to him<\/p>\n
when Section 12(2) was applicable to all other<\/p>\n
Vice-Chancellors and there being no distinction<\/p>\n
in this regard between the Vice-Chancellor in<\/p>\n
office        and         the      Vice-Chancellors                to       be<\/p>\n
appointed. In that situation, the plea of the<\/p>\n
respondent-Government                  was    that     the     provision<\/p>\n
similar to Section 13A was also incorporated in<\/p>\n
two    other          enactments             relating        to        Andhra<\/p>\n
University           and     Shri       Venkateswara           and        was,<\/p>\n
therefore, not a one man legislation. It was<\/p>\n
further       contended          by    the     State    that       it      was<\/p>\n
always        open     and       permissible         to      the        State<\/p>\n
Legislature          to    treat       the     Vice-Chancellor             in<\/p>\n
office as a class in itself and make provisions<\/p>\n
in that regard. All the contentions on behalf<\/p>\n
of the State Government were rejected by the<\/p>\n
Constitution Bench judgment of this Court in<\/p>\n
the case of D.S.Reddy (supra) and it was held<\/p>\n
that     it      was         a        clear     case       of          “naked<\/p>\n
discrimination” for removal of one man and by<\/p>\n
                                                                     55<\/span>
\ndepriving him of the protection under Section<\/p>\n
12(2)       of   the      Act     without      there        being        any<\/p>\n
rationality          of      creating        a        classification<\/p>\n
between the Vice-Chancellor in office and the<\/p>\n
Vice-Chancellor to be appointed in future. It<\/p>\n
was further held in the case of D.S.Reddy that<\/p>\n
such a classification was not founded on an<\/p>\n
intelligible        differentia          and     was       held     to    be<\/p>\n
violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of<\/p>\n
India. Accordingly, the provision of Section<\/p>\n
13A        was     held      to     be      ultra           vires        and<\/p>\n
unconstitutional and hit by Article 14 of the<\/p>\n
Constitution. Similarly in the present case,<\/p>\n
the impugned proviso to Section 11(1A) itself<\/p>\n
states       that       it   is    carrying           out    premature<\/p>\n
termination         of       the     tenure           of     the        writ<\/p>\n
petitioner. It is also admitted that such a<\/p>\n
premature termination is without following the<\/p>\n
safeguards of justifiable reasons and notice.<\/p>\n
It    is    thus    a     case     similar       to    the     case       of<\/p>\n
D.S.Reddy and other decisions cited above that<\/p>\n
the impugned legislation is hit by Article 14<\/p>\n
                                                                   56<\/span>
\nas it creates an unreasonable classification<\/p>\n
between    the     writ    petitioner         and    the     future<\/p>\n
Directors and deprives the writ petitioner of<\/p>\n
the principles of natural justice without there<\/p>\n
being any intelligible differentia.<\/p>\n
32. In view of our discussion made hereinabove<\/p>\n
and for the reasons aforesaid, we are of the<\/p>\n
view that this writ petition is covered by the<\/p>\n
decisions     of        this    Court    in     the     case        of<\/p>\n
D.S.Reddy     and       L.P.Agarwal      and    the     impugned<\/p>\n
proviso to Section 11A of the AIIMS Act is,<\/p>\n
therefore,       hit       by     Article       14      of         the<\/p>\n
Constitution.       Accordingly,         we    hold    that       the<\/p>\n
proviso is ultra vires and unconstitutional and<\/p>\n
accordingly        it     is    struck     down.       The        writ<\/p>\n
petition under Article 32 of the Constitution<\/p>\n
is allowed. In view of our order passed in the<\/p>\n
writ petition, the writ petitioner shall serve<\/p>\n
the nation for some more period, i.e., upto<\/p>\n
2nd   of   July,        2008.    We      direct       the     AIIMS<\/p>\n
Authorities to restore the writ petitioner in<\/p>\n
                                                             57<\/span>
\nhis office as Director of AIIMS till his period<\/p>\n
comes to an end on 2nd of July, 2008. The writ<\/p>\n
petitioner    is    also    entitled       to        his          pay          and<\/p>\n
other   emoluments     as    he   was         getting                  before<\/p>\n
premature termination of his office from the<\/p>\n
date of his order of termination.                        Considering<\/p>\n
the   facts   and    circumstances          of         the          present<\/p>\n
case, there will be no order as to costs.<\/p>\n
                                      …………………………………………J.
\n                                      [TARUN CHATTERJEE]<\/p>\n
New Delhi:                          …………………………………………J.
\nMay 8, 2008                       [HARJIT SINGH BEDI]<\/p>\n
                                                                      58<\/span>
\n59<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India P.Venugopal vs Union Of India on 8 May, 2008 Author: T Chatterjee Bench: Tarun Chatterjee, Harjit Singh Bedi REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.656 OF 2007 P.VENUGOPAL …Petitioner VERSUS UNION OF INDIA …Respondent J U D G M E N T TARUN CHATTERJEE,J. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-137870","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nP.Venugopal vs Union Of India on 8 May, 2008 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"P.Venugopal vs Union Of India on 8 May, 2008 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2008-05-07T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-05-10T06:21:05+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"50 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"P.Venugopal vs Union Of India on 8 May, 2008\",\"datePublished\":\"2008-05-07T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-05-10T06:21:05+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008\"},\"wordCount\":9779,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-venugopal-vs-union-of-india-on-8-may-2008\",\"name\":\"P.Venugopal vs Union Of India on 8 May, 2008 - 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