{"id":146846,"date":"2008-11-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-11-16T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanmugha-arts-vs-union-of-india-on-17-november-2008"},"modified":"2016-10-16T20:53:01","modified_gmt":"2016-10-16T15:23:01","slug":"shanmugha-arts-vs-union-of-india-on-17-november-2008","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanmugha-arts-vs-union-of-india-on-17-november-2008","title":{"rendered":"Shanmugha Arts vs Union Of India on 17 November, 2008"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
Shanmugha Arts vs Union Of India on 17 November, 2008<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT\n\nDATED : 17\/11\/2008\n\nCORAM\nTHE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA\n\nW.P(MD)No.4377 of 2008\nand\nM.P(MD)Nos.1 to 3 of 2008\n\nShanmugha Arts, Science, Technology and\nResearch Academy (known as Sastra University),\nhaving its main campus at Shanmuga Campus,\nTirumalaisamudram,\nThanjavur - 613 402.\nrepresented by its Registrar,\nN.Anantharaman\t                        ... Petitioner\n\nVs -\n\n1.Union of India,\n  represented by its\n  Secretary to Government,\n  Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and\n  Highways,\n  \"Transport Bhavan\",\n  No.1, Parliament Street,\n  New Delhi - 110 001.\n\n2.The Competent Authority and\n  Special District Revenue Officer,\n  (Land Acquisition - National Highways),\n  Perambalur, Tirichirappalli,\n  Pudukottai - Thanjavur Districts,\n  Tiruchirappalli.\n\n\n3.National Highways Authority of India,\n  Project Implementation Unit,\n  No.54, 1st Street,\n  Natarajapuram North Colony,\n  Medical College Road,\n  Thanjavur - 613 004.\n  represented by its\n  Project Director.\t\t      ... Respondents\n\nPrayer\n\nWrit Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India\npraying for the issuance of a Writ of Certiorari calling for the records\nrelating to the order issued by the second respondent dated 30.04.2008 in\nR.C.60\/2007\/Unit III\/Thanjavur - Tiruchirappalli and quash the same.\n\n!For Petitioner ... Mr.G.Rajagopal,\n\t\t    Senior Counsel for\n\t\t    M\/s.G.R.Associates.\n^For Respondents... Mr.K.Ramakrishnan for R.1\n\t\t    Mrs.V.Chellammal,\n\t\t    Special Govt. Pleader for R.2\n\t            Mr.A.Rajendran for R.3\n\t            Mr.G.R.Swaminathan\n\t\t    for proposed respondent in\n\t\t    M.P(MD)No.2 of 2008.\n* * * * *\n\n:ORDER\n<\/pre>\n
\tAnimadverting upon the order passed by the second respondent dated
\n30.04.2008 in R.C.60\/2007\/Unit III\/Thanjavur – Tiruchirappalli, this writ
\npetition  is focused so as to get quashed the same, by issuing a Writ of
\nCertiorari.\n<\/p>\n
\t2. The facts giving rise to the filing of this writ petition as stood
\nexposited from the affidavit accompanying the writ petition as well as from the
\nsubmissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, could
\nsuccinctly and precisely, tersely and briefly, be set out thus:
\n\tThe third respondent intended to acquire the land for widening the
\nexisting road connecting Trichy and Thanjavur and in that process, steps have
\nbeen taken.  Wherefore the Central Government passed notification dated
\n17.12.2007 vide 3A(1) Notification published in GOI Gazette Special Publication
\nNo.1550 S.O.No.2136 (E).  Whereupon, the substance of the notification was
\npublished in two local newspapers namely “Dhina Thanthi” and “The Hindu” dated
\n31.01.2008.  Even before such paper publications, but after the Gazette
\nnotification, the communication dated 10.01.2008 was sent by the third
\nrespondent to the petitioner who submitted his objection on 21.01.2008.  After
\nthe publication in the newspapers cited supra, one other objection dated
\n19.02.2008 was submitted by the petitioner reiterating what was already put
\nforth before the third respondent.  Whereupon, the second respondent, the
\ncompetent authority issued notice  scheduling the date of enquiry as 13.03.2008
\nand on that date, the petitioner appeared along with his advocate.  On the date
\nof hearing, a written submission in the form of supplication was also given by
\nthe petitioner to the second respondent.  Ultimately, the second respondent
\nserved the copy of the impugned order dated 30.04.2008 on the petitioner,
\nthereupon only, the petitioner came to know that the objection filed by the
\npetitioner was communicated to the third respondent and obtained their remarks
\nand after referring to the objections of the petitioner as well as the remarks
\nthereon furnished by the third respondent, the second respondent passed the
\nimpugned orders.  However, the impugned order dated 30.04.2008 passed by the
\nsecond respondent is niggard and bereft of reasons for having rejected the
\npetitioner’s objections and for agreeing with the remarks furnished by the third
\nrespondent.  No copy of the remarks furnished by the third respondent as against
\nthe objections filed by the petitioner, was served on the petitioner so as to
\neffectively put forth the case of the petitioner.  As such, the principles of
\nnatural justice have been violated in this regard.  The second respondent
\nmechanically by simply narrating the objections filed by the petitioner and the
\nremarks furnished by the third respondent, agreed with the third respondent
\nwithout setting out reasons and hence, the impugned order passed by the second
\nrespondent is liable to be set aside as it falls foul of the principles of
\nnatural justice.\n<\/p>\n
\t3. The plan prepared by the third respondent, a copy of it, which was
\nfurnished to the petitioner, contains an artificial bend at the campus of the
\npetitioner and thereby, deprives the petitioner to run his institution.  If the
\nroad is laid as per the said plan, naturally the petitioner’s running of the
\ndeemed University would be set at naught or it will be in doldrums; ultimately,
\nthey would be put to irreparable loss.  In the objections also, the petitioner
\nhad set out as to how, if the proposed road was laid, it would cause noise
\npollution and create various other difficulties in addition to resulting in
\ndemolition of hospital building and other buildings of the University.\n<\/p>\n
\t4. Per contra, the refutatory counter has been filed by the third
\nrespondent denying and remonstrating, gainsaying and contradicting the
\naverments\/allegations in the petition; the sum and substance, the pith and
\nmarrow, the warp and woof of the same, could inter alia be set out thus:\n<\/p>\n
\tThe petitioner is having no right to invoke Article 226 of the
\nConstitution of India as per the decisions of the Honourable Apex Court.  The
\nscope of the enquiry under Section 3-C of the National Highways Act is very
\nlimited and no Court could go into the validity of any plan.  On technical
\naspects, the Court cannot interfere.  Various buildings of other persons have
\nbeen demolished for the purpose of laying the road and only the petitioner is
\nobjecting.  The views obtained by the third respondent from the experts, are
\nfound referred to in the impugned order which would speak by itself that the
\nplan is strictly in accordance with Indian Road Congress.  If as suggested by
\nthe petitioner, the alignment of the road is changed,  it would be necessitate
\nother lands  belonging to different persons may have to be acquired and various
\nbuildings have to be demolished.\n<\/p>\n
\t5. Per contra, if the existing plan is implemented in stricto sensu, cost
\nwise it would be lesser and furthermore, it would enable free flow of traffic
\nvehicular at 100 Km\/hr which is the object of laying the said road.  At the
\nmost, if the said plan is implemented, the petitioner will be loosing only the
\nbuilding where a small hospital is being run and their compound wall and not as
\naired by the petitioner in the affidavit accompanying the writ petition.  The
\nentire running of the deemed University would not be hampered.  It would not
\ncause noise pollution also.  Accordingly, he prayed for the dismissal of the
\nwrit petition.\n<\/p>\n
\t6. Heard both sides.\n<\/p>\n
\t7. The points for consideration are:\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) Whether the petitioner has justifiably invoked Article 226 of the
\nConstitution of India in the facts and circumstances of this case?\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii)Whether the allegations\/averments as found set out in the objections
\nfiled before the second respondent are within the purview of enquiry under
\nSection 3 C of the The National Highways Act, 1956? and\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) Whether the principles of natural justice have been adhered to in
\nthis case before passing the impugned order by the second respondent?\n<\/p>\n
\t8. All the above three points are inter-linked and entwined, interwoven
\nand interconnected with one another and accordingly, all these points are taken
\ntogether for discussion.\n<\/p>\n
Point Nos.(i) to (iii):\n<\/p>\n
\t9. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, placing reliance on a
\nplethora of precedents, would develop his arguments to the effect that when the
\nprinciples of natural justice are violated by the quasi-judicial authority, the
\nCourt could always interfere and it would be preposterous on the part of the
\nrespondents to contend that the Court cannot interfere whenever the provisions
\nof the National Highways Act, 1956, is  being implemented.\n<\/p>\n
\t10. Whereas the learned Counsel for the third respondent would cite
\nvarious other decisions in support his contention that on technical matters,
\nsuch as alignment of road, noise pollution etc., the Court cannot interfere and
\nit has no jurisdiction.  Citing the decision of the Honourable Apex Court in
\nCompetent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory<\/a> reported in (2005) 13 SCC 477, he
\nwould develop his argument that virtually the pleas as the ones raised by the
\npetitioner are beyond the scope of enquiry and consideration under Section 3-C
\nof the National Highways Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t11. The learned Counsel for the petitioner also would put forth a
\nfactually based argument to the effect that the third respondent is intending to
\nwiden the existing road which is already having such curve in that locality and
\nit is not a new curve which could be labelled as a new artificial and motivated
\ncurve.  If the suggestion of the petitioner is accepted, various other buildings
\nof the private persons would have to be demolished which would not be just and
\nproper.\n<\/p>\n
\t12. It is just and necessary to consider the decisions cited on either
\nside in seriatim.\n<\/p>\n
\t13. The learned Counsel for the third respondent cited the decision of the
\nHonourable Apex Court in Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory<\/a> reported
\nin (2005) 13 SCC 477.  An excerpt from it, would run thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“8.The absence of a plan also renders the right to file objections under
\nSection 3-C(1), nugatory.  In the absence of a plan, it is impossible to
\nascertain or know which part of the acquired land was to be used and in what
\nmanner.  Without this knowledge no objections regarding use of land could be
\nfiled.  Since the objection regarding use of the land had been given up by the
\nwrit petitioners, we need not go any further in this aspect.  We would, however,
\nlike to add that unlike Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which
\nconfers a general right to object to acquisition of land under Section 4 of the
\nsaid Act, Section 3-C(1) of the National Highways Act gives a very limited right
\nto object.  The objection can be only to the use of the land under acquisition
\nfor purposes other than those under Section 3-A(1).  The Act confers no right to
\nobject to acquisition as such.  This answers the  argument advanced by the
\nlearned counsel for NHAI that failure to file objections disentitles the writ
\npetitioners to object to the acquisition.  The Act confers no general right to
\nobject, therefore, failure to object becomes irrelevant.  The learned counsel
\nrelied on the judgment of this Court in Delhi Admn v, Gurdip Singh Urban.  In
\nour view, this judgment has no application in the facts of the present case
\nwhere the right to object is a very limited right.  The case cited is a case
\nunder the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which confers a general right to object to
\nacquisition of land under Section 5-A.  Failure to exercise that right could be
\nsaid to be acquiescence. The National Highways Act confers no such right.  Under
\nthis Act there is no right to object to acquisition of land except on the
\nquestion of its user.  Therefore, the present objection has to be decided
\nindependently of the right to file objections.  Dehors the right to file
\nobjection, the validity of the notification has to be considered.  Failure to
\nfile objection to the notification under Section 3-C, therefore, cannot non-suit
\nthe writ petitioners in this case.”\n<\/p>\n
\t14. Placing reliance on the aforesaid excerpt, the main thrust of the
\nargument of the learned Counsel for the third respondent, would be that the
\nscope of enquiry under Section 3-C of the Act is only to the limited extent of
\nconsidering the objections if any which could be focussed to the effect that the
\nproposed use of the land is for a purpose, other than the ones which are
\ncontemplated under Section 3-A(1) of the said Act.  Here, the purpose is to lay
\ndown the road which is covered under Section 3-A(1) of the said Act and in such
\na case, the writ itself is a misconceived one.\n<\/p>\n
\t15. Whereas by way of torpedoing and pulverizing the arguments of the
\nlearned Counsel for the third respondent, the learned Senior Counsel for the
\npetitioner would submit that paragraph No.8 of the Honourable Apex Court’s
\njudgment should not be read in isolation and it should be read in conjunction
\nwith the observations made in paragraph No.5 of it, which is also extracted as
\nunder:\n<\/p>\n
\t“… So far as the question whether the impugned notification meets the
\nrequirement of Section 3-A(1) of the Act regarding giving brief description of
\nland is concerned, we have already shown that even though plot numbers of lands
\nin respect of each mouza are given, different prices of land are acquired either
\nas whole or in part.  Wherever the acquisition is of a portion of a bigger piece
\nof land, there is no description as to which portion was being acquired.  Unless
\nit is known as to which portion was to be acquired, the petitioners  would be
\nunable to understand the impact of acquisition or to raise any objection about
\nuser of the acquired land for the purposes specified under the Act or to make a
\nclaim for compensation.  It is settled law that where a stature requires a
\nparticular act to be done in a particular manner, the act has to be done in that
\nmanner alone.  Every word of the statute has to be given its due meaning.  In
\nour view, the impugned notification fails to meet the statutory mandate.  It is
\nvague.  The least that is required in such cases is that the acquisition
\nnotification should let the person whose land is sought to be acquired know what
\nhe is going to lose.  The impugned notification in this case is, therefore, not
\nin accordance with law.”\n<\/p>\n
\t16. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would develop his
\nargument to the effect that no part of the enactment should be rendered nugatory
\nand otiose as exemplified in the Honourable Apex Court’s precedent cited supra.
\nAccording to him, Section 3-C of the Act would clearly and categorically
\nhighlight and spotlight the fact that during enquiry contemplated therein, the
\npetitioner as the owner of the land can very well object to the use of the land
\nand that includes his right to object to the way in which the proposed road is
\ngoing to be laid through the petitioner’s land.\n<\/p>\n
\t17. Trite, the proposition of law is that even obiter of the Honourable
\nApex Court is binding on the High Court.  Here, whatever stated by the
\nHonourable Apex Court at paragraph No.8 is only obiter, nonetheless, it is
\nbinding on this Court. As correctly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel
\nfor the petitioner, the entire judgment has to be read and on being read, it is
\npellucid and palpable that in paragraph No.5 of the said judgment, the
\nHonourable Apex Court held that no part of the enactment should be rendered
\nnugatory or otiose.   Here, conducting an enquiry under Section 3-C of the Act
\nshould not be an ’empty formality’ and that is what the Honourable Apex Court
\nhighlighted in the said judgment.  For the purpose of the disposal of this case,
\nthere is no necessity to delve deep into the legal principles envisaged in
\nSection 3-C of the Act and ponder over the broad proposition, as to what is the
\nactual scope and parameter of Section 3-C of the National Highways Act; suffice,
\nto consider whether the plea of artificial curve in the said plan as objected to
\nby the petitioner, could be gone into or not during enquiry under Section 3-C of
\nthe Act.  I am of the considered opinion that such objection could rightly be
\ntaken as the one within the ambit of the enquiry under Section 3-C of the Act as
\notherwise, there would be no purpose in conducting enquiry at all.  Here, the
\npetitioner is not challenging as to whether the road should be laid or not, but
\nthe challenge is limited to the said artificial curve and the consequential
\nproposal to demolish the buildings of the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t18. In the petitioner’s objection, they have stated that they are having
\nno objection for laying the road connecting Trichy and Thanjavur, but their main
\nobjection is relating to the artificial curve that is found crept in the road
\nplan.  Even though in very many words, they have not expatiated and delineated
\nas to the motive behind such curve, the learned Senior Counsel for the
\npetitioner would submit that such an artificial curve is borne out of some
\nulterior motive only.\n<\/p>\n
\t19. Be that as it may, now then, a mere perusal of the said plan would
\nclearly indicate and evince that in that proposed plan, there is a curve or bend
\nin the road at the property of the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t20. It is therefore obvious and axiomatic that the petitioner has got the
\nright to raise objections concerning the same which the District Revenue Officer
\nshould have concentrated and given his objective reasons on that.  The
\nratiocination of the second respondent in  respect of his dismissive attitude
\ntowards the pleas of the petitioner is missing in the impugned order.  At this
\ncontext, the non-furnishing of the copy of the remarks of the third respondent
\nto the petitioner’s objections before the passing of the impugned order gains
\nprominence and significance.\n<\/p>\n
\t21. At this juncture, the learned Counsel for the third respondent would
\nargue that absolutely there is nothing in Section 3-C of the said Act on par
\nwith Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, that a copy of the remarks to the
\nobjections filed by the petitioner, should be furnished to the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t22. I am at a loss to understand as to how such an argument could be
\ncountenanced.  No doubt, ex facie and prima facie, there is no version found
\nincorporated in Section 3-C of the National Highways Act that a copy of the
\nremarks furnished by the third respondent should be given to the petitioner.
\nNonetheless, in this case, the second respondent did choose to furnish the
\nobjection to the third respondent whereupon, the third respondent also furnished
\ntheir remarks with the help of an expert and it is a fait accompli, but the copy
\nof the remarks of the expert which the second respondent relied on in the
\nimpugned order was not furnished to the petitioner so as to enable them to
\nchallenge the remarks.\n<\/p>\n
\t23. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would rely on the Full
\nBench decision of this Court in Pari, R. v. The Special Tahsildar, Adi-Dravidar
\nWelfare, Devakkottai<\/a> reported in 2006 (4) CTC 609.  An excerpt from it, would
\nrun thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“18.Under the State Act, the statutory provisions in the shape of Section
\n4 and Rule 3 are silent regarding holding of any enquiry (either by the District
\nCollector or by the authorised officer).  The statutory provisions merely
\ncontemplate issuance of notice to show cause and the Rules only contemplate
\nissuance of notice in Form I.  However, such Form I specifically contemplates
\n“the statement of objections, if any” received within the time stipulated will
\nbe enquired into “at a particular place” on ” a particular date” at the office
\nof “a particular office”, to be specified in such notice.  The Form-I further
\ncontemplates that the person interested is at liberty to appear and to adduce
\nany oral and documentary evidence in support of his objection.  It is no doubt
\ntrue that such a notice in the statutorily prescribed form can be considered as
\npart of the Rules.  However, the procedure to be followed by the authorised
\nofficer is not specifically laid down, save and except as contained in Section
\n4(3)(b).  This clause only contemplates that the officer authorised shall make
\nreport to the District Collector containing his recommendations on the cause so
\nshown for the decision of the District Collector.  It further contemplates that
\nthe District Collector may pass such orders as he may deem fit after considering
\nsuch report.  The provisions contained in the Act, the Rules or in Form-I do not
\nspecifically envisage as to which record will be placed before the District
\nCollector.  Similarly the provisions are silent as to whether the copy of report
\nof the authorised officer is required to be furnished to the objectors.  The
\nprinciples of natural justice regarding furnishing of copy of report can be
\nconsidered as super added to such provisions.  It cannot be said that merely
\nbecause the Form-I does not specifically prescribe any further opportunity, such
\nopportunity is impliedly prescribed.  Since the Central Act had specifically and
\nin detail made certain provisions, it is reasonable to conclude that the Central
\nAct has exhaustively laid down the manner in which and the extent of principles
\nof natural justice is required to be complied with and impliedly excluded any
\nother extension of principles of natural justice; whereas under the State Act
\nthe statutory provisions and the Rules being silent, the scope and extent of
\nnatural justice to be followed need not be confined to whatever has been
\ndescribed in the Form-I.\n<\/p>\n
\t39. It was submitted on behalf of the State Government that since specific
\nprovisions had been in Section 4 and Rule 3 and particularly in Form I, it would
\nnot be appropriate to incorporate any other principle of natural justice.
\n\tA similar contention had been repelled by the Supreme Court in the
\ndecisions in Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi,
\nAIR<\/a> 1978 SC 851 and S.L.Kapoor v. Jagmohan and others<\/a>, AIR 1981 SC 136.  In the
\nlater decision, relying upon the decision reported in Mohinder Singh Gill V. The
\nChief Election Commissioner, New Delhi, AIR<\/a> 1978 SC 851, it was observed:
\n\t“10.  … We are unable to agree with the submission of the learned
\nAttorney General.  It is not always a necessary inference that if opportunity is
\nexpressly provided in one provision and not so provided in another, opportunity
\nis to be considered as excluded from that other provision.  It may be a weighty
\nconsideration to be taken into account but the weightier consideration is
\nwhether the administrative action entails civil consequences.  This was also the
\nview taken in Mohinder Singh Gill V. The Chief Election Commissioner, New Delhi,
\nAIR<\/a> 1978 SC 851, where it was observed (at p.316):\n<\/p>\n
\t“We have been told that wherever the Parliament has intended a hearing it
\nhas said so in the Act and the rules and inferentially where it has not
\nspecified it is otiose.  There is no such sequitur.  The silence of a statute
\nhas no exclusionary effect except where it flows from necessary implication.
\nArticle 324 vests a wide power and where some direct consequence on candidates
\nemanates from its exercise we must read this functional obligation.”\n<\/p>\n
\t24. Over and above that, he would also cite one other decision in
\nSundaravalli Ammal v. The Government of Tamil Nadu<\/a> reported in 2008 (2) CTC 241,
\nwhich would reiterate the views expressed in the earlier Full Bench decision
\ncited supra.  An excerpt from it, would run thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“11)We hold that having regard to the dictum of the Full Bench decision
\nreported in R.Pari -vs-Special Tahsildar, Adi Dravidar Welfare, Pasumpon
\nMuthramalinga Thevar District and another, 2006 (4) CTC 609: 2007 (2) MLJ 706,
\nthe Division Bench  ought to have applied the ratio laid down in the said
\ndecision and disposed of the matter.  If at all the Division Bench felt any
\ndoubt as to the correctness of the said Full Bench decision,  in all fairness
\nthe Division Bench could have directed the registry to place the matter before
\nthe learned Chief Justice for his consideration as to whether a further
\nreference is called for for referring the issue to a Larger Bench.\n<\/p>\n
\t12)Since we have found as stated in paragraph-8 of this Order that the
\nconclusion of the Full Bench decision reported in  R.Pari -vs-Special Tahsildar,
\nAdi Dravidar Welfare, Pasumpon  Muthramalinga Thevar District and another, 2006
\n(4) CTC 609: 2007 (2) MLJ 706, has laid down the law appropriately and that
\nthere is no flaw in the said decision, we hold that the order of  reference to a
\nLarger Bench is uncalled for.  The said Full Bench decision is therefore binding
\non the Division Bench.  We accordingly, direct the registry to place the matter
\nbefore the Division Bench to decide the Appeals on merits.”\n<\/p>\n
\t25. It is therefore clear from the aforesaid two Full Bench decisions that
\neven though in the statute, there is no express provision for furnishing copy of
\nthe said remarks referred to above, yet the principles of natural justice
\nwarrant such furnishing of the copy of the remarks to the petitioner so as to
\nenable them to effectively put forth their case before the second respondent.\n<\/p>\n
\t26. At this juncture, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner cited
\nparagraph No.37 of the aforesaid decision in Pari, R. v. The Special Tahsildar,
\nAdi-Dravidar Welfare, Devakkottai<\/a> reported in 2006 (4) CTC 609 and it is
\nextracted hereunder for ready reference:\n<\/p>\n
\t“37)The desirability of furnishing a copy of the report to enable the land
\nowner to make a further representation to the District Collector does not mean
\nthat in every case, where such report has not been furnished, the ultimate order
\npassed by the District Collector deciding to acquire the land is automatically
\nvitiated.  The scope for judicial interference in the matter relating to
\nacquisition of land obviously being very limited, the Court in each case is
\nrequired to find out whether  non-furnishing of the report in any way has
\nprejudiced the person concerned.  The object of furnishing the report and
\naffording further opportunity to the land owner to make a further representation
\nis obviously to pinpoint any deficiency in the report of the authorized offer.
\nIf any particular aspect has been highlighted by the land owner and has not been
\nconsidered by the authorised officer, the land owner would get a further
\nopportunity to highlight such aspect before the District Collector.  In other
\nwords, if the authorised officer has considered the relevant because a copy of
\nsuch report is not furnished and no further  opportunity is given to the land
\nowner, may not be a ground to quash the land acquisition proceedings.  On the
\nother hand, if important aspects, which have been highlighted by the land owner,
\nhave been ignored by the authorised officer, it may be reasonable to infer non-
\nfurnishing of such report and non- offering of opportunity to make further
\nrepresentation might have vitiated the ultimate decision of the District
\nCollector.  These are matters to be considered on the basis of the facts and
\ncircumstances in each acquisition and it should  not be construed that as a
\nmatter of law in every case where copy of the report has not been furnished and
\nopportunity of making further representation had been denied, it is sufficient
\nto quash such acquisition.  Ultimately the Court has to judge the prejudice
\ncaused to such person by keeping in view the facts and circumstances in
\nparticular case.”\n<\/p>\n
\t27. Placing reliance on the aforesaid excerpt, the learned Senior Counsel
\nfor the petitioner would develop his argument that the Court while scrutinizing
\nthe records as well as the validity of the impugned order, could very well see
\nas to whether in a particular case involved such non-furnishing of the report is
\nfatal or not and it differs from case to case.  However, according to him, so
\nfar this case is concerned, such non-furnishing of such copy is fatal because
\nhere the objection is relating to an artificial curve as well as the noise
\npollution etc.  and the expert allegedly gave his opinion and it was accepted by
\nthe second respondent, but the copy of it was not given to the petitioner.  I
\ncould see considerable force in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for
\nthe petitioner that this is a case which warranted the furnishing of the said
\nreport to the petitioner so as to enable him to meet the comments and remarks in
\nthe report passed as against the objections of the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t28. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also placed reliance on
\ndecision of this Court in  AL.Ranathan Amutha & Co, Indian Oil Dealer,
\nTiruchirapalli -vs- Government of India, rep.by its Secretary Ministry of Road
\nTransport and Highways, New Delhi and others reported in  2008 5 MLJ 888.  An
\nexcerpt from it, would run thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“20)It is trite that any authority, particularly quasi-judicial authority,
\nwho exercises his powers is required to spell out the reasons for his conclusion
\nirrespective  of the fact whether the conclusion is subject to appeal, revision
\nor judicial review.  The extent and nature of reasons would depend on particular
\nfacts and circumstances and those reasons must be clear and explicit so as to
\nindicate that the authority concerned has given due consideration to the points
\nin controversy.  More so, the need for recording reasons is greater in a case
\nwhere his order is based by an order of other authority.  The requirement of
\nconsideration of objection mandated in the Act is not an empty formality and as
\nsuch, the second respondent ought not to have rejected the petitioner’s
\nobjections  simply based on the technical opinion given by the Project Director.
\nTo put it otherwise, the second respondent  should have restrained himself from
\nconsidering the petitioner’s objections simply for the sake of doing.  This is
\nbecause it is not sufficient if the rule of law is followed in letter and it
\nshould be followed in spirit as well in a constructive manner.  In addition to
\nrelying on the Project Director’s technical opinion, the second respondent
\nshould have also applied his mind and dealt with the petitioner’s objections one
\nby one and should have arrived at his conclusion with due reasoning in a
\nspeaking manner.  It has been held in a catena of decisions of the Supreme Court
\nand this Court that spelling out of reasons in an administrative decision is a
\nrule of natural justice.  It is a well settled principle that reasoning is the
\nheartbeat of every conclusion becomes not only meaningless but also lifeless.
\nThe object behind spelling out reasons is that the affected party should know as
\nto why the decision has gone against him.  One of the fundamental principles of
\nnatural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made even in rejecting the
\nobjections.  At this juncture, it would be very much appropriate to state that a
\nvery recent judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Director, Horticulture,
\nPunjab and Others -vs- Jagjivan Parshad 2008 AIR SCW 2858, adds strength to this
\nsettled proposition of law and the relevant portions of which are extracted as
\nunder:\n<\/p>\n
\t“Reasons introduce clarity in an order.  On plainset consideration of
\njustice, the High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief, in
\nits order indicative of an application of its minds, all the more when its order
\nis amenable to further avenue of challenge.  The absence of reasons  has
\nrendered the High Court; judgment not sustainable.\n<\/p>\n
\tReasons substitute subjectivity by objectivity.  The emphasis on recording
\nreasons is that if the decision reveals the “inscrutable face of the sphinx”, it
\ncan, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for the Courts to perform
\ntheir appellate function or exercise the power of judicial review in adjudging
\nthe validity of the decision.  Right to reason is an indispensable part of a
\nsound judicial system.  Another rationale is that the affected party  can know
\nwhy the decision has gone against him.  One of the salutary requirements of
\nnatural justice is spelling out reasons for the order made, in other words, a
\nspeaking-out.  The “inscrutable face of the sphinx” is ordinarily incongruous
\nwith a judicial or quasi-judicial performance.”\n<\/p>\n
\t29. The above excerpt would clearly highlight and spotlight that when an
\nauthority under Section 3-C of the Act, wants to rely upon the view expressed by
\nthe third respondent, then there should be reason set out in support of the
\nsame.  Here, the perusal of the impugned order does not reveal or demonstrate
\nthat for what reasons, the views of the expert was accepted and the objections
\nof the petitioner was rejected.\n<\/p>\n
\t30. At this juncture, it is just and necessary to extract certain excerpts
\nfrom the said impugned order:\n<\/p>\n
\t“Objections:\n<\/p>\n
  \t1.The Objector stated that sufficient lands are available on the opposite
\nside adjoining the existing Highways.  It is also stated that when free lands
\nwithout any building or construction are available for widening, there is
\nabsolutely no need for acquiring the land belonging to the University.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.That he stated that from the plan it is very apparent that instead of
\nfollowing a straight path, the road takes a bend near the University and again
\nstraightens after crossing the University.  It is also stated that there is a
\nbasic defect in the alignment of the highway and already representations have
\nbeen given with proof regarding the same.\n<\/p>\n
\t3.That he stated that the reason for bending the road near the University
\nso as to enter into the University area is not clear at all.  It is also stated
\nthat the proposed design will seriously affect the functioning of the
\nUniversity.  Further it is stated that in these circumstances, the land
\nbelonging to the University cannot be acquired.\n<\/p>\n
\t4.That he stated that the proposed alignment as per the drawing obtained
\nfrom the National Highways Authority clearly evidences the curve towards the
\nUniversity premises on the Vallam side at chainages of 98.8 and 100.2 on the
\nTrichy side, leaving a vast space on the other side of the proposed road.\n<\/p>\n
\t5.That he stated that SASTRA is a University declared as a Deemed
\nUniversity by the Central Government under Section 3 of the University Grants
\nCommission Act,1956.  He also said that the Central Government has notified
\nSASTRA as Centre for excellence and the University has been conducting research
\nwork in the joint venture of the Central Government, TIFAC-CORE in Advanced
\nComputing and Information Processing Centre for Nanotechnology & Advanced
\nBiomaterials, Centre for Advanced in Indian System of Medicine (CARISM),
\nNational Facilities in Engineering and Technology with Industrial Collaboration
\n(NAFETIC) etc.”\n<\/p>\n
\t31. The aforesaid excerpts in the impugned order summarised the objections
\nrelating to the artificial curve and other objections raised by the petitioner
\nin the plan, for which the second respondent in page No.5 of its report would
\nobserve thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“1)To the objections No.1 to 5:\n<\/p>\n
\tThe Project Director has stated that the present design has optimum
\nutilization of existing roadway with minimum load acquisition and the Project
\nHighway, is designed for 100 km\/hr and the design in carried out as per IRC
\nspecifications.  He further stated that the proposed alignment is the most
\nfeasible alignment in terms of financial and geometric considerations and
\nproposing a totally new alignment alternative is suggested will be costly and
\nwill result in abandoning the existing roadway.  This new alignment will also
\nresult in additional land acquisition and additional cost implication to the
\nGovernment of India.”\n<\/p>\n
\t32. As such, the above excerpt is the summary of the remarks filed on the
\nside of the third respondent, but the copy of the report was not given to the
\npetitioner.  Ultimately, in the impugned order at page No.6, the second
\nrespondent observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“1)With regard to the suggestion made by the petitioner for alternative
\nalignment, the Project Director, NAHI, Tiruchy has stated that the present
\ndesign has optimum utilization existing Roadways with minimum land acquisition.
\nThe Project Highway is designed for 100 K.m\/Hr and the design is carried out as
\nper IRC specifications.  The alignment will not cause Fatal accidents.  The
\nproposed alignment is the most feasible alignment in terms of financial and
\ngeometrical consideration.  Proposing a totally new alignment will be costly and
\nwill result in abandoning of the existing Roadway.  The new alignment will also
\nresult in additional land acquisition and additional cost implication to the
\nGovernment of India.”\n<\/p>\n
\t33. It is therefore clear from the aforesaid excerpts that the authority
\nsimply accepted the view of the third respondent and rejected the objections of
\nthe petitioner without citing any reason.  At page No.6, it is simply found
\nstated as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“I agree with the remarks of the Project Director, NHAI, Tanjore.  Hence,
\nthe objection made by the petitioner is negatived and also rejected.”\n<\/p>\n
\t34. Put simply, without independently applying the mind, the second
\nrespondent rejected the objections of the petitioner.  As such, my above
\ndiscussion would exemplify and demonstrate that the second respondent without
\nadhering to the principles of natural justice, passed the impugned order which
\nwarrants quashment on that ground itself.\n<\/p>\n
\t35. With a view to highlight that non-furnishing of the copy of the
\nremarks furnished by the third respondent is material, I would like to observe
\nfurther thus:\n<\/p>\n
\tThe learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the
\nfact that as per the proposed plan, the compound wall of the petitioner’s
\npremises would be the mid-line of the proposed road, whereas now the existing
\nroad is far away from the compound wall and that itself is the indicative of the
\nfact that there is an artificial curve.  While exercising the jurisdiction under
\nArticle 226 of the Constitution of India, when such a glaring defect in the plan
\nis highlighted before this Court, this Court could visualize that the grievance
\nof the petitioner that there is an artificial curve, is not one fraught with
\ngobble de gook, gibberish, recondite, abstruse uncanny statements.  The
\ncontention of the petitioner that unless there occurs such an artificial curve
\nin the plan, the existing compound wall cannot constitute the middle line of the
\nproposed road., deserves deep scrutiny by the second respondent. However, I do
\nnot finally decide that what the petitioner contended, is correct.  The second
\nrespondent should have necessarily applied his mind on that aspect and given a
\nfinding either way.  Had the proposition as put forth by the learned Counsel for
\nthe petitioner was not at all factually correct, then that would have been
\nreferred to in the impugned order itself by citing factual details.  As pointed
\nout by the learned Counsel for the third respondent, if the proposal of the
\npetitioner is accepted, it would affect others obviously, than those facts
\nshould have been detailed in the impugned order itself.  De hors that even in
\nthe counter, I could not see no such details about other persons and the owners
\nof the buildings who would be allegedly affected if the suggestion of the
\npetitioner is accepted.  As such, without deciding factually, I would like to
\nobserve that the impugned order is niggard and bereft of details and
\naccordingly, it falls foul of the principles of natural justice warranting
\nquashment as it was passed by the second respondent without au fait with law and
\nau curante  with fact.\n<\/p>\n
\t36.The learned Counsel for the third respondent also cited various
\ndecisions as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) In Ramniklal N.Bhutta and another -vs- State of Maharashtra and others
\nreported in (1997) 1 SCC 134. An excerpt from it, would run thus:
\n\t“10.Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come
\nwhere the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising
\ntheir power of granting stay\/injunction.  The power under Article 226 is
\ndiscretionary.  It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice
\nand not merely on the making out of a legal point.  And in the matter of land
\nacquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public
\ninterest coalesce.  They are very often one and the same.  Even in a civil suit,
\ngranting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an
\ninterlocutory nature, is equally discretionary.  The courts have to weight the
\npublic interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under
\nArticle 226-indeed any of their discretionary powers.\n<\/p>\n
\t37. There could be no quarrel over the proposition of law as found
\nenunciated in the aforesaid decision as it is clear that the current trend of
\nthinking is that for the greater good of public, there should be sacrifice by
\nthe individual.  My mind is redolent and reminiscent of the famous maxim
\n“Privatorum conventio juri publico non derogat.”\n<\/p>\n
\t38. But, here, the petitioner is in no way objecting to the laying of the
\nroad, but what his objection is that there is an artificial curve in the
\nproposed plan which is actuated by ulterior motive and not by actual
\nrequirements by any standard including Indian Road Congress.\n<\/p>\n
\t39. An excerpt from the decision in Krishnaveni and others -vs- Union of
\nIndia rep.by the Secretary to Government, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways,
\nNew Delhi and others reported in 2007 6 MLJ 935, would run thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“23.The petitioners sought to challenge the veracity and correctness of
\nthe detailed finalized plan of National Highways Authority of India, in my view,
\nthe said submission is devoid of merits.  The findings of expert bodies in
\ntechnical and scientific matters would not ordinarily be interfered with by this
\nCourt in exercise of their power under Article 226 of the Constitution, followed
\nAkhil Bharat Gaseva  Sangh -vs- State of Andhra Pradesh (2006) 4 SCC 162 wherein
\nin para-59, it was held thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“59. The appellant sought to challenge the veracity and correctness of the
\nfigures given in the report of the Central Government as well as in the
\nquinquennial census.  In our view, this submission is devoid of merit.  It is
\nnow  well settled by various decisions of this Court that the findings of expert
\nbodies in technical and scientific matters would not ordinarily be interfered
\nwith by the courts in exercise of their power under Article 226 of the
\nConstitution or by this Court under Article 136 or 32 of the Constitution..”\n<\/p>\n
\t40. Placing reliance on the aforesaid decision, the learned Counsel for
\nthe third respondent would develop his argument that the findings of the expert
\nbodies in technical and scientific matters would not ordinarily be interfered
\nwith by this Court in exercise of their power under Article 226 of the
\nConstitution of India.  There could be no second opinion over the aforesaid
\ndecision.  But, my above discussion supra would demonstrate and indicate as to
\nhow in this case, the details are missing and there is no objectivity in
\naddition to the order having been passed without adhering to the principles of
\nnatural justice.\n<\/p>\n
\t41.The learned Counsel for the third respondent also cited the decision in
\nM.Haridass and others -vs- State of Tamil Nadu rep.by its Secretary to
\nGovernment, Industries Department, Chennai and others reported in 2008 5 MLJ
\n1174.  An excerpt from it, would run thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“59.Therefore, it is made clear that a public notice in writing with the
\nsignature of the officer concerned be made widely known in the locality by
\naffixing in the conspicuous public places or publishing the same by beat of drum
\nor by advertisement in a local newspaper, etc.,.  It is significant to note that
\nas far as issuance of show cause notice to the owner or person interested in the
\nopinion of the Government, neither the Act nor the Rules prescribe any method to
\nbe followed, which means that if such show cause notice is sent to the owner or
\npersons interested in any acceptable form, the same is certainly a proper method
\nof service.    Even in this way service of show cause notice and public notice,
\nunder Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999 is totally different from Section 4(1) of the
\nCentral Act 1 of 1894 which contemplates the notification to be published in the
\nOfficial Gazette stating that it appears to the appropriate Government that such
\nland in the locality is needed for public purpose in addition to that, it is the
\nduty of the Government to publish the same in two daily newspapers circulating
\nin that locality of which at least one should be in regional language.  In
\naddition to that, it is the duty of the District Collector to cause public
\nnotice of substance of such notification at convenient places in the said
\nlocality.  Such stringent provisions is not available either under Section 3(2)
\nof Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999 or under Rules 3 and 4 of the Rules framed
\nthereunder.\n<\/p>\n
\t60.The term “hearing” as contemplated under Section 3(3) of the Act cannot
\nbe equated to the term “hearing of objections” under Section 5-A of the Central
\nAct 1 of 1894.  Section 5-A(2) states as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\tIn the absence of any such stringent provision as it is seen in the
\nCentral Act 1 of 1894 especially under Section  5(A)(2), in the Tamil Nadu Act
\n10 of 1999, there is no difficulty in coming to the conclusion that the
\nintention of the law makers in respect of Tamil Nadu Act 10 of 1999 while taking
\ninto consideration the basis object of enacting such law, is not to have an
\nenquiry of the sort provided for under the Central Act 1 of 1894, but passing
\norders after hearing and considering the objections.”\n<\/p>\n
\t42. Placing reliance on the aforesaid decision, he would submit that the
\npetitioner cannot equate the enquiry under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition
\nAct with that of the one under Section 3-C of the National Highways Act.  In my
\nconsidered opinion, there is much of a muchness which could be seen in Section
\n5-A of the Land Acquisition Act as well as in Section 3-C of the National
\nHighways Act; however, verbatim both are not one and the same.\n<\/p>\n
\t43.So far the adherence to the principles of natural justice, there is no
\nquestion of arguing that two different types of principles of natural justice
\nare found embedded under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act vis-a-vis
\nSection 3-C of the National Highways Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t44. The learned Advocate for the third respondent as well as the learned
\nAdvocate for the proposed fourth respondent (in M.P(MD)No.2 of 2008), would in
\nunison put forth the plea to the effect that quite contrary to the time limit of
\n21 days contemplated under section 3-C of the Act, the petitioner filed the
\nobjections belatedly. According to them, the Central Government Gazette was
\ndated 17.12.2007; whereas the objection was filed only on 21.01.2008, obviously
\nafter 21 days. By way of torpedoing the arguments as put forth by the learned
\nAdvocates for the third respondent and the proposed fourth respondent, the
\nlearned Senior Counsel for the petitioner would invite the attention of this
\nCourt to Section 3-A as well as Section 3-C of the Act and develop his argument
\nthat mere notification in the Gazette would not meet the requirements of Section
\n3-A of the Act as Section 3-A(3) of the Act would contemplate the publication of
\nthe substance of the notification in two local newspapers as a condition
\nprecedent for coming into force of the notification.  As such, from the date of
\npublication of the substance of the notification in the newspapers, the period
\nof 21 days should be calculated and if calculated, in this case, the objection
\nfiled by the petitioner was in time.  He would also correctly draw the attention
\nof this Court that in “The Hindu” Newspaper, the substance of the notification
\ndated 17.12.2007 was published on 31.01.2008 and even before such publication in
\nthe newspapers, on 21.01.2008 itself, in response to the communication sent to
\nthe petitioner by the third respondent, objection was filed by the petitioner
\nand after such publication in the newspapers on 19.02.2008, another objection
\nreiterating the earlier objection, was filed by the petitioner.  Hence, by no
\nstretch of imagination, it could be stated that the objection filed was not
\nwithin time.  However, the learned Advocates for the third respondent as well as
\nthe proposed fourth respondent, would try to interpret Section 3-C of the Act to
\nthe effect that the period of 21 days should be calculated from the date of
\nnotification in the Gazette and not the date of publication of the substance of
\nthe notification in the newspapers. In fact, Mr.G.R.Swaminathan, learned Counsel
\nfor the proposed fourth respondent, would place reliance on the following words
\n” … from the date of publication of the notification under sub-section (1) of
\nSection 3-A, …” in Section 3-C of the Act and develop his argument that in
\nSection 3-C of the Act, there is no reference to Section 3-A(3).  In my opinion,
\nsuch an interpretation cannot be countenanced for the reason that the words
\n“notification under sub-section (1) of Section 3-A, …” is by way of describing
\nthe notification and not the term ‘publication’.  The word ‘publication’ refers
\nto the publication under Section 3-A(3) of the Act as correctly pointed out by
\nthe learned Counsel for the petitioner.  As such, in this view of the matter,
\nthe contentions raised on the side of the third respondent cannot be
\ncountenanced as correct.  At this context, the maxim “Ut res magis valeat quam
\npereat”, could be recollected.  In regard to this maxim, the fruitful discussion
\ncould be seen in the famous treatise “Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes”
\n(Twelfth Edition by P.St.J.Langan at page No.45) as under:
\n\t“If the choice is between two interpretations, the narrower of which would
\nfail to achieve the manifest purpose of the legislation, we should avoid a
\nconstruction which would reduce the legislation to futility and should rather
\naccept the bolder construction based on the view that Parliament would legislate
\nonly for the purpose of bringing about an effective result.  “Where alternative
\nconstructions are equally open, that alternative is to be chosen which will be
\nconsistent with the smooth working of the system which the statute purports to
\nbe regulating; and that alternative is to be rejected which will introduce
\nuncertainty, friction or confusion into the working of the system.”
\n\tIn accordance with these principles, the court should avoid
\ninterpretations which would leave any part of the provision to be interpreted
\nwithout effect; will not narrow enactments designed to prevent tax evasion; may
\nsometimes find it necessary to depart from the principle that mens rea is an
\nessential ingredient of criminal offences; and may give a wide sense to words in
\na penal statute.”\n<\/p>\n
Over and above that, the principle of bonam partem also could be cited in
\nsupport of the interpretation referred to by me supra.\n<\/p>\n
\t45.The learned Counsel for the third respondent would  cite the decision
\nin Dr.S.Ajay Venkatesh -vs- Union of India rep.by its Secretary to Government,
\nMinistry of Shipping Road Transport and Highways, New Delhi-1 and others
\nreported in 2007 (3) CTC 431. An excerpt from it, would run thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t“7)Therefore there is no scope for the Competent Authority under the
\nNational Highways Act, to act otherwise than in accordance with the provisions
\nof the Act.  If a Statutory   Authority is obliged to perform a function in a
\nparticular manner by the Statute, he shall perform the same only in accordance
\nwith the Statute and not otherwise.  Hence, there cannot be a direction to the
\nrespondents to provide lands to the petitioner in lieu of compensation, since
\nthere is no provision in the Act for the respondents to do so.   …\n<\/p>\n
\t10.Therefore, the question as to whether there are any standard norms and
\nwhether such standard norms are actually exceeded, is not a subject matter for
\njudicial review.  The acquisition of a land for National Highways can be
\nobjected to only on certain well established principles.  No standard norms are
\nprescribed either by the Act or by any Executive Instructions issued in
\npursuance of the provisions of the Act.  Therefore the standard norms, even if
\nthere are any, cannot be enforced through a Court of law, as they confer no
\nright upon the individual whose lands are sought to be acquired.”\n<\/p>\n
\t46.Absolutely, there could be no difference of opinion over this decision
\nalso.  In fact, as per Section 3-C of the Act, the second respondent was
\nexpected to adhere to the principles of natural justice in stricto sensu for the
\nreasons already cited supra, but he failed to so.\n<\/p>\n
\t47.In view of the aforesaid reasons, Point No.(i) is decided to the effect
\nthat this Court has got jurisdiction in the facts and circumstances of the case
\nto entertain the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India
\nand point Nos.(ii) and (iii) are decided to the effect that the principles of
\nnatural justice have been violated in passing the impugned order by the second
\nrespondent, which warrants interference.\n<\/p>\n
\t48.In the result, while allowing the writ petition, I would like to pass
\nthe following direction:\n<\/p>\n
\tOn receipt of a copy of this order, the second respondent shall do well to
\nsee that he is furnishing to the petitioner a copy of the remarks\/report
\nfurnished by the third respondent as against the objections filed by the
\npetitioner, within a period of one week, whereupon, within a week thereof, the
\nobjections could be filed by the petitioner before the second respondent and
\nthereupon, the second respondent within a period of fifteen days shall pass
\norders after giving due opportunity of being heard to the petitioner and the
\nthird respondent.  The petitioner shall co-operate with the second respondent in
\ncomplying with this order in letter and spirit.  Consequently, the connected
\nMiscellaneous Petitions are also closed.  No costs.\n<\/p>\n
rsb\/gsr<\/p>\n
TO\n<\/p>\n
1.The Secretary to Government,
\n  Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport and
\n  Highways,
\n  “Transport Bhavan”,
\n  No.1, Parliament Street,
\n  New Delhi – 110 001.\n<\/p>\n
2.The Competent Authority and
\n  Special District Revenue Officer,
\n  (Land Acquisition – National Highways),
\n  Perambalur, Tirichirappalli,
\n  Pudukottai – Thanjavur Districts,
\n  Tiruchirappalli.\n<\/p>\n
3.The Project Director,
\n  National Highways Authority of India,
\n  Project Implementation Unit,
\n  No.54, 1st Street,
\n  Natarajapuram North Colony,
\n  Medical College Road,
\n  Thanjavur – 613 004.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court Shanmugha Arts vs Union Of India on 17 November, 2008 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED : 17\/11\/2008 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE G.RAJASURIA W.P(MD)No.4377 of 2008 and M.P(MD)Nos.1 to 3 of 2008 Shanmugha Arts, Science, Technology and Research Academy (known as Sastra University), having its main campus at Shanmuga […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-146846","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nShanmugha Arts vs Union Of India on 17 November, 2008 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/shanmugha-arts-vs-union-of-india-on-17-november-2008\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Shanmugha Arts vs Union Of India on 17 November, 2008 - 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