{"id":147000,"date":"1961-12-05T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1961-12-04T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961"},"modified":"2015-07-31T11:46:58","modified_gmt":"2015-07-31T06:16:58","slug":"state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961","title":{"rendered":"State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR 779, \t\t 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 876<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B., Sarkar, A.K., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nSTATE OF WEST BENGAL\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nM\/S. B. K. MONDAL AND SONS\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n05\/12\/1961\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nSARKAR, A.K.\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nCITATION:\n 1962 AIR  779\t\t  1962 SCR  Supl. (1) 876\n CITATOR INFO :\n F\t    1964 SC 152\t (6,11,12)\n R\t    1966 SC 580\t (9)\n R\t    1967 SC 203\t (8)\n F\t    1968 SC1218\t (6)\n R\t    1971 SC2210\t (3)\n F\t    1973 SC1174\t (6)\n F\t    1977 SC2149\t (8)\n E\t    1980 SC1109\t (3)\n RF\t    1980 SC1285\t (18)\n RF\t    1980 SC1330\t (8)\n\n\nACT:\n     State  Government-Enjoying\t benefit  of  non-\ngratuitous  work-If  bound  to\tpay  compensation-\nAbsence\t  of   valid   contract,   if\texonerates\nliability-Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872)-s.\n70 Government  of India\t Act, 1935 (25 & 26 Geo.5.\nCh. 42), s. 175(3).\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     By s. 70 of the Contract Act, \"where a person\nlawfully does  anything\t for  another  person,\tor\ndelivers anything  to him,  not intending to do so\ngratuitously; and  such other  person  enjoys  the\nbenefit thereof,  the  latter  is  bound  to  make\ncompensation to\t the former  in respect\t of, or to\nrestore, the thing so done or delivered\". Under s.\n175(3)\tof   the  Government   of  India  Act  all\ncontracts made\tin the\texercise of  the executive\nauthority of  a province  shall be expressed to be\nmade by\t the Governor of the province and shall be\nexecuted on behalf of the Governor by such persons\nand in such manner as he may director authorise.\n     The   respondent,\t  a   firm   of\t  building\ncontractors  doing   construction  works  for  the\nProvincial  Government\t did  certain\tadditional\nconstruction on\t the request  of its officers. Its\nbills for  these latter works were not paid and it\nsued the  Government basing  its claim on contract\nand in\tthe alternative\t on s.\t70 of the Contract\nAct. The  defence of  the  Provincial  Government,\ninter alia,  was  that\tthere  was  no\tvalid  and\nbinding contract and s. 70 had no application. The\ntrial Judge\n877\nfound that  although there  was no  valid contract\nunder s.175(3)\tof the\tGovernment of  India  Act,\n1935, the  claim was  justified under  s.70 of the\nContract and decreed the suit. The Court of appeal\naffirmed  that\t decree.  The  State  appealed\tby\nspecial leave.\n^\n     Held (Per curiam), that the courts below were\nright in  holding that\ts.70 of\t the Contract  Act\napplied to the case and the appeal must fail.\n     Per  Gajendragadkar,  Wanchoo  and\t Ayyangar,\nJJ.-Whether a  mandatory provision in a statute is\nmerely directory  or obligatory\t should be decided\non a  careful examination  of  the  scope  of  the\nstatute\t and   the  object   of\t  the\tparticular\nprovision. In  enacting s.175(3) of the Government\nof  India   Act,  1935,\t  the  intention   of  the\nparliament  was\t that  the  state  should  not\tbe\nburdened  with\tliability  based  on  unauthorised\ncontracts.  The\t  provision  made  was\tin  public\ninterest and so the word 'shall' used therein must\nbe held to make it obligatory and not directory.\n     Seth Bhikraj  Jaipuria  v.\t Union\tof  India,<\/a>\n[1962] 2 S.C.R. 880, approved.\n     Chatturbhuj  Vithaldas  Jasani  v.\t Moreshwar\nPrashram<\/a> [1954] S.C.R. 817, explained.\n     In order that a person can invoke s.70 of the\nContract Act  he must  be able to show (1) that he\nacted lawfully,(2)  that he  did not intend to act\ngratuitously and (3) that the other person enjoyed\nthe benefit.\n     A claim for compensation under s.70 therefore\nis not\tone based  on any  subsisting contract but\nproceeds on  the basis\tthat something was done or\ndelivered to  another who  voluntarily accepted it\neven though he had always the option to refuse the\nsame.\n     Recognition of the claim in the present case,\ncould not  therefore, amount to a contravention of\ns.175(3) of  the Government  of India  Act, either\ndirectly or indirectly.\n     The word  'lawfully' in s. 70 of the Contract\nAct  means   that  after   something  is  done\tor\ndelivered  by\tone  person   to  another  and\tis\nvoluntarily accepted  and enjoyed by the latter, a\nlawful relationship  arises between  the two which\nattracts  s.70\tof  the\t Contract  Act.\t In  cases\nfalling under the section, there cannot, therefore\nbe any\tscope for  claims for specific performance\nor for\tdamages for  breach of contract, the claim\nfor compensation  under the  section being  on the\nfooting that  there has\t been no  contract and the\nconduct of  parties  has  created  a  relationship\nresembling that arising out of a contract.\n878\n     There  is\t nothing  in   s.  175(3)  of  the\nGovernment of India Act, tested in the light of s.\n23 of the Contract Act, that forbids a claim under\ns. 70  of the  Contract Act,  There is no conflict\nbetween the two sections, each covering a distinct\nand separate  field and\t s. 70 Contract Act should\nbe regarded  rather as\tsupplementing s. 175(3) of\nthe Government of India Act.\n     Chedi Lal\tv. Bhagwan  Das, (1889)\t I.L.R. 11\nA11. 234, disapproved.\n     Held, further,  that in construing a specific\nstatutory provision  such as s. 70 of the Contract\nAct it\twould be  unreasonable to  seek assistance\nfrom English  decisions\t on  statutory\tprovisions\ncontained in English law.\n     Ramanandi Kuer  v. Kalawati Kuer, (1927) L.R.\n55 I.A. 18, referred to.\n     The State\tGovernment, as much as an ordinary\ncitizen, must  be subject to s. 70 of the Contract\nAct and\t it was wrong to suggest that its position\nwas like  that of  a minor  and, therefore, it was\noutside the scope of s. 70 of the Act.\n     Suchand Ghosal  v.\t Balaram  Mardana,  (1911)\nI.L.R. 38 Cal. 1, referred to.\n     Case law referred to.\n     Per Sarkar\t and Das  Gupta, JJ.- The question\nin  the\t  instant  case\t  was  whether\tthe  three\nrequisites of  s. 70  of the Contract Act had been\nsatisfied.  There   was\t no   dispute\tthat   the\nGovernment  had\t taken\tbenefit\t of  the  work\tit\nurgently needed\t the work  and put  it to  its use\nimmediately. It was also clear that the respondent\ndid not\t intend to  do the work gratuitously. What\nthe request made by the officers did was to inform\nthe respondent that the Government needed the work\nimmediately and\t would pay  for it  when done, and\nworks similar  the respondent,\twho had previously\ndone and been paid for, readily acted on it.\n     There can\talso be no doubt that the work was\ndone lawfully.\tEven assuming that work done under\na  contract   invalid  under   s.  175(3)  of  the\nGovernment of India Act, would be unlawful because\nof evasion  of it,  that section does not say that\nwork done  without any\tcontract at all, as in the\ninstant case,  would be\t work unlawfully  done nor\ndoes it\t make it  unlawful for\tthe Government\tto\ntake benefit  of work  done  for  it  without  any\ncontract at all.\n     Section 175(3) of the Government of India Act\napplies\t to   a\t consensual   contract\twhich  the\nGovernment makes  and not  to something\t which\tis\nalso called a contract but which the\n879\nlaw   brings   into   existence\t  by   a   fiction\nirrespective  of   the\tconsent\t of  the  parties.\nSection 70  of the  Contract Act applies where its\nrequisites exist,  if it  is necessary\tto imply a\ncontract  or   contemplate  a  quasi-contract  for\napplying the section that must be done and neither\ns. 175(3)  of the  Government of India Act nor any\nother impediment can stand in the way.\n     Held, further,  that a  resort to English Law\nis not\tjustified for  deciding a question arising\non an  Indian statute  unless it  is such  that it\ncannot\tbe   reasonably\t understood  without  such\nassistance.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION :  Civil Appeal
\nNo. 286 of 1958.\n<\/p>\n
     Appeal by special leave from the judgment and
\ndecree dated  the January 4, 1957, of the Calcutta
\nHigh Court  in Civil  Appeal From  Original Decree
\nNo. 155 of 1953.\n<\/p>\n
     B. Sen,  P. K. Chatterjee and P. K. Bose, for
\nthe appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     N.\t C.  Chatterjee,  A.N.\tSinha  and  P.\tK.
\nMukherjee, for the respondents.\n<\/p>\n
     1961.   December\t 5.   The    Judgment\tof
\nGajendragadkar, Wanchoo\t and Ayyrangar,\t JJ.,  was
\ndelivered by  Gajendragadkar, J.  The Judgment\tof
\nSarkar and Das Gupta, JJ. was delivered by Sarkar,
\nJ.\n<\/p>\n
     GAJENDRAGADKAR,J.-This  appeal   by   special
\nleave arises out of a suit filed by the respondent
\nB. K.  Mondal &\t Sons against  the  appellant  the
\nState of  West Bengal  on the Original Side of the
\nCalcutta High Court claiming a sum of Rs. 19,325\/-
\nfor works done by it for the appellant. This claim
\nwas made  out in two ways. It was alleged that the
\nworks in  question had been done by the respondent
\nin terms  of a\tcontract entered  into between the
\nparties and  as such  the appellant  was liable to
\npay the\t amount due  for the  said works.  In  the
\nalternative it was alleged that if the contract in
\nquestion was  invalid then  the respondent’s claim
\nfell under  s. 70  of the Indian Contract Act. The
\nrespondent had lawfully done such works not
\n880<\/span>
\nintending to  act gratuitously\tin that behalf and
\nthe appellant had enjoyed the benefit thereof.\n<\/p>\n
     The respondent’s case was that on February 8,
\n1944, it  offered  to  put  up\tcertain\t temporary
\nstorage godowns\t at Arambagh  in the  District\tof
\nHooghly\t for   the  use\t  of  the  Civil  Supplies
\nDepartment of  the State  of Bengal  and that  the
\nsaid offer  was accepted by the said department by
\na letter  dated February 12, 1944. Accordingly the
\nrespondent complete  the said construction and its
\nbill for  Rs. 39,476\/- was duly paid in July 1944.
\nMeanwhile, on  April 7,\t 1944, the  respondent was
\nrequested by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Arambagh,
\nto submit  its estimate\t for the construction of a
\nkutcha road,  guard room, office, kitchen and room
\nfor clerks at Arambagh for the Department of Civil
\nSupplies.  The\t respondent   alleged\tthat   the
\nAdditional  Deputy   Director  of  Civil  Supplies
\nvisited Arambagh on April 20, 1944, and instructed
\nthe respondent to proceed with the construction in
\naccordance with\t the estimates\tsubmitted  by  it.
\nAccordingly  the  respondent  completed\t the  said
\nconstructions and  a  bill  for\t Rs.  2,322\/8  was
\nsubmitted in that behalf to the Assistant Director
\nof Civil  Supplies on  April 27,  1944. Thereafter
\nthe Sub-Divisional  Officer, Arambagh required the
\nconstruction of\t certain storage sheds at Khanakul
\nand the Assistant Director of Civil Supplies wrote
\nto the\trespondent on April 18, 1944, asking it to
\nproceed with  the construction of the said storage
\nsheds.\tThis   work  also  was\tcompleted  by  the
\nrespondent in  due course  and for the said work a
\nbill  for  Rs.\t17,003\/-  was  submitted.  In  the
\npresent suit  the respondent  claimed that the two
\nbills submitted\t by it in which the respondent had
\nclaimed\t  Rs.\t 2,322\/8\/-   and    Rs.\t  17,003\/-
\nrespectively had  remained unpaid and that was the
\nbasis of the present claim.\n<\/p>\n
     The  appellant   denied  all   the\t  material
\nallegations made  by the respondent in its plaint.
\nIt
\n881<\/span>
\nalleged that  the requests  in pursuance  of which
\nthe respondent\tclaims to  have made  the  several
\nconstructions were  invalid and\t unauthorised  and
\ndid not\t constitute a  valid contract  binding the
\nappellant under\t s. 175(3)  of the  Government\tof
\nIndia Act,  1935 (hereafter  called the\t Act).\tIt
\npleaded that  there was\t no  privity  of  contract
\nbetween the  respondent and  itself and\t it denied
\nits liability  for the\tentire claim.  The written
\nstatement filed\t by the\t appellant was\tvery vague
\nand general  in terms  and no specific or detailed
\npleas had  been set  out by  the appellant  in its
\npleading.\n<\/p>\n
     However, G.K. Mitter, J., who tried the suit,
\nframed five  material issues  on the pleadings and
\nrecorded his findings on them. He held that having
\nregard to  the provisions  of s. 175(3) of the Act
\nthere was  no valid  and binding  contract between
\nthe  respondent\t  and  the   appellant\t for   the
\nconstruction of\t huts  and  sheds  at  Khakul  and
\nArambagh.  This\t finding  was  in  favour  of  the
\nappellant. He  held that  the  respondent’s  claim
\nagainst\t the  appellant\t was,  however,\t justified
\nunder s.  70 of\t the Indian  Contract Act,  and he
\ncame to the conclusion that the said claim was not
\nbarred by limitation. He also rejected the plea of
\nthe appellant  that the\t liability of the Province
\nof Bengal  had not  devolved  upon  the\t appellant
\nunder the  provisions of  the Indian  Independence
\n(Rights, Property  and\tLiabilities)  Order  1947.
\nThus, on  these three  points the  findings of the
\ntrial judge were against the appellant. It appears
\nthat at\t the trial  the respondent had also relied
\nupon s.\t 65 of\tthe Indian Contract Act in support
\nof its\tclaim. The  learned judge  held that s. 65
\ndid not\t apply to the facts of the case and so the
\nfinding\t on  this  point  was  in  favour  of  the
\nappellant. The\tresult was  that the  respondent’s
\nclaim was  upheld under\t s. 70 of the Contract Act
\nand a  decree for  the amount  claimed by  it  was
\naccordingly passed in its favour.\n<\/p>\n
882<\/span><\/p>\n
     The appellant  disputed the  correctness  and
\nvalidity of  the  said\tdecree\tby  preferring\tan
\nappeal to  the Calcutta\t High Court  in its  civil
\nappellate jurisdiction.\t The said appeal was heard
\nby S.R.\t Das  Gupta  and  Bachawat,  JJ.  The  two
\nlearned Judges who heard the said appeal delivered
\nseparate   though    concurring\t  judgments    and
\nsubstantially  confirmed   the\tmaterial   finding
\nrecorded by  the trial\tcourt. In  the result  the
\nappeal preferred  by the  appellant was dismissed.
\nThe appellant  then applied  for a  certificate to
\ncome to this Court but the High Court rejected its
\napplication. Thereupon\tthe appellant  moved  this
\nCourt for  a special  certificate and on obtaining
\nit has come to this Court; and the principal point
\nwhich has  been urged  before us  by  Mr.  Sen\ton
\nbehalf of  the appellant  is that  s.  70  of  the
\nContract Act does not apply to the present case.\n<\/p>\n
     Before dealing wit this point it is necessary
\nto refer  briefly to  the finding  recorded by the
\nCourts\tbelow  that  the  contract  on\twhich  the
\nrespondent relied  is invalid  under s.\t 175(3) of
\nthe Act.  Mr. Sen  argues  that\t this  finding\tis
\ncorrect whereas\t Mr. Chatterjee\t faintly suggested
\nthat the  contract cannot  be said  to be invalid.
\nSection 175(3)\tprovided,  inter  alia,\t that  all
\ncontracts made\tin the\texercise of  the executive
\nauthority of  a province  shall be expressed to be
\nmade by\t the Governor  of a  Province and all such
\ncontracts made in exercise of that authority shall
\nbe executed  on behalf\tof the\tGovernor  by  such
\npersons and  in such  manner as\t he may\t direct or
\nauthorise. It  is common-ground that the contracts
\nin question  were not executed by any persons duly
\nauthorised by the Governor in that behalf, and the
\nquestion is whether the said contracts can be said
\nto be  valid inspite  of the fact that they do not
\ncomply\twith  the  mandatory  requirements  of\ts.
\n175(3) of the Act. In our opinion, there can be no
\ndoubt that  failure to\tcomply with  the mandatory
\nprovisions of the said section
\n883<\/span>
\nmakes the  contracts invalid.  The question  as to
\nwhether mandatory provisions contained in statutes
\nshould\tbe   considered\t merely\t as  directory\tor
\nobligatory has\toften been  considered in judicial
\ndecisions. In dealing with the question no general
\nor inflexible  rule can be laid down. It is always
\na matter of trying to determine the real intention
\nof the\tLegislature in\tusing  the  imperative\tor
\nmandatory  words,   and\t such\tintention  can\tbe
\ngathered by  a careful\texamination of\tthe  whole
\nscope of the statute and the object intended to be
\nachieved by  the particular  provision\tcontaining
\nthe mandatory  clause. If  it  is  held\t that  the
\nmandatory  clause   is\tobligatory  it\tinevitably
\nfollows that  contravention  of\t the  said  clause
\nimplies the  nullification of  the contract. There
\ncan be no doubt that in enacting the provisions of
\ns. 175(3)  the Parliament  intended that the state
\nshould not  be burdened\t with liability\t based\ton
\nunauthorised contracts and the plain object of the
\nprovision, therefore,  is to  save the\tState from
\nspurious claims\t made  on  the\tstrength  of  such
\nunauthorised contracts. Thus the provision is made
\nin the\tpublic interest\t and so\t there can  be\tno
\ndifficulty in  holding that  the word “shall” used
\nin making  the provision  is intended  to make the
\nprovision itself  obligatory  and  not\tdirectory.
\nThis is\t the view  taken by  this  Court  in  Seth
\nBhikraj Jaipuria  v. The  Union of India<\/a> (1), and,
\nwith respect, we are in entire agreement with that
\nview.\n<\/p>\n
     As in  the case  of Bhikraj Jaipuria(1) so in
\nthe present  case too Mr. Chatterjee has attempted
\nto argue  that the conclusion about the obligatory
\ncharacter  of  the  provisions\tof  s.\t175(3)\tis
\ninconsistent with  the decision\t of this  Court in
\nChatturbhuj   Vithaldas\t   Jasani   v.\t Moreshwar
\nParashram<\/a> (2)  In that\tcase a\tcontract  for  the
\nsupply of  goods had  been entered  into with  the
\nCentral Government by the
\n884<\/span>
\nfirm  Moolji   Scika  and  Company  of\twhich  the
\ncandidate Chatturbhuj  was a partner. The contract
\nin question  had not  complied with  the mandatory
\nprovisions of  Art.  299(1)  of\t the  Constitution
\n(which corresponds  snbstantially to  s. 175(3) of
\nthe Act)  and the question which this Court had to
\nconsider was  whether in view of the fact that the
\ncontract   in\tquestion   had\t contravened   the
\nprovisions   of\t   Art.\t  299(1)   the\t candidate
\nChatturbhuj could  be said  to be disqualified for
\nbeing chosen  as a  member of Parliament by virtue
\nof the\tdisqualification set out in s. 7(d) of the
\nRepresentation of  the People  Act 43  of 1951. In
\ndealing with this question Bose, J., who spoke for
\nthe  Court,   observed\tthat   “s.  7(d)   of  the
\nRepresentation of  the People Act does not require
\nthat the  contracts at\twhich it strikes should be
\nenforceable  against   the  Government;\t  all\tit
\nrequires is  that the  contracts should be for the
\nsupply of  goods to  the Government; The contracts
\nin question  are just  that and\t so are hit by the
\nsection”. It  would thus  be seen that in the case
\nof Chatturbhuj(1)  this Court was dealing with the
\nnarrow\tquestion   as  to   whether  the  impugned
\ncontract for  the supply  of goods  would cease to
\nattract\t the   provisions   of\t s.7(d)\t  of   the
\nRepresentation of  the People  Act on  the  ground
\nthat is did not comply with the provisions of Art.
\n299(1), and  this Court\t held that notwithstanding
\nthe fact  that the  contract could not be enforced
\nagainst the  Government it  was a  contract  which
\nfell  within   the  mischief   of  s.\t7(d).  Mr.
\nChatterjee, however,  contends that in considering
\nthe effect  of non-compliance of Art. 299(1) Bose,
\nJ., has also observed that “the Government may not
\nbe bound  by the  contract  but\t that  is  a  very
\ndifferent thing\t from saying that the contract was
\nvoid and  of no effect and that it only meant that
\nthe principal  (Government) could  not be sued but
\nthere will  be nothing\tto prevent ratification if
\nit was\tfor the\t benefit of  the Government.”  Mr.
\nChatterjee points  out that this observation shows
\nthat the contract
\n885<\/span>
\nwith which  the Court  was dealing was not treated
\n“as void  and of  no effect.”  It would be noticed
\nthat  the  observation\ton  which  Mr.\tChatterjee
\nrelies has  to be  read\t in  the  context  of  the
\nquestion posed\tfor the decision of this Court and
\nits effect  must be  judged in\tthat way. All that
\nthis Court  meant by the said observation was that
\nthe contract  made in contravention of Art. 299(1)
\ncould be  ratified by the Government if it was for
\nits benefit and as such it could not take the case
\nof the\tcontractor outside the purview of s. 7(d).
\nThe contract  which is\tvoid may not be capable of
\nratification, but,  since according  to the  Court
\nthe contract  in question could have been ratified
\nit was\tnot void  in that technical sense. That is
\nall  that  was\tintended  by  the  observation\tin
\nquestion. We  are not  prepared to  read the  said
\nobservation or\tthe final  decision in the case of
\nChatturbhuj(1) as  supporting the proposition that
\nnotwithstanding the  failure  of  the  parties\tto
\ncomply with  Art. 299(1) the contract would not be
\ninvalid. Indeed,  Bose, J.,  has expressly  stated
\nthat such  a contract  cannot be  enforced against
\nthe  Government\t  and  is   not\t binding   on  it.
\nTherefore, we do not think that Mr. Chatterjee can
\nsuccessfully challenge\tthe finding  of the Courts
\nbelow that the contracts in question were invalid.
\nIt is  on this\tbasis that we have to consider the
\nmain question  about the applicability of s. 70 to
\nthe facts of the present case.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Sen  argues  that  in\tdealing\t with  the
\nquestion about\tthe scope  and effect  of s. 70 it
\nwould be  material to  remember the  background of
\nthis section.  He suggests that the rule laid down
\nin the\tsection is  based on  the notes in Smith’s
\nLeading Cases  to Lampleigh v. Brathwaite (2), and
\nso he  argues that  in construing the said section
\nit would  be relevant  to  refer  to  the  English
\ndecisions bearing on the point. The first decision
\non which
\n886<\/span>
\nMr. Sen\t very strongly\trelies is  the case  of H.
\nYoung &\t Co. v. The Mayor and Corporation of Royal
\nLeamington Spa\t(1). In\t that case,  the House\tof
\nLords had to consider the effect of the provisions
\nof s.  174(1) of the Public Health Act, 1875 (38 &
\n39 Vict\t c. 55).  The  said  section  enacts  that
\n“every contract made by an urban authority whereby
\nthe value  or  amount  exceeds\t$50  shall  be\tin
\nwriting and  sealed with  the common  seal of such
\nauthority”. It was held that “the provision of the
\nsaid  section\tis  obligatory\t and  not   merely
\ndirectory and  it applies  to an executed contract
\nof which  the urban  authority have  had the  full
\nbenefit and enjoyment, and which has been effected
\nby their  agent duly  appointed under their common
\nseal.”\tIt   appears  that   the  Corporation\tof
\nLeamington had\tentered into  a contract  with one
\nPowis for the execution of certain works to supply
\nthe  district\twith  water.  Before  Powis  could
\ncomplete this contract it was terminated. Then the
\nCouncil,  in  its  capacity  as\t urban\tauthority,
\npassed a  resolution not  under seal  whereby  its
\nengineer was  authorised to  enter into a contract
\nfor completing the works left unfinished by Powis.
\nThe  said  engineer  employed  the  plaintiff  who
\ncompleted  the\t unfinished  work   and\t sued  the
\nCorporation for\t the sum  due to him as balance in
\nrespect of  the work  executed by  him. This claim
\nwas resisted by the Corporation on the ground that
\nthe provisions\tof s.  174(1) were  mandatory  and
\nsince the  contract on which the plaintiff’s claim
\nwas based had not complied with the said mandatory
\nprovision no  claim  could  be\tmade  against  the
\nCorporation. The Queen’s Bench Division upheld the
\ndefence and  the decision of the Queen’s Bench was
\nconfirmed by the Court of Appeal as well as by the
\nHouse of Lords.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t dealing   with\t the   argument\t that  the
\ncontract in  question was  not void Lord Blackburn
\ncited
\n887<\/span>
\nwith approval  the observations\t made by  Lindley,
\nL.J., in  the Court of Appeal. “In a case like the
\npresent before us”, observed Lindley, L.J., “if we
\nwere to hold the defendants liable to pay for what
\nhas been  done under  the contract,  we should\tin
\neffect be  repealing the  Act  of  Parliament  and
\ndepriving the  ratepayers of that protection which
\nParliament intended  to secure\tfor them”. He also
\nadded “it  may be  said that  this is  a hard  and
\nnarrow view  of the  law, but  my answer  is  that
\nParliament has\tthought expedient  to require this
\nview to\t be taken,  and it  is not for this or any
\nother Court to decline to give effect to a clearly
\nexpressed statute  because it may lead to apparent
\nhardship”. Lord\t Bramwell went\tfurther and in his
\nspeech added  that he  did not agree in the regret
\nexpressed  at\thaving\tto   come  to\tthe   said
\nconclusion. “The  Legislature has made provision”,
\nsaid  Lord   Bramwell,\t“for   the  protection\tof
\nratepayers, shareholders  and others, who must not
\nthrough the  agency of\ta representative  body, by
\nrequiring the  observance of  certain  solemnities
\nand formalities\t which\tinvolve\t deliberation  and
\nreflection. That is the importance of the seal. It
\nis idle to say that there is no magio in a water”.
\nMr. Sen argues that the decision in the case of H.
\nYoung &\t Co.(1). offers\t us material assistance in
\ndealing with the question about the effect of non-
\ncompliance  of\ts.  175(3)  of\tthe  Act  and  the
\napplicability of s. 70 of the Indian Contract Act.\n<\/p>\n
     Incidentally it  may be  pointed out  that in
\nEngland the  decision in  Young’s case (1) has now
\nbecome obsolete because the relevant provisions of
\nthe Public Health Act, 1875, were repealed in 1933
\nby the\tLocal Government Act, 1933. Section 266 of
\nthe said  Act authorises  the local  authority\tto
\nenter into contract necessary for the discharge of
\ntheir functions\t and provides  that all\t contracts
\nmade by\t a  local  authority  or  by  a\t committee
\nthereof shall be made in accordance with the
\n888<\/span>
\nstanding orders of the local authority, and in the
\ncase of\t contracts for\tthe  supply  of\t goods\tor
\nmaterials, or  for the\texecution  of  works,  the
\nstanding orders\t shall (a) require that, except as
\notherwise  provided   by  or  under  the  standing
\norders, notice\tof the\tintention of the authority
\nor the\tcommittee, as  the case\t may be,  to enter
\ninto the  contract shall  be published and tenders
\ninvited, and  (b) regulate  the\t manner\t in  which
\nnotice shall be published and tenders invited. The
\nproviso to  this section  lays down  that a person
\nentering into  a contract with the local authority
\nshall not be bound to enquire whether the standing
\norders of  the\tauthority  which  applied  to  the
\ncontract  have\t been  complied\t  with,\t and   all
\ncontracts entered  into with  the local authority,
\nif otherwise  valid, shall  have  full\tforce  and
\neffect not  with standing that the standing orders
\napplicable thereto  have not  been complied  with.
\nSubsequently in 1960 the Corporate Bodies Contract
\nAct (8 & 9 Eliz., 2 c. 46) has been passed; and s.
\n1 of  the Act  now governs  the contracts  entered
\ninto   by    the   corporate\tbodies\t  wherever
\nincorporated.  The   said  section  provides  that
\n(1)(a) a  contract which  if made  between private
\npersons would be by law required to be in writing,
\nsigned by the parties to be charged therewith, may
\nbe made on behalf of the body corporate in writing
\nsigned by  any person  acting under its authority,
\nexpress or  implied, and  (b) a\t contract which if
\nmade between private persons would by law be valid
\nalthough made  by parol only, and not reduced into
\nwriting, may  be made  by parol on behalf of their
\nbody corporate\tby any\tperson\tacting\tunder  its
\nauthority, express or implied; (2) a contract made
\naccording to  this section  shall be  effectual in
\nlaw and\t shall bind  the body  corporate  and  its
\nsuccessors and\tall other  parties  thereto.  Sub-
\nsection (4)  of s. 1 provides that nothing in this
\nsection shall  be taken\t as preventing\ta contract
\nunder seal from being made by or on behalf of
\n889<\/span>
\na body\tcorporate. It  will thus  be seen that the
\ntechnical  and\t rigorous  requirement\t that  the
\ncontract shall be made under seal by a corporation
\nhas now\t become obsolete;  and so  the decision in
\nYoung’s case  (1) has ceased to be a matter of any
\nimportance.\n<\/p>\n
     Before these legislative changes were however
\nmade a\tdistinction used to be drawn between cases
\nwhere the  requirement of a seal was the result of
\nthe  common   law  rule\t  as   to   contracts\tby
\ncorporations and  those where the said requirement
\nwas based  on a\t statutory provision  like the one
\nunder s.174(1) of the Public Health Act, 1875. The
\nnon-observance\t of    the   statutory\t provision
\nrequiring that\ta contract  of the  specified type
\nshould be  in writing  and sealed  with the common
\nseal of\t the authority\tin  question  renders  the
\ncontract void  and as such exempts the corporation
\nfrom any  liability to\tpay compensation  for  the
\nperformance  of\t  the  contract\t  even\twhere  the
\ncorporation may\t have had  the\tfull  benefit  and
\nenjoyment of the said contract. On the other hand,
\nwhere the  requirement as  to writing  and seal is
\nbased not on statutory provision but on principles
\nof common  law, failure\t to comply  with the  said
\nrequirement would  not afford  a valid\tdefence to
\nthe corporation\t to  resist  a\tclaim  made  by\t a
\ncontractor for compensation for a work done by him
\nif it  is  shown  that\tthe  corporation  had  the
\nbenefit and  enjoyment\tof  the\t said  work.  This
\nlatter principle  has been  laid down by the Court
\nof Appeal  in  Lawford\tv.  The\t Billericay  Rural
\nDistrict Council  (2). In  that case  it was  held
\nthat ‘”where  the purposes for which a corporation
\nis created render it necessary that work should be
\ndone or\t goods supplied\t to carry  those  purposes
\ninto  effect   and  orders   are  given\t  by   the
\ncorporation in\trelation to  work to  be  done\tor
\ngoods to  be supplied  to carry\t into effect those
\npurposes, if the
\n890<\/span>
\nwork done  or goods  supplied are  accepted by the
\ncorporation  and   the\twhole\tconsideration  for
\npayment is  executed, there  is a  contract to pay
\nimplied from  the acts of the corporation, and the
\nabsence of  a  contract\t under\tthe  seal  of  the
\ncorporation is\tno answer  to an action brought in
\nrespect of  the work  done or the goods supplied.”
\nIn coming  to this conclusion Vaughan Williams, L.
\nJ., followed the rule recognised by Lord Denman in
\nDoc v.\tTaniere (1)  where he said that “where the
\ncorporation  have   acted  as\tupon  an  executed
\ncontract, it  is to  be presumed against them that
\neverything has\tbeen done  that was  necessary\tto
\nmake it a binding contract upon both parties, they
\nhaving had  all the  advantage they would have had
\nif the\tcontract had  been regularly made. That is
\nby no  means inconsistent  with the  rule that, in
\ngeneral, a  corporation can only contract by deed,
\nit is  merely raising  a presumption against them,
\nfrom their acts, that they have contracted in such
\na manner  as to\t be binding  upon them”.  In other
\nwords, the  decision was  based on the ground that
\nreliance may  be placed\t on  an\t implied  contract
\narising\t from  an  executed  consideration  on\tan
\nacceptance of the benefit of the contract.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. Sen’s\targument is  that in  dealing with
\nthe question about the effect of the contravention
\nof s.175(3) of the Act and the applicability of s.
\n70 of the Contract Act the decision in the case of
\nLawford (2)  is irrelevent  while that in the case
\nof H.  Young and  Co. (3) is relevent and material
\nbecause we are concerned with the contravention of
\na   statutory\tprovision   and\t  not\twith   the
\ncontravention of  the provision\t of  the  rule\tof
\ncommon law. We are not impressed by this argument.
\nThe question  which the\t appellant has\traised for
\nour decision  falls to\tbe considered in the light
\nof the\tprovisions of s. 70 and has to be answered
\non a  fair  and\t reasonable  construction  of  the
\nrelevant terms of
\n891<\/span>
\nthe said  section. In  such a  case, where  we are
\ndealing with  the problem of construing a specific
\nstatutory provision  it would  be unreasonable\tto
\ninvoke the assistance of English decisions dealing
\nwith the statutory provisions contained in English
\nLaw. As\t Lord Sinha  has observd in delivering the
\njudgment of the Privy Council in Ramanandi Kuer v.
\nKalawati Kuer  (1) “it\thas often been pointed out
\nby this\t Board that  where  there  is  a  positive
\nenactment of  the Indian  Legislature  the  proper
\ncourse is  to examine the language of that statute
\nand to\tascertain its  proper meaning uninfluenced
\nby any\tconsideration derived  from  the  previous
\nstate of  the law or of the English law upon which
\nit may\tbe founded”.  If the  words  used  in  the
\nIndian statute are obscure or ambiguous perhaps it
\nmay be permissible in interpreting them to examine
\nthe background\tof the law or to derive assistance
\nfrom English  decisions bearing\t on the point; but
\nwhere the words are clear and unambiguous it would
\nbe unreasonable\t to interpret them in the light of
\nthe alleged  background\t of  the  statute  and\tto
\nattempt to  see that their interpretation conforms
\nto the\tsaid background.  That is  why, in dealing
\nwith the  point raised before us we must primarily
\nlook to\t the law  as embodied in s. 70 and seek to
\nput upon it a fair and reasonable construction.\n<\/p>\n
     Section 70 reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Where a  person lawfully  does anything
\n     for another  person, or  delivers anything to
\n     him, not intending to do so gratuitously, and
\n     such other person enjoys the benefit thereof,
\n     the latter\t is bound  to make compensation to
\n     the former\t in respect of, or to restore, the
\n     thing so done or delivered.”\n<\/p>\n
     It is  plain that\tthree conditions  must\tbe
\nsatisfied before this section can be invoked. The
\n892<\/span>
\nfirst condition\t is that  a person should lawfully
\ndo  something\tfor  another   person  or  deliver
\nsomething to  him. The second condition is that in
\ndoing the  said thing or delivering the said thing
\nhe must\t not intend  to act  gratuitously; and the
\nthird is  that the other person for whom something
\nis done\t or to\twhom something\tis delivered  must
\nenjoy the  benefit thereof.  When these conditions
\nare  satisfied\ts.  70\timposes\t upon  the  latter
\nperson, the  liability to make compensation to the
\nformer in  respect of  or to restore, the thing so
\ndone or\t delivered. In\tappreciating the scope and
\neffect of  the provisions of this section it would
\nbe useful  to illustrate how this section it would
\noperate. If a person delivers something to another
\nit would be open to the latter person to refuse to
\naccept the  thing or to return it; in that case s.
\n70 would not come in to operation. Similarly, if a
\nperson does something for another it would be open
\nto the\tlatter person  not to accept what has been
\ndone by the former; in that case again s. 70 would
\nnot apply.  In other  words, the person said to be
\nmade liable  under s. 70 always has the option not
\nto accept  the thing  or to  return it. It is only
\nwhere he  voluntarily accepts  the thing or enjoys
\nthe work  done that  the  liability  under  s.\t70
\narises. Taking\tthe facts  in the  case before us,
\nafter the  respondent constructed  the\twarehouse,
\nfor instance,  it was  open to\tthe  appellant\tto
\nrefuse to  accept the  said warehouse  and to have
\nthe benefit  of it.  It could have called upon the
\nrespondent to demolish the said warehouse and take
\naway the  materials used by it in constructing it;
\nbut; if\t the appellant accepted the said warehouse
\nand used it and enjoyed its benefit then different
\nconsiderations come  into play\tand s.\t70 can\tbe
\ninvoked. Section  70 occurs  in\t chapter  V  which
\ndeals  with  certain  relations\t resembling  those
\ncreated by  contract. In other words, this chapter
\ndoes not  deal\twith  the  rights  or  liabilities
\naccruing from the contract. It deals with the
\n893<\/span>
\nrights and  liabilities\t accruing  from\t relations
\nwhich resemble\tthose created  by  contract.  That
\nbeing so,  reverting to\t the facts  of the present
\ncase once  again after\tthe respondent constructed
\nthe  warehouse\t it  would  not\t be  open  to  the
\nrespondent to  compel the  appellant to\t accept it
\nbecause what  the respondent  has done\tis not\tin
\npursuance of  the terms\t of any valid contract and
\nthe respondent in making the construction took the
\nrisk  of   the\trejection   of\tthe  work  by  the
\nappellant. Therefore, in cases falling under s. 70
\nthe  person   doing  something\t for  another\tor
\ndelivering something to another cannot sue for the
\nspecific performance  of the  contract nor ask for
\ndamages for  the breach\t of the\t contract for  the
\nsimple reason  that there  is no  contract between
\nhim  and   the\tother  person  for  whom  he  does
\nsomething or  to whom  he delivers  something. All
\nthat s. 70 provides is that if the goods delivered
\nare accepted  or  the  work  done  is  voluntarily
\nenjoyed then the liability to pay compensation for
\nthe enjoyment  of the said goods or the acceptance
\nof the\tsaid work  arises. Thus, where a claim for
\ncompensation is made by one person against another
\nunder s.  70, it  is  not  on  the  basis  of  any
\nsubsisting contract  between the parties, it is on
\nthe basis  of the  fact that something was done by
\nthe party  for another\tand the\t said work so done
\nhas been  voluntarily accepted by the other party.
\nThat  broadly\tstated\tis   the  effect   of  the
\nconditions prescribed by s. 70.\n<\/p>\n
     It is,  however, urged  by Mr.  Sen that  the
\nrecognition  of\t  the\trespondent’s   claim   for
\ncompensation virtually\tpermits the  circumvention
\nof the mandatory provisions of s. 175(3), because,
\nhe argues,  the work  done by the respondent is no
\nmore than  the performance of a so-called contract
\nwhich is  contrary to the said provisions and that
\ncannot be  the true  intent of\ts. 70.\tIt is thus
\nclear  that   this  argument   proceeds\t  on   the
\nassumption that if a decree is passed in favour of
\nthe respondent for
\n894<\/span>
\ncompensation as\t alternatively claimed\tby it,\tit
\nwould in  substance amount to treating the invalid
\ncontract as  being valid.  In  our  opinion,  this
\nargument is  not well-founded. It is true that the
\nprovisions of  s. 175(3)  are mandatory and if any
\ncontract is  made in  contravention  of\t the  said
\nprovisions the said contract would be invalid; but
\nit must be remembered that the cause of action for
\nthe alternative claim of the respondent is not the
\nbreach of  any contract by the appellant; in fact,
\nthe alternative\t claim is  based on the assumption
\nthat  the  contract  in\t pursuance  of\twhich  the
\nrespondent made\t the constructions in question was
\nineffective and as such amounted to no contract at
\nall. The  respondent says  that it  has done  some
\nwork which  has been  accepted and  enjoyed by the
\nappellant and  it is  the voluntary acceptance and
\nenjoyment of  the said\twork which is the cause of
\naction for  the alternative  claim. Can it be said
\nthat when  the respondent built the warehouse, for
\ninstance, without  a valid contract between it and
\nthe appellant  it was  doing something contrary to
\ns. 175(3)?  As we  have already made it clear even
\nif the respondent built the warehouse he could not
\nhave forced  the appellant  to accept  it and  the
\nappellant may  well have  asked it to demolish the
\nwarehouse and  take away the materials. Therefore,
\nthe mere  act of constructing the warehouse on the
\npart  of   the\trespondent   cannot  be\t  said\tto
\ncontravene the\tprovisions of  s. 175(3).  In this
\nconnection  it\t may  be   relevant  to\t  consider
\nillustration (a)  to s.\t 70. The said illustration
\nshows that  if A  a tradesman  leaves goods at his
\nhouse by  mistake, and\tB treats  the goods as his
\nown he\tis bound  to pay  A for\t them. Now,  if we
\nassume that B stands for the State Government, can
\nit be  said that A was contravening the provisions
\nof s.  175(3) when by mistake he left the goods at
\nthe house  of B?  The answer  to this  question is
\nobviously in the negative. Therefore, if goods are
\ndelivered by  A to the State Government by mistake
\nand the
\n895<\/span>
\nState Government accepts the goods and enjoys them
\na claim\t for compensation can be made by A against
\nthe State Government, and in entertaining the said
\nclaim  the   Court  could  not\tbe  upholding  the
\ncontravention of  s. 175(3) at all either directly
\nor indirectly.\tOnce it is realised that the cause
\nof action for a claim for compensation under s. 70
\nis based not upon the delivery of the goods or the
\ndoing of  any work as such but upon the acceptance
\nand enjoyment  of the  said goods or the said work
\nit would  not be difficult to hold that s. 70 does
\nnot treat  as valid the contravention of s. 175(3)
\nof the\tAct. That being so, the principal argument
\nurged\tby   Mr.   Sen\t that\tthe   respondent’s
\nconstruction of\t s.70 nullifies\t the effect  of s.
\n175(3) of the Act cannot be accepted.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  true that s. 70 requires that a person
\nshould lawfully\t do something  or lawfully deliver
\nsomething to another. The word “lawfully” is not a
\nsurplusage and\tmust be\t treated as  an\t essential
\npart of\t the requirement  of s. 70. What then does
\nthe word  “lawfully” in\t s. 70\tdenote ?  Mr.  Sen
\ncontends that the word “lawfully” in s. 70 must be
\nread in the light of s. 23 of the said Act; and he
\nargues that  a thing  cannot be\t said to have been
\ndone lawfully  if the  doing of it is forbidden by
\nlaw. However,  even if\tthis test is applied it is
\nnot possible  to hold that the delivery of a thing
\nor a doing of a thing the acceptance and enjoyment
\nof which  gives rise  to a  claim for compensation
\nunder s.  70 is forbidden by s. 175(3) of the Act;
\nand so\tthe interpretation  of the word “lawfully”
\nsuggested by  Mr. Sen  does not\t show that  s.\t70
\ncannot be  applied to  the facts  in  the  present
\ncase.\n<\/p>\n
     Another argument has been placed before us on
\nthe strength  of the  word “lawfully”  and that is
\nbased  upon   the  observations\t  of  Mr.  Justice
\nStraight in Chedi Lal v. Bhagwan Dass (1). Dealing
\nwith the  construction\tof  s.\t70  Straight,  J.,
\nobserved:\n<\/p>\n
896<\/span><\/p>\n
“I presume that the legislature intended something
\nwhen it\t used the  word “lawfully” and that it had
\nin contemplation cases in which a person held such
\na relation to another as either directly to create
\nor  by\t implication  reasonably   to  justify\tan
\ninference that by some act done for another person
\nthe party  doing the  act was entitled to look for
\ncompensation for  it to the person for whom it was
\ndone.” It  is urged that in the light of this test
\nit cannot  be said that the respondent held such a
\nrelation to  the appellant  as to be able to claim
\ncompensation from  the appellant. With respect, we
\nare not\t satisfied that\t the  test  laid  down\tby
\nStraight, J.,  can be  said to be justified by the
\nterms of  s. 70. It is of course true that between
\nthe  person   claiming\tcompensation   and  person
\nagainst\t  whom\t it   is   claimed   some   lawful
\nrelationship  must   subsist,  for   that  is  the
\nimplication of\tthe use\t of the word “lawfully” in
\ns. 70; but the said lawful relationship arises not
\nbecause the  party claiming  compensation has done
\nsomething  for\t the  party   against\twhom   the
\ncompensation is\t claimed but because what has been
\ndone by\t the former  has been accepted and enjoyed
\nby the\tlatter. It is only when the latter accepts
\nand enjoys  what is  done by  the  former  that\t a
\nlawful relationship  arises between the two and it
\nis the\texistence of  the said lawful relationship
\nwhich gives  rise to  the claim\t for compensation.
\nThis aspect  of the  matter has\t not been properly
\nbrought into  the picture  when Straight, J., laid
\ndown the  test on  which  Mr.  Sen’s  argument\tis
\nbased. If  the said test is literally applied then
\nit is  open to\tthe comment  that if one person is
\nentitled by  reason of the relationship as therein
\ncontemplated  to  receive  compensation\t from  the
\nother s.  70 would be hardly necessary. Therefore,
\nin our\topinion, all  that the\tword “lawfully” in
\nthe context  indicates is  that after something is
\ndelivered or  something is  done by one person for
\nanother and  that thing is accepted and enjoyed by
\nthe latter,  a lawful relationship is born between
\nthe two which
\n897<\/span>
\nunder the  provisions of  s. 70\t gives rise  to\t a
\nclaim for compensation.\n<\/p>\n
     There is no doubt that the thing delivered or
\ndone must not be delivered or done fraudulently or
\ndishonestly nor\t must  it  be  delivered  or  done
\ngratuitously.  Section\t 70  is\t not  intended\tto
\nentertain claims  for compensation made by persons
\nwho officiously\t interfere  with  the  affairs\tof
\nanother or  who\t impose\t on  others  services  not
\ndesired by them. Section 70 deals with cases where
\na person does a thing for another not intending to
\nact gratuitously  and the  other enjoys\t it. It is
\nthus clear  that when a thing is delivered or done
\nby one\tperson it must be open to the other person
\nto  reject   it.  Therefore,  the  acceptance  and
\nenjoyment of  the thing delivered or done which is
\nthe basis  for the claim for compensation under s.
\n70 must\t be voluntary.\tIt would  thus be  noticed
\nthat  this   requirement  affords  sufficient  and
\neffective safeguard  against spurious claims based
\non unauthorised\t acts. If  the\tact  done  by  the
\nrespondent  was\t  unauthorised\tand  spurious  the
\nappellant could\t have easily refused to accept the
\nsaid act  and then  the respondent  would not have
\nbeen able  to make a claim for compensation. It is
\nunnecessary to\trepeat that in cases falling under
\ns. 70  there is\t no scope  for claims for specific
\nperformance or for damages for breach of contract.
\nIn  the\t  very\tnature\t of  things   claims   for
\ncompensation are  based on  the footing that there
\nhas been  no contract  and that the conduct of the
\nparties in  relation to\t what is delivered or done
\ncreates a relationship resembling that arising out
\nof contract.\n<\/p>\n
     In regard\tto  the\t claim\tmade  against  the
\nGovernment of  a State\tunder s. 70 it may be that
\nin many cases the work done or the goods delivered
\nare the\t result of  a request made by some officer
\nor other on behalf of the said Government. In such
\na case, the request may be in effective or invalid
\nfor
\n898<\/span>
\nthe reason that the officer making the request was
\nnot authorised\tunder s.  175(3), or,  if the said
\nofficer was  authorised to  make the  said request
\nthe request becomes inoperative because it was not
\nfollowed up  by a  contract executed in the manner
\nprescribed by s. 175 (3). In either case the thing
\nhas been  delivered or\tthe  work  has\tbeen  done
\nwithout a  contract and\t that brings  in s.  70. A
\nrequest is  thus not  an element  of s.\t 70 at all
\nthough the existence of an invalid request may not
\nmake s.\t 70 inapplicable. An invalid request is in
\nlaw no\trequest at  all, and so the conduct of the
\nparties has  to be  judged on the basis that there
\nwas no\tsubsisting contract  between them  at  the
\nmaterial time.\tDealing with the case on the basis
\nwe  have   to  enquire\t whether   the\t requisite
\nconditions  prescribed\t by  s.\t  70   have   been
\nsatisfied. If  they are satisfied then a claim for
\ncompensation can  and must be entertained. In this
\nconnection it  is necessary to emphasise that what
\ns. 70 provides is that compensation has to be paid
\nin respect  of the  goods delivered  or\t the  work
\ndone. The  alternative to  the\tcompensation  thus
\nprovides  is  the  restoration\tof  the\t thing\tso
\ndelivered or  done. In\tthe present case there has
\nbeen no\t dispute about\tthe amount of compensation
\nbut normally  a claim  for compensation made under
\ns. 70  may not mean the same things as a claim for
\ndamages for  breach of\tcontract if a contract was
\nsubsisting between the parties. Thus considered it
\nwould, we think, not be reasonable to suggest that
\nin recognining\tthe claim  for compensation  under
\ns.70  we   are\teither\t directly  or\tindirectly
\nnullifying the\teffect of s. 175 (3) of the Act or
\ntreating as valid a contract which is invalid. The
\nfields covered\tby the two provisions are separate
\nand distinct,  s. 175 (3) deals with contracts and
\nprovides how they should be made. Section 70 deals
\nwith cases  where there\t is no\tvalid contract and
\nprovides for  compensation to  be paid\tin a  case
\nwhere the three requisite conditions prescribed by
\nit are satisfied. We are
\n899<\/span>
\ntherefore, satisfied  that there  is  no  conflict
\nbetween the two provisions.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  well-known that  in the functioning of
\nthe vast  organisation\trepresented  by\t a  modern
\nState Government officers have invariably to enter
\ninto a\tvariety of  contracts which are often of a
\npetty nature.  Sometimes they  may have\t to act in
\nemergency, and\ton many\t occasions, in the pursuit
\nof the\twelfare policy\tof  the\t State\tGovernment
\nofficers may have to enter into contract orally or
\nthrough correspondence\twithout strictly complying
\nwith the  provisions of\t s. 175(3) of the Act. If,
\nin all\tthese cases,  what is done in pursuance of
\nthe contracts is for the benefit of the Government
\nand for\t their use  and enjoyment and is otherwise
\nlegitimate and\tproper s.  70 would  step  in  and
\nsupport a  claim  for  compensation  made  by  the
\ncontracting parties  notwithstanding the fact that
\nthe contracts  had not been made as required by s.
\n175(3). If it was held that s. 70 was inapplicable
\nin regard  to such dealings by government officers
\nit   would    lead   to\t  extremely   unreasonable
\nconsequences and  may even  hamper, if\tnot wholly
\nbring to a standstill the efficient working of the
\nGovernment from\t day to\t day. We  are referring to
\nthis aspect  of the  matter not\t with  a  view\tto
\ndetract\t from\tthe  binding   character  of   the
\nprovisions of  s. 175  (3) of the Act but to point
\nout that  like ordinary\t citizens even\tthe  State
\nGovernment is  subject to the provisions of s. 70,
\nand if\tit has accepted the things delivered to it
\nor enjoyed  the work  done for it, such acceptance
\nand enjoyment  would  afford  a\t valid\tbasis  for
\nclaims of compensation against it. Claims based on
\na contract  validly made  under\t s.  175(3)  must,
\ntherefore,  be\t distinguished\tfrom   claims  for
\ncompensation  made   under  s.\t70,  and  if  that
\ndistinction is\tborne in  mind there  would be\tno
\ndifficulty in  rejecting the  argument that  s. 70
\ntreats as  valid the contravention of s. 175(3) of
\nthe Act. In a sense it may be said that
\n900<\/span>
\ns.  70\t should\t be   read  as\tsupplementing  the
\nprovisions of s. 175(3) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
     There is  one more argument which yet remains
\nto be  considered. Mr.\tSen ingeniously\t suggested
\nthat the position of the appellant is like that of
\na minor\t in the\t matter of  its capacity to make a
\ncontract, and  he argues  that just  as a minor is
\nout side  the purview  of s.  70 so  would be  the
\nappellant. It  is true\tas has\tbeen held  by  the
\nPrivy  Council\t in  Mohori   Bibee  v.\t Dhurmodas
\nGhose(1)  that\t a  minor,   like  a  lunatic,\tis
\nincompetent, to contract, and so where he purports
\nto enter  into a  contract the alleged contract is
\nvoid and  neither s.  64 nor s. 65 of the Contract
\nAct can apply to it. It is also true that s. 68 of
\nthe  Contract\tAct  specifically   provides  that
\ncertain claims for necessaries can be made against
\na  minor  and  so  a  minor  cannot  be\t sued  for
\ncompensation under  s.\t70  of\tthe  Contract  Act
\n(Vide: Bankay  Behari Prasad  v.  Mahendra  Prasad
\n(2). Mr.  Sen pressed  into service the analogy of
\nthe minor and contends that the result of a 175(3)
\nof the Act is to make the appellant incompetent to
\nenter into  a contract unless the contract is made
\nas required  by s.  175(3). In\tour opinion,  this
\nargument  is  not  well\t founded.  Section  175(1)
\nprovides for  and  recognises  the  power  of  the
\nProvince to  purchase or  acquire property for the
\npurposes there specified and to make contracts. No
\ndoubt  s.   175(3)  provides  for  the\tmaking\tof
\ncontracts in  the specified  manner.  We  are  not
\nsatisfied that\ton reading  s. 175  as a  whole is
\nwould be  possible to  entertain the argument that
\nthe appellant  is in  the position  of a minor for
\nthe  purpose   of  s.  70  of  the  Contract  Act.
\nIncidentally,  the  minor  is  excluded\t from  the
\noperation of  s. 70  for the  reason that his case
\nhas been  specifically provided for by s. 68. What
\ns. 70 prevents is unjust enrichment and it applies
\nas much to individuals as to corporations and
\n901<\/span>
\nGovernment. Therefore, we do not think it would be
\npossible to  accept the\t very broad  argument that
\nthe State  Government is outside the purview of s.\n<\/p>\n
70. Besides,  in the  case of  a minor,\t even  the
\nvoluntary acceptance  of the  benefit of work done
\nor thing  delivered which is the foundation of the
\nclaim under s. 70 would not be present, and so, on
\nprinciple s. 70 cannot be invoked against a minor.\n<\/p>\n
     The question  about the  scope and\t effect of
\ns.70 and  its applicability  to cases  of  invalid
\ncontracts made\tby the Provincial Government or by
\ncorporations  has   been  the\tsubject-matter\tof
\nseveral judicial decisions in this country; and it
\nmay be\tstated broadly\tthat the  preponderance of
\nopinion is  in favour  of the  view which  we  are
\ninclined to  take (Vide: Mathura Mohan Saha v. Ram
\nKumar Saha  and Chittagong  District Board; Abaji,
\nSitaram\t Modak\t v.  The   Trimbak   Municipality;
\nPallonjee Eduljee  & Sons,  Bombay v. Lonavla Gity
\nMunicipality; Municipal\t Committee, Gujranwala\tv.
\nFazal Din;  Ram Nagin Singh v. Governor-General in
\nCouncil; Union\tof India v. Ramnagina Singh<\/a>; Union
\nof India  v. New  Marine Coal  Co.  (Bengal)  Ltd.
\nDamodara Mudalar<\/a>  v. Secretary of State for India;
\nCorporation of\tMadras\tv.  M.\tKothandapani-Naidu
\nYogambal  Boyee\t  Ammani  Ammal\t v.  Naina  Pillai
\nMarkayar; and,\tRam Das\t v. Ram\t Babu. Sometimes a
\nnote of\t dissent from  this view has no doubt been
\nstruok (Vide  : Chedi  Lal v.  Bhawan  Das;  Radha
\nKishana Das v. The Municipal Board of Benare Anath
\nBandha Deb  v.\tDominion  of  India  Punjabhai\tv.
\nBhagawan Das  Kisandas and  G. R. Sanchuiti v. Pt.
\nR. K. Choudhari.\n<\/p>\n
902<\/span><\/p>\n
     Before we\tpart with  this point  we think it
\nwould be  useful to refer to the observations made
\nby Jenkins, C. J. in dealing with the scope of the
\nprovisions of  s. 70  in Suchand Ghosal v. Balaram
\nMardana(1). “The  terms of s.70”, said Jenkins, C.
\nJ., “are  unquestionably wide,\tbut  applied  with
\ndiscretion  they   enable   the\t  Courts   to\tdo
\nsubstantial justice  in cases  where it\t would\tbe
\ndifficult  to  impute  to  the\tpersons\t concerned
\nrelations actually  created by\tcontract.  It  is,
\nhowever, especially  incumbent on  final Courts of
\nfact  to  be  guarded  and  circumspect\t in  their
\nconclusions  and   not\tto   countenance  acts\tor
\npayments that are really officious.”\n<\/p>\n
     Turning to the facts of this case it is clear
\nthat both the Courts have found that the acts done
\nby the\trespondent were\t done in fact in pursuance
\nof the\trequests invalidly  made by  the  relevent
\nofficers of  the appellant,  and so  they must\tbe
\ndeemed to  have been  done without  a contract. It
\nwas not disputed in the Courts below that the acts
\ndone by\t the respondent\t have been accepted by the
\nappellant and  the buildings constructed have been
\nused by\t it. In\t fact, both  the learned judges of
\nthe Appellate  Court have  expressly  pointed  out
\nthat the  appellant did\t not contest  this part of
\nthe respondent’s case. “I should mention”, says S.
\nR. Das\tGupta, J.,  “that the  appellant  did  not
\ncontest before us the quantum decreed in favour of
\nthe plaintiff”;\t and Bachawat,\tJ.,  has  observed
\nthat “the materials from the record also show that
\nthe Government\turgently needed the work which was
\ndone by\t the respondent\t and that  the\tGovernment
\naccepted it as soon as it was done and used it for
\nits benefit”.  In fact the learned judge adds that
\n“the learned  Advocate-General\tfrankly\t confessed
\nthat this  is a\t case where the Province of Bengal
\nwas  under   a\tmoral\tobligation  to\t pay   the
\nrespondent”, and has further added
\n903<\/span>
\nhis comment that “an obligation of this kind which
\nis apart  from the  provisions of  s. 70 of Indian
\nContract Act  a moral and natural obligation is by
\nthe provision  of that\tsection\t convertd  into\t a
\nlegal obligation”.  Therefore once  we\treach  the
\nconclusion that\t s.  70\t can  be  invoked  by  the
\nrespondent against  the appellant  on the findings
\nthere is no doubt that the requisite conditions of
\nthe said  section have\tbeen satisfied. That being
\nso, the\t Courts below  were right in decreeing the
\nrespondent’s claim.\n<\/p>\n
     The  result   is  the  appeal  fails  and\tis
\ndismissed with costs.\n<\/p>\n
     SARKAR, J.-We  also think\tthat  this  appeal
\nshould fail.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t 1944,\t the   respondent,   a\t firm\tof
\ncontractors,  had   at\tthe   request  of  certain
\nofficers of  the Government  of Bengal\tas it then
\nexisted, done  certain construction  work for that
\nGovernment and the latter had taken the benefit of
\nthat work.  These officers,  however, had not been
\nauthorised by  the Government  to make the request
\non its behalf and the respondent was aware of such
\nlack of\t authority all\talong. These facts are not
\nin controversy.\n<\/p>\n
     As the respondent did not receive payment for
\nthe work,  it filed a suit in the Original Side of
\nthe High  Court at  Calcutta in\t 1949 against  the
\nProvince of West Bengal for a decree for moneys in
\nrespect of  the work.  The High Court, both in the
\noriginal hearing  and appeal,  held that there was
\nno  contract   between\tthe   respondent  and  the
\nGovernment in  respect of  the work  on which  the
\nsuit might  be\tdecreed\t but  the  respondent  was
\nentitled  to  compensation  under  s.  70  of  the
\nContract Act  and that\tthe liability  to pas  the
\ncompensation   which   was   originally\t  of   the
\nGovernment  of\t Bengal,  had\tunder  the  Indian
\nIndependence (Rights,  Properties and Liabilities)
\nOrder, 1947,  devolved on the Province West Bengal
\n(now the State
\n904<\/span>
\nof West\t Bengal) which\tcame into existence on the
\npartition of  India. In\t the result the respondent
\nsuit succeeded.\t The  State  of\t West  Bengal  has
\nappealed against the decision of the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
     The only  question argued\tin this\t appeal is
\nwhether the  High Court\t was right  in\tpassing\t a
\ndecree under  s. 70  of the Contract Act. We think
\nit was.\n<\/p>\n
     Now s. 70 is in these terms:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  Section 70   “Where  a  person  lawfully
\n     does anything for another person, or delivers
\n     anything to  him,\tnot  intending\tto  do\tso
\n     gratuitously, and\tsuch other  person  enjoys
\n     the benefit  therefor, the latter is bound to
\n     make compensation\tto the\tformer in  respect
\n     of, or  to restore,  the  thing  so  done\tor
\n     delivered.”\n<\/p>\n
     G. K.  Mitter, J.,\t who heard the suit in the
\nfirst instance,\t observed in regard to s. 70 that,
\n“The  requisites   for\tentitling   a  person\tto
\ncompetion for work done are: (i) that it should be
\nlawfully done, (ii) that it should not be intended
\nto be  done gratuitously and (iii) that the person
\nfor whom the work is done should enjoy the benefit
\nthereof”. We  agree  with  this\t analysis  of  the
\nsection and  the view  of the  High Court that the
\nnecessary requisites exist in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
     In this  Court the\t case was argued on behalf
\nof the\tappellant on the basis that the High Court
\nwas in\terror in  holding that, relief under s. 70
\ncan  be\t granted  where\t the  Government  has  the
\nbenefit of  work done  under a\tcontract  with\tit
\nwhich was  not made  in terms  of s. 175(3) of the
\nGovernment of India Act, 1935, and was, therefore,
\ninvalid. Various  authorities,\tboth  English  and
\nIndian, were cited in support of this argument. We
\nthink it  unnecessary to discuss them as the basis
\non which  the present  contention is advanced does
\nnot exist  in this  case. Nor do we think that the
\nHigh Court decided the case  on that basis.\n<\/p>\n
905<\/span><\/p>\n
     It is  clear from\tthe findings  of the  High
\nCourt, to  which we  shall presently  refer,  that
\nthere was  in fact no agreement, valid or invalid,
\nbetween the  respondent\t and  the  Government.\tIt
\nfollows that  the work had not been done under any
\nagreement  with\t  the  Government.   No\t question,
\ntherefore arises  as to the validity or invalidity
\nof an  agreement with  the Government because of a
\nfailure to  comply with the terms of s. 175 (3) of
\nthe  Government\t  of  India  Act  nor  as  to  the
\napplicability of  s. 70\t of the\t Contract Act  for
\ngranting  compensation\t for  work  done  under\t a
\ncontract with  the  Government\twhich  is  invalid
\nbecause it  had\t not,  been  made  in  the  manner
\nprescribed by s. 175(3).\n<\/p>\n
     The reason\t why we\t say  that  there  was\tno
\nagreement whatever  between the Government and the
\nrespondent is  that the\t agreement  could  in  the
\npresent case  have  been  made\tonly  through  the
\nofficers  but\tthese  officers\t did  not  to  the
\nknowledge of  the respondent possess the authority
\nof the Government to bind it by contract. That was
\nwhat the High Court held, as would appear from the
\nobservations of\t the learned  Judges which we will
\nnow set out. G. K. Mitter, J., said, “The plantiff
\nnever  had  any\t doubt\tabout  the  fact  that\tno
\nagreement  of  any  kind  had  been  entered  into
\nbetween it  and the  province of  Bengal” and “The
\nplantiff never\tright from the beginning, that the
\nofficers  who  were  requesting\t the  plantiff\tto
\nproceed with  the work\thad, no authority to enter
\ninto a binding contract with the plantiff and that
\nthey were  awaiting sanction from higher officials
\nwhich they  hoped to  get.” The\t learned Judges of
\nthe appellate  bench  also  took  the  same  view.
\nBachawat,  J.,\t observing,  “Neither\tof   these
\nofficers had  any authority  from the  Province of
\nBengal to make the request to the plaintiff. There
\nwas no agreement either express or implied between
\nthe plaintiff and
\n906<\/span>
\nthe Province  of Bengal.  There is,  therefore, no
\nagreement which\t is void or which is discovered to
\nbe void”.  The learned Judges no doubt referred to
\ns. 175(3)  of the Government of India Act that was
\nobviously because  arguments based  on it had been
\nadvanced before\t them. They distinguished the case
\nof Union  of India v. Ramnagina Singh<\/a> (1) in which
\nit had\tbeen held  that s.  70 of the Contract Act
\nhad no\tapplication where  work was  done under\t a
\nrequest which had resulted in a void agreement, on
\nthe ground that in the present case there had been
\nno request  from the  Government  as  the  persons
\nmaking the  request had\t no authority to do so for
\nthe Government\tand so no question of an agreement
\nwith the  Government, which was void, arose. It is
\nwrong, to contend, as the learned advocate for the
\nappellant did, that the learned Judges of the High
\nCourt decided  the case on the basis that s. 70 is
\napplicable where  work is  done for the Government
\nunder an  invalid contract  with it.  No doubt the
\nlearned Judges\tdealt with  certain cases  dealing
\nwith the  question of  work done  under an invalid
\ncontract but that was because those cases had been
\ncited at the bar.\n<\/p>\n
     We are  not, therefore,  called upon  in  the
\npresent\t case\tto  pronounce  upon  the  question
\nwhether compensation  under s.\t70 of the Contract
\nAct can\t be awarded  where goods are delivered to,
\nor work\t done for, the Government under a contract
\nwith it\t which is  invalid for\tthe reason that it
\nhad not\t been made  in the  terms prescribed by s.
\n175(3) of  the Government  of India  Act and we do
\nnot do so.\n<\/p>\n
     Now, if  the work\twas done at the request of
\nthe officers of Government who had no authority to
\nmake the request for Government and the respondent
\nwas aware  of this,  it would follow that the work
\nhad been  done at the request made by the officers
\nin their  personal capacity.  In such  a  case\tit
\nseems to us
\n907<\/span>
\nthat if the request resulted in a contract between
\nthe officer  and the  respondent under\twhich  the
\nofficers  were\t personally  bound   to\t pay   the
\nrespondent reasonable  remuneration for\t the work,
\nthen it would be a very debatable question whether
\nthe respondent\twould have  any claim  against the
\nGovernment under  s. 70.  We say debatable because
\nwe have\t grave doubts  if the section was intended
\nto give a person in the position of the respondent
\nwho had\t a remedy  against the officers personally
\nunder a\t contract with\tthem, a remedy against the
\nGovernment for\tthe same  thing in addition to the
\nremedy under  the contract.  We, however, need say
\nno more on this aspect of the matter for we do not
\nthink that  any contract  had in  the present case
\ncome into  existence between  the officers and the
\nrespondent.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  true that when one requests another to
\ndo work\t for him a tacit promise to pay reasonable
\nremuneration for  the  work  may  be  inferred\tin
\ncertain circumstances  and that promise may result
\nin a  contract when  the work is done which may be
\nenforced. That\tmay also  be  the  case\t when  the
\nrequest is  to do  the work for another’s benefit,
\nfor consideration  for the promise would in either
\ncase be\t the detriment suffered by the promisee by
\ndoing the  work. The following illustration may be
\ngiven from  Pollock on Contracts (13th edition) p.
\n9:-  “The  passenger  who  steps  into\tferry-boat
\nthereby requests the ferryman to take him over for
\nthe usual  fare”. We  should suppose  the position
\nwould be  the same  where a  person expressly asks
\nthe ferryman  to carry him or another over without
\nsaying anything\t about the remuneration to be paid
\nfor the\t carriage; in  each  of\t these\tcases  the
\nperson\tmaking\t the  request\twould  be  tacitly
\npromising to pay the ferryman his usual fare.\n<\/p>\n
     A tacit  promise of  this kind may however be
\ninferred only if the circumstances are such that
\n908<\/span>
\nfrom them  a man  of business and experience would
\nconsider  it   reasonable  to\tinfer.\tIt  is\tan
\ninference of  fact and\tnot which any law requires
\nto be  made An\tinteresting passage  from Cheshire
\nand Fifoot’s  Law of  Contract (5th Edition) p. 30
\nmay be\tquoted here:  “It would\t be  ludicrous\tto
\nsuppose\t   that\t    businessmen\t   couch     there
\ncommunications in  the\tform  of  a  catechism\tof
\nreduce their  negotiations to  such a  species\tof
\ninterrogatory  as  was\tformulated  in\tthe  Roman
\nstipulatio.  The   rules  which\t the  Judges  have
\nelaborated  from   the\tpromise\t  of   offer   and
\nacceptance are\tneither the  rigid  deductions\tof
\nlogic nor the inspiration of natural justice. They
\nare only presumption, drawn from experience, to be
\napplied in  so far  as\tthey  serve  the  ultimate
\nobject\t of    establishing   the   phenomena\tof
\nagreement…..”\n<\/p>\n
     Now on the facts of this case we are entirely
\nunable to  infer any tacit promise by the officers
\nto pay\tpersonally for\tthe work done. As the High
\nCourt pointed  out, the officers made it clear, of
\nwhich  indeed  the  respondent\titself\twas  fully
\naware,\tthat   the  payment   would  be\t  by   the
\nGovernment, and,  therefore, that  they themselves
\nwould\thave   no   liability.\t They\tsaid   the
\nrespondent’s “estimates have been submitted to the
\nDeputy Director\t for formal  sanction  which  when
\nreceived will  be communicated\tto them. Meanwhile
\nthey must not delay the work.” The Deputy Director
\npresumably was the not officer authorised to grant
\nthe sanction.  He  however  was\t not  one  of  the
\nofficers who  had made\tthe request  for the work.
\nThe respondent\twas fully  aware that the work was
\nneeded for  the Government and the officers had no
\npersonal  interest   in\t it.   And  what  is  most
\nimportant is  that  the\t respondent  never  itself
\nthought that  the officers  had made  any personal
\npromise to  pay. Throughout,  the  respondent  had
\nbeen requesting\t the Government\t to  sanction  the
\norders placed by
\n909<\/span>
\nthe officers, submitting estimates for the work to
\nthe  Government\t and  requesting  the  latter  for
\npayment; not  once did it look to the officers for
\nany liability  in respect  of the  work done under
\ntheir  orders.\tThe  respondent\t had  on  previous
\noccasions done\twork for the Government on similar
\nrequests and  had never\t thought that the officers
\nhad there by undertaken any personal liability. If
\nit itself  did not  get that  impression, no other
\nperson of experience could reasonably infer in the
\nsame circumstances a tacit promise by the officers
\nto pay personally. It is of some interest to point
\nout that  the learned  advocate for  the appellant
\nnever even suggested there was such a contract. We
\nfind it\t impossible in such circumstances to think
\nthat there  was any  tacit promise by the officers
\npersonally to  pay for\tthe work  or any  contract
\nbetween them and the respondent in respect of it.\n<\/p>\n
     It\t is  also  not\tpossible  to  say  on  the
\nmaterials on the record that the officers promised
\nto the\trespondent that\t they would secure payment
\nfor the\t work done.  We think Bachawat, J., of the
\nappellate bench\t of the\t High Court  correctly put
\nthe  position\twhen  he   said:-  “The\t work  was
\ncertainly done\tat the\trequest of  these officers
\nbut it was done under circumstances in which it is
\nnot possible to imply that the officers personally
\npromised to  pay for  the  work\t done.\tThere  is,
\ntherefore, no scope for any argument that the work
\nwas done  in course  of performance  of a contract
\nbetween\t the   plaintiff  and\tthe  officers  who
\nrequested him  to do  the work…… The materials
\non the\trecord clearly show that the plaintiff did
\nthe work  for the  Province of\tBengal. Credit was
\ngiven to  the Province\tof Bengal  and not  to the
\nofficers. It is impossible to say on the materials
\non  the\t  record  that\t work  was  done  for  the
\nofficers.” If the other learned Judges of the High
\nCourt did  not expressly  refer to  this aspect of
\nthe case  that was  clearly  because  it  was  not
\nargued by the advocates; it was obviously not
\n910<\/span>
\na  point   which  any  advocate\t could\treasonably
\nadvance on the facts of this case.\n<\/p>\n
     We are,  however, not  to\tbe  understood\tas
\nsaying that  in no  case can  Government  officers
\nundertake personal liability to contractors in the
\nposition of  the respondent. Each case must depend
\non its\town facts.  Circumstances may  conceivably
\nexist where  it would  be reasonable  to  infer\t a
\npersonal undertaking  by the  officers\tto  pay\t a
\ncontractor doing work for the Government. All that
\nwe decide is that such is not the present case.\n<\/p>\n
     The position  then is that the respondent had
\ndone the  work\tfor  the  Government  without  any
\ncontract with  anybody. The  question is,  are the
\nthree requisites  of  s.  70,  as  very\t correctly
\nformulated by  G. K.  Mitter, J.,  satisfied ?\tWe
\nthink  they   are.  There   is\tno   dispute  that
\nGovernment had\ttaken the  benefit of the work. We
\nalso feel  no doubt  that the  respondent did  not
\nintend to  do the  work gratuitously. It submitted
\nits estimate  for the  work and was very prompt in
\nsubmitting its\tbill after  the work  was done. It
\nhad  earlier   in  similar  circumstances  without
\nproper contract\t with the Government done work for
\nit at  the request  of its  officers and  received
\npayment from  the Government.  It was  a  firm\tof
\ncontractors whose  trade it was to carry out works
\nof construction for payment and the Government was
\naware of this. There is no reason to think that in
\nthe present  case it did the work gratuitously. On
\nits part  the Government  never thought\t that  the
\nwork had  been done  gratuitously  for\tit  raised
\nobjections to the bill submitted by the respondent
\non grounds  of bad quality of the work and that it
\nhad  been   done  without   proper  sanction.  The
\nGovernment urgently  needed the work and no sooner
\nwas it\tcompleted, it  promptly put it to its use.
\nIt was\tplainly fully aware that the work was done
\nfor it\tby a  party whose  trade was  to work  for
\nremuneration
\n911<\/span>
\nand who\t had previously\t done similar work and had
\nbeen paid for it by the Government.\n<\/p>\n
     The request  by the  officers does not affect
\nthe question  that arises  in this case. It had no
\ncompelling effect  and no  effect as a promise and
\nin fact no effect at all. Its practical use was to
\ninform the  respondent that  the Government needed
\nthe work  immediately and it would give a sanction
\nin respect of it in due course and pay for it when
\ndone,  an  information\ton  which  the\trespondent
\nreadily acted  as it  gave it  a chance to do more
\nbusiness. So  the work\twas done by the respondent
\nreally out  of its  free  choice  by  way  of  its
\nbusiness and  with the\tintention of  getting paid
\nfor it.\n<\/p>\n
     We also  feel no doubt that the work was done
\nlawfully. It  was work\twhich the Government badly
\nneeded. We will assume for the present purpose, as
\nthe learned  advocate for the appellant said, that
\nwork done  under a  contract with  the\tGovernment
\nwhich is  invalid in  view of  the provision of s.
\n175(3) of  the Government  of India  Act, is  work
\nunlawfully done.  The learned  advocate\t contended
\nthat would  be because\tthereby section 175 (3) of
\nthe Government\tof India Act would be evaded which
\nis the\tsame thing as doing that which the section
\nforbids. Assume\t that is so. But that section does
\nnot say\t that if  work is  done for the Government
\nwithout any  contract  or  agreement  at  all  and
\nvoluntarily, as was done in the present case, that
\nwork would not have been lawfully done. Government
\nis free\t not to\t take the  benefit of  such  work.
\nThere is  no law, and none has been pointed out to
\nus, which  makes the  doing of such work unlawful.
\nNo other reason was given or strikes us for saying
\nthat the  work was  not lawfully done. There is no
\nlaw, as\t Bachawat, J., said that Government cannot
\ntake any  work except  under a contract in respect
\nof it made in terms of s. 175(3) of the Government
\nof India Act. That section may forbid a Government
\nto take\t work under  a contract\t which is  invalid
\nbecause
\n912<\/span>
\nnot in\tterms of  it, but  it  does  not  make\tit
\nunlawful for the Government to take the benefit of
\nwork done  for it  without any contract at all. We
\nshould suppose\tthat if\t the doing of the work was
\nunlawful the  Government would\tnot have  accepted
\nthe benefit  of\t it.  In  the  present\tcase,  the
\nGovernment needed the work badly and we do not see
\nhow then  the Government can say that the work was
\nnot done  lawfully. We\ttherefore think\t that  the
\nwork was done lawfully.\n<\/p>\n
     It was contended that the obligation under s.
\n70  of\t the   Contract\t  Act\tarises\t only\tin
\ncircumstances in  which\t English  law  would  have
\ncreated an  obligation on  the basis of an implied
\ncontract or  a quasi-contract and that there could
\nbe no  implied contract or quasi-contract with the
\nGovernment because  a contract\tcould be made with
\nit only\t in  accordance\t with  s.  175(3)  of  the
\nGovernment  of\t India\tAct.   Now  it\t has  been
\nrepeatedly held\t that a\t resort to  English law is
\nnot justified  for deciding  a question arising on
\nour statute  unless the\t statute is  such that\tit
\ncannot\tbe   reasonably\t understood   without  the
\nassistance of  English law,  indeed, there is good
\nauthority for  saying that s. 70 was framed in the
\nform in\t which it appears with a view to avoid the
\nniceties of  English law  on the  subject, arising
\nlargely from  historical reasons  and to  make the
\nposition simple\t and free from fictions of law and
\nconsequent complications: see Pollock on Contracts
\n(13th ed.)  p. 10. Furthermore, we do not see that
\ns. 175(3)  in any way prevents a contract with the
\nGovernment being  implied  or  a  Government  from
\nincurring an  obligation under a quasi-contract. A
\ncontract implied in law or a quasi-contract is not
\na real\tcontract or, as it is called, a consensual
\ncontract and s. 175(3) is concerned only with such
\ncontracts. The\tsection says  that “all\t contracts
\nmade in the exercise of the executive authority of
\nthe  Federation\t  or  of   a  Province\t shall\tbe
\nexpressed” in a certain manner and
\n913<\/span>
\n“shall be  executed on\tbehalf\tof  the\t Governor-
\nGeneral or  Governor by\t such person  and in  such
\nmanner\tas   he\t may   direct  or  authorise”.\tIt
\ntherefore applies  to consensual  contracts  which
\nthe Government makes and not to something which is
\nalso called  a contract\t but which  the law brings
\ninto existence\tby a  fiction irrespective  of the
\nparties having\tagreed to it. Now, by its terms s.
\n70 of  the Contract  Act must be applied where its
\nrequisites exist,  if it  is necessary\tto imply a
\ncontract or  to contemplate  the  existence  of\t a
\nquasi-contract for  applying the section that must
\nbe done\t and we do not think that s. 175(3) of the
\nGovernment of  India Act prevents that, nor are we
\naware of any other impediment in this regard. This
\nargument must also fail.\n<\/p>\n
     We,  therefore,   feel  that  s.  70  of  the
\nContract Act  applies to  this case and the decree
\nof the High Court should be confirmed.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t\t Appeal dismissed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961 Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR 779, 1962 SCR Supl. (1) 876 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B., Sarkar, A.K., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala PETITIONER: STATE OF WEST BENGAL Vs. RESPONDENT: M\/S. B. K. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-147000","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nState Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1961-12-04T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-07-31T06:16:58+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"62 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"State Of West Bengal vs M\\\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961\",\"datePublished\":\"1961-12-04T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-07-31T06:16:58+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961\"},\"wordCount\":11321,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961\",\"name\":\"State Of West Bengal vs M\\\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1961-12-04T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-07-31T06:16:58+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"State Of West Bengal vs M\\\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1961-12-04T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2015-07-31T06:16:58+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"62 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961","datePublished":"1961-12-04T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-07-31T06:16:58+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961"},"wordCount":11321,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961","name":"State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1961-12-04T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-07-31T06:16:58+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-west-bengal-vs-ms-b-k-mondal-and-sons-on-5-december-1961#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"State Of West Bengal vs M\/S. B. K. Mondal And Sons on 5 December, 1961"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/147000","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=147000"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/147000\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=147000"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=147000"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=147000"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}