{"id":148532,"date":"1964-03-16T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1964-03-15T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bondada-gajapathy-rao-vs-state-of-adhra-pradesh-on-16-march-1964"},"modified":"2017-10-27T23:51:43","modified_gmt":"2017-10-27T18:21:43","slug":"bondada-gajapathy-rao-vs-state-of-adhra-pradesh-on-16-march-1964","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bondada-gajapathy-rao-vs-state-of-adhra-pradesh-on-16-march-1964","title":{"rendered":"Bondada Gajapathy Rao vs State Of Adhra Pradesh on 16 March, 1964"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Bondada Gajapathy Rao vs State Of Adhra Pradesh on 16 March, 1964<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 1645, \t\t 1964 SCR (7) 251<\/div>\n
Author: A Sarkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Sarkar, A.K.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nBONDADA GAJAPATHY RAO\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSTATE OF ADHRA PRADESH\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n16\/03\/1964\n\nBENCH:\nSARKAR, A.K.\nBENCH:\nSARKAR, A.K.\nHIDAYATULLAH, M.\nMUDHOLKAR, J.R.\n\nCITATION:\n 1964 AIR 1645\t\t  1964 SCR  (7) 251\n CITATOR INFO :\n D\t    1975 SC 236\t (15)\n\n\nACT:\nCriminal Trial-Appellant sentenced to imprisonment for life-\nDeath  during  the  pendency  of  appeal-Heirs\twhether\t can\nprosecute appeal-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, (Act 5 of\n1898), s. 431, 435, 439-Constitution of India, Art. 136.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe appellant was convicted under section 302 of the  Indian\nPenal  Code  and sentenced to imprisonment for life  by\t the\nHigh  Court for the offence of the murder of his  wife.\t  He\nwas  granted special leave to appeal by this Court.   During\nthe  pendency  of the hearing of this appeal  the  appellant\ndied.  After his death his sons and daughter applied to this\nCourt for permission to continue to prosecute the appeal.\nIt was pleaded by the legal representatives of the appellant\nthat though that sentence of imprisonment could no longer be\nexecuted, it still affected the property of the deceased and\nthe legal representatives were, therefore, interested in the\nappeal\tand  should  be\t permitted  to\tcontinue  it.\t The\nappellant,  who\t held  a high office in\t the  Government  of\nAndhra\tPradesh had been suspended during the  investigation\nof the charge against him and he was dismissed from  service\nunder certain service rules on his conviction.\tDuring\tthis\ntime  the appellant had only been given a  small  allowance.\nOn these facts it was pleaded that if the conviction was set\naside,\tthe  estate  of the deceased would  be\tentitled  to\nreceive the full salary from the Government.\nHeld (Per Sarkar, J.): (i) Neither s. 431 nor the cases men-\ntioned\tcan  be said to apply to the  present  case  proprio\nvigore,\t for the present is not an appeal under the code  of\ncriminal procedure which is dealt with by s. 431 nor is it a\nrevisional  application\t like  the one\twhich  came  up\t for\nconsideration in Pranab Kumar Mitra's case, while as for the\nEnglish case, it is only of persuasive value.\nPranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal,<\/a> [1959] Supp.\n1  S.C.R.  63 and Hodgson v. Lakeman, [1943] L.R.  K.B.\t 15,\ndistinguished.\n(ii).The principle on which the hearing of a proceeding\t may\nbe  continued after the death of an accused would appear  to\nbe  the effect of the sentence on his property in the  hands\nof his legal representatives.  If the sentence affects\tthat\nproperty,  the\tlegal  representatives can  be\tsaid  to  be\ninterested  in\tthe proceeding and allowed to  continue\t it.\nThis  principle\t applies  in  appeals,\trevisions,  and\t  in\npetitions under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\nA  sentence of fine no doubt affects the property.   In\t the\npresent\t case, however, the sentence was not of fine but  of\nimprisonment  which on the death of the accused\t has  become\ninfructuous.  In the present case the effect of the sentence\nimposed\t in  this case being set aside\twould  not  directly\nentitle the legal representatives to the salary.  They\twill\nhave to obtain necessary orders from the Government for\t the\npurpose.\n252\nHeld (Per Hidayatullah, J.): (i) This was an appeal  against\na  sentence of imprisonment and an appeal of this  character\nwould normally abate on the death of the appellant because a\ncriminal prosecution is concerned primarily with the punish-\nment  of an offender and not with the trial of\tan  abstract\nissue about the truth or falsity of a prosecution case.\t The\nsame  principle\t must  apply to\t appeals  after\t conviction,\nexcept in so far as a\t judgment  already rendered  touches\nassets which would come\t to the legal representative.  In so\nfar as personal punishment    (other   than   a\t  fine)\t  is\nconcerned that stands dissolved by the death of the offender\nand  an\t appeal\t to get that punishment\t set  aside  becomes\ninfructuous and abates.\nPranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal,<\/a> [1959] Supp.\n1  S.C.R.  63,\tPritam Singh v. State,\t[1950]\tS.C.R.\t453,\ndistinguished.\nHodgson\t v.  Lakeman, [1943] L.R.K.B. 15,  Baghis  v.  Rowes\n[1955] 1 Q.B.D. 573, referred to.\n(ii).The  principle laid down in Pranab Kumar Mitra  v.\t The\nState of..West Bengal and Another and in Pritam Singh v. The\nState has.no application to the present matter because there\nis  no\tanalogy\t between an appeal by special  leave  and  a\nrevision  under\t the code.  The present case is not  a\tcase\nwhere  the  legal  representatives after the  death  of\t the\noffender  have\tto  meet  the liability of  a  fine  or\t are\nrequired to protect the assets which they claim should reach\nthem.\tIn the present case no claim of the  petitioners  is\njeopardized  directly,\tby  the judgment.   Their  claim  is\ndependent upon the administrative action of Government which\nmay  not  proceed upon the result of  criminal\tprosecution.\nThis  appeal  was  only concerned with\tthe  correctness  or\notherwise of the conviction and not with any monetary claims\ndepending  upon\t the  result  of  the  appeal.\t In  such  a\nsituation  the\tordinary  rule that  a\tcriminal  proceeding\nagainst\t a person comes to an end on his demise\t must  apply\nalso  to special appeals in this court, such as\t this,\teven\nthough the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code may not\nbe directly applicable.\nHeld (Per Mudholkar, J.): (i) The decision of this court  in\nPranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal<\/a> has no, bear-\ning  upon an appeal brought to this court by special  leave.\nIt is no doubt true that the power confer-red by section 435\nof  the Code on the High Court and certain other courts\t and\nby  Article  136  of  the  Constitution\t on  this  Court  is\ndiscretionary.\tUnder section 439 of the Code the High Court\ncan  exercise  any  of the powers conferred on\ta  court  of\nappeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a court by s.\n338  and has also the power to enhance the sentence.   Under\nSection\t 435 of the Code, the High Court can suo  motu\tcall\nfor  the record of any inferior court but this power  cannot\nbe  exercised  by  this\t court\tunder  article\t136  of\t the\nConstitution.\tTherefore there is a fundamental  difference\nbetween\t the  power of the High Court in  revision  and\t the\npower of this Court in Art. 136 of the Constitution.\nPranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West Bengal,<\/a> [1959] Supp.\n1 S.C.R. 63, distinguished.\n(ii).In a criminal matter the issue is personal between\t the\naccused person and the State and the right of appeal is also\npersonal  to the appellant.  There is admittedly no  express\nprovision    permitting\t   the\t substitution\t of    legal\nrepresentatives\t of  a\tdecreased appellant  in\t a  criminal\nappeal brought to this Court by\n253\nspecial\t leave.\t The policy of the law discernible  from  s.\n431  of the Code has to be borne in mind.  The policy  under\nsection 431 of the Code is that every criminal appeal  under\nchapter XXXI will abate except an appeal from a sentence  of\nfine.\t There\t is  no\t provision  which   prescribes\t the\ncontinuation of the appeal on the death of the appellant  in\ncases where the sentence is of imprisonment.\nThe  interest  of the legal representatives in\tthe  present\ncase  is not a direct interest in the sense that  it  cannot\narise  out  of the decision of this court even if it  is  in\nfavour\tof  the\t appellant.  The  only\tinterest  which\t the\napplicants  have  is a contingent one and is not  one  which\ncould  flow  directly out of the ultimate decision  of\tthis\nCourt.\nHodgson\t v.  Lakeman, (1943) L.R.K.B. 15,  Regina  v.  Rowe,\n(1955)\t(1)  Q.B.D.  573,  Hesketh  v.\tAtherton,  Leach  v.\nWanstead  School Board, Siberry v. Connolly, Constantine  v.\nIllingworth,  Jones v. Gallowfield, Rivers v.  Glasse,\t(all\ncited in Short and Mellor, Practice on the Crown Side of the\nKing's\tBench Division 2nd Ed. at p. 425), United States  v.\nMook,  125  F2d 706, The State of Kerala  v.  Narayani\tAmma\nKamala\tDevi,<\/a>  [1962] Supp. 3 S.C.R. 943 and  Imperatrix  v.\nDongali\t Andaji,  (1879) I.L.R. Bom. 564,  referred  to\t and\ndiscussed.\n(iii).....The Legislature has by limiting in section 431  of\nthe  Code  the\tsurvival  of  appeals  to  appeals   against\nsentences  of fine has chosen to recognise only one kind  of\ninterest  and  no  other.  This Court  in  exercise  of\t its\ninherent powers or discretionary powers would not be  acting\naccording to correct legal principles in recognising a\tkind\nof  interest  which  the  legislature  has  not\t chosen\t  to\nrecognise.  In the circumstances the applicants ought not to\nbe granted special leave to prosecute the appeal.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 179  of
\n1961.\tAppeal by special leave from the judgment and  order
\ndated October 31, 1960, of the Andhra Pradesh High Court  in
\nCriminal Appeal No. 161 of 1960.\n<\/p>\n
K.   R. Chaudhuri, for the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
A.   S. R. Chari, B. R. G. K. Achar, and R. N. Sachthey,
\nfor the respondent.\n<\/p>\n
March 16, 1964.\t The following judgments were delivered-
\nSARKAR, J.-This is an appeal from a sentence of imprisonment
\nfor  life imposed on the appellant upon his  conviction\t for
\nthe offence of the murder of his wife.\tThe appeal was filed
\nwith the special leave of this Court granted under Art.\t 136
\nof  the\t Constitution  but the appellant  died\tpending\t the
\nappeal.\t  His  legal  representatives  now  seek  leave\t  to
\ncontinue the appeal.\n<\/p>\n
There  would seem to be authority for the  proposition\tthat
\nrevision  petitions and some appeals from sentences of\tfine
\nmight be continued by his legal representatives on the death
\n254<\/span>
\nof  the\t accused pending the proceeding: see s. 431  of\t the
\nCode  of  Criminal Procedure and Pranab Kumar Mitra  v.\t The
\nState of West Bengal<\/a>(1).  It appears that in England appeals
\nfrom similar sentences are permitted to be continued by\t the
\nexecutors   of\tthe  deceased  appellant:  see\tHodgson\t  v.
\nLakeman(2).   It is true that neither s. 431 nor  the  cases
\nmentioned  can be said to apply to the present case  proprio
\nvigore,\t for  the present is not an appeal  under  the\tCode
\nwhich  is  dealt  with\tby s. 431 nor  is  it  a  revisional
\napplication like the one which came up for consideration  in
\nPranab Kumar Mitra’s case, while as for the English case, it
\nis  only of persuasive value.  All the same however I  think
\nit must now be held that appeals from sentences of fine\t may
\nbe permitted to be continued by the legal representatives of
\nthe deceased appellant.\t First, I find no, provision  making
\nsuch  appeals abate.  If they can be continued when  arising
\nunder  the Code, there is no reason why they should  not  be
\ncontinued when arising under the Constitution.\tIf  revision
\npetitions may be allowed to be continued after the death  of
\nthe   accused  so  should  appeals,  for  between  them\t  no
\ndistinction  in\t principle is possible for  the\t purpose  of
\ncontinuance.  It is true that the Code of Criminal Procedure
\nwhich creates the revisional powers of a Court provides that
\nsuch  powers may be exercised suo motu but it does not\tseem
\nto  me that Pranab Kumar Mitra’s case(1) was based  on\tthis
\nfor  on\t that  ground all revision cases  should  have\tbeen
\npermitted to be continued and the permission should not have
\nbeen  confined to cases of fine.  Indeed in that  case\tthis
\nCourt  proceeded  on the basis that there was  no  statutory
\nprovision  applying to the case.  It observed, “even in\t the
\nabsence\t   of\t any   statutory   provisions,\t  we\thave
\nheld………….  that\t the  High Court has  the  power  to
\ndetermine  the\tcase even after the death of  the  convicted
\nperson, if there was a sentence of fine also imposed on him,
\nbecause\t that sentence affects the property of the  deceased
\nin  the hands of his legal representative”.  A\tsentence  of
\nfine affects property equally when the case is taken further
\nup  in\tappeal or in revision, If it is just and  proper  to
\ncontinue  the  hearing in one case after the  death  of\t the
\naccused, it would be equally so in the other case.
\nThe  principle on which the hearing of a proceeding  may  be
\ncontinued  after the death of an accused would appear to  be
\nthe  effect of the sentence on his property in the hands  of
\nhis  legal  representatives.  If the sentence  affects\tthat
\nproperty,  the\tlegal  representatives can  be\tsaid  to  be
\ninterested in the proceeding and allowed to continue it.
\nA  sentence of fine no doubt affects the property.   In\t the
\npresent -case, however, the sentence was not of fine but  of
\nimprisonment which on the death of the accused has become
\n(1) [1959] 1 S.C.R. 63.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1943] L.R.K.B. 15.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    255<\/span><\/p>\n
infructuous.  There is no one now who can be imprisoned.  It
\nis, however, said that though that sentence can no longer be
\nexecuted, it still affects the property of the deceased\t and
\nthe legal representatives are, therefore, interested in\t the
\nappeal\tand should be permitted to continue it.\t The  matter
\nis  put in this way.  The appellant, who held a high  office
\nin  the\t Government  of Andhra Pradesh\thad  been  suspended
\nduring\tthe investigation of the charge against him  and  he
\nwas  dismissed from service under certain service  rules  on
\nhis  conviction.   During this time the appellant  had\tonly
\nbeen  given  a\tsmall allowance.  It was said  that  if\t the
\nconviction  was set aside, the estate would be\tentitled  to
\nreceive the full salary from the Government.
\nIt seems to me that this contention is not accurate.  It may
\nbe  that  if the sentence is set aside that may\t assist\t the
\nlegal  representatives\tin their effort to obtain  the\tfull
\nsalary\tto  which  the deceased’s  estate  would  have\tbeen
\nentitled.   But the effect of the sentence imposed  in\tthis
\ncase  being set aside would not directly entitle  the  legal
\nrepresentatives\t to  the salary.  They will have  to  obtain
\nnecessary  orders from the Government for the  purpose.\t  It
\nhas not been shown to us that such order will  automatically
\nfollow the setting aside of the conviction.  Neither has  it
\nbeen  shown that the legal representatives cannot  move\t the
\nGovernment  to\tpass  such orders on  the  ground  that\t the
\ncorrectness of the conviction could not be tested because of
\nthe  death of the appellant.  For these reasons I am  unable
\nto  hold  that tire justice of the case\t requires  that\t the
\nlegal representatives of the deceased should be permitted to
\ncontinue  the appeal.  It would be extending  the  principle
\napplied\t to the case of a sentence of fine, if on the  basis
\nof  it this appeal was allowed to be continued by the  legal
\nrepresentatives\t after\tthe death of the appellant  and\t for
\nsuch an extension I find no warrant.\n<\/p>\n
In my view, for these reasons the legal representatives\t are
\nnot  entitled to continue the appeal.  That being so and  as
\nthe sentence was one of imprisonment which would not  affect
\nanyone\tafter  the death of the accused, it cannot  be\tsaid
\nthat there is anyone interested in the appeal.\tThere is no,
\nquestion,  therefore, in such a case for proceeding  further
\nwith the appeal.\n<\/p>\n
HIDAYATULLAH, J.-The appellant was convicted under s. 302 of
\nthe Indian Penal Code and sentenced to imprisonment for life
\nby the High Court of Andhra Pradesh.  He was granted special
\nleave to appeal by this Court.\tDuring the pendency of\tthis
\nappeal\tthe  appellant died on August 30, 1963.\t  After\t his
\ndeath  his  sons  and daughters applied\t to  this  Court  on
\nOctober 5, 1963 for permission to continue to prosecute\t the
\nappeal.\t Their petition is all that we are concerned with at
\nthe present moment.\n<\/p>\n
The   appellant\t was  working  as  Superintending   Engineer
\n(Electricity)  in  the service of the Government  of  Andhra
\nPradesh.   The case against him was that on August 10,\t1959
\nhe
\n256<\/span>
\ncommitted the murder of his wife by shooting her in the back
\nwith a revolver.  He was acquitted by the Sessions Judge  of
\nKrishna\t Division, Masulipatnam but, on appeal by the  State
\nGovernment  the order of acquittal was set aside and he\t was
\nconvicted   and\t sentenced  as\tabove.\t In  view   of\t the
\nappellant’s  death  we\tare of\tcourse\tnot  interested\t any
\nfurther\t in considering the details of the offence, if\tany,
\nunless we allow the heirs of the appellant to prosecute\t the
\nappeal\tafter  his  death and this  is\tprecisely  what\t the
\npresent\t petitioners claim they are entitled to do.   It  is
\nadmitted,  however,  that no analogous contention  was\tever
\nraised\tin this Court, though appeal on the death of a\tsole
\nappellant  were, before this, treated as abated.  One  would
\nexpect that an appeal of this character would normally abate
\non the death of the appellant because a criminal prosecution
\nis  concerned primarily with the punishment of\tan  offender
\nand not with the trial of an abstract issue about the  truth
\nor  falsity of a prosecution case.  The maxim  actio  perso-
\nnalis  moritur cum persona is often invoked in this  behalf.
\nThe Criminal Procedure Code in s. 431 also provides that all\n<\/p>\n
-appeals  filed\t under s. 41 I-A sub-s. 2 or  s.  417  shall
\nfinally\t abate on the death of the accused and\tevery  other
\nappeal\tunder Chapter XXXI shall finally abate on the  death
\nof  the\t appellant, except an appeal against a\tsentence  of
\nfine.  The section cannot cover a, case such as the  present
\nbecause this appeal was not filed under any of the  sections
\nmentioned in s. 431 or under Chapter XXXI.\n<\/p>\n
It is contended that without the aid of a provision like  s.
\n431, Criminal Procedure Code, the appeal must be treated as
\ncontinuing  and it is pointed out that for this\t reason\t and
\nfor the additional reason that the powers of revision can be
\nexercised suo motu this Court allowed legal  representatives
\nt` continue to prosecute criminal revisions under s. 439  of
\nthe  Code in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. The State of West  Bengal
\nand  Another<\/a>(1)\t and Pritam Singh v. The  State(2).   It  is
\nurged  that  on\t a parity of reasonig  this  appeal  can  be
\ncontinued  by the heirs.  It is not my purpose to  consider,
\nwhether\t in the absence of any direct injury to\t the  living
\nevery  criminal\t proceeding must come to an  end  after\t the
\ndeath of the accused whether before his conviction or after.
\nBut  there  must  always  be  some  discernible\t reason\t for
\npermitting  another  person to continue\t an  appeal  whether
\ncivil  or  criminal after the death of\tthe  appellant.\t  An
\nappeal\tis not a heritable asset and does not revolve  as  a
\nmatter\tof course upon an executor or heir.  Even under\t the
\ncivil law an express provision is required for\tsubstitution
\nof another person in the place of the person deceased before
\nthe  appeal  can be continued and this is again\t subject  to
\nwhether\t the  cause  of action survives or  not.   The\tsame
\nprinciple is again to the
\n(1) [1959] (1) S.C.R. 63.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 453.\n<\/p>\n
257<\/span><\/p>\n
forefront  in s. 431 when it allows an appeal in respect  of
\nfine to be continued but not appeals involving imprisonment.
\nThe  intention there too appears to be to afford only  those
\npersons a right whose interests are directly jeopardized  by
\nthe judgment.  In so far as personal punishment (other\tthan
\na  fine) is concerned that stands dissolved by the death  of
\nthe offender and an appeal to get that punishment set  aside
\nbecomes infructuous and abates.\n<\/p>\n
The only question in this case is whether the principle laid
\ndown  in  the  two cases of this Court\tcited  above  should
\ngovern\tspecial appeals or the principle underlying s.\t431.
\nIt  may\t be  said at once that the former is  not  a  direct
\nprecedent applicable to the present matter because there  is
\nno analogy between an appeal by special leave and a revision
\nunder  the  Code.  The latter can be suo motu  but  not\t the
\nformer.\t  The petitioners claim that the father, if he\twere
\nacquitted, would have been entitled to claim his pay for the
\nperiod upto his death since on his conviction he was removed
\nfrom service by the Government and the amount thus  involved
\nis  Rs.\t 40,000\/-.  The petitioners say that if\t the  appeal
\nwere  now allowed they would be able to ask for this  amount
\nand  in this way claim an interest in the appeal.   This  is
\nnot  a case where the legal representatives after the  death
\nof the offender have to meet the liability of a fine or\t are
\nrequired to protect the assets which they claim should reach
\nthem.\tThis is a case where the petitioners claim  to\thave
\nthe  judgment of the High Court reexamined so that they\t may
\nbe  able  to  prefer a claim to the salary  to\twhich  their
\nfather would have been entitled if he had been acquitted  of
\nthe  criminal  charge.\t In my judgment.  no  claim  of\t the
\npetitioners is jeopardized directly by the judgment.   Their
\nclaim  is  dependent  upon  the\t administrative\t action\t  of
\nGovernment  which  may not proceed upon the  result  of\t the
\ncriminal  prosecution.\t In other words, the  claim  on\t the
\nstrength  of which the present petitioners seek to  join  in
\nthis  appeal  is too remote and not  directly  consequential
\nupon  the issue to be tried.  The appeal was only  concerned
\nwith the correctness, or otherwise of the conviction and not
\nwith  any monetary claims depending upon the result  of\t the
\nappeal.\t  In  such  a situation the  ordinary  rule  that  a
\ncriminal proceeding against a person comes to an end on\t his
\ndemise\tmust  apply also to special appeals in\tthis  Court,
\nsuch  as  this, even though the provisions of  the  Criminal
\nProcedure Code may not be directly applicable.
\nAt  the hearing counsel cited cases from the English  Courts
\nand  the  Supreme Court of the United States.\tThe  English
\ncases referred to are collected in Short & Mellor’s Practice
\nof  the Crown Office and Griffith’s Guide to Crown  Practice
\nand  the  cases\t of the United States  are  referred  to  in
\nAnnotations.\n<\/p>\n
L\/P(D)ISCI-9 ..\n<\/p>\n
258<\/span><\/p>\n
in 87 Lawyer’s Edition 1234 and 1 Lawyer’s Edition II Series
\n1879.  The English practice appears to be that there must be
\na,  direct  monetary liability attaching to  the  living  by
\nreasons of     the  impugned  judgment before  they  can  be
\nallowed\t to continue an appeal filed by a dead person.\t See
\nHodgson\t v. Lakeman(1) and Regina v. Rowe(2).  The  American
\npractice also appears to be the same.\n<\/p>\n
There is good reason for holding that a criminal prosecution
\nin  which the State is anxious to bring an offender to\tbook
\nwith a view to getting him punished for a crime comes to  an
\nend  on\t the  death  of\t the  person  arraigned.   The\tsame
\nprinciple  must\t apply\talso to\t appeals  after\t conviction,
\nexcept\tin  so far as a judgment  already  rendered  touches
\nassets which would come to the legal representatives or\t the
\nexecutor as the case may be.  Beyond this it is not possible
\nto conceive of remoter interests because if the law were  to
\ntake  into account such remote interests every appeal  would
\nhave  to be continued after the death of the appellant.\t  In
\nmy judgment, the present petitioners do not claim any direct
\ninterest  and the appeal must, therefore, be taken  to\thave
\nabated.\t  I  agree that the petition be\t dismissed  and\t the
\nappeal held to have abated.\n<\/p>\n
MUDHOLKAR,   J.-This  appeal  raises  an   interesting\t and
\nimportant  question.   It is whether the heirs at law  of  a
\ndeceased  person who had brought an appeal to this Court  by
\nspecial leave in which he had challenged his conviction\t and
\nsentence  for  an  offence, are entitled  to  prosecute\t the
\nappeal\tafter his death during the pendency of\tthe  appeal.
\nThe  applicants are the children of the deceased who  was  a
\nSuperintending Engineer (Electricity) in the service of\t the
\nGovernment  of\tAndhra\tPradesh.  He  was  charged  with  an
\noffence under s. 302, Indian Penal Code for having committed
\nthe  murder  of his wife by shooting her  with\ta  revolver.
\nDuring the investigation of the offence he was placed  under
\nsuspension with effect from August 10, 1959 and was  allowed
\nsubsistence  allowance\tfor some time.\tHis defence  at\t the
\ntrial  was that while his wife was picking up  the  revolver
\nfrom the teapoy on which he had kept it, suspecting that  he
\nwould  shoot  himself with it, it went\toff  accidently\t and
\nkilled her.  This defence was accepted by the Sessions Judge
\nand he was acquitted.  On appeal by the State the High Court
\nof Andhra Pradesh set aside the acquittal and convicted\t him
\nof  an\toffence under s. 302, I.P.C. and  sentenced  him  to
\nundergo\t imprisonment  for life.  He  thereupon\t sought\t and
\nobtained special leave from this Court to prefer an  appeal.
\nDuring the pendency of the appeal he died.  According to the
\napplicants a sum of Rs. 40,000\/- would be due to the deceas-
\ned,  being the difference between the subsistence  allowance
\nactually paid by the Government to him and the total  emolu-
\nments that would have been payable to him from the date of
\n(2)  [1955] 1 Q.B.D. 573
\n(1) [1943] K.B. 15.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    259<\/span><\/p>\n
suspension  till his death and that they as his legal  heirs
\nwould be entitled to act this amount in case the  conviction
\nand sentence are set aside by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
In support of his contention that the appeal has not  abated
\nby reason of the death of the appellant Mr. K. R.  Chaudhuri
\npoints\tout  that s. 431 of the Code of\t Criminal  Procedure
\n(hereafter referred as the Code) which speaks about  appeals
\nis limited in its application to appeals under Ch.  XXXI  of
\nthe Code and would not fetter the powers of this Court under
\nArt.  136  of  the Constitution to hear\t an  appeal  brought
\nbefore\tit  by\tspecial leave even  though  the\t person\t who
\nbrought it is no longer alive.\tIt is no doubt true that  s.
\n431 of the Code only says that appeals under s. 411A, sub-s.
\n(2)  and  s.  417 shall finally abate on the  death  of\t the
\naccused and every other appeal under Chapter XXXI except  an
\nappeal\tfrom a sentence of fine shall finally abate  on\t the
\ndeath  of the appellant.  It does not, therefore,  in  terms
\napply  to an appeal permitted to be preferred by this  Court
\nin  exercise  of  its  discretion  under  Art.\t136  of\t the
\nConstitution.\tThe  argument of Mr. Chaudhuri is  that\t the
\npower  conferred  upon this Court by Art. 136  is  wide\t and
\ndiscretionary  and is analogous to that conferred  upon\t the
\nHigh  Court  by\t s.  439  read with  s.\t 435  of  the  Code.
\nTherefore, upon an analogy of the decision of this Court  in
\nPranab\tKumar  Mitra  v.  The  State  of  West\tBengal\t and<\/a>
\nanother(1)  this Court has the power to hear the appeal\t and
\nto  permit  the\t applicants to prosecute it.   He  does\t not
\ncontend\t that the applicants have a right to be\t brought  on
\nthe  record in place of the deceased appellant\tbut  submits
\nthat  to  meet\tthe ends of justice it would  be  right\t and
\nproper\tto  permit the applicants to  prosecute\t the  appeal
\nbecause\t if it succeeds they will be able to claim from\t the
\nGovernment  the arrears with respect to salary due to  their
\ndeceased father from the Government.\n<\/p>\n
It  seems  to me that the decision upon which  reliance\t has
\nbeen  placed has no bearing upon an appeal brought to  this,
\nCourt by special leave.\t It is no doubt true that the  power
\nconferred  by  s.  435 of the Code on  the  High  Court\t and
\ncertain other courts and by Art. 136 of the Constitution  on
\nthis  Court is discretionary.  In so far as the\t High  Court
\nand certain other courts are concerned the discretion is  to
\ncall for and examine any record of any proceeding before  an
\ninferior  criminal court situate within the local limits  of
\nits jurisdiction for the purpose of satisfying itself as  to
\nthe  correctness,  legality  or propriety  of  any  finding,
\nsentence or order passed by the inferior court and as to the
\nregularity  of any proceeding of such court.  Under  s.\t 435
\nthese  courts have power to act in this manner suo motu\t and
\ns. 440 provides that no party has a right to be heard either
\n(1)  [1959] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 63.\n<\/p>\n
    L\/d)D)ISCI-9,a) ….\n<\/p>\n
260<\/span><\/p>\n
personally  or\tby  a pleader before such  court,  with\t one
\nexception.   That  exception is that the High  Court  cannot
\nmake  an order under s. 439 of the Code to the prejudice  of
\nan accused person unless he is given an opportunity of being
\nheard either personally or by pleader in his defence.\tWhen
\nthe  record  comes  before  the High Court  it\tmay  in\t its
\ndiscretion  exercise any of the powers conferred on a  Court
\nof appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 or on a Court by
\ns.  338\t and  has also the power to  enhance  the  sentence.
\nArticle 136 of the Constitution confers discretion upon this
\ncourt  whether\tto  grant special leave or  not.   But\tthis
\nArticle\t does not confer any power upon this Court  to\tcall
\nfor  the  record of any court or tribunal suo motu  for\t the
\npurpose of examining it and making an appropriate order.  It
\nonly empowers this Court to grant leave to a person to bring
\nhis  appeal  before  it and afford  him\t an  opportunity  of
\nshowing\t such  error as may be existing in the\tjudgment  or
\norder appealed from.  There is a fundamental difference bet-
\nween a power which is exercisable by a Court suo motu and  a
\npower  which can be exercised only when it is moved in\tthat
\nbehalf\tby a party.  For the exercise of suo motu power\t the
\nappearance  of a, party before the Court concerned is not  a
\nprerequisite.\tIndeed\tas s. 440 provides, it\tis  for\t the
\nCourt to decide whether or not to allow the party to  appear
\nbefore\tit  and be heard.  But of course  the  principle  of
\nnatural\t justice would preclude a court even in such a\tcase
\nfrom  making  an order to the prejudice of a  party  without
\ngiving\tthe party an opportunity to be heard.  In so far  as
\nan  appeal  is concerned, by whichever way  it\tis  brought,
\nwhether\t as  of\t right\tconferred  by  a  provision  in\t the
\nConstitution  or  by any other law or by special  leave\t the
\nappellant  has a right to be heard and a right to  prosecute
\nthe  appeal.  A Court exercising suo motu powers may  choose
\nat  any\t stage\tto drop the proceeding and  not\t proceed  to
\nexamine\t the  records at all.  But as long as an  appeal  is
\npending\t before\t a  Court  and there  is  a  person  legally
\ncompetent  to prosecute it and there is no legal  impediment
\nto its being heard, the Court has no discretion to refuse to
\ngo on with the appeal even though initially it may have been
\nbrought\t before it by its leave.  As soon as -the  leave  is
\ngranted a right accrues in favour of the party who has\tbeen
\ngranted\t leave.\t It may be that where this Court finds\tthat
\nleave  has been improperly obtained or given it\t may  revoke
\nthe  leave.   But that is quite different from\tsaying\tthat
\nwithout\t revoking  the leave it can drop the  appeal.\tThis
\ndistinction  between revisional powers and appellate  powers
\nhas been adverted to in the decision relied upon(1) at p.  70.
\nSinha, J. (as he then was) has observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  revisional\tpowers\tof  the\t High  Court
\n\t      vested in it by s. 439 of the Code, read\twith
\n\t      s.  435,\tdo  not\t create\t any  right  in\t the
\n\t      litigant,\t but only conserve the power of\t the
\n\t      High Court to see that justice is
\n\t      (1)   [1959] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 63.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      261<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      done  in accordance with the recognized  rules
\n\t      of    Criminal   Jurisprudence,\t and\tthat
\n\t      subordinate  criminal  courts  do\t not  exceed
\n\t      their  jurisdiction,  or\tabuse  their  powers
\n\t      vested  in  them by the Code.   On  the  other
\n\t      hand, as already indicated, a right of  appeal
\n\t      is  a  statutory\tright which has\t got  to  be
\n\t\t\t    recognized\tby  the courts, and  the
\nright  of
\n\t      appeal, where one exists, cannot be denied  in
\n\t      exercise\tof the discretionary powers even  of
\n\t      the High Court.”\n<\/p>\n
Thus,  when the special leave granted by this Court has\t not
\nbeen  revoked  it can exercise with respect  to\t the  appeal
\nbefore\tit  what  may be  called  appellate  powers.   While
\nhearing\t an appeal from the decision of a High\tCourt,\tthis
\nCourt  will, therefore, be competent to exercise  only\tsuch
\npowers\tas the High Court itself could exercise in  relation
\nto  the\t appeal.  In so far as the procedure for  hearing  a
\ncriminal appeal by special leave is concerned this Court has
\nframed\tcertain\t rules.\t Order XXI of Supreme  Court  Rules,
\n1950  contains those rules.  Rule 23 of that Order  provides
\nfor  the  entering of appearance by parties in\tthe  appeal.
\nRule 24 provides for the filing of statements of case by the
\nparties.   Rule 25 provides for setting down the appeal\t for
\nhearing.    Rule  26  empowers\tthe  Court  to\tdirect\t the
\nengagement of an Advocate at the cost of the Government in a
\nproper\tcase where the accused person is not represented  by
\nan Advocate ‘on record of his choice.  Rule 27 provides\t for
\ngiving\ta notice to the accused where he is not\t represented
\non the date fixed for the hearing of the appeal and  permits
\nthe  accused person if he so wishes to present his  case  by
\nsubmitting  his\t argument in writing and  provides  for\t the
\nconsideration of the written argument at the hearing.\tSub-
\nrule (2) of that rule dispenses with necessity of production
\nof  the\t accused  person in custody at the  hearing  of\t the
\nappeal.\t  There is no express rule which states as  to\twhat
\nhas to be done where the accused person who is an  appellant
\nis not present or represented at the hearing of the  appeal.
\nOrder XLV, rule 5, however, preserves the inherent power  of
\nthe  Court to make such orders as may be necessary  to\tmeet
\nthe  ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the  process
\nof the Court.  Thus this Court has the power to prevent\t the
\nabuse of its process and it will be an abuse of its  process
\nif  the appellant despite service of notice of the  date  of
\nhearing chooses to remain absent at the hearing.  Now,\tjust
\nas  the Court can, under r. 18 of 0. XXI dismiss  an  appeal
\nfor non-prosecution where the appellant refuses to take\t the
\nnecessary steps for bringing the appeal to hearing, it\tmust
\nbe  deemed  to have similar power to dismiss  it  where\t the
\nappellant  is not present or is not represented.  Where\t the
\nabsence of the appellant is due to the fact that he is\tdead
\nit would still be a case of non-prosecution and,  therefore,
\nthis Court would have the right and the duty to dismiss\t the
\nappeal.\t Since the power
\n262<\/span>
\nto  prosecute the appeal inhered in the appellant alone,  no
\none: else can claim to exercise it unless the law  conferred
\nsuch  a right upon that other person.  This the law  may  do
\nexpressly  as. it has done in 0. XXII of the Code  of  Civil
\nProcedure or impliedly as it has done in s. 431 of the Code.
\nApart  from the fact that in a criminal matter the issue  is
\npersonal  between the accused person and the State the\tfact
\nremains\t that  the right of appeal is also personal  to\t the
\nappellant.  It cannot be allowed to be exercised by  another
\nunless there is some provision in law which would permit  it
\nto  be exercised or unless such a course is  permissible  by
\nreference  to a principle.  There is admittedly\t no  express
\nprovision   permitting\t the  substitution  of\t the   legal
\nrepresentatives of a deceased appellant in a criminal appeal
\nbrought\t to this Court by special leave.  We have,  however,
\nto  bear in mind the policy of the law as enacted in s.\t 431
\nof the Code.  The policy is that every criminal appeal under
\nchapter XXXI will abate except an appeal from a sentence  of
\nfine.\tThus,  instead of there being any principle  on\t the
\nstrength  of  which  the legal heirs of a  person  could  be
\nallowed\t to prosecute after his death an appeal\t brought  by
\nhim challenging his conviction and sentence of\timprisonment
\nthe  policy  of\t the  law  is  definitely  opposed  to\t it.
\nMoreover,  only\t a  person  who\t can  properly\trepresent  a
\ndeceased appellant can be allowed to be brought on record in
\nhis  place and prosecute the appeal.  That is the  principle
\nupon  which the provisions of 0. XXII of the Code  of  Civil
\nProcedure  are based.  That again is the principle  followed
\nby  the Courts in England in allowing appeals in  which\t the
\nchallenge  was\tto a fine imposed upon the appellant  to  be
\ncontinued  by  the  executors  and  administrators  of\t the
\ndeceased  appellant.   As an instance of  this\twould  first
\nrefer  to  Hodgson  v. Lakeman(1).  In\tthat  case  Viscount
\nCaldecote  C.J.,  permitted the executors  of  the  deceased
\nappellant  claiming  an interest in the appeal\tagainst\t his
\nconviction  and\t sentence of fine to prosecute\tthe  appeal.
\nThe  fine, though a small one, would have been a  burden  on
\nthe estate and thus the executors could be said to have\t had
\nan  interest in having that burden removed.  This  case\t was
\ndistinguished in Regina v. Rowe(2) In that case the widow of
\nthe deceased appellant sought leave to prosecute the  appeal
\nin which he had challenged his conviction on four counts  of
\nobtaining  money  by  false pretences and  the\tsentence  of
\nimprisonment to 18 months.  The ground on which the  widow’s
\napplication  was supported was that the\t conviction  against
\nher  husband  affected\ther chances of\temployment  and\t her
\nposition among her friends and that if interest is the test,
\nthen  the  widow also had an interest.\t This  argument\t was
\nrepelled by Lord Goddard C.J. who said that the Court cannot
\ntake notice of that because the interest she
\n(1) [1943] 1 K.B. 15.\t      (2) [1955] 1 Q.B.D. 573.\n<\/p>\n
263<\/span><\/p>\n
has  was not a pecuniary one.  It was further  urged  before
\nthe  Court  that where any person might be prejudiced  by  a
\nconviction  against  a deceased person, and  an\t appeal\t was
\nlodged\tbefore\tthe death of that person, the  Court  should
\nallow  the appeal to be continued by that person so that  if
\nthere had been a miscarriage of justice and the heirs of the
\ndeceased were living under the shadow of the fact that their
\nrelative had died a convict, the interests of justice  would
\nrequire\t that  the appeal be heard.  To\t this  argument\t the
\nanswer of the learned Chief Justice was that this would be a
\ncase  for making an application for a tree pardon.   In\t the
\ncourse of the judgment he observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “…………… we cannot allow a widow or an
\n\t      executor\tor  an administrator of\t a  deceased
\n\t      person to appeal to this court unless they can
\n\t      show  a  legal  interest.\t  If  a\t person\t  is
\n\t      sentenced\t to  pay  a  fine  and\tdies  having
\n\t      appealed, or even if he dies after payment  of
\n\t      the fine-it might be immediately afterwards-it
\n\t      may be that the court would allow executors or
\n\t      administrators to appeal merely on the  ground
\n\t      that if the conviction were quashed they could
\n\t\t\t    recover the fine for the benefit of th
\ne  estate
\n\t      of  the  deceased\t which\tthey  are  bound  to
\n\t      administer.  In Hodgson v. Lakeman(1) to which
\n\t      our  attention  was called, which was  a\tcase
\n\t      before the Divisional Court, but the principle
\n\t      would be the same, the appellant was dead, and
\n\t      the  court allowed the executors\tto  continue
\n\t      the  appeal  because  there  was\ta  pecuniary
\n\t      interest.\t Supposing, as sometimes happens,  a
\n\t      man is convicted on indictment and fined pound
\n\t      500;  the money has to be paid, and the  Crown
\n\t      can recover that money whether he is alive  or
\n\t      dead,  for  it  can  recover  it\tagainst\t his
\n\t      estate,\tand,  therefore,  it  would  be\t  an
\n\t      injustice if the executors were not allowed to
\n\t      appeal  and  to say that\tthe  conviction\t was
\n\t      wrong,  because,\tif it was wrong,  the  money
\n\t      would be saved.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      It may be that it is artificial to say that if
\n\t      there  is a pecuniary penalty an appeal  might
\n\t      lie,   whereas  if  corporal   punishment\t  or
\n\t      imprisonment  is\timposed there cannot  be  an
\n\t      appeal, but at the same time I do not see\t any
\n\t      ground on which we can say in the present case
\n\t      that anybody has an interest.  It may be\tthat
\n\t      the  widow  would\t be very glad  to  have\t her
\n\t      husband’s name cleared, but we cannot take any
\n\t      notice of that sentimental interest.  There is
\n\t      nobody  affected\tnow by the judgment  of\t the
\n\t      court because
\n\t      [1943] K. B. 15.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      264<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      the  judgment was a sentence  of\timprisonment
\n\t      and the prisoner has died.  It would be a very
\n\t      novel step if, in these circumstances, we said
\n\t      that the court would entertain an appeal.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In Short and Mellor’s (The Practice on the Crown Side of the
\nKing’s\tBench Division, second edition) it is stated  at  p.
\n425  that  the\tpractice does not seem\tto  be\tuniform\t and
\nreference is made to some cases.  In one of them-Hesketh  v.
\nAtherton(1) the counsel was allowed to argue an appeal after
\nthe  death of one of the parties.  But in Leach v.  Wanstead
\nSchool Board (2) (2) wherein a conviction against the father
\nof  a  child  for  not\tsending\t the  child  to\t school\t was
\nchallenged  in appeal and the father and the child had\tdied
\nin the meanwhile, the Court refused to allow the case to  be
\nargued\ton the ground that there was no interest  surviving.
\nIn  Siberry  v.\t Connolly(3) where there  was  a  claim\t for
\nseaman’s  wages, the appellant’s executors were\t allowed  to
\ntake the place of the deceased appellant.  In Constantine v.
\nIllingworth(4)\twhere the defendant in a criminal  case\t had
\ndied, the Court ordered the case to be struck out.  The same
\nwas done in Jones v. Fallowfield(5).  In Rivers v. Glasse(6)
\nwhere  the respondent had died and the appellant  had  given
\nnotice to the executors to support the conviction, the Court
\nheard and determined the case and gave costs to the  respon-
\ndent’s executors.  The position so far as the United  States
\nis concerned is set out as follows(7):\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  death of an accused ordinarily abates  a
\n\t      criminal action, including review\t proceedings
\n\t      pending at that time.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      The interest of the deceased’s representatives
\n\t      or  next of kin in clearing his good name\t was
\n\t      held  in\tUnited States v. Mook(8) not  to  be
\n\t      sufficient to allow the appellate court, after
\n\t      the defendant’s death pending his appeal\tfrom
\n\t      a\t conviction  of\t violating  the\t  Interstate
\n\t      Commerce\tAct,  to decide the  appeal  on\t the
\n\t      merits.\tThe court however, added: ‘we  think
\n\t      it may not be amiss to say that it seems to us
\n\t      that the next-of-kin of a convicted person who
\n\t      dies  pending  an appeal have an\tinterest  in
\n\t      clearing\this good name, which Congress  might
\n\t      well  believe  would justify a change  in\t the
\n\t      law.”‘
\nThus  in that jurisdiction also the basis  of  intervention,
\nwhen permitted, is a survival of an interest in the heirs or
\nexecutors  of the deceased.  That interest would only  be  a
\npecuniary one
\n(1)Short and Mellor at p. 425.(2) ibid.\n<\/p>\n
(3)ibid.  (4) ibid.\n<\/p>\n
(5)ibid.  (6) ibid.\n<\/p>\n
(7)  1 L.Ed. 2nd Series, p. 1879.(8) 125 F2d. 706.\n<\/p>\n
265<\/span><\/p>\n
and where the estate is not affected by the conviction there
\nwould be no ground for allowing the intervention of the heir
\nor  executor.  It may be that the interest of the  heirs  of
\nthe deceased convict to clear his name should be  recognised
\nand  they  ought to be allowed an opportunity to  clear\t it.
\nBut  unless  it is recognised by the legislature  the  court
\ncannot take notice of it.  So far as the Court is concerned,
\nthe only question arising in the appeal before us is whether
\nthe  conviction and sentence of imprisonment are correct  in
\nlaw.   The  only person who had an interest  in\t the  appeal
\nbefore the Court in showing that both were not justified was
\nthe  appellant and since he is dead, the interest  which  he
\nhad ceases to exist and cannot pass to anyone.
\nAnother case which was referred to at the bar was The  State
\nof  Kerala  v.\tNarayani Amma Kamala Devi<\/a>(1)  in  which\t the
\ndecision  in Pranab Kumar Mitra’s case (2) was\trelied\tupon
\nand reference was made to Imperatrix v. Dongaji Andaji(3) In
\nthat  case  also  the question was whether  the\t High  Court\n<\/p>\n
-could\texercise  its revisional powers against\t an  accused
\nperson\teven  after  his death.\t There\tthe  Court  was\t not
\nconcerned  with\t its own powers with respect to\t a  criminal
\nappeal brought before it by special leave.
\nIt  is then said that the applicants have an interest  inas-
\nmuch  as  the  estate of the  deceased\tappellant  would  be
\nenriched by Rs. 40,000\/- if this Court ultimately finds\t the
\nappellant  innocent  and if the Government,  acting  on\t the
\nbasis  of the decision of this Court which is  binding\tupon
\nit,  rescinds  the  suspension\torder  passed  against\t the
\nappellant  and\tin conformity with it pays  the\t arrears  of
\nsalary due to the appellant.  This interest is not a  direct
\ninterest  in  the  sense that it cannot\t arise\tout  of\t the
\ndecision  of  this  Court even if it is\t in  favour  of\t the
\nappellant.   The only interest which the applicants have  is
\na.  contingent one and is not one which could flow  directly
\nout  of\t the  ultimate decision of this Court.\t If  we\t may
\nmention, the argument advanced in Rowe’s case(4) before Lord
\nGoddard\t C.J., that by clearing her deceased husband’s\tname
\nthe widow’s chances of securing employment would improve was
\nnot  accepted  as creating a pecuniary interest such  as  to
\njustify granting her permission to prosecute the appeal.
\nIndeed,\t the legislature has, by limiting in s. 431  of\t the
\nCode the survival of appeals to appeals against sentences of
\nfine  has chosen to recognise only one kind of interest\t and
\nno  other.  There could be several other kinds of  interest,
\nas was suggested during the arguments at the bar.  But\tthis
\nCourt, in
\n(1)[1962]  Supp. 3 S.C.R. 943. ( 2 ) [1959] Supp.  1  S.C.R.\n<\/p>\n
63. (3) (1879) I.L.R. Bom. 564. (4) [1955] 1 Q. B.D. 573.\n<\/p>\n
266<\/span><\/p>\n
exercise  of  its inherent powers or  discretionary  powers,
\nwould not be acting according to correct legal principles in
\nrecognising a kind of interest which the legislature has not
\nchosen to recognise.  In the circumstances, therefore, I  am
\nclear  that the applicants ought not to be granted leave  to
\nprosecute the appeal.\n<\/p>\n
\t     Leave to prosecute appeal refused.\n<\/p>\n
267<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Bondada Gajapathy Rao vs State Of Adhra Pradesh on 16 March, 1964 Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 1645, 1964 SCR (7) 251 Author: A Sarkar Bench: Sarkar, A.K. PETITIONER: BONDADA GAJAPATHY RAO Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF ADHRA PRADESH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16\/03\/1964 BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. BENCH: SARKAR, A.K. HIDAYATULLAH, M. MUDHOLKAR, J.R. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-148532","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nBondada Gajapathy Rao vs State Of Adhra Pradesh on 16 March, 1964 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bondada-gajapathy-rao-vs-state-of-adhra-pradesh-on-16-march-1964\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Bondada Gajapathy Rao vs State Of Adhra Pradesh on 16 March, 1964 - 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