{"id":151401,"date":"2002-09-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2002-09-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-vs-jayabalan-on-4-september-2002"},"modified":"2015-08-11T01:38:01","modified_gmt":"2015-08-10T20:08:01","slug":"state-vs-jayabalan-on-4-september-2002","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-vs-jayabalan-on-4-september-2002","title":{"rendered":"State vs Jayabalan on 4 September, 2002"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Madras High Court<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">State vs Jayabalan on 4 September, 2002<\/div>\n<pre>       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS\n\nDated: 04\/09\/2002\n\nCoram\n\nThe Honourable Mr. Justice P. SHANMUGAM\nand\nThe Honourable Mr. Justice M. CHOCKALINGAM\n\nCriminal Appeal No.65 of 1995\n\n\nState, represented by\nThe Public Prosecutor,\nPondicerry.                             ..  Appellant\n\n-Vs-\n\nJayabalan                              ..  Respondent\n\nPrayer:  Appeal against the judgment of the Third Additional  Sessions  Judge,\nPondicherry dated 7.10.1994 in Sessions Case No.17 of 1993.\n\n!For Appellants :  Mr.  A.P.  Surya Prakash,\n                Addl.  Public Prosecutor,\n                Pondicherry.\n\n^For Respondent :  Mr.  A.  Padmanabhan\n\n\n:J U D G M E N T\n<\/pre>\n<p>P.  SHANMUGAM, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>                The  State  represented by the Public Prosecutor has filed the<br \/>\nabove appeal against the order of acquittal passed  by  the  Third  Additional<br \/>\nSessions Judge, Pondicherry.\n<\/p>\n<p>                2.  The accused is the husband.  He was charged for an offence<br \/>\npunishable  under  Section  302 of the Indian Penal Code for having beaten his<br \/>\nwife Vasanthi with a blunt object, poured kerosene over her and  set  fire  to<br \/>\nher,  thereby committing murder by intentionally causing the death of his wife<br \/>\non 29.5.1992 at about 9.20  am  in  his  house  at  No.95  ,  Subbayya  Nagar,<br \/>\nPondicherry.  The Sessions Court found that the prosecution could not make out<br \/>\nthe  case  against  the  accused  beyond  reasonable  doubt  and acquitted the<br \/>\naccused.  The appeal is against this judgment.\n<\/p>\n<p>                3.  The case of  the  prosecution  is  stated  hereunder;  the<br \/>\naccused  before  the  Sessions  Court  shall be hereinafter referred to as the<br \/>\nrespondent :\n<\/p>\n<p>                The marriage between the respondent  Jayabalan  and  Vasanthi,<br \/>\nthe deceased  took  place on 5.9.1988.  They have two children, one aged 2-1\/2<br \/>\nyears and the other aged six months as on the date of  the  occurrence  namely<br \/>\n29.5.1992.   Vasanthi,  comes from a big family of six children, consisting of<br \/>\nfour sisters and two brothers.  She was  employed  as  a  Nurse  in  the  T.B.<br \/>\nHospital,  Pondicherry  and  the  respondent  was  employed  as  a  Teacher in<br \/>\nAlankuppam Government School, Pondicherry.  It was an  arranged  marriage  and<br \/>\nthe  couple  were  living separately, just opposite to the house of Vasanthi&#8217;s<br \/>\nparents, the two houses being divided by a 20&#8242; wide road.  The respondent used<br \/>\nto collect all the salary of Vasanthi and used to be very strict  in  allowing<br \/>\nher  to  spend her money and he was in the habit of suspecting the fidelity of<br \/>\nVasanthi whenever she used to talk with a male person.  Because of this, there<br \/>\nused to be frequent quarrels between the couple.  Some time in July 1992,  two<br \/>\nmonths  prior  to the death of Vasanthi, she is said to have complained to her<br \/>\nparents that she could not live with the respondent any longer  and  that  she<br \/>\nhad  an apprehension that if she continued to live with him, he will kill her.<br \/>\nHowever, her parents persuaded her to adjust with  him  since  she  had  three<br \/>\nyounger  sisters  yet  to  be  married  and  thereafter,  she went back to her<br \/>\nhusband&#8217;s house.  Just 1 5 days prior  to  her  death,  there  was  a  quarrel<br \/>\nbetween  the  couple  in  connection  with  the  ear-boring  ceremony of their<br \/>\nchildren.  While the respondent wanted to spend  lavishly  and  celebrate  the<br \/>\nceremony  along  with  the  ear-boring  ceremony of his brother&#8217; children, for<br \/>\nwhich the deceased did not agree, but wanted a function as simple as  possible<br \/>\nwithout much expenditure.  The ear-boring ceremony was fixed on 1.6.1 99 2.\n<\/p>\n<p>                4.   While  so, on Friday, the 29th of May 1992, Vasanthi came<br \/>\nto her parents&#8217; house with her daughter and six months old son  and  took  her<br \/>\nbreakfast.  Thereafter,  she  went  back to her husband&#8217;s house.  The girl was<br \/>\ntaken to her school by Vasanthi&#8217;s sister.  After she left her parents&#8217;  house,<br \/>\nVasanthi&#8217;s father  took  his  wife,  i.e.  Vasanthi&#8217;s mother to the Government<br \/>\nHospital, Pondicherry for some treatment.  At about 9.10  am,  when  the  baby<br \/>\nstarted  crying,  Vasanthi&#8217;s younger sister Chitra took the child, went to her<br \/>\nsister&#8217;s house which was opposite to their house, left the child  there  after<br \/>\ninforming about the same to her sister Vasanthi.\n<\/p>\n<p>                5.   At  about 9.25 am on 29.5.1992, the brother and sister of<br \/>\nVasanthi heard her screams.  Immediately, they went to their sister&#8217;  s  house<br \/>\nand  found the respondent jumping and coming out from the bathroom without any<br \/>\nclothes on his body.  It was noticed that he had suffered burn injuries.   The<br \/>\nrespondent  is  said to have requested P.W.1, the brother of Vasanthi, who had<br \/>\ncome  there  upon  hearing  the  screams  of  her  sister,  to  call  for   an<br \/>\nauto-rickshaw.   P.W.1  took  up  the  baby  and handed him over to his sister<br \/>\nChitra and requested Narayanan, their neighbour  to  fetch  an  auto-rickshaw.<br \/>\nWhen the auto came, the accused got into it along with P.W.6, who was asked to<br \/>\naccompany him.  He went to the Jawaharlal Nehru Institute of Medical Education<br \/>\nand Research, Pondicherry, and as per Ex.P.13, he was attended upon at 9.45 am<br \/>\nfor  the  burn injuries alleged to have been sustained by him while lighting a<br \/>\nstove at 9.30 am at his house.  As per Ex.P.14, the  Medico-Legal  Examination<br \/>\nReport, the respondent was having pain and burn injuries all over his body and<br \/>\nhe was conscious and oriented.  He had no LOC\/ Vomitting\/Convulsions.\n<\/p>\n<p>                6.   Coming  back  to  the  scene  of  occurrence,  as per the<br \/>\nprosecution case, P.W.1, the brother of Vasanthi,  P.Ws.3  and  4,  Vasanthi&#8217;s<br \/>\nsisters as well as P.W.5, their neighbour, heard Vasanthi&#8217;s cries that she was<br \/>\nburning and  found  that she was burning inside the bathroom.  As the bathroom<br \/>\ndoor was bolted from inside, they broke open the door with a crow-bar.    They<br \/>\ncovered her  with  gunny  bags  and put off the fire.  She was conscious while<br \/>\nbeing lifted from the bathroom.  When P.W.1 asked her what had  happened,  she<br \/>\nhad  told  that  &#8220;Mama&#8221;  &#8211;  husband  (  accused\/respondent) beat and burnt her<br \/>\npouring kerosene oil.  They brought her to the hall and she breathed her  last<br \/>\nthere.   A fresh injury was noticed on the forehead of Vasanthi just above her<br \/>\nleft eye on the face and her body was completely burnt.\n<\/p>\n<p>                7.  At about 9.30 am, one Premila, a  neighbour,  is  said  to<br \/>\nhave  informed  the  Control  Room,  Pondicherry to the effect that a lady was<br \/>\nburnt and was lying  in  the  house  at  No.95,  Subbayya  Nagar.    The  said<br \/>\ninformation  was  recorded  by  P.W.10, the Assistant Sub Inspector who was on<br \/>\nduty at that time.  The information was passed on by wireless to  the  D.Nagar<br \/>\nPolice Station.    The  Sub  Inspector  of  Police  from the Station House, in<br \/>\nreceipt of the information, left the police station with a police party to the<br \/>\nplace of occurrence and obtained a complaint, Ex.P.1 from P.W.1.   Thereafter,<br \/>\nhe  returned to the station and the said complaint was registered as Complaint<br \/>\nNo.123 of 1992 under Section 302 I.P.C.   Ex.P.11  is  the  First  Information<br \/>\nReport,  which  was  registered  at  11.10 am on 29.5.1992 against the accused<br \/>\nunder Section 302 I.P.C.  that on 29.5.1992 at 0920 hours at  No.95,  Subbayya<br \/>\nNagar,  Pondicherry,  the accused committed the murder of his wife Vasanthi by<br \/>\nconfining her inside the bathroom and set fire on her by pouring  kerosene  on<br \/>\nher due  to  family  dispute.    P.W.14,  the  Inspector of Police started the<br \/>\ninvestigation at 11.00 am and prepared the observation magazar.\n<\/p>\n<p>                8.  Charges were framed against the  accused  dated  17.9.1993<br \/>\nunder Section 302 I.P.C.  and he was put on trial.\n<\/p>\n<p>                9.  Fourteen  witnesses  were  examined.   P.Ws.1 to 6 are the<br \/>\nprosecution witnesses who speak about the occurrence.  P.Ws.7  to  9  are  the<br \/>\nwitnesses for identifying the statements given by P.Ws.1 and 2.  P.W.10 is the<br \/>\nAssistant Sub Inspector working in the Control Room on 29.5 .19 92.  P.W.11 is<br \/>\nthe Police Photographer.  P.W.12 is the Junior Specialist in the Department of<br \/>\nForensic Science and Medicine.  P.W.1 3 is the Sub Inspector of Police who got<br \/>\nthe complaint and registered the F.I.R.  P.W.14 is the Inspector of Police who<br \/>\nconducted the investigation.\n<\/p>\n<p>                10.   Of  these,  P.W.1, the brother of Vasanthi and P.Ws.3, 4<br \/>\nand 5 are eye-witnesses.  P.W.2 is the father of the deceased.  P.W.6 is their<br \/>\nneighbour who accompanied the respondent to the hospital.\n<\/p>\n<p>                11.  The learned Sessions Judge, after  considering  the  oral<br \/>\nand  documentary  evidence,  found that there were different versions given by<br \/>\nthe prosecution witnesses and that the evidence of P.W.5 did not  support  the<br \/>\ncase  of the prosecution regarding the utterances of the deceased and that the<br \/>\ndeceased was not in a fit condition to speak and that the medical report  does<br \/>\nnot support the case of the prosecution and that the conduct of the respondent<br \/>\ncannot  be taken advantage of since he was in a disturbed state of mind as his<br \/>\nwife was burning and that there was no sufficient motive to support  the  case<br \/>\nof the  prosecution.   The learned Judge chose to give the benefit of doubt to<br \/>\nthe accused and hence acquitted him of the charges framed against him.\n<\/p>\n<p>                12.  The learned  Additional  Public  Prosecutor,  Pondicherry<br \/>\nassailed the  order  of  the  Sessions Judge on several grounds.  According to<br \/>\nhim, there is clear evidence, both direct and circumstantial  with  sufficient<br \/>\nmotive to prove that the respondent has committed the heinous crime of burning<br \/>\nhis own  wife.  He further submits that the learned Judge has made much out of<br \/>\nthe minor contradictions without appreciating the core  of  the  case  of  the<br \/>\nprosecution.   According  to  him,  the  learned  Judge failed to see that the<br \/>\ntheory of suicide is totally ruled out in this case, and  in  the  absence  of<br \/>\nacceptable  explanation  for  the injuries found on the body of the respondent<br \/>\nand the defence statement  of  the  respondent  himself,  the  action  of  the<br \/>\nrespondent in committing the murder is established beyond any shadow of doubt.\n<\/p>\n<p>                13.   Learned  Additional  Public Prosecutor further submitted<br \/>\nthat the conduct of the accused in climbing over the wall and jumping  out  of<br \/>\nthe  bathroom,  wherein  admittedly the deceased was burning and then, leaving<br \/>\nthe place without informing any one about the position of the deceased at that<br \/>\ntime is totally inconsistent with his plea of innocence and it  is  consistent<br \/>\nwith the  proof  of  his  guilt.  The learned Sessions Judge, according to the<br \/>\nAdditional Public Prosecutor, has failed to see that the only  inference  that<br \/>\ncould  be  drawn  in  this case is that the accused is responsible for causing<br \/>\ninjury on the head of the deceased, pouring kerosene and burning her and  also<br \/>\nmaking good  his  escape from the scene of occurrence.  He also submitted that<br \/>\nthe decisions referred to in the judgment of  the  Sessions  Judge  cannot  be<br \/>\napplied in  favour  of  the  respondent.   He contended that the learned Judge<br \/>\nmisapplied and wrongly interpreted the medical  evidence  in  support  of  the<br \/>\nrespondent.    He,   therefore,   prayed   that   justice   be  done  and  the<br \/>\naccused\/respondent be found guilty of murder and given  the  maximum  sentence<br \/>\nfor the serious offence against his own helpless wife.\n<\/p>\n<p>                14.  The learned  counsel  Mr.    A.  Padmanabhan appearing on<br \/>\nbehalf of the respondent strenuously pleaded that if two views  are  possible,<br \/>\nthe  court  should  lean  towards the accused and give the benefit of doubt to<br \/>\nhim.  According to him, the respondent had clearly set out his defence in  his<br \/>\nwritten  statement  and  pleaded  that  in  the  facts  and circumstances, the<br \/>\ndeceased had committed suicide and that the court has rightly found it  to  be<br \/>\nso.\n<\/p>\n<p>                15.   According to the learned counsel, there is a discrepancy<br \/>\nwith regard to the time of registration of  the  F.I.R.    and  the  delay  in<br \/>\nforwarding the  same  to  the  Magistrate  Court.  He had also highlighted the<br \/>\ndifferent versions of P.W.4 in reference to the reporting of the incident  and<br \/>\nthe  nature  of burn injuries suffered by the respondent to the extent of 60%.<br \/>\nHe submits that the medical evidence falsifies the oral evidence.    According<br \/>\nto him, all the eye-witnesses are very closely related to the deceased, namely<br \/>\nbrother  and  sisters and hence, their evidence is unbelievable and is clouded<br \/>\nby a feeling of revenge against the respondent.  He further submits  that  the<br \/>\ndying  declaration  of the deceased is not corroborated by any other evidence.<br \/>\nHe strongly relies on the decisions of the Supreme Court  in  support  of  his<br \/>\ncontention that if two views are possible, the court must adopt and accept the<br \/>\nopinion in support of the accused.  He also emphasises that the finding of the<br \/>\ntrial court, which had the advantage of seeing the demeanour of the witnesses,<br \/>\nshould not be lightly disturbed by the appellate court.\n<\/p>\n<p>                16.   We  have  heard the learned Additional Public Prosecutor<br \/>\nfor the State and the learned counsel for the respondent  and  considered  the<br \/>\nmatter carefully.\n<\/p>\n<p>                17.  After going through the records and the evidence, we find<br \/>\nthat  we  have the advantage of the evidence of eye-witnesses, the medicolegal<br \/>\nexamination report as well as the defence statement of the respondent in order<br \/>\nto come to a clear conclusion.  Of course, this will be subject  to  the  test<br \/>\nand scrutiny of the oral and documentary evidence in accordance with law.\n<\/p>\n<p>                18.  MOTIVE :\n<\/p>\n<p>                The deceased was married to the respondent on 5.9.1988 and has<br \/>\ngot two  children  out  of their wedlock.  Their marital life was not happy as<br \/>\nper the evidence of both the prosecution witnesses  as  well  as  the  defence<br \/>\nstatement of  the  respondent.  to the prosecution, the appellant has a motive<br \/>\nto murder her, whereas the defence  attribute  a  motive  for  her  to  commit<br \/>\nsuicide.   According  to  the  written statement filed by the respondent under<br \/>\nSection 313 readwith Section 233(2 ) of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure,  the<br \/>\ndeceased did  not  like his parents and his support to them.  She did not like<br \/>\nthe ear-boring ceremony of their  children  being  conducted  along  with  his<br \/>\nbrother&#8217;s children.    According  to him, the deceased was an egocentric woman<br \/>\nwith a stubborn character.  Whereas, according to the  prosecution  witnesses,<br \/>\nthe  respondent  did  not allow the deceased to spend her money and she had to<br \/>\ngive all her salary to the respondent and the respondent was  also  suspecting<br \/>\nher fidelity  whenever  she talked to male members.  The prosecution witnesses<br \/>\nalso speak of her coming back to her parents&#8217; house two months  prior  to  the<br \/>\noccurrence,  complaining  that she could not live with the respondent any more<br \/>\nand that if she continued to do so, the respondent would kill her.    However,<br \/>\nit  was  only  after  the persuasion of the parents of the deceased that since<br \/>\nthree younger sisters were in their house yet  to  be  married  and  on  their<br \/>\nadvice to adjust with the respondent, she went back to the respondent&#8217;s house.<br \/>\nEven  15  days prior to the occurrence, there was a quarrel between the couple<br \/>\nwith reference to the ear-boring ceremony of their children.  According to the<br \/>\nprosecution case, the respondent wanted to spend lavishly  for  that  ceremony<br \/>\nand  wanted  it  to  be conducted along with his brother&#8217;s children, which the<br \/>\ndeceased objected to.  Insofar as the last part of this difference of  opinion<br \/>\nis  concerned,  there  is no controversy, since the respondent, in his written<br \/>\nstatement, has also admitted the same.\n<\/p>\n<p>                19.  The fact that the deceased was not having a happy married<br \/>\nlife has been spoken to by P.W.1, her brother and P.W.2, her father, who  have<br \/>\nstated  that  there  were  frequent  quarrels  between  the  deceased  and the<br \/>\nrespondent in reference to his spending the money on his  family  members  and<br \/>\nthat  the  respondent  used  to assault the deceased whenever such differences<br \/>\narose between them.  P.W.3 also speaks of the deceased coming to  their  house<br \/>\ntwo  months  earlier with a suitcase, stating that she would not live with the<br \/>\nrespondent any more as he used to beat her frequently and that  her  life  was<br \/>\nnot safe  in  his  hands.  She, however, heeded to her parents&#8217; advice to bear<br \/>\nwith the  respondent  since  her  younger  sisters  had  to  get  married  and<br \/>\nthereafter, she went back.  P.W.4, another sister, also speaks of the frequent<br \/>\nquarrels and the difference of opinion between the couple.  She also says that<br \/>\ntwo  months  prior  to her death, the deceased came away to their house with a<br \/>\ndetermination not to join her husband.  It was only their parents who  advised<br \/>\nher to  go  back  to  his house as her other sisters had to get married.  Once<br \/>\nagain, a fortnight before her death, there was a misunderstanding between them<br \/>\nin connection with the ear-boring ceremony of their kids.  Ex.P.1,  complaint,<br \/>\nwhich  was  given  by  P.W.1, also mentions about the fact that the respondent<br \/>\nused to be very strict in the handling of the salary money of the deceased and<br \/>\nthat two months prior to  the  occurrence,  the  deceased  came  away  to  her<br \/>\nparents&#8217;  house with a bag and luggage and that the parents had counselled her<br \/>\nand sent her back on the same day to the respondent&#8217;s house.    The  complaint<br \/>\nalso  refers  to  the  quarrel  between  the  deceased  and  the respondent in<br \/>\nreference to the ear-boring ceremony on 28.5.1992.\n<\/p>\n<p>                20.  Though P.Ws.1 to 4 are closely related, their evidence is<br \/>\nclear and categorical  in  reference  to  the  frequent  quarrel  between  the<br \/>\ndeceased and the respondent, the beating and the ill treatment received by the<br \/>\ndeceased at the hands of the respondent which compelled her to leave his house<br \/>\nand  come  to her matrimonial home permanently and as to the persuasion of her<br \/>\nparents to adjust and live with the respondent.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  the<br \/>\ndeceased  had  told them, which is spoken to by P.Ws.1 to 4 consistently, that<br \/>\nif she goes back, her life will not be safe in the hands  of  the  respondent.<br \/>\nThe  complaint,  which  was  given immediately thereafter, also speaks of this<br \/>\nquarrel.  The written statement also admits about the  serious  difference  in<br \/>\nreference  to  the  ear-boring ceremony and also says that the deceased was an<br \/>\negocentric woman with stubborn qualities.    The  facts  that  the  respondent<br \/>\nsuspected  her  fidelity, as this happened during a holiday tour and that from<br \/>\nthen onwards, the respondent did not like her talking to any  male  or  female<br \/>\npersons, has been spoken to by P.W.2, the father of the deceased; P.W.1, P.W.3<br \/>\nand  P.W.4 also speak about the dislike of the deceased towards the respondent<br \/>\nand of the facts that he did not like  the  deceased  spending  even  her  own<br \/>\nsalary  and  that  he  beat her and often quarreled with her on these accounts<br \/>\nhave been clearly spoken to by them and we find that their evidence  is  true.<br \/>\nThere is evidence to the fact that the deceased apprehended danger to her life<br \/>\nand  hence  she  came  away with her bag and luggage to her parents&#8217; house and<br \/>\nthat she was compelled by her parents to go back to her house.  We  find  that<br \/>\nthere were admittedly, frequent quarrels and the respondent had been strict on<br \/>\nthe  deceased  spending  her salaries and suspecting her fidelity, and a stage<br \/>\nreached when the deceased felt unsafe to live with him  and  hence  came  away<br \/>\nwith her  bag  for a separation.  This was two months prior to the occurrence.<br \/>\nThe immediate quarrel started over the ear-boring  ceremony,  as  admitted  by<br \/>\nboth.   There  was a refusal on the part of the deceased to participate in the<br \/>\nceremony with the respondent&#8217;s relatives and her insistence  was  to  make  it<br \/>\nsimple affair.    If the deceased were not to go in for the ceremony scheduled<br \/>\nto be held on 1.6.1992, the respondent was bound to suffer.   He  admits  that<br \/>\nthe deceased  was  stubborn and egocentric.  This is what is stated in Ex.P.1,<br \/>\nthe complaint given by P.W.1 :\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;vd; khkh FL:k;g jfuhW fhuzkhf mf;fh  tre;jpia  gyte;jkhf  ghj;UKf;Fs;<br \/>\njs;sp\/  cs;gf;fkhf  jhHpl;L\/  mf;fhit  jhf;fpa[k;\/ mts; nky; kz;bzz;bza; Cj;jp<br \/>\njPitj;Js;shh;.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>In these circumstances, the contention  that  there  was  no  motive  for  the<br \/>\nrespondent  to  do  away  with  the  deceased or that they were living happily<br \/>\ncannot be accepted.\n<\/p>\n<p>                21.  OCCURRENCE :  The fact that on 29.5.1992  at  about  0920<br \/>\nhours,  the  deceased Vasanthi, the wife of the respondent, was burnt to death<br \/>\nis not in dispute.  But, the question that arises for determination is whether<br \/>\nit was a murder, as contended by the  prosecution  or  a  suicide\/accident  as<br \/>\npleaded by the respondent.\n<\/p>\n<p>                22.   To  rule  out  the possibility of suicide, the following<br \/>\ncircumstances are relevant.  Firstly, the deceased had gone to  the  house  of<br \/>\nher  parents  just  across  the  street at 8.30 am on 29.5.1992 along with her<br \/>\nchildren and took breakfast there.  At that time, P.W.2, her father, told  her<br \/>\nthat he was going to take her mother to the Government Hospital, for which the<br \/>\ndeceased  is said to have replied that she was to attend her second shift duty<br \/>\nand wanted her parents to come back quickly in order to leave  her  baby  with<br \/>\nthem.   Vasanth  Kumar,  another  brother of the deceased (not examined), took<br \/>\nSowmiya, the first daughter  of  the  deceased  to  the  school,  whereas  the<br \/>\ndeceased  left the baby in her parents&#8217; house and thereafter, she went back to<br \/>\nher house.  After some time, the baby started crying and therefore, P.W.3, the<br \/>\nyounger sister of the deceased, took the child to her sister&#8217;s house and after<br \/>\ninforming her sister, who was in the kitchen, that the  boy  was  crying,  she<br \/>\nleft him in the house and went back to their house.  According to her, she was<br \/>\nalso observing  whether  her  sister takes care of the child.  Within minutes,<br \/>\nshe saw the respondent taking the child and therefore, she came back to  their<br \/>\nhouse.  This  was  at  9  am.    Therefore,  if  there was any problem for the<br \/>\ndeceased at that time, she had the full opportunity to tell the  same  to  her<br \/>\nparents  and  her  brother and sisters who were available at the house at that<br \/>\ntime.  On the other hand, she has informed her  father  that  she  was  having<br \/>\nsecond shift  duty and had requested them to come back early.  Even though the<br \/>\nrespondent has  stated,  on  his  being  questioned,  that  the  deceased  had<br \/>\nattempted  to  commit  suicide  on  earlier  occasions, there is absolutely no<br \/>\nevidence in support of that claim.\n<\/p>\n<p>                23.  Secondly, apart from this oral evidence, it could be seen<br \/>\nthat the bathroom, where the deceased is said to have been burnt, is  said  to<br \/>\nbe a small cramped room measuring 4&#8217;1&#8243; x 4&#8217;1&#8243; with a low wall of 4<\/p>\n<p>&#8216; height.   The bathroom is accessible to anybody to jump over the 4&#8242; wall and<br \/>\na person can observe easily as to  what  is  happening  inside  the  bathroom.<br \/>\nThirdly, there are two rooms in the respondent&#8217;s house, namely a bedroom and a<br \/>\nreading  room,  of  which  the bedroom is available without any disturbance or<br \/>\naccess from outside.  Fourthly, the child aged six  months  was  left  in  the<br \/>\nrespondent&#8217;s  house  and  the  deceased had the opportunity to leave the child<br \/>\nsafely in her parents&#8217; house, but she did not do so.   Fifthly,  she  was  not<br \/>\nalone  in the house so as to attempt a suicide as any of her attempts could be<br \/>\nthwarted.\n<\/p>\n<p>                24.  Sixthly, P.W.12, Doctor R.  Balaraman, Junior  Specialist<br \/>\nof  Forensic Medicine, has stated in his chief-examination, &#8220;If a person pours<br \/>\nkerosene by himself or herself on head, it would spread over the  back  also&#8221;.<br \/>\nEx.P.8,   the   Post-   Mortem   Examination   Report  says  that  there  were<br \/>\nepidermo-dermal burns present all over  the  body  excepting  back  of  chest,<br \/>\nabdomen and  right  foot.    Seventhly, the observation magazar, Ex.A.2 states<br \/>\nabout the finding of 18 burnt match sticks, two unburnt  match  sticks  and  a<br \/>\nburnt match  box.   The preliminary particulars of the deceased as recorded in<br \/>\nEx.P.7 by the Inspector of Police found, on the body of  the  deceased,  above<br \/>\nthe  left eye-brow, an incised wound and in Column No.3, it is stated that the<br \/>\nsaid injury appears to have been caused by a sharp weapon.    The  Post-Mortem<br \/>\nCertificate  also  says  that there is a lacerated injury 2.5 x 1 cm bone deep<br \/>\npresent over the forehead on left side.  The doctor, in  his  chiefexamination<br \/>\nsays, &#8220;lacerated injury found on the left forehead of the deceased was fresh&#8221;.<br \/>\nOf  course,  he says in the cross-examination that the lacerated injury on the<br \/>\nleft forehead would have been caused by coming  into  contact  with  any  hard<br \/>\nobject.  He further says that if intense is applied, cracks and fissures occur<br \/>\non the  skin  and  that  they  may resemble incised or lacerated injuries.  In<br \/>\nEx.A.7, the requisition to conduct the post-mortem addressed to  the  Resident<br \/>\nMedical  Officer  in  reference  to  the body of the deceased, it is stated as<br \/>\nfollows :\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Column No.2 :\n<\/p>\n<p>        Injuries found on the body &#8211;\n<\/p>\n<p>        (1) A lacerated injury on the left side of      the head over the left<br \/>\neye-brow.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (2) The body was found charred.\n<\/p>\n<p>Column No.3 :\n<\/p>\n<p>        Type of weapons that would have been used<br \/>\nfor causing the injury &#8211;\n<\/p>\n<p>        (1) Sharp weapon appears to have been used.     (2) Burn injuries.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>From the records and the evidence, it is clear that the lacerated injury 2.5 x<br \/>\n1 cm is bone deep and that the injury could not  have  been  a  self-inflicted<br \/>\ninjury and hence, the suggestion that this could have been caused by the burns<br \/>\nis not  probable.    When  the  deceased  is found charred, why this lacerated<br \/>\ninjury alone should result out of the burns is not explained.\n<\/p>\n<p>                25.  None of the prosecution witnesses namely the father,  the<br \/>\nbrother and the sisters of the deceased speak of her possibility of committing<br \/>\nsuicide.   The  defence  statement  says  that &#8220;Vasanthi should have committed<br \/>\nsuicide for reasons best known to her&#8221;.  There is no immediate statement  made<br \/>\nprior to  this  incident  by the deceased as per the defence statement.  There<br \/>\nshould have been some wordy quarrel etc.    between  the  respondent  and  the<br \/>\ndeceased which  was  preceded  by  the incident.  The defence statement admits<br \/>\nthat she was of a stubborn  character.    From  the  evidence  available,  the<br \/>\ncircumstances  of  this case and the material objects found, we are clearly of<br \/>\nthe view that there is no scope for the suicide theory and that this cannot be<br \/>\na case of suicide.\n<\/p>\n<p>                26.  Apart from the circumstantial and oral evidence, we  have<br \/>\ngot  the  answers  of  the respondent given to the questions put to him by the<br \/>\nCourt under Section 313 Cr.P.C.   and  his  defence  statement  under  Section<br \/>\n233(2) Cr.P.C.    The questions and the answers are extracted below for better<br \/>\nappreciation :-\n<\/p>\n<p>Q.  No.11 :  He (P.W.1) added that at about 9.25 am, he heard the  screams  of<br \/>\nhis  deceased sister and immediately he came to your house and when he entered<br \/>\nyour house, he noticed you jumping and coming out from bath room and  was  not<br \/>\nwearing  any  clothes,  and on your chest and body, there were burnt injuries.<br \/>\nWhat do you say ?\n<\/p>\n<p>Ans.:  On hearing the cries of my wife, I attempted to  save  her  by  jumping<br \/>\ninto  the  bath room as it was locked and since could not do so, I came out of<br \/>\nit by jumping.  In the process I sustained grievous injuries.\n<\/p>\n<p>Q.  No.12:  He added that on seeing you he asked  the  reason  for  sustaining<br \/>\ninjuries  and you asked him to call an autorickshaw and he asked his neighbour<br \/>\nNarayanan to bring an auto, auto came and on seeing the auto, you got into  it<br \/>\nand left the place.  What do you say ?\n<\/p>\n<p>Ans.:  I told him what had happened.  (Not Clear) &#8230;..\n<\/p>\n<p>I took the auto to the hospital, along with a person sent by him.\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;..\n<\/p>\n<p>Q.  No.15:    He added that they placed gunny bags on the body of the deceased<br \/>\nand put off the fire, lifted the body and asked her  what  had  happened,  for<br \/>\nwhich  the  deceased replied that you beat and burnt her pouring kerosene oil.<br \/>\nWhat do you say ?\n<\/p>\n<p>Ans.:  I do not know whether she was alive or not.  It  is  not  true  that  I<br \/>\npoured kerosene and set her fire.\n<\/p>\n<p>Q.  No.16  :   He added that at that time, his sisters Subathira and Kanimozhi<br \/>\nwere following with the body and when they brought the deceased  to  the  hall<br \/>\nshe lost her breath.  What do you say ?\n<\/p>\n<p>Ans.:  I do not know whether she was alive.\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;..\n<\/p>\n<p>For Q.  No.28, the accused has stated that she has committed suicide.\n<\/p>\n<p>Q.  No.35  :    She  (P.W.3) added that immediately, she and her sister ran to<br \/>\nyour house and noticed that you had burnt injuries and  P.W.1  rushed  out  to<br \/>\nfetch  an  auto  and  when  the auto came, you got into it and left the place.<br \/>\nWhat do you say ?\n<\/p>\n<p>Ans.:  It is true.  I told what had happened.\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;..\n<\/p>\n<p>Q.  No.82 :  Have you got anything to say in this case ?\n<\/p>\n<p>Ans.:  My deceased wife earlier attempted to  commit  suicide.    (Not  Clear)<br \/>\n&#8230;..  She  got that tendency.  On the date of crime, I came to know about her<br \/>\nburning only when I heard her screams noticed.  I jumped into the bath room to<br \/>\nsave her.  When I could not do so and since I was burnt and unable to open the<br \/>\nbath room door, I jumped out of the room on hearing.  I have not committed any<br \/>\ncrime.  I am also filing the written statement and counter both under  Section<br \/>\n313 Cr.P.C.  read with 233(2) Cr.P.C.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>                27.   The relevant portion of the written statement translated<br \/>\nreads as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;On the date of occurrence just prior to 9  or  9.30  am,  the<br \/>\ndeceased  told  me that ear-boring ceremony should not be conducted along with<br \/>\nmy family members.  I did not agree.  I was reading in my reading room.    The<br \/>\nmain door was  kept open.  Suddenly I heard groaning sound.  Then itself there<br \/>\nwas a smoke.  I was wearing lungi.  I was putting on  a  turkey  towel  on  my<br \/>\nbody.  There  was  fire  leaping  from the bathroom.  There was full of smoke.<br \/>\nSince the bathroom door was locked from inside, I climbed  over  the  bathroom<br \/>\nwall and  jumped  inside.    First, I tried to open the bathroom door so as to<br \/>\nbring Vasanthi outside.  My left hand  thumb  was  injured  in  that  process.<br \/>\nFurther, the  bathroom was a small place.  Since Vasanthi was lying across the<br \/>\nbathroom over the stove and her head was broken, I suffered burn injuries  and<br \/>\nI could  not  manage,  so I came back by jumping.  I was feeling thirsy and my<br \/>\ntongue was struck and I could not talk.  I showed my hand towards the baby  to<br \/>\nthe public who  came  inside  the house.  I became unconscious.  Somebody from<br \/>\nthe public took an auto and sent me to a hospital.  I was not steady  and  was<br \/>\nin an unconscious state.  The doctor asked me something, I could not talk.\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8230;..   Vasanthi,  for  reasons  known  to herself, should have poured<br \/>\nkerosene from the stove and  committed  suicide.    Or,  while  attempting  to<br \/>\nprepare  hot  water  for  the child, her saree should have caught fire and she<br \/>\nshould have fallen on the stove and got burnt.  I have not poured kerosene  on<br \/>\nher.  The  evidence  of  P.Ws.1, 2, 3 and 4 is false.  Vasanthi could not have<br \/>\ntold the words, &#8220;Mama (myself) beat and burnt me&#8221;.  The witnesses had seen the<br \/>\ndead body only in the bathroom.  They  are  giving  evidence  because  of  the<br \/>\nenmity against me.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>The  case  of  the respondent is that he attempted to save his wife by getting<br \/>\ninto the bathroom and on his failure and on  his  getting  burn  injuries,  he<br \/>\njumped over the bathroom wall and came out and went into the hospital with the<br \/>\nassistance in  an unconscious state.  Even before the doctor, he could not say<br \/>\nanything.\n<\/p>\n<p>                28.  The above stand of the respondent is clearly falsified by<br \/>\nthe following evidence.  Admittedly, the respondent was seen jumping over  the<br \/>\nbathroom  wall  by all the witnesses namely P.Ws.1, 3 and 4 and it is admitted<br \/>\nby the respondent himself that he jumped over the bathroom wall and came  out.<br \/>\nIt  is  the  further case of the prosecution witnesses that he was not wearing<br \/>\nany cloth on his body at that time.  This was clearly spoken to  by  P.W.1  in<br \/>\nhis evidence  as well in his complaint to the police.  The observation magazar<br \/>\nEx.A.2 also says that there was a burnt kaili  inside.    For  question  no.11<br \/>\nunder  Section  313  Cr.P.C.,  the  respondent  has not disputed as to his not<br \/>\nwearing any cloth while jumping out the bathroom.\n<\/p>\n<p>                29.  It is further seen from the evidence that the  respondent<br \/>\nanswered  to  question  no.12  that he had told P.W.1 as to what had happened.<br \/>\nFor question no.35 that he came out, got into the  auto  and  left  the  place<br \/>\nwithout telling anything, his answer was that he had told what had happened.\n<\/p>\n<p>                30.   Ex.P.14,  the  Medico-Legal  Examination  Report  of the<br \/>\nrespondent states as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>        Name &#8211; and found the following :   &#8220;Alleged  to  have  sustained  burn<br \/>\ninjuries  while  lighting  a  stove  at 9.30 am on 29.5.1992 at his house.&#8221; In<br \/>\nreference to the column detailed &#8216;description of injuries  etc.&#8217;,  the  doctor<br \/>\nhas stated as  follows  :    &#8220;C\/O  pain  and  burning  all over body.  No H\/O,<br \/>\nLOC\/Vomitting\/Convulsions.  Conscious oriented.  Pulse 96\/ minute REG.   BP  =<br \/>\n160\/110 mm.    The injuries suffered shown in the column is 1% on neck, 18% on<br \/>\nthe chest, 2% on the right fore arm, 4% on the left fore arm and totally 6% on<br \/>\nboth the legs.  Some totalling 38 % burn injuries.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>This statement recorded by the doctor falsifies the  case  of  the  respondent<br \/>\nthat  he  went  to  the  rescue  of his burning wife and jumped out due to his<br \/>\ninability to help her.  The admitted statement said to have been made  by  him<br \/>\nafter  coming  out,  that  he had told the people what had happened, cannot be<br \/>\ntrue.  If he had told so, the reaction of P.W.1  and  others  gathered  there,<br \/>\nwould  have  been  to  save  Vasanthi  and  give  first aid to the respondent.<br \/>\nTherefore, the  written  statement  of  the  respondent  that  he  was  in  an<br \/>\nunconscious state after climbing over the bathroom wall and that he was not in<br \/>\na position  to  talk  to anybody is clearly a false statement.  On his own, he<br \/>\nhas stated that he had told what had happened and that  he  was  found  to  be<br \/>\nconscious  and  oriented and was able to tell the doctor that he had sustained<br \/>\nthe injuries while lighting a stove at  his  house.    Considering  the  clear<br \/>\nmedical  examination  report  with  the thumb impression of the respondent, he<br \/>\ncannot dispute that he did not say anything to the doctor.    P.W.6,  who  had<br \/>\naccompanied  the  respondent  to the hospital, had stated that when the doctor<br \/>\nasked the respondent how he sustained the injuries, he had replied that due to<br \/>\nthe  bursting  of  the  kerosene  stove,  he  had  sustained   the   injuries.<br \/>\nThereafter, the  doctor  had  asked him to get a O.P.  Chit in the name of the<br \/>\naccused and he went and brought the O.P.  Chit and gave it to the  doctor  and<br \/>\nafter leaving  the  respondent  there, he left the place.  In the statement of<br \/>\nP.W.6 in the crossexamination, his statement that he did not remember  whether<br \/>\nthe  accused  gave  his  answer  to the doctor in English or in Tamil does not<br \/>\nmaterially affect the answer of the respondent since he was  accompanying  the<br \/>\nrespondent  for the purpose of admitting him in the hospital and the statement<br \/>\ncould have been only by the respondent himself.  There is nothing  to  suspect<br \/>\nthe  entries  made by the doctor as the respondent was fully conscious as seen<br \/>\nfrom the facts and circumstances of the case.\n<\/p>\n<p>                31.  The stand of the respondent  that  though  his  wife  was<br \/>\nburning  inside  the  bathroom, he came out of the bathroom and left the house<br \/>\nwithout uttering a word to all those assembled in the house and  further  that<br \/>\nhe  did  not  help them to save his wife and his further conduct clearly prove<br \/>\nthe guilty mind of the respondent.  The  further  circumstances  available  on<br \/>\nthis aspect are as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                (1)  After  climbing  down the bathroom wall, he ought to have<br \/>\ntaken a cloth to wear and waited for  the  auto  to  arrive  and  should  have<br \/>\ntravelled  for  a  considerable  time  to  reach the hospital and informed the<br \/>\ndoctor as to how he sustained the injuries.  The medical report also says that<br \/>\nhe was conscious and oriented.  Therefore, though  the  respondent  was  fully<br \/>\nconscious,  he did not choose to make any attempt to try to help the people to<br \/>\nget his wife out of the bathroom and to give her the treatment.  The  plea  of<br \/>\n&#8216;unconsciousness&#8217; is made only to get out of this unnatural conduct.\n<\/p>\n<p>                (2)  His  guilty  mind  is  also  further  revealed  from  his<br \/>\nassertion in the answer to the questions put to him by the court under Section<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">313<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Cr.P.C.  For the question that after the fire was put off, when  the  deceased<br \/>\nwas  asked  as  to  what  had  happened,  she is said to have replied that the<br \/>\nrespondent had beaten and burnt  her  pouring  kerosene  oil,  for  which  the<br \/>\nrespondent&#8217;s answer  was,  &#8220;I did not know whether she was alive or not&#8221;.  For<br \/>\nthe next question that the deceased lost her breath  only  in  the  hall,  the<br \/>\nrespondent says,  &#8220;I  do  not  know  whether she was alive&#8221;.  From this, it is<br \/>\nclear that the respondent was sure that his wife was dead in the bathroom  and<br \/>\nthat  should  be  the circumstances which impelled him to reply doubting about<br \/>\nher replies or as to her breathing her last in the hall.\n<\/p>\n<p>                32.  Apart from this, it is seen from the evidence that  there<br \/>\nare 18<\/p>\n<p>burnt  match  sticks found in the middle of the bathroom which only shows that<br \/>\nthese match sticks should have been  used  for  the  purpose  of  burning  the<br \/>\ndeceased.   The  first  reaction  of  the  respondent,  on finding the alleged<br \/>\nattempt of the deceased to commit suicide, is just to shout  across  the  road<br \/>\nfor  help  to  get  the brother and sisters of the deceased; secondly, to find<br \/>\nsome material to stop the burning before jumping into the bathroom.    On  the<br \/>\ncontrary,  he  is  said  to  have  jumped  into the bathroom without informing<br \/>\nanybody, when the front door was kept very much open and when the relatives of<br \/>\nthe deceased were just 20&#8242; across the road, later came out  of  the  bathroom,<br \/>\nleaving his kaili\/cloth in the bathroom, did not say what was happening in the<br \/>\nbathroom and  simply  left  for  the  hospital.    This clearly shows that the<br \/>\nrespondent has deliberately acted to see  that  his  wife  died  out  of  burn<br \/>\ninjuries.   The 18 burnt match sticks, the burning of the front portion of the<br \/>\nbody of the deceased, the deep incised wound on the left  forehead  caused  by<br \/>\neither  a blunt object or a sharp weapon and the burn injuries suffered by the<br \/>\nrespondent himself on both his fore arms, chest as well  his  legs  only  show<br \/>\nthat it quite probable that the deceased was initially hit with a blunt object<br \/>\nor  a  sharp  weapon  and  was taken to the bathroom, laid there on the floor,<br \/>\nkerosene was poured over her and all the match sticks were used  in  order  to<br \/>\nlight  the various parts of her body and after finding the whole body burning,<br \/>\nthe respondent ought to have bolted the door from inside to make it  appear  a<br \/>\nsuicide, climbed  over  the bathroom wall and jumped out.  P.W.1, rushing into<br \/>\nthe house at that moment, seeing the respondent climbing out of  the  bathroom<br \/>\nnaked, should have asked him as to what had happened and that should have been<br \/>\nthe  reason for his not informing P.W.1 or anybody else about the alleged fact<br \/>\nthat Vasanthi was committing  suicide  by  burning  herself  or  that  he  had<br \/>\nsustained  the  injuries on his body while trying to help Vasanthi and his not<br \/>\nmaking any attempt to help others to rescue Vasanthi.  Instead,  he  tried  to<br \/>\nget  out  of  the place by going to the hospital with the help of P.W.1 to get<br \/>\nhimself treated.\n<\/p>\n<p>                33.  Apart from these clear circumstances pointing the  needle<br \/>\nof guilt towards the respondent, there is clear evidence of the oral testimony<br \/>\nof P.Ws.1,  3,  4 and 5.  All of them speak of the deceased uttering the words<br \/>\nbefore she breathed her last that it was &#8220;Mama&#8221; ( accused\/respondent) who  had<br \/>\nbeaten and  burnt  her  pouring  kerosene  oil.   The deceased is said to have<br \/>\nstated so to P.W.1.  P.W.3, the younger sister Chitra, also heard the deceased<br \/>\ntelling that &#8216;Mama&#8217; (accused\/ respondent) poured kerosene oil and set  her  on<br \/>\nfire.   P.W.4,  another sister by name Subathira, also says that she heard the<br \/>\nreply of the deceased that the accused\/respondent beat her, poured kerosene on<br \/>\nher and set her on fire.  P.W.5 is an independent  witness,  their  neighbour,<br \/>\nwho  came  running  after hearing the cries of the sisters of the deceased and<br \/>\nP.W.1.  He helped them to break open the bathroom door,  where  he  found  the<br \/>\ndeceased lying  and  burning.    According to him, himself and P.W.1, with the<br \/>\nhelp of gunny bags, put off the fire and thereafter, both of  them,  with  the<br \/>\nhelp  of  P.W.3,  lifted  the  body and while coming out with the body, at the<br \/>\nentrance, they felt that she was still conscious and P.W.1 asked her what  had<br \/>\nhappened,  for  which  she  is  said  to  have said something and that she was<br \/>\nmurmuring.  P.W.5, who is said to have stated in his statement  under  Section<br \/>\n161  Cr.P.C.,  that  the deceased had stated that it is the respondent who had<br \/>\nbeat her and burnt her pouring kerosene oil,  had  later  gone  back  and  had<br \/>\nstated  that he could not hear anything about what she had stated and that she<br \/>\nwas murmuring.  Therefore, he was treated as a  hostile  witness  and  in  his<br \/>\ncross-examination, he has denied the suggestion that he was disowning the said<br \/>\nstatement in order to help the accused.\n<\/p>\n<p>                34.  It is argued on behalf of the respondent that the medical<br \/>\nevidence  is to the effect that the deceased should have died instantaneously,<br \/>\nas delirium should have set in and hence, there was no possibility for her  to<br \/>\nutter the  words  alleged.  The final opinion of the doctor in the post-mortem<br \/>\nreport as to the cause of the death of the deceased is, &#8220;Died of shock due  to<br \/>\nburns.  Extent  of  burns  80%&#8221;.    The  doctor,  P.W.12,  has  stated  in his<br \/>\nchief-examination that on examination, he found sirngeing of scalp  hair  with<br \/>\nsmell  of kerosene, epidermo dermal burns present all over body except back of<br \/>\nchest and abdomen and right foot with a lacerated injury 2.5 x 1 cm, bone deep<br \/>\npresent over forehead on left side.  According to him, the burns found on  the<br \/>\nbody of the deceased could have been caused within ten minutes to halfan-hour.<br \/>\nIn  the  cross-examination,  he  says that he found Mucosa congested, implying<br \/>\nsuffocation.  This also, according to him, in turn, implies oxygen failing  to<br \/>\nreach the  brain  in  the  required  amount.   He states that the deceased had<br \/>\ninhaled kerosene through smoke and it ought to have reached  the  lungs,  from<br \/>\nthe lungs to the heart and then through other internal organs.  He also states<br \/>\nthat  if  a  person  is set ablaze by sprinkling kerosene, it produces intense<br \/>\nheat.  The intense heat will cause unbearable pain.  Then there will  be  loss<br \/>\nof fluid.    Because  of  the  above  symptoms  and  due  to  unbearable pain,<br \/>\nunconsciousness supervenes preceded by poor respiration and feeble  pulse  and<br \/>\ndrop of blood pressure.  This means in effect &#8216;shock&#8217;.  Shock means a state of<br \/>\nprofound  depression  of the vital processes of the body by reason of burns in<br \/>\nthis case.  Shock implies disorientation.  Disorientation means loss of normal<br \/>\nrelationship to one&#8217;s surrounding with failure to comprehend time,  place  and<br \/>\npeople.  The doctor further says as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;If  death  has  ensued immediately after the burning, death must have<br \/>\nbeen preceded by delirium.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>Taking advantage of this statement  of  the  doctor  that  death  should  have<br \/>\npreceded  by  delirium,  it  is  contended  that what the deceased had uttered<br \/>\nshould not be taken to have a meaning since it was uttered during a period  of<br \/>\ndelirium.  We are unable to agree with the said reasoning and argument.\n<\/p>\n<p>                35.   Modi&#8217;s  Medical  Jurisprudence  and  Toxicology  &#8211;  22nd<br \/>\nEdition, Chapter XI, at page 309, deals with the injuries from burns,  scalds,<br \/>\nlightning or  electricity.    Under the heading &#8216;Classification of Burns&#8217;, the<br \/>\neffects of burns have been spoken to.  Under the heading  &#8216;  Extent  of  Total<br \/>\nBody Surface Area&#8217; at page 312, this is what the author states :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;To  estimate  the  amount of area affected by second or third<br \/>\ndegree burns in percentage (modern classification), the body is  divided  into<br \/>\ndifferent areas,  each representing nine per cent.  This is called the rule of<br \/>\nnine.  There is marked fluid loss resulting in shock when over 20 per cent  of<br \/>\nthe body is affected and usually over 50 per cent is fatal.\n<\/p>\n<p>        Under the heading &#8216;Causes of Death&#8217;, this is what is stated :<br \/>\n&#8220;(i) Immediate Causes of Death\n<\/p>\n<p>        (a) Shock  :   Severe pain and marked protein rich loss from extensive<br \/>\nburns which result  in  increased  capillary  permeability,  cause  shock  and<br \/>\nproduce a feeble pulse, pale and cold skin, and hypotension resulting in death<br \/>\ninstantaneously or  within 24 to 48 hours.  In children, it may lead to stupor<br \/>\nand insensibility deepening into come and death due to primary shock within 48<br \/>\nhours.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (b) Suffocation :  Persons removed from houses destroyed by  fire  are<br \/>\noften  found  dead  from  suffocation  due  to the inhalation of smoke, carbon<br \/>\nmonoxide and other irrespirable gases, which are products of combustion.    In<br \/>\nsuch a case, burns found on the body are usually postmortem.  Toxic inhalation<br \/>\nof  combustion  products of synthetic material may aggravate the anoxic effect<br \/>\nproduced by COHb.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>The learned author also says that burns caused by  kerosene  oil  are  usually<br \/>\nvery  severe  and  are  known  from  its  characteristic  odour  and the sooty<br \/>\nblackening of body parts.  The learned author says that a shock may result  in<br \/>\ndeath instantaneously  or  within 24 to 48 hours.  Therefore, the statement of<br \/>\nP.W.12 is taken out of context  in  order  to  support  the  theory  that  the<br \/>\ndeceased would not have uttered anything after the burn injuries.\n<\/p>\n<p>                36.   Gradwohl&#8217;s  Legal  Medicine &#8211; Second Edition, in Chapter<br \/>\nXXI at page 380, under the heading &#8216;burns by fire&#8217;, says that  destruction  of<br \/>\nvictim  by  fire is one of the oldest methods used by murderers to conceal the<br \/>\ncrime and hence, every death  by  burning  where  the  victim  is  found  dead<br \/>\nrequires meticulous  medico-legal  scrutiny.    The  relevant  extract  of the<br \/>\nlearned author is as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;The burns will usually commence lower on  that  side  of  the<br \/>\nlegs immediately  opposite  that part of the garment which first ignited.  The<br \/>\nonly parts of the body spared are usually the lower legs, the inner  sides  of<br \/>\nthe thighs  and the axillae, unless the victim has raised his arms.  Even with<br \/>\nmost extensive burns, some period of survival is  common,  especially  in  the<br \/>\nyoung.  In one case, the driver of a chemical lorry which caught fire survived<br \/>\nfor  24 hours with full thickness skin burns involving his entire body, except<br \/>\nfor the soles of his feet.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>                &#8230;..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>                &#8220;Heat lacerations and any other injury should be recorded.&#8221;<br \/>\n                &#8230;..<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>                &#8220;The presence of fine carbon  particles  in  the  trachea  and<br \/>\nbronchi,  often  intimately  mixed  with mucus, provides indisputable evidence<br \/>\nthat the decedent  had  inhaled  smoke  and  had  thus  been  alive  in  fire.<br \/>\nCarbon-impregnating the mucus may be swallowed and be found in the stomach.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>                37.   HWV  Cox  Medical  Jurisprudence  and  Toxicology &#8211; XVII<br \/>\nEdition at page 545, under the heading &#8216;burns  under  special  circumstances&#8217;,<br \/>\nhas the following to say :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;Both  homicide and suicide by burning is not all the uncommon<br \/>\nand where inflammable fluids such  as  kerosene,  gasoline  or  other  organic<br \/>\nliquids  have  been used, then there may be some obvious signs of trickling of<br \/>\nthe burning fluids over certain parts of the body.  For instance, if a body is<br \/>\nsplashed with kerosene while lying on its back and then  ignited,  then  there<br \/>\nwill  be runs of burning liquid down the sides of the neck, sides of the trunk<br \/>\nbetween the thighs and the other  areas,  especially  where  the  clothing  is<br \/>\nabsent in this area.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>Under the heading &#8216;suicide, accident or homicide, it is stated as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;Whether a death is suicide, accident or homicide is largely a<br \/>\nmatter for  the  police investigation.  As mentioned above, suicide by burning<br \/>\nfluids is not uncommon  and  sometimes,  the  position  of  the  body  may  be<br \/>\ndetermined by the trickling marks of the fluid burns.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>                38.   By  going through the medical report and the authorities<br \/>\non the subject, we find that the  body  of  the  deceased  was  lying  in  the<br \/>\nbathroom  on its back and that there were no burn injuries on the back side of<br \/>\nthe body.  If really the deceased had committed suicide  by  pouring  kerosene<br \/>\nfrom  her  head,  definitely the liquid would have spread both on the front as<br \/>\nwell as on the back side of the body and if really the  deceased  had  ignited<br \/>\nher  body  on  her  own,  the fire would have spread and burns would have been<br \/>\ncaused both the front as well as on the back side  of  the  body.    From  the<br \/>\nposition  in which the body was found, it is clear that kerosene was poured on<br \/>\nthe deceased while the body was lying and it was ignited, as a result of which<br \/>\nthere are no burn injuries on the back side of the  body.    Even  though  the<br \/>\nrespondent  has  attempted  to  put forward the theory that the deceased would<br \/>\nhave died instantaneously and that she would not  have  survived,  it  is  not<br \/>\nsupported  by the medical evidence given in this case or the authorities cited<br \/>\nabove.  On the other hand, it is seen that it  is  the  accused  who,  in  his<br \/>\nresponse to the  question  under Section 313 Cr.P.  C.  as to the statement of<br \/>\nthe deceased that it was the accused who had beaten her,  poured  kerosene  on<br \/>\nher  and burnt her, he has replied that he does not know whether she was alive<br \/>\nor not.\n<\/p>\n<p>                39.  Even P.W.5, who went back  from  his  earlier  statement,<br \/>\nadmits  that  the  deceased  was  conscious  when  she  was brought out of the<br \/>\nbathroom and was murmuring and that she died when she was brought to the hall.<br \/>\nIt is P.W.1, the brother of the deceased, who went first inside  the  bathroom<br \/>\nand  says that he heard his sister crying that she was burning and behind him,<br \/>\ntwo other sisters as well as P.W.5 were there.  P.W.1, P.W.5 and P.W.3  lifted<br \/>\nthe body  and  at  that time, she was conscious.  All the three who lifted the<br \/>\nbody, including P.W.5, admit that she was conscious.  It is  P.W.1  who  asked<br \/>\nthe  deceased  while lifting her as to what had happened and the deceased told<br \/>\nhim  that  the  respondent  beat  and  burnt  her  by  pouring  kerosene  oil.<br \/>\nTherefore, all the three eye-witnesses namely P.Ws.1, 3 and 4 speak clearly as<br \/>\nto the  replies  of  the deceased to P.W.1 to the same effect.  Their evidence<br \/>\nhas not, in any manner, been shattered in the cross-examination.\n<\/p>\n<p>                40.   Though  the  defence  tried  to  say  that  there  is  a<br \/>\ndiscrepancy  with  regard  to the place of the occurrence and the place of the<br \/>\ndeath, we do not find any such discrepancy.  According to P.W.1, the  deceased<br \/>\ndid  not  die in the bathroom and she had given a dying declaration inside the<br \/>\nbathroom before they lifted her.  P.W.1, in this regard, says as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;Only after we lifted my sister and brought her back, I  asked<br \/>\nher what  had  happened.  Inside the bathroom, my deceased sister did not die.<br \/>\nI did state in Ex.P.1 that Vasanthi told that the accused poured kerosene  and<br \/>\nset  her  fire  and that she has stated this inside the bathroom and before we<br \/>\nlifted her, she died and that we brought her dead from the bathroom  and  laid<br \/>\nher in the  hall.    What I have stated in Ex.P.1 is not correct.  I have also<br \/>\ntold in my statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.  that Vasanthi died inside  the<br \/>\nbathroom, i.e.   before we lifted her from the bathroom, she died.  I had also<br \/>\nadded in that statement that we brought the dead body and laid  in  the  hall.<br \/>\nMy statement  to  the police is also not correct.  We did not put our ear near<br \/>\nher mouth as what was telling was audible.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>P.W.3, the sister of the deceased says as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;Since they were not able to enter into the bathroom, standing<br \/>\noutside, my brother and Narayanan placed some gunny bags on the  body  to  put<br \/>\noff the  fire.    At  that  time,  my other sisters were also standing nearby.<br \/>\nLater, my brother and Narayanan lifted  my  sister  and  asked  her  what  had<br \/>\nhappened, for which she replied that Mama beat her, poured kerosene on her and<br \/>\nset her on  fire.    I  also  helped them in lifting the body.  Thereafter, we<br \/>\ncarried her to the hall and made her to lie on  the  ground.    She  lost  her<br \/>\nbreath.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>She  has  denied the suggestion in the cross-examination that she had told the<br \/>\npolice that as soon as the deceased informed them about the incident, she died<br \/>\nand that they brought only the dead body to the hall.  She has also denied the<br \/>\nsuggestion that in order to take revenge against the accused, she was deposing<br \/>\nfalsely.  P.W.4 also says the same thing in her cross-examination as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;We noticed that my sister was lying on the floor and burning.<br \/>\nP.  W.1 and Narayanan placed some gunny bags on the body of my sister and  put<br \/>\noff the fire.  She was lying on the stove.  P.W.1 and Narayanan lifted her and<br \/>\nwhile  bringing  her  to  the  hall,  on  enquiry by my brother as to what had<br \/>\nhappened, she replied back that Mama beat her, poured  kerosene  and  set  her<br \/>\nfire.   At  that  time,  myself  and  my  sister  Kanimozhi were also present.<br \/>\nThereafter, we brought my sister to the hall and made her to lie on the floor.<br \/>\nAt that time, she lost her breath.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>In the cross-examination, she says,<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;my sister lost her breath immediately after  replying  to  my<br \/>\nbrother.  I did not know when my deceased sister was brought to the hall.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>From the above, the learned Sessions Judge also found that there are different<br \/>\nversions  given  during  the  cross-examination  and  in  paragraph  44 of his<br \/>\njudgment, he has found as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;Altogether   a   different   version   was    given    during<br \/>\ncross-examination  by  evidencing  that  only  after  lifting the deceased and<br \/>\nbringing her out of the bath room he asked her what  had  happened  and  after<br \/>\nsaying so she died.  Unfortunately, he asserted in his cross-examination, that<br \/>\nwhat  he had stated in Ex.P.1 and before the police are not true and only what<br \/>\nhe evidenced before this court is correct.  Whereas, P.W.3  ,  sister  of  the<br \/>\ndeceased  and  P.W.1  who purported to have present when the deceased declared<br \/>\nthat  the  accused  was  responsible   for   her   death,   deposed   in   her<br \/>\nchief-examination,  that  after carrying the deceased to the hall she last her<br \/>\nbreathe.  During cross-examination, it was her version that the deceased  told<br \/>\nthat  the  accused  was  responsible  for  her  death, only after crossing the<br \/>\nbathroom and not inside the bathroom.  She also disowned her statement  before<br \/>\nthe police  that the deceased said those words inside the bathroom.  The other<br \/>\nsister, P.  W.4 of the deceased and P.W.1, who according to  the  prosecution,<br \/>\nwas present when the maker told that the accused beat, poured kerosene and set<br \/>\nher fire, informed her uncle Mohandoss about it.  In her crossexamination, she<br \/>\nhad  categorically  stated that she did not tell Mohanoss that the accused was<br \/>\nresponsible for the death of her sister.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>In paragraph 62 of the judgment, the learned Judge further says that the  only<br \/>\nindependent  witness  did not endorse the evidence of the interested witnesses<br \/>\nP.Ws.1, 3 and 4 and that apart, the evidence is lacking on  the  part  of  the<br \/>\nprosecution, whether the deceased was in a fit condition to make any statement<br \/>\nas claimed by the prosecution.\n<\/p>\n<p>                41.   Thus,  we find that the learned Sessions Judge proceeded<br \/>\non the basis that in view of the  apparent  inconsistency  between  the  place<br \/>\nwhere  the  deceased  had given her dying declaration and the impossibility of<br \/>\nthe deceased to utter the words as per the medical evidence,  the  prosecution<br \/>\nhas not  established  their  case.  We are to see that the bathroom is a small<br \/>\ncramped place measuring 4&#8217;1&#8243; x 4&#8217;1&#8243; and when  the  deceased  was  burning  and<br \/>\nlying  inside  the  bathroom,  it  would  not  have  been possible for all the<br \/>\nprosecution witnesses to enter the same.  Admittedly, only two of them  namely<br \/>\nP.W.1  and  P.W.5,  Narayanan lifted her and they were taking her and removing<br \/>\nher from the bathroom to the hall and in that process, P.W.1 and P.W.5 had  to<br \/>\nput  off  the  fire  with  the help of gunny bags and thereafter she had to be<br \/>\nlifted from the bathroom, in which P.W.3 also assisted them.  In  the  process<br \/>\nof  lifting her and bringing her out of the bathroom, P.W.1 had asked her what<br \/>\nhad happened.  There is no possibility for P.W.1 to ask the deceased what  had<br \/>\nhappened,  even when she was burning, without first putting of the fire and it<br \/>\nis quite probable that P.W.1 should have first removed her from  the  bathroom<br \/>\nbefore asking her what had happened.  It stands to reason that a brother would<br \/>\nhave  gone  to  the  rescue  of  the deceased sister and to get her out of the<br \/>\nsituation before making enquiries as to the incident.  As a  matter  of  fact,<br \/>\nP.W.1,  not  suspecting the conduct of the respondent, had first tried to help<br \/>\nthe respondent when he climbed out of the bathroom with burn injuries  and  it<br \/>\nwas  he  who  tried to get an auto-rickshaw to enable the respondent to go the<br \/>\nhospital  for  treatment,  thinking  that  he  had  suffered  burn   injuries.<br \/>\nTherefore,  P.W.1,  P.W.3 and P.W.4 could have heard the deceased saying about<br \/>\nthe involvement of the respondent only in the process of  coming  out  of  the<br \/>\nbathroom before  laying her in the hall.  All the witnesses are clear that the<br \/>\ndeceased was conscious at that time and that she had implicated the respondent<br \/>\nin the incident.  As a matter of fact, excepting P.W.5 who went back later  on<br \/>\nhis  statement, the witnesses are clear that the deceased was audible and that<br \/>\nshe had told them as to what had happened.   As  we  have  seen  earlier,  the<br \/>\nmedical  evidence does not support the case of the respondent, as found by the<br \/>\nlearned Sessions Judge.\n<\/p>\n<p>                42.   Yet another infirmity, according to the defence, is that<br \/>\nwhen P.W.4 informed about this incident to her maternal uncle  Mohandoss,  she<br \/>\ndid  not  tell  him  that  the  accused was responsible for the death of their<br \/>\nsister.  P.W.2, the father of the deceased, has stated that he was informed by<br \/>\nhis brother-in-law Mohandoss that his daughter caught fire with  a  stove  and<br \/>\nwas serious.    The argument of the counsel is that if really the deceased had<br \/>\nstated that she was burnt by her husband, P.W.4 would have informed  the  same<br \/>\nto  her  uncle,  who  in  turn,  would have informed this to P.W.2 in the same<br \/>\nmanner.  Instead, what P.  W.4 had informed was that Vasanthi caught fire with<br \/>\nstove and was seriuos.  It is quite natural that when they informed the father<br \/>\nwithout giving a shock about the occurrence, they  would  not  have  told  him<br \/>\nabout the  heinous  nature  of  the  crime.   It is expected of relatives like<br \/>\nMohandoss to inform their close relatives like P.W.2  that  his  daughter  had<br \/>\nsuffered serious  burn injuries because of a fire with a stove.  From this, it<br \/>\ncannot be inferred that the deceased would not have stated about the incident.<br \/>\nP.W.13, the Sub Inspector of  Police  who  visited  the  scene  of  occurrence<br \/>\nimmediately after receipt of the wireless information, has stated that when he<br \/>\nasked  P.W.1  what  had  happened he orally told about the incident and on his<br \/>\nasking, P.W.1 gave a written complaint, Ex.P.1, but did not reveal the time at<br \/>\nwhich it was written.  Both P.W.13 and P.W.14 have denied the suggestion  that<br \/>\nEx.  P.1  was prepared after the arrival of P.W.14 at the scene at 2 pm.  From<br \/>\nthe records, it is seen that the information was given at 9.30  am  to  P.W.13<br \/>\nthrough  a  wireless  message  and  that  he  arrived at the scene immediately<br \/>\nthereafter and on receipt of the written complaint, the F.I.R.  was registered<br \/>\nat 11.10 am and after the investigation by P.W.14 and after taking of  inquest<br \/>\nover  the dead body, the body was sent to the Government Hospital, Pondicherry<br \/>\nand thereafter, he went to the accused and collected information regarding his<br \/>\nadmission in the hospital  and  on  his  enquiry,  the  accused  did  not  say<br \/>\nanything.   Thus,  we  find  that  the  report  as  well  as the investigation<br \/>\ncommenced immediately thereafter and from Ex.P.11, it is seen that the  F.I.R.<br \/>\nwas  registered  at 10.30 am and without any delay, steps were and on the same<br \/>\nday, the F.I.R.  was forwarded along with the complaint to the Judicial  First<br \/>\nClass Magistrate,  Pondicherry.  Though there is a discrepancy in reference to<br \/>\nthe place where the deceased breathed last, i.e.  in Ex.P.1 complaint,  it  is<br \/>\nstated  that Vasanthi died before she was brought out of the bathroom and that<br \/>\nthey only brought the dead body in the hall.  Whereas, in  the  evidence,  all<br \/>\nthe witnesses categorically say that while the deceased was being removed from<br \/>\nthe  bathroom  to  the  hall,  the  deceased uttered the words implicating the<br \/>\nrespondent upon enquiry and that she breathed her last when she  was  laid  in<br \/>\nthe hall.    Considering  the  facts  and  circumstances  of  the case and the<br \/>\nprobabilities that the distance between the bathroom and the hall must be less<br \/>\nthan 5 feet (refer Ex.P.6 Series) as stated above, we do not find any  serious<br \/>\ndiscrepancy so as to disbelieve the eye-witnesses.\n<\/p>\n<p>                43.  In SUMESH LAL VS.  STATE OF BIHAR [2002 (3) S.C.C.   27],<br \/>\nthe  Supreme  Court  has  held that minor inconsistencies in the evidence of a<br \/>\nwitness cannot be  a  ground  for  disregarding  the  evidence,  if  otherwise<br \/>\nacceptable as competent  and  truthful.  In MULAKH RAJ VS.  SATISH KUMAR [1992<br \/>\n(3) S.C.C.  43], the learned Judges of the Supreme Court have held that  in  a<br \/>\ncase  founded  on  circumstantial evidence, the prosecution must prove all the<br \/>\ncircumstances connecting the unbroken  chain  of  links  leading  to  only  on<br \/>\ninference that  the  accused  committed  the  crime.   If any other reasonable<br \/>\nhypothesis of the innocence of the accused can be  inferred  from  the  proved<br \/>\ncircumstances, the  accused  would  be  entitled  to the benefit.  The further<br \/>\nobservation of their lordships is as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;What is required is not the  quantitative,  but  qualitative,<br \/>\nreliable  and  probable  circumstances  to  complete  the chain connecting the<br \/>\naccused with the crime.  If the conduct of the  accused  in  relation  to  the<br \/>\ncrime  comes  into  question,  the  previous  and  subsequent conduct are also<br \/>\nrelevant facts.  Therefore, the absence of the ordinary course of  conduct  of<br \/>\nthe accused  and  human probabilities of the case also would be relevant.  The<br \/>\ncourt must weigh the evidence of the cumulative effect  of  the  circumstances<br \/>\nand  if  it  reaches the conclusion that the accused committed the crime, then<br \/>\nthe charge must be held  proved  and  the  conviction  and  sentence  must  he<br \/>\nconfirmed.&#8221; (emphasis added)<\/p>\n<p>In STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH VS.  ANIL SINGH [1988 (SUPPLEMENT) S.C.C.  68<\/p>\n<p>6],  the  Supreme  Court  has  held  that merely because a prosecution witness<br \/>\nexaggerated  his  part,  that  by  itself,  is  no  ground  to  discredit  the<br \/>\nprosecution case, if otherwise true.  Their lordships observed in this context<br \/>\nas follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;&#8230;..   That  invariably, the witnesses add embroidery to the<br \/>\nprosecution story, perhaps for the fear of being disbelieved, but that  is  no<br \/>\nground to  throw the case over board the main.  If there is a ring of truth in<br \/>\nthe main, the case should not be rejected.  It is the duty  of  the  court  to<br \/>\ncull  out  the  nuggets  of  truth from the evidence unless there is reason to<br \/>\nbelieve that inconsistencies or falsehood are so glaring as to utterly destroy<br \/>\nthe confidence in the witnesses.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>In the above said judgment, their lordships also say that the appellate  court<br \/>\ndoes   not  disturb  the  concurrent  finding  of  fact  reached  upon  proper<br \/>\nappreciation.  Even if two views are reasonably possible, one  convicting  and<br \/>\nthe  other  acquittal,  court  will not interfere with the order of acquittal.<br \/>\nTheir lordships also observed as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;But the court will not hesitate to  interfere  if  the  acquittal  is<br \/>\nperverse  in  the  sense  that  no  reasonable  person would have come to that<br \/>\nconclusion or if the acquittal is manifestly illegal or grossly unjust.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>Their lordships also held that it is not proper to  reject  the  case  of  the<br \/>\nprosecution  for  want  of  corroboration by independent witnesses if the case<br \/>\nmade out is otherwise true and acceptable.  In RAJENDRA KUMAR VS.    STATE  OF<br \/>\nUTTAR PRADESH (A.I.R.    1998  S.C.  2896), the Supreme Court held that in the<br \/>\nlight of the opinion of the  doctor  that  the  location  and  nature  of  the<br \/>\ninjuries  found  on the body of the accused were not consistent with the claim<br \/>\nthat he had tried to extinguish the fire on the deceased,  but  on  the  other<br \/>\nhand,  he  had tried to hold the deceased by his hands and to prevent her from<br \/>\ngoing out of the room, disbelieved the version of the accused.  In this  case,<br \/>\nthe  case of the respondent\/accused that he went into the bathroom to save his<br \/>\nwife could not have been true since no attempt was made by him  to  extinguish<br \/>\nthe fire on the deceased as claimed by him.\n<\/p>\n<p>                44.  In  ARVIND  SINGH  VS.    STATE OF BIHAR [2001 (6) S.C.C.\n<\/p>\n<p>407], while considering the dying  declaration  made  to  her  mother  by  the<br \/>\ndeceased, the Supreme Court has held as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;Dying declaration ought to be treated with care and caution since the<br \/>\nmaker of the statement cannot be subjected to any crossexamination.  The dying<br \/>\ndeclaration,  has  not been made to any doctor or any independent witness, but<br \/>\nto the mother of the deceased who is said to have arrived at the place only in<br \/>\nthe morning.  The mother admittedly is an interested witness, though  that  by<br \/>\nitself  would  not  discredit  the  evidence  tendered  in court, but the fact<br \/>\nremains that the doctor&#8217;s evidence, considering the nature of burns, creates a<br \/>\nconsiderable doubt as to whether such a statement could be  made  half-an-hour<br \/>\nbefore the  death.  Reliance of the High Court on such a dying declaration has<br \/>\nto be scrutinized with a certain degree of caution.  The victim is  stated  to<br \/>\nhave  quietly  told  her  mother the reason of her death, a few minutes before<br \/>\npassing away.  This is not acceptable, more so, having regard  to  declaration<br \/>\nbeing made  to  the mother only.  Further, it is in evidence that the deceased<br \/>\nwas extensively burnt, including her mouth, nose and  lips  and  the  doctor&#8217;s<br \/>\nevidence  in  that case was that she could not have survived for more than ten<br \/>\nminutes in view of the extensive burns on her.  This was  another  reason  for<br \/>\nnot accepting  her  mother&#8217;s  evidence.   Another fact was that the police had<br \/>\nalready arrived when mother and brother of victim reached.   It  was  unlikely<br \/>\nthat  the  police  would  not  make  any  attempt to have the statement of the<br \/>\ndeceased on their arrival, and instead to wait for her mother&#8217;s arrival.    It<br \/>\nwas  also  noticed  that  the  deceased  was  in  a  fit condition to make the<br \/>\nstatement.  In this context, it was held that dying declarations would have to<br \/>\nbe dealt with care and caution.  Corroboration is not  essential,  but  it  is<br \/>\nexpedient to have the same in order to strengthen the evidentiary value of the<br \/>\ndeclaration.   Independent witnesses may not be available, but there should be<br \/>\nproper care and caution in the matter of acceptance of  such  a  statement  as<br \/>\ntrustworthy evidence&#8221; (emphasis added).\n<\/p>\n<p>The  question  of obtaining certificate of mental fitness of the deceased does<br \/>\nnot arise in this case.  The statement of the deceased is said  to  have  been<br \/>\nmade just  before  she passed her last breath.  The prosecution witnesses, who<br \/>\nwere available at that time near  the  deceased,  have  clearly  and  cogently<br \/>\nstated  that the deceased was conscious and had made the said statement and we<br \/>\nhave no reason to doubt the correctness and  the  authenticity  of  the  dying<br \/>\ndeclaration in question.\n<\/p>\n<p>                45.  In  JAWAHARLAL  VS.    STATE  OF MADHYA PRADESH [2001 (5)<br \/>\nS.C.C.  300], the Supreme Court considered the various circumstances in a case<br \/>\nof death by burning to establish the guilt of the accused.  In that case also,<br \/>\nthe burns were not found all over the body.  The torso part of the body  which<br \/>\ntouched the  floor  of the room was not found burnt.  Their lordships observed<br \/>\nas follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;Therefore, it is quite possible that after this assault,  the<br \/>\nvictim  is  said to have been physically rendered helpless so that there could<br \/>\nbe no resistance from her side.  In that view  of  the  matter,  it  is  quite<br \/>\npossible that  the  murder could have been committed by a single person.  Some<br \/>\nof the burn injuries were found to be postmortem.    This  is  proved  by  the<br \/>\nevidence of  the  doctor.   In a case of circumstantial evidence, the chain of<br \/>\ncircumstances should be firmly established and it should have the tendency  to<br \/>\nunerringly point to the guilt of the accused.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>                46.  In NANAHAURAM  VS.  STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH (A.I.R.  1988<br \/>\nS.C.  912<\/p>\n<p>), the deceased was struck by a dacoit by gunshot wounds.  In the presence  of<br \/>\nthe  people  gathered,  the  deceased  told to take down his statement that he<br \/>\nrecognised the two accused among the dacoits and scribed the dying declaration<br \/>\nwith his thumb impression thereon.  He died while being taken to the hospital.<br \/>\nThe said dying declaration was not mentioned in the F.I.R.  The Supreme  Court<br \/>\nheld  in the facts and circumstances of that case that mere delay in recording<br \/>\nthe statement, which was indisputedly a lapse  of  the  prosecution  evidence.<br \/>\nThe Supreme Court approved the view of the High Court that the identity of the<br \/>\ntwo  appellants as being amongst the dacoits has been amply established by the<br \/>\nevidence of witnesses and this has been reinforced by  the  oral  and  written<br \/>\ndying declaration of the deceased.  A Division Bench of the Orissa High Court,<br \/>\nin BUDHIR  SINGH  VS.    STATE  (1983 CRIMINAL LAW JOURNAL 1020), held that if<br \/>\nafter searching scrutiny, the court is satisfied that  the  dying  declaration<br \/>\nrepresents a truthful version of the occurrence in which the deceased received<br \/>\nthe  injuries which led to his death, a conviction can be founded thereon even<br \/>\nin the absence of any independent corroboration.\n<\/p>\n<p>                47.  In STATE (DELHI ADMINISTRATION) VS.  LAXMAN  KUMAR  [1985<br \/>\n(4) S.C.C.   476], the Supreme Court considered the scope of an appeal against<br \/>\nacquittal and held that the pre-ponderance of judicial opinion is  that  there<br \/>\nis  no  difference  between an appeal against conviction and an appeal against<br \/>\nacquittal except that while dealing with  an  appeal  against  acquittal,  the<br \/>\ncourt  keeps in view the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and<br \/>\nthe same stands fortified by the order of acquittal, and if the  view  adopted<br \/>\nby the High Court is a reasonable one and the conclusion reached by it had its<br \/>\ngrounds  well  set  on  the  materials  on  record,  the  acquittal may not be<br \/>\ninterfered with.  Once evidence has been led and the court  has  proceeded  to<br \/>\nreview  the  entire material, there is no limitation in law in the exercise of<br \/>\njurisdiction for the purpose of making a just decision.  Their lordships  also<br \/>\nheld  in  reference to the facts of that particular case that the deceased, in<br \/>\nher dying declaration made contemporaneously, as deposed to by the  witnesses,<br \/>\nhad stated that kerosene had been poured by the mother-in-law and the fire had<br \/>\nalso been  lit  by her.  Though the Supreme Court was not prepared to base the<br \/>\nconviction on the oral dying declaration alone, such  dying  declarations,  in<br \/>\ntheir  opinion,  were  not  to be totally rejected and the same can be used as<br \/>\ncorroborative materials.\n<\/p>\n<p>                48.  In AJIT SAVANT MAJAGVAI VS.  STATE OF KARNATAKA [1997 (7)<br \/>\nS.C.C.  110], their lordships laid down seven principles that would govern  to<br \/>\nregulate the hearing of appeal by the High Court against an order of acquittal<br \/>\nand also the scope of conviction solely on the circumstantial evidence.  Their<br \/>\nlordships held as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>        &#8220;(1)  In  an  appeal  against  an  order  of acquittal, the High Court<br \/>\npossesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers it possesses  while<br \/>\nhearing an appeal against the order of conviction.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (2)  The  High  Court  has  the  power  to reconsider the whole issue,<br \/>\nreappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and findings  in  place<br \/>\nof  the findings recorded by the trial court, if the said findings are against<br \/>\nthe weight of the evidence on record, or in other words, perverse.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (3) Before reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court  has  to<br \/>\nconsider  each  ground on which the order of acquittal was based and to record<br \/>\nits own reasons for not accepting those grounds and  not  subscribing  to  the<br \/>\nview expressed by the trial court that the accused is entitled to acquittal.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (4)  In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep<br \/>\nin view the fact that the presumption  of  innocence  is  still  available  in<br \/>\nfavour  of  the  accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the<br \/>\norder of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (5) If the High Court, on a fresh  scrutiny  and  reappraisal  of  the<br \/>\nevidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is another<br \/>\nview  which  can  be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused<br \/>\nshould be adopted.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial  court  had<br \/>\nthe  advantage  of  looking  at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their<br \/>\nconduct in the Court especially in the witness-box.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at  that  stage,<br \/>\nthe accused  was  entitled to benefit of doubt.  The doubt should be such as a<br \/>\nreasonable person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt<br \/>\nof the accused.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>                49.  In RAMILABEN HASMUKHBAI KHRISTI VS.   DAHYABHAI  ASHABHAI<br \/>\nKHRISTI PARMAL, in Criminal Appeal Nos.245 TO 247 of 2001, by a judgment dated<br \/>\n14.8.2002  reported  in Judgment Information System (JUDIS), the Supreme Court<br \/>\ndealt with a case which rested on dying declaration.  Their lordships, in that<br \/>\ncase, referred to the judgment in UKARAM VS.  STATE  OF  RAJASTHAN  [2001  (5)<br \/>\nS.C.C.   254], wherein it was held that though a dying declaration is entitled<br \/>\nto great weight, yet it is worthwhile  to  note  that  as  the  maker  of  the<br \/>\nstatement is not subjected to cross-examination, it is essential for the court<br \/>\nto  insist  that  the dying declaration should be of such nature as to instill<br \/>\nfull confidence of the  court  in  its  correctness.    The  court  should  be<br \/>\nsatisfied  that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement.<br \/>\nThus, in a case where the prosecution rested their case solely  on  the  dying<br \/>\ndeclaration,  the  court  should  be  cautious and satisfied on the mental and<br \/>\nphysical fitness and capability of the declarant to make the statement.    The<br \/>\nratio  laid  down  in this judgment will not apply to the facts of the case on<br \/>\nhand, since the prosecution does not rely solely on the dying declaration.\n<\/p>\n<p>                50.  Applying the principles laid down in the above decisions,<br \/>\nwe find in this case that the dying declaration was made to the first rescuers<br \/>\nof the deceased namely P.W.1 and P.W.5.  P.Ws.3 and 4 were also there when the<br \/>\ndeceased had made the statement.  Though P.W.5, an independent witness gave  a<br \/>\nstatement to that effect under Section 161<\/p>\n<p>Cr.P.C.,  he  later went back to the extent to say that the deceased was alive<br \/>\nand when she was taken out of the bathroom, she was murmuring,  but  he  could<br \/>\nnot hear what she said.  That did not exclude the other witnesses from hearing<br \/>\nwhat the  deceased  said.  P.W.5 did not say that the other witnesses also did<br \/>\nnot hear the statement of the deceased.  Further, the medical evidence is also<br \/>\nnot to the effect that she should have died instantaneously.    After  putting<br \/>\noff the fire, she was being taken to the hall and in the meanwhile, when asked<br \/>\nabout  the  incident,  she  is  said  to have stated, implicating the accused.<br \/>\nConsidering the whole cumulatively,  we  find  that  there  is  no  reason  to<br \/>\ndiscredit the eye-witnesses and the statement of the deceased.\n<\/p>\n<p>                51.  In  SHARAD  BIRDHICHAND  SARDA  VS.  STATE OF MAHARASHTRA<br \/>\n(A.I.R.  19<\/p>\n<p>84 S.C.  1622), the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, while considering<br \/>\nthe scope of Section 32(1) of the Indian Evidence Act, laid down the following<br \/>\nfive propositions :\n<\/p>\n<p>        (1) in view of the peculiar conditions of our society and the  diverse<br \/>\nnature  and  character  of  our people, it is necessary to widen the sphere of<br \/>\nSection 32 to avoid injustice.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (2) The test of  proximity  cannot  be  too  literally  construed  and<br \/>\npractically  reduced  to a cut-and-tried formula of universl application so as<br \/>\nto be confined in a straight-jacket.  Distance of time would  depend  or  vary<br \/>\nwith the circumstances of each case.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (3) The second part of Clause 1 of Section 32 is yet another exception<br \/>\nto  the  rule that in criminal law, the evidence of a person who was not being<br \/>\nsubjected to or given an opportunity of being crossexamined  by  the  accused,<br \/>\nwould  be  valueless  because  the  place  of crossexamination is taken by the<br \/>\nsolemnity and sanctity of oath for the simple reason  that  a  person  on  the<br \/>\nverge  of death is not likely to make a false statement unless there is strong<br \/>\nevidence to show that  the  statement  was  secured  either  by  prompting  or<br \/>\ntutoring.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (4)  Section  32 does not speak of himicide alone but includes suicide<br \/>\nalso.\n<\/p>\n<p>        (5) Statements and letters directly related to a death  would  clearly<br \/>\nfall within the four corners of Section 32 and therefore admissible.\n<\/p>\n<p>In  this  context, their lordships held that the evidence of witnesses who are<br \/>\nclose relatives and friends of the deceased should be examined with very great<br \/>\ncare and caution.  Their lordships held that if two views are possible that it<br \/>\nmay be a case of suicide and that it may be a case of murder and if  both  are<br \/>\nequally probable,  the  prosecution case shall stand disproved.  This has been<br \/>\nheld on the basis of the evidence in that case where it was held in  paragraph<br \/>\n165 as follows :\n<\/p>\n<p>                &#8220;In  the  instant case, while two ingredients have been proved<br \/>\nbut two have not.  In the first place, it has not doubt been proved that Manju<br \/>\ndied of potassium cyanide and secondly, it has also been proved that there was<br \/>\nan opportunity to administer the poison.  It has, however, not been proved  by<br \/>\nany evidence  that  the  appellant  had  the poison in his possession.  On the<br \/>\nother hand, as  indicated  above,  there  is  clear  evidence  of  P.W.2  that<br \/>\npotassium  cyanide could have been available to Manju from the plastic factory<br \/>\nof her mother, but there is no evidence to show that the  accused  could  have<br \/>\nprocured potassium cyanide from any available source.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>The  Supreme Court also found that the circumstances afforded a greater motive<br \/>\nto the deceased to commit suicide than for the accused to commit murder.    In<br \/>\nour case, we do not find that there are two views on the death of the deceased<br \/>\nand the evidence on record as well as the circumstances clearly point out that<br \/>\nthere is only one possibility namely the accused committing the murder.\n<\/p>\n<p>                52.  In SANWAT  SINGH  VS.    STATE OF RAJASTHAN (A.I.R.  1961<br \/>\nS.C.  715), their lordships held that while  entertaining  an  appeal  against<br \/>\nacquittal,  the  High  Court  should  have substantial and compelling reasons.<br \/>\nTheir lordships held that the  High  Court  should  not  only  have  good  and<br \/>\nsufficiently  cogent  reasons or strong reasons after considering every matter<br \/>\non record having a bearing on the question of fact and the reason given by the<br \/>\ncourt below in support of its order of acquittal in arriving at the conclusion<br \/>\non those facts, but should also express those reasons in their judgment  which<br \/>\nled to hold  that acquittal was not justified.  In MULUWA VS.  STATE OF MADHYA<br \/>\nPRADESH (A.I.R.  197 6 S.C.  980), it was held by the Supreme Court that  when<br \/>\ntwo  views  on  evidence are reasonably possible, one taken by the trial court<br \/>\nand the other reached by the High  Court,  in  the  absence  of  any  material<br \/>\nirregularity,  manifest  error  or  illegality,  the  High  Court  should  not<br \/>\ninterfere with the order of acquittal, merely cause it thinks that  it  would,<br \/>\nsitting as a trial Court, have taken the other view.\n<\/p>\n<p>                53.    After   considering  the  oral  and  material  evidence<br \/>\ncumulatively, including the written statement of the respondent, we find  that<br \/>\nthe suicide  theory  of self-immolation is totally unsupportable.  In the same<br \/>\nmanner, the accident theory put forward by the respondent that she might  have<br \/>\nprepared  hot  water  for  her  daughter  after bolting the bathroom door from<br \/>\ninside and might have fell down also cannot be believed.  As a matter of fact,<br \/>\nin the statement of the accused under Section  313  Cr.P.C.,  he  had  clearly<br \/>\nstated that it was a suicide.  Whereas, there is an improvement in his written<br \/>\nstatement that  it  may  be  an  accident.    Once  this theory of suicide and<br \/>\naccident is ruled out, the respondent being the only person available  at  the<br \/>\nhouse  and  considering  the  conduct  of  the respondent of coming out of the<br \/>\nbathroom by jumping out it, instead  of  opening  the  bolt  and  coming  out,<br \/>\nwithout  any clothes on and leaving for hospital for his own treatment without<br \/>\ntelling the witnesses as to what had actually happened or even without  trying<br \/>\nto  rescue  the deceased and further informing the doctor that he had suffered<br \/>\nthe injuries while lighting the stove, instead of  telling  that  he  suffered<br \/>\nthose  injuries  while trying to help his wife, if it was really true, as also<br \/>\nhis subsequent conduct by claiming unconsciousness while  coming  out  of  the<br \/>\nbathroom  are  very  difficult  to  believe,  but  only proves that it was the<br \/>\naccused who has committed this dastardly murder of his wife.  The  conduct  of<br \/>\nthe  respondent is so unnatural and opposed to ordinary human conduct, leading<br \/>\nus to disbelieve his defence theory and coming to the only conclusion that the<br \/>\naccused ought to have committed the murder.  Therefore, assuming for the  sake<br \/>\nof  argument  that  the  dying  declaration  given  by  the deceased has to be<br \/>\neschewed, still the other circumstances are overwhelming to point out that  it<br \/>\nis the accused who is guilty of this crime.\n<\/p>\n<p>                54.   The  learned  Sessions  Judge,  in  paragraph  49 of his<br \/>\njudgment, has found that there was nothing unreasonable about the  conduct  of<br \/>\nthe  accused  for  his  inability  to  tell the reasons for his sustaining the<br \/>\ninjuries when P.W.1 asked him.  According to the  learned  Judge,  it  was  so<br \/>\n&#8220;because  he  was  in a disturbed state of mind as his wife was burning and he<br \/>\ntoo had sufficient burns.  That apart, an auto was arranged by P.W.1 and other<br \/>\npersons who had collected there and he was sent to the hospital.&#8221; The  learned<br \/>\ncounsel  for  the  respondent  submits that the accused suffered more than 38%<br \/>\nburn injuries.  But, he was not able to explain as to how those  injuries  had<br \/>\nbeen  caused and the attempts made by him and the manner in which the injuries<br \/>\nhad been caused to him while he is alleged to have attempted to save his wife.<br \/>\nIt is unfortunate that the investigating agency has not  examined  the  doctor<br \/>\nwho had  issued Ex.P.14, the report against the accused.  However, the accused<br \/>\nhad admitted to have climbed over the wall into the bathroom and came  out  of<br \/>\nthe bathroom by jumping over the wall on his failure to save his wife and that<br \/>\nhe  suffered the injuries while trying to save her and since the injuries have<br \/>\nbeen properly admitted by him, it is for the accused  to  explain  as  to  how<br \/>\nthose  extent  of  injuries  had been suffered by him while trying to save the<br \/>\ndeceased.  In the absence of any proper explanation and  from  the  facts  and<br \/>\ncircumstances  of the case, it is clear that it is the accused who had hit the<br \/>\ndeceased, made her to lie down, poured kerosene on various parts of  her  body<br \/>\nand  lighted  with  18 match sticks, each part of the body and when the flames<br \/>\nstarted coming, he ought to have been also caught in the fire and suffered the<br \/>\nburn injuries.\n<\/p>\n<p>                55.  We have also found that we have no reason  to  disbelieve<br \/>\nP.Ws.1,  3  and  4 as to the statement of the deceased and taking into account<br \/>\nthe cumulative evidence on record, we have to hold that the accused is  guilty<br \/>\nof the  crime.    We  find that the reasoning of the learned Sessions Judge is<br \/>\ntotally unsatisfactory.  In paragraph 48 of his judgment,  the  learned  Judge<br \/>\nsays  that if the intention of the accused was to get rid of her by his brutal<br \/>\nact, he would not have chosen the morning time, that too  after  9  &#8216;o  clock,<br \/>\nopening the  gate  especially for her kith and kin to witness it.  So much so,<br \/>\nit shows his innocence to save her life than to  put  an  end  to  her.    The<br \/>\nfinding  of  the learned Judge that the burn injuries found on the body of the<br \/>\naccused show his genuine intention to save her, and as the bathroom was bolted<br \/>\nfrom inside and as he was also burning, it was not feasible for  him  to  save<br \/>\nher and  therefore,  he  retraced  his steps.  We are unable to appreciate the<br \/>\nreasoning of the learned Judge.  Assuming for the sake of  argument  that  the<br \/>\naccused  could  not save his wife, his conduct in not informing others who had<br \/>\ngathered there to save his wife, but instead, taking an  auto  to  go  to  the<br \/>\nhospital  for  taking  treatment  for himself and informing the doctor that he<br \/>\nsustained the injuries while lighting the stove only show the guilty  mind  of<br \/>\nthe  accused  and  his conduct was not to save his wife, but to see to it that<br \/>\nshe dies of the burns.  In the written defence statement,  he  contradicts  by<br \/>\nstating  that he could not talk and further improvement is made in the defence<br \/>\ncounsel that he was not conscious.  This is fortified by the  answers  of  the<br \/>\naccused  to  the  questions  put  as  to his response for the statement of the<br \/>\nwitnesses that the deceased is said to have told them about  his  beating  and<br \/>\npouring kerosene on her, his reply was that it was not possible for her to say<br \/>\nso.   Even  accepting  the  case  of  the  respondent  that he came out of the<br \/>\nbathroom unable to save his wife, he cannot say that she was dead because  she<br \/>\nwas still burning and he had left the scene and the prosecution witnesses were<br \/>\nthere to  rescue  her.  When the statement of the deceased was put to him, the<br \/>\nhis reply was, &#8220;I do not know whether she was alive or not&#8221;, implying that she<br \/>\ncould not have been alive to make such a statement.\n<\/p>\n<p>                56.  We have taken into account  every  circumstance  and  the<br \/>\nevidence  and  considered  them  so  closely  and  carefully  so as to satisfy<br \/>\nourselves whether the prosecution has established the  guilt  of  the  accused<br \/>\nbeyond any  reasonable  doubt.   We are to point out that the investigation in<br \/>\nreference to the non-examination of the Doctor who had issued the Medico-Legal<br \/>\nCertificate (Ex.P.14) and the lack of evidence regarding the manner  in  which<br \/>\nthe incised  injury was caused to the deceased are not satisfactory.  However,<br \/>\nas discussed above, we are fully  satisfied  that  the  oral  and  documentary<br \/>\nevidence,  combined  with  the  defence  stand  of the respondent, as also the<br \/>\nvarious circumstances in the chain of events, clearly establish the  guilt  of<br \/>\nthe  accused  and  rule  out the reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the<br \/>\naccused.  We are clear, from the above, beyond doubt as to the involvement  of<br \/>\nthe accused\/respondent in committing the murder of his wife.\n<\/p>\n<p>                57.   For all these reasons, we hold the accused guilty of the<br \/>\ncharge of murder and he deserves the punishment for the same.  Accordingly, we<br \/>\nset aside the  judgment  of  the  learned  Third  Additional  Sessions  Judge,<br \/>\nPondicherry, find the accused\/respondent guilty of the charge against him that<br \/>\nthe  accused\/respondent  did commit murder intentionally, causing the death of<br \/>\nhis wife by hitting his wife with a blunt object, pouring kerosene on her  and<br \/>\nsetting  her  on  fire, thereby committing an offence punishable under Section<br \/>\n302 I.P.C.    We  impose  a  punishment  of  imprisonment  for  life  on   the<br \/>\naccused\/respondent.  The appeal is accordingly allowed.\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                (P.S.M., J.) (M.C., J.)\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                                04..09..2002<\/p>\n<p>Index :  Yes<br \/>\nInternet :  Yes<\/p>\n<p>ab<\/p>\n<p>To<\/p>\n<p>1.  The III Additional Sessions Judge, Pondicherry.\n<\/p>\n<p>2.  The III Additional Sessions Judge, Pondicherry<br \/>\nthrough Principal Sessions Judge, Pondicherry.\n<\/p>\n<p>3.  The District Collector, Pondicherry.\n<\/p>\n<p>4.  The Inspector General of Police, Pondicherry.\n<\/p>\n<p>5.  The Public Prosecutor, Pondicherry.\n<\/p>\n<p>6.  The Inspector of Police,<br \/>\nD.  Nagar Police Station,<br \/>\nPondicherry.\n<\/p><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Madras High Court State vs Jayabalan on 4 September, 2002 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS Dated: 04\/09\/2002 Coram The Honourable Mr. Justice P. SHANMUGAM and The Honourable Mr. Justice M. CHOCKALINGAM Criminal Appeal No.65 of 1995 State, represented by The Public Prosecutor, Pondicerry. .. Appellant -Vs- Jayabalan .. Respondent Prayer: Appeal against [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-151401","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>State vs Jayabalan on 4 September, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-vs-jayabalan-on-4-september-2002\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"State vs Jayabalan on 4 September, 2002 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; 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