{"id":151856,"date":"2010-01-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-01-17T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010"},"modified":"2019-01-02T21:56:05","modified_gmt":"2019-01-02T16:26:05","slug":"state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010","title":{"rendered":"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010<\/div>\n
Bench: Dalveer Bhandari, Mukundakam Sharma<\/div>\n
                                                                                                   REPORTABLE\n                         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\n                         CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n                      CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1134-1135 OF 2002\n\nState of Uttaranchal                                          .. Appellant\n\n                                            Versus\n\nBalwant Singh Chaufal & Others                              .. Respondents\n\n\n\n\n                                    J U D G M E N T\n<\/pre>\n
Dalveer Bhandari, J.\n<\/p>\n
1.           These     appeals       have     been     filed       by     the       State     of<\/p>\n
Uttaranchal          (now     Uttarakhand)           against       the       orders       dated<\/p>\n
12.7.2001          and 1.8.2001 passed by the Division Bench of the<\/p>\n
High Court of Uttaranchal at Nainital in Civil Miscellaneous<\/p>\n
Writ Petition No. 689 (M\/B) of 2001.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
2.           The appointment of L. P. Nathani was challenged before<\/p>\n
the High Court in a Public Interest Litigation on the ground<\/p>\n
that    he    could     not   hold     the    august        Office      of    the    Advocate<\/p>\n
General       of     Uttarakhand      in     view    of     Article       165     read      with<\/p>\n
Article 217 of the Constitution.                     According to the respondent,<\/p>\n
Mr. Nathani was ineligible to be appointed as the Advocate<\/p>\n
General      because     he    had    attained        the    age     of      62   years     much<\/p>\n
before he was appointed as the Advocate General.                                    The High<\/p>\n
Court     entertained         the     petition         and     directed           the     State<\/p>\n
Government to take decision on the issue raised within 15 days<\/p>\n
and apprise the same to the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
3.           The    State       of   Uttaranchal       preferred            special    leave<\/p>\n
petitions before this Court on 6.8.2001. This Court vide order<\/p>\n
dated 9.8.2001 stayed the operation of the impugned judgment<\/p>\n
of    the     High       Court.       Thereafter       on    11.2.2002,        this    Court<\/p>\n
granted leave and directed that the stay already granted shall<\/p>\n
continue.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
4.           It    may     be   pertinent      to    mention        that,     despite       the<\/p>\n
service of notice, the respondents who had initially filed the<\/p>\n
writ     petition          before       the     High        Court     challenging           the<\/p>\n
appointment of Nathani as the Advocate General did not appear<\/p>\n
before       this        Court.      This     clearly       demonstrates        the        non-<\/p>\n
seriousness and non-commitment of the respondents in filing<\/p>\n
the petition.\n<\/p>\n
5.           Before we proceed to examine the controversy involved<\/p>\n
in this case, we deem it appropriate to set out Articles 165<\/p>\n
and    217    of     the    Constitution       dealing       with     the    post     of    the<\/p>\n
Advocate      General       and      the    qualifications          for   appointment        to<\/p>\n
this post in the Constitution.                      Article 165 which deals with<\/p>\n
the appointment of the Advocate General for the States is<\/p>\n
reproduced as under:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
            “165. The Advocate-General for the State.-(1)
\n            The Governor of each State shall appoint a
\n            person who is qualified to be appointed a Judge
\n            of a High Court to be Advocate-General for the
\n            State.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
            (2) It shall be the duty of the Advocate-General
\n            to give advice to the Government of the State
\n            upon such legal matters, and to perform such
\n            other duties of a legal character, as may from
\n       time to time be referred or assigned to him by
\n       the Governor, and to discharge the functions
\n       conferred on him by or under this Constitution
\n       or any other law for the time being in force.<\/p>\n
       (3) The Advocate-General shall hold office
\n       during the pleasure of the Governor, and shall
\n       receive such remuneration as the Governor may
\n       determine.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
6.     Article 217 which deals with the appointment and the<\/p>\n
conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court is set out<\/p>\n
as under:\n<\/p>\n
       217 – Appointment and conditions of the office
\n       of a Judge of a High Court .- (1) Every Judge of
\n       a High Court shall be appointed by the President
\n       by warrant under his hand and seal after
\n       consultation with the Chief Justice of India,
\n       the Governor of the State, and, in the case of
\n       appointment of a Judge other than the Chief
\n       Justice, the Chief Justice of the High court,
\n       and shall hold office, in the case of an
\n       additional or acting Judge, as provided in
\n       article 224, and in any other case, until he
\n       attains the age of sixty-two years:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       Provided that–\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (a)     a Judge may, by writing under his hand
\n       addressed to the President, resign his office;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (b)     a Judge may be removed from his office
\n       by the President in the manner provided in
\n       clause (4) of article 124 for the removal of a
\n       Judge of the Supreme Court;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (c)   the office of a Judge shall be vacated by
\n       his being appointed by the President to be a
\n       Judge of the Supreme Court or by his being
\n       transferred by the President to any other High
\n       Court within the territory of India.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (2)     A person shall not be qualified for
\n       appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he
\n       is a citizen of India and–\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (a)     has for at least ten years held         a
\n       judicial office in the territory of India; or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         (b)     has for at least ten years been an
\n         advocate of a High Court or of two or more such
\n         courts in succession;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Explanation: For the purposes of this clause–\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         (a)     in computing the period during which a
\n         person has held judicial office in the territory
\n         of India, there shall be included any period,
\n         after he has held any judicial office, during
\n         which the person has been an advocate of a High
\n         Court or has held the office of a member of a
\n         tribunal or any post, under the Union or a
\n         State, requiring special knowledge of law;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         (aa)    in computing the period during which a
\n         person has been an advocate of a High Court,
\n         there shall be included any period during which
\n         the person has held judicial office or the
\n         office of a member of a tribunal or any post,
\n         under the Union or a State, requiring special
\n         knowledge of law after he became an advocate;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         (b)     in computing the period during which a
\n         person has held judicial office in the territory
\n         of India or been an advocate of High Court,
\n         there shall be included any period before the
\n         commencement of this Constitution during which
\n         he has held judicial office in any area which
\n         was comprised before the fifteenth day of
\n         August, 1947, within India as defined by the
\n         Government of India Act,1935, or has been an
\n         advocate of any High Court in any such area, as
\n         the case may be.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         (3)     If any question arises as to the age of
\n         a Judge of a High Court, the question shall be
\n         decided by the President after consultation with
\n         the Chief Justice of India and the decision of
\n         the President shall be final.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
7.       The Division Bench of the High Court in the impugned<\/p>\n
judgment observed that the first clause of Article 165 insists<\/p>\n
that   the   Governor   shall   appoint   a   person   as   the   Advocate<\/p>\n
General who is qualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High<\/p>\n
Court.    The qualifications for the appointment of a Judge of a<\/p>\n
High Court are prescribed in the second clause of Article 217.<\/p>\n
It is true that the first clause of Article 217 says that a
\nJudge of a High Court “shall hold office until he attains the<\/p>\n
age of 60 years” (at the relevant time the age of retirement<\/p>\n
of a Judge of the High Court was 60 years and now it is 62<\/p>\n
years).          The Division Bench further held that the real<\/p>\n
question then was whether this provision is to be construed as<\/p>\n
one   prescribing   a   qualification   or   as   one   prescribing    the<\/p>\n
duration of the appointment of a Judge of a High Court.                 It<\/p>\n
was further held that as the provision does not occur in the<\/p>\n
second clause, it can only be construed as one prescribing the<\/p>\n
duration of the appointment of a Judge of a High Court.                The<\/p>\n
Court further observed that the provisions about duration in<\/p>\n
the first clause of Article 217 cannot be made applicable to<\/p>\n
the   Advocate    General   because   the    Constitution   contains     a<\/p>\n
specific provision about the duration of the appointment of<\/p>\n
the Advocate General in the third clause of Article 165 which<\/p>\n
says that the Advocate General shall hold office during the<\/p>\n
pleasure of the Governor.        This provision does not limit the<\/p>\n
duration of the appointment by reference to any particular<\/p>\n
age, as in the case of a Judge, it is not permissible to<\/p>\n
import into it the words “until he attains the age of sixty<\/p>\n
years”.     The specific provision in the Constitution must,<\/p>\n
therefore, be given effect to without any limitation.                 If a<\/p>\n
person is appointed as an Advocate General, say at the age of<\/p>\n
fifty-five years, there is no warrant for holding that he must<\/p>\n
cease to hold his office on his attaining sixty two years<\/p>\n
because it is so stated about a Judge of a High court in the<\/p>\n
first clause of Article 217.          If that be a true position, as
\nwe hold it is, then the appointment is not bad because the<\/p>\n
person   is     past   sixty   two   years,   so   long   as   he   has   the<\/p>\n
qualifications prescribed in the second clause of Article 217.<\/p>\n
8.       Shri     Dinesh   Dwivedi,     the   learned     senior    counsel<\/p>\n
appearing for the State of Uttarakhand submitted that, over<\/p>\n
half a century ago, in G.D. Karkare v. T.L. Shevde & Others<\/p>\n
AIR 1952 Nagpur 330, this controversy has been settled by the<\/p>\n
Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court and the said judgment<\/p>\n
was approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case<\/p>\n
of Atlas Cycle Industries Ltd. Sonepat v. Their Workmen<\/a> 1962<\/p>\n
Supp. (3) SCR 89.        In Karkare’s case (supra), it was observed<\/p>\n
as follows:\n<\/p>\n
         “25.    It is obvious that all the provisions
\n         relating to a Judge of a High Court cannot be
\n         made applicable to the Advocate-General.     The
\n         provisions about remuneration are different for
\n         the two offices. A Judge of the High Court is
\n         governed by Art. 221.    The Advocate-General is
\n         governed by clause (3) of Art. 165 and receives
\n         such remuneration as the Governor may determine.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         26.     What the first clause of Art. 165
\n         insists is that the Governor shall appoint a
\n         person who is qualified to be appointed a Judge
\n         of a High Court to be Advocate-General for the
\n         State.   The qualifications for the appointment
\n         of a Judge of a High Court are prescribed in the
\n         second clause of Art. 217. It is true that the
\n         first clause of Art 217 says that a Judge of a
\n         High Court “shall hold office until he attains
\n         the age of 60 years”. The real question then is
\n         whether this provision is to be construed as one
\n         prescribing   a   qualification    or   as   one
\n         prescribing the duration of the appointment of a
\n         Judge of a High Court.    As the provision does
\n         not occur in the second clause, it can only be
\n         construed as one prescribing the duration of the
\n         appointment of a Judge of a High Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         27.      The provision about         duration in the\n         first    clause of Art. 217           cannot be made\n<\/pre>\n
applicable to the Advocate-General because the
\nConstitution contains a specific provision about
\nthe duration of the appointment of the Advocate-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
General in the third clause of Art. 165 which
\nsays that the Advocate-General shall hold office
\nduring the pleasure of the Governor.     As this
\nprovision does not limit the duration of the
\nappointment by reference to any particular age,
\nas in the case of a Judge, it is not permissible
\nto import into it the words “until he attains
\nthe age of sixty years”. The specific provision
\nin the Constitution must therefore be given
\neffect to without any limitation.    If a person
\nis appointed Advocate-General, say at the age of
\nfifty-five, there is no warrant for holding that
\nhe must cease to hold his office on this
\nattaining sixty years because it is so stated
\nabout a Judge of a High Court in the first
\nclause of Art. 217.      If that be the true
\nposition, as we hold it is, then the appointment
\nis not bad because the person is past sixty
\nyears, so long as he has the qualifications
\nprescribed in the second clause of Art. 217.
\nIt was not suggested that the non-applicant does
\nnot possess the qualifications prescribed in
\nthat clause.\n<\/p>\n
28.     The provision that every Judge of a High
\nCourt “shall hold office until he attains the
\nage of sixty years” has two aspects to it. While
\nin one aspect it can be viewed as a guarantee of
\ntenure during good behaviour to a person
\nappointed as a Judge of a High Court until he
\nattains the age of sixty, in another aspect it
\ncan be viewed as a disability in that a Judge
\ncannot hold his office as of right after he
\nattains the age of sixty years.\n<\/p>\n
29.     We say as of right because under Art.\n<\/p>\n
224 a person who has retired as a Judge of a
\nHigh Court may be requested to sit and act as a
\nJudge of a High court.    The attainment of the
\nage of sixty by a person cannot therefore be
\nregarded as a disqualification for performing
\nthe functions of a Judge.       But the learned
\ncounsel for the applicant tried to distinguish
\nbetween the case of a person qualified to be
\nappointed a Judge of a High Court under Article
\n217 and the case of a person requested to sit
\nand act as a Judge under Article 224.\n<\/p>\n
       The distinction between the case of a
\nperson qualified to be appointed a Judge of a
\nHigh Court under Article 217 and the case of a
\nperson requested to sit and act under Article
\n224 is not with respect to the qualifications
\nfor performing the functions of a Judge, but
\nwith respect to the matters provided by Article
\n221, 222, 223, etc.      In the language of the
\nConstitution   a   Judge   does  not  lose   the
\nqualifications prescribed in the second clause
\nof Article 217 on the attainment of the age of
\nsixty years.     A person who attains that age
\ncannot be appointed as a Judge not because he is
\nnot qualified to be so appointed within the
\nmeaning of the second clause of Article 217, but
\nbecause the first clause of that Article
\nexpressly provides that a Judge shall hold
\noffice until he attains the age of sixty years.<\/p>\n
(30) If the provision in the first clause of
\nArticle 217 viewed as a guarantee of tenure of
\noffice until the age of sixty is not available
\nto the Advocate-General because he holds office
\nduring the pleasure of the Governor, we see no
\ncompelling   reason  why   the   same   provision
\nconstrued as a disability should be made
\napplicable to him.    We are, therefore, of the
\nview that the first clause of Article 217 cannot
\nbe read with the first clause of Article 165 so
\nas to disqualify a person from being appointed
\nAdvocate-General after the age of sixty years.
\nWe have no doubt on the point. Even if the
\nquestion be considered as not free from doubt,
\nas the applicant desires to construe the first
\nclause of Article 217 as a disabling provision
\nagainst the non-applicant, we cannot forget that
\nprovisions entailing disabilities have to be
\nconstrued   strictly:    `Parameshwaram    Pillai
\nBhaskara Pillai v. State’, 1950-5 Dom L R (Trav)\n<\/p>\n
382.   The canon of construction approved by
\ntheir Lordships of the Privy Council is that if
\nthere be any ambiguity as to the meaning of a
\ndisabling provision, the construction which is
\nin favour of the freedom of the individual
\nshould be given effect to : `David v. De’silva’,
\n(1934) A C 106 at p. 114.\n<\/p>\n
(31)    There is no force in the contention that
\nthe non-applicant could not have been appointed
\nAdvocate-General because he had retired as a
\nJudge of the High Court.     The learned counsel
\nreferred us to Clause (4)(a) of Article 22 of
\nthe   Constitution   and   submitted   that  the
\nConstitution makes a distinction between a
\nperson who has been a Judge and one who is
\nqualified to be appointed as a Judge of a High
\nCourt. The provision in our view only makes an
\n        exhaustive enumeration of the classes of persons
\n        who can constitute an Advisory Board.       Such
\n        persons must either be or must have been or must
\n        be qualified to be appointed as Judges of a High
\n        Court.   The provision has therefore no bearing
\n        on the question whether the first clause of
\n        Article 165 has to be read with the first clause
\n        of Article 217, which question we have already
\n        answered in the negative. The case of the non-\n<\/p>\n
        applicant is unique.       Article 220 is not
\n        applicable to him because he did not hold office
\n        as a Judge of the High Court after the
\n        commencement of the Constitution. So the bar
\n        contained in that Article also does not come in
\n        his way.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
9.      Despite the fact that the controversy has been fully<\/p>\n
settled by a judgment of this Court, it has been raised from<\/p>\n
time to time in a number of writ petitions before the various<\/p>\n
High Courts.         We would reproduce some of the judgments to<\/p>\n
demonstrate    that     after   the   controversy   has     been   finally<\/p>\n
settled by this Court, the filing of indiscriminate petitions<\/p>\n
with   the    same    relief    creates   unnecessary     strain   on   the<\/p>\n
judicial system and consequently leads to inordinate delay in<\/p>\n
disposal of genuine and bona fide cases.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
10.     The following cases would demonstrate that, in how many<\/p>\n
High Courts, the similar controversy has been raised after the<\/p>\n
matter was finally settled by this Court:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
11.     In Ghanshyam Chandra Mathur v. The State of Rajasthan<\/p>\n
& Others 1979 Weekly Law Notes 773, the appointment of the<\/p>\n
Advocate General was once again challenged.               The court held<\/p>\n
that “…no age of superannuation has been mentioned in Article<\/p>\n
165 of the Constitution of India.          This clearly means that the<\/p>\n
age of superannuation which applies to a High Court Judge,
\ndoes not apply to the office of the Advocate General”.<\/p>\n
12.         In Dr. Chandra Bhan Singh v. State of Rajasthan &<\/p>\n
Others AIR 1983 Raj. 149, the question regarding the validity<\/p>\n
of the appointment of the Advocate General was challenged.<\/p>\n
The Court in this case had held that the age of superannuation<\/p>\n
of    a    High   Court    Judge   did    not   apply     to   the   post    of    the<\/p>\n
Advocate General.          The court noted that all provisions in the<\/p>\n
Constitution for High Court Judges, such as remuneration and<\/p>\n
tenure of office do not apply to the post of the Advocate<\/p>\n
General.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
13.         In Manendra Nath Rai & Another v. Virendra Bhatia &<\/p>\n
Others AIR 2004 All. 133, the appointment of the Advocate<\/p>\n
General was yet again challenged. The Court held as under:<\/p>\n
          “The argument that the provision of Sub-clause (1)
\n          of Article 217 of the Constitution should be
\n          followed in the matter of appointment of Advocate
\n          General is wholly misconceived. Article 217 of the
\n          Constitution   deals  with  the   appointment  and
\n          conditions of the office of a Judge of a High
\n          Court. The consultation with the Chief Justice of
\n          the State in the matter of appointment of a Judge
\n          of the High Court cannot be made a requirement in
\n          the matter of the appointment of Advocate General.
\n          The appointment of Advocate General is not
\n          governed by the aforesaid Article which falls in
\n          Chapter-V Part-6 of the Constitution whereas
\n          Article 165, which deals with the appointment of
\n          Advocate General for the State falls in Chapter II
\n          of Part 6. The scheme of the Constitution for the
\n          appointment of Advocate General as well as for
\n          appointment of a Judge of the High Court is
\n          totally different.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
14.         In a Division Bench judgment dated 4.2.2005 of the<\/p>\n
Allahabad High Court in Prem Chandra Sharma & Others v. Milan<\/p>\n
Banerji      &    Others   in   writ     petition   No.    716   (M\/B)      of    2005
\nreported in 2005 (3) ESC 2001, the appointment of the Attorney<\/p>\n
General for India was challenged and a prayer was made to<\/p>\n
issue a writ in the nature of quo warranto, because according<\/p>\n
to the petitioner, the respondent Milan Banerji had already<\/p>\n
attained the age of 65 years and he could not be appointed as<\/p>\n
the Attorney General for India.     In that case, the Division<\/p>\n
Bench relied upon the judgment of the Division Bench of the<\/p>\n
Nagpur High Court in G.D. Karkare’s case (supra).      The Court<\/p>\n
held as under:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
    “Having   examined   various    provisions     of  the
\n    Constitution,   it   is    quite    clear    that  the
\n    Constitution of India does not provide the
\n    retirement    age    of     various     constitutional
\n    appointees. No outer age limit has been provided
\n    for the appointment of the Attorney General,
\n    Solicitor General and Advocate General in the
\n    State. In the democratic system, prevailing in our
\n    country the Attorney General is appointed on the
\n    recommendation of the Prime Minister by the
\n    President of India and traditionally, he resigns
\n    along with the Prime Minister. Learned Counsel for
\n    the petitioner could not show any law relating to
\n    the age of retirement of Attorney General or
\n    embargo provided in Constitution on appointment of
\n    a person as Attorney General, who has already
\n    attained the age of 65 years. We are of the
\n    considered opinion that the letter and spirit of
\n    the Constitution as far as appointment of the
\n    Attorney   General    is    concerned,    looking   to
\n    significance, responsibility and high status of
\n    the post, it lays down certain requirements for a
\n    Member of Bar to be appointed as Attorney General
\n    of India. It is in this backdrop that the framers
\n    of the Constitution thought it necessary to
\n    prescribe   minimum   requisite     qualification   by
\n    laying that a person who is qualified to be
\n    appointed as Judge of the Hon’ble Court can be
\n    appointed as Attorney-General of India. This
\n    situation,   however,    cannot   lead    us   to  the
\n    conclusion by any stretch of imagination that the
\n    Attorney General cannot hold his office after the
\n    age of 65 years. As already indicated herein-above
\n    there are various constitutional functionaries
\n    where no outer age limit is provided to hold the
\n       office.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
15.       In   view    of   the   clear    enunciation       of    law   in    the<\/p>\n
aforesaid judgments, the controversy has been fully settled<\/p>\n
that the Advocate General for the State can be appointed after<\/p>\n
he\/she attains the age of 62 years.                Similarly, the Attorney<\/p>\n
General for India can be appointed after he\/she attains the<\/p>\n
age of 65 years.            In a number of other cases regarding the<\/p>\n
appointment of other authorities, the Courts have consistently<\/p>\n
taken the similar view.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
16.       This Court in Binay Kant Mani Tripathi v. Union of<\/p>\n
India & Others<\/a> (1993) 4 SCC 49 has re-affirmed this position.<\/p>\n
The Court pointed out that the decision of appointing D.K.<\/p>\n
Aggarwal to the position of the Vice-chairman of the Central<\/p>\n
Administrative Tribunal could not be held to be illegal or<\/p>\n
wrong on the ground that he was more than sixty two years old.<\/p>\n
17.       In Baishnab Patnaik & Others v. The State AIR 1952<\/p>\n
Orissa 60, the appointment of a person to the Advisory Board<\/p>\n
under   the    Preventive     Detention     Act    was    challenged     on    the<\/p>\n
grounds    that   he    was    older      than    60     years    (the   age    of<\/p>\n
superannuation for High Court judges at that time). The court<\/p>\n
pointed out:\n<\/p>\n
       “If the makers of the Constitution thought that
\n       the age limit was one of the qualifications for
\n       appointment as a Judge of a High Court they would
\n       not have specified it in Clause (1) of Article 217
\n       but would have included it in Clause (2) of the
\n       said Article.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 18.      In Gurpal Singh v. State of Punjab & Others<\/a> (2005) 5
\nSCC 136, the appointment of the appellant as Auction Recorder<\/p>\n
was     challenged.            The     Court     held       that     the      scope    of<\/p>\n
entertaining a petition styled as a public interest litigation<\/p>\n
and locus standi of the petitioner particularly in matters<\/p>\n
involving service of an employee has been examined by this<\/p>\n
Court    in     various     cases.     The     Court       observed     that     before<\/p>\n
entertaining the petition, the Court must be satisfied about<\/p>\n
(a) the credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie<\/p>\n
correctness or nature of information given by him; (c) the<\/p>\n
information being not vague and indefinite. The information<\/p>\n
should show gravity and seriousness involved.                          The court has<\/p>\n
to    strike    balance      between    two     conflicting         interests;         (i)<\/p>\n
nobody    should      be   allowed     to    indulge       in   wild    and    reckless<\/p>\n
allegations      besmirching     the        character      of     others;     and     (ii)<\/p>\n
avoidance       of    public    mischief        and     to      avoid      mischievous<\/p>\n
petitions seeking to assail, for oblique motives, justifiable<\/p>\n
executive actions.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
19.       The aforementioned cases clearly give us the picture<\/p>\n
how the judicial process has been abused from time to time and<\/p>\n
after the controversy was finally settled by a Constitution<\/p>\n
Bench of this Court, repeatedly the petitions were filed in<\/p>\n
the various courts.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
20.       In the instant case, one of the petitioners before the<\/p>\n
High    Court    is   a    practicing       lawyer    of    the    court.       He    has<\/p>\n
invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court in<\/p>\n
this matter.          It was expected from a Hon’ble member of the
\nnoble profession not to invoke the jurisdiction of the court<\/p>\n
in a matter where the controversy itself is no longer res<\/p>\n
integra.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
21.     Similarly,    it   is   the   bounden    duty   of   the   court    to<\/p>\n
ensure that the controversy once settled by an authoritative<\/p>\n
judgment should not be reopened unless there are extraordinary<\/p>\n
reasons for doing so.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
22.     In the instant case, the High Court entertained the<\/p>\n
petition despite the fact that the controversy involved in the<\/p>\n
case was no longer res integra.                 In reply to that writ<\/p>\n
petition, the Chief Standing Counsel of Uttrakhand also filed<\/p>\n
a   Miscellaneous    Application      before    the   High   Court.        The<\/p>\n
relevant portion of the application reads as under:<\/p>\n
      “3.     That  the   following   Attorney Generals
\n      appointed under Article 76 of the Constitution
\n      were appointed when they were appointed as
\n      Attorney General were beyond prescribed age for
\n      appointment as Supreme Court of India.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           (I) Sri M. C. Setalvad
\n           (II) Sri C. K. Dapatary
\n           (III)Shri Niren De
\n           (IV) Sri Lal Narain Singh
\n           (V) Sri K. Parasaran
\n           (VI) Sri Soli Sorabjee<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      4.      That the appointment of present Attorney
\n      General (Mr. Milon Banerjee) was challenged before
\n      the Delhi High Court and the petition was
\n      dismissed in limine. The appointment of Mr. R.P.
\n      Goel, Advocate General of U.P. who has passed the
\n      age of 62 at the time of appointment was also
\n      dismissed.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      5.      That  in    the   Hon’ble   High  Court   of
\n      Judicature at Allahabad Sri JV. K.S. Chaudhary,
\n      Sir Rishi Ram, Pt. Kanhaiya Lal Mishra, Sri Shanti
\n      Swaroop   Bhatnagar    and   several   others   were
\n      appointed as Advocate General after crossing the
\n       age of 62 years.         There were several Advocate
\n       Generals in India       who were appointed after 62
\n       years.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
23.       The State of Uttrakhand was a part of the State of U.P.<\/p>\n
a few years ago.         In the State of U.P., a large number of<\/p>\n
Advocate Generals appointed were beyond 62 years of age at the<\/p>\n
time of their appointment.          The petitioner, a local practicing<\/p>\n
lawyer, ought to have bestowed some care before filing this<\/p>\n
writ petition in public interest under Article 226 of the<\/p>\n
Constitution.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
24.       The controversy raised by the petitioner in this case<\/p>\n
was decided 58 years ago in the judgment of Karkare (supra)<\/p>\n
which was approved by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court way back in 1962.            Unfortunately, the same controversy<\/p>\n
has been repeatedly raised from time to time in various High<\/p>\n
Courts.    When the controversy is no longer res-integra and the<\/p>\n
same controversy is raised repeatedly, then it not only wastes<\/p>\n
the precious time of the Court and prevent the Court from<\/p>\n
deciding    other     deserving    cases,   but      also   has   the   immense<\/p>\n
potentiality     of    demeaning    a    very   important     constitutional<\/p>\n
office and person who has been appointed to that office.<\/p>\n
25.       In our considered view, it is a clear case of the abuse<\/p>\n
of    process   of    court   in   the   name   of    the   Public      Interest<\/p>\n
Litigation.      In order to curb this tendency effectively, it<\/p>\n
has now become imperative to examine all connected issues of<\/p>\n
public interest litigation by an authoritative judgment in the<\/p>\n
hope that in future no such petition would be filed and\/or
\nentertained by the Court.\n<\/p>\n
26.      To settle the controversy, we deem it appropriate to<\/p>\n
deal    with   different     definitions   of    the    Public     Interest<\/p>\n
Litigation in various countries.           We would also examine the<\/p>\n
evolution of the public interest litigation.<\/p>\n
DEFINITIONS OF PUBLIC INTERST LITIGATION<\/p>\n
27.      Public   Interest    Litigation   has   been    defined    in   the<\/p>\n
Black’s Law Dictionary (6th Edition) as under:-<\/p>\n
       “Public Interest – Something in which the public,
\n       the community at large, has some pecuniary
\n       interest, or some interest by which their legal
\n       rights or liabilities are affected. It does not
\n       mean anything so narrow as mere curiosity, or as
\n       the interests of the particular localities, which
\n       may be affected by the matters in question.
\n       Interest shared by citizens generally in affairs
\n       of local, state or national government….”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
28.      Advanced   Law    Lexicon   has   defined      `Public    Interest<\/p>\n
Litigation’ as under:-\n<\/p>\n
       “The expression `PIL’ means a legal action
\n       initiated in a Court of law for the enforcement of
\n       public interest or general interest in which the
\n       public or a class of the community has pecuniary
\n       interest or some interest by which their legal
\n       rights or liabilities are affected.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
29.      The Council for Public Interest Law set up by the Ford<\/p>\n
Foundation in USA defined “public interest litigation” in its<\/p>\n
report of Public Interest Law, USA, 1976 as follows:<\/p>\n
       “Public Interest Law is the name that has recently
\n       been given to efforts provide legal representation
\n       to previously unrepresented groups and interests.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       Such   efforts  have   been   undertaken  in   the
\n       recognition that ordinary market place for legal
\n       services fails to provide such services to
\n       significant segments of the population and to
\n       significant interests. Such groups and interests
\n       include the proper environmentalists, consumers,
\n       racial and ethnic minorities and others.” (M\/s
\n       Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra
\n       & Ors.<\/a> – AIR 2008 SC 913, para 19).\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
30.         This court in People’s Union for Democratic Rights &<\/p>\n
Others v. Union of India & Others<\/a> (1982) 3 SCC 235 defined<\/p>\n
`Public     Interest       Litigation’         and    observed          that    the    “Public<\/p>\n
interest litigation is a cooperative or collaborative effort<\/p>\n
by    the   petitioner,         the    State     of       public    authority         and   the<\/p>\n
judiciary         to   secure    observance          of    constitutional         or    basic<\/p>\n
human rights, benefits and privileges upon poor, downtrodden<\/p>\n
and vulnerable sections of the society”.\n<\/p>\n
\nORIGIN OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:\n<\/p>\n
31.         The    public       interest       litigation          is    the    product     of<\/p>\n
realization of the constitutional obligation of the court.<\/p>\n
32.         All these petitions are filed under the big banner of<\/p>\n
the public interest litigation.                      In this view of the matter,<\/p>\n
it has become imperative to examine what are the contours of<\/p>\n
the   public       interest      litigation?              What     is   the    utility      and<\/p>\n
importance of the public interest litigation?                             Whether similar<\/p>\n
jurisdiction           exists    in     other        countries          or     this    is   an<\/p>\n
indigenously developed jurisprudence?                        Looking to the special<\/p>\n
conditions         prevalent      in     our    country,           whether      the    public<\/p>\n
interest litigation should be encouraged or discouraged by the<\/p>\n
courts?       These      are     some    of    the        questions      which    we    would<\/p>\n
endeavour to answer in this judgment.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
33.         According       to     our     opinion,           the       public        interest
\nlitigation is an extremely important jurisdiction exercised by<\/p>\n
the Supreme Court and the High Courts.                 The Courts in a number<\/p>\n
of cases have given important directions and passed orders<\/p>\n
which   have     brought     positive    changes      in    the    country.     The<\/p>\n
Courts’    directions        have     immensely       benefited      marginalized<\/p>\n
sections of the society in a number of cases.                        It has also<\/p>\n
helped in protection and preservation of ecology, environment,<\/p>\n
forests,      marine       life,     wildlife      etc.     etc.    The     court’s<\/p>\n
directions to some extent have helped in maintaining probity<\/p>\n
and transparency in the public life.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
34.       This     court     while     exercising      its     jurisdiction      of<\/p>\n
judicial review realized that a very large section of the<\/p>\n
society because of extreme poverty, ignorance, discrimination<\/p>\n
and illiteracy had been denied justice for time immemorial and<\/p>\n
in fact they have no access to justice.                      Pre-dominantly, to<\/p>\n
provide access to justice to the poor, deprived, vulnerable,<\/p>\n
discriminated and marginalized sections of the society, this<\/p>\n
court   has      initiated,    encouraged       and    propelled      the     public<\/p>\n
interest litigation.           The litigation is upshot and product of<\/p>\n
this court’s deep and intense urge to fulfill its bounded duty<\/p>\n
and constitutional obligation.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
35.       The    High     Courts    followed    this       Court   and    exercised<\/p>\n
similar jurisdiction under article 226 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n
The courts expanded the meaning of right to life and liberty<\/p>\n
guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution.                      The rule of<\/p>\n
locus   standi      was    diluted     and   the    traditional       meaning    of
\n`aggrieved person’ was broadened to provide access to justice<\/p>\n
to a very large section of the society which was otherwise not<\/p>\n
getting any benefit from the judicial system.                      We would like<\/p>\n
to term this as the first phase or the golden era of the<\/p>\n
public    interest     litigation.          We   would      briefly    deal     with<\/p>\n
important cases decided by this Court in the first phase after<\/p>\n
broadening the definition of `aggrieved person’.                           We would<\/p>\n
also deal with cases how this Court prevented any abuse of the<\/p>\n
public interest litigation?\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
36.       This Court in Akhil Bharatiya Soshit Karamchari Sangh<\/p>\n
(Railway) v. Union of India & Others AIR<\/a> 1981 SC 298 at page<\/p>\n
317, held that our current processual jurisprudence is not of<\/p>\n
individualistic       Anglo-Indian     mould.      It       is   broad-based      and<\/p>\n
people-oriented,       and    envisions      access      to      justice    through<\/p>\n
`class      actions’,        `public        interest         litigation’,         and<\/p>\n
`representative proceedings’.           Indeed, little Indians in large<\/p>\n
numbers     seeking     remedies       in    courts         through    collective<\/p>\n
proceedings, instead of being driven to an expensive plurality<\/p>\n
of litigations, is an affirmation of participative justice in<\/p>\n
our democracy.         We have no hesitation in holding that the<\/p>\n
narrow concepts of `cause of action’, `person aggrieved’ and<\/p>\n
individual     litigation       are    becoming        obsolescent         in   some<\/p>\n
jurisdictions.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
37.       In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India & Others AIR<\/a><\/p>\n
1984   SC   802,   this      court    entertained       a     petition     even   of<\/p>\n
unregistered    Association      espousing       the    cause     of   over     down-
\ntrodden or its members observing that the cause of “little<\/p>\n
Indians” can be espoused by any person having no interest in<\/p>\n
the matter.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
38.         In the said case, this court further held that where a<\/p>\n
public interest litigation alleging that certain workmen are<\/p>\n
living in bondage and under inhuman conditions is initiated it<\/p>\n
is    not    expected      of   the   Government     that     it    should    raise<\/p>\n
preliminary      objection         that   no    fundamental     rights   of       the<\/p>\n
petitioners or the workmen on whose behalf the petition has<\/p>\n
been    filed,      have    been    infringed.       On   the      contrary,      the<\/p>\n
Government should welcome an inquiry by the Court, so that if<\/p>\n
it is found that there are in fact bonded labourers or even if<\/p>\n
the workers are not bonded in the strict sense of the term as<\/p>\n
defined in the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976 but<\/p>\n
they are made to provide forced labour or any consigned to a<\/p>\n
life of utter deprivation and degradation, such a situation<\/p>\n
can be set right by the Government.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
39.         Public interest litigation is not in the nature of<\/p>\n
adversary litigation but it is a challenge and an opportunity<\/p>\n
to the government and its officers to make basic human rights<\/p>\n
meaningful     to    the    deprived      and   vulnerable    sections       of   the<\/p>\n
community and to assure them social and economic justice which<\/p>\n
is the signature tune of our Constitution.                   The Government and<\/p>\n
its officers must welcome public interest litigation because<\/p>\n
it would provide them an occasion to examine whether the poor<\/p>\n
and the down-trodden are getting their social and economic
\nentitlements or whether they are continuing to remain victims<\/p>\n
of    deception      and   exploitation         at   the   hands    of   strong      and<\/p>\n
powerful   sections        of    the    community     and    whether     social      and<\/p>\n
economic justice has become a meaningful reality for them or<\/p>\n
it has remained merely a teasing illusion and a promise of<\/p>\n
unreality,      so    that      in    case    the    complaint      in   the    public<\/p>\n
interest litigation is found to be true, they can in discharge<\/p>\n
of their constitutional               obligation root out exploitation and<\/p>\n
injustice and ensure to the weaker sections their rights and<\/p>\n
entitlements.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
40.       In Fertilizer Corporation Kamagar Union (Regd., Sindri<\/p>\n
& Others v. Union of India & Others AIR<\/a> 1981 SC 844, this<\/p>\n
court observed that “public interest litigation is part of the<\/p>\n
process    of     participative         justice      and    `standing’     in    civil<\/p>\n
litigation of that pattern must have liberal reception at the<\/p>\n
judicial doorsteps”.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
41.       In Ramsharan Autyanuprasi & Another v. Union of India<\/p>\n
& Others AIR<\/a> 1989 SC 549, this court observed that the public<\/p>\n
interest       litigation        is     for     making      basic    human      rights<\/p>\n
meaningful      to   the     deprived     and    vulnerable        sections     of   the<\/p>\n
community and to assure them social, economic and political<\/p>\n
justice.\n<\/p>\n
\nEVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN INDIA<\/p>\n
42.       The origin and evolution of Public Interest Litigation<\/p>\n
in     India     emanated        from        realization      of     constitutional<\/p>\n
obligation by the Judiciary towards the vast sections of the
\nsociety    –     the     poor   and    the   marginalized       sections         of   the<\/p>\n
society.         This jurisdiction has been created and carved out<\/p>\n
by the judicial creativity and craftsmanship.                       In M. C. Mehta<\/p>\n
& Another v. Union of India & Others AIR<\/a> 1987 SC 1086, this<\/p>\n
Court observed that Article 32 does not merely confer power on<\/p>\n
this     Court      to     issue     direction,     order     or        writ    for   the<\/p>\n
enforcement of fundamental rights.                   Instead, it also lays a<\/p>\n
constitutional           obligation     on   this     Court        to     protect     the<\/p>\n
fundamental rights of the people. The court asserted that, in<\/p>\n
realization         of   this   constitutional      obligation,           “it   has   all<\/p>\n
incidental and ancillary powers including the power to forge<\/p>\n
new remedies and fashion new strategies designed to enforce<\/p>\n
the fundamental rights”.               The Court realized that because of<\/p>\n
extreme poverty, a large number of sections of society cannot<\/p>\n
approach the court.                The fundamental rights have no meaning<\/p>\n
for them and in order to preserve and protect the fundamental<\/p>\n
rights    of     the     marginalized     section     of    society       by    judicial<\/p>\n
innovation, the courts by judicial innovation and creativity<\/p>\n
started giving necessary directions and passing orders in the<\/p>\n
public interest.\n<\/p>\n
43.       The development of public interest litigation has been<\/p>\n
extremely significant development in the history of the Indian<\/p>\n
jurisprudence.             The decisions of the Supreme Court in the<\/p>\n
1970’s loosened the strict locus standi requirements to permit<\/p>\n
filing of petitions on behalf of marginalized and deprived<\/p>\n
sections       of    the    society     by   public        spirited       individuals,<\/p>\n
institutions and\/or bodies.               The higher Courts exercised wide
\npowers   given   to    them   under   Articles   32    and   226    of   the<\/p>\n
Constitution.      The sort of remedies sought from the courts in<\/p>\n
the public interest litigation goes beyond award of remedies<\/p>\n
to the affected individuals and groups.               In suitable cases,<\/p>\n
the courts have also given guidelines and directions.                    The<\/p>\n
courts have monitored implementation of legislation and even<\/p>\n
formulated guidelines in absence of legislation.             If the cases<\/p>\n
of the decades of 70s and 80s are analyzed, most of the public<\/p>\n
interest litigation cases which were entertained by the courts<\/p>\n
are   pertaining      to   enforcement   of   fundamental     rights      of<\/p>\n
marginalized and deprived sections of the society.                 This can<\/p>\n
be termed as the first phase of the public interest litigation<\/p>\n
in India.\n<\/p>\n
44.      The Indian Supreme Court broadened the traditional rule<\/p>\n
of standing and the definition of “person aggrieved”.<\/p>\n
45.      In this judgment, we would like to deal with the origin<\/p>\n
and development of public interest litigation.                We deem it<\/p>\n
appropriate to broadly divide the public interest litigation<\/p>\n
in three phases.\n<\/p>\n
            Phase-I: It deals with cases of this Court
\n            where directions and orders were passed
\n            primarily to protect fundamental rights under
\n            Article 21 of the marginalized groups and
\n            sections of the society who because of
\n            extreme poverty, illiteracy and ignorance
\n            cannot approach this court or the High
\n            Courts.\n<\/p>\n
            Phase-II: It deals with the cases relating to
\n            protection,    preservation    of    ecology,
\n            environment, forests, marine life, wildlife,
\n            mountains, rivers, historical monuments etc.
\n            etc.\n<\/p>\n
           Phase-III: It deals with the directions issued
\n           by the Courts in maintaining the probity,
\n           transparency and integrity in governance.<\/p>\n
46.     Thereafter, we also propose to deal with the aspects of<\/p>\n
abuse of the Public Interest Litigation and remedial measures<\/p>\n
by which its misuse can be prevented or curbed.<\/p>\n
DISCUSSION OF SOME IMPORTANT CASES OF PHASE-I<\/p>\n
47.     The   court   while   interpreting   the   words    “person<\/p>\n
aggrieved” in Jasbhai Motibhai Desai v. Roshan Kumar, Haji<\/p>\n
Bashir Ahmed & Others<\/a> (1976) 1 SCC 671 observed that “the<\/p>\n
traditional rule is flexible enough to take in those cases<\/p>\n
where the applicant has been prejudicially affected by an act<\/p>\n
or omission of an authority, even though he has no proprietary<\/p>\n
or even a fiduciary interest in the subject-matter.           That<\/p>\n
apart, in exceptional cases even a stranger or a person who<\/p>\n
was not a party to the proceedings before the authority, but<\/p>\n
has a substantial and genuine interest in the subject-matter<\/p>\n
of the proceedings will be covered by this rule”.<\/p>\n
48.     The rule of locus standi was relaxed in Bar Council of<\/p>\n
Maharashtra v. M. V. Dabholkar & Others<\/a> 1976 SCR 306.           The<\/p>\n
court observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “Traditionally used to the adversary system, we
\n      search for individual persons aggrieved. But a new
\n      class of litigation public interest litigation-
\n      where a section or whole of the community is
\n      involved (such as consumers’ organisations or
\n      NAACP-National Association for Advancement of
\n      Coloured   People-in   America),   emerges   in   a
\n      developing country like ours, this pattern of
\n      public oriented litigation better fulfils the rule
\n      of law if it is to run close to the rule of life.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
               xxx             xxx              xxx
\n       “The possible apprehension that widening legal
\n       standing with a public connotation may unloose a
\n       flood of litigation which may overwhelm the judges
\n       is misplaced because public resort to court to
\n       suppress public mischief is a tribute to the
\n       justice system.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
49.      The       court    in        this   case         observed      that           “procedural<\/p>\n
prescriptions        are    handmaids,             not    mistresses         of    justice         and<\/p>\n
failure of fair play is the spirit in which Courts must view<\/p>\n
procession deviances.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
50.      In    The       Mumbai        Kamgar        Sabha,         Bombay        v.    Abdulbhai<\/p>\n
Faizullabhai        &    Others        AIR<\/a>   1976        SC    1455,    this           Court      made<\/p>\n
conscious      efforts      to        improve       the    judicial      access             for    the<\/p>\n
masses by relaxing the traditional rule of locus standi.<\/p>\n
51.      In Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration & OthersAIR<\/a> 1978<\/p>\n
SC    1675,   the       Court    departed          from       the   traditional             rule    of<\/p>\n
standing      by    authorizing          community            litigation.               The    Court<\/p>\n
entertained a writ petition from a prisoner, a disinterested<\/p>\n
party, objecting to the torture of a fellow prisoner.                                              The<\/p>\n
Court    entertained            the     writ       after       reasoning           that       “these<\/p>\n
‘martyr’ litigations possess a beneficent potency beyond the<\/p>\n
individual      litigant         and     their       consideration            on        the    wider<\/p>\n
representative           basis         strengthens             the      rule           of      law.”<\/p>\n
Significantly, citing “people’s vicarious involvement in our<\/p>\n
justice system with a broad-based concept of locus standi so<\/p>\n
necessary in a democracy where the masses are in many senses<\/p>\n
weak,”   the       Court   permitted           a    human      rights    organization               to<\/p>\n
intervene in the case on behalf of the victim.\n<\/p>\n
52.       In   Hussainara    Khatoon    &   Others   v.   Home   Secretary,<\/p>\n
State of Bihar, Patna AIR<\/a> 1979 SC 1369, P. N. Bhagwati, J. has<\/p>\n
observed that “today, unfortunately, in our country the poor<\/p>\n
are priced out of the judicial system with the result that<\/p>\n
they are losing faith in the capacity of our legal system to<\/p>\n
(sic) about changes in their life conditions and to deliver<\/p>\n
justice to them. The poor in their contact with the legal<\/p>\n
system have always been on the wrong side of the line. They<\/p>\n
have always come across ‘law for the poor” rather than law of<\/p>\n
the poor’. The law is regarded by them as something mysterious<\/p>\n
and forbidding–always taking something away from them and not<\/p>\n
as a positive and constructive social device for changing the<\/p>\n
social economic order and improving their life conditions by<\/p>\n
conferring rights and benefits on them. The result is that the<\/p>\n
legal system has lost its credibility for the weaker section<\/p>\n
of the community.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
53.       In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration AIR<\/a> 1980<\/p>\n
SC 1535, a prisoner sent a telegram to a judge complaining of<\/p>\n
forced    handcuff   on     him   and   demanded     implicit    protection<\/p>\n
against humiliation and torture.              The court gave necessary<\/p>\n
directions by relaxing the strict rule of locus standi.<\/p>\n
54.       In Municipal Council, Ratlam v. Vardhichand & Others<\/p>\n
AIR<\/a> 1980 SC 1622, Krishna Iyer, J. relaxed the rule of locus<\/p>\n
standi:\n<\/p>\n
      “The truth is that a few profound issues of
\n      processual   jurisprudence of   great  strategic
\n      significance to our legal system face us and we
\n      must zero-in on them as they involve problems of
\n      access to justice for the people beyond the
\n      blinkered rules of ‘standing’ of British Indian
\n      vintage. If the center of gravity of justice is to
\n      shift, as the Preamble to the Constitution
\n      mandates, from the traditional individualism of
\n      locus standi to the community orientation of
\n      public interest litigation, these issues must be
\n      considered…..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
               xxx               xxx                xxx\n               xxx               xxx                xxx\n\n<\/pre>\n
      Why drive common people to public interest action?
\n      Where Directive Principles have found statutory
\n      expression in Do’s and Don’ts the court will not
\n      sit idly by and allow municipal government to
\n      become   a  statutory   mockery.   The  law   will
\n      relentlessly be enforced and the plea of poor
\n      finance will be poor alibi when people in misery
\n      cry for justice……”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
55.     In Fertilizer Corporation Kamgar Union (supra) Krishna<\/p>\n
Iyer, J. and Bhagwati, J. had to answer in affirmative as to<\/p>\n
whether the workers in a factory owned by government had locus<\/p>\n
standi to question the legality of sale of the factory. They<\/p>\n
concluded with a quote: `Henry Peter Brougham: Nieman Reports,<\/p>\n
April 1956 as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “It was the boast of Augustus that he found Rome
\n      of brick and left it of marble. But how much
\n      nobler will be the sovereign’s boast when he shall
\n      have it to say that he found law dear and left it
\n      cheap; found it a sealed book and left it a living
\n      letter; found it the patrimony of the rich and
\n      left it the inheritance of the poor; found it the
\n      two-edged sword of craft and oppression and left
\n      it the staff of honesty and the shield of
\n      innocence.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
56.     In   People’s   Union   for    Democratic   Rights   &   Others<\/p>\n
(supra), this Court observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “that public interest litigation which is a
\n      strategic arm of the legal aid movement and which
\n      is intended to bring justice within the reach of
\nthe poor masses, who constitute the low visibility
\narea of humanity, is a totally different kind of
\nlitigation     from     the    ordinary     traditional
\nlitigation which is essentially of an adversary
\ncharacter where there is a dispute between two
\nlitigating parties, one making claim or seeking
\nrelief against the other and that other opposing
\nsuch claim or resisting such relief. Public
\ninterest litigation is brought before the court
\nnot for the purpose of enforcing the right of one
\nindividual against another as happens in the case
\nof ordinary litigation, but it is intended to
\npromote   and   vindicate    public   interest    which
\ndemands that violations of constitutional or legal
\nrights of large numbers of people who are poor,
\nignorant   or    in   a   socially   or    economically
\ndisadvantaged position should not go unnoticed and
\nun-redressed. That would be destructive of the
\nRule of Law which forms one of the essential
\nelements of public interest in any democratic form
\nof government. The Rule of Law does not mean that
\nthe protection of the law must be available only
\nto a fortunate few or that the law should be
\nallowed to be prostituted by the vested interests
\nfor protecting and upholding the status quo under
\nthe guise of enforcement of their civil and
\npolitical rights. The poor too have civil and
\npolitical rights and the Rule of Law is meant for
\nthem also, though today it exists only on paper
\nand not in reality. If the sugar barons and the
\nalcohol kings have the Fundamental Right to carry
\non their business and to fatten their purses by
\nexploiting    the    consuming    public,    have   the
\n‘chamars’ belonging to the lowest strata of
\nsociety no Fundamental Right to earn an honest
\nliving through their sweat and toil? The former
\ncan approach the courts with a formidable army of
\ndistinguished lawyers paid in four or five figures
\nper day and if their right of exploit is upheld
\nagainst   the    government   under    the   label   of
\nFundamental Right, the courts are praised for
\ntheir boldness and courage and their independence
\nand fearlessness are applauded and acclaimed. But,
\nif the Fundamental Right of the poor and helpless
\nvictims of injustice is sought to be enforced by
\npublic   interest     litigation,    the    so   called
\nchampions of human rights frown upon it as waste
\nof time of the highest court in the land, which,
\naccording to them, should not engage itself in
\nsuch small and trifling matters. Moreover, these
\nself-styled human rights activists forget that
\ncivil   and    political    rights,    priceless    and
\ninvaluable as they are for freedom and democracy,
\nsimply do not exist for the vast masses of our
\n      people. Large numbers of men, women and children
\n      who constitute the bulk of our population are
\n      today living a sub-human existence in conditions
\n      of abject poverty: utter grinding poverty has
\n      broken their back and sapped their moral fibre.
\n      They have no faith in the existing social and
\n      economic system. What civil and political rights
\n      are these poor and deprived sections of humanity
\n      going to enforce?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
57.         Justice Bhagwati of this court in his judgment in S.P.<\/p>\n
Gupta    v.    President      of    India   &   Others     AIR<\/a>   1982    SC    149<\/p>\n
altogether      dismissed     the   traditional     rule   of    standing,     and<\/p>\n
replaced it with a liberalized modern rule.                 In this case, the<\/p>\n
Court awarded standing to advocates challenging the transfer<\/p>\n
of judges during Emergency.             Describing the traditional rule<\/p>\n
as an “ancient vintage” of “an era when private law dominated<\/p>\n
the legal scene and public law had not been born,” the Court<\/p>\n
concluded that the traditional rule of standing was obsolete.<\/p>\n
In    its     place,   the    Court    prescribed    the     modern     rule   on<\/p>\n
standing:\n<\/p>\n
      “where a legal wrong or a legal injury is caused
\n      to a person or to a determinate class of persons
\n      by reason of violation of any constitutional or
\n      legal   right  or   any  burden    is  imposed   in
\n      contravention of any constitutional or legal
\n      provision or without authority of law or any such
\n      legal wrong or legal injury or illegal burden is
\n      threatened and such person or determinate class of
\n      persons is by reason of poverty, helplessness or
\n      disability    or    socially     or    economically
\n      disadvantaged position, unable to approach the
\n      Court for relief, any member of the public can
\n      maintain   an  application   for    an  appropriate
\n      direction, order or writ, in the High Court under
\n      Article 226, and in case of breach of any
\n      fundamental right, in this Court under Article\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      32.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
58.         Finding    that   the   practicing    advocates      “are    vitally
\ninterested in the maintenance of a fearless and an independent<\/p>\n
Judiciary,” the Court granted standing to the advocates under<\/p>\n
the modern rule to bring cases challenging the transfer of<\/p>\n
judges   during   Emergency.   In   this   case,   this   Court   further<\/p>\n
observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “……it must now be regarded as well settled law
\n      where a person who has suffered a legal wrong or a
\n      legal injury or whose legal right or legally
\n      protected interest is violated, is unable to
\n      approach the Court on account of some disability
\n      or it is not practicable for him to move the Court
\n      for some other sufficient reasons, such as his
\n      socially or economically disadvantaged position,
\n      some other person can invoke assistance of the
\n      Court for the purpose of providing judicial
\n      redress to the person wronged or injured, so that
\n      the legal wrong or injury caused to such person
\n      does not go un-redressed and justice is done to
\n      him.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
              xxx               xxx                xxx\n              xxx               xxx                xxx\n\n<\/pre>\n
      ……Today a vast revolution is taking place in the
\n      judicial process; the theatre of the law is fast
\n      changing and the problems of the poor are coming
\n      to the forefront. The Court has to innovate new
\n      methods and devise new strategies for the purpose
\n      of providing access to justice to large masses of
\n      people who are denied their basic human rights and
\n      to whom freedom and liberty have no meaning. The
\n      only way in which this can be done is by
\n      entertaining writ petitions and even letters from
\n      public      spirited  individuals  seeking   judicial
\n      redress for the benefit of persons who have
\n      suffered a legal wrong or a legal injury or whose
\n      constitutional or legal right has been violated
\n      but who by reason of their poverty or socially or
\n      economically disadvantaged position are unable to
\n      approach the Court for relief. It is in this
\n      spirit that the Court has been entertaining
\n      letters for Judicial redress and treating them as
\n      writ petitions and we hope and trust that the High
\n      Courts of the country will also adopt this pro-
\n      active, goal-oriented approach.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
59.      In Anil Yadav & Others v. State of Bihar and Bachcho
\nLal Das, Superintendent, Central Jail, Bhagalpur, Bihar (1982)<\/p>\n
2 SCC 195, a petition was filed regarding blinding of under-<\/p>\n
trial prisoners at Bhagalpur in the State of Bihar.           According<\/p>\n
to the allegation, their eyes were pierced with needles and<\/p>\n
acid poured into them.        The Court had sent a team of the<\/p>\n
Registrar and Assistant Registrar to visit the Central Jail,<\/p>\n
Bhagalpur and submit a report to the Court. The Court passed<\/p>\n
comprehensive orders to ensure that such barbarous and inhuman<\/p>\n
acts are not repeated.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
60.     In Munna & Others v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others,<\/p>\n
(1982) 1 SCC 545, the allegation was that the juvenile under-<\/p>\n
trial prisoners have been sent in the Kanpur Central Jail<\/p>\n
instead of Children’s Home in Kanpur and those children were<\/p>\n
sexually exploited by the adult prisoners.          This Court ruled<\/p>\n
that in no case except the exceptional ones mentioned in the<\/p>\n
Act, a child can be sent to jail.          The Court further observed<\/p>\n
that the children below the age of 16 years must be detained<\/p>\n
only in the Children’s Homes or other place of safety.             The<\/p>\n
Court also observed that “a Nation which is not concerned with<\/p>\n
the welfare of the children cannot look forward to a bright<\/p>\n
future.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
61.     Thereafter, in a series of cases, the Court treated<\/p>\n
Post Cards and letters as writ petitions and gave directions<\/p>\n
and orders.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
62.     In Sheela Barse v. State of Maharashtra AIR<\/a> 1983 SC<\/p>\n
378,   Sheela   Barse,   a   journalist,    complained   of   custodial
\nviolence    to    women    prisoners   in    Bombay.        Her   letter    was<\/p>\n
treated as a writ petition and the directions were given by<\/p>\n
the court.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
63.       In Dr. Upendra Baxi (I) v. State of Uttar Pradesh &<\/p>\n
Another<\/a> 1983 (2) SCC 308 two distinguished law Professors of<\/p>\n
the   Delhi      University    addressed      a   letter    to    this     court<\/p>\n
regarding     inhuman     conditions      which   were   prevalent    in    Agra<\/p>\n
Protective Home for Women.          The court heard the petition on a<\/p>\n
number of days and gave important directions by which the<\/p>\n
living conditions of the inmates were significantly improved<\/p>\n
in the Agra Protective Home for Women.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
64.       In Veena Sethi (Mrs.) v. State of Bihar & Others AIR<\/a><\/p>\n
1983 SC 339, some prisoners were detained in jail for a period<\/p>\n
ranging from 37 years to 19 years.                 They were arrested in<\/p>\n
connection with certain offences and were declared insane at<\/p>\n
the time of their trial and were put in Central Jail with<\/p>\n
directions to submit half-yearly medical reports.                    Some were<\/p>\n
convicted, some acquitted and trials were pending against some<\/p>\n
of them.      After they were declared sane no action for their<\/p>\n
release was taken by the authorities.               This Court ruled that<\/p>\n
the prisoners remained in jail for no fault of theirs and<\/p>\n
because     of    the     callous   and     lethargic    attitude     of    the<\/p>\n
authorities.       Even if they are proved guilty the period they<\/p>\n
had undergone would exceed the maximum imprisonment that they<\/p>\n
might be awarded.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
65.       In Labourers Working on Salal Hydro Project v. State
\nof Jammu & Kashmir & Others AIR<\/a> 1984 SC 177, on the basis of a<\/p>\n
news item in the Indian Express regarding condition of the<\/p>\n
construction workers, this Court took notice and observed that<\/p>\n
the construction work is a hazardous employment and no child<\/p>\n
below the age of 14 years can therefore be allowed to be<\/p>\n
employed in construction work by reason of the prohibition<\/p>\n
enacted in Article 24 and this constitutional prohibition must<\/p>\n
be enforced by the Central Government.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
66.      In Shri Sachidanand Pandey & Another v. The State of<\/p>\n
West   Bengal    &     Others    (1987)    2    SCC    295,    in    the    concurring<\/p>\n
judgment,        Justice        Khalid,    J.    observed       that       the   public<\/p>\n
interest litigation should be encouraged when the Courts are<\/p>\n
apprised of gross violation of fundamental rights by a group<\/p>\n
or a class action or when basic human rights are invaded or<\/p>\n
when there are complaints of such acts as shock the judicial<\/p>\n
conscience      that    the     courts,    especially         this    Court,     should<\/p>\n
leave aside procedural shackles and hear such petitions and<\/p>\n
extend   its    jurisdiction       under       all    available      provisions     for<\/p>\n
remedying      the     hardships     and    miseries       of       the    needy,   the<\/p>\n
underdog and the neglected.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
67.      The case of B. R. Kapoor & Another v. Union of India &<\/p>\n
Others AIR 1990 SC 752 relates to public interest litigation<\/p>\n
regarding mismanagement of the hospital for mental diseases<\/p>\n
located at Shahdara, Delhi.               This Court appointed a Committee<\/p>\n
of Experts which highlighted the problems of availability of<\/p>\n
water, existing sanitary conditions, food, kitchen, medical
\nand   nursing        care,     ill-treatment            of       patients,          attempts    of<\/p>\n
inmates    to    commit       suicide,          death      of    patients       in    hospital,<\/p>\n
availability of doctors and nurses etc.                               The Court went on to<\/p>\n
recommend the Union of India to take over the hospital and<\/p>\n
model it on the lines of NIMHANS at Bangalore.<\/p>\n
68.       In Smt. Nilabati Behera alias Lalita Behera v. State<\/p>\n
of    Orissa     &    Others        AIR<\/a>       1993    SC       1960,     this       Court     gave<\/p>\n
directions       that        for     contravention              of      human       rights     and<\/p>\n
fundamental freedoms by the State and its agencies, a claim<\/p>\n
for monetary compensation in petition under Article 32 of 226<\/p>\n
is justified.                In a concurring judgment, Anand, J. (as he<\/p>\n
then was) observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
        “The old doctrine of only relegating the aggrieved to
\nthe remedies available in civil law limits the role of the
\ncourts too much as protector and guarantor of the indefeasible
\nrights of the citizens.    The courts have the obligation to
\nsatisfy the social aspirations of the citizens because the
\ncourts and the law are for the people and expected to respond
\nto their aspirations.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
69.       In    Punjab       and     Haryana         High       Court    Bar     Association,<\/p>\n
Chandigarh through its Secretary v. State of Punjab & Others<\/p>\n
(1994)    1     SCC   616,         the       allegation         was    that     a    practicing<\/p>\n
advocate,      his    wife     and       a    child     aged     about     two       years    were<\/p>\n
abducted and murdered.                   This Court directed the Director of<\/p>\n
the CBI to investigate and report to the Court.<\/p>\n
70.       In Navkiran Singh & Others v. State of Punjab through<\/p>\n
Chief    Secretary       &    Another          (1995)      4    SCC     591,    in     a    letter<\/p>\n
petition the advocates from the Punjab & Haryana High Court<\/p>\n
expressed       concerned           about       the      kidnapping\/elimination                 of
\nadvocates in the State of Punjab.                This Court directed the<\/p>\n
CBI to investigate the matter and also directed the State of<\/p>\n
Punjab to provide security to those advocates who genuinely<\/p>\n
apprehend   danger      to    their   lives   from   militants\/anti-social<\/p>\n
elements.         The Court also observed that if the request for<\/p>\n
security is recommended by the District Judge or the Registrar<\/p>\n
of the High Court, it may treated as genuine and the State<\/p>\n
Government may consider the same sympathetically.<\/p>\n
71.     In Delhi Domestic Working Women’s Forum v. Union of<\/p>\n
India & Others<\/a> (1995) 1 SCC 14, the Court expressed serious<\/p>\n
concern about the violence against women.                 The Court gave<\/p>\n
significant   directions        and   observed    that   compensation   for<\/p>\n
victims shall be awarded by the court on conviction of the<\/p>\n
offender    and    by   the    Criminal   Injuries     Compensation   Board<\/p>\n
whether or not a conviction has taken place.               The Board will<\/p>\n
take into account pain, suffering and shock as well as loss of<\/p>\n
earnings due to pregnancy and the expenses of child birth if<\/p>\n
this occurred as a result of the rape.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
72.     In Citizens for Democracy             v. State of Assam & Others<\/a><\/p>\n
(1995) 3 SCC 743, this Court held that handcuffing and tying<\/p>\n
with ropes is inhuman and in utter violation of human rights<\/p>\n
guaranteed under the international law and the law of the<\/p>\n
land.   The Court in para 15 observed as under:<\/p>\n
      “15.    ….. The handcuffing and in addition tying
\n      with ropes of the patient-prisoners who are lodged
\n      in the hospital is, the least we can say, inhuman
\n      and in utter violation of the human rights
\n      guaranteed      to   an    individual   under   the
\n      international law and the law of the land. We are,
\n      therefore, of the view that the action of the
\n      respondents was wholly unjustified and against
\n      law.   We direct that the detenus – in case they
\n      are still in hospital – be relieved from the
\n      fetters and the ropes with immediate effect.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
73.       In Paramjit Kaur (Mrs.) v. State of Punjab & Others<\/a><\/p>\n
(1996) 7 SCC 20, a telegram was sent to a Judge of this Court<\/p>\n
which   was    treated    as    a     habeas    corpus      petition.           The<\/p>\n
allegation was that the husband of the appellant was kidnapped<\/p>\n
by some persons in police uniform from a busy residential area<\/p>\n
of Amritsar.        The Court took serious note of it and directed<\/p>\n
the   investigation      of    the    case     by    the   Central    Bureau     of<\/p>\n
Investigation.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
74.       In M. C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu & Others<\/a> (1996) 6<\/p>\n
SCC 756, the Court was dealing with the cases of child labour<\/p>\n
and   the   Court    found     that   the    child       labour    emanates   from<\/p>\n
extreme poverty, lack of opportunity for gainful employment<\/p>\n
and intermittency of income and low standards of living.                        The<\/p>\n
Court observed that it is possible to identify child labour in<\/p>\n
the organized sector, which forms a minuscule of the total<\/p>\n
child labour, the problem relates mainly to the unorganized<\/p>\n
sector where utmost attention needs to be paid.<\/p>\n
75.       In D. K. Basu v. State of West Bengal (1997) 1 SCC 416,<\/p>\n
this Court observed that the custodial death is perhaps one of<\/p>\n
the worst crimes in a civilized society governed by the rule<\/p>\n
of law.     The rights inherent in Articles 21 and 22(1) of the<\/p>\n
Constitution     require       to     be     jealously       and    scrupulously<\/p>\n
protected.      The    expression      “life        or   personal    liberty”   in
\nArticle 21 includes the right to live with human dignity and<\/p>\n
thus it would also include within itself a guarantee against<\/p>\n
torture and assault by the State or its functionaries.                            The<\/p>\n
precious right guaranteed by Article 21 cannot be denied to<\/p>\n
convicts, undertrials, detenus and other prisoners in custody,<\/p>\n
except    according     to    the    procedure    established          by   law   by<\/p>\n
placing such reasonable restrictions as are permitted by law.<\/p>\n
The Court gave very significant directions which are mandatory<\/p>\n
for all concerned to follow.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
76.      In Vishaka & Others v. State of Rajasthan & Others<\/a><\/p>\n
(1997)    6    SCC   241,     this   Court    gave      directions      regarding<\/p>\n
enforcement of the fundamental rights of the working women<\/p>\n
under Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.                       The Court<\/p>\n
gave    comprehensive       guidelines      and   norms    and    directed        for<\/p>\n
protection and enforcement of these rights of the women at<\/p>\n
their workplaces.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
77.      In a recently decided case Prajwala v. Union of India<\/p>\n
& Others<\/a> (2009) 4 SCC 798, a petition was filed in this Court<\/p>\n
in which it was realized that despite commencement of the<\/p>\n
Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of<\/p>\n
Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995, disabled people are<\/p>\n
not    given   preferential     treatment.        The     Court    directed       the<\/p>\n
State Governments\/local authorities to allot land for various<\/p>\n
purposes indicted in section 43 of the Act and various items<\/p>\n
indicated in section 43, preferential treatment be given to<\/p>\n
the    disabled      people    and    the     land   shall        be    given      at
\nconcessional rates.           The percentage of reservation may be left<\/p>\n
to the discretion of the State Governments.                           However, total<\/p>\n
percentage of disabled persons shall be taken into account<\/p>\n
while deciding the percentage.\n<\/p>\n
78.       In Avinash Mehrotra v. Union of India & Others<\/a> (2009) 6<\/p>\n
SCC   398,     a    public    interest      litigation    was    filed,     when     93<\/p>\n
children were burnt alive in a fire at a private school in<\/p>\n
Tamil Nadu.         This happened because the school did not have the<\/p>\n
minimum safety standard measures.                      The court, in order to<\/p>\n
protect future tragedies in all such schools, gave directions<\/p>\n
that it is the fundamental right of each and every child to<\/p>\n
receive education free from fear of security and safety, hence<\/p>\n
the   Government       should     implement      National     Building     Code     and<\/p>\n
comply with the said orders in constructions of schools for<\/p>\n
children.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
79.       All      these    abovementioned       cases   demonstrate       that     the<\/p>\n
courts,      in    order     to   protect      and   preserve    the     fundamental<\/p>\n
rights of citizens, while relaxing the rule of locus standi,<\/p>\n
passed a number of directions to the concerned authorities.<\/p>\n
80.       We       would    not   like    to     overburden     the     judgment     by<\/p>\n
multiplying         these    cases,   but      brief   resume    of     these     cases<\/p>\n
demonstrate         that     in   order     to    preserve      and     protect    the<\/p>\n
fundamental rights of marginalized, deprived and poor sections<\/p>\n
of the society, the courts relaxed the traditional rule of<\/p>\n
locus standi and broadened the definition of aggrieved persons<\/p>\n
and gave directions and orders.                   We would like to term cases
\nof this period       where the        court relaxed      the rule          of locus<\/p>\n
standi as the first phase of the public interest litigation.<\/p>\n
The Supreme Court and the High Courts earned great respect and<\/p>\n
acquired great credibility in the eyes of public because of<\/p>\n
their   innovative         efforts     to    protect     and        preserve       the<\/p>\n
fundamental       rights    of    people    belonging        to    the     poor    and<\/p>\n
marginalized sections of the society.\n<\/p>\n
PHASE-II – DIRECTIONS            TO   PRESERVE    AND   PROTECT      ECOLOGY       AND
\nENVIRONMENT<\/p>\n
81.     The second phase of public interest litigation started<\/p>\n
sometime     in    the     1980’s     and   it   related      to     the     courts’<\/p>\n
innovation    and    creativity,       where     directions       were     given    to<\/p>\n
protect ecology and environment.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
82.     There are a number of cases where the court tried to<\/p>\n
protect forest cover, ecology and environment and orders have<\/p>\n
been passed in that respect.            As a matter of fact, the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court has a regular Forest Bench (Green Bench) and regularly<\/p>\n
passes orders and directions regarding various forest cover,<\/p>\n
illegal mining, destruction of marine life and wild life etc.<\/p>\n
Reference of some cases is given just for illustration.<\/p>\n
83.     In the second phase, the Supreme Court under Article 32<\/p>\n
and   the   High    Court    under    Article     226   of    the    Constitution<\/p>\n
passed a number of orders and directions in this respect.<\/p>\n
84.     The recent example is the conversion of all public<\/p>\n
transport in the Metropolitan City of Delhi from diesel engine
\nto CNG engine on the basis of the order of the High Court of<\/p>\n
Delhi to ensure that the pollution level is curtailed and this<\/p>\n
is being completely observed for the last several years.                     Only<\/p>\n
CNG vehicles are permitted to ply on Delhi roads for public<\/p>\n
transport.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
85.      Louise Erdrich Bigogress, an environmentalist has aptly<\/p>\n
observed that “grass and sky are two canvasses into which the<\/p>\n
rich details of the earth are drawn.”                 In 1980s, this court<\/p>\n
paid special attention to the problem of air pollution, water<\/p>\n
pollution, environmental degradation and passed a number of<\/p>\n
directions     and   orders   to    ensure    that    environment      ecology,<\/p>\n
wildlife should be saved, preserved and protected.                    According<\/p>\n
to court, the scale of injustice occurring on the Indian soil<\/p>\n
is catastrophic.       Each day hundreds of thousands of factories<\/p>\n
are functioning without pollution control devices.                    Thousands<\/p>\n
of Indians go to mines and undertake hazardous work without<\/p>\n
proper   safety      protection.    Everyday       millions    of    litres    of<\/p>\n
untreated      raw   effluents     are   dumped      into    our    rivers    and<\/p>\n
millions       of tons of hazardous waste are simply dumped on the<\/p>\n
earth.       The environment has become so degraded that instead<\/p>\n
of nurturing us it is poisoning us. In this scenario, in a<\/p>\n
large number of cases, the Supreme Court intervened in the<\/p>\n
matter and issued innumerable directions.<\/p>\n
86.      We give brief resume of some of the important cases<\/p>\n
decided by this court.             One of the earliest cases brought<\/p>\n
before   the    Supreme   Court     related   to     oleum    gas   leakage    in
\nDelhi.          In     order      to    prevent          the      damage     being       done    to<\/p>\n
environment and the life and the health of the people, the<\/p>\n
court passed number of orders.                           This is well-known as M.C.<\/p>\n
Mehta & Another v. Union of India & Others AIR<\/a> 1987 SC 1086.<\/p>\n
The     court     in     this       case      has       clearly      laid        down    that    an<\/p>\n
enterprise       which       is     engaged        in    a       hazardous       or     inherently<\/p>\n
dangerous       industry          which      poses      a    potential       threat        to   the<\/p>\n
health and safety of the persons working in the factory and<\/p>\n
residing in the surrounding area owes an absolute and non-<\/p>\n
delegable duty to the community to ensure that no such harm<\/p>\n
results    to        anyone       on    account         of       hazardous       or     inherently<\/p>\n
dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken.                                       The<\/p>\n
court     directed           that      the     enterprise            must        adopt    highest<\/p>\n
standards of safety and if any harm results on account of such<\/p>\n
activity,        the     enterprise            must         be     absolutely          liable    to<\/p>\n
compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the<\/p>\n
enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and<\/p>\n
that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part.<\/p>\n
87.       In Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra, Dehradun &<\/p>\n
Others v. State of U.P. & Others AIR<\/a> 1985 SC 652 the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court ordered closure of all lime-stone quarries in the Doon<\/p>\n
Valley taking notice of the fact that lime-stone quarries and<\/p>\n
excavation in the area had adversely affected water springs<\/p>\n
and environmental ecology. While commenting on the closure of<\/p>\n
the   lime-stone         quarries,           the    court        stated     that       this   would<\/p>\n
undoubtedly          cause      hardship           to    owners       of     the        lime-stone<\/p>\n
quarries,       but     it     is      the    price      that       has     to    be     paid   for
\nprotecting and safeguarding the right of the people to live in<\/p>\n
healthy    environment    with   minimal   disturbance   of    ecological<\/p>\n
balance and without avoidable hazard to them and to their<\/p>\n
cattle, homes and agricultural land and undue affectation of<\/p>\n
air, water and environment.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
88.       Environmental PIL has emerged because of the court’s<\/p>\n
interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution.              The court<\/p>\n
in Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti v. State of U.P.<\/p>\n
& Others AIR<\/a> 1990 SC 2060 observed that every citizen has<\/p>\n
fundamental right to have the enjoyment of quality of life and<\/p>\n
living as contemplated by Article 21 of the Constitution of<\/p>\n
India.       Anything which endangers or impairs by conduct of<\/p>\n
anybody either in violation or in derogation of laws, that<\/p>\n
quality of life and living by the people is entitled to take<\/p>\n
recourse to Article 32 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n
89.       This court in Subhash Kumar v. State of Bihar & Others<\/p>\n
AIR   1991    SC   420   observed   that   under   Article    21   of   the<\/p>\n
Constitution people have the right of enjoyment of pollution<\/p>\n
free water and air for full enjoyment of life.                If anything<\/p>\n
endangers or impairs that quality of life in derogation of<\/p>\n
laws, a citizen has right to have recourse to Article 32 of<\/p>\n
the Constitution for removing the pollution of water or air<\/p>\n
which may be detrimental to the quality of life.<\/p>\n
90.       The case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others<\/a><\/p>\n
(1988) 1 SCC 471, relates to pollution caused by the trade<\/p>\n
effluents discharged by tanneries into Ganga river in Kanpur.
\nThe court called for the report of the Committee of experts<\/p>\n
and gave directions to save the environment and ecology.                               It<\/p>\n
was held that “in Common Law the Municipal Corporation can be<\/p>\n
restrained by an injunction in an action brought by a riparian<\/p>\n
owner who has suffered on account of the pollution of the<\/p>\n
water in a river caused by the Corporation by discharging into<\/p>\n
the river insufficiently treated sewage from discharging such<\/p>\n
sewage into the river.             But in the present case the petitioner<\/p>\n
is    not   a    riparian     owner.        He    is     a    person      interested   in<\/p>\n
protecting the lives of the people who make use of the water<\/p>\n
flowing     in    the    river     Ganga    and    his       right   to    maintain    the<\/p>\n
petition        cannot   be    disputed.          The    nuisance      caused    by    the<\/p>\n
pollution of the river Ganga is a public nuisance, which is<\/p>\n
widerspread in range and indiscriminate in its effect and it<\/p>\n
would not be reasonable to expect any particular person to<\/p>\n
take proceedings to stop it as distinct from the community at<\/p>\n
large.      The petition has been entertained as a Public Interest<\/p>\n
Litigation.          On the facts and in the circumstances of the<\/p>\n
case, the petitioner is entitled to move the Supreme Court in<\/p>\n
order to enforce the statutory provisions which impose duties<\/p>\n
on the municipal authorities and the Boards constituted under<\/p>\n
the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974”.<\/p>\n
91.         In Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v. Union of India &<\/p>\n
Others AIR<\/a> 1996 SC 2715, this court ruled that precautionary<\/p>\n
principle and the polluter pays principle are part of the<\/p>\n
environmental        law      of   the     country.           This     court    declared<\/p>\n
Articles 47, 48A and 51A(g) to be part of the constitutional
\nmandate to protect and improve the environment.<\/p>\n
92.       In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others AIR<\/a> 1988 SC<\/p>\n
1037,   this    court   observed     that   the     effluent    discharged    in<\/p>\n
river Ganga from a tannery is ten times noxious when compared<\/p>\n
with the domestic sewage water which flows into the river from<\/p>\n
any urban area on its banks.           The court further observed that<\/p>\n
the financial capacity of the tanneries should be considered<\/p>\n
as    irrelevant   without   requiring       them    to     establish   primary<\/p>\n
treatment plants.        Just like an industry which cannot pay<\/p>\n
minimum wages to its workers cannot be allowed to exist, a<\/p>\n
tannery which cannot set up a primary treatment plant cannot<\/p>\n
be permitted to continue to be in existence for the adverse<\/p>\n
effect on the public at large.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
93.       In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others AIR<\/a> 1997 SC<\/p>\n
734, this court observed that in order to preserve and protect<\/p>\n
the ancient monument Taj Mahal from sulphurdioxide emission by<\/p>\n
industries near Taj Mahal, the court ordered 299 industries to<\/p>\n
ban the use of coke\/coal.          The court further directed them to<\/p>\n
shift-over to Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) or re-locate them.<\/p>\n
94.       In A. P. Pollution Control Board v. Prof. M. V. Nayadu<\/p>\n
(Retd.)    &   Others<\/a>   (1999)   2   SCC    718,     this    Court   quoted   A.<\/p>\n
Fritsch,       “Environmental      Ethics:        Choices      for   Concerned<\/p>\n
Citizens”.      The same is reproduced as under:<\/p>\n
       “The basic insight of ecology is that all living
\n       things exist in interrelated systems; nothing
\n       exists in isolation. The world system in weblike;
\n       to pluck one strand is to cause all to vibrate;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       whatever happens to one part has ramifications for
\n      all the rest. Our actions are not individual but
\n      social; they reverberate throughout the whole
\n      ecosystem”. [Science    Action Coalition   by A.
\n      Fritsch,   Environmental   Ethics:  Choices   for
\n      Concerned Citizens 3-4 (1980)] : (1988) Vol. 12
\n      Harv. Env. L. Rev. at 313).”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
95.     The   court    in   this   case   gave     emphasis    that   the<\/p>\n
directions of the court should meet the requirements of public<\/p>\n
interest, environmental protection, elimination of pollution<\/p>\n
and   sustainable     development.   While       ensuring     sustainable<\/p>\n
development, it must be kept in view that there is no danger<\/p>\n
to the environment or to the ecology.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
96.     In Essar Oil Ltd. v. Halar Utkarsh Samiti & Others AIR<\/a><\/p>\n
2004 SC 1834, while maintaining the balance between economic<\/p>\n
development and environmental protection, the court observed<\/p>\n
as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “26. Certain principles were enunciated in the
\n      Stockholm Declaration giving broad parameters and
\n      guidelines for the purposes of sustaining humanity
\n      and its environment.    Of these parameters, a few
\n      principles are extracted which are of relevance to
\n      the present debate. Principle 2 provides that the
\n      natural resources of the earth including the air,
\n      water,    land,   flora   and    fauna   especially
\n      representative samples of natural eco-systems must
\n      be safeguarded for the benefit of present and
\n      future generations through careful planning and
\n      management as appropriate. In the same vein, the
\n      4th principle says “man has special responsibility
\n      to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of
\n      wild life and its habitat which are now gravely
\n      imperiled by a combination of adverse factors.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      Nature conservation including wild life must,
\n      therefore, receive importance in planning for
\n      economic   developments”.   These   two  principles
\n      highlight the need to factor in considerations of
\n      the environment while providing for economic
\n      development. The need for economic development has
\n      been dealt with in Principle 8 where it is said
\n      that “economic and social development is essential
\n      for ensuring a favourable living and working
\n       environment for man and for creating conditions on
\n       earth that are necessary for improvement of the
\n       quality of life”.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
97.       On sustainable development, one of us (Bhandari, J.) in<\/p>\n
Karnataka       Industrial        Areas    Development         Board        v.    Sri     C.<\/p>\n
Kenchappa & Others AIR<\/a> 2006 SC 2038, observed that there has<\/p>\n
to be balance between sustainable development and environment.<\/p>\n
This    Court    observed        that    before   acquisition          of    lands       for<\/p>\n
development, the consequence and adverse impact of development<\/p>\n
on environment must be properly comprehended and the lands be<\/p>\n
acquired for development that they do not gravely impair the<\/p>\n
ecology and environment; State Industrial Areas Development<\/p>\n
Board    to    incorporate        the   condition      of   allotment        to        obtain<\/p>\n
clearance      from   the    Karnataka      State      Pollution       Control          Board<\/p>\n
before    the     land      is    allotted    for      development.              The    said<\/p>\n
directory condition of allotment of lands be converted into a<\/p>\n
mandatory condition for all the projects to be sanctioned in<\/p>\n
future.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
98.       In another important decision of this Court in the case<\/p>\n
of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal Nath & Others<\/a> (2000) 6 SCC 213, this<\/p>\n
Court was of the opinion that Articles 48A and 51-A(g) have to<\/p>\n
be considered in the light of Article 21 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n
Any disturbance of the basic environment elements, namely air,<\/p>\n
water    and    soil,     which    are    necessary      for    “life”,          would     be<\/p>\n
hazardous to “life” within the meaning of Article 21. In the<\/p>\n
matter of enforcement of rights under Article 21, this Court,<\/p>\n
besides       enforcing     the    provisions     of    the     Acts    referred          to
\nabove,    has       also    given     effect      to    Fundamental        Rights        under<\/p>\n
Articles 14 and 21 and has held that if those rights are<\/p>\n
violated by disturbing the environment, it can award damages<\/p>\n
not only for the restoration of the ecological balance, but<\/p>\n
also     for    the        victims        who   have         suffered      due     to     that<\/p>\n
disturbance.         In    order     to    protect      the     “life”,      in    order      to<\/p>\n
protect “environment” and in order to protect “air, water and<\/p>\n
soil”    from        pollution,       this       Court,        through       its    various<\/p>\n
judgments has given effect to the rights available, to the<\/p>\n
citizens and persons alike, under Article 21.<\/p>\n
99.       The       court    also     laid      emphasis       on    the   principle          of<\/p>\n
Polluter-pays. According to the court, pollution is a civil<\/p>\n
wrong.    It    is    a     tort   committed      against          the   community       as    a<\/p>\n
whole.          A    person,       therefore,          who    is    guilty    of    causing<\/p>\n
pollution has to pay damages or compensation for restoration<\/p>\n
of the environment and ecology.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
100.      In        Managing        Director,          A.P.S.R.T.C.          v.     S.        P.<\/p>\n
Satyanarayana AIR<\/a> 1998 SC 2962, this Court referred to the<\/p>\n
White Paper published by the Government of India that the<\/p>\n
vehicular pollution contributes 70% of the air pollution as<\/p>\n
compared       to    20%    in     1970.        This    Court       gave   comprehensive<\/p>\n
directions to reduce the air pollution on the recommendation<\/p>\n
of an Expert Committee of Bhure Lal appointed by this Court.<\/p>\n
101.      In Re. Noise Pollution AIR 2005 SC 3136, this Court was<\/p>\n
dealing with the issue of noise pollution.                           This Court was of
\nthe opinion that there is need for creating general awareness<\/p>\n
towards       the     hazardous              effects        of     noise      pollution.<\/p>\n
Particularly,        in     our       country         the   people    generally       lack<\/p>\n
consciousness of the ill effects which noise pollution creates<\/p>\n
and how the society including they themselves stand to benefit<\/p>\n
by preventing generation and emission of noise pollution.<\/p>\n
102.      In Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of<\/p>\n
India & Others<\/a> (1996) 5 SCC 281 the main grievance in the<\/p>\n
petition      is    that    a   notification            dated     19.2.1991    declaring<\/p>\n
coastal stretches as Coastal Regulation Zones which regulates<\/p>\n
the activities in the said zones                       has not been implemented or<\/p>\n
enforced.      This has led to continued degradation of ecology in<\/p>\n
the    said    coastal      areas.              The   court      observed   that   while<\/p>\n
economic development should not be allowed to take place at<\/p>\n
the    cost   of    ecology          or    by     causing     widespread    environment<\/p>\n
destruction and violation; at the same time, the necessity to<\/p>\n
preserve ecology and environment should not hamper economic<\/p>\n
and other developments.                Both development and environment must<\/p>\n
go     hand   in    hand,       in        other    words,     there   should    not     be<\/p>\n
development at the cost of environment and vice versa, but<\/p>\n
there should be development while taking due care and ensuring<\/p>\n
the protection of environment.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
103.      In S. Jagannath v. Union of India & Others<\/a> (1997) 2 SCC<\/p>\n
87, this Court dealt with a public interest petition filed by<\/p>\n
the Gram Swaraj Movement, a voluntary organization working for<\/p>\n
the upliftment of the weaker section of society, wherein the
\npetitioner sought the enforcement of Coastal Zone Regulation<\/p>\n
Notification    dated    19.2.1991       and   stoppage     of    intensive   and<\/p>\n
semi-intensive    type     of    prawn    farming      in   the    ecologically<\/p>\n
fragile    coastal      areas.       This      Court    passed      significant<\/p>\n
directions as under:\n<\/p>\n
          1.   The Central Government shall constitute an
\n               authority conferring on the said authority
\n               all the powers necessary to protect the
\n               ecologically    fragile   coastal   areas,
\n               seashore, waterfront and other coastal
\n               areas and specially to deal with the
\n               situation created by the shrimp culture
\n               industry in coastal States.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    2.      The   authority so   constituted   by  the
\n    Central     Government  shall    implement    “the
\n    Precautionary principle” and “the Polluter Pays”
\n    principles.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    3.   The shrimp culture industry\/the shrimp ponds
\n    are covered by the prohibition contained in para
\n    2(i) of the CRZ Notification. No shrimp culture
\n    pond can be constructed or set up within the
\n    coastal regulation zone as defined in the CRZ
\n    notification. This shall be applicable to all
\n    seas,   bays,   estuaries,   creeks  rivers   and
\n    backwaters. This direction shall not apply to
\n    traditional and improved traditional types of
\n    technologies (as defined in Alagarswami report)
\n    which are practised in the coastal low lying
\n    areas.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    4. All acquaculture industries\/shrimp culture
\n    industries\/shrimp culture ponds operating\/set up
\n    in the coastal regulation zone as defined under
\n    the CRZ Notification shall be demolished and
\n    removed from the said area before March 31, 1997.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    5. The agricultural lands, salt pan lands,
\n    mangroves, wet lands, forest lands, land for
\n    village common purpose and the land meant for
\n    public purposes shall not be used\/converted for
\n    construction of the shrimp culture ponds.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       6.   No   acquaculture   industry\/shrimp   culture
\n       industry\/shrimp    culture    ponds    shall    be
\n       constructed\/set up within 1000 meter of Chilka
\n       lake and Pulicat lake (including Bird Sanctuaries
\n       namely Yadurapattu and Nelapattu).\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       7.     Acquaculture    industry\/shrimp   culture
\n       industry\/shrimp culture ponds already operating
\n       and functioning in the said area of 1000 meter
\n       shall be closed and demolished before March 31,
\n       1997.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       8. The Court also directed that the shrimp
\n       industries functioning within 1000 meter from the
\n       Coastal Regulation Zone shall be liable to
\n       compensate the affected persons on the basis of
\n       the “polluter pays” principle.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
       9.   The authority was directed to compute the
\n       compensation under two heads namely, for reversing
\n       the ecology and for payment to individuals.<\/p>\n
       10. The compensation amount recovered from the
\n       polluters shall be deposited under a separate head
\n       called “Environment Protection Fund” and shall be
\n       utilised for compensating the affected persons as
\n       identified by the authority and also for restoring
\n       the damaged environment.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
104.     The   Court   also   granted    substantial   costs   to   the<\/p>\n
petitioners.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
105.     The courts because of vast destruction of environment,<\/p>\n
ecology,    forests,   marine    life,   wildlife   etc.   etc.     gave<\/p>\n
directions in a large number of cases in the larger public<\/p>\n
interest. The courts made a serious endeavour to protect and<\/p>\n
preserve ecology, environment, forests, hills, rivers, marine<\/p>\n
life, wildlife etc. etc.        This can be called the second phase
\nof the public interest litigation in India.<\/p>\n
THE TRANSPARENCY AND PROBITY IN GOVERNANCE – PHASE-III OF THE
\nPUBLIC INTERST LITIGATION<\/p>\n
106.       In the 1990’s, the Supreme Court expanded the ambit and<\/p>\n
scope of public interest litigation further.                       The High Courts<\/p>\n
also under Article 226 followed the Supreme Court and passed a<\/p>\n
number     of     judgments,        orders    or     directions          to     unearth<\/p>\n
corruption and maintain probity and morality in the governance<\/p>\n
of the State.       The probity in governance is a sine qua non for<\/p>\n
an efficient system of administration and for the development<\/p>\n
of   the   country       and   an   important       requirement         for   ensuring<\/p>\n
probity in governance is the absence of corruption.                           This may<\/p>\n
broadly be called as the third phase of the Public Interest<\/p>\n
Litigation.       The    Supreme    Court    and    High       Courts    have    passed<\/p>\n
significant orders.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
107.       The case of Vineet Narain & Others v. Union of India &<\/p>\n
Another AIR<\/a> 1998 SC 889 is an example of its kind.                              In that<\/p>\n
case, the petitioner, who was a journalist, filed a public<\/p>\n
interest        litigation.           According          to     him,     the      prime<\/p>\n
investigating           agencies     like      the        Central        Bureau        of<\/p>\n
Investigation and the Revenue authorities failed to perform<\/p>\n
their legal obligation and take appropriate action when they<\/p>\n
found,     during       investigation        with    a        terrorist,      detailed<\/p>\n
accounts     of   vast    payments,     called      `Jain       diaries’,       made   to<\/p>\n
influential politicians and bureaucrats and direction was also<\/p>\n
sought in case of a similar nature that may occur hereafter.
\nA number of directions were issued by the Supreme Court.                                  The<\/p>\n
Court in that case observed that “it is trite that the holders<\/p>\n
of   public   offices      are   entrusted          with    certain         power    to   be<\/p>\n
exercised in public interest alone and, therefore, the office<\/p>\n
is held by them in trust for the people.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
108.      Another significant case is Rajiv Ranjan Singh `Lalan’<\/p>\n
& Another v. Union of India & Others (2006) 6 SCC 613.                                 This<\/p>\n
public     interest     litigation        relates          to    the        large     scale<\/p>\n
defalcation    of     public     funds    and       falsification           of   accounts<\/p>\n
involving hundreds of crores of rupees in the Department of<\/p>\n
Animal Husbandry in the State of Bihar.                      It was said that the<\/p>\n
respondents had interfered with the appointment of the public<\/p>\n
prosecutor.    This    court     gave    significant            directions       in    this<\/p>\n
case.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
109.      In yet another case of M. C. Mehta v. Union of India &<\/p>\n
Others<\/a> (2007) 1 SCC 110, a project known as “Taj Heritage<\/p>\n
Corridor Project” was initiated by the Government of Uttar<\/p>\n
Pradesh.      One of the main purpose for which the same was<\/p>\n
undertaken was to divert the River Yamuna and to reclaim 75<\/p>\n
acres of land between Agra Fort and the Taj Mahal and use the<\/p>\n
reclaimed     land    for      constructing          food       plazas,       shops       and<\/p>\n
amusement     activities.         The    Court       directed         for    a   detailed<\/p>\n
enquiry    which     was    carried      out    by     the      Central       Bureau      of<\/p>\n
Investigation (CBI).             On the basis of the CBI report, the<\/p>\n
Court     directed     registration            of    FIR        and     made        further<\/p>\n
investigation in the matter.               The court questioned the role
\nplayed by the concerned Minister for Environment, Government<\/p>\n
of Uttar Pradesh and the Chief Minister, Government of Uttar<\/p>\n
Pradesh.    By the intervention of this Court, the said project<\/p>\n
was stalled.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
110.   These    are   some   of   the   matters   where   the    efficacy,<\/p>\n
ethics and morality of the governmental authorities to perform<\/p>\n
their statutory duties was directed under the scanner of the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court and the High Courts.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
111.   In M. C. Mehta v. Union of India & Others<\/a> (2007) 12<\/p>\n
SCALE 91, in another public interest litigation, a question<\/p>\n
was raised before the court whether the Apex Court should<\/p>\n
consider the correctness of the order passed by the Governor<\/p>\n
of Uttar Pradesh refusing to grant sanction for prosecution of<\/p>\n
the Chief Minister and Environment Minister after they were<\/p>\n
found responsible in `Taj Heritage Corridor Project”.                  It<\/p>\n
was held that the judiciary can step in where it finds the<\/p>\n
actions on the part of the legislature or the executive to be<\/p>\n
illegal or unconstitutional.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
112.   In Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of<\/p>\n
India & Another AIR<\/a> 2003 SC 3277, two writ petitions were<\/p>\n
filed in public interest by the petitioner calling in the<\/p>\n
question of decision of the government to sell majority of<\/p>\n
shares in Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited and Bharat<\/p>\n
Petroleum   Corporation      Limited    to   private   parties    without<\/p>\n
Parliamentary approval or sanction as being contrary to and
\nviolative      of       the    provisions      of    the     ESSO    (Acquisition       of<\/p>\n
Undertaking in India) Act, 1974, the Burma Shell (Acquisition<\/p>\n
of Undertaking in India) Act, 1976 and Caltex (Acquisition of<\/p>\n
Shares   of        Caltex      Oil    Refining      India    Limited       and   all   the<\/p>\n
undertakings in India for Caltex India Limited) Act, 1977.<\/p>\n
The court upheld the petitions until the statutes are amended<\/p>\n
appropriately.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
113.     These are some of the cases where the Supreme Court and<\/p>\n
the    High    Courts          broadened      the    scope    of     public      interest<\/p>\n
litigation and also entertained petitions to ensure that in<\/p>\n
governance         of    the     State,     there     is     transparency        and    no<\/p>\n
extraneous considerations are taken into consideration except<\/p>\n
the    public        interest.        These      cases      regarding       probity     in<\/p>\n
governance or corruption in public life dealt with by the<\/p>\n
courts can be placed in the third phase of public interest<\/p>\n
litigation.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
114.     We would also like to deal with some cases where the<\/p>\n
court gave direction to the executives and the legislature to<\/p>\n
ensure that the existing laws are fully implemented.<\/p>\n
115.     In Pareena Swarup v. Union of India<\/a> (2008) 13 SCALE 84,<\/p>\n
a member of the Bar of this court filed a public interest<\/p>\n
litigation         seeking       to    declare       various        sections     of    the<\/p>\n
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 as ultra vires to the<\/p>\n
Constitution as they do not provide for independent judiciary<\/p>\n
to decide the cases but the members and chairperson to be<\/p>\n
selected      by    the       Selection    Committee        headed    by   the    Revenue
\nSecretary.      According to the petitioner, following the case<\/p>\n
of L. Chandrakumar v. Union of India & Others (1997) 3 SCC 261<\/p>\n
undermines     separation     of     powers    as    envisaged       by    the<\/p>\n
Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
116.     We have endeavoured to give broad picture of the public<\/p>\n
interest litigation of Ist, IInd and IIIrd phases decided by<\/p>\n
our courts.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
117.     We would briefly like to discuss evolution of the<\/p>\n
public interest litigation in other judicial systems.<\/p>\n
EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC INTERST LITIGATION IN OTHER JUDICIAL
\nSYSTEMS NAMELY, USA, U.K., AUSTRALIA AND SOUTH AFRICA.<\/p>\n
AUSTRALIA<\/p>\n
118.     In   Australia     also   for   protecting       environment,     the<\/p>\n
Australian    court   has    diluted     the   principle     of    `aggrieved<\/p>\n
person’.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
119.     In Australia, Public Interest Litigation has been a<\/p>\n
method   of   protecting    the    environment.     The   courts    have   not<\/p>\n
given a definition of `Public Interest Litigation’, but in<\/p>\n
Oshlack v Richmond River Council (1998) 193 CLR 72 : (1998)<\/p>\n
152 ALR 83, the High Court of Australia (apex court) upheld<\/p>\n
the concept and pointed out the essential requirements. McHugh<\/p>\n
J., quoted Stein J., from the lower court:\n<\/p>\n
       “In summary I find the litigation to be properly
\n       characterised as public interest litigation. The
\n       basis of the challenge was arguable, raising
\n       serious and    significant issues   resulting in
\n       important   interpretation  of   new   provisions
\n       relating to the protection of endangered fauna.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       The application concerned a publicly notorious
\n       site amidst continuing controversy. Mr. Oshlack
\n       had nothing to gain from the litigation other than
\n       the   worthy   motive   of   seeking   to   uphold
\n       environmental   law   and  the   preservation   of
\n       endangered fauna.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
120.      To the court it was important that the petitioner did<\/p>\n
not have any other motive than the stated one of protecting<\/p>\n
the environment. The test therefore in Australia seems to be<\/p>\n
that the petitioner when filing a public interest litigation,<\/p>\n
should not stand to gain in some way.\n<\/p>\n
\nU.S.A.\n<\/p>\n
121.      The    US     Supreme     Court    realized    the    constitutional<\/p>\n
obligation of reaching to all segments of society particularly<\/p>\n
the    black         Americans     of   African       origin.      The   courts’<\/p>\n
craftsmanship and innovation is reflected in one of the most<\/p>\n
celebrated path-breaking judgment of the US Supreme Court in<\/p>\n
Oliver Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka 347 U.S. 483,<\/p>\n
489-493      (1954).             Perhaps,    it   would        accomplish     the<\/p>\n
constitutional obligation and goal. In this case, the courts<\/p>\n
have carried out their own investigation and in the judgment<\/p>\n
it is observed that “Armed with our own investigation” the<\/p>\n
courts held that all Americans including Americans of African<\/p>\n
origin can study in all public educational institutions. This<\/p>\n
was    the   most      significant      development     in   the    history   of<\/p>\n
American judiciary.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
122.      The US Supreme Court dismissed the traditional rule of<\/p>\n
Standing        in     Association      of     Data     Processing       Service<\/p>\n
Organizations v. William B. Camp 397 U.S. 150 (1970).                         The
\ncourt    observed    that    a    plaintiff   may   be   granted   standing<\/p>\n
whenever he\/she suffers an “injury in fact” – “economic or<\/p>\n
otherwise”.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
123.     In another celebrated case Olive B. Barrows v. Leola<\/p>\n
Jackson 346 U.S. 249 (1953), 73 S.Ct. 1031 the court observed<\/p>\n
as under:-\n<\/p>\n
       “But in the instant case, we are faced with a
\n       unique situation in which it is the action of the
\n       state court which might result in a denial of
\n       constitutional rights and in which it would be
\n       difficult if not impossible for the persons whose
\n       rights are asserted to present their grievance
\n       before   any   court.       Under   the   peculiar
\n       circumstances of this case, we believe the reasons
\n       which underlie our rule denying standing to raise
\n       another’s rights, which is only a rule of
\n       practice, are outweighed by the need to protect
\n       the fundamental rights which would be denied by
\n       permitting the damages action to be maintained.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
124.     In environment cases, the US Supreme Court has diluted<\/p>\n
the stance and allowed organizations dedicated to protection<\/p>\n
of environment to fight cases even though such societies are<\/p>\n
not directly armed by the action.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
125.     In United States          v. Students Challenging Regulatory<\/p>\n
Agency Procedures (SCRAP) 412 US 669 (1973), the court allowed<\/p>\n
a group of students to challenge the action of the railroad<\/p>\n
which would have led to environmental loss.<\/p>\n
126.     In Paul J. Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance<\/p>\n
Company 409 U.S. 205 (1972) the Court held that a landlord’s<\/p>\n
racially discriminatory practices towards non-whites inflicted<\/p>\n
an   injury   in    fact   upon   the   plaintiffs,   two   tenants   of   an
\napartment complex, by depriving them of the “social benefits<\/p>\n
of living in an integrated community.”\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
127.      Similarly, the Supreme Court of the United States has<\/p>\n
granted    standing         in   certain   situations        to   a    plaintiff    to<\/p>\n
challenge injuries sustained by a third party with whom he\/she<\/p>\n
shares a “close” relationship.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
128.      In Thomas E. Singleton v. George J. L. Wulff 428 U.S.<\/p>\n
106    (1976),    the       Court    granted   standing      to   two    physicians<\/p>\n
challenging the constitutionality of a state statute limiting<\/p>\n
abortions.            Similarly, in Caplin v. Drysdale 491 U.S. 617,<\/p>\n
623-24 n. 3 (1989), the Court granted standing to an attorney<\/p>\n
to challenge a drug forfeiture law that would deprive his<\/p>\n
client of the means to retain counsel.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
129.      The    Supreme         Court   has   also    granted        organizational<\/p>\n
standing.        In Robert Warth v. Ira Seldin 422 U.S. 490, 511<\/p>\n
(1975), the Court declared that “even in the absence of injury<\/p>\n
to itself, an association may have standing solely as the<\/p>\n
representative         of    its     members.”        This    judgment     had     far<\/p>\n
reaching consequence.               In James B. Hunt v. Washington State<\/p>\n
Apple Advertising Commission, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977), the<\/p>\n
Court elaborated the parameters for organizational standing<\/p>\n
where an organization or association “has standing to bring<\/p>\n
suit on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would<\/p>\n
otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the<\/p>\n
interests        it     seeks       to   protect      are     germane       to     the<\/p>\n
organization’s purpose; (c) neither the claim asserted, nor
\nthe relief requested, requires the participation of individual<\/p>\n
members in the lawsuit”.\n<\/p>\n
ENGLAND<\/p>\n
130.      The use of PIL in England has been comparably limited.<\/p>\n
The limited development in PIL has occurred through broadening<\/p>\n
the rules of standing.\n<\/p>\n
\nBroad Rules of Standing<\/p>\n
131.      In   Re.   Reed,     Bowen     &   Co.      (1887)   19   QBD     174    to<\/p>\n
facilitate      vindication        of   public        interest,     the     English<\/p>\n
judiciary      prescribed     broad     rules    of    standing.       Under      the<\/p>\n
traditional      rule   of    standing,      judicial       redress       was     only<\/p>\n
available to a `person aggrieved’ – one “who has suffered a<\/p>\n
legal   grievance,      a    man   against      whom    a   decision      has     been<\/p>\n
pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something or<\/p>\n
wrongfully refused him something or wrongfully affected his<\/p>\n
title to something.”          However, the traditional rule no longer<\/p>\n
governs standing in the English Courts.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
132.      One of the most distinguished and respected English<\/p>\n
Judge Lord Denning initiated the broadening of standing in the<\/p>\n
English Courts with his suggestion that the “words `person<\/p>\n
aggrieved’ are of wide import and should not be subjected to a<\/p>\n
restrictive interpretation.” – Attorney-General of the Gambia<\/p>\n
v. Pierre Sarr N’Jie (1961) AC 617.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
133.      The Blackburn Cases broadened the rule of standing in
\nactions seeking remedy through prerogative writs brought by<\/p>\n
individuals against public officials for breach of a private<\/p>\n
right. (e.g., mandamus, prohibition, and certiorari).                           Under<\/p>\n
the     Blackburn    standard,       “any   person        who    was     adversely<\/p>\n
affected” by the action of a government official in making a<\/p>\n
mistaken policy decision was eligible to be granted standing<\/p>\n
before the Court for seeking remedy through prerogative writs<\/p>\n
– Regina v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis, Ex parte<\/p>\n
Blackburn [1968] 2 W.L.R. 893 (“Blackburn I”).<\/p>\n
134.      In Blackburn I, the Court of Appeal granted standing<\/p>\n
to     Blackburn to seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Police<\/p>\n
Commissioner to enforce a betting and gambling statute against<\/p>\n
gambling clubs.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
135.      In Blackburn II, the Court of Appeal found no defects<\/p>\n
in Blackburn’s standing to challenge the Government’s decision<\/p>\n
to join a common market. Blackburn v. Attorney-General [1971]<\/p>\n
1 W.L.R. 1037).\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
136.      In Blackburn III, the Court of Appeal granted standing<\/p>\n
to    Blackburn     to   seek    a   writ   of    mandamus      to     compel    the<\/p>\n
Metropolitan        Police      to     enforce     laws      against       obscene<\/p>\n
publications.       Regina      v.   Commissioner       of      Police     of    the<\/p>\n
Metropolis, Ex parte Blackburn [1973] Q.B. 241.<\/p>\n
137.      In Blackburn IV, the Court of Appeal granted standing<\/p>\n
to Blackburn to seek a writ of prohibition directed at the<\/p>\n
Greater    London    Council     for    failing    to     properly       use    their
\ncensorship powers with regard to pornographic films.                             Regina<\/p>\n
v. Greater London Council ex parte. Blackburn [1976] 1 W.L.R.<\/p>\n
550.<\/p>\n
138.      The English judiciary was hesitant in applying this<\/p>\n
broadened rule of standing to actions seeking remedy through<\/p>\n
relator claims – Relator claims are remedies brought by the<\/p>\n
Attorney General to remedy a breach of a public right. (e.g.,<\/p>\n
declaration and injunction).             Initially, Lord Denning extended<\/p>\n
the    broadened    rule     of   standing       in    actions     seeking       remedy<\/p>\n
through prerogative writs to actions seeking remedy through<\/p>\n
relator    claims.      In     Attorney     General         Ex   rel    McWhirter     v.<\/p>\n
Independent Broadcasting Authority, (1973) Q.B. 629 the Court<\/p>\n
stipulated that, “in the last resort, if the Attorney-General<\/p>\n
refuses leave in a proper case, or improperly or unreasonably<\/p>\n
delays in giving leave, or his machinery works too slowly,<\/p>\n
then a member of the public who has a sufficient interest can<\/p>\n
himself apply to the court.” This rule was promptly overturned<\/p>\n
by the House of Lords in Gouriet v. Union of Post Office<\/p>\n
Workers [1978] A.C. 435.                In this case, the House of Lords<\/p>\n
held    that   in    relator      claims,      the     Attorney        General    holds<\/p>\n
absolute discretion in deciding whether to grant leave to a<\/p>\n
case.     Thus, the English judiciary did not grant standing to<\/p>\n
an individual seeking remedy through relator claims.<\/p>\n
139.      Finally,    an     amendment      to   the    Rules      of    the    Supreme<\/p>\n
Court     in   1978    through         Order     53     overcame        the     English<\/p>\n
judiciary’s     hesitation        in    applying        a    broadened         rule   of
\nstanding to relator claims.                Order 53 applied the broadened<\/p>\n
rule    of     standing     to   both    actions          seeking          remedy   through<\/p>\n
prerogative writs and actions seeking remedy through relator<\/p>\n
claims.      Rule 3(5) of Order 53 stipulates that the Court shall<\/p>\n
not grant leave for judicial review “unless it considers that<\/p>\n
the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which<\/p>\n
the applicant relates.” – ORDER 53, RULES                      OF   THE   SUPT. CT. (1981).<\/p>\n
In    Inland    Revenue      Commissioners          v.    National          Federation     of<\/p>\n
Self-Employed and Small Businesses Ltd. [1982] A.C. 617, the<\/p>\n
Court explained that “fairness and justice are tests to be<\/p>\n
applied”       when     determining      if     a    party           has     a   sufficient<\/p>\n
interest.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
140.      In Regina v. Secretary of State for the Environment,<\/p>\n
Ex parte Rose Theatre Trust Co. (1990) 1 Q.B. 504, the Court<\/p>\n
elaborated that “direct financial or legal interest is not<\/p>\n
required” to find sufficient interest. Thus, under the new<\/p>\n
rule    of     standing      embodied     in    Order          53,        individuals    can<\/p>\n
challenge actions of public officials if they are found to<\/p>\n
have “sufficient interest” – a flexible standard.<\/p>\n
SOUTH AFRICA<\/p>\n
141.      The    South      African     Constitution            has       adopted   with    a<\/p>\n
commitment to “transform the society into one in which there<\/p>\n
will    be     human       dignity,     freedom          and        equality.”      –    See:<\/p>\n
Soobramoney v. Minister of Health, KwaZulu-Natal, 1998 (1) SA<\/p>\n
765    (CC),    p.    5.     Thus,    improving          access       to    justice     falls<\/p>\n
squarely       within      the   mandate       of    this           Constitution.          In
\nfurtherance      of    this      objective,        the   South   African     legal<\/p>\n
framework takes a favorable stance towards PIL by prescribing<\/p>\n
broad rules of standing and relaxing pleading requirements.<\/p>\n
(A)    Broad Rules of Standing<\/p>\n
142.     Section 38 of the Constitution broadly grants standing<\/p>\n
to approach a competent court for allegations of infringement<\/p>\n
of a right in the bill of rights to:\n<\/p>\n
       “(a)      anyone acting in their own interest;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (b)     anyone acting on behalf of another person
\n       who cannot act in their own name;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (c)     anyone acting as a member of, or in the\n       interest of, a group or class of persons;\n\n       (d)       anyone acting in the public interest;\n\n       (e)     an association acting in the interest of\n       its members.\"\n\n<\/pre>\n
143.     In expressly permitting class actions and third-party<\/p>\n
actions, Section 38 prescribes broad rules of standing for<\/p>\n
constitutional claims.             Interpreting the language of Section<\/p>\n
38, the Constitutional Court elaborated in Ferreira v. Levin<\/p>\n
NO & Others 1996 (1) SA 984 (CC), p. 241 that a broad approach<\/p>\n
to    standing   should     be     applied    to    constitutional     claims   to<\/p>\n
ensure that constitutional rights are given the full measure<\/p>\n
of    protection      to   which    they     are    entitled.     In   the    said<\/p>\n
judgment by a separate concurring judgment, Justice O’Regan<\/p>\n
suggested that a “wider net for standing” should be extended<\/p>\n
to all “litigation of a public character.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
(B)     Relaxing Formal Requirements of Pleadings<\/p>\n
144.     The    Constitutional        Court    has   been    prompt    to   relax<\/p>\n
formal pleading requirements in appropriate cases.                      In S v.<\/p>\n
Twala   (South      African   Human    Rights      Commission      Intervening),<\/p>\n
2000 (1) SA 879, the President of the Court directed that a<\/p>\n
hand written letter received from a prisoner complaining about<\/p>\n
his frustration in exercising his right to appeal be treated<\/p>\n
as an application for leave to appeal.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
145.     In Xinwa & Others v. Volkswagen of South Africa (PTY)<\/p>\n
Ltd.    2003 (4) SA 390 (CC), p. 8 the Court cemented the Twala<\/p>\n
principle that “form must give way to substance” in public<\/p>\n
interest    litigation.       The   Court      explained     that     “pleadings<\/p>\n
prepared by lay persons must be construed generously and in<\/p>\n
the light most favourable to the litigant.                         Lay litigants<\/p>\n
should not be held to the same standard of accuracy, skill and<\/p>\n
precision      in   the   presentation        of   their    case    required   of<\/p>\n
lawyers.    In construing such pleadings, regard must be had to<\/p>\n
the purpose of the pleading as gathered not only from the<\/p>\n
content of the pleadings but also from the context in which<\/p>\n
the pleading is prepared.”\n<\/p>\n
\nIMPACT OF PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION ON NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES<\/p>\n
146.     The development of public interest litigation in India<\/p>\n
has had an impact on the judicial systems of neighbouring<\/p>\n
countries like Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Pakistan and<\/p>\n
other countries.\n<\/p>\n
PAKISTAN:\n<\/p>\n
147.         By a recent path-breaking historical judgment of the<\/p>\n
Pakistan       Supreme       Court    at    Islamabad       dated   31st    July,      2009<\/p>\n
delivered in public interest litigation bearing Constitution<\/p>\n
Petition       No.9     of     2009       filed    by    Sindh      High    Court      Bar<\/p>\n
Association through its Secretary and Constitution Petition<\/p>\n
No.8 of 2009 filed by Nadeem Ahmed Advocate, both petitions<\/p>\n
filed    against        Federation         of     Pakistan      through     Secretary,<\/p>\n
Ministry of Law and Justice, Islamabad & Others, the entire<\/p>\n
superior judiciary which was sacked by the previous political<\/p>\n
regime has now been restored.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
148.         Another path breaking judgment delivered very recently<\/p>\n
on 16th December, 2009 by all the 17 judges of the Pakistan<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Constitution Petition Nos.76 to 80 of 2007<\/p>\n
and 59 of 2009 and another Civil Appeal No.1094 of 2009 also<\/p>\n
has far-reaching implications.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
149.         In this judgment, the National Reconciliation Ordinance<\/p>\n
(No.XV) 2007 came under challenge by which amendments were<\/p>\n
made     in     the      Criminal          Procedure     Code,       1898     and      the<\/p>\n
Representation         of     the     People      Act,   1976    and   the       National<\/p>\n
Accountability Ordinance of 1999. The National Accountability<\/p>\n
Ordinance, 1999 (for short, NAO) was designed to give immunity<\/p>\n
of     the    consequences           of    the    offences       committed       by    the<\/p>\n
constitutional authorities and other authorities in power and<\/p>\n
(NRO)    was     declared      void       ab    initio   being      ultra    vires     and<\/p>\n
violative      of     constitutional           provisions    including      4,    8,    25,
\n62(f), 63(i)(p), 89, 175 and 227 of the Constitution.                This<\/p>\n
judgment was also delivered largely in public interest.<\/p>\n
150.     In an important judgment delivered by the Supreme Court<\/p>\n
of Pakistan in General Secrerary, West Pakistan Salt Miners<\/p>\n
Labour Union (CBA) Khewra, Jhelum v. The Director, Industries<\/p>\n
and Mneral Development, Punjab, Lahore<\/a> reported in 1994 SCMR<\/p>\n
2061 (Supreme Court of Pakistan) in Human Right Case No.120 of<\/p>\n
1993 on 12th July, 1994 gave significant directions largely<\/p>\n
based on the judgments of this court.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
151.     The petitioners in the said petition sought enforcement<\/p>\n
of the rights of the residents to have clean and unpolluted<\/p>\n
water.     Their apprehension was that in case the miners are<\/p>\n
allowed to continue their activities, which are extended in<\/p>\n
the water catchment area, the watercourse, reservoir and the<\/p>\n
pipelines would get contaminated.           According to the court,<\/p>\n
water    has   been   considered   source   of   life   in   this   world.<\/p>\n
Without water there can be no life.           History bears testimony<\/p>\n
that due to famine and scarcity of water, civilization have<\/p>\n
vanished, green lands have turned into deserts and arid goes<\/p>\n
completely destroying the life not any of human being, but<\/p>\n
animal life as well.      Therefore, water, which is necessary for<\/p>\n
existence of life, if polluted, or contaminated, will cause<\/p>\n
serious threat to human existence.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
152.     The    court    gave   significant      directions    including<\/p>\n
stopping the functioning of factory which created pollution<\/p>\n
and environmental degradation.\n<\/p>\n
153.      Another significant aspect which has been decided in<\/p>\n
this    case   was    to     widen      the     definition          of    the     `aggrieved<\/p>\n
person’.        The        court     observed        that      in        public    interest<\/p>\n
litigation, procedural trappings and restrictions of being an<\/p>\n
aggrieved person and other similar technical objections cannot<\/p>\n
bar the jurisdiction of the court.                        The Supreme Court also<\/p>\n
observed that the Court has vast power under Article 183(3) to<\/p>\n
investigate into question of fact as well independently by<\/p>\n
recording evidence.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
154.            In another important case Ms. Shehla Zia v. WAPDA<\/p>\n
PLD 1994 Supreme Court 693, a three-Judge Bench headed by the<\/p>\n
Chief    Justice      gave       significant         directions.            In     the   said<\/p>\n
petition    four     residents          of    Street     No.    35,F-6\/1,         Islamabad<\/p>\n
protested to WAPDA against construction of a grid station in<\/p>\n
F-6\/1, Islamabad. A letter to this effect was written to the<\/p>\n
Chairman       on     15.1.1992              conveying         the        complaint        and<\/p>\n
apprehensions        of    the     residents      of   the      area      in     respect    of<\/p>\n
construction of a grid station allegedly located in the green-<\/p>\n
belt of a residential locality.                      They pointed out that the<\/p>\n
electromagnetic       field        by   the    presence        of    the    high       voltage<\/p>\n
transmission lines at the grid station would pose a serious<\/p>\n
health hazard to the residents of the area particularly the<\/p>\n
children, the infirm and the Dhobi-ghat families that live;<\/p>\n
the     immediate         vicinity.            The     presence           of      electrical<\/p>\n
installations        and    transmission         lines      would        also     be    highly<\/p>\n
dangerous to the citizens particularly the children who play
\noutside in the area.            It would damage the greenbelt and affect<\/p>\n
the environment.             It was also alleged that it violates the<\/p>\n
principles of planning in Islamabad where the green belts are<\/p>\n
considered        an     essential              component        of       the      city      for<\/p>\n
environmental and aesthetic reasons.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
155.      The Supreme Court observed that where life of citizens<\/p>\n
is degraded, the quality of life is adversely affected and<\/p>\n
health hazards created are affecting a large number of people.<\/p>\n
The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction may grant<\/p>\n
relief to the extent of stopping the functioning of such units<\/p>\n
that create pollution and environmental degradation.<\/p>\n
SRI LANKA:\n<\/p>\n
156.      There        has    been     great          impact     of       Public      Interest<\/p>\n
Litigation on other countries.                     In Bulankulama and six others<\/p>\n
v. Secretary, Ministry of Industrial Development and seven<\/p>\n
others (Eppawala case), the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka gave<\/p>\n
significant directions in public interest litigation. In the<\/p>\n
said case, Mineral Investment Agreement was entered between<\/p>\n
the Government and the private company for rapid exploitation<\/p>\n
of     rock   phosphate        reserves          at     Eppawala          in    Sri    Lanka’s<\/p>\n
agriculture       rich       North     Central        Province        –    High       intensity<\/p>\n
mining operation plus establishment of a processing plant on<\/p>\n
Trincomalee coast was set up which would produce phosphoric<\/p>\n
and    sulphuric       acid.         Six    residents       of    the      area       of   whose<\/p>\n
agricultural       lands       stood       to    be    affected       filed       a   petition<\/p>\n
before the court in public interest.                           It was stated in the
\npetition that the project was not for a public purpose but for<\/p>\n
the     benefit       of     a    private      company      and     would        not        bring<\/p>\n
substantial       economic         benefit     to    Sri    Lanka.       The    petitioners<\/p>\n
claimed       imminent       infringement       of     their       fundamental          rights<\/p>\n
under    various       provisions         of   the     Constitution.             The        court<\/p>\n
invoked    the       public       trust   theory      as    applied       in    the     United<\/p>\n
States and in our country in the case of M.C. Mehta v. Kamal<\/p>\n
Nath<\/a> (1997) 1 SCC 388.                    The court upheld the petitioners’<\/p>\n
fundamental       rights.           The   respondents        were        restrained          from<\/p>\n
entering into any contract relating to the Eppawala phosphate<\/p>\n
deposit. The court allowed the petition and the respondents<\/p>\n
were directed to give costs to the petitioners.                                 The Supreme<\/p>\n
Court    of     Sri    Lanka       protected        environmental         degradation          by<\/p>\n
giving important directions in this case.<\/p>\n
NEPAL:\n<\/p>\n
157.      A three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court of Nepal in<\/p>\n
Surya Prasad Sharma Dhungle v. Godawari Marble Industries in<\/p>\n
writ petition No.35 of 1992 passed significant directions.                                     It<\/p>\n
was alleged in the petition that Godawari Marble Industries<\/p>\n
have     been     causing          serious     environmental             degradation           to<\/p>\n
Godawari forest and its surrounding which is rich in natural<\/p>\n
grandeur and historical and religious enshrinement are being<\/p>\n
destroyed       by     the       respondents.          In    the        petition       it     was<\/p>\n
mentioned       that       the     illegal     activities          of     the    respondent<\/p>\n
Godawari Marble Industries have caused a huge public losses.<\/p>\n
158.      The Supreme Court of Nepal gave significant directions
\nto protect degradation of environment and ecology.                       The court<\/p>\n
adopted the concept of sustainable development.<\/p>\n
159.      The Indian courts may have taken some inspiration from<\/p>\n
the group or class interest litigation of the United States of<\/p>\n
America    and    other    countries        but    the    shape    of   the   public<\/p>\n
interest     litigation         as     we    see     now     is     predominantly<\/p>\n
indigenously developed jurisprudence.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
160.      The public interest litigation as developed in various<\/p>\n
facets    and    various   branches         is    unparalleled.         The   Indian<\/p>\n
Courts by its judicial craftsmanship, creativity and urge to<\/p>\n
provide access to justice to the deprived, discriminated and<\/p>\n
otherwise vulnerable sections of society have touched almost<\/p>\n
every aspect of human life while dealing with cases filed in<\/p>\n
the label of the public interest litigation. The credibility<\/p>\n
of the superior courts of India has been tremendously enhanced<\/p>\n
because of some vital and important directions given by the<\/p>\n
courts.         The   courts’    contribution        in    helping      the   poorer<\/p>\n
sections of the society by giving new definition to life and<\/p>\n
liberty and to protect ecology, environment and forests are<\/p>\n
extremely significant.\n<\/p>\n
\nABUSE OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION:\n<\/p>\n
161.      Unfortunately, of late, it has been noticed that such<\/p>\n
an important jurisdiction which has been carefully carved out,<\/p>\n
created    and    nurtured      with   great       care    and    caution     by   the<\/p>\n
courts, is being blatantly abused by filing some petitions
\nwith oblique motives.       We think time has come when genuine and<\/p>\n
bona    fide   public    interest     litigation             must    be    encouraged<\/p>\n
whereas    frivolous     public     interest          litigation           should   be<\/p>\n
discouraged.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
162.      In   our   considered   opinion,       we      have       to    protect   and<\/p>\n
preserve this important jurisdiction in the larger interest of<\/p>\n
the people of this country but we must take effective steps to<\/p>\n
prevent and cure its abuse on the basis of monetary and non-<\/p>\n
monetary directions by the courts.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
163.      In BALCO Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India &<\/p>\n
Others AIR<\/a> 2002 SC 350, this Court recognized that there have<\/p>\n
been, in recent times, increasing instances of abuse of public<\/p>\n
interest litigation.           Accordingly, the court has devised a<\/p>\n
number of strategies to ensure that the attractive brand name<\/p>\n
of public interest litigation should not be allowed to be used<\/p>\n
for suspicious products of mischief.                     Firstly, the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court   has    limited   standing     in   PIL      to       individuals      “acting<\/p>\n
bonafide.”      Secondly, the Supreme Court has sanctioned the<\/p>\n
imposition     of    “exemplary     costs”     as        a    deterrent       against<\/p>\n
frivolous and vexatious public interest litigations.                         Thirdly,<\/p>\n
the Supreme Court has instructed the High Courts to be more<\/p>\n
selective in entertaining the public interest litigations.<\/p>\n
164.      In S. P. Gupta’s case (supra), this Court has found<\/p>\n
that this liberal standard makes it critical to limit standing<\/p>\n
to   individuals     “acting   bona    fide.          To      avoid       entertaining<\/p>\n
frivolous and vexatious petitions under the guise of PIL, the
\nCourt    has        excluded    two   groups     of    persons      from   obtaining<\/p>\n
standing       in    PIL     petitions.     First,      the    Supreme     Court    has<\/p>\n
rejected       awarding        standing     to    “meddlesome           interlopers”.<\/p>\n
Second, the Court has denied standing to interveners bringing<\/p>\n
public interest litigation for personal gain.<\/p>\n
165.         In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (supra),<\/p>\n
the Court withheld standing from the applicant on grounds that<\/p>\n
the applicant brought the suit motivated by enmity between the<\/p>\n
parties.           Thus, the Supreme Court has attempted to create a<\/p>\n
body of jurisprudence that accords broad enough standing to<\/p>\n
admit genuine PIL petitions, but nonetheless limits standing<\/p>\n
to thwart frivolous and vexations petitions.<\/p>\n
166.         The     Supreme     Court    broadly      tried       to   curtail     the<\/p>\n
frivolous public interest litigation petitions by two methods<\/p>\n
– one monetary and second, non-monetary.                       The first category<\/p>\n
of cases is that where the court on filing frivolous public<\/p>\n
interest litigation petitions, dismissed the petitions with<\/p>\n
exemplary costs.              In Neetu v. State of Pubjab & Others AIR<\/p>\n
2007    SC    758,     the    Court   concluded       that    it   is   necessary   to<\/p>\n
impose exemplary costs to ensure that the message goes in the<\/p>\n
right direction that petitions filed with oblique motive do<\/p>\n
not have the approval of the Courts.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
167.         In S.P. Anand v. H.D. Deve Gowda & Others AIR<\/a> 1997 SC<\/p>\n
272, the Court warned that it is of utmost importance that<\/p>\n
those who invoke the jurisdiction of this Court seeking a<\/p>\n
waiver of the locus standi rule must exercise restraint in
\nmoving the Court by not plunging in areas wherein they are not<\/p>\n
well-versed.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
168.      In Sanjeev Bhatnagar v. Union of India & Others AIR<\/a><\/p>\n
2005 SC 2841, this Court went a step further by imposing a<\/p>\n
monetary penalty against an Advocate for filing a frivolous<\/p>\n
and vexatious PIL petition.                The Court found that the petition<\/p>\n
was devoid of public interest, and instead labelled it as<\/p>\n
“publicity interest litigation.”                    Thus, the Court dismissed<\/p>\n
the petition with costs of Rs.10,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
169.      Similarly,      in    Dattaraj         Nathuji    Thaware        v.   State   of<\/p>\n
Maharashtra      &    Others<\/a>      (2005)     1    SCC    590,   the    Supreme      Court<\/p>\n
affirmed the High Court’s monetary penalty against a member of<\/p>\n
the Bar for filing a frivolous and vexatious PIL petition.<\/p>\n
This   Court     found       that      the   petition       was       nothing     but     a<\/p>\n
camouflage to foster personal dispute.                     Observing that no one<\/p>\n
should be permitted to bring disgrace to the noble profession,<\/p>\n
the Court concluded that the imposition of the penalty of Rs.<\/p>\n
25,000 by the High Court was appropriate.                             Evidently, the<\/p>\n
Supreme    Court       has      set       clear    precedent          validating        the<\/p>\n
imposition       of    monetary         penalties        against       frivolous        and<\/p>\n
vexatious PIL petitions, especially when filed by Advocates.<\/p>\n
170.      This    Court,     in     the    second       category      of   cases,    even<\/p>\n
passed harsher orders.                In Charan Lal Sahu & Others v. Giani<\/p>\n
Zail   Singh     &    Another     AIR<\/a>     1984    SC    309,    the    Supreme      Court<\/p>\n
observed that, “we would have been justified in passing a<\/p>\n
heavy order of costs against the two petitioners” for filing a
\n“light-hearted     and    indifferent”    PIL     petition.     However,   to<\/p>\n
prevent “nipping in the bud a well-founded claim on a future<\/p>\n
occasion,” the Court opted against imposing monetary costs on<\/p>\n
the petitioners.”          In this case, this Court concluded that<\/p>\n
the    petition   was    careless,    meaningless,    clumsy    and    against<\/p>\n
public interest.        Therefore, the Court ordered the Registry to<\/p>\n
initiate prosecution proceedings against the petitioner under<\/p>\n
the Contempt of Courts Act.            Additionally, the court forbade<\/p>\n
the Registry from entertaining any future PIL petitions filed<\/p>\n
by the petitioner, who was an advocate in this case.<\/p>\n
171.      In J. Jayalalitha v. Government of Tamil Nadu & Others<\/a><\/p>\n
(1999) 1 SCC 53, this court laid down that public interest<\/p>\n
litigation can be filed by any person challenging the misuse<\/p>\n
or improper use of any public property including the political<\/p>\n
party in power for the reason that interest of individuals<\/p>\n
cannot    be   placed    above   or    preferred     to   a   larger   public<\/p>\n
interest.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
172.      This court has been quite conscious that the forum of<\/p>\n
this court should not be abused by any one for personal gain<\/p>\n
or for any oblique motive.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
173.      In BALCO (supra), this court held that the jurisdiction<\/p>\n
is being abused by unscrupulous persons for their personal<\/p>\n
gain.    Therefore, the court must take care that the forum be<\/p>\n
not abused by any person for personal gain.<\/p>\n
174.      In   Dattaraj     Nathuji     Thaware     (supra),    this    court
\nexpressed its anguish on misuse of the forum of the court<\/p>\n
under the garb of public interest litigation and observed that<\/p>\n
the public interest litigation is a weapon which has to be<\/p>\n
used with great care and circumspection and the judiciary has<\/p>\n
to be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil<\/p>\n
of public interest, an ugly private malice, vested interest<\/p>\n
and\/or publicity seeking is not lurking.            It is to be used as<\/p>\n
an   effective   weapon   in   the   armoury   of   law   for   delivering<\/p>\n
social justice to the citizens.         The court must not allow its<\/p>\n
process to be abused for oblique considerations.<\/p>\n
175.     In Thaware’s case (supra), the Court encouraged the<\/p>\n
imposition of a non-monetary penalty against a PIL petition<\/p>\n
filed by a member of the bar.            The Court directed the Bar<\/p>\n
Councils and Bar Associations to ensure that no member of the<\/p>\n
Bar becomes party as petitioner or in aiding and\/or abetting<\/p>\n
files frivolous petitions carrying the attractive brand name<\/p>\n
of Public Interest Litigation.         This direction impels the Bar<\/p>\n
Councils and Bar Associations to disbar members found guilty<\/p>\n
of filing frivolous and vexatious PIL petitions.<\/p>\n
176.     In Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. v. Prem Chandra Mishra &<\/p>\n
Others AIR<\/a> 2008 SC 913, this Court observed as under:<\/p>\n
        `It is depressing to note that on account of such
\n       trumpery proceedings initiated before the Courts,
\n       innumerable days are wasted, the time which
\n       otherwise could have been spent for disposal of
\n       cases of the genuine litigants. Though we spare no
\n       efforts in fostering and developing the laudable
\n       concept of PIL and extending our long arm of
\n       sympathy to the poor, the ignorant, the oppressed
\n       and the needy, whose fundamental rights are
\n    infringed and violated and whose grievances go
\n    unnoticed, un-represented and unheard; yet we
\n    cannot avoid but express our opinion that while
\n    genuine   litigants    with  legitimate   grievances
\n    relating to civil matters involving properties
\n    worth hundreds of millions of rupees and criminal
\n    cases in which persons sentenced to death facing
\n    gallows under untold agony and persons sentenced
\n    to life imprisonment and kept in incarceration for
\n    long years, persons suffering from undue delay in
\n    service matters -government or private, persons
\n    awaiting the disposal of cases wherein huge
\n    amounts   of    public   revenue   or   unauthorized
\n    collection of tax amounts are locked up, detenu
\n    expecting their release from the detention orders
\n    etc. etc. are all standing in a long serpentine
\n    queue for years with the fond hope of getting into
\n    the Courts and having their grievances redressed,
\n    the busybodies, meddlesome interlopers, wayfarers
\n    or officious interveners having absolutely no
\n    public interest except for personal gain or
\n    private profit either of themselves or as a proxy
\n    of others or for any other extraneous motivation
\n    or for glare of publicity break the queue muffing
\n    their faces by wearing the mask of public interest
\n    litigation and get into the Courts by filing
\n    vexatious   and    frivolous  petitions   and   thus
\n    criminally waste the valuable time of the Courts
\n    and as a result of which the queue standing
\n    outside the doors of the Courts never moves, which
\n    piquant situation creates frustration in the minds
\n    of the genuine litigants and resultantly they
\n    loose faith in the administration of our judicial
\n    system.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The Court cautioned by observing that:\n<\/p>\n
    “Public interest litigation is a weapon which has
\n    to be used with great care and circumspection and
\n    the judiciary has to be extremely careful to see
\n    that behind the beautiful veil of public interest
\n    an ugly private malice, vested interest and\/or
\n    publicity seeking is not lurking. It is to be used
\n    as an effective weapon in the armory of law for
\n    delivering social justice to the citizens. The
\n    attractive   brand   name   of   public    interest
\n    litigation should not be used for suspicious
\n    products of mischief. It should be aimed at
\n    redressal of genuine public wrong or public injury
\n    and not publicity oriented or founded on personal
\n    vendetta.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
            xxx             xxx            xxx\n\n             xxx            xxx             xxx\n<\/pre>\n
       The Court has to be satisfied about (a) the
\n       credentials of the applicant; (b) the prima facie
\n       correctness or nature of information given by him;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (c)   the   information  being   not   vague   and
\n       indefinite. The information should show gravity
\n       and seriousness involved. Court has to strike
\n       balance between two conflicting interests; (i)
\n       nobody should be allowed to indulge in wild and
\n       reckless allegations besmirching the character of
\n       others; and (ii) avoidance of public mischief and
\n       to avoid mischievous petitions seeking to assail,
\n       for   oblique   motives,   justifiable   executive
\n       actions. In such case, however, the Court cannot
\n       afford to be liberal. It has to be extremely
\n       careful to see that under the guise of redressing
\n       a public grievance, it does not encroach upon the
\n       sphere reserved by the Constitution to the
\n       Executive and the Legislature. The Court has to
\n       act ruthlessly while dealing with imposters and
\n       busybodies or meddlesome interlopers impersonating
\n       as public-spirited holy men. They masquerade as
\n       crusaders of justice. They pretend to act in the
\n       name of Pro Bono Publico though they have no
\n       interest of the public or even of their own to
\n       protect.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
177.     The malice of frivolous and vexatious petitions did not<\/p>\n
originate in India.     The jurisprudence developed by the Indian<\/p>\n
judiciary   regarding   the    imposition     of   exemplary   costs    upon<\/p>\n
frivolous   and    vexatious    PIL    petitions    is    consistent    with<\/p>\n
jurisprudence     developed    in   other   countries.       U.S.    Federal<\/p>\n
Courts    and   Canadian      Courts   have    also      imposed    monetary<\/p>\n
penalties upon public interest claims regarded as frivolous.<\/p>\n
The courts also imposed non-monetary penalties upon Advocates<\/p>\n
for filing frivolous claims.           In Everywoman’s Health Centre<\/p>\n
Society v. Bridges 54 B.C.L.R. (2nd Edn.) 294, the British<\/p>\n
Columbia Court of Appeal granted special costs against the<\/p>\n
Appellants for bringing a meritless appeal.<\/p>\n
178.     U.S. Federal Courts too have imposed monetary penalties
\nagainst    plaintiffs         for       bringing    frivolous         public      interest<\/p>\n
claims.         Rule   11    of    the    Federal      Rules     of   Civil      Procedure<\/p>\n
(“FRCP”) permits Courts to apply an “appropriate sanction” on<\/p>\n
any party for filing frivolous claims.                           Federal Courts have<\/p>\n
relied     on     this      rule    to     impose        monetary      penalties        upon<\/p>\n
frivolous public interest claims.                      For example, in Harris v.<\/p>\n
Marsh 679 F.Supp. 1204 (E.D.N.C. 1987), the District Court for<\/p>\n
the    Eastern     District        of    North    Carolina       imposed     a   monetary<\/p>\n
sanction    upon       two   civil       rights     plaintiffs        for    bringing      a<\/p>\n
frivolous, vexatious, and meritless employment discrimination<\/p>\n
claim.          The Court explained that “the increasingly crowded<\/p>\n
dockets of the federal courts cannot accept or tolerate the<\/p>\n
heavy burden posed by factually baseless and claims that drain<\/p>\n
judicial resources.”               As a deterrent against such wasteful<\/p>\n
claims,    the     Court      levied       a    cost     of     $83,913.62       upon    two<\/p>\n
individual civil rights plaintiffs and their legal counsel for<\/p>\n
abusing the judicial process.                   Case law in Canadian Courts and<\/p>\n
U.S. Federal Courts exhibits that the imposition of monetary<\/p>\n
penalties upon frivolous public interest claims is not unique<\/p>\n
to Indian jurisprudence.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
179.      Additionally,           U.S.    Federal      Courts     have      imposed     non-<\/p>\n
monetary    penalties         upon       Attorneys        for    bringing        frivolous<\/p>\n
claims.     Federal rules and case law leave the door open for<\/p>\n
such non-monetary penalties to be applied equally in private<\/p>\n
claims    and     public     interest          claims.        Rule    11    of   the    FRCP<\/p>\n
additionally permits Courts to apply an “appropriate sanction”<\/p>\n
on Attorneys for filing frivolous claims on behalf of their
\nclients.         U.S.       Federal      Courts     have       imposed      non-monetary<\/p>\n
sanctions upon Attorneys for bringing frivolous claims under<\/p>\n
Rule 11.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
180.      In Frye v. Pena 199 F.3d 1332 (Table), 1999 WL 974170,<\/p>\n
for example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth<\/p>\n
Circuit      affirmed       the    District       Court’s      order     to   disbar    an<\/p>\n
Attorney     for      having      “brought    and    pressed      frivolous      claims,<\/p>\n
made personal attacks on various government officials in bad<\/p>\n
faith and for the purpose of harassment, and demonstrated a<\/p>\n
lack of candor to, and contempt for, the court.” This judicial<\/p>\n
stance endorses the ethical obligation embodied in Rule 3.1 of<\/p>\n
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”): “a lawyer<\/p>\n
shall     not    bring       or    defend     a     proceeding,        or     assert     or<\/p>\n
controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law<\/p>\n
and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”                            Together, the<\/p>\n
FRCP,     U.S.       federal      case   law,      and    the    MRPC       endorse     the<\/p>\n
imposition       of     non-monetary         penalties         upon    attorneys        for<\/p>\n
bringing frivolous private claims or public interest claims.<\/p>\n
181.      In Bar Council of Maharashtra (supra) this court was<\/p>\n
apprehensive that by widening the legal standing there may be<\/p>\n
flood   of      litigation        but    loosening       the    definition       is    also<\/p>\n
essential       in    the    larger      public     interest.          To     arrest    the<\/p>\n
mischief is the obligation and tribute to the judicial system.<\/p>\n
182.      In SP Gupta (supra)             the court cautioned that important<\/p>\n
jurisdiction of public interest litigation may be confined to<\/p>\n
legal wrongs and legal injuries for a group of people or class
\nof   persons.        It   should    not   be   used   for    individual   wrongs<\/p>\n
because individuals can always seek redress from legal aid<\/p>\n
organizations.        This is a matter of prudence and not as a rule<\/p>\n
of law.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
183.      In Chhetriya Pardushan Mukti Sangharsh Samiti (supra)<\/p>\n
this court again emphasized that Article 32 is a great and<\/p>\n
salutary safeguard for preservation of fundamental rights of<\/p>\n
the citizens.         The superior courts have to ensure that this<\/p>\n
weapon under Article 32 should not be misused or abused by any<\/p>\n
individual or organization.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
 184.     In Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Others<\/a> (1992) 4 SCC<\/p>\n
305, the court rightly cautioned that expanded role of courts<\/p>\n
in     modern    `social’        state    demand      for    greater     judicial<\/p>\n
responsibility. The PIL has given new hope of justice-starved<\/p>\n
millions of people of this country.                The court must encourage<\/p>\n
genuine PIL and discard PIL filed with oblique motives.<\/p>\n
185.      In Guruvayur Devaswom Managing Committee & Another v.<\/p>\n
C.K. Rajan & Others<\/a> (2003) 7 SCC 546, it was reiterated that<\/p>\n
the court must ensure that its process is not abused and in<\/p>\n
order to prevent abuse of the process, the court would be<\/p>\n
justified       in   insisting      on    furnishing    of    security    before<\/p>\n
granting    injunction      in     appropriate     cases.      The   courts   may<\/p>\n
impose heavy costs to ensure that judicial process is not<\/p>\n
misused.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
186.      In Dattaraj Nathuji Thaware (supra) this court again
\ncautioned     and    observed        that      the   court    must   look    into   the<\/p>\n
petition carefully and ensure that there is genuine public<\/p>\n
interest      involved         in        the     case     before        invoking    its<\/p>\n
jurisdiction.            The     court         should    be    careful      that    its<\/p>\n
jurisdiction is not abused by a person or a body of persons to<\/p>\n
further his or their personal causes or to satisfy his or<\/p>\n
their    personal       grudge      or    grudges.       The    stream     of   justice<\/p>\n
should     not     be    allowed         to    be    polluted      by    unscrupulous<\/p>\n
litigants.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
187.     In Neetu (supra) this court observed that under the<\/p>\n
guise of redressing a public grievance the public interest<\/p>\n
litigation should not encroach upon the sphere reserved by the<\/p>\n
Constitution to the Executive and the Legislature.<\/p>\n
188.     In M\/s. Holicow Pictures Pvt. Ltd. (supra) this court<\/p>\n
observed that the judges who exercise the jurisdiction should<\/p>\n
be extremely careful to see that behind the beautiful veil of<\/p>\n
PIL, an ugly private malice, vested interest and\/or publicity-<\/p>\n
seeking is not lurking.              The court should ensure that there is<\/p>\n
no abuse of the process of the court.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
189.     When we revert to the facts of the present then the<\/p>\n
conclusion is obvious that this case is a classic case of the<\/p>\n
abuse of the process of the court.                        In the present case a<\/p>\n
practicing lawyer has deliberately abused the process of the<\/p>\n
court.      In that process, he has made a serious attempt to<\/p>\n
demean   an      important     constitutional           office.      The    petitioner<\/p>\n
ought to have known that the controversy which he has been
\nraising in the petition stands concluded half a century ago<\/p>\n
and by a Division Bench judgment of Nagpur High Court in the<\/p>\n
case    of   Karkare    (supra)   the   said   case   was   approved   by   a<\/p>\n
Constitution Bench of this court.          The controversy involved in<\/p>\n
this case is no longer res integra.              It is unfortunate that<\/p>\n
even after such a clear enunciation of the legal position, a<\/p>\n
large number of similar petitions have been filed from time to<\/p>\n
time in various High Courts.             The petitioner ought to have<\/p>\n
refrained from filing such a frivolous petition.<\/p>\n
190.     A degree of precision and purity in presentation is a<\/p>\n
sine qua non for a petition filed by a member of the Bar under<\/p>\n
the label of public interest litigation.              It is expected from<\/p>\n
a member of the Bar to at least carry out the basic research<\/p>\n
whether the point raised by him is res integra or not.                  The<\/p>\n
lawyer who files such a petition cannot plead ignorance.<\/p>\n
191.     We would like to make it clear that we are not saying<\/p>\n
that the petitioner cannot ask the court to review its own<\/p>\n
judgment because of flaws and lacunae, but that should have<\/p>\n
been a bona fide presentation with listing of all relevant<\/p>\n
cases in a chronological order and that a brief description of<\/p>\n
what judicial opinion has been and cogent and clear request<\/p>\n
why    where   should   be   re-consideration    of   the   existing   law.<\/p>\n
Unfortunately, the petitioner has not done this exercise.               The<\/p>\n
petition which has been filed in the High Court is a clear<\/p>\n
abuse of the process of law and we have no doubt that the<\/p>\n
petition has been filed for extraneous considerations.                  The
\npetition      also    has   the   potentiality          of     demeaning          a    very<\/p>\n
important constitutional office.                  Such petition deserves to<\/p>\n
be discarded and discouraged so that no one in future would<\/p>\n
attempt to file a similar petition.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
192.     On    consideration      of    the     totality       of     the      facts    and<\/p>\n
circumstances of the case, we allow the appeals filed by the<\/p>\n
State and quash the proceedings of the Civil Miscellaneous<\/p>\n
Writ Petition No. 689 (M\/B) of 2001 filed in the Uttaranchal<\/p>\n
High Court.      We further direct that the respondents (who were<\/p>\n
the    petitioners      before    the    High        Court)    to     pay       costs    of<\/p>\n
Rs.1,00,000\/-        (Rupees   One     Lakh)    in     the     name       of    Registrar<\/p>\n
General of the High court of Uttarakhand.                           The costs to be<\/p>\n
paid by the respondents           within two months.                If the costs is<\/p>\n
not deposited within two months, the same would be recovered<\/p>\n
as the arrears of the Land Revenue.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
193.     We request the Hon’ble Chief Justice of Uttrakhand High<\/p>\n
Court to create a fund in the name of Uttarakhand High Court<\/p>\n
Lawyers Welfare Fund if not already in existence.                                The fund<\/p>\n
could be utilized for providing necessary help to deserving<\/p>\n
young    lawyers       by   the   Chief        Justice        of    Uttarakhand         in<\/p>\n
consultation with the President of the Bar.<\/p>\n
194.     We    must    abundantly       make    it    clear        that    we    are    not<\/p>\n
discouraging     the    public    interest       litigation         in     any    manner,<\/p>\n
what we are trying to curb is its misuse and abuse. According<\/p>\n
to us, this is a very important branch and, in a large number<\/p>\n
of PIL petitions, significant directions have been given by
\nthe     courts      for     improving   ecology    and     environment,         and<\/p>\n
directions helped in preservation of forests, wildlife, marine<\/p>\n
life etc. etc.            It is the bounden duty and obligation of the<\/p>\n
courts to encourage genuine bona fide PIL petitions and pass<\/p>\n
directions and orders in the public interest which are in<\/p>\n
consonance with the Constitution and the Laws.<\/p>\n
195.      The    Public      Interest   Litigation,      which    has    been    in<\/p>\n
existence in our country for more than four decades, has a<\/p>\n
glorious record.            This Court and the High Courts by their<\/p>\n
judicial creativity and craftsmanship have passed a number of<\/p>\n
directions in the larger public interest in consonance with<\/p>\n
the inherent spirits of the Constitution.                 The conditions of<\/p>\n
marginalized         and     vulnerable    section       of      society     have<\/p>\n
significantly improved on account of courts directions in the<\/p>\n
P.I.L.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
196.      In our considered view, now it has become imperative to<\/p>\n
streamline the P.I.L.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
197.      We have carefully considered the facts of the present<\/p>\n
case.     We have also examined the law declared by this court<\/p>\n
and other courts in a number of judgments.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
198.      In order to preserve the purity and sanctity of the<\/p>\n
PIL,     it   has     become     imperative   to     issue       the    following<\/p>\n
directions:-\n<\/p>\n
       (1)    The courts must encourage genuine and bona fide
\n              PIL and effectively discourage and curb the PIL
\n              filed for extraneous considerations.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (2)   Instead of every individual judge devising his
\n             own procedure for dealing with the public
\n             interest litigation, it would be appropriate for
\n             each High Court to properly formulate rules for
\n             encouraging the genuine PIL and discouraging the
\n             PIL filed with oblique motives.    Consequently,
\n             we request that the High Courts who have not yet
\n             framed the rules, should frame the rules within
\n             three months.    The Registrar General of each
\n             High Court is directed to ensure that a copy of
\n             the Rules prepared by the High Court is sent to
\n             the Secretary General of this court immediately
\n             thereafter.\n<\/p>\n
       (3)   The courts should prima facie verify the
\n             credentials    of     the petitioner before
\n             entertaining a P.I.L.\n<\/p>\n
       (4)   The court should be prima facie satisfied
\n             regarding the correctness of the contents of the
\n             petition before entertaining a PIL.\n<\/p>\n
       (5)   The court should be fully satisfied that
\n             substantial public interest is involved before
\n             entertaining the petition.\n<\/p>\n
       (6)   The court should ensure that the petition which
\n             involves larger public interest, gravity and
\n             urgency must be given priority over other
\n             petitions.\n<\/p>\n
       (7)   The courts before entertaining the PIL should
\n             ensure that the PIL is aimed at redressal of
\n             genuine public harm or public injury.         The
\n             court should also ensure that there is no
\n             personal gain, private motive or oblique motive
\n             behind filing the public interest litigation.<\/p>\n
       (8)   The court should also ensure that the petitions
\n             filed by busybodies for extraneous and ulterior
\n             motives   must  be   discouraged  by   imposing
\n             exemplary costs or by adopting similar novel
\n             methods to curb frivolous petitions and the
\n             petitions filed for extraneous considerations.<\/p>\n
199.     Copies   of   this   judgment   be   sent   to   the   Registrar<\/p>\n
Generals of all the High Courts within one week.\n<\/p>\n
200.   These   appeals   are   listed      on     03.05.2010               to      ensure<\/p>\n
compliance of our order.\n<\/p>\n
                                                  ……………………………………..J.
\n                                         (Dalveer Bhandari)<\/p>\n
                                          …………………………………… J.
\n                                 (Dr. Mukundakam Sharma)<\/p>\n
New Delhi;\n<\/p>\n
January 18, 2010.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010 Bench: Dalveer Bhandari, Mukundakam Sharma REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.1134-1135 OF 2002 State of Uttaranchal .. Appellant Versus Balwant Singh Chaufal & Others .. Respondents J U D G M […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-151856","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nState Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2010-01-17T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2019-01-02T16:26:05+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"107 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010\",\"datePublished\":\"2010-01-17T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2019-01-02T16:26:05+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010\"},\"wordCount\":21400,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010\",\"name\":\"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2010-01-17T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2019-01-02T16:26:05+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2010-01-17T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2019-01-02T16:26:05+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"107 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010","datePublished":"2010-01-17T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2019-01-02T16:26:05+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010"},"wordCount":21400,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010","name":"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2010-01-17T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2019-01-02T16:26:05+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-uttaranchal-vs-balwant-singh-chaufal-ors-on-18-january-2010#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"State Of Uttaranchal vs Balwant Singh Chaufal & Ors on 18 January, 2010"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/151856","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=151856"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/151856\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=151856"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=151856"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=151856"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}