{"id":152163,"date":"1992-08-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1992-08-26T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992"},"modified":"2018-02-11T08:15:20","modified_gmt":"2018-02-11T02:45:20","slug":"sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992","title":{"rendered":"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992<\/div>\n
Author: B Verma<\/div>\n
Bench: J.S. Verma, N.M. Kasliwal, K. Ramaswamy, K.J. Reddy, S.C. Agrawal<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nWrit Petition (civil)  514 of 1992\n\nPETITIONER:\nSAROJINI RAMASWAMI \n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS. \n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 27\/08\/1992\n\nBENCH:\nJ.S. VERMA & N.M. KASLIWAL & K. RAMASWAMY & K.J. REDDY & S.C. AGRAWAL\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
1992 AIR 2219 = 1992 (1)Suppl.SCR 108 = 1992 (4) SCC 506 = 1992(5) JT 1 =
\n1992(2) SCALE 257<\/p>\n
(Under Article 32 of the Constitutions of India)<\/p>\n
The Judgment was delivered by : Hon’ble Justice J. S. Verma, Hon’ble
\nJustice K. Jayachandra Reddy and Hon’ble Justice S. C. Agrawal<\/p>\n
J. S.VERMA, J. (for himself and on behalf of K. Jayachandra and S. C.
\nAgrawal, JJ.) (Majority view):-\n<\/p>\n
1. The person entitled to seek judicial review and the stage at which it is
\navailable against the findings of the Inquiry Committee constituted under
\nSection 3(2) of the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as
\n‘the Act’) in accordance with the law declared in Sub-Cornmittee on
\nJudicial Accountability v. Union of India,<\/a> (1991) 4 SCC 699   is the
\nquestion for decision in this writ petition. According to the petitioner,
\nthe remedy of judicial review is available to the concerned Judge against
\nthe finding, if any, by the Inquiry Committee that the learned Judge is
\n‘guilty’ of misbehaviour only prior to submission of the report of the
\nCommittee to the Speaker – in accordance with Section 4 (2) of the Act or
\nlatest till it is laid before the Parliament as required by Section 4(3) of
\nthe Act, but not thereafter. Accordingly, the petitioner claims that a copy
\nof the report should be furnished to the concerned Judge before it is
\nsubmitted to the Speaker, to preserve the right of the Judge to seek
\njudicial review of the finding of ‘guilty’, if any, in the report. The
\nmerit of this submission is considered herein.\n<\/p>\n
2. The petitioner is the wife of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami, a sitting Judge
\nof the Supreme Court of India. In this writ petition under Article 32 of
\nthe Constitution of India, certain constitutional issues have been raised
\nwhich are to be decided on the construction of Article 124 of the
\nConstitution of India and the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 read with the
\nJudges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 framed thereunder, in the background of the
\nlaw declared in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India,<\/a>
\n(1991) 4 SCC 699  In essence, this petition is a sequel to that earlier
\ndecision rendered in the context of the proceedings for removal of Mr.
\nJustice V. Ramaswami from the office of a Judge of the Supreme Court of
\nIndia.\n<\/p>\n
3. Certain allegations of financial improprieties and irregularities were
\nmade against Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami in his capacity as the Chief Justice
\nof the High Court of Punjab and Haryana prior to his appointment in October
\n1989 as a Judge of the Supreme Court of India by 108 members of the Ninth
\nLok Sabha by a notice of motion for presenting an address to the President
\nfor the removal from office of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami. On March 12, 1991,
\nthe motion was admitted by the Speaker of the Ninth Lok Sabha who also
\nproceeded to constitute a Committee consisting of Mr. Justice P. B. Sawant,
\na sitting Judge of this Court, Mr. Justice P. D. Desai, Chief Justice of
\nthe High Court of Bombay and Mr. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, a retired
\nJudge of this Court as a distinguished jurist in terms of Section 3(2) of
\nthe Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. On dissolution of the Ninth Lok Sabha, the
\nUnion Government was of the view that the notice of motion given by 108
\nmembers of the Ninth Lok Sabha for presenting an address to the President
\nfor removal of the learned Judge as well as the decision of the Speaker of
\nthe Ninth Lok Sabha to admit the motion and constitute a Committee under
\nthe provisions of the Act had lapsed with the dissolution of the Ninth Lok
\nSabha. Accordingly, the Union Government abstained from acting in aid of
\nthe decision of the Speaker to notify that the services of the two sitting
\nJudges on the Committee would be treated as ‘actual service within the
\nmeaning of para 11(b)(i) of Part D of the Second Schedule to the
\nConstitution to enable them to function as members of the Committee.
\nImportant constitutional issues as to the status of a motion for the
\nremoval of a Judge under the Act made pursuant to Article 124(5) of the
\nConstitution and applicability of the doctrine of lapse to such a motion
\nupon the dissolution of the Lok Sabha together with the connected questions
\nincluding the justiciability thereof in a Court of law arose in these
\nrather unfortunate circumstances.\n<\/p>\n
4. A body called the “Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability” represented
\nby a Senior Advocate of this Court as its Convener filed Writ Petition No.
\n491 of 1991 and the Supreme Court Bar Association filed Writ Petition No.
\n541 of 1991 in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution. The common
\nprayers in both the petitions were for a direction to the Union of India to
\ntake immediate steps to enable the Inquiry Committee to discharge its
\nfunctions under the Act; and to restrain the Judge concerned Mr. Justice V.
\nRamaswami from performing judicial functions and exercising ‘judicial
\npowers during the pendency of the proceedings before the Committee. The
\ndecision rendered therein by a Constitution Bench is Sub-Committee on
\nJudicial Accountability v. Union of India,<\/a> (1991) 4 SCC 699<\/p>\n
5. The Constitution Bench by a majority of 4: 1 held that a motion under
\nSection 3(2) of the Act does not lapse upon the dissolution of the House.
\nThe majority opinion concluded as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“All that is necessary to do is to declare the correct constitutional
\nposition. No specific writ or direction need issue to any authority. Having
\nregard to the nature of the subject matter and the purpose it is ultimately
\nintended to serve all that is necessary is to declare the legal and
\nconstitutional position and leave the different organs of the State to
\nconsider matters falling within the orbit of their respective jurisdiction
\nand powers”\n<\/p>\n
6. The controversy before the Constitution Bench in those matters was so
\ndecided and Writ Petitions Nos. 491 and 541 of 1991 were disposed of by the
\nappropriate declarations of the law as contained in the judgment.\n<\/p>\n
7. After declaration of the legal and constitutional position in this
\nbehalf on the points in controversy in the above decision, the Union of
\nIndia took the necessary steps to act in aid of the decision of the Speaker
\nof the Ninth Lok Sabha and the requisite notification was also issued in
\nrespect of the two sitting Judges of the Committee as required by para
\n11(b)(i) of Part D of the Second Schedule to the Constitution of India. The
\nCommittee constituted by the Speaker under the Act then proceeded to
\ninquire into the allegations made against the Judge concerned Mr. Justice
\nV. Ramaswami and, as intimated at the hearing of this petition, the
\nCommittee has completed the Inquiry and also prepared its Report for being
\nsubmitted to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha as required by Section 4(2) of
\nthe Act.\n<\/p>\n
8. The learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami sent a letter dated May 10,
\n1992 to Mr. Justice P. B. Sawant, Presiding Officer of the Inquiry
\nCommittee, requesting that a copy of the report of the Committee be
\nforwarded to him giving him sufficient time to seek redress in a Court of
\nlaw, if required or necessary, as a result of the findings of the
\nCommittee: He was sent a reply by the Secretary to the Committee by letter
\ndated May 15, 1992. These letters are collectively marked Annexure 1 to the
\npetition. They are reproduced as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“Justice V, Ramaswami Judge, Supreme Court 2, Teenmurthi Marg New Delhi-
\n110011<\/p>\n
May 10, 1992<\/p>\n
Hon’ble Mr. Justice P. B. Sawant Presiding Officer<\/p>\n
Committee Appointed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 433 Parliament
\nHouse Annexe<\/p>\n
New Delhi 110001.\n<\/p>\n
Sir,<\/p>\n
I am informed that the Committee is resuming its sittings for further
\nexamination of witnesses on May 11, 1992. My counsel Shri Ranjit Kumar, who
\nwas present in Court during the course of the hearing in Writ Petition No.
\n149 of 1992 in the Supreme Court of India, learnt that only 5 or 6
\nwitnesses remain to be examined and that thereafter the matter will be
\nfixed for arguments. As the Committee will be sitting from May 11, 1992
\nonwards, presumably the entire process will be completed during the period
\nwhen the Hon’ble Supreme Court is closed for summer vacation. My advocate
\nalso learned that the Hon’ble Speaker has extended the date for the
\nCommittee to furnish its report under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 till
\nJuly 31, 1992. I, therefore, assume that prior to that date the report will
\nbe furnished to the Hon’ble Speaker. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in its
\njudgment on Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v.Union of India,
\n(1991) 4 SCC 699  has held that the Committee under the Judges (Inquiry)
\nAct, 1968 is a statutory committee and from the time it commences its
\nproceedings till its report is placed before Parliament, its proceedings
\nare deemed to be outside Parliament and, therefore, subject to judicial
\nreview.\n<\/p>\n
As the Committee is required to render its findings in respect of the
\nvarious charges framed against me, I would like to be supplied a copy of
\nthe report well in time to entitle me to challenge the same by filing
\nappropriate proceedings, in the event any findings are rendered against me.
\nA reading of the Constitution Bench’s judgment would suggest that such an
\nopportunity would be available to me since the Committee functions as a
\nTribunal outside Parliament. I, therefore, do not expect the Committee to
\nrender infructuous this valuable constitutional right, in the event its
\nreport is adverse to me, by submitting it in haste to the Hon’ble Speaker,
\nwho might place it before Parliament when in session. Recourse to such a
\nprocedure would not only be in violation of my constitutional right to
\nreceive the report but would be violative of natural justice, since I
\nwould, in that situation, be pre-empted from challenging the report in an
\nappropriate forum.\n<\/p>\n
I am writing to you well in advance so that upon completion of the report,
\na copy is forwarded to me forthwith and sufficient time is granted to me to
\nseek redress in a Court of law, if required or necessary. Naturally, you
\nwould, therefore, in forwarding a copy of the report to me, withhold the
\nforwarding of the said report to the Hon’ble Speaker, simultaneously. I,
\ntherefore, expect that you would be responding to this request of mine very
\nsoon, since any delay in this regard would be extremely prejudicial to my
\ninterests and would tend to defeat even the limited right granted to me by
\nthe judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Kindly respond to this request
\nof mine within a couple of days of your receiving this letter.\n<\/p>\n
Thanking you,<\/p>\n
Yours sincerely,<\/p>\n
Sd\/-\n<\/p>\n
(V. Ramaswami)”\n<\/p>\n
“Committee Appointed under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 433, Parliament
\nHouse Annexe<\/p>\n
New Delhi-110001<\/p>\n
No. 17\/17- CB-11\/91 May 15, 1992<\/p>\n
From:\n<\/p>\n
S. C. Gupta, Secretary<\/p>\n
To<\/p>\n
Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami, Judge,<\/p>\n
Supreme Court of India,<\/p>\n
2 Teen Murti Marg,<\/p>\n
New Delhi- 110011.\n<\/p>\n
Sir,<\/p>\n
With reference to your letter dated 10th May, 1992 addressed to the
\nPresiding Officer, 1 am to inform you that counsel for the Committee
\nbrought your letter to the attention of the Constitution Bench which is now
\nseized of the matter, during the hearing on 14th May, 1992 in Writ Petition
\nNo. 149 of 1992, stating that the Committee will abide by any directions
\nthat may be given in this regard by their Lordships in the said case.\n<\/p>\n
Yours faithfully,<\/p>\n
Sd\/- S. C. Gupta<\/p>\n
Secretary”\n<\/p>\n
9. The petitioner, Smt. Sarojini Ramaswami, wife of Mr. Justice V.
\nRamaswami, has filed this writ petition on July 6, 1992 after receipt of
\nthe letter dated May 15, 1992 by Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami from the
\nSecretary to the Committee, impleading the Union of India and the Committee
\nappointed under the Act as the respondents. The relief sought in this writ
\npetition is for a direction to the Committee to supply a copy of the Report
\nof the Committee to Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami and to withhold forwarding of
\nthe said Report to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha simultaneously to enable
\nMr. Justice V. Ramaswami to seek redress in a court of law, if required or
\nnecessary, against the findings of the Committee in its Report. This relief
\nis sought on the basis of the decision of the Constitution Bench reported
\nin (1991) 4 SCC 699 (AIR 1992 SC 320) that the entire proceedings of the
\nCommittee are statutory in nature and, therefore, subject to judicial
\nreview.\n<\/p>\n
10. When the matter came up for hearing before us first on July 21, 1992,
\nwe indicated to Shri Kapil Sibal, senior counsel for the petitioner that
\neven though the petitioner’s right for the relief claimed in this petition
\nis founded on her status as wife of the learned Judge and the right flowing
\nto her through her husband, yet Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami had not been
\nimpleaded as a party and it was also not indicated that the writ petition
\nwas for and on behalf of the learned Judge so as to bind the learned Judge
\nhimself to the decision in this petition. We also pointed out that the
\nexact position of the learned Judge has to be made clear to us before we
\nproceed to consider and decide this writ petition on merits. Shri Kapil
\nSibal indicated that the learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami would be
\nbound by the decision herein and he also undertook to file a writing to
\nthat effect. We accordingly adjourned the matter to the next day July 22,
\n1992 for this purpose. The proceedings of July 21, 1992 are as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“Shri Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel appears for the petitioner. In
\nresponse to our query whether Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami would be bound by
\nthe adjudication made in this petition wherein his wife is the petitioner,
\nShri Sibal submitted that he will obtain written instructions to this
\neffect from the learned Judge, Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami and file the same
\nin the Court by tomorrow morning.\n<\/p>\n
The matter will be taken up tomorrow, the 22nd July, 1992.”\n<\/p>\n
11. On July 22,1992, Shri Ranjit Kumar, the counsel instructing Shri Kapil
\nSibal, senior counsel for the petitioner filed in the Court a letter
\naddressed by him to Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami with the endorsement of the
\nlearned Judge at the foot thereof. The same is reproduced as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“Ranjit Kumar<\/p>\n
Advocate<\/p>\n
July 21, 1992.\n<\/p>\n
Sub: Writ Petition (C) No. 514 of 1992 Mrs. Sarojini Ramaswami v. Union of
\nIndia and others<\/a>.\n<\/p>\n
Dear Sir,<\/p>\n
When Writ Petition (Civil) No. 514\/ 1992 was taken up today, the Hon’ble
\nJudges comprising the Bench wanted to be informed of your stand in respect
\nof the binding nature of the adjudication in the event the petition was
\ntaken up for hearing and judgment rendered thereon.\n<\/p>\n
Shri Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate, appearing on behalf of the petitioner in
\nthis Writ Petition informed the learned Judges that as the right of Mrs.
\nRamaswami to move this Hon’ble Court directly flowed from your right to
\ncontinue to hold office as a Judge of this Hon’ble Court, you would
\nnaturally be bound by the adjudication rendered in respect of the relief
\nsought in Writ Petition No. 514 of 1992. Please confirm if Mr. Sibal has
\nrightly conveyed to the Hon’ble Judges your position in this regard.\n<\/p>\n
Thanking you,<\/p>\n
Yours faithfully,<\/p>\n
Sd\/-\n<\/p>\n
(Ranjit Kumar)<\/p>\n
Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami<\/p>\n
2, Teen Murti Marg<\/p>\n
New Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
The statement made by Mr. Sibal correctly reflects my position.\n<\/p>\n
Sd\/- V. Ramaswami<\/p>\n
21-7-1992″\n<\/p>\n
12. On production of the above letter of Shri Ranjit Kumar, bearing thereon
\nthe endorsement of acceptance by Mr. Justice v. Ramaswami in his own hand,
\nwe made an order to this effect which is contained in the proceedings dated
\nJuly 22,1992 asunder:-\n<\/p>\n
“Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned counsel for the petitioner has filed a letter
\ndated July 21, 1992 addressed by him to Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami bearing
\nthe endorsement of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami at the foot of it accepting as
\ncorrect Justice V. Ramaswami the position is that this writ petition is in
\nsubstance by the learned Judge himself field through his wife who is shown
\nas the petitioner” (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
13. The result, therefore, is that this writ petition is in substance by
\nthe learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami himself filed through his wife,
\nthe petitioner Smt. Sarojini Ramaswami for the relief claimed herein on
\nbehalf of her husband Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami. This writ petition is
\ntreated accordingly for the purpose of deciding the points raised herein.\n<\/p>\n
14. In addition to issuing notice to the respondents, namely, the Union of
\nIndia and the Inquiry Committee appointed under Section 3 (2) of the Act,
\nwe also requested the learned Attorney General to appear and assist the
\nCourt in his capacity as the Attorney General of India. We have heard Shri
\nKapil Sibal for the petitioner, Shri F. S. Nariman for the Inquiry
\nCommittee and the Attorney General Shri G. Ramaswamy.\n<\/p>\n
15. Before proceeding to consider the arguments advanced by these learned
\ncounsel, we consider it appropriate to make a brief reference to Writ
\nPetition (Civil) No. 149 of 1992 – Shri Krishna Swami v. Union of India<\/a>  –
\nwhich had been filed earlier and of which reference is made in this writ
\npetition as well as in the correspondence between Mr. Justice v. Ramaswami
\nand the Committee.\n<\/p>\n
16. Writ Petition No. 149 of 1992 was filed in this Court by M. Krishna
\nSwami, a member of the Tenth Lok Sabha for several reliefs specified
\ntherein. Those reliefs relate to the aforesaid Inquiry by the Committee
\nappointed under the Act to investigate into the allegations made against
\nMr. Justice v. Ramaswami. The petitioner therein M. Krishna Swami claiming
\nto be a person interested as a member of the Tenth Lok Sabha as well as an
\nadvocate of Madras known to Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami for long alleged
\ncertain illegalities in the procedure adopted by the Committee prejudicial
\nto the learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami and on that basis, apart from
\nseeking reconsideration of the decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial
\nAccountability, (AIR 1991 SC 320 ), also sought quashing of the charges
\nframed by the Committee and a declaration that the proceedings of the
\nCommittee are null and void. That writ petition was listed initially before
\na Division Bench comprising of three learned Judges which referred the writ
\npetition for hearing by a larger Bench. This is how Writ Petition No. 149
\nof 1992 came up for hearing before this Bench. On 6-5-1992, during
\nconsideration of the question of maintainability of that writ petition in
\nthe absence of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami as a party, Shri Kapil Sibal,
\nsenior counsel appearing for the petitioner in that writ petition also took
\ntime to make an application for impleading Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami as a
\nparty in that petition. However, on 7-5-1992, Shri Kapil Sibal stated that
\nthe petitioner therein did not want to implead Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami as
\na party and he had decided to pursue that writ petition as framed.
\nAccordingly, that writ petition was heard on the question of its
\nmaintainability for grant of the reliefs claimed therein without impleading
\nthe learned Judge Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami, who would undoubtedly be
\ndirectly affected by the decision on merits of the questions raised
\ntherein. We are disposing of Writ Petition No. 149 of 1992 also separately
\non the definite stand taken by the petitioner therein of pursuing that
\npetition declining to implead Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami in spite of
\nopportunity given for the purpose. The present Writ Petition No. 514 of
\n1992 by Smt. Sarojini Ramaswami came to be filed thereafter in these
\ncircumstances on conclusion of the Inquiry by the Committee constituted
\nunder the Act.\n<\/p>\n
17. The main point for decision in this writ petition – Writ Petition No.
\n514 of 1992 – is: Whether as a result of the decision in Sub-Committee on
\nJudicial Accountability Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami<\/a> is entitled to be supplied
\na copy of the report of the Committee containing its findings before
\nsubmission of that report to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha in accordance
\nwith Section 4 (2) of the Act to enable him to challenge the adverse,
\nfindings, if any, against him at this stage in a Court of law? The
\nsubmission of Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior counsel for the petitioner
\nis that this right of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami is a logical corollary of
\nthe decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, (AIR 1992 SC 320
\n), wherein it has been held that the process up to submission of the report
\nto the Speaker and it being laid before the House for its consideration is
\nstatutory subject to judicial review. The further submission of learned
\ncounsel is that the contrary view would result in depriving the learned
\nJudge of his right to challenge the adverse finding of ‘guilty’, if any,
\nonce the parliamentary part of the process commences. He submitted that the
\norder of removal thereafter would be immune from challenge being the
\nculmination of the parliamentary process and, therefore, the learned Judge
\nwould be denied his constitutional right of seeking judicial review of the
\nstatutory part of the process even though that is the foundation for the
\nsubsequent parliamentary part. Shri Sibal urged that the order of removal
\nmade by the President as a result of this process being in effect the
\nculmination of the parliamentary process would be immune from judicial
\nreview and, therefore, unless the learned Judge has the opportunity of
\nseeking judicial review before commencement of the parliamentary part of
\nthe process, his constitutional right, notwithstanding any illegality in
\nthe procedure culminating in the adverse findings of the Committee, would
\nbe defeated in spite of the declaration of law made in the earlier
\ndecision. Finally, Shri Sibal modified this part of the argument slightly
\nto contend that even assuming the order of removal made by the President
\nunder Article 124 (4) be not immune from judicial review on permissible
\ngrounds of illegality, which according to learned counsel is extremely
\ndoubtful, great prejudice would be caused to the learned Judge by
\npostponement of the stage of judicial review till after the making of the
\norder of removal under Article 124(4) if the illegality attaches to the
\nfinding of ‘guilty’ in the report of the Committee. In short, according to
\nShri Kapil Sibal, judicial review to test the legality of the Committee’s
\nfindings is available either ‘now’ before commencement of the parliamentary
\nprocess on submission of the report to the Speaker under Section 4 (2) of
\nthe Act ‘or never’. This, according to Shri Sibal, is the reason for
\ndirecting the Committee, a statutory authority, to furnish a copy of its
\nreport to the learned Judge before submitting the report to the Speaker in
\naccordance with Section 4(2) of the Act. The question, therefore, is:
\nWhether the basic premise on which the argument is based, namely, judicial
\nreview now or never’ is correct or the law is that judicial review on
\npermissible grounds is not now but only later in case an order of removal
\nis made by the President under Article 124(1) of the Constitution? Is it
\nthat the challenge permissible in the constitutional scheme is actually to
\nthe order of removal made by the President under Article 124(4) based on
\nthe composite process of removal comprising of the initial statutory part
\nwhich provides the condition precedent for, and the parliamentary part of
\nthe process thereafter?\n<\/p>\n
18. Shri F. S. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the
\nCommittee did not dispute the right of the learned Judge to seek judicial
\nreview of the statutory part of the process as declared in the earlier
\ndecision on permissible grounds of judicial review, but he urged that on
\ncompletion of the Inquiry culminating in recording of the findings in the
\nreport. The principle of committee between the constitutional authorities
\nrequires that the Courts must not interdict the process contemplated by the
\nAct once the findings have been recorded in the report; and judicial review
\nto the extent permissible must be only in the event an order of removal is
\nmade by the President under Article 124 (4) of the Constitution if the
\nParliament chooses to act on the adverse finding of ‘guilty’, if any, in
\nthe Committee’s report by adopting the motion of removal as prescribed.
\nShri Nariman submitted that the learned Judge is entitled to an opportunity
\nduring the parliamentary process to assail the adverse findings and thereby
\nfacilitate the Parliament to consider the matter properly while discussing
\nthe motion on receipt of the Committee’s report, as was the procedure
\nadopted during the impeachment of Justice Angelo Vasta in Australia where
\nthe procedure is entirely parliamentary. Shri Nariman added that there is
\nno reason to assume that the Parliament would not give such an opportunity
\nto the learned Judge or that it would not properly consider the objections
\nto the findings raised by the learned Judge before voting on the motion;
\nand in case those objections are accepted and the motion fails, the
\nproceedings would end in favour of the learned Judge without any need for
\nhim to seek redress by judicial review. Shri Nariman further submitted that
\neven though he could not make a definite submission that the ultimate order
\nof removal, if any, would be subject to judicial review, yet he was unable
\nto find any clear limitation, in principle or authority, on the power of
\njudicial review against an order of removal by the President under Article
\n124(4) of the Constitution on the permissible grounds of illegality on
\nwhich alone the learned Judge can assail the adverse findings of the
\nCommittee at this stage, assuming he has a right to do so, before
\nCommencement of the parliamentary process.\n<\/p>\n
19. The learned Attorney General, to begin with, adopted fully the
\narguments of Shri Kapil Sibal and supported the petitioner’s case. However,
\nthe final stand of the learned Attorney General was modified wherein he
\nsubmitted that the right of the learned Judge to challenge the order of
\nremoval made by the President under Article 124(4) being doubtful, it is
\nappropriate that in order to avoid defeating his right of seeking judicial
\nreview in case of an adverse findings, if any, the learned Judge should be
\nfurnished a copy of the report of the Committee at this stage before it is
\nsubmitted to the Speaker under Section 4(2) of the Act. The learned
\nAttorney General entirely agreed with Shri F. S. Nariman that in the event
\nof an adverse finding by the Committee, the learned Judge would be entitled
\nto an opportunity during the parliamentary process to assail the finding
\nagainst him and thereby facilitate the Parliament to consider the motion
\nproperly.\n<\/p>\n
20. From the rival submissions, as summarised above, it is clear that in
\ncase the learned Judge would have the right to seek judicial review in the
\nevent an order of removal is made against him under Article 124(4) of the
\nConstitution, and the permissible grounds of judicial review whatever they
\nbe at this stage, would remain unimpaired then, the main reason for
\nrequiring a copy of the Report of the Committee to be furnished now before
\ncommencement of the parliamentary process would disappear. In such a
\nsituation, the only other question would be: Whether there is any added
\nprejudice by deferment of the exercise of that right till after the making
\nof the order of removal, if any? This further question would arise only if
\nthe constitutional scheme envisages the remedy of judicial review to the
\nlearned Judge now as well as at the end. If it is held that the
\nconstitutional scheme envisages and permits a challenge by the concerned
\nJudge to the adverse finding of ‘guilty’ recorded in the report of the
\nCommittee only if, and when, the order of removal is made by the President
\nunder Article 124(4) of the Constitution and not earlier, it being
\ncontemplated that during the parliamentary process the concerned Judge
\nwould be given an opportunity for the purpose to enable the Parliament to
\ntake into account the objections, if any, of the concerned Judge to the
\nadverse findings against him before voting on the motion for removal of the
\nJudge, then any interdiction by the Court at an intermediate stage would be
\nexcluded in a matter of this kind where expedition and early conclusion of
\nthe process is of utmost public importance. The scheme then would be that
\nin case of an adverse finding of ‘guilty’ by the Committee, the Parliament
\ngives an opportunity to the concerned Judge to show cause against his
\nremoval on the basis of the adverse findings and takes that into
\nconsideration for voting on the motion so that if it accepts the objections
\nof the concerned Judge, the motion would not be passed and the matter would
\nrest there. The learned Judge would not then be required to seek redress in
\nthe Court of law to challenge the statutory part of the process preceding
\nthe parliamentary process.\n<\/p>\n
21. If, however, the motion is passed, notwithstanding the objections to
\nthe findings raised by the concerned Judge, leading to the order of removal
\nbeing made by the President under Article 124(4) of the Constitution, then
\nalone there is occasion for the concerned Judge to assail the adverse
\nfinding of ‘guilty’ and the statutory process preceding it on the
\npermissible grounds of judicial review by challenging the order of removal
\nin a Court of law on that basis. Keeping in view the desirability of early
\nconclusion of the proceedings of this nature in public interest, such a
\nconstitutional scheme would not be unreasonable reconciling the larger
\npublic interest with the individual interest of the concerned Judge
\nhimself. The first point for consideration, therefore, is: The existence of
\nthe right of judicial review in the concerned Judge of the Order of removal
\nmade by the President under Article 124 (4) of the Constitution, if and
\nwhen it is made.\n<\/p>\n
22. Another submission of Shri Kapil Sibal, in effect, to buttress his main
\nsubmission indicated above, is that the Committee constituted under Section
\n3(2) of the Act, is a Tribunal and, therefore, its findings are subject to
\nappeal in this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution. This argument
\nalso is to claim that the learned Judge is entitled to a copy of the report
\nbefore its submission under Section 4 (2) of the Act to the Speaker to
\nexercise the right of appeal against the adverse finding of ‘guilty’, if
\nany, in the report.\n<\/p>\n
23. The constitutional scheme for the removal of a Judge of the Supreme
\nCourt or a High Court in accordance with Article 124(4) of the Constitution
\nand the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 made under Article 124(5) of the
\nConstitution read with the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969 framed under the
\nAct was considered and indicated in the earlier decision in Sub-Committee
\non Judicial Accountability (AIR 1992 SC 320 ). It is, however, useful to
\nrecapitulate the scheme in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and the Judges
\n(Inquiry) Rules, 1969 made thereunder in the context of the question which
\nnow arises for decision on the basis of the declaration of law made in Sub-
\nCommittee on Judicial Accountability. We proceed to do so before we advert
\nto the specific declaration of law made in the earlier decision.\n<\/p>\n
24. Article 124(5) mandates enactment of a parliamentary law to regulate
\nthe investigation and proof of misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge under
\nclause (4) and pursuant to it the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 has been
\nenacted by the Parliament. As held in sub-committee on Judicial
\nAccountability, on a construction of Article 124, ‘the policy appears to be
\nthat the entire stage up to proof of misbehaviour or incapacity, beginning
\nwith the initiation of investigation on the allegation being made, is
\ngoverned by the law enacted under Article 124(5) and in view of the
\nrestriction provided in Article 121, that machinery has to be outside the
\nParliament and not within it and ‘the Parliament comes in the picture only
\nwhen a finding is reached by that machinery that the alleged misbehaviour
\nor incapacity has been proved’. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 enacted
\nunder Article 124(5) of the Constitution being made for this purpose, the
\nprovisions thereof have to be construed in that light.\n<\/p>\n
25. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 provides that the procedure for removal
\nof a Judge of the Supreme Court or a High Court can be initiated only if a
\nnotice of a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for
\nhis removal, signed by not less than 100 members of the House of the People
\nor 50 members of the Council of States is given to the Speaker \/ Chairman
\nin accordance with sub-section (1) of Section 3 of the Act. Any other
\nmethod for initiating the prescribed procedure for removal of a Judge is
\nobviously excluded. The Speaker \/ Chairman is empowered to either admit or
\nrefuse to admit the motion ‘after consulting such persons, if any, as he
\nthinks fit and after considering such materials, if any, as may be
\navailable to him’. The indication is that the Speaker \/ Chairman is
\nempowered to consult such persons as he thinks fit and is required to take
\ninto consideration the materials available to him for deciding whether to
\nadmit the motion or refuse to admit the same. It is reasonable to assume
\nthat one such person to be consulted would be the Chief Justice of India,
\nwho apart from being the Head of the Indian Judiciary would also be the
\nauthority involved in the choice and availability of a sitting Judge of the
\nSupreme Court and a sitting Chief Justice of a High Court as members of the
\nCommittee constituted under Section 3(2) of the Act, if the motion is
\nadmitted by the Speaker \/ Chairman. Sub-section (2) of Section 3 then
\nprovides that the Speaker\/ Chairman, in case he admits the motion, ‘shall
\nkeep the motion pending and constitute, as soon as may be, for the purpose
\nof making an investigation into the grounds on which the removal of a Judge
\nis prayed for’, a Committee of three members of whom one shall be from
\namong the Chief Justice and other Judges of the Supreme Court, one from
\namong the Chief Justices of the High Courts and a distinguished jurist.
\nThis means that an inquiry into the grounds on which the removal of a Judge
\nis prayed for in the notice of motion given by the specified minimum number
\nof members of Parliament or in other words the inquiry into the allegations
\nof misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge requiring his removal would be
\nmade by the Committee so constituted comprising of two sitting Judges and a
\ndistinguished jurist. Sub-section (1) of Section 4 empowers the Committee
\nto regulate its own procedure subject to any rules made in this behalf and
\nthe giving of a reasonable opportunity to the Judge concerned of defending
\nhimself in that inquiry. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 requires the
\nCommittee, ‘at the conclusion of the investigation’, to submit its report
\nto the Speaker \/ Chairman ‘stating therein its findings on each of the
\ncharges separately with such observations on the whole case as it thinks
\nfit’. The Speaker \/ Chairman, as required by sub-section (3) ‘shall cause
\nthe report submitted under sub-section (2) to be laid, as soon as may be,
\nrespectively before the House of the People and the Council of States’.
\nThus sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 4 require the Committee to submit
\nits report to the Speaker \/ Chairman ‘at the conclusion of the
\ninvestigation’ and the Speaker \/ Chairman ‘shall cause the report to be
\nlaid, as soon as may be, before the House of the People and the Council of
\nStates’. In the present context, it is the requirement at this stage, ‘at
\nthe conclusion of the investigation’, when the report of the Committee has
\nbeen prepared, which raises the question: Whether, as a consequence of the
\nearlier decision in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, (AIR 1992 SC
\n320 ), the Committee is required to furnish a copy of its report to the
\nconcerned Judge before submitting it to the Speaker as enjoined by Section
\n4(2) of the Act?\n<\/p>\n
26. Section 6 of the Act provides for the stage subsequent to submission of
\nthe report by the Committee to the Speaker \/ Chairman. Sub-section (1) of
\nSection 6 lays down that if the Committee absolves the concerned Judge, In
\nits report and records a finding that the Judge is ‘not guilty of any
\nmisbehaviour then no further steps shall be taken in either House of
\nParliament and the motion pending in the House shall not be proceeded
\nwith’. It is clear from sub-section (1) of Section 6 that a finding of ‘not
\nguilty’ recorded by the Committee in its report terminates the process of
\nremoval of the concerned Judge initiated in accordance with Section 3(1) of
\nthe Act, that part of the process being statutory, and the parliamentary
\npart of the process initiated on the Committee’s report being laid before
\nthe House by the Speaker \/ Chairman in accordance with Section 4(3) does
\nnot commence. This is clear from the expressions ‘then no further steps
\nshall be taken in either Houseand the motion pending in the House shall not
\nbe proceeded with’ in Section 6(1) of the Act. In Sub-Committee on Judicial
\nAccountability, (1991 (4) SCC 699<\/p>\n
“If, however, the finding reached by the machinery provided in the enacted
\nlaw is that the allegation is not proved, the matter ends and there is no
\noccasion to move the motion in accordance with Article 124(4)”.\n<\/p>\n
27. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 6 provide for the situation where
\nthe report of the Committee contains a finding that the Judge is ‘guilty’
\nof any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity. Sub-section (2)
\nprescribes that the motion admitted by the Speaker \/ Chairman under Section
\n3(1) of the Act shall then be taken up for consideration by the House
\ntogether with the report of the Committee. It is in this situation and in
\nthis manner that the parliamentary part of the process of removal of a
\nJudge commences requiring the House to consider the motion for removal of
\nthe Judge. Sub-section (3) lays down that if the motion is adopted by each
\nHouse of Parliament in accordance with provisions of clause (4) of Article
\n124, then the misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge shall be deemed to
\nhave been proved and the address praying for the removal of the Judge shall
\nbe presented to the President in the prescribed manner. Thus, commencement
\nof the parliamentary part of the process for removal is after the end of
\nthe earlier statutory part, only in case the report of the Committee
\ncontains a finding that the Judge is ‘guilty’ of any misbehaviour or
\nsuffers from any incapacity and not otherwise. The entire process of
\nremoval is composite in nature.\n<\/p>\n
28. A brief reference to the relevant provisions of the Judges (Inquiry)
\nRules, 1969 framed under the above Act which are material in the present
\ncontext may now be made. Rule 9 relates to the report of the Inquiry
\nCommittee. Sub-rule (1) says that where the members of the Inquiry
\nCommittee are not unanimous, the report submitted under Section 4 of the
\nAct shall be in accordance with the findings of the majority of the
\nmembers. Sub-rule (2) requires the Presiding Officer of the Inquiry
\nCommittee to forward within the specified period its report in duplicate,
\nduly authenticated to the Speaker \/ Chairman by whom the Committee was
\nconstituted. Sub-rule (3) requires an authenticated copy of the report of
\nthe Inquiry Committee to be laid before each House of Parliament. Sub-rule
\n(4) prescribes that where the finding of ‘guilty’ is by majority, the
\ncontrary finding of the third member shall also be forwarded along with the
\nreport submitted under Section 4 of the Act. Sub-rule (5) requires an
\nauthenticated copy of the contrary finding of ‘not guilty’ made by the
\nthird member in such a case also to be laid before each House of
\nParliament. Thus, sub-rules (4) and (5) require that where the finding of
\n‘guilty’ is not unanimous but. only by majority, then the contrary opinion
\nof the third member in favour of the concerned Judge shall also be laid
\nbefore each House of Parliament to be available to the Parliament for
\nconsideration along with the report containing the finding of ‘guilty’ by
\nthe majority while considering the motion for removal of the Judge. Sub-
\nrule (6) makes provision for the converse situation where the finding by
\nthe majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee is that the Judge is
\n‘not guilty’, but the third member makes a finding to the contrary. It
\nprovides that in such a situation where the majority of the members of the
\nInquiry Committee finds that the Judge is ‘not guilty’, then ‘the Inquiry
\nCommittee shall not disclose the finding made by such third member to
\nParliament or to any other authority, body or person’.\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
29. It is clear that if the finding of ‘not guilty’ is even by majority and
\nnot unanimous, the contrary finding of ‘guilty’ by the third member is not
\neven to be disclosed to ‘Parliament or to any other authority, body or
\nperson’ much less acted upon for any purpose by anyone. The scheme embodied
\nin Section 6 of the Act read with Rule 9 is that where the finding of the
\nInquiry Committee is of ‘not guilty’ whether unanimous or by majority of
\nthe members of the Inquiry Committee, the entire process of removal of the
\nJudge terminates with that finding giving the quietus to the accusation of
\nmisbehaviour by the Judge scotching all rumours and the motion is not even
\nrequired to be taken up for consideration by the Parliament so that the
\nparliamentary part of the process does not commence in the absence of the
\ncondition precedent of a finding of ‘guilty’ by the Inquiry Committee
\nessential for its commencement. In such a situation when the finding of
\n‘not guilty’ is by majority of the members only, the contrary finding of
\nguilty by the third member is not even to be disclosed to any authority or
\nperson including the Parliament since all debate on the conduct of the
\nconcerned Judge based on those allegations must end. The scheme is that the
\nmatter must end there finally with no one, not even the Parliament, having
\nthe right or authority to consider, debate or examine the finding of ‘not
\nguilty’.\n<\/p>\n
30. It is, therefore, obvious that the Inquiry Committee constituted under
\nSection 3(2) of the Act becomes the sole and final arbiter on the question
\nof removal of the concerned Judge where the finding reached by the
\nCommittee, whether unanimous or by majority, is that the Judge is ‘not
\nguilty’. Rule 9(6) read with Section 6(1) indicates the extent and wide
\nsweep of a finding of ‘not guilty by the committee by providing that the
\ncontrary finding of ‘guilty’ by the dissenting third member in case of a
\nfinding of ‘not guilty’ by majority shall not even be disclosed to anyone
\nincluding the Parliament. The idea is that if the Committee even by
\nmajority records a finding of ‘not guilty’, notwithstanding the contrary
\nopinion of the third member, the matter must terminate there with no one,
\nnot even the Parliament, being entitled to even scrutinise much less
\nquestion the correctness or legality of the finding of ‘not guilty’. The
\nintention manifest from these provisions is that in case the Inquiry
\nCommittee makes a finding that the Judge is ‘not guilty, of any
\nmisbehaviour, any further scrutiny of that finding is excluded in the
\nconstitutional scheme, and no useful purpose being served by disclosure of
\nthe contrary finding of guilty reached by the third member even to the
\nParliament, its disclosure is forbidden with the majority opinion of ‘not
\nguilty’ giving the quietus to the allegation of misbehaviour made against
\nthe concerned Judge. The disclosure of the dissenting opinion of guilty by
\nthe third member would needlessly harm the reputation of the concerned
\nJudge, notwithstanding termination of the process of removal with the
\nmajority finding him ‘not guilty’.\n<\/p>\n
31. These provisions in the Act and the Rules are a strong indication that
\nthe constitutional scheme for the removal of a Judge in accordance with
\nclauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 of the Constitution and the
\nparliamentary law enacted under Article 124(5) shuts out all scrutiny even
\nby judicial review where the Inquiry Committee unanimously or even by
\nmajority makes a finding that the Judge is ‘not guilty’ of any
\nmisbehaviour. Obviously, the concerned Judge cannot be aggrieved by a
\nfinding of ‘not guilty’ in his favour and in case such finding is not
\nunanimous but by majority, non-disclosure of the dissenting opinion of
\nguilty, as required by Rule 9(6) of the Rules, even to the Parliament,
\nprevents any possible damage to the reputation of the concerned Judge from
\nthe dissenting opinion and, therefore, there can be no legitimate grievance
\nto him from the undisclosed dissenting opinion. For this reason, the
\nconcerned Judge can have no grievance against exclusion of judicial review
\nin that situation.\n<\/p>\n
32. The constitutional scheme indicates that it is only the Members of
\nParliament acting jointly in the specified minimum number who can bring
\nabout initiation of the procedure for removal of a Judge, all other modes
\nand persons being excluded. The provision in Rule 9(6) for non-disclosure
\nof the dissenting opinion of ‘guilty’ even to the Parliament further
\nindicates that no one including the Members of Parliament who gave the
\nnotice of motion under Section 3(1) of the Act to initiate the process of
\nremoval have any right in that situation to even scrutinise much less
\nassail the finding of ‘not guilty’ recorded by the Inquiry Committee even
\nby majority. Section 6(1) of the Act read with Rule 9(6) of the Rules is a
\nclear pointer in this direction. Thus, there is total exclusion of judicial
\nreview at the instance of any one, including the concerned Judge and
\nMembers of Parliament who gave the notice of motion, as well as any debate
\neven in Parliament, in case the finding by the Inquiry Committee, whether
\nunanimous or by majority, is that the Judge is ‘not guilty’ of any
\nmisbehaviour. This being the situation in the event of the Committee’s
\nreport containing a finding of ‘not guilty’, there can be no requirement at
\nleast in that situation for the Committee to furnish a copy of its report
\nto the concerned Judge before submitting the same to the Speaker \/ Chairman
\nunder Section 4 (2) of the Act. There being no grievance to the concerned
\nJudge, the question of his right to seek judicial review does not arise.
\nThe question, however, is of this obligation in the converse situation
\nwhere the Committee makes the finding of ‘guilty’ against the concerned
\nJudge.\n<\/p>\n
33. The absence of any obligation in the Committee to furnish a copy of its
\nreport to the concerned Judge before submitting it to the Speaker \/
\nChairman under Section 4(2) of the Act is in consonance with the law
\ndeclared in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, that the process for
\nremoval of the Judge is statutory till the laying of the report by the
\nSpeaker before the Parliament on its submission to him by the Committee in
\naccordance with sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 4 of the Act. There
\nbeing no scope for judicial review in the case of finding of ‘not guilty’
\nin the report for the reasons already given, the finding of ‘not guilty’
\nbeing immune from any scrutiny in the constitutional scheme adopted, there
\nneed not be any obligation to furnish a copy of the report to the concerned
\nJudge. The Judge not being aggrieved and all others being excluded when the
\nfinding is ‘not guilty’, any interdiction by the Court is automatically
\nruled out, notwithstanding the process till then being statutory. The
\nincidents of statutory process are to be considered in this perspective.\n<\/p>\n
34. In this background, the real question for decision now is: Whether the
\nright of the concerned Judge to assail the finding of ‘guilty’ against him
\nreached by the Inquiry Committee, a statutory authority, can be exercised
\nonly if the report is furnished to the concerned Judge before the
\ncommencement of the parliamentary process which obliges the Inquiry
\nCommittee to furnish a copy of the report to him at least in the situation
\nwhere the finding reached is that the Judge is ‘guilty’ of any
\nmisbehaviour? Before proceeding to consider this question, it may be added
\nthat if there be several charges framed against the Judge and in respect of
\nsome of them the finding is that the Judge is ‘guilty’ while the finding on
\nthe other charges is that the Judge is ‘not guilty’, then the consequences
\nwhich would ensue in respect of the finding on each charge would depend on
\nits nature. In other words, in respect of a charge of which the Judge is
\nfound ‘not guilty’, the consequences would be those indicated above in
\naccordance with Section 6(1) of the Act and Rule 9(6) of the Rules and the
\nprocess of removal relating to those charges would terminate in the manner
\nindicated without being subject to any further scrutiny or judicial review
\nas in the case of a finding of ‘not guilty’ in respect of all the charges
\nlevelled against a Judge.\n<\/p>\n
35. At this stage, certain extracts from the earlier decision in Sub-
\nCommittee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India,<\/a> (1991 (4) SCC 699
\nmay be quoted for convenience. The point raised in this petition was
\ndebated mainly with reference to these portions of the earlier decision.
\nThese extracts are as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“But the constitutional scheme in India seeks to achieve a judicious blend
\nof the political and judicial processes for the removal of Judges. Though
\nit appears at the first sight that the proceedings of the Constituent
\nAssembly relating to the adoption of clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124
\nseem to point to the contrary and evince an intention to exclude
\ndetermination by a judicial process of the correctness of the allegations
\nof misbehaviour or incapacity on a more careful examination this is not the
\ncorrect conclusion”\n<\/p>\n
“The proceedings in the Constituent Assembly, therefore, do not give an
\nindication that in adopting clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 of the
\nConstitution, the intention of the Constituent Assembly was to exclude
\ninvestigation and proof of misbehaviour or incapacity of the judge sought
\nto be removed, by a judicial body. Having regard to the views expressed by
\nShri Alladi Krishnaswami Ayyar, who was a member of the Drafting Committee,
\nwhile opposing the amendments proposed by Shri M. Ananthasayanam Ayyangar,
\nit is possible to infer that the intention of the Constituent Assembly was
\nthat the provision with regard to the machinery for such investigation and
\nproof was a matter which need not be contained in the Constitution and it
\nis a matter for which provision could be made by Parliament by law.”\n<\/p>\n
The three available constitutional options were mentioned in the decision
\nof which the second which was accepted by the majority opinion is as
\nunder:-\n<\/p>\n
“Second.- Since a motion for presenting an address to the President
\nreferred to in Articles 121 and 124(4) has to be on ground of ‘proved’
\nmisbehaviour and incapacity, no such motion can be made until the
\nallegations relating to misbehaviour or incapacity have first been found to
\nbe proved in some forum outside either Houses of Parliament. Law under
\nArticle 124(5) is mandatory and until the Parliament enacts a law and makes
\nprovision for an investigation into the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity
\nand regulates the procedure therefor, no motion for removal of a Judge
\nwould be permissible under Article 124(4) and the Houses of Parliament
\nwould not be brought into the picture till some authority outside the two
\nHouses of Parliament has recorded a finding of misbehaviour or incapacity.
\nThe emphasis is on the expression ‘proved’.”\n<\/p>\n
Acceptance of the second view was stated thus –\n<\/p>\n
“The second view has its own commendable features. It enables the various
\nprovisions to be read harmoniously and, together, consistently with the
\ncherished values of judicial independence. It also accords due recognition
\nto the word “proved” in Article 124(4). This view would also ensure
\nuniformity of procedure in both Houses of Parliament and serve to eliminate
\narbitrariness in the proceedings for removal of a Judge. It would avoid
\nduplication of the investigation and inquiry in the two Houses. Let us
\nelaborate on this”.\n<\/p>\n
“The motion which lifts the bar contained in Article 121 is really a motion
\nfor such removal under clause (4) of Article 124 moved in the House after
\nthe alleged misbehaviour or incapacity has been proved in accordance with
\nthe law enacted by the Parliament under clause (5) of Article 124. In this
\nconnection, the parliamentary procedure commences only after proof of
\nmisbehaviour or incapacity in accordance with the law enacted under clause
\n(5), the machinery for investigation and finding of proof of the
\nmisbehaviour or incapacity being statutory, governed entirely by provisions
\nof the law enacted under clause (5). This also harmonises Article 121. The
\nposition would be that an allegation of misbehaviour or incapacity of a
\nJudge has to be made, investigated and found proved in accordance with the
\nlaw enacted by the Parliament under Article 124(5) without the Parliament
\nbeing involved up to that stage; on the misbehaviour or incapacity of a
\nJudge being found proved in the manner provided by that law, a motion for
\npresenting an address to the President for removal of the Judge on that
\nground would be moved in each House under Article 124(4); on the motion
\nbeing so moved after the proof of misbehaviour or incapacity and it being
\nfor presenting an address to the President praying for removal of the
\nJudge, the bar on discussion contained in Article 121 is lifted and
\ndiscussion can take place in the Parliament with respect to the conduct of
\nthe Judge; and the further consequence would ensue depending on the outcome
\nof the motion in a House of Parliament. If, however, the finding reached by
\nthe machinery provided in the enacted law is that the allegation is not
\nproved, the matter ends and there is no occasion to move the motion in
\naccordance with Article 124(4)”.\n<\/p>\n
“The other view is that clause (4) of Article 124 gives power to the
\nParliament to act for removal of the Judge on the ground of proved
\nmisbehaviour or incapacity in the manner prescribed if the matter is
\nbrought before it at this stage; and for reaching that stage the Parliament
\nis required to enact a law under clause (5) regulating the procedure for
\nthat purpose. This means that making of the allegation, initiation of the
\nproceedings, investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a
\nJudge are governed entirely by the law enacted by the Parliament under
\nclause (5) and when that stage is reached, the Parliament comes into the
\npicture and the motion for removal of the Judge on the ground of proved
\nmisbehaviour or incapacity is moved for presentation of the address to the
\nPresident in the manner prescribed This indicates that the machinery for
\ninvestigation and proof must necessarily be outside Parliament and not
\nwithin it. In other words, proof which involves a discussion of the conduct
\nof the Judge must be by a body which is outside the limitation of Article\n<\/p>\n
121. The word ‘proved’ also denotes proof in the manner understood in our
\nlegal system i.e. as a result of a judicial process. The policy appears to
\nbe that the entire stage up to proof of misbehaviour or incapacity,
\nbeginning with the initiation of investigation on the allegation being
\nmade, is governed by the law enacted under Article 124 (5) and in view of
\nthe restriction provided in Article 121, that machinery has to be outside
\nthe Parliament and not within it. If this be so, it is a clear pointer that
\nthe Parliament neither has any role to play till misconduct or incapacity
\nis found proved nor has it any control over the machinery provided in the
\nlaw enacted under Article 124 (5). The Parliament comes in the picture only
\nwhen a finding is reached by that machinery that the alleged misbehaviour
\nor incapacity has been proved. The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 enacted under
\nArticle 124(5) itself indicates that the Parliament so understood the
\nintegrated scheme of Articles 121, 124(4) and 124(5). The general scheme of
\nthe Act conforms to this view (para 39 at pp. 349-50 of AIR)<\/p>\n
“If this be the correct position, then the validity of law enacted by the
\nParliament under clause (5) of Article 124 and the stage up to conclusion
\nof the inquiry in accordance with that law being governed entirely by state
\nwould be open to judicial review as the parliamentary process under Article
\n124(4) commences only after a finding is recorded that the alleged
\nmisbehaviour or incapacity is proved in the inquiry conducted in accordance
\nwith the law enacted under clause (5) for this reason the argument based on
\nexclusivity of Parliament’s jurisdiction over the process and progress of
\ninquiry under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and consequently exclusion of
\nthis Court’s jurisdiction in the matter at this stage does not arise”
\n(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
” This indicates that this area is not left uncovered which too is a
\npointer that the stage at which the bar in Article 121 is lifted is the
\nstarting point of the parliamentary process i.e. when the misbehaviour or
\nincapacity is proved; the stage from the initiation of the process by
\nmaking the allegation, its mode, investigation and proof are covered by the
\nlaw enacted under clause (5); in case the allegation is not proved, the
\ncondition precedent to invoke the Parliament’s jurisdiction under clause
\n(4), does not exist, which is the reason for S. 6 of 1968 Act saying so;
\nand in case it is proved, the process under clause (4) commences,
\nculminating in the result provided in it.”\n<\/p>\n
“Accordingly, the scheme is that the entire process of removal is in two
\nparts – the first under clause (5) from initiation to investigation and
\nproof of misbehaviour or incapacity is covered by an enacted law,
\nParliament’s role being only legislative as in all the laws enacted by it;
\nand the second part only after proof under clause (4) is in Parliament,
\nthat process commencing only on proof in accordance with the law enacted
\nunder clause (5). Thus the first part is entirely statutory while the
\nsecond part alone is the parliamentary process.\n<\/p>\n
The Constitution intended a clear provision for the first part covered
\nfully by enacted law, the validity of which and the process thereunder
\nbeing subject to judicial review independent of any political colour and
\nafter proof it was intended to be a parliamentary process. It is this
\nsynthesis made in our Constitutional Scheme for removal of a Judge.”\n<\/p>\n
“Indeed, the Act reflects the constitutional philosophy of both the
\njudicial and political elements of the process of removal. The ultimate
\nauthority remains with the Parliament in the sense that even if the
\ncommittee for investigation records a finding that the Judge is guilty of
\nthe charges it is yet open to the Parliament to decide not to present an
\naddress to the President for removal. But if the committee records a
\nfinding that the Judge is not guilty, then the political element in the
\nprocess of removal has no further option. The law is, indeed, a civilised
\npiece of legislation reconciling the concept of accountability of Judges
\nand the values of judicial independence.”\n<\/p>\n
“Our conclusions, therefore, on Contentions B, C and D are as under:\n<\/p>\n
The constitutional process for removal of a judge up to the point of
\nadmission of the motion, constitution of the committee and the recording of
\nfindings by the committee are not, strictly, proceedings in the Houses of
\nParliament. The Speaker is a statutory authority under the Act. Up to that
\npoint the matter cannot be said to remain outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
\nContention B is answered accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
Prior proof of misconduct in accordance with the law made under Article
\n124(5) is a condition precedent for the lifting of the bar under Art. 121
\nagainst discussing the conduct of a Judge in the Parliament. Art. 124(4)
\nreally becomes meaningful only with a law made under Article 124(5).
\nWithout such a law the constitutional scheme and process for removal of a
\nJudge remains inchoate. Contention C is answered accordingly.”\n<\/p>\n
36. The proceeding being statutory means that it is governed in that part
\nby the law enacted under Art. 124(5) and it is statutory in the sense that
\nit is outside the Parliament while thereafter in case of a finding of
\n‘guilty’ by the Committee, the proceedings are in the Parliament.\n<\/p>\n
37. The constitutional scheme indicated by clauses (4) and (5) of Art. 124
\nand reflected in the law enacted by the Parliament under Art. 124(5) is, as
\nindicated in sub-committee on Judicial Accountability, ‘a judicious blend
\nof the political and judicial processes for the removal of Judges’ and,
\ntherefore, we must first look at these provisions to provide the answer to
\nevery query raised in this context. The different schemes for removal of
\nJudges in the other countries do not provide the answer to the problem
\nbefore us and are at best only of marginal precedent value. The practice
\nand precedents in other countries, such as Australia, may provide guidance
\nonly in respect of the political part of the procedure in our
\nconstitutional scheme which commences after a finding of ‘guilty’ is made
\nby the Inquiry Committee and the report is laid before the Parliament under
\nS. 4(3) of the Act. We must, therefore, find the indication for the problem
\nbefore us primarily from the provisions of the Constitution and the law
\nenacted under Art. 124(5). In view of ‘a judicious blend of the political
\nand judicial processes’ in the constitutional scheme in India, no one need
\nlook askance at the exclusion of judicial review at the instance of
\neveryone in case the Inquiry Committee makes a finding that the Judge is
\n‘not guilty’. The clear pointer is that the accusation made in the manner
\nprescribed by the specified minimum number of members of Parliament having
\nbeen investigated by an Inquiry Committee comprising of high judicial
\ndignitaries and the conclusion reached by them being that the Judge is ‘not
\nguilty’ of any misbehaviour, the matter must conclude there scotching all
\nrumours without anyone being permitted to even reagitate much less examine
\nthe correctness of that finding of ‘not guilty’.\n<\/p>\n
38. When the finding in the Committee’s report is that the Judge is
\n‘guilty’ of any misbehaviour, then S. 6(2) of the Act mandates that the
\nmotion for removal of the Judge shall be taken up for consideration by the
\nHouse together with the report of the Committee submitted in accordance
\nwith S. 4(2) and laid before it under S. 4(3) of the Act. Rule 9(1) of the
\nRules provides that where the members of the Inquiry Committee are not
\nunanimous, the report submitted by the Committee shall be in accordance
\nwith the finding of the majority of the members thereof. We have already
\nindicated the provision in Rule 9(6) and its true import where the majority
\nof the members makes a finding that the Judge is not guilty. Rule 9(4)
\nprovides for the other situation where the majority of the members of the
\nCommittee make a finding that the Judge is guilty of misbehaviour but the
\nthird member makes a contrary finding. Unlike sub-rule (6) which contains a
\nclear prohibition against disclosure of the dissenting opinion of the third
\nmember when the majority opinion is that the Judge is not guilty, sub-rule
\n(4) requires that where the majority opinion is that the Judge is guilty,
\nthe finding to the contrary made by the third member shall also be
\nforwarded by the Inquiry Committee along with the report submitted under S.
\n4(2) of the Act in accordance with the findings of the majority that the
\nJudge is guilty, as required by Rule 9(1). This distinction in the two
\nsituations is significant. Whereas according to Rule 9(6), the dissenting
\nopinion of, the third member is not even to be disclosed to any one
\nincluding the Parliament, where the majority of the members of the Inquiry
\nCommittee makes a finding that the Judge is not guilty of any misbehaviour,
\nwhere the majority finds the Judge ‘guilty’ of misbehaviour, the dissenting
\nopinion of the third member to the contrary, that is, ‘not guilty’ must be
\nforwarded along with the report submitted under S. 4(2) of the Act. Sub-
\nrule (5) of Rule 9 further lays down that an authenticated copy of the
\nfinding made by the third member referred to in sub-rule (4) shall also be
\nlaid before each House of Parliament. Obviously, the purpose of requiring
\nthe dissenting opinion of not guilty by the third member to be submitted
\nalong with the report under S. 4(2) and the further requirement that it
\nshould also be laid before each House of Parliament is to enable the
\nParliament while considering the motion for removal of the Judge on a
\nfinding of guilty being recorded by the majority of members of the Inquiry
\nCommittee to take into account the dissenting opinion as well before
\ndeciding whether to act on the majority opinion of guilty or not. Rule
\n10(2) requires a copy of the evidence received by the Inquiry Committee to
\nbe also laid before each House of Parliament along with the report. These
\nprovisions indicate the manner of consideration by the Parliament of the
\nmotion for removal of the Judge before taking a decision whether the motion
\nis to be adopted in accordance with Art. 124(4) or not since it is only on
\nthe motion being so adopted by the requisite majority in each House of
\nParliament that the misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge shall be deemed
\nto have been proved as provided in S. 6(3) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
39. The Parliament while considering the motion for removal of the Judge
\nfor deciding whether to adopt the motion or not takes into consideration
\nthe report as well as the dissenting opinion, if any, of the third member
\nof the Inquiry Committee in case the majority opinion is that the Judge is
\nguilty, along with the entire evidence received by the Inquiry Committee on
\nwhich the finding of guilty of the Inquiry Committee is based. No doubt,
\nthe Parliament does not substitute its finding for that of the Inquiry
\nCommittee or supersede it in case it decides not to adopt the motion by the
\nrequisite majority so that the motion for removal of the Judge fails and
\nthe proceedings terminate but in doing so it does take the decision to not
\nadopt the motion because it declines to accept and act on the finding of
\nguilty recorded in the report of the Committee after debating the issue on
\nthe basis of the materials before it.\n<\/p>\n
40. These express provisions in the law enacted under Art. 124(4) leave no
\ndoubt that a full consideration on merits including correctness of the
\nfinding of ‘guilty’ made by the Inquiry Committee on the basis of the
\nmaterials before the Parliament is contemplated during the parliamentary
\npart of the process of removal of a Judge. Notwithstanding the finding of
\n‘guilty’ made by the Inquiry Committee in its report, the Parliament may,
\non a full consideration of the matter on the materials before it, choose
\nnot to adopt the motion for removal of the Judge which would terminate the
\nprocess of removal.\n<\/p>\n
41. Consistent with this scheme which is manifest from the provisions of
\nthe law enacted under Art. 124(5) is the requirement that the Parliament
\nshould also have the benefit of the comments, if any, of the concerned
\nJudge on the finding of ‘guilty’ against him made in the report of the
\nInquiry Committee. In addition to the requirement of placing of the
\nmaterials received by the Inquiry Committee before each House of Parliament
\nin accordance with Rule 10(2), the requirement in sub-rules (4) and (5) of
\nRule 9 of the dissenting opinion of not guilty by the third member of the
\nInquiry Committee to be also made available to the Parliament is a clear
\nindication that when the Parliament takes up for consideration the motion
\nfor removal of the Judge along with the report containing the finding of
\n‘guilty’ made by the Inquiry Committee, the Parliament should have not
\nmerely the entire material received by the Inquiry Committee on which its
\nfinding of ‘guilty’ is based but also the contrary opinion of not guilty
\nrecorded on the same material by the third member of the Committee. The
\nconcerned Judge would invariably be in a position to facilitate the task of
\nthe Parliament in this behalf by indicating his point of view against the
\nfinding of guilty recorded in the Committee’s report, in case he chooses to
\navail of the opportunity. It is, therefore, implicit in the constitutional
\nscheme for the removal of a Judge provided in Art. 124(4) and the law
\nenacted under Article 124(5) that the Parliament should also have the
\nbenefit of the point of view and the comments, if any, of the concerned
\nJudge on the finding of ‘guilty’ against him recorded by the Inquiry
\nCommittee in its report when the Parliament takes up the motion for removal
\nof the Judge for consideration along with the Inquiry Committee’s report
\nand the other relevant materials made available to it. To enable
\nperformance of this exercise and to effectuate the concerned Judge’s right
\nto show cause against the finding of ‘guilty’ made in the report at this
\nstage to the Parliament, it is the clear obligation of the Speaker \/
\nChairman to supply a copy of the Inquiry Committee’s report to the
\nconcerned Judge while causing it to be laid before the Parliament under S.
\n4(3) ‘as soon as may be’ on its submission under S. 4(2). This view also
\nhas the advantage of providing the concerned Judge an opportunity during
\nthe parliamentary part of the process of removal to place his point of view
\nand offer the comments, if any, on the finding of ‘guilty’ against him made
\nby the Inquiry Committee for consideration by the Parliament before voting
\non the motion for removal of the Judge.\n<\/p>\n
42. The further question then is of the nature of this opportunity to the
\nconcerned Judge during the parliamentary part of the process. Reference to
\nthe procedure adopted for giving an opportunity to Mr. Justice Vasta of the
\nSupreme Court of Queensland in Australia where the process for removal of
\nthe Judge was entirely parliamentary was made by Shri F. S. Nariman.
\nLearned counsel submitted that an opportunity to the learned Judge during
\nthe parliamentary process in the case of a finding of ‘guilty’ by the
\nCommittee is not inconsistent with the constitutional scheme adopted in
\nIndia where the parliamentary process commences only after a finding of
\n‘guilty’ is recorded by the Inquiry Committee during the statutory part.
\nThe learned Attorney General expressed his full agreement with this
\nsubmission of Shri Nariman. Shri Kapil Sibal without contesting this
\nsubmission of Shri Nariman supported on this aspect by the Attorney
\nGeneral, contended that it would be needless harassment to the learned
\nJudge to face also the parliamentary process if the finding of ‘guilty’, if
\nany, recorded by the Committee in its report can be quashed by resort to
\njudicial review thereof at this stage on the permissible grounds.\n<\/p>\n
43. We find no reason to doubt the correctness of the submission of Shri
\nNariman about the requirement of an opportunity to the concerned Judge to
\nplace his point of view with the comments, if any, against the Committee’s
\nfinding of ‘guilty’ for consideration by the Parliament along with the
\nother materials available to it while considering the motion for removal of
\nthe Judge to decide to adopt or not to adopt it. We are, therefore, of the
\nopinion that in the constitutional scheme in India envisaged and reflected
\nby the constitutional provisions and the law enacted thereunder for the
\nremoval of a Judge it is implicit that such an opportunity be given to the
\nconcerned Judge when the Parliament takes up the motion for his removal for
\nconsideration along with the Committee’s report and other relevant
\nmaterials. We have already indicated the obligation of the Speaker Chairman
\nto supply a copy of the report to the concerned Judge while laying it
\nbefore the Parliament under S. 4(3) as a part of this opportunity to be
\ngiven to the learned Judge. The precise details of the manner in which such
\nan opportunity is to be given to the concerned Judge may be for the Speaker
\n\/ Chairman and the Parliament to decide, but it does appear to us to be the
\nclear mandate in our constitutional scheme that the procedure adopted for
\nthis purpose should be such as would ensure availability to each House of
\nParliament of the concerned Judge’s point of view and comments, if any, on
\nthe finding of guilty made in the Committee’s report when it takes up for
\nconsideration the motion for removal of the Judge, such procedure ensuring
\nfairness to the concerned Judge and being in keeping with the dignity of
\nthe high office held by the learned Judge.\n<\/p>\n
44. This aspect being related to the right of judicial review available to
\nthe concerned Judge and in view of our above opinion that an opportunity to
\nthe Judge during the parliamentary process is clearly implicit in the
\nconstitutional scheme, a brief reference to the nature of opportunity given
\nin the case of Justice Vasta in Australia would be helpful as a persuasive
\nprecedent.\n<\/p>\n
45. Justice Angelo Vasta faced a proceeding for his removal from office as
\na Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland in Australia. A Commission of
\nInquiry was set up under the Parliamentary (Judges) Commission of Inquiry
\nAct, 1988. The function of the Commission as provided in the Act was to
\ninquire and advise the Legislative Assembly of Queensland whether the
\nbehaviour of Justice Vasta warranted his removal from office. The
\nCommission was constituted of a former Chief Justice of Australia and two
\nother Judges. The Commission was guided by the Special Report of the
\nAustralian Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into the conduct of Justice
\nLionel Murphy, a Judge of the High Court of Australia under S. 72 of the
\nAustralian Constitution. The Commission advised the Legislative Assembly of
\nQueensland that in the opinion of the members of the Commission, the
\nbehaviour of Justice Vasta in relation to the matters specified warranted
\nhis removal from office as a Judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The
\nreport of the Commission of Inquiry concerning Justice Vasta was laid on
\nthe table of the House on May 30, 1989. The Parliamentary Debates No. 16,
\n1988-89, from page 5146, indicate the procedure adopted by the,Legislative
\nAssembly of Queensland on the report of the Commission of Inquiry being
\nlaid before the House. On May 30,1989, Mr. M. J. Ahern, Premier and
\nMinister for State Department, moved the House in the matter and while
\nsaying that Justice Vasta be called upon to show cause why he should not be
\nremoved from office, speaking on the motion the Premier said:-\n<\/p>\n
“The Commissioners have found and reported to Parliament that there has
\nbeen behaviour by the judge such that his removal from office is warranted.
\nNo responsible Parliament could in those circumstances do other than call
\nupon the judge to show cause why he should not be removed. That course is
\nconsistent with history, convention, the law and proper constitutional
\npractice. The resolution proposed by the Government will give the judge
\nfull and proper opportunity to show cause without embarking upon a re-
\nexamination of those matters so minutely and carefully examination (Sic) by
\nthe commissioners.\n<\/p>\n
I intend to say no more. I urge all honourable members to adopt a similar
\ndiscretion in the interests of not prejudicing the judge and his right to
\nappear before us to attempt to show cause.”\n<\/p>\n
(at p. 5147)<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
In seconding the motion, the Minister for Justice and Attorney General, Mr.
\nP. J. Clauson said:-\n<\/p>\n
“By establishing the Parliamentary Judges Commission, the Assembly
\ndelegated to that body the difficult and arduous task of hearing the
\nevidence, determining question of credit and law, and making
\nrecommendations which we will consider. Of course, the final decision rests
\nquite properly with the Legislative Assembly. The Parliamentary Commission
\nwas established to assist Parliament, not to pre-empt its important
\nconstitutional role.\n<\/p>\n
I believe that Mr. Justice Vasta has the. right – and we have the duty to
\nallow him to address us, either personally or by his lega1 representatives
\nshould he so wish but the purpose of this privilege is to assist us in our
\ndifficult deliberations,<\/p>\n
Finally, I also wish to emphasise to honourable members that it would be
\ninappropriate at this stage for there to debate on the findings of the
\nCommission and it would be better both for the dignity of this House and in
\nfairness to Mr. Justice Vasta that we give him the opportunity to address
\nus before the matter is fully debated and a decision is made by the
\nAssembly.”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
The Parliamentary Debates further show that Justice Vasta was given such an
\nopportunity which he availed. It is not necessary in the present case to
\nmake any further reference to the proceedings against Justice Vasta.
\nSuffice it to say that the materials relating to the proceedings of removal
\nof Justice Vasta show clearly that he was given an opportunity to show
\ncause against his removal from office as a Judge by the Parliament when it
\ntook up for consideration the recommendation of the Commission of Inquiry
\nwhich had found him guilty of misbehaviour warranting his removal; and the
\ncause shown by Justice Vasta before the Legislative Assembly was taken into
\nconsideration in making the final decision.\n<\/p>\n
46. We find no reason why in the constitutional scheme adopted in India,
\nthe concerned Judge should not be given a similar opportunity when the
\nParliament takes up for consideration the motion for his removal on a
\nfinding of ‘guilty’ being made by the Committee constituted under the
\nJudges (Inquiry) Act, 1968. Such an opportunity is consistent with and is
\nalso the requirement of fairness, an essential attribute of procedure for
\nany decision having civil consequences. We need say no more on this aspect.
\nWe consider it necessary to say this much in view of our above opinion and
\nShri F. S. Nariman’s submission with which the learned Attorney General
\nagreed that this is the kind of procedure which the Parliament is expected
\nto and is likely to follow in the present case, should the occasion arise
\nfor commencement of the parliamentary process if the Committee finds the
\nlearned Judge ‘guilty’ of misbehaviour.\n<\/p>\n
47. If the constitutional scheme, as we have held, envisages and provides
\nfor an opportunity to the concerned Judge to show cause against his removal
\nfrom office on the finding of ‘guilty’ recorded by the Inquiry Committee
\nbeing placed before the Parliament for its consideration and the Parliament
\nis required to take it into account before it decides to accept the finding
\nof ‘guilty’ and act on it by adopting the motion of removal by the
\nrequisite majority or not to adopt the motion which would terminate the
\nproceedings for removal, it would indicate that the opportunity of this
\nkind in the scheme to show cause is against the inchoate finding of guilty
\nprior to the stage of making the final decision which alone is required to
\nbe subject to judicial review. The clear intendment is that in such a
\nsituation it is the Parliament ‘which should first consider the question
\nwithout there being any need for judicial review at that stage. This is so
\nbecause the misbehaviour is deemed to be proved, according to S. 6(3) of
\nthe Act, only when the Parliament adopts the motion in the manner
\nprescribed. The remedy of judicial review to concerned Judge is available
\nonly when his misbehaviour is ‘deemed to be proved’ in law and not against
\nthe inchoate finding of ‘guilty’ made by the Inquiry Committee which may or
\nmay not be acted upon by the Parliament. Another reason to support this
\nview appears to be that the proceedings for removal of a Judge are required
\nto be concluded at the earliest in public interest and, therefore, no
\ninterdiction of the process is contemplated at the stage of an inchoate
\nfinding of ‘guilty’ by the Inquiry Committee. An opportunity to the
\nconcerned Judge at that stage also to show cause against that inchoate
\nfinding of guilty’ fully safeguards his interest without the need for
\njudicial review at that stage, the scope for Parliament’s scrutiny of the
\nCommittee’s finding of guilty being very wide.\n<\/p>\n
48. Even though judicial review of the finding of ‘guilty’ made by the
\nInquiry Committee may be permissible on limited grounds pertaining only to
\nlegality, yet the power of the Parliament would not be so limited while
\nconsidering the motion for removal inasmuch as the Parliament is empowered
\nto not adopt the motion in spite of the finding of ‘guilty’ made by the
\nCommittee on a consideration of the entire material before it which enables
\nit to go even into the probative value of the material on which the finding
\nis based and to decide the desirability of adopting the motion in a given
\ncase. The Parliament decides by voting on the motion and is not required to
\ngive any reasons for its decision if it chooses not to adopt the motion. We
\nhave already indicated that the concerned Judge is to be given an
\nopportunity to show cause against his removal before the Parliament. There
\nis no reason to assume that the Parliament would not discharge its
\nobligation in the constitutional scheme with as much responsibility and
\nseriousness as is expected from any other organ of the State or authority
\ninvolved in the process of removal of a Judge. The nature and extent of
\npower entrusted to the Parliament in this process is a relevant factor to
\nindicate exclusion of judicial review till after the making of the order of
\nremoval by the President in case the Parliament adopts the motion by the
\nrequisite majority. The finding of ‘guilty’ made by the Committee is only a
\nrecommendation to the Parliament to of commence its process and to act on
\nthat finding which, at best, is tentative and inchoate at the stage of
\nsubmission of the report under S. 4 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
49. The contrary view would result in a serious anomaly. If the finding of
\n‘guilty’ made by the Committee by itself amounts to ‘proved misbehaviour’
\nfor the purpose of Article 124(4), anomalous situation would arise if the
\nParliament does not adopt the motion of removal thereafter. In that
\nsituation the process would end and, notwithstanding a finding of ‘proved
\nmisbehaviour’, the Judge cannot be removed from office. Such a piquant
\nsituation at the end of the process of removal in spite of a finding of
\n‘proved misbehaviour’ could never be contemplated in the scheme and,
\ntherefore, a construction which can lead to that absurdity must be
\neschewed.\n<\/p>\n
50. This being so, the remedy of judicial review to the concerned Judge has
\nto be only after the stage of his ‘proved misbehaviour’ is reached on
\nadoption of the motion by the Parliament which leads inevitably to the
\norder of removal made by the, President in accordance with Article 124(4).
\nResort to judicial review by the concerned Judge, between the time of
\nconclusion of the inquiry by the Committee and making of the order of
\nremoval by the President would be premature and is unwarranted in the
\nconstitutional scheme.\n<\/p>\n
51. This construction while protecting interest of the concerned Judge
\ngives full effect and due importance to the role of all the high
\ndignitaries involved in the process of removal, there being no reason to
\ndoubt that each one of them would be fully alive to the significance of his
\nrole and extent of obligation under the constitutional scheme. If, however,
\nany illegality occurs even then, the provision for judicial review at the
\nend of the process permits its correction without interdicting the process
\nin between.\n<\/p>\n
52. We may at this stage deal with the other submission of Shri Kapil Sibal
\nthat the Inquiry Committee is a Tribunal for the purpose of Art. 136 of the
\nConstitution.\n<\/p>\n
53. Shri Kapil Sibal has urged that the Committee constituted by the
\nSpeaker \/ Chairman in exercise of his power under S. 3(2) of the Judges
\n(Inquiry) Act, 1968 is a ‘Tribunal’ for the purpose of Art. 136 of the
\nConstitution and since an appeal would lie in this Court against the
\nfindings of the said Committee, the report of the Committee is required to
\nbe furnished to the Judge concerned in order to enable him to exercise that
\nright. Shri Sibal has pointed out that while recording its findings on the
\ncharges framed by it the Committee exercises judicial functions. Reference
\nhas been made to the provisions of S. 5 of the Act to show that the
\nCommittee has the trappings of a Court. Relying on the decisions of this
\nCourt in The Bharat Bank Ltd. v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd.,<\/a> 1950
\nSCR 459  Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh,<\/a> (1955) 1 SCR 267
\nIndo-China Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh,<\/a> (1964) 6 SCR 594  and
\nDev Singh v. Registrar, Punjab and Haryana High Court,<\/a> (1987) 2 SCR 1005
\nShri Sibal has contended that the Committee fulfils the tests laid down by
\nthis Court for determining whether an authority is a tribunal for the
\npurpose of Art. 136. The learned Attorney General has supported Shri Sibal.\n<\/p>\n
54. Before we deal with the question whether the Committee in the present
\ncase fulfils the tests for determining whether a particular body is a
\ntribunal, we may briefly refer to some of the decisions of this Court
\nwherein this question has been considered.\n<\/p>\n
55. In Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmichand<\/a> (1963) Supp 1 SCR 242 , the
\nexpression ‘determination’, in the context in which it occurs in Art. 136,
\nhas been construed to mean “an effective expression of opinion which ends a
\ncontroversy or a dispute by some authority to whom it is submitted; rider a
\nvalid law of disposal”. It was further,held that the expression “order”
\nmust also nave a similar meaning, except that, it need not operate to end
\nthe dispute. The Conciliation Officer, while granting or refusing
\npermission to alter the terms of employment of workmen, in exercise of the
\npower conferred upon him by clause 29 of the order issued by the Governor
\nof Uttar Pradesh under the U. P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, was held
\nnot-to be a Tribunal under Art. 136 though the Conciliation Officer was
\nrequired to act judicially. It was observed: –\n<\/p>\n
“He is concerned in granting leave to determine whether there is a prima
\nfacie case for dismissal or discharge of an employee or for altering terms
\nof employment, and whether the employer is actuated by unfair motives; he
\nhas not to decide whether the proposed step of discharge or dismissal of
\nthe employee was within the rights of the employer. His order merely
\nremoves a statutory ban in certain eventualities, laid upon the Common law
\nright of an employer to dismiss, discharge or alter the terms of employment
\n‘according to contract between the parties. The Conciliation Officer has
\nundoubtedly to act judicially in dealing with an application under cl. 29,
\nbut he is not invested with the judicial power of the State; he cannot
\ntherefore be regarded as a ‘tribunal’ within the meaning of Art. 136 of the
\nConstitution.”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
56. In Workmen of Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. Meenakshi Mills Ltd.<\/a> (1992) 3 JT
\n(S C) 446  on a conspectus of the earlier decisions, it was held by the
\nConstitution Bench that the appropriate Government or authority while
\ngranting or refusing permission for retrenchment of workmen under S. 25-N
\nof the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is not a tribunal on the view that
\nthe position of the appropriate Government or authority exercising the said
\npower was not very different from that of a Conciliation Officer who was
\nheld to be not a tribunal in Jaswant Sugar Mills (AIR 1963 SC 677 ). The
\nview taken was that there was no provision attaching finality to an order
\nunder S. 25-N(2) and it was permissible for the workmen aggrieved by
\nretrenchment affected in pursuance of order granting permission for such
\nretrenchment to raise an industrial dispute and also open to the
\nappropriate Government to refer such a dispute for adjudication. It is
\nunnecessary to refer to the earlier decisions considered therein.\n<\/p>\n
57. The decisions of this Court indicate that one of the considerations
\nwhich has weighed with the Court for holding a statutory authority to be a
\ntribunal under Art. 136 is finality or conclusiveness and the binding
\nnature of the determination by such authority.\n<\/p>\n
58. It may be pointed out that in Dev Singh v. Registrar, Punjab & Haryana
\nHigh Court,<\/a> (1987 (2) SCR , on which reliance was placed by Shri Sibal, it
\nwas held that the High Court, while exercising its appellate powers under
\nRule X(2) in Chapter 18-A of the Rules and Orders of the Punjab High Court,
\nVol. I, against penalties inflicted by the District Judge in disciplinary
\nproceedings against ministerial servants, was acting purely
\nadministratively and was not acting as a tribunal since it was not
\nresolving any dispute or controversy between two adversaries but only
\nexercising its power of control over the subordinate judiciary. It was
\nobserved:\n<\/p>\n
“In certain matters even Judges have to act administratively and in so
\ndoing may have to act quasi-judicially in dealing with the matters
\nentrusted to them. It is only where the authorities are required to act
\njudicially either by express provisions of the statute or by necessary
\nimplication that the decisions of such an authority would amount to a quasi
\nJudicial proceeding. When Judges in exercise of their administrative
\nfunctions decide cases it cannot be said that their decisions are either
\njudicial or quasi-judicial decisions In the appeal before the High Court,
\nthe High Court was following its own procedure, a procedure not normally
\nfollowed in judicial matters. The High Court was not resolving any dispute
\nor controversy between two adversaries. In other words, while deciding this
\nappeal there was no lis before the High Court. The High Court was only
\nexercising its Power of control while deciding this appeal”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
59. We have earlier indicated the constitutional scheme in the process of
\nremoval of a Judge as envisaged by clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read
\nwith the provisions of the law enacted under Art. 124(5). It is. with
\nreference to that constitutional scheme that this contention has to be
\nexamined.\n<\/p>\n
60. It is no doubt true that while investigating into the charges framed by
\nit against the Judge, the Committee is required to act judicially and, as
\nheld by this Court in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability (AIR 1992 SC
\n320 ), the said process is subject to judicial review. But the question is
\nwhether in discharging this function the Committee acts as a tribunal. In
\norder to answer this question it is necessary to examine the nature of
\ndetermination made by the Committee.\n<\/p>\n
61. In this context, it would be relevant to recall the scheme indicated
\nearlier. The determination by the Committee that the Judge is ‘not guilty’
\nof misbehaviour is alone final as it terminates the proceeding. However, in
\nthat case there is no scope for judicial review of the finding of ‘not
\nguilty’ made by the Committee as already indicated. This aspect negates the
\ncharacter of tribunal for this reason alone. In the other situation when
\nthe Committee’s determination is that the Judge is ‘guilty’ of
\nmisbehaviour, that finding is inchoate which may or may not be acted upon
\nby the Parliament. Finding of ‘guilty’ made by the Committee is in the
\nnature of recommendation to Parliament to commence its process and by
\nitself is not self-effectuating. Thus, the finding recorded by the
\nCommittee where it finds the Judge guilty of any misbehaviour being subject
\nto acceptance by the Parliament is not final and is, therefore, not
\nconclusive.\n<\/p>\n
62. No action is to be taken on the motion in case the Committee finds that
\nthe Judge is not guilty of any misbehaviour. In that event if the Committee
\nhas to be regarded as a tribunal under Art. 136, it would serve no useful
\npurpose and would also lead to the anomalous result that the Committee is
\nto be treated as a tribunal if it finds that the Judge is not guilty of any
\nmisbehaviour but it is not to be treated as a tribunal if it finds that
\nthe, Judge is guilty of any misbehaviour. The character of the Committee as
\na tribunal cannot depend on the findings that are ultimately recorded by
\nit.\n<\/p>\n
63. The misbehaviour of the Judge is ‘deemed to be proved’ according to S.
\n6(3) of the Act only when the motion is adopted by the Parliament and not
\notherwise. The finding of ‘guilty’ made by the Committee does not by itself
\nbring about that result. An essential test of the determinative nature of
\nthe finding, an attribute of the tribunal is lacking. The test indicated in
\nDev Singh (AIR 1987 SC 1629 ) of the absence of the any dispute or lis
\nbetween two adversaries also negatives the contention that the Committee is
\na tribunal for the purpose of Art. 136.\n<\/p>\n
64. In effect, the report of the Inquiry Committee containing a finding
\nthat the Judge is guilty of misbehaviour is in the nature of recommendation
\nfor his removal which may or may not be acted upon by the Parliament while
\nconsidering the motion for removal according to the procedure laid down in
\nthe Constitution for removal of a superior Judge, which is the only manner
\nof curtailing the fixed tenure of the Judge. This is for security of tenure
\nand thereby to ensure independence of the higher judiciary. The report of
\nthe Committee being of this kind, in our opinion, the Inquiry Committee
\ncannot be treated as a ‘tribunal’ for the purpose of Art. 136 of the
\nConstitution. For this reason, no provision is made in the law enacted
\nunder Art. 124(5) for supply of a copy of the report by the Committee to
\nthe concerned Judge before submitting it to the Speaker as required by S. 4
\nof the Act in the manner prescribed in the Rules.\n<\/p>\n
65. If the supply of a copy of the report to the Judge by the Committee
\nbefore its submission to the Speaker was contemplated by the law enacted
\nunder Art. 124(5) that area would not be left blank in the provisions made
\nin the law while providing elaborately for submission of the report
\ntogether with its manner, including the number of copies, in S. 4 of the
\nAct and R. 9 framed thereunder. The absence of such a provision in this law
\nis a deliberate and not an inadvertent omission to emphasis absence of the
\nrequirement which also matches the construction made by us of the
\nConstitutional scheme including the requirement of an opportunity to show
\ncause against removal to be given by the Parliament to the Judge.\n<\/p>\n
66. Keeping in view the aforesaid provisions of the Act and the Rules and
\nspecially.the fact that certain finding recorded by a member of the
\nCommittee is not required to be disclosed in the given circumstances and
\nthe finding recorded by the Committee holding that the Judge is guilty of
\nany misbehaviour is not final and conclusive, it is legally not permissible
\nto hold that the Committee is a tribunal under Art. 136 of the
\nConstitution. This contention of Shri Sibal is, therefore, rejected.\n<\/p>\n
67. No doubt, on a motion for presenting an address to the President
\npraying for removal of the Judge being adopted in each House of Parliament
\nby the requisite majority in the manner prescribed, the misbehaviour or
\nincapacity of the Judge is ‘deemed to be proved and the order of removal
\nmade by the President in accordance with Art. 124(4) would follow. The
\nquestion is: whether it is open to the concerned Judge so removed to
\nchallenge the finding of ‘guilty’ made by the Inquiry Committee which leads
\nto the making of order of removal by the President after the President has
\nmade the order of removal? Shri Nariman’s submission was that judicial
\nreview of the order of removal may not be excluded but he could not
\ndefinitely say so. The learned Attorney General as well as Shri Sibal
\nsubmitted that it is likely that the remedy of judicial review may be
\navailable to the concerned Judge after the order of removal has been made,
\nbut it was extremely doubtful. Shri Sibal added that with the parliamentary
\npart of the process intervening, it appeared more unlikely that such a
\nremedy would be available to the concerned Judge after the order of removal
\nis made by the President.\n<\/p>\n
68. On giving our anxious consideration to the submissions made by the
\nlearned counsel, we find no embargo, in principle or authority, to infer
\nthat in the Constitutional scheme adopted in India, judicial review of the
\nfinding of guilty recorded by the Inquiry Committee during the statutory
\npart of the process is impermissible after that tentative, finding matures
\ninto ‘proved misbehaviour culminating in the order of removal. The argument
\nof ‘now or never’ does not appeal to us and what appears more consistent in
\nthe Constitutional scheme is that judicial review on permissible grounds is
\navailable not now but at the end of the process after the order of removal,
\nif that stage is reached. In our view, this conclusion adequately protects
\nthe right of the concerned Judge, ensures expeditious conclusion of the
\nprocess once it is commenced in the manner prescribed and accords with the
\nview that the scheme is ‘a judicious blend of the political and judicial
\nprocesses for the removal of Judges’. It ensures preservation of the right,
\ninterest and dignity of the learned Judge and is commensurate with the
\ndignity of all the institutions and functionaries involved in the process.
\nIt also excludes the needless meddling in the process by busy bodies
\nconfining the participation in it to the Members of Parliament, the Speaker
\n\/ Chairman and the Inquiry Committee comprising of high judicial
\nfunctionaries apart from the concerned Judge, if the allegations permitted
\nto be made only in the prescribed manner justify an inquiry into the
\nconduct of the Judge.\n<\/p>\n
69. In the event of an order of removal being made by the President under
\nArticle 124(4), the right of the concerned Judge to seek judicial review on
\npermissible grounds would be for quashing the order of removal made against
\nhim on the basis that the finding of ‘guilty’ made by the Inquiry Committee
\nin its report which matured into ‘proved misbehaviour’ on adoption of the
\nmotion by Parliament suffers from an illegality renderhig it void resulting
\nin the extinction of the, condition precedent for commencement of the
\nparliamentary process for removal in the absence of which there is no
\nfoundation for considering or adopting the motion for presenting an address
\nto the President for removal of the Judge and, therefore, no authority in
\nthe President to make the order of removal.\n<\/p>\n
70. The permissible grounds for judicial review of the finding of ‘guilty’
\nreached by a statutory process are well-settled and whether the ground of
\nchallenge in a given case is available for this purpose or not would be a
\nquestion of fact in each case. In view of the limited question raised in
\nthis petition after conclusion of the proceedings before the Inquiry
\nCommittee and the preparation of its report, there is no occasion for us to
\nexamine the grounds of attack to a finding of’guilty’, if any, reached in
\nthe present case. That question does not arise for consideration by us in
\nthe present proceeding and, therefore, we need not say anything more on
\nthis aspect.\n<\/p>\n
71. We may, however, add that the intervention of the parliamentary part of
\nthe process, in case a finding of guilty is made, which according to Shri
\nSibal would totally exclude judicial review thereafter is a misapprehension
\nsince limited judicial review even in that area is not in doubt after the
\ndecision of this Court in Keshav Singh – (1965) 1 SCR 413 A reference to
\nthis aspect was made also in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability,
\n(1991 (4) SCC 699 , while dealing with the meaning and scope of clause (5)
\nof Art. 124 of the Constitution. It was said therein as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“Article 124(5) is in the nature of a special provision intended to
\nregulate the procedure for removal of a Judge under Art. 124(4) which is
\nnot a part of the normal business of the House but is in the nature of
\nspecial business. It covers the entire field relating to removal of a
\nJudge. Rules made under Article 118 have no application in this field.\n<\/p>\n
ARTICLE necessary to specifically prescribe that the law made under Art.
\n119 shall prevail over the rules of procedure made under Art. 118. Since
\nArticles 118 and 124(5) operate in different fields a provision like that
\ncontained in Art. 119 was not necessary and even in the absence of such a
\nprovision, a law made under Article 124(5) will override the rules made
\nunder Article 118 and shall be binding on both the Houses of Parliament. A
\nviolation of such law would constitute illegality and could not be immune
\nfrom judicial scrutiny under Article 122(1).”\n<\/p>\n
(of SCC)<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
72. At this stage, a reference to the nature and scope of judicial review
\nas understood in similar situations is helpful. In Administrative Law
\n(Sixth Edition) by H. W. R. Wade, in the chapter “Constitutional
\nFoundations of the Powers of the Courts” under the heading ‘The Sovereignty
\nof Parliament’, the effect of Parliament’s intervention is stated thus:-\n<\/p>\n
“There are many cases where some administrative order or regulation is
\nrequired by statute to be approved by resolutions of the Houses. But this
\nprocedure in no way protects the order or regulation from being condemned
\nby the Court, under the doctrine of ultra vires, if it is not strictly in
\naccordance with the Act. Whether the challenge is made before or after the
\nHouses have given their approval is immaterial.”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
Later at p. 411, Wade has said that ‘in accordance with constitutional
\nprinciple, parliamentary approval does not affect the normal operation of
\njudicial review’. while discussing ‘Judicial Review’, Wade indicates the
\nposition thus –\n<\/p>\n
“As these cases show, judicial review is in no way inhibited by the fact
\nthat rules or regulations have been laid before Parliament and approved,
\ndespite the ruling of the House of Lords that the test of unreasonableness
\nshould not then operate in its normal way. The Court of Appeal has
\nemphasised that in the case of subordinate legislation such as an order in
\nCouncil approved in draft by both Houses, ‘the Courts would without doubt
\nbe competent to consider whether or not the Order was properly made in the
\nsense of being intra vires’.”\n<\/p>\n
73. The clear indication, therefore, is that mere parliamentary approval of
\nan action or even a report by an outside authority when without such
\napproval, the Action or report is ineffective by itself does not have the
\neffect of excluding judicial review on the permissible grounds. In the
\npresent context, the only question for us to consider is whether judicial
\nreview of the finding of guilty in the report of the Inquiry Committee
\nconstituted under the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 would be permissible on
\nthe available grounds of judicial scrutiny after the making of an order of
\nremoval by the President pursuant to adoption of the motion for removal by
\nthe Parliament based on the Inquiry Committee’s report. There is no ground
\nto hold that judicial review is barred for this reason.\n<\/p>\n
74. In our opinion, availability of judicial review to the learned Judge,
\nin case the need arises as a result of the order of removal made by the
\nPresident, after the making of such an order cannot be doubted in view of
\nthe vide powers of the Supreme Court of India.\n<\/p>\n
75. Judicial review is the exercise of the Courts’ inherent power to
\ndetermine legality of an action and award suitable relief and thereby
\nuphold the rule of law. No further statutory authority is needed for the
\nexercise of this power which is granted by the Constitution of India to the
\nsuperior courts ‘ There is no reason to take the view that an order of
\nremoval of a Judge made by the President of India under Art. 124(4) of the
\nConstitution is immune from judicial review on permissible grounds to
\nexamine the legality of the finding of guilty made by the Inquiry Committee
\nduring the statutory process for removal which is the condition precedent
\nfor commencement of the parliamentary process culminating in the making of
\norder of removal by the President.\n<\/p>\n
76. In Regina v. Boundary Commission for England, Ex parte Foot and others,
\nRegina v. Boundary Commission for England, Ex parte Gateshead Borough
\nCouncil and others (1983) 1 QB 600 : [1983] 2 W.L.R. 458, CA, the Court of
\nAppeal held that the judicial review by the High Court was permissible to
\nconsider whether the Boundary Commission had properly carried out the
\ninstructions given by the Parliament in its report under the terms of the
\nHouse of Commons (Redistribution of Seats) Act, 1979. The conclusion of the
\nCourt of Appeal on examining the merits was as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“Parliament has thought it right to set up independent advisory bodies, the
\nBoundary Commissions, to advise it and, in so doing, it has given the
\ncommissions instructions as to the criteria to be employed in formulating
\nthat advice. For good reasons, which we can well understand, Parliament has
\nnot asked the Courts to advise it and it has not provided for any right of
\nappeal to the courts from the advice or proposed advice of the Boundary
\nCommissions.\n<\/p>\n
This does not mean that the Courts have no part to play. They remain
\ncharged with the duty of helping to ensure that the instructions of
\nParliament are carried out. This is done by a procedure known as judicial
\nreview. Precisely what action, if any, should be taken by the courts in any
\nparticular case depends upon the circumstances of that case including, in
\nparticular the nature of the instruction which have been given by
\nParliament to he minister, authority or body concerned.”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
On that conclusion, the Court of Appeal declined to interfere. The House of
\nLords dismissed the further appeal. Judicial review of the Action of an
\nindependent advisory body set up by the Parliament to advise it is clearly
\nindicated by this decision.\n<\/p>\n
77. In Nottinghamshire County Council and Secretary of State for the
\nEnvironment, City of Bradford Metropolitan Council and Secretary of State
\nfor the Environment, (1986) 1 AC 240 : [1986] 2 W.L.R. 1, the House of
\nLords specified the limits of judicial review ‘in a matter of public
\nfinancial administration that had been one for the political judgment of
\nthe Secretary of State and the House of Commons’ clearly indicating
\nexistence of the power of review in such matters while circumscribing
\nlimits thereof. We are at present concerned only with existence of the
\npower of judicial review in such matters and not the extent of its limits.\n<\/p>\n
78. This is also the indication from the decision of the Court of Appeal in
\nRegina v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, Ex parte Smedley, (1985) 1 QB 657 :
\n[1985] 2 W.L.R. 576, CA, wherein the relevant passages are as under.-\n<\/p>\n
” It therefore behoves the courts to be ever sensitive to the paramount
\nneed to refrain from trespassing upon the province of Parliament or, so far
\nas this can be avoided, even appearing to do so. Although it is not a
\nmatter for me, 1 would hope and expect that Parliament would be similarly
\nsensitive to the need to refrain from trespassing upon the province of the
\ncourts.”\n<\/p>\n
“I have somewhat laboured these distinctions between the respective
\nfunctions of Parliament and Her Majesty in Council in the present case, for
\nthe purpose of demonstrating the somewhat limited role which is allotted to
\nParliament by S. 1(3) of the Act of 1972. This role is analogous to a power
\nof veto. If it withholds its approval from the draft Order in Council, the
\nOrder cannot be made. If, however, the approval of Parliament is given, Her
\nMajesty in Council is left with a discretion whether or not to make the
\nOrder. There is no possible question of the court seeking or being able to
\ncontrol the exercise of the Parliamentary power of veto. However, 1 can see
\nno reason why the exercise of the last mentioned discretion given to Her
\nMajesty in Council should not be open to attack in the courts by the
\nprocess of judicial review, subject to the stringent restrictions on any
\nsuch attack imposed by what has come to be known as the Wednesbury
\nprinciple (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury
\nCorporation, [1948] 1 K.B. 223, 229)”\n<\/p>\n
79. The contention that the remedy of judicial review would not be
\navailable to the learned Judge once the parliamentary part of the process
\nof removal commences on a finding of guilty being made in the report of the
\nInquiry Committee, even when it leads to the making of an order of removal
\nagainst him on account of the intervention of the parliamentary process is,
\nin our opinion, based on a misapprehension and is, therefore, not
\nacceptable to us.\n<\/p>\n
80. We may briefly refer to the indication available of judicial review in
\nsimilar situations in some other countries and als o mention the two
\ndecisions in Halsted L. Ritter v. The United States, 84 C Cls. 293 and Adam
\nClayton Powell v. John W. McCormark, (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 491. Ritter was a
\nJudge of the District Court in the United States who was impeached for his
\nremoval from office in 1936. The House of Representatives of the United
\nStates adopted articles of impeachment against him which were duly
\npresented to the Senate of the United States sitting as the High Court of
\nImpeachment. Ritter filed a suit to recover his salary for the Deriod in
\nwhich the question arose of the Court’s jurisdiction to review the
\nconclusion of the United States Senate in a case of impeachment of a Judge.
\nRitter’s suit was dismissed as the Court came to the conclusion that it had
\nno authority to review the impeachment proceedings held in the Senate since
\n‘the Senate was the sole tribunal that could take jurisdiction of the
\narticles of mpeachment presented to that body and its decision is final’.
\nApart from the fact that he law in United States has undergone considerable
\nchange since Ritter’s case, it appears to us that Ritter is clearly
\ndistinguishable since the process for removal of a Judge there was entirely
\npolitical, no part of it being statutory, and Article 1 of the U.S.
\nConstitution states that the House ‘shall have sole power of impeachment’
\nand that ‘the Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments’. On
\nthe contrary, the constitutional scheme in India, as already indicated, is
\nthat the scheme is composite being a judicious blend of statutory and
\nparliamentary components.\n<\/p>\n
81. Adam Clayton Powell v. John W. “McCormack, (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 491 – is a
\ndecision rendered in 1969. It was held by the U.S. Supreme Court that the
\nHouse of Representatives has no power to exclude from its membership a
\nperson duly elected who meets the requirements specified in the Federal
\nConstitution; and such a person on being excluded from membership by a
\nresolution of the House is entitled to a declaratory judgment that his
\nexclusion was unlawful. It was held that the case was justiciable since the
\nHouse of Representatives had no power to exclude from its membership any
\nperson who was duly elected and who met the requirements specified in the
\nConstitution, there being a distinction between exclusion from Congress and
\nexpulsion therefrom. It was held in Powell while dealing with the question
\nof justiciability and the ‘political question doctrine’ relating to it, as
\nunder:-\n<\/p>\n
Respondents’ first contention is that this ‘case presents a political
\nquestion because under Art. 1, S. 5, there has been a “textually
\ndemonstrable constitutional commitment” to the House of the “adjudicatory
\npower” to determine Powell’s qualifications. Thus it is argued that the
\nHouse, and the House alone, has power to determine who is qualified to be a
\nmember.\n<\/p>\n
In order to determine whether there has been a textual commitment to a co-
\nordinate department of the Govt. we must interpret the Constitution. In
\nother words, we must first determine what power the Constitution confers
\nupon the House through Art. 1, S. 5, before we can determine to what
\nextent, if any, the exercise of that power is subject to judicial review”\n<\/p>\n
“In other words, whether there is a “textually demonstrable constitutional
\ncommitment of the issue to a co-ordinate political department ” of
\nGovernment and what is the scope of such commitment are questions we must
\nresolve for the first time in this case. For, as we pointed out in Baker v.
\nCarr (1962 (369) US 186), Supra, “(d)eciding whether a matter has in any
\nmeasure been committed by the Constitution to another branch of Government,
\nor whatever the Action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
\ncommitted is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional interpretation,
\nand is a responsibility of this Court as ultimate interpreter of the
\nConstitution.”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
82. Powell’s case (1969 (23) Law Ed 2d 91) indicates availability of
\nJudicial Review in certain situations even where the entire process is
\nwithin the House.\n<\/p>\n
83. Salleh Abas v. Abdul Hamid, 1988 LRC 25 – was a case relating to
\nremoval of a Supreme Court Judge in Malaysia. Article 125 of the
\nConstitution of Malaysia is similar to Art. 124 of the Constitution of
\nIndia. Clauses (2), (3) and (4) of Article 125 of the Constitution of
\nMalaysia provide that a Judge of the Supreme Court shall not be removed
\nfrom office except in accordance with the provisions of the Article; clause
\n(3) provides for removal on the ground of misbehaviour or of inability,
\nfrom infirmity of body or mind or any other cause, properly to discharge
\nthe functions of his office and prescribes the appointment of a tribunal in
\naccordance with clause (4) when such a situation arises; and then only is
\nthere removal of a Judge from office on the recommendation of the tribunal.
\nCl. (4) therein prescribes the composition of the tribunal by appointment
\nof the Judges specified. The question arose of jurisdiction of the Court to
\nrestrain the tribunal appointed under Art. 125(3) from submitting its
\nrecommendations or report of the inquiry made by it in connection with the
\nremoval of a Judge of the Supreme Court of Malaysia. The Supreme Court of
\nMalaysia expressed its unanimous view as under.-\n<\/p>\n
“The function of the Tribunal appointed under Art. 125(3) of the
\nConstitution is to enquire and investigate on the representation and then
\nreport to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong with any recommendation it may make.
\nThe Tribunal is a body which investigates and does not decide. It is
\nperforming a constitutional function. The tribunal should not therefore be
\nrestrained from performing its constitutional function.\n<\/p>\n
Finally, the members of the Tribunal are appointees of the Yang di-Pertuan
\nAgong. From the language of Art. 125 it is clear the Yang di-Pertuan Agong
\nis entitled to the report of the Tribunal. To restrain the Tribunal from
\nsubmitting their report is in effect to restrain His Majesty from receiving
\nthe report.”\n<\/p>\n
Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
Injunction was refused to restrain submission of the report by the Tribunal
\nconstituted under Art. 125(3).\n<\/p>\n
84. Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems (1973), in
\nChapter III dealing with ‘Judicial Review’, states thus: –\n<\/p>\n
” If there be indeed a conflict between the judicial jurisdiction in “all
\ncases” and the Senates “sole power to try all impeachments, “our course has
\nbeen marked out by Chief Justice Marshall: “When two principles come in
\nconflict with each other, the Court must give them both a reasonable
\nconstruction, so as to preserve them both to a reasonable extent,” a canon
\nearlier cited by Elbridge Gerry in the First Congress. We need only read
\nthe power to “try” as a grant of jurisdiction to try a case in the first
\ninstance; leaving untouched an appeal to the Supreme.Court from action in
\nexcess of jurisdiction – a case “arising under” the Constitution, An
\naccommodation of a “trial” by the Senate with an appeal from violation of
\nconstitutional boundaries would harmonize with the Powell holding that the
\nArticle 1, S. 5(1) provision that “each House shall be the Judge of the
\nqualifications of its own members” does not bar inquiry into action in
\nexcess of jurisdiction”\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
Discussing further ‘judicial review’ in the context of impeachment
\nproceedings, Raoul Berger states at p. 116 that ‘it was never intended that
\nCongress should be the final judge of the boundaries of its own powers’ and
\nproceeds to say, thus-\n<\/p>\n
“To this it may be answered that just as the ultimate guarantee that the
\njudiciary will not step out of bounds is the self-restraint of the Court,
\nso the Senate too must be trusted to exercise self-restraint. It is one
\nthing, however, to expect self-restraint of judges schooled to disciplined,
\ndispassionate judgment, and not subject to the gusts of faction, and
\nsomething else again to expect self-restraint of a body predominantly
\npolitical in character and which both in England and the United States has
\nbeen unable to shake off partisan considerations when sitting in judgment.
\nSelf-restraint could be relied upon with respect to the judiciary because,
\nin the words of Hamilton, they “have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely
\njudgment,” and were “therefore the least dangerous to the political rights
\nof the Constitution”\n<\/p>\n
Constitutional limits, as Powell v. McCormick ((1969) 23 L Ed 2d 491 )
\nagain reminds us, are subject to judicial enforcement; and I would urge
\nthat judicial review of impeachments is required to protect the other
\nbranches from Congress’ arbitrary will. It is hardly likely Framers, so
\ndevoted to, “checks and balances,” who so painstakingly piled one check of
\nCongress on another, would reject a crucial check at the nerve center of
\nthe separation of powers. They scarcely contemplated that their wise
\nprecautions must crumble when Congress dons its “judicial” hat, that then
\nCongress would be free to shake the other branches to their very
\nfoundations. Before we swallow such consequences, the intention of the
\nFramers to insulate congressional transgressions of the “limits” they
\nimposed upon impeachment should be proved, not casually assumed. The
\nConstitution, said the Supreme Court, condemns. “all arbitrary exercise of
\npower;” “there is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of
\narbitrary power.” The “sole power to try” affords no more exemption from
\nthat doctroine than does the sole power to legislate, which, it needs no
\ncitation, does not extend to arbitrary acts.\n<\/p>\n
Finally, if it be assumed that the “sole power to try” conferred insulation
\nfrom review, it must yield to the subsequent Fifth Amendment provision that
\n“no person” shall “be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
\nprocess of law.” If the Constitution does in fact place limits upon the
\npower of impeachment, action beyond those limits is without “due process of
\nlaw” in its primal sense: “when the great barons of England wrung from King
\nJohn the concession that neither their lives nor their property should be
\ndisposed of by the crown, except as provided by the law of the land, they
\nmeant by ‘law of the land’ the ancient and customary laws of the English
\npeople. “In our system the place of the “ancient and customary laws” was
\ntaken by the Constitution; and Article VI, S. 2, expressly makes the
\nConstitution “the supreme law of the land.” Injurious action not authorized
\nby the Constiiution is therefore contrary to the “law of the land” and is
\nforbidden by the due process clause. “Due process” has been epitomized by
\nthe Court as the “protection of the individual against arbitrary action.”
\nOne who enters Government service does not cease to be a “person,, within
\nthe Fifth Amendment; and an impeachment for offences outside constitutional
\nauthorization would deny him the protection afforded by “due process.” It
\nwould be passing strange to conclude that a citizen may invoke the judicial
\n“bulwark,’ against a twenty-dollars fine but not against an
\nunconstitutional impeachment, removal from and perpetual disqualification
\nto hold federal office. Here protection of the individual coincides with
\npreservation of the separation of powers; and the interests of the
\nassaulted branch, as Judge George Wythe perceived, are one with the
\ninterest of “the whole community.” Those interests counsel us ‘to give full
\nscope of the “strong American bias in favour of a judicial determination of
\nconstitutional and legal issues,” and to deny insulation from review of
\nimpeachments in defiance of constitutional bounds.” (Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
85. American Bar Association Journal, Vol. 60 (June 1974) contains an
\ninteresting article “Is Judicial Review of Impeachment Coming? by Daniel A.
\nRezneck, wherein judicial review in the case of an entirely political
\nprocess has been discusssed. An extract therefrom is as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“Baker and Powell Opened the Door If Powell was entitled to judicial review
\nof the legality of his exclusion from the House, it is difficult to see why
\na President may not seek,judicial review in the event of his impeachment
\nand conviction. Raoul Berger of Harvard, perhaps the country’s leading
\nauthority on the law of impeachment, concluded in his 1973 Book,
\nImpeachment: The Constitutional Problems, that Baker v. Carr (1962 (369) US\n<\/p>\n
186) and Powell v. McCormack ((1969) 23 L Ed 2d 491 ) together open the
\n‘way for judicial review of the impeachment process to assure that it
\nconforms to constitutional standards.”\n<\/p>\n
86. The effect of Powell is also considered in Texas Law Review, Vol. 68,
\nNumber 1, November 1989, under heading ‘Judicial Review of Impeachments’. A
\nuseful extract therefrom is as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“The Supreme Court’s decision in Powell v. McCormack also indicates that
\nthere may be judicial review of any aspects of an impeachment proceeding.
\nIn Powell, the Supreme Court held that whether the House of Representatives
\nfollowed the proper procedure in excluding Adam Clayton Powell from taking
\nhis seat in the House was not a political question. The Powell Court also
\nheld that although Congress has the dual powers to expel and to exclude its
\nmembers, Congress is not empowered to apply expulsion standards in
\nproceedings to exclude a representative.\n<\/p>\n
The lesson of Powell is that the Supreme Court may use judicial review to
\ndetermine whether Congress followed the proper procedure for making the
\npolitical decision committed to it by the Constitution Also, under Powell
\nthe Federal Courts may decide whether Congress has chosen the correct
\nprocedure to accomplish its asserted purposes<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
87. In S.P.Gupta v. Union of lndia,1981 Supp SCC 87  Venkataramiah, J. as
\nhe then was, after stating that ‘the doctrine of political question which
\nwas holding the field long time back in the United States of America has
\nnow been exploded’, referred to the decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court in
\nBaker v. Carr 1962 (369) US 186 and Powell v. McCormack, (1969) 395 US 486:
\n(1969) 23 L Ed 2d 491, as well as the opinion of R. Berger and then
\nsummarised the position in India as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“In our country which is governed by a written Constitution also many
\nquestions which appear to have a purely political colour are bound to
\nassume the character of judicial questions. In the State of Rajasthan v.
\nUnion of India, (1978) 1 SCR 1  the Government’s claim that the validity of
\nthe decision of the President under Art. 365(1) of the Constitution being
\npolitical in character was not justifiable on that sole ground was rejected
\nby this Court. Bhagwati, J. in the course of his judgment observed in that
\ncase at SCR pages 80-81<\/p>\n
It will, therefore, be seen that merely because a question has a political
\ncolour, the Court cannot fold its hands in despair and declare “Judicial
\nhands off”. So long as a question arises whether an authority under the
\nConstitution has acted within the limits of its power or exceeded it, it
\ncan certainly be decided by the Court. Indeed it would be its
\nconstitutional obligation to do so. It is necessary to assert in the
\nclearest terms, particularly in the context of recent history, that the
\nConstitution is suprema lex, the paramount law of the land, and there is no
\ndepartment or branch of Government above or beyond it. Every organ of
\nGovernment, be it the executive or the legislature or the judiciary,
\nderives its authority from the Constitution and it has to act within the
\nlimits of its authority. No one howsoever highly placed and no authority
\nhowsoever lofty can claim that it shall be the sole judge of the extent of
\nits power under the Constitution or whether its action is within the
\nconfines of such power laid down by the Constitution. This Court is the
\nultimate interpreter of the Constitution and to this Court is assigned the
\ndelicate task of determining what is the power conferred on each branch of
\nGovernment, whether it is limited, and if so, what are the limits and
\nwhether any action of that branch transgresses such limits.It is for this
\nCourt to uphold the constitutional values and to enforce the constitutional
\nlimitations. That is the essence of the rule of law.\n<\/p>\n
The objection that the questions involved in these petitions are non-
\njusticiable merely on the ground that they are political in character has
\nto be negatived. But it is made clear that the courts are not entitled to
\nenquire into every sort of question without any limitation. There is still
\na certain class of questions such as international relations, national
\nsecurity which cannot be entertained by the Court. It is for the Court to
\ndetermine in each case whether a particular question should be debated
\nbefore it or not.” (Paras 981 & 982<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
88. The above discussion indicates the modern trend to accept judicial
\nreview in certain situations within circumscribed limits even where the
\nentire process is political since the ‘political question doctrine’, as
\ndiscussed in Powell, permits this course. In such cases where the entire
\nprocess is political, judicial review to the extent permissible on
\nconclusion of the political process is not doubted. There appears to be no
\nreason in principle why judicial review at the end of the entire process of
\nremoval of a Judge in India, where it is a composite process of which the
\npolitical process is only a part, can be excluded after conclusion of the
\nentire process including the political process. It appears to us that the
\nview we have taken is reinforced by the law in other systems as indicated
\nabove.\n<\/p>\n
89. At the commencement of the hearing of this petition, the learned
\nAttorney General made the statement that the Speaker would await the
\ndeclaration of law made in our decision and abide by it. A statement to
\nthis effect was also made by Shri F. S. Nariman on behalf of the Inquiry
\nCommittee. Consistent with the statement made by the learned Attorney
\nGeneral, the Hon’ble Speaker of the Lok Sabha also extended the time for
\nsubmission of the report by the Committee, to give us reasonable time to
\nprepare our opinion after conclusion of the hearing. This augurs well for
\nthe future.\n<\/p>\n
90. Willis in Constitutional Law of the United States (1936) making ‘final
\nevaluation of the work of the Supreme Court’ speaks about the U.S. Supreme
\nCourt thus:\n<\/p>\n
“Without the Active co-operation of justices of the Supreme Court, the
\nConstitution would be a dead letter. They protect alike their own powers,
\nexecutive powers, and legislative powers against encroachments and designs
\nof the other departments It does not have the positive power over the purse
\nnor over the sword, nor any other powers which could actually overthrow our
\nGovernment, but the negative power of declaring the law, which has kept our
\nwhole mighty fabric of Government from rushing to destruction.\n<\/p>\n
The Court has not been infallible. It has made mistakes. It sometimes has
\nrun counter to the deliberate and better judgment of the c community. But
\nthe final judgment of the American people will unquestionably be that their
\nconstitutional rights are safe in the hands of the federal judiciary.
\nThroughout the whole history of the United States, it furnishes the highest
\nexample of adequate results of any branch of our Government. it has averted
\nmany a storm which has threatening our peace and has lent its powerful aid
\nin uniting the whole country in the bonds of justice. To paraphrase the
\nlanguage of William Wirt, “if the judiciary were struck from our system”
\nthere would be little of value that would remain. The Government cannot
\nexist without it. “It would be as rational to talk of a solar system
\nwithout a sun” as to talk of a Government in the- United States without the
\ndoctrine of the supremacy of the Supreme Court.”\n<\/p>\n
91. The role of the Supreme Court of India is no less significant or wide
\nas envisaged in the Constitution which came to be enacted after the role of
\nthe U.S. Supreme Court in a comparable constitutional scheme had come to be
\nso understood and appreciated.\n<\/p>\n
92. In this context, it is also useful to recall the observations of R. S.
\nPathak, C.J., speaking for the Constitution Bench in Union of India v.
\nRaghubir Singh (Dead)<\/a> by LRs. (1989) 2 SCC 754  about the; nature and scope
\nof judicial review in India. The learned Chief ‘Justice stated thus:-\n<\/p>\n
” It used to be disputed that Judges make law. Today, it is no longer a
\nmatter of doubt that a substantial volume of the law governing the lives of
\ncitizens and regulating the functions of the State flows from the decisions
\nof the superior courts. “There was a time,” observed Lord Reid, “when it
\nwas thought almost indecent to suggest that Judges make law – they only
\ndeclare it But we do not believe in fairy tales any more”. In countries
\nsuch as the United Kingdom, where Parliament as the legislative organ is
\nsupreme and stands at the apex of the Constitutional structure of the
\nState, the role played by judicial law-making is limited<\/p>\n
And Ungoed Thomas, J. in Cheney v. Conn (1968 (1) All ER 779 : [1968] 1
\nW.L.R. 242 ) referred to a Parliamentary statute as “the highest form of
\nlaw which prevails over every other form of law”. The position is
\nsubstantially different under a written Constitution such as the one which
\ngoverns us. The Constitution of India, which represents the Supreme Law of
\nthe land, envisages three distinct organs of the State, each with its own
\ndistinctive functions, each a pillar of the State. The range of judicial
\nreview recognised in the superior judiciary of India is perhaps the widest
\nand the most extensive known to the world of lawWith this impressive
\nexpanse of judicial power, it is only right that the superior courts in
\nIndia should be conscious of the enormous responsibility which rest on
\nthem. This is specially true of the Supreme Court, for as the highest Court
\nin the entire judicial system the law declared by it is, by Article 141 of
\nthe Constitution, binding on all Courts within the territory of India.”\n<\/p>\n
“This need for adapting the law to new urges in society brings home the
\ntruth of the Holmesian aphorism that “the life of the law has not been
\nlogic it has been experience”, and again when he declared in another study
\nthat “the law is forever adopting new principles from life at one end”, and
\n“sloughing off” old ones at the other. Explaining the conceptual import of
\nwhat Holmes had said, Julius Stone elaborated that it is by the
\nintroduction of new extra-legal propositions emerging from experience to
\nserve as premises, or by experience-guided choice between competing legal
\npropositions, rather than by the operation of logic upon existing legal
\npropositions, that the growth of law tends to be determined.\n<\/p>\n
Legal compulsions cannot be limited by existing legal propositions, because
\nthere will always be, beyond the frontiers of the existing law, new areas
\ninviting judicial scrutiny and judicial choice-making which could well,
\naffect the validity of existing legal dogma. The search for solutions
\nresponsive to a changed social era involves a search not only among
\ncompeting propositions of law, or competing version of legal proposition,or
\nthe modalities of an indeterminancy such as “fairness” or ”
\nreasonableness”, but also among propositions from outside the ruling law,
\ncorresponding to the empirical knowledge or accepted values of present time
\nand place, relevant to the dispensing of justice within the new
\nparameters.”.\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
It is this onerous constitutional obligation which we have attempted to
\ndischarge keeping in view the limitations within which the exercise has to
\nbe performed.\n<\/p>\n
93. We have already indicated the constitutional scheme in India and the
\ntrue import of clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 read with the law enacted
\nunder Article 124(5), namely, the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and the Judges
\n(Inquiry) Rules, 1969, which, inter alia contemplate the provisions for an
\nopportunity to the concerned Judge to show cause against the finding of
\n‘guilty’ in the report before the Parliament takes it up for consideration
\nalong with the motion for his removal. Along with the decision in Keshav
\nSingh (AIR 1965 SC 745) has to be read the declaration made in Sub-
\nCommittee on Judicial Accountability that ‘a law made under Article 124(5)
\nwill override the Rules made under Article 118 and shall be binding on both
\nthe Houses of Parliament. A violation of such a law would constitute
\nillegality and could not be immune from judicial scrutiny under Article
\n122(1)’. The scope of permissible challenge by the concerned Judge to the
\norder of removal made by the President under Article 124(4) in the Judicial
\nreview available after making of the order of removal by the President will
\nbe determined on these considerations. This question in the context of the
\nprocess and progress of the statutory inquiry prior to recording of the
\nfindings in the report of the Inquiry Committee does not arise in this case
\nand has not been raised at the instance of the concerned Judge even in the
\nconnected matter, W.P. (C) No. 149 of 1992 –Shri Krishna Swami v. Union of
\nIndia & others<\/a> , which was filed earlier and, therefore, we express no
\nopinion on the scope of judicial review during the progress of inquiry
\nprior to its conclusion. The reasons for declining to consider those
\nquestions at the instance of a third person in the absence of the concerned
\nJudge facing the inquiry are given by us in the separate judgment delivered
\nby us in that matter.\n<\/p>\n
94. In sum, the position is this: Every Judge of the Supreme Court and the
\nHigh Courts on his appointment is irremovable from office during his tenure
\nexcept in the manner provided in clauses (4) and (5) of Article 124 of the
\nConstitution of India. The law made by the Parliament under Article 124(5),
\nnamely, the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 and the Judges (Inquiry) Rules, 1969
\nframed thereunder, is to be read along with Article 124(4) to find out the
\nconstitutional scheme adopted in India for the removal of a Judge of the
\nSupreme Court or a High Court. The law so enacted under Article 124(5)
\nprovides that any accusation made against a sitting Judge to enable
\ninitiation of the process of his removal from office has to be only by not
\nless than the minimum number of Members of Parliament specified in the Act,
\nall other methods being excluded. On initiation of the process in the
\nprescribed manner, the Speaker\/ Chairman is to decide whether the
\naccusation requires investigation. If he chooses not to act on the
\naccusation made in the form of motion by the specified minimum number of
\nMembers of Parliament, the, matter ends there. On the other hand, if the
\nSpeaker\/ Chairman, on a consideration of the materials available and after
\nconsulting such persons as he thinks fit, forms the opinion that a prima
\nfacie case for investigation into the accusation against the Judge is made
\nout, he constitutes a committee of judicial functionaries in accordance
\nwith Section 3(2) of the Act. If the Inquiry Committee at the conclusion of
\nthe investigation made by it records a finding that the Judge is ‘not
\nguilty’, the process ends with no one, not even the Parliament, being
\nempowered to consider much less question the finding of ‘not guilty’
\nrecorded by the Inquiry Committee. If the finding made by the Inquiry
\nCommittee is that the Judge is ‘guilty’, then the Parliament considers the
\nmotion for removal of the Judge along with the Committee’s report and other
\navailable materials including the cause, if any, shown by the concerned
\nJudge against his removal for which he has to be given an opportunity after
\nsubmission of the report to the Speaker\/ Chairman under Section 4(2) of the
\nAct. To be effective, this opportunity must include supply of a copy of the
\nreport to the concerned Judge by the Speaker\/Chairman while causing it to
\nbe laid before the Parliament under Section 4(3). If the Parliament does
\nnot adopt the motion for removal of the Judge, the process ends there with
\nno challenge available to any one. If the motion for removal of the Judge
\nis adopted by the requisite majority by the Parliament culminating in the
\norder of removal by the President of India under Article 124(4) of the
\nConstitution, then only the concerned Judge would have the remedy of
\njudicial review available on the permissible grounds against the order of
\nremoval. The statutory part of the process, by which a finding of guilty is
\nmade by the Inquiry Committee, is subject to judicial review as held in
\nSub-Committee on Judicial Accountability, (AIR 1992 SC 320 ) but in the
\nmanner indicated herein, that is, only in the event of an order of removal
\nbeing made and then at the instance of the aggrieved Judge alone. The
\nInquiry Committee is statutory in character but is not a tribunal for the
\npurpose of Article 136 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
95. The view we have taken is in complete accord with the majority opinion
\nin sub-committee on Judicial Accountability that the statutory part of the
\nprocess of removal of a Judge is subject to judicial review. The question
\nof the stage and the situation in which the remedy of judicial review
\nbecomes available and by whom it can be availed did not arise for
\nconsideration in the earlier case and, therefore, this further question
\nwhich now arises before us was not dealt with therein. The real controversy
\nin the earlier decision was whether the entire process of removal of a
\nJudge in our constitutional scheme is parliamentary to attract the doctrine
\nof lapse to the motion for removal of the learned Judge on dissolution of
\nthe Ninth Lok Sabha or a part thereof was statutory to which the doctrine
\nof lapse of motions in the Parliament could have no application. It was in
\nthis context that the majority in that decision took the view that the
\nprocess was statutory till the Parliament takes up the motion for
\nconsideration on a finding of ‘guilty’ being made by the Inquiry Committee
\nin its report which is submitted to the Parliament; and the Ninth Lok Sabha
\nhaving been dissolved before commencement of the Parliamentary process,
\nthere was no question of the motion lapsing at that stage which was
\nstatutory.\n<\/p>\n
96. On a careful reading of the earlier decision in Sub-Conimittee on
\nJudicial Accountability, (AIR 1992 SC 320 ) we are unable to accept the
\nsubmission, that the only logical corollary of the earlier decision is that
\nthe concerned Judge has a right to obtain a copy of the report of the
\nInquiry Committee before commencement of the parliamentary process to
\nenable him at this stage to avail the remedy of judicial review in case the
\nCommittee has recorded a finding of ‘guilty’ against the learned Judge. We
\nhave adequately indicated how the rights of the learned Judge are fully
\nprotected on the construction we have made of the relevant provisions and
\nthe manner in which we have read the Constitutional scheme adopted in India
\nfor the removal of a superior Judge in accordance with clauses (4) and (5)
\nof Article 124.\n<\/p>\n
97. We have no doubt that every constitutional functionary and authority
\ninvolved in the process is as much concerned as we are to find out the true
\nmeaning and import of the scheme envisaged by the relevant constitutional
\nand statutory provisions, in order to prevent any failure by any one to
\ndischarge the constitutional obligations avoiding transgression of the
\nlimits of the demarcated powers. No doubt, there are certain grey areas. We
\nhave attempted to illuminate them with the able assistance of the learned
\ncounsel who are equally concerned that the law should be unambiguously and
\ncorrectly stated to avoid any possible misapplication thereof. All that is
\nnecessary for us to do is to declare the correct constitutional position as
\nwe are able to discern, there being no need to issue any specific writ or
\ndirection to any authority and to ‘leave the different organs of the State
\nto consider matters falling within the orbit of their respective
\njurisdiction and powers’ as was done in the earlier case. We do so,
\naccordingly, herein.\n<\/p>\n
98. Brother Kasliwal expressly says in his separate opinion that he fully
\nagrees with us. Brother K. Ramaswamy, however, appears to have differed in
\nsome area. On a reconsideration of the matter in the light of the
\nexposision of law made by Brother K. Ramaswamy in his separate opinion
\ncirculated to us, we find that to a large extent he agrees with us, but in
\nthe area of his disagreement, we regret our inability to concur with him.\n<\/p>\n
99. Consequently, for the aforesaid reasons, this Writ Petition is disposed
\nof by declaring the law as contained in the judgment.\n<\/p>\n
KASLIWAL, J. (concurring with majority view):- 100. I have gone through the
\njudgment prepared by my learned brothers Justice J. S. Verma and Justice K.
\nRamaswamy. 1 fully agree with the judgment prepared by Justice J. S. Verma
\nand regret my inability to agree with the view taken by Justice K.
\nRamaswamy. However, looking to the questions raised being of seminal
\nimportance, 1 would like to express my own views also in the matter.\n<\/p>\n
101. This petition has been filed by the wife of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami,
\na sitting Judge of this Court. 1 need not recapitulate the facts of this
\ncase which have already. been stated in detail in the judgment prepared by
\nmy learned brothers. The short controversy raised in the petition now
\nrelates to an issue of a Writ of Mandamus directing the Committee appointed
\nunder the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’)
\nto forward a copy of the report as and when prepared, to Justice V.
\nRamaswami. It has been also prayed that a direction be also given to the
\nCommittee to withhold the forwarding of the report to the Hon’ble Speaker
\nof the Lok Sabha simultaneously, so that Justice V. Ramaswami may get
\nreasonable time to initiate appropriate proceedings, in the event he wishes
\nto challenge all or any part of the said report.\n<\/p>\n
102. The above relief has been sought mainly on two grounds:\n<\/p>\n
(1) That a Constitution Bench of this Court in its judgment in Sub-
\nCommittee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of India,<\/a> (1991) 4 SCC 699
\nhas already held that the proceedings before the Committee from its
\ninception till the time the report of the Committee is placed before
\nParliament are deemed to be proceedings outside Parliament and this part
\nbeing statutory can be subjected to judicial review.\n<\/p>\n
(2) If a copy of the report is not given to Justice V. Ramaswami before
\nsuch report is forwarded to the Hon’ble Speaker for the purpose of taking
\nout appropriate proceedings, it would not only defeat the Constitutional
\nright of Justice V. Ramaswami, but would also violate principles of natural
\njustice.\n<\/p>\n
103. It may be noted at the inception that the petitioner has not
\nchallenged The Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 or The Judges (Inquiry) Rules,
\n1969 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’) framed in exercise of the
\npowers conferred by sub-section (4) of Section 7 of The Judges (Inquiry)
\nAct, 1968. We have thus, to consider the scheme of the provisions of the
\nAct and the Rules as well as the provisions of the Constitution, in order
\nto decide whether the relief sought by the petitioner can be given or not.
\nThough, the Act deals with the procedure for the investigation and proof of
\nmisbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge, but in the present case we are only
\nconcerned with the investigation and proof of misbehaviour and not with the
\nincapacity of the Judge to discharge his duties efficiently due to any
\nphysical or mental incapacity. Section 3 of the Act provides for
\ninvestigation into misbehaviour and for that purpose it is necessary that a
\nnotice for such motion has to be given by not less than hundred members of
\nthe House of the People in case of such notice given in the House of the
\nPeople and not less than fifty members in the case of a notice given in the
\nCouncil of States. the Speaker or the Chairman, as the case may be, after
\nconsulting such persons, if any, as he thinks fit and after considering
\nsuch materials, if any, as may be available to him, either admit the motion
\nor refuse to admit the same. If such motion is admitted, then the motion
\nshall be kept pending and a committee consisting of the following three
\nmembers shall be constituted for making investigation into the grounds on
\nwhich the removal of a Judge is prayed. This Committee shall consist of the
\nfollowing three members of whom:-\n<\/p>\n
(a) one shall be chosen from among the Chief Justice and other Judges of
\nthe Supreme Court;\n<\/p>\n
(b) one shall be chosen from among the Chief Justices of the High Courts;
\nand<\/p>\n
(c) one shall be a person who is, in the opinion of the Speaker or, as the
\ncase may be, the Chairman, a distinguished jurist.\n<\/p>\n
104. The Committee under sub-section (3) of Section 3 is required to frame
\ndefinite charges against the Judge on the basis of which the investigation
\nis proposed to be held and under sub-section (4) of Section 3, such charges
\ntogether with a statement of the grounds on which each such charge is based
\nshall be communicated to the Judge and he shall be given a reasonable
\nopportunity of presenting a written statement of defence within such time
\nas may be specified in this behalf by the Committee. Then under subsection
\n(8) of Section 3, the Committee may, after considering the written
\nstatement of the Judge, if any, amend the charges framed under sub-section
\n(3) and in such a case, the Judge shall be given a reasonable opportunity
\nof presenting a fresh written statement of defence. Under sub-section (9)
\nof Section 3, the Central Government may, appoint an advocate to conduct
\nthe case against the Judge, if required by the Speaker or the Chairman or
\nboth as the case may be. Under Section 4 of the Act, the Committee has been
\ngiven power to regulate its own procedure in making the investigation
\nsubject to any rules. This also provides of giving reasonable opportunity
\nto the Judge of cross-examining witnesses, adducing evidence and of being
\nheard in his defence. Sub-section (2) of Section 4 with which we are
\ndirectly concerned reads as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“At the conclusion of the investigation, the Committee shall submit its
\nreport to the Speaker or, as the case may be, to the Chairman, or where the
\nCommittee has been constituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman, to
\nboth of them, stating therein its findings on each of the charges.
\nseparately with such observations on the whole case as it thinks fit.”\n<\/p>\n
Thereafter under sub-section (3) of Section 4 of the Act, the Speaker or
\nthe Chairman, or, where the Committee has been constituted jointly by the
\nSpeaker and the Chairman, both of them, shall cause the report to be laid
\nas soon as may be, respectively before the House of the People and the
\nCouncil of States. Section 5 provides for the powers of the Committee, like
\na Civil Court and has been authorised to summon and enforce the attendance
\nof any person and examining him on oath, requiring the discovery and
\nproduction of documents, receiving evidence on oath, issuing commissions
\nfor the examination of witnesses or documents and such other matters as may
\nbe prescribed. Then comes Section 6 which has important bearing on the
\nissue raised before us and as such is reproduced as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“6. (1) If the report of the Committee contains a finding that the Judge is
\nnot guilty of any misbehaviour or does not suffer from any incapacity,
\nthen, no further steps shall be taken in either House of Parliament in
\nrelation to the report and the motion pending in the House or the Houses of
\nParliament shall not be proceeded with.\n<\/p>\n
(2) If the report of the Committee contains a finding that the Judge is
\nguilty of any misbehaviour or suffers from any incapacity, then, the motion
\nreferred to in sub-section (1) of Section 3 shall, together with the report
\nof the Committee, be taken up for consideration by the House or the Houses
\nof Parliament in which it is pending.\n<\/p>\n
(3) If the motion is adopted by each House of Parliament in accordance with
\nthe provisions of clause (4) of Article 124 or, as the case may be, in
\naccordance with that clause read with Article 218 of the Constitution,
\nthen, the misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge shall be deemed to have
\nbeen proved and an address praying for the removal of the Judge shall be
\npresented in the prescribed manner to the President by each House of
\nParliament ‘in the same session in which the motion has been adopted.”\n<\/p>\n
Section 7 provides for the power to make rules. We would now consider the
\nprovisions of the Rules which are relevant and necessary for deciding the
\ncontroversy raised before us. Rule 5 provides for the manner in which the
\ncharges framed against the Judge shall be served on him. Under Rule 6 when
\nthe Judge appears, he may object in writing to the sufficiency of the
\ncharges framed against him and if the objection is sustained by the
\nmajority of the members of the Inquiry Committee, the Inquiry Committee may
\namend the charges and give the Judge a reasonable opportunity of presenting
\nafresh written statement of defence. Under Rule 7, if the Judge denies that
\nhe is guilty of the misbehaviour or if he refuses or omits, or is unable,
\nto plead or desires that the inquiry should be made, the Inquiry Committee
\nshall proceed with the inquiry. Rule 8 permits the Inquiry Committee to
\nproceed with the inquiry in the absence of the Judge, if the Judge does not
\nappear after service of notice on him. Rule 9 deals with the report of the
\nInquiry Committee and this Rule being relevant and necessary for deciding
\nthe controversy is reproduced as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“9. Report of the Inquiry Committee. (1) Where the members of the Inquiry
\nCommittee are not unanimous, the report submitted by the Inquiry Committee
\nunder Section 4 shall be in accordance with the findings of the majority of
\nthe members thereof.\n<\/p>\n
(2) The presiding officer of the Inquiry Committee shall-\n<\/p>\n
(a) cause its report to be prepared in duplicate,<\/p>\n
(b) authenticate each copy of the report by putting his signature thereon,
\nand<\/p>\n
(c) forward, within a’ period of three months from the date on which a copy
\nof the barges framed under sub-section (3) of Section 3 is served upon the
\nJudges, or, where no such service is made from the date of publication of
\nthe notice referred to in sub-rule (3) of Rule 5, the authenticated copies
\nof the report to the Speaker or Chairman by whom the Committee was
\nconstituted, or where the Committed was constituted jointly by them, or
\nboth of them:\n<\/p>\n
Provided that the Speaker or Chairman, or both of them (where the Committee
\nwas constituted jointly by them), may, for sufficient cause, extend the
\ntime within which the Inquiry Committee shall submit its report.\n<\/p>\n
(3) A copy of the report of the Inquiry Committee, authenticated in the
\nmanner specified in sub-rule (2), shall be laid before each House of
\nParliament.\n<\/p>\n
(4) Where the majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee makes a
\nfinding to the effect that the Judge is guilty of a misbehaviour or that he
\nsuffers from an incapacity, but the third member thereof makes a finding to
\nthe contrary, the presiding officer of the Inquiry Committee shall
\nauthenticate, in the manner specified in sub-rule (2), the finding made by
\nsuch third member, in duplicate and shall forward the same along with the
\nreport submitted by him under Section 4.\n<\/p>\n
(5) An authenticated copy of the finding made by third member, referred to
\nin sub-rule (4) shall also be laid before each House of Parliament.\n<\/p>\n
(6) Where the majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee makes a
\nfinding to the effect that the Judge is not guilty of an y misbehaviour or
\nthat he does not suffer from any incapacity, and the third member thereof
\nmakes a finding to the contrary, the Inquiry Committee shall not disclose
\nthe finding made by such third member to Parliament or to any other
\nauthority, body or person.”\n<\/p>\n
Rule 10 provides for recording of evidence according to the provisions of
\nthe Code of Civil Procedure so far as may be applicable to the examination
\nof any witness by the Committee. A copy of the evidence, oral and
\ndocumentary, received by the Committee shall be laid before each House of
\nParliament along with the report laid before it under Section 4 of the Act.
\nSub-rule (1) of Rule 11 provides for allowing the Judge a right to consult,
\nand to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice. Apart from the
\nprovisions of the Act and the Rules, it has been provided in clause 4 of
\nArticle 124 of the Constitution that a Judge of the Supreme Court shall not
\nbe removed from his office except by an order of the President passed after
\nan address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total
\nmembership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of
\nthe members of that House present and voting has been presented to the
\nPresident in the same session for such removal on the grounds of proved
\nmisbehaviour.\n<\/p>\n
105. In pursuance to the above provisions 108 members of the House of the
\nPeople had given a notice of motion which was admitted by the Speaker on
\n12-3-1991 and a Committee was constituted of the following three persons
\n(1) Hon’ble Mr. Justice P.B. Sawant, a sitting Judge of this Court (2)
\nHon’ble Mr. Justice P.D. Desai, Chief Justice of Bombay High Court and (3)
\nHon’ble Mr. Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, a retired Judge of this Court in
\nthe category of a distinguished jurist. The Lok Sabha was dissolved on
\n13-3-1991. The Union Government after the fresh elections of the Lok Sabha
\nrefused to act in aid of the decision taken by the Speaker of the earlier
\nLok Sabha and as such a Writ Petition was filed by a body called the Sub-
\nCommittee on Judicial Accountability. That case was decided on October 29,
\n1991 and the majority opinion in that case was that the process for removal
\nof a Judge of the Supreme Court comprises of two stages. The first stage is
\nof investigation and proof in accordance with The Judges (Inquiry) Act,
\n1968 enacted under Article 124 (5) of the Constitution by the Committee
\nconstituted by the Speaker acting as a statutory authority under the Act
\nand the second stage commences after allegations of misbehaviour are found
\nproved. In the second stage when motion is moved, bar under Article 121 on
\ndiscussion in Parliament in respect of the conduct of the Judge is lifted
\nand the process envisaged under Article 124 (4) is attracted. The first
\nstage is subject to judicial review, but the second stage is not subject to
\njudicial review as the process involved being parliamentary process.\n<\/p>\n
106. The Inquiry report in the present case has been stated to be completed
\nand awaits the decision of this Court in the present case. A perusal of the
\nprovisions of the Act and the Rules mentioned above shows that the process
\nas a whole is an amalgam of statutory process as well as parliamentary
\nprocess. There are number of checks and safeguards kept in the process
\nwhere the matter relates to the misbehaviour of a sitting Judge of the
\nSupreme Court and the High Courts who are high constitutional
\nfunctionaries. The Parliament while enacting the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
\nlong after 18 years of the coming into force of the Constitution was fully
\nconscious regarding the consideration of any allegation of misbehaviour
\nimputed against a Judge of the Supreme Court or of a High Court. It may be
\nnoted that Article 121 of the Constitution was a clear bar for any
\ndiscussion in Parliament with respect to the conduct of any Judge of the
\nSupreme Court or of the High Court in the discharge of his duties except
\nupon a motion for presenting an address to the President praying for the
\nremoval of the Judge. The framers of the Constitution under clause 5 of
\nArticle 124 of the Constitution gave an authority to the Parliament to make
\nany law for regulating the procedure for the presentation of an address and
\nfor the investigation and proof of the misbehaviour or incapacity of a
\nJudge under clause (4). The framers of the Constitution themselves laid
\ndown in clause (4) of Article 124 of the Constitution that a Judge of the
\nSupreme Court shall not be removed from his office except by an order of
\nthe President passed after an address by each House of Parliament supported
\nby a majority of total membership of that House and also by a majority of
\nnot less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting.
\nIn case of the consideration of a motion for the removal of the Judge on
\nthe ground of proved misbehaviour, the above provision shows that the
\nframers of the Constitution themselves keeping in view the independence of
\nthe judiciary and the Judges of the High Courts and Supreme Court. provided
\nthat in case of any charges of misbehaviour the Judge shall not be removed
\nfrom his office except by an order of the President passed after such
\nmotion is supported by not only a majority of the total membership of the
\nHouse, but also by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of
\nthat House present and voting and to be presented to the President in the
\nsame session. The Parliament while enacting the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968
\nin respect of constituting a Committee for the investigation and proof of
\nany allegations of misbehaviour provided for constitution of a Committee
\nconsisting of only persons belonging to the judiciary. Not only that, the
\nmembers of the Committee consisted of – one to be chosen from among the
\nChief Justice of India and other Judges of the Supreme Court, second one to
\nbe chosen from among the Chief Justices of the High Courts and the third
\none a distinguished jurist. The matter of investigation as such was
\nentrusted to a high judicial authority consisting of a sitting Judge of the
\nSupreme Court, a Chief Justice of the High Court and a distinguished
\njurist. This shows that the intention of the Parliament was to maintain the
\ndignity and independence of the judiciary and as such the investigation in
\nrespect of the misbehaviour of a sitting Judge of the Supreme Court or the
\nHigh Court was entrusted to a wholly judicial body consisting of judicially
\ntrained persons and no interference of any kind has been allowed or given
\nto any executive authority or to any person outside the judiciary. Not only
\nthat, a combined reading of all the relevant provisions of the
\nConstitution, the Act and the Rules clearly show that where an Inquiry
\nCommittee unanimously or by majority records a finding of not guilty of the
\ncharges levelled against the Judge, the matter ends and no further
\ndiscussion on the motion is required in the Parliament. It is further
\nimportant to note that sub-rule (6) of Rule 9 further provides that where
\nthe majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee makes -a finding to
\nthe effect that the Judge is not guilty of any misbehaviour and the third
\nmember thereof makes a finding to the contrary, the Inquiry Committee shall
\nnot disclose the finding made by such third member to Parliament or to any
\nother authority, body or person. This provision clearly indicates the
\nrespect, dignity and maintenance of the independence of the judiciary and
\nnot to disclose to any authority, body or person including the Parliament,
\nthe contrary finding of guilty made by the third member and thus to
\nmaintain the prestige of the Judge concerned intact. The Parliament under
\nthe above scheme is entitled to take up the motion, for consideration only
\nwhen it receives a report with the finding of guilty recorded by a majority
\nor unanimous opinion of the members of the Committee. It may be further
\nnoted that in such kind of case where out of the three members of the
\nCommittee, if two members record a finding of guilty while the third member
\ngives a finding of not guilty, then in that case, both the findings are
\nrequired to be submitted on the floor of the House so that at the time of
\nconsideration of the motion both views may be available for consideration
\nbefore taking any final decision on the motion.\n<\/p>\n
107. In the background of the above scheme of the law we have to consider
\nwhether this Court can give any direction for the supply of the report of
\nthe Committee to the concerned Judge for the purpose of giving sufficient
\ntime so that the Judge may decide to take further action or not by may of
\nchallenging the report by judicial review. Both the reliefs as prayed are
\nintermixed and according to the petitioner and rightly so one without the
\nother is of no use. Admittedly, there is no provision in the Act or the
\nRules for the supply of such copy to the concerned Judge by the Inquiry
\nCommittee before sending such report to the Speaker for laying down the
\nreport before the Parliament.\n<\/p>\n
108. The argument of Mr. Sibal, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf
\nof the petitioner is that this Court in the case sub-committee on Judicial
\nAccountability has held that the admission of motion by the Speaker and
\nconstitution of the Committee are statutory functions of the Speaker
\noutside Parliamentary process. Till the report is received by the
\nParliament and the motion is taken for consideration the matter is outside
\nthe Parliamentary process and any action till such stage being outside
\nParliamentary process is amenable to judicial review. It has been submitted
\nthat the learned Judge is entitled to question the adverse findings of
\nmisbehaviour, if any, recorded by the Committee and this can be done only
\nwhen the copy of the report is given to the learned Judge and thereafter
\nreasonable time is given for availing the right of challenging the same by
\njudicial review. It has also been contended that there is no provision in
\nthe Act and the Rules for the Speaker to supply a copy of the report to the
\nlearned Judge. Once a report is placed on the floor of each House of
\nParliament, it is exclusively within the domain of the Parliament and it
\ncannot be predicated as to what procedure the Parliament may adopt
\nregarding the consideration of the motion. This valuable right cannot be
\ntaken away nor rendered nugatory by interpretative process which would
\nviolate the principles of nature justice.\n<\/p>\n
109. Mr. G. Ramaswamy, Learned Attorney General contended that the
\nCornmittee is in the nature of a subordinate.authority to the Speaker. The
\nreport is like granting of sanction for prosecution of a public servant as
\ncontemplated under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
\nUnless the validity of the sanction is questioned at the earliest stage the
\naccused is precluded to assail it at a later stage. On the same analogy the
\nlearned Judge is entitled to challenge the adverse findings, if any,
\nrecorded in the report by the Committee before the same is taken for
\nconsideration by the Parliament. This can only be done when such report is
\nmade available to the learned Judge for seeking a judicial review. It is
\nnot for this Hon’ble Court to decide as to what procedure Parliament will
\nfollow for the purpose of voting upon the motion nor can this Court, in any
\nway, interfere with the Parliamentary process. It is for the Parliament
\nalone to decide as to how the motion shall be dealt with and in case a copy
\nof the Inquiry report is not furnished to the learned Judge at this stage
\nfor seeking judicial review, it would be against the basic principle of
\nnatural justice not to condemn a person unheard.\n<\/p>\n
110. So far as the propositions of law laid down in Sub-Committee on
\nJudicial Accountability’s case is concerned, I do not consider it necessary
\nto burden this judgment as it has been considered in great detail in the
\njudgment by Verma, J. Suffice to say that in the aforesaid case the
\ncontroversy raised in the present case was not in issue and the Court in
\nthat case was concerned with the stage of entertaining the motion by the
\nSpeaker for consideration of the House and the fate of such motion upon the
\ndissolution of the Lok Sabha.\n<\/p>\n
111. We shall now deal with the question directly raised in the present
\ncase whether this Court should give a direction to the President of the
\nCommittee to furnish the copy of the report to the learned Judge before
\nsending the same to the Speaker and to make a further direction to withhold
\nthe submission of the report for a reasonable period so that the learned
\nJudge may get time to avail or not to avail the remedy of challenging the
\nadverse findings in the report by way of judicial review. In order to
\ndecide this. question it is necessary to consider as to under what
\nprinciple of law or authority such relief is sought. Admittedly, there is
\nno provision in the Act or Rules for giving the copy of the Inquiry report
\nto the concerned Judge before sending it to the Speaker. This position is
\neven accepted by the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. If we
\nexamine the provisions of the Act and the Rules a contrary conclusion
\nemerges to what is prayed by the petitioner. Section 4 (2) of the Act
\nclearly envisages that at the conclusion of the investigation, the
\nCommittee shall submit its report to the Speaker and under sub-section (3)
\nthe Speaker shall cause the report to be laid, as soon as may be before the
\nHouse of the People in the present case. Further under Rule 9(2) (c), it is
\nprovided that the Presiding Officer of the Inquiry Committee shall forward
\nthe report within a period of three months from the date on which a copy of
\nthe charges framed under sub-section (3) of Section 3 is served upon the
\nJudge, or where no such service is made from the date of publication of the
\nnotice referred to in sub-rule (3) of Rule 5. Under the proviso, the
\nSpeaker is authorised to extend the time for sufficient cause. Thus, the
\nintendment of the aforesaid scheme of the provisions is a speedy disposal
\nof the investigation in public interest and the report is required to be
\nsent to the Speaker as soon as the investigation is concluded, unless the
\ncase falls within the ambit of Rule 9(6) in that case the Inquiry Committee
\nshall not disclose the finding made by such third member to Parliament or
\nto any other authority, body or person.\n<\/p>\n
112. Now the other aspect to be examined is the violation of any principle
\nof natural justice, if the copy of the report is not given to the Judge
\nconcerned for seeking a judicial review and this is the main plank of
\nsubmission on which the entire edifice is built on behalf of the
\npetitioner. So far as, the principle of audi alteram partem that no person
\ncan be condemned unheard, is concerned, in my view is not applicable in the
\npresent case. The right of hearing to the concerned Judge in the present
\nscheme of law can only arise before two authorities. One before the Inquiry
\nCommittee and the other before the Parliament. So far as the right of
\nhearing before the Committee is concerned, there is ample opportunity given
\nin the provisions of the Act and the Rules. The entire investigation into
\nmisbehaviour is done after a notice given to the concerned Judge. The
\ncharges framed together with a statement of the grounds on which each such
\ncharge is based is communicated to the Judge and he is given a reasonable
\nopportunity of presenting a written statement of defence. The Committee
\nafter considering the written statement of the Judge may amend the charges
\nand thereafter the Judge is again given a reasonable opportunity of
\npresenting a fresh written statement of defence. The Committee in making
\nthe investigation is required to give a reasonable opportunity to the Judge
\nof cross-examining witnesses, adducing evidence and of being heard in his
\ndefence. The plea of the Judge is recorded, the evidence of each witness
\nexamined by the Inquiry Committee is taken down in writing. The Judge is
\nalso given a right to consult, and to be defended by a legal practitioner
\nof his choice. Thus, so far as the opportunity of hearing before the
\nInquiry Committee is concerned, the above mentioned provisions clearly show
\nthat full opportunity of hearing is given to the Judge in respect of
\ncontesting the charges framed against him as well as cross-examining any
\nwitness and leading any evidence in defence.\n<\/p>\n
112A. Now, so far as the opportunity of any hearing to be given to the
\nconcerned Judge by the Parliament, that stage has not reached in the
\npresent case. It is no doubt correct that Parliament is free to adopt its
\nown procedure while considering the motion, but that alone cannot be
\nconsidered as a ground for seeking a judicial review against the report of
\nthe Committee. The question of not giving any opportunity of hearing before
\nany action is taken against the learned Judge by the Parliament can only
\narise after any decision is taken against the Judge by the Parliament. The
\nviolation of principle of natural justice, if any, cannot be examined in
\nisolation, but depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. No
\nargument based on the violation of principle of natural justice can be
\nconsidered on the assumption that the Parliament may adopt a procedure
\nwhich may be in violation of principles of natural justice. Learned
\nAttorney General at a subsequent stage of the arguments as well as the
\nCounsel for the Committee were in agreement on this score that the
\nParliament shall give an opportunity of hearing to the learned Judge before
\ntaking a final decision on the motion and as a necessary corollary thereof
\nthe copy of the Inquiry report shall be given to the learned Judge by the
\nParliament. Thus, if a direction is being sought for supplying a copy of
\nthe report on the ground of assumed violation of any principle of natural
\njustice by the Parliament, we find no justification and it would be
\nprejudging the issue and predicating a remedy without laying any foundation
\nor basis for such relief.\n<\/p>\n
113. It may also be noted that the Rules of natural justice are manifested
\nin the twin principles of nemo judes in sua caues and audi alteram partem.
\nWe are not concerned here with the former since no case of bias has been
\nurged. The grievance ventilated is that being condemned unheard. The audi
\nalteram partem rule has a few facets two of which are (a) notice of the
\ncase to be met; and (b) opportunity to explain. There is no violation in
\nthe present case of anyone of the above two facets of the audi alteram
\npartem rule. The violation of principle of natural justice will depend on
\nthe facts and circumstances of each case and in my view there is nothing to
\nshow that in the present case there is any violation of the principles of
\nnatural justice.\n<\/p>\n
114. The next limb of this ground of violation of principles of natural
\njustice claimed on behalf of the petitioner is that if the copy of the
\nreport will not be given to the learned Judge, then it would defeat his
\nright of judicial review. I do not find any force in this submission. The
\nright of judicial review is not a right emerging under any principle of
\nnatural justice. It cannot be equated with the rule of audi alteram partem.
\nThe rule of judicial review is itself a right available only on limited
\npermissible grounds. The remedy of seeking a judicial review depends on the
\nfacts of each individual case and will depend on several factors which
\nwould be necessary to be examined before the particular order or action is
\nput under challenge. There cannot be any demand of judicial review as an
\nabstract proposition of law on the premise of violation of any principle of
\nnatural justice at this stage in the scheme of the Act and the Rules. No
\ndirection as such can be sought on the basis that if the copy of the report
\nis not supplied at this stage, the learned Judge would be left with no
\nremedy of judicial review at a later stage. Neither in the scheme of the
\nAct and the Rules nor under any provision of the Constitution it has been
\nshown that such right is available to the concerned Judge. There is neither
\nany violation of any principle of natural justice nor violation of any
\nconstitutional or statutory provision in not affording a copy of the
\nInquiry report before sending the same to the Speaker. This Court cannot
\ngive any mandamus to any authority unless it can be shown that such
\nauthority is acting in violation of any provisions of the statute or
\nconstitutional obligation. Thus, even if it may be considered that the
\nCommittee is performing a statutory function amenable to the jurisdiction
\nof this Court in judicial review, it must be shown that it is acting in
\nviolation of any rule or law. In the present case the Inquiry Committee is
\nrather performing its legal duty and fulfilling the statutory obligation of
\nsending the report to the Speaker and as such no mandamus or direction can
\nbe given to delay or put any hindrance in such lawful action on the part of
\nthe Committee.\n<\/p>\n
115. I am not convinced with the submission of the learned Attorney General
\nthat the Inquiry report in this case can be compared or equated with the
\nsanction given under Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in
\nrespect of a public servant. The powers, duties and functions of the
\nInquiry Committee constituted under the, provisions of the Act and composed
\nof high judicial functionaries which records its finding after giving an
\nopportunity to the concerned Judge on the basis of the oral and documentary
\nevidence cannot be compared or equated with the sanction accorded by an
\nexecutive authority in respect of a public servant.\n<\/p>\n
116. We shall also examine other aspects of the matter having a direct
\nbearing on the question in issue. So far as any finding of guilty recorded
\nby the Committee on the charges is concerned, it is not conclusive and
\nfinal and the Parliament can still hold that the charges levelled against
\nthe concerned Judge did not amount to misbehaviour and may decide not to
\nadopt the motion. On the other hand, if in the course of judicial review
\nthis Court approves or affirms such findings recorded by the Inquiry
\nCommittee being a decision of this Court shall be binding on the
\nParliament. In that case, it would not be possible for the Parliament to
\ntake a different view and this would be an extra constitutional
\ninterference in the framework of the scheme. In another case during the
\ncourse of judicial review this Court may come to the conclusion of quashing
\nthe entire proceedings conducted by the Inquiry Committee and require it to
\nhold a fresh Inquiry. In that kind of case a problem may arise of the
\ncontinuation of the investigation beyond the period allowed in the Rules
\nand by the Speaker. It is important to note that the life and existence of
\nthe Inquiry Committee itself is conterminous with the period of 3 months as
\nlaid down in rule 9(2)(c) of the Rules or till the Speaker extends the time
\nfor sufficient cause under the proviso to the aforesaid rule. After this
\nperiod is over, the Committee ceases to function and neither this court nor
\nany other court can extend this period in the exercise of judicial review
\nof the findings of the Inquiry Committee. The period of 3 months has been
\nfixed in the statutory rules itself and the Speaker alone has been
\nauthorised to extend such period for sufficient cause. In my humble opinion
\nthis court cannot extend such period nor give any direction to the Speaker
\nto do so, and any attempt of remanding the matter for fresh Inquiry or to
\nkeep the matter pending till the concerned Judge decides to challenge the
\nreport by way of judicial review or to keep the matter pending for decision
\nunder the exercise of judicial review beyond the aforesaid period is not
\npermissible and cannot be done in an indirect manner which cannot be done
\ndirectly. This Court has no power to extend the life of the Inquiry
\nCommittee by a judicial fiat in the teeth of the express provisions of the
\nstatutory rules.\n<\/p>\n
117. Further, in case a judicial review is permitted at this stage against
\nthe findings recorded by the Committee then in that case even findings of
\nnot guilty recorded by the Committee may also be challenged in Court by
\npersons who had initiated the motion. It has been contended in this regard
\non behalf of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that no question of any
\nchallenge to the findings of not guilty recorded by the Committee is
\npermissible as contemplated under Section 6(1) of the Act according to
\nwhich if the report of the Committee contains a finding that the Judge is
\nnot guilty of any misbehaviour then no further steps shall be taken in
\neither House Parliament in relation to the report. 1 find no force in such
\ncontention because this will only apply when such finding of not guilty is
\naffirmed by the Court in judicial review also. -But in case such finding
\nitself is reversed in judicial review, then the finding of not guilty by
\nthe Committee no longer exists and it would be taken as a finding of guilty
\nrecorded in judicial review. Thus, many problems may arise which cannot be
\npredicated and which may result against the interest of the concerned Judge
\nhimself.\n<\/p>\n
118. Thus, in the circumstances mentioned above in the scheme of the Act
\nand the Rules and the Constitution, no direction can be given to the
\nInquiry Committee to furnish the report to the Judge for seeking judicial
\nreview at this stage when the investigation is already complete. So far as
\nthe stage after the conclusion of the proceedings in the Parliament are
\nconcerned, the remedy of judicial review is always available which, of
\ncourse, will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case emerging
\nthen and subject to recognised permissible grounds of judicial review.\n<\/p>\n
118A. The entire constitutional scheme in this matter shows that the
\nParliament had complete confidence in the independence and dignity of
\njudiciary. The Inquiry has been left to the Inquiry Committee composed of
\nhigh judicial functionaries alone. In case of such Committee giving a
\nfinding of not guilty, the same has been considered as final and giving a
\nquietus and no further discussion on the motion has been made permissible.
\nIt is only in, case of finding of guilty recorded by the Inquiry Committee
\nthat the motion is required to be taken up for further consideration. In
\nthis kind of case in the larger public interest including the independence
\nof the-judiciary itself any delay after the recording of such finding of
\nguilty, if any, by the.Inquiry Committee and to permit such report being
\nchallenged by way of judicial review at this stage would not be proper. The
\nmatter after recording, if any, a finding of guilty against the concerned
\nJudge by the Inquiry Committee should be left for further consideration by
\nthe Parliament. The Parliament should be left answerable to the public at
\nlarge for its future course of action in the matter.\n<\/p>\n
119. Thus, taking in view the entire. facts and circumstances of the case,
\nno direction can be given as prayed by the petitioner and the petition
\nstands disposed of in terms of the direction given in the judgment of
\nbrother Verma, J.\n<\/p>\n
K. RAMASWAMY, J. (Minority View): -120. Having had the benefit of reading
\nthe draft judgment circulated by my learned brother Verma, J. and given my
\nanxious consideration, 1 express my regrets not to sail totally with them
\nbut prefer to sink alone.\n<\/p>\n
121. The petitioner sought a writ of Mandamus or any other writ or
\ndirections to direct Mr. Justice P. B. Sawant Committee, appointed under S.
\n3(2) of the Judges (Enquiry) Act, 1968 for short ‘the Act’, to supply a
\ncopy of its report to Hon’ble Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami before its
\nsubmission to the Speaker of the Lok Sabha. She also sought direction to
\nthe said committee to withhold forwarding simultaneously the said report to
\nthe Speaker. The facts in nut shell are that the Speaker of 9th Lok Sabha
\nconstituted Mr. Justice P. B. Sawant Committee to enquire into the grounds
\nof the motion prayed for the removal of Mr. Justice V. Ramaswami from the
\noffice as Judge of this Court with the allegations that he committed, in
\nhis administrative capacity as Chief Justice of Punjab & Haryana High
\nCourt, financial irregularities which constitute misbehaviour within the
\nmeaning of Art. 124(4) of the Constitution of India. Mr. M. Krishna Swami
\nfiled Writ Petition No. 149 of 1992 and questioned the power and
\njurisdiction of the Speaker to admit the motion, the constitution of the
\ncommittee and the procedure it adapted to investigate into the charges etc.
\nThe committee on assumption of its office while started investigation, the
\nstay of the proceedings, though sought for, was not granted and the
\ninvestigation went on. While we were hearing the writ petition, on May 10,
\n1992, the learned Judge addressed a letter to the Presiding Officer of the
\nCommittee requesting to supply him a copy of its report before being
\nforwarded to the Speaker and also requested to withhold the same by giving
\nreasonable time to peruse and to take appropriate action thereon. An
\napplication for the same relief was also made in Writ Petition No. 149 of
\n1992. This Bench was given to understand that the Committee would submit
\nthe report to the Hon’ble Speaker on or before July 31, 1992, the extended
\ndate. During summer vacation the petitioner filed the writ petition for the
\naforesaid reliefs which was posted along with writ petition No. 149 of
\n1992. On enquiry by this Bench whether the learned Judge would agree to
\nabide by the decision that may be given in this case, Mr. Kapil Sibal, the
\nlearned senior counsel for the petitioner, on instruction, stated to the
\npositive. He placed on record the letter he addressed and the endorsement
\nthereon by the learned Judge.\n<\/p>\n
122. He argued that in Sub-Committee on Judicial Accountability v. Union of
\nIndia,<\/a> (1991) 2 SCR 741  for short ‘SCJA’ case, this Court held that the
\nadmission of the motion by the Speaker and constitution of the committee
\nare statutory functions of the Speaker outside Parliamentary process. Till
\nthe report was placed on the floor of each House of the Parliament, the
\nSpeaker has possession of the report and power to withhold. So the
\nCommittee too. If it finds on investigation that the misconduct has not
\nbeen proved, there ends the matter and need to take further political
\nprocess is obviated. If it finds that the misconduct has been proved, the
\nParliamentary process to remove the Judge gets revived on placing the
\nreport and the evidence on the floor of each House of Parliament and the
\naddress started. The investigation is judicious blend of political and
\njudicial process. The admission of the motion, constitution of the
\ncommittee and submission of the report by the committee to the Speaker are
\noutside Parliamentary processes and amenable to judicial review. The
\nlearned Judge is entitled to question the adverse finding of misbehaviour
\nand so is entitled to the supply of a copy of the report before it being
\nactually submitted to the Speaker. When the learned Judge has a right and
\nis entitled to judicial review, to question the correctness of the finding
\nof proved misbehaviour he has right to move this Court under Art. 32 or
\nArt. 136 or to the High Court under Art. 226. Without supply of the copy of
\nthe report he cannot adequately plead and prove its incorrectness to quash
\nthe same. Accordingly it is his contention that the supply of the report
\nand grant of reasonable time are essential postulates sequal to avail
\njudicial review. Accordingly the learned Judge is entitled to the copy of
\nthe report thereof. In support thereof he stated that the Parliamentary
\nprocess commences only when the Speaker moves the motion as annexure in the
\nhouse along with the address to be presented to the President for the
\nremoval of the Judge. Until then the Speaker remains a statutory authority,
\nthere is no express provision either in the Act or the judges Enquiry
\nRules, 1969 for short ‘the Rules’ or in the Constitution to provide the
\nlearned Judge with an opportunity of representation aid hearing on the
\nfloor of both the Houses of Parliament. We cannot predicate as to what
\nprocedure the Parliament may adapt in its address and it is also immune
\nfrom judicial review. By necessary implication, the learned Judge when he
\nhas right to review must have remedy to challenge the adverse report in a
\njudicial process and supply of the copy of the report is a must. There is
\nalso no provision in the Act and Rules for the Speaker to supply a copy of
\nthe report to the learned Judge. Once a report is placed on the floor of
\neach House of the Parliament it is exclusively within the domain of the
\nParliament and the Judge loses his right to Judicial review. The Parliament
\nmay choose to give a copy of the report or constitute a sub-committee to
\nanalyse the report or may proceed with the address without any opportunity
\nto the learned Judge. As a corollary to the judgment of this Court in
\nSCJA’s case, the report of the committee with its finding must be furnished
\nto the learned Judge without which there can never be any efficacious
\njudicial review. This valuable right cannot be taken away nor rendered
\nnugatory by interpretative process which would violate the principles of
\nnatural justice and unfair procedure offending Article 21. The Committee is
\na statutory Tribunal, even though per force its report is not operative. As
\na Tribunal it is enjoined to supply him a copy of its report and if it
\nfails to supply, the learned Judge is entitled to maintain the writ
\npetition compelling the committee to supply the copy of the report.\n<\/p>\n
123. Sri G. Ramaswami, the learned Attorney General contended that the
\ncommittee is in the nature of a subordinate authority to the Speaker, the
\nlatter being a statutory authority. The report is like grant of sanction
\nfor prosecution of a public servant under Section 197 of the Code of
\nCriminal Procedure, 1973. Unless validity of the sanction is questioned at
\nthe earliest stage the accused is precluded to assail it later on. On the
\nsame analogy the Judge is entitled to challenge adverse findings, the
\nfoundation for address in the Parliament, at the earliest stage even before
\nbeing considered by the Parliament. This Court in SCJA’s case found that
\nthe judicial review is available against the adverse report of the
\ncommittee. The Parliamentary process of removal is not amenable to judicial
\nreview. Therefore, before any motion is laid on the floor of each House of
\nParliament, the learned Judge is entitled to the supply of a copy of the
\nreport and to the judicial review thereof. Thereafter, this Court has no
\njurisdiction to interdict the proceeding before both the Houses of
\nParliament take up the motion for discussion. Interference later on would
\ntantamount to interfere with the Parliamentary process. The Parliament
\nalone is to decide as to how the motion is to be dealt with. Neither this
\nCourt nor any other Court in this country has any jurisdiction to deal with
\nthe matter or interfere with its decisions. Under these circumstances the
\nlearned Judge is entitled to a copy of the report and a right to judicial
\nreview of the same by this Court. Any construction otherwise would leave
\nthe learned Judge high and dry. Such a situation is anathema to rule of law
\nand the cause of justice. Exercise of the power of judicial review would be
\nconsistent with the interpretation of the provision of the Constitution,
\nthe Act and the Rules as laid by this Court in SCJA’s case. Any other view
\nwould run counter to the conclusions in SCJA’s case. He also contended that
\nit is a basic principle of natural justice that the person against whom
\nfindings are rendered is entitled to be heard and seek judicial review of
\nthe adverse findings. As a corollary he is entitled to be supplied with the
\ncopy of the report and later the members of the Committee are not amenable
\nto writ jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n
124. Sri Nariman, the learned Senior counsel for the committee contended
\nthat the report submitted by the committee germinates certain statutory
\nconsequences directly relatable to the political process of removal of the
\nJudge, be the finding is one of guilt or exoneration. The report forms a
\nParliamentary document for its consideration an ‘ d determines the future
\ncourse of the pending motion. If the finding is one of guilt the motion has
\nto proceed to the stage of consideration and vote. If the finding is of
\n“not guilty” the motion by force of statute is terminated without further
\nconsideration or discussion by the Parliament. By operation of Sections
\n4(2) and 4(3) of the Act the committee is enjoined to submit its report to
\nthe Speaker who is obligated to place it on the floor of both the houses of
\nParliament under Section 4(3). If the contention that the findings in the
\nreport are subject to judicial review, the consequence would be that the
\nfinding of “not guilty” is also equally liable to be questioned by any
\nmember of the Parliament that moved the motion. Until the report is upheld
\nor quashed the Speaker would take no further steps in both Houses of the
\nParliament. By necessary implication it excludes consideration by the
\nParliament. In other words judicial review would tantamount to stultify the
\npolitical process in the highest forum under the Constitution. On placing
\nthe report on the floor of each House of Parliament the motion would be
\nsubject to discussion, and resolution by majority in terms of Art. 124 (4)
\nwhich by necessary implication excludes judicial review of the said finding
\nand of the political process in the Parliament. The learned Judge is not
\nwithout remedy. Judicial review need not necessarily be by a Court of law.
\nArticle 124 (4) empowers the Parliament to review the report submitted by
\nthe Committee in terms of the law made under Art. 124 (5). The learned
\nJudge is entitled to be heard in the Parliament when the report is taken up
\nfor consideration. In support thereof he placed reliance on the instance of
\nMr. Justice Angelo Vasta of the Supreme Court of Queensland, Australia,
\nwherein Justice Vasta was given a notice and he was heard on the floor of
\nthe House before the Parliament discussed his conduct and recommended to
\nthe Governor for his removal.\n<\/p>\n
125. It is next contended that the ratio in SCJA’s case was only to oversee
\n“the process and progress” of the Committee’s proceedings before it sends
\nits report. The function of the Committee ends with its submitting the
\nreport to the Speaker finding with proved guilt or non-guilt. By
\nimplication thereafter the report is not subject to judicial review. The
\njudicial review after the order of removal passed by the President, in
\nterms of Article 124(4), does not appear to be immuned from judicial
\nreview, be it by a civil suit under S. 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
\n1908 which did not expressly or by necessary implication barred it or in a
\nproceeding under Art. 32 or Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is settled law
\nby this Court that it is not bound by the technicalities of prerogative
\nwrits. Exercise of power under Art. 226 or Art. 32 of the Constitution is
\nelastic to mete out justice. The nature of the remedy may be different, may
\nnot be reinstatement but may be damages. It is his further contention that
\nexpedition in disposal of the motion admitted by the Speaker is the
\nanimation from a reading of the relevant provisions prescribing 3 months
\ntime to send the report to the Speaker. Interference in that judicial
\nreview in the mid-stream is not called for. He also contends that being a
\ndocument of the. Parliament, the logical consequences would be to permit
\nthe highest forum namely the Parliament to discuss the proved misbehaviour
\nof the learned Judge and to allow the Parliament to take its decision per
\nmajority in terms of Article 124(4) of the Constitution. The judicial
\nreview by necessary implication must be eschewed at this stage by proper
\nand true interpretations of Article 124(4) and Article 124(5), the Act and
\nthe Rules, According to the learned counsel it is not sensitivity of the
\nlearned Judge, but larger public interest of the confidence in the
\nindependence of judiciary is paramount. Nonreview of the report till the
\norder of removal by the President is passed, would protect and subserve
\npublic interest. It would also avoid protraction and proliferation of
\ninsidious effects on the efficacy of judicial review in the interregnum.\n<\/p>\n
126. In support of his contention that the judicial review removal under
\nArt. 124(4) is impermissible, he placed reliance on the decision in Tun
\nDato Haji Mohanad Sallah Bin Abus v. Tam Sri Dato, 1983 LRC 25, of the
\nSupreme Court of Malasiya, wherein the Court held that a mandamus cannot be
\nissued restraining the Tribunal to investigate into the misbehaviour of the
\nJudge and to submit the report thereon since it is a constitutional
\nfunction which in effect amounts to restraining His Majesty from receiving
\nthe report.\n<\/p>\n
127. Regarding justiciability of the order of removal at the end stage he
\nplaced reliance on Powell v. McComack, (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 491, whereunder
\nremoval of Powell from the House by the. Senate was reviewed by the Supreme
\nCourt and held that the impeachment power was subject to judicial review.
\nHe also placed reliance on the Commentary thereon by Raul Berge on
\nImpeachment, Black on Impeachment of Prof. S. A. DeSmith’s Article in 16
\nModern Law Review 502; 1974 American Bar Association Journal 681; and Prof.
\nLawrence Tribe of Harward University, American Constitutional Law, 1988,
\n2nd Edn. Texas Law Review, Vol. 68 (1989) p. 97 Judicial Review of
\nImpeachment by Michael Gerhadt and Emanucts Constitutional Law 1991-92. He
\ndrew analogies from the provisions of the Constitution itself. The
\nimpeachment of the President under Art. 61; removal of the Vice-President
\nunder Art. 67(b), the Dy. Chairman of the Rajya Sabha under Art. 70(c),
\nremoval of the Speaker and Dy. Speaker of Lok Sabha under Art. 94(c) are
\nnot subject to judicial review, as they being purely of political process
\nwhile for removal of a Judge, Arts. 124(4) and 124(5) are an amalgam of
\npolitical and judicial process. The removal of the Chairman or Member of
\nthe Public Service Commission on a report by the Supreme Court under Art.
\n317 is not subject to judicial review under Art. 32, since the report is of
\nthe Supreme Court and not of a Committee of Judges.\n<\/p>\n
128. The learned Attorney General and Sri Sibal are unanimous in their
\nreply that the political process of removal of a Judge after the resolution
\nper majority, in tune with Art. 124 (4) of the Constitution, is not subject
\nto judicial review as the Parliament exercises judicial power but not
\nlegislative power. Its power of recording judicial finding whether or not
\nguilty was entrusted to the Committee and it is its judgment. It cannot be
\nprognosticated as to what procedure the Parliament would follow to
\ndiscussing the misbehaviour of the learned Judge. Therefore, the judicial
\nreview would trench into conflict of jurisdiction of two constitutional
\nwings of the State and the Court would exercise self restraint to disturb
\nthe finality of constitutional process of removing a Judge. This Court in
\nSCJA’s case held that the judicial review would be available to the Judge
\nonly before it is being placed on the floor of the House as a concomitant.
\nBut they relented to the position that judicial review would be available,
\nif the removal is not passed like by a majority of 2\/3rd members of the
\nParliament present and voting or discussion and voting was not in the same
\nsession or that even the proved facts and based thereon the finding of
\nguilt as accepted by the Parliament per se is not a misconduct in the eye
\nof law, etc. Sri Sibal distinguished Powel’s case on the ground that it was
\na disqualification to sit as a member of the House and not impeachment for
\nmisconduct and purely political process. He relied on Halsted L. Ritter v.
\nU. S., 84 C Cls. 293, referred to by Sri Nariman and certiorari was denied
\nin Ritter v. U.S., (1936) 300 US 663. This Court in SCJA’s case expressly
\nheld that from the stage of admitting the motion till submission of the
\nreport being statutory the Tribunal’s findings are reviewable by this Court
\nunder Art. 32 or 136 of the Constitution or Art. 226 in the High Court. The
\nadverse report, if found, would give cause of action to file writ petition.
\nIt is open to the learned Judge to show to the Court the illegalities
\ncommitted by the Committee and at the threshold they be corrected and the
\njudicial review after removal is not efficacious. The availability of the
\nremedy after removal does not preclude the Court to correct illegalities or
\nerrors at the earliest.\n<\/p>\n
129. Though the contentions are carved on wide canvass, I prefer to focus
\nthe problem within narrow confines. Whether, judicial review of a finding
\nof guilt recorded by the committee for removal of the Judge following the
\nresolution passed by both the House of Parliament on an address with
\nrequisite majority, amenable to judicial review and if so on what grounds,
\nat what stage and to what extent, would not arise on the present facts. The
\ncontroversy thereof traverses wider dimensions pregnant with far reaching
\nramifications. The need to traverse the entire gamut is obviated for the
\nreason that it is premature to go into the question at this stage and
\nsecondly when it trenches into conflict of jurisdictions of this court and
\nof the Parliament, it would be better to avoid an opinion at an inopportune
\nstage. The Parliament while making the Act in the language of this court in
\nSCJA’s case adopted ‘judicious blend” or an “admixture and amalgam” of
\npolitical and judicial process as held in Krishna Swami’s case, to remove a
\nJudge of the Constitutional court. The initiation of the process to remove
\na Judge was entrusted to the requisite members of either Rajya Sabha or Lok
\nSabha with stated grounds in the motion. The power was entrusted to the
\nSpeaker to admit or to refuse its admission and on its admission the duty
\nto constitute a High Judicial Committee composed of a sitting Judge of the
\nSupreme Court, one of the Chief Justices of the High Courts and a
\ndistinguished Jurist. In SCJA’s case this court held that all the Actions
\nof the Speaker under the Act are statutory one, outside the parliamentary
\nproceedings and are subject to judicial review.\n<\/p>\n
130. In my respectful view, the only question on the facts relevant for
\ndecision In this case is, whether the learned Judge is entitled to the
\nsupply of a copy of the report of the Committee to be submitted to Hon’ble
\nthe Speaker of Lok Sabha. If the contention of Sri Nariman is accepted that
\nthe moment the report was signed by the Committee it forms a Parliamentary
\ndocument is accepted, the logical result must end in an address by both the
\nHouses of Parliament; a resolution in that behalf passed in terms of Art.
\n124(4) and an order of removal would be passed by the President. Certainly,
\nthe consequence would be that the political process comes to a terminus and
\nthe order of removal of the Judge becomes final. Whether it is reviewable
\nby judicial process is yet another question. As soon as the report is
\nsigned by the Committee, as reported to have already been signed by the
\nCommittee, whether would automatically form part of the Parliamentary
\ndocument is the question. Whether the finding of exoneration of the learned
\nJudge by the Committee is also liable to be questioned as contended for by
\nSri Nariman? Let us first take the later question. To bring out that
\ncontention pointedly to focuss, it is necessary to consider the scope of S.
\n6 of the Act which reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
6. the of in and no or the Houses of Parliament shall not be proceeded
\nwith.\n<\/p>\n
(2) If the report of the Committee contains a finding that the Judge is
\nguilty of any misbehaviour or suffers from any Incapacity, then, the motion
\nreferred to in sub-sec. (1) of S. 3 shall, together with the report of the
\nCommittee, be taken up for consideration by the House or the Houses of
\nParliament in which it is pending.\n<\/p>\n
(3) If the motion is adopted by each House of Parliament in accordance with
\nthe provisions of clause (4) of Art. 124 or, as the case may be, in
\naccordance with that clause read with Art. 218 of the Constitution, then,
\nthe misbehaviour or incapacity of the Judge shall be deemed to have been
\nproved and an address praying for the removal of the Judge shall be
\npresented in the prescribed manner to the President by each House of
\nParliament in the same session in which the motion has been adopted.”\n<\/p>\n
The Act insisted that the political process of removal of a Judge must be
\nflavoured by a finding of guilt of proved misbehaviour or incapacity, a
\nfoundation for removal under Art. 124(4) by a high judicial authority as it
\nimpinges upon the reputation and forfeiture of office by an equally high
\nconstitutional functionary. Art. 124(5) empowers to make law of procedure
\nfor investigation into misbehaviour or incapacity of a Judge. Section 3(2)
\nauthorises the Speaker to constitute the Committee in terms thereof and,
\ntherefore, he ceases to have any hold over the committee. The Committee
\nthus is a high judicial body consistent with the status of the Judge. The
\ncontention of the Attorney General that the Committee is a delegate of the
\nSpeaker is ill conceived. By operation of S. 6(1), if the report of the
\nCommittee contains a finding that the Judge is not guilty of misbehaviour
\nor does not suffer from any incapacity, then no further steps should be
\ntaken in either House of the Parliament in relation to the report and there
\nis legislative mandamus that the motion pending in either the House of the
\nParliament shall not be proceeded with. In other words the motion stands
\nlapsed. The result also is envisaged in Rule 9(4). Rule 9 provides the
\nprocedure to submit the report. Sub-rule (4) of rule 9 provides thus:\n<\/p>\n
“(4) Where the majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee makes a
\nfinding to the effect that the Judge. is guilty of a misbehaviour or that
\nhe suffers from an incapacity, but the third member thereof makes a finding
\nto the contrary, the presiding officer of the Inquiry Committee shall
\nauthenticate, in the manner specified in sub-rule (2), the finding made by
\nsuch third member,. in duplicate and shall forward the same along with the
\nreport submitted by him under S. 4.\n<\/p>\n
Sub-rule (6) of rule 9 reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
“(6) Where the majority of the members of the Inquiry Committee makes a
\nfinding to the effect that the Judge is not guilty of any misbehaviour or
\nthat he does not suffer from any incapacity, and the third member thereof
\nmakes a finding to the contrary, the Inquiry Committee shall not disclose
\nthe finding made by such third member to Parliament or to any other
\nauthority, body or person.”\n<\/p>\n
A conjoint reading of S. 6(1), rule 9(4) read with rule 9(6) would
\nestablish the legislative animation that where the report contains a
\nfinding of guilt of misbehaviour or that the Judge suffers from an
\nincapacity, unanimously or per majority view, then the Presiding Officer
\n(sitting Judge of this Court) of the Inquiry Committee shall authenticate,
\nin the manner prescribed in sub-rule (2) the finding made by the third
\nmember of not guilty, in duplicate, should be forwarded to the Speaker\/
\nChairman along with the report submitted by him under S. 4. At the
\ndiscussion by the Parliament, the favourable finding of ‘not guilty’ may be
\ntaken into account by the Parliament or even the finding of guilt may be
\nopen to discussion with the aid of the evidence placed on its floor and the
\nParliament may or may not agree with the majority view in which case there
\nshall be deemed proof or disproof of misbehaviour or incapacity in the
\nlight of majority resolution, though no express finding was recorded in
\nthat behalf On the other hand, if the majority members make a finding that
\nthe Judge is not guilty of any misbehaviour or he does not suffer from any
\nincapacity, but the third member records a finding to the contrary, the
\nCommittee shall not disclose that finding of the third member to the
\nParliament or to any other authority, body or person. In other words there
\nis a statutory prohibition or mandatory injunction to the committee to
\ndisclose the minority view to the public. Thus it is clear that the finding
\nof “not guilty”, in other words, “exoneration” from the alleged
\nmisbehaviour or incapacity by majority of the members was, treated to be
\nconclusive and should be kept secret and by necessary implication it
\nexclude judicial review. The reason is obvious that the finding of a high
\njudicial body, a final arbiter, must be respected; should receive finality
\nand should not be tinkered with. Equally disclosure of even the minority
\nview would effect not only the reputation of the Judge but also ward off
\ncollateral attack from any quarter nor liable to be questioned by any third
\nparty. It is held in Krishna Swami’s case that neither the members of the
\nParliament, nor anybody have locus or right to participate and lead
\nevidence against the Judge at the investigation done by the Committee. As a
\nnecessary corollary no one is entitled to impugn the correctness of the
\nfindings of ‘not guilty’ recorded by the Committee, absolving the Judge
\nfrom the charge. Therefore, the legislature itself made a distinction
\nbetween the consequences that would flow from recording a finding of guilty
\nor exoneration and. the former is subject to political process, together
\nwith the contra finding of third member but in the latter case it is
\nconclusive. As held in SCJA’s case, no further steps based thereon should
\nbe taken up for consideration. In other words, it is immune from attack
\nfrom any quarter whatsoever, when even the Parliament itself was prohibited
\nto go into that question. It must thus be held that the first contention of
\nSri Nariman is not tenable and accordingly it is negatived.\n<\/p>\n
131. The next question is as to when the report of unanimous or per
\nmajority finding of ‘proved misbehaviour or in capacity’ would form part of
\nParliamentary document. Under sub-sec. (2) of S. 4, ‘at the conclusion of
\nthe investigation, the Committee shall send the report to the Speaker, as
\nthe case may be, to the Chairman or where the Committee has been
\nconstituted jointly by the Speaker and the Chairman, to both of them
\nstating therein its findings on each of the charges with such of the
\nreasons on the whole case as it deemsfit’. Under sub-sec. (3) thereof the
\nSpeaker or the Chairman or both when the committee was constituted jointly
\nby them, ‘shall cause the report to be laid, as soon as may be, before the
\nHouse of People and Council of State’. Under Rule 9(3), a copy of the
\nreport of the Inquiry Committee, authenticated in the manner specified in
\nsub-rule (2), ‘shall be laid before each House of Parliament’. Under sub-
\nrule (6) of rule 9 when one member recorded a finding of not guilty of
\nmisbehaviour or does not suffer from any incapacity, the said report of the
\nthird member, as authenticated by the Presiding Officer, shall also be laid
\nbefore each House of Parliament along with the evidence as per Rule 9(5).\n<\/p>\n
132. In SCJA’s case interpreting Ss. 3, 4 and 6 of the Act, the majority,
\nin the context of the doctrine of lapse, held that the entire stage up to
\nproof of misbehaviour or incapacity began with the initiation of
\ninvestigation on the allegation being made is governed by the law enacted
\nunder Article 124(5). The stage of an address by each House of the
\nParliament commences only when the alleged misbehaviour or incapacity is
\nproved in accordance with the law enacted under Clause 5 . The House does
\nnot come into picture at the stage of admitting the motion, constituting
\nthe committee and the investigation into the alleged misbehaviour or
\nincapacity.\n<\/p>\n
133. Therefore, the Speaker on receipt of the report submitted by the
\ncommittee under S. 4(2) or, as the case may be, the Chairman or both of
\nthem, by operation of sub-section (3) thereof should cause the report laid
\nbefore each House of Parliament. The manner of preparation of the record is
\ncontrolled and regulated by Rule 16.. It postulates that, when the
\ncommittee unanimously or per majority thereof, finds that the Judge is
\nguilty of any -misbehaviour or suffers from an incapacity, the Secretary of
\nthe Lok Sabha or Rajya Sabha, as the case may be, shall prepare the address
\nin form II, copy of the motion shall be annexed to the address. They shall
\nfix the date for consideration by each House and address may be supported
\nby majority members in terms of Art. 124(4). Thus it is clear that the
\nmoment the report was signed by the committee, it did not, ipso facto,
\nbecame the document of the Parliament but when the Speaker\/ Chairman or
\nboth, as the case may be, caused the report laid on the floor of each House
\nof Parliament together with the evidence and the motion in the manner
\nprescribed in Rule 16, it becomes the document of the Parliament. Until
\nthen the Speaker\/ Chairman holds the document in his statutory capacity
\nunder the Act. The anchor of Sri Nariman lost its hook.\n<\/p>\n
134. The question then is whether the committee is a tribunal? In Indo-
\nChina Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Jasjit Singh, Addl. Collector of Custom,<\/a>
\n(1964) 6 SCR 594  the facts were that under the Customs Act on proceedings
\nhaving been taken and confiscated the goods, an appeal was laid before the
\nCentral Board of Revenue which was rejected. A revision to the Central
\nGovt. also met with the same fate. When their correctness was questioned in
\nthis court under Art. 136, a preliminary objection was raised that the
\nBoard and the Government are not a tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136
\nand that, therefore, the order passed by the authorities under the Act was
\nnot subject to judicial review. While repelling the contention the
\nConstitution Bench held at pages 603 and 604 thus:\n<\/p>\n
“It is difficult to lay down any definite or precise test for determining
\nthe character of a body which is called upon to adjudicate upon matters
\nbrought before it. Sometimes in deciding such a question, courts enquire
\nwhether the body or authority whose status or character is the subject
\nmatter of the enquiry is clothed with the trappings of a court. Can it
\ncompel witnesses to appear before it and administer oath to them, is it
\nrequired to follow certain rules of procedure, is it bound to comply with
\nthe rules of natural justice, is it expected to deal with the matters
\nbefore it fairly, justly and on the merits and not be guided by subjective
\nconsiderations; in other words, is the approach which it is quasi-judicial
\napproach? If all or some of the important tests in that behalf are
\nsatisfied, the proceedings can be characterised as judicial proceedings and
\nthe test of trappings may be said to be satisfied. But apart from the test
\nof trappings, another test of importance is whether the body or authority
\nhad been constituted by the State and the State had conferred on it its
\ninherent judicial power. If it appears that such a body or authority has
\nbeen constituted by the legislature and on it has been conferred the
\nState’s inherent judicial power, that would be a significant, if not a
\ndecisive, indication that the said body or authority is a Tribunal.”\n<\/p>\n
135. Accordingly it was held that the Central Board of Revenue and the
\nCentral Govt. are Tribunals for the purpose of Art. 136. In The Bharat Bank
\nLtd., Delhi v. Employees of the Bharat Bank Ltd., Delhi,<\/a> 1950 SCR 459  when
\nsimilar objection was taken of Industrial Tribunal another Constitution
\nBench held that the main function of the Industrial Tribunal is to
\nadjudicate on industrial disputes which implies that there must be two or
\nmore parties before it with conflicting cases and that it has also to
\narrive at a conclusion as to how the dispute is ended. Prima facie,
\ntherefore, a Tribunal like this cannot be excluded from the scope of Art.\n<\/p>\n
136. It was also further held that though the award proprio vigore is not
\nenforceable, its life kindles into being, on acceptance by the government
\nconcerned and a notification was issued by the government in the manner
\nPrescribed by law. It by itself is not a determinative factor to keep the
\naward outside the purview of Art. 136 of the Constitution. In Associated
\nCement Co. Ltd. v. P N. Sharma,<\/a> (1965) 2 SCR 366 , the question was whether
\nthe order passed by the government with the concurrence of the Labour
\nCommissioner under the Punjab Welfare Officer Recruitment and Conditions of
\nService Rules, 1952 is a Tribunal within the meaning of Art. 136. This
\nCourt at pages 386 & 387 held thus:-\n<\/p>\n
“The presence of all or some of the trappings of a court is really not
\ndecisive. The presence of some of the trappings may assist the
\ndetermination of the question as to whether the power exercised by the
\nauthority which possesses the said trappings is the judicial power of the
\nState or not. The main and the basic test, however, is whether the
\nadjudicating power which a particular authority is empowered to exercise
\nhas been conferred on it by a statute and can be described as a part of the
\nState’s inherent power exercised in discharging its judicial function.
\nApplying this test, there can be no doubt that the power which the State
\nGovt. exercises under R. 6(5) and R. 6(6) is a part of the State’s judicial
\npower. It has been conferred on the State Government by a statutory Rule
\nand it can be exercised in respect of disputes between the management and
\nits Welfare Officers. There is, in that sense, a lis; there is affirmation
\nby one party and denial by another, and the dispute necessarily involves
\nthe rights and obligations of the parties to it.”\n<\/p>\n
The same is the ratio in Durga Shankar Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh<\/a>
\n(1955) 1 SCR 267  and Dev Singh v. Registrar, Punjab and Haryana High
\nCourt,<\/a> (1987) 2 SCR 1005  and the latter a little digressed on facts.\n<\/p>\n
136. It is, therefore, settled law that all the trappings of the court need
\nnot necessarily be present in a particular case to bring the authority as a
\nTribunal but the essential postulate must be that it must be the creature
\nof the statute and the State should delegate its inherent power of judicial
\nreview to the Tribunal; all or some of the trappings of a court may or may
\nnot be present in a given case. The Tribunal should adjudicate the dispute
\nbetween the parties before it, after giving reasonable opportunity to the
\nparties, consistent with the principles of fair play. and natural justice.
\nIt is not necessary that proprio vigore it is enforceable. The mere fact
\nthat it is subject to further orders does not take away the effect of the
\ndecision or findings recorded thereunder.\n<\/p>\n
137. The committee is not a recommendatory body. It is high judicial
\nauthority derived its power from Art. 124(5) of the Constitution read with
\nS. 3(2) of the Act. On framing definite charges and service on him, it
\ngives reasonable time to the learned Judge to file his defence. The
\nCommittee under Rule 8 is empowered to conduct ex parte enquiry, in the
\nabsence of the Judge when he did not appear or had chosen to remain absent.
\nThe Judge also has been given right under Rule 11 to consult his counsel
\nand the right to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. During
\ninvestigation the Committee was empowered by S. 5 of the Act ‘powers of a
\ncivil court while trying the civil suit’ under Code of Civil Procedure,
\n1908 in respect of enumerated matters, namely, ‘to summon, and enforce the
\nattendance of the witnesses and their examination, power of discovery and
\ninspection or to direct them, production of documents, to receive evidence
\non oath, to issue commission for examination of the witnesses or the
\ndocuments and such other prescribed matters’. Under S. 4(1) the Committee
\nshall give reasonable opportunity to the Judge and the Advocate appointed
\nunder S. 3(9) to examine witnesses, right to examine, adjudication of
\nevidence in proof or disproof of the charges and right to be heard in
\ndefence. Under Rule 10(1) the evidence should be recorded as per provision
\nof the Code of Civil Procedure. The right to examine and cross-examine
\nwitnesses is a valuable right akin to a trial of dispute between two
\ncontending parties and their right to address the Committee on the evidence
\nadduced is in proof or disproof of the charges to adjudge the issue in a
\njudicious manner. The Committee thus has been empowered to adjudicate on
\nthe proof or disproof of the charges in accordance with the evidence
\nlegally adduced after hearing the Judge and the Advocate. The Committee has
\nno other function except to adjudicate upon the dispute of “the proved
\nguilt or not guilty”. By operation of Rule 6 the Committee, on
\nconsideration of the evidence and applying the standard of ‘proof beyond
\nreasonable doubt’, make a finding that the misbehaviour or incapacity has
\nbeen proved or disproved. The finding of guilt alone is subject to
\npolitical process. Thus the Inquiry Committee is a high judicial body or
\nauthority.\n<\/p>\n
138. The problem could be broached from a different perspective. In
\nsubstance the investigation and proof of misbehaviour or incapacity of a
\nJudge under Art. 124(5) read with the Act and the Rules; the address by
\neach House of Parliament supported by the requisite majority and removal of
\na Judge by the President is akin to a disciplinary measure to resuscitate
\nand infuse needed judicial conduct and fervidity by assertion of the
\nsupremacy of law that the Judge too will be subject to law. The Judge
\noccupies a constitutional office. Art. 124(5) devised an amalgam of
\njudicial and political process to remove an erring Judge or Judge suffering
\nfrom incapacity. The report submitted by the Committee to the Speaker with
\nthe finding that the alleged misbehaviour is proved and the Judge is found
\nguilty of the proved misbehaviour, constitutes fresh material This Court in
\nUnion of India v. H. C. Goel,<\/a> (1964) 4 SCR 718<\/p>\n
“The enquiry report along with the evidence recorded constitute the
\nmaterial on which the government has ultimately to act. That is the only
\npurpose of the enquiry held by the competent officer and the report which
\nhe makes as a result of the said enquiry”.\n<\/p>\n
(Emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
“It is true that the order of dismissal which may be passed against a
\ngovernment servant found guilty of misconduct, can be described as an
\nadministrative order; nevertheless. the proceedings held against such a
\npublic servant under the statutory rules to determine whether he is guilty
\nof the charge framed against him are in the nature of quasi-judicial
\nProceedings and there can be little doubt that a writ of certiorari, for
\ninstance, can be claimed by a public servant if he is able to satisfy the
\nHigh Court that the ultimate conclusion of the government in the said
\nproceedings which is the basis of his dismissal is based on no evidence.\n<\/p>\n
139. In Union of India v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan,<\/a> (1991) 1 SCC 588 ), a bench of
\nthree Judges held (of course it is subject to the decision by the
\nConstitution Bench, pending reference) that the disciplinary authority very
\noften influenced by the conclusion of the enquiry officer and even by the
\nrecommendations relating to the nature of the punishment to be inflicted.
\nWith the 42nd amendment the delinquent officer is associated with the
\ndisciplinary enquiry not beyond the recording of evidence and submissions
\nmade on the basis of the matter to assist the enquiry officer has to come
\nto his. conclusion. In case his conclusions are kept away beyond the
\nenquiry with or without recommendation as to punishment, the delinquent is
\nprecluded from knowing the contents thereof although such material is used
\nagainst him by the disciplinary authority. The report is an adverse
\nmaterial if the Inquiry Officer records a finding of guilt and proposes a
\npunishment so far as the delinquent is concerned. In a quasi-judicial
\nmatter, if the delinquent is being deprived of knowledge of the material
\nagainst him, though the same was made available to the punishing authority
\nin the matter of reaching its conclusion, it is violative of the rules of
\nnatural justice. This court further approved the ratio in Mazharul Islam
\nHashmi v. State of U.P.,<\/a> (1979) 4 SCC 537  that the other person must know
\nwhat he has to meet and he must have an opportunity of meeting that case.
\nThe Legislature, however, can exclude operation of these principles
\nexpressly or impliedly but in the absence of any such exclusion, principles
\nof natural justice will have to be followed. The finding of guilt of
\nmisbehaviour or incapacity, with which the Judge is suffering from, would
\nvisit with civil consequences of loss of reputation in the society apart
\nfrom forfeiture of office. In Mohinder Singh Gill v. The Chief Election
\nCommr. New Delhi,<\/a> (1978) 2 SCR 272  it was held that a person effected by
\nthe civil consequences is entitled to the Report. It is now settled law
\nthat the principles of natural justice are an integral part of
\nconstitutional scheme of just and fair procedure envisaged under Art. 14 of
\nthe Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
140. The above discussion leads to conclude that if the committee makes a
\nunanimous or per majority, finding that the learned Judge is, ‘not guilty’
\nof misbehaviour, the finding receives quiteous and is conclusive. The
\npolitical process pursuant to pending motion should not be proceeded with
\nand should stand lapsed. The minority finding of ‘guilt’ should remain
\nsecret and none be entitled to either access to the report of exoneration
\nor to assail the correctness of the finding of not guilty recorded by the
\ncommittee. The need to supply the report is obviated. On the other hand if
\nthe committee either unanimously or per majority makes a finding of ‘guilt
\nof the proved misbehaviour’ only that part should be laid on the floor of
\neach House of the Parliament in terms of the Act and the Rules along with
\nthe minority views of ‘not guilty’ and the political process for removal of
\nthe Judge would start. That report is adverse to the learned Judge. The
\nconstitutional scheme laid emphasis on expedition of the consideration of
\nthe pending motion and, it should doubtless be done for, its dilation would
\ngenerate deleterious effects on public confidence in the efficacy of
\nadministration of justice. Every right carries with it the corollary remedy
\nto redress the injury. Indisputably and as a fact in fairness, Sri Nariman,
\nalso accepted that the learned Judge is entitled to judicial review. The
\narena of controversy is whether, before the Parliament had taken up the
\nmotion for consideration or after the President passed an order of removal
\nunder Art. 124(4). As prefaced before the start of discussion that stage
\nwould set only if and when the learned Judge has chosen to seek judicial
\nreview. That would arise only when he has been supplied with a copy of the
\nreport. Without knowing what the contents of the report are; the reasoning
\nin support of the findings of proved misbehaviour or other illegalities in
\nthe process of adjudication, can a party be foreclosed of legal remedy? In
\nsuch a case is it not a non-issue? Without supply of the material, the
\nfoundation of legal injury, can he adequately and effectively plead, prove
\nand disabuse the incorrectness of the finding. etc.? May be the learned
\nJudge opt to avail the remedy on the floor of the House of Parliament. Does
\nnon-supply of the report not trench into offending the principles of
\nnatural justice? Is it not anathema to judicial process? The secrecy of the
\nreport of minority member’s finding of ‘guilt’ is to protect the Judge but
\nwhen the finding of guilt when adversely affects the Judge, can it be
\ndenied on the plea of secrecy? May be the counsel may canvass any
\ncontention on a non-issue. Is the court bound to answer all the contentions
\nraised? In the circumstances, I am of the humble view that the learned
\nJudge is entitled to the supply of a copy of the report and the committee
\nbeing a high statutory one, the court can, keeping the status of the
\ncommittee in view, make a request to supply the copy of the report to the
\nlearned Judge.\n<\/p>\n
141. The necessary conclusion, therefore, is that the learned Judge is
\nentitled to the supply of a copy of the report of the committee. Its
\nconcomitant would be that the learned Judge needs time to reflect upon to
\ntaking a decision and action thereon. Though the Speaker was sought to be
\nimpleaded as a respondent to the writ petition, later on he was deleted.
\nTherefore the question of direction to Hon’ble the Speaker with a request
\nnot to lay the report on the floor of each House of Parliament does not
\narise. Necessarily, the committee is to be requested to withhold submission
\nof its report for a reasonable time.\n<\/p>\n
142. Accordingly, I allow the writ petition and direct the Registrar
\nGeneral to communicate a letter of request to Sri Justice P. B. Sawant
\nCommittee to supply a copy of the report to Hon’ble Sri Justice V.
\nRamaswami and to convey further request to withhold submission of its
\nreport for a reasonable time from the date of the receipt of the letter of
\nrequest from the Registry. The Attorney General is also requested to
\napprise the Hon’ble Speaker of the Lok Sabha of the order passed in this
\nbehalf and if necessary to extend the needed time to enable the committee
\nto submit its report within that extended time. The writ petition is
\naccordingly ordered but in the circumstances without cost.\n<\/p>\n
ORDER<\/p>\n
The Writ Petition is disposed of in terms of, and in accordance with the
\nmajority opinion.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992 Author: B Verma Bench: J.S. Verma, N.M. Kasliwal, K. Ramaswamy, K.J. Reddy, S.C. Agrawal CASE NO.: Writ Petition (civil) 514 of 1992 PETITIONER: SAROJINI RAMASWAMI RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27\/08\/1992 BENCH: J.S. VERMA & […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-152163","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nSarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1992-08-26T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-02-11T02:45:20+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"188 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992\",\"datePublished\":\"1992-08-26T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-02-11T02:45:20+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992\"},\"wordCount\":37672,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992\",\"name\":\"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1992-08-26T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-02-11T02:45:20+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1992-08-26T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-02-11T02:45:20+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"188 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992","datePublished":"1992-08-26T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-02-11T02:45:20+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992"},"wordCount":37672,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992","name":"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1992-08-26T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-02-11T02:45:20+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sarojini-ramaswami-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-27-august-1992#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Sarojini Ramaswami vs Union Of India & Ors on 27 August, 1992"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/152163","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=152163"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/152163\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=152163"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=152163"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=152163"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}