{"id":154477,"date":"2009-07-02T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2009-07-01T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009"},"modified":"2017-05-12T21:26:11","modified_gmt":"2017-05-12T15:56:11","slug":"laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009","title":{"rendered":"Laila vs Muhammedali on 2 July, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"
Kerala High Court<\/div>\n
Laila vs Muhammedali on 2 July, 2009<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n  IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM\n\nMat.Appeal.No. 103 of 2003(F)\n\n\n1. LAILA, D\/O.KAVATHANVEETTIL HAMZA HAJI,\n                      ...  Petitioner\n2. FATHIMATH SHABEEBA,\n\n                        Vs\n\n\n\n1. MUHAMMEDALI, S\/O.VAKKAYIL MODUNNI,\n                       ...       Respondent\n\n                For Petitioner  :SRI.T.KRISHNAN UNNI (SR.)\n\n                For Respondent  :SRI.ESM.KABEER\n\nThe Hon'ble MR. Justice R.BASANT\nThe Hon'ble MRS. Justice M.C.HARI RANI\n\n Dated :02\/07\/2009\n\n O R D E R\n                                                           \"CR\"\n\n              R.BASANT & M.C.HARI RANI, JJ.\n              --------------------------------------------------\n                   Mat.Appeal No.103 OF 2003\n          -----------------------------------------------------\n           DATED THIS THE 2nd DAY OF JULY, 2009\n\n                         J U D G M E N T\n<\/pre>\n
Basant, J.\n<\/p>\n
           (1)   Does      the    prayer      for   declaration   of<\/p>\n
                 illegitimacy of a child born during the<\/p>\n
                 subsistence of a valid marriage fall within the<\/p>\n
                 sweep of explanation (e) to Section 7(1) of<\/p>\n
                 the Family Courts Act?\n<\/p>\n
           (2)   Is the presumption of legitimacy under<\/p>\n
                 Section 112 of the Evidence Act available in<\/p>\n
                 favour of a child born within 209 days of the<\/p>\n
                 date on which access commenced between<\/p>\n
                 the spouses?\n<\/p>\n
These are the crucial questions that arise for consideration<\/p>\n
in this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     2.    The appellants are a divorced wife and her minor<\/p>\n
daughter.     The marriage of the first appellant with the<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -2-<\/span><\/p>\n
respondent took place on 24.6.1985. The child in question<\/p>\n
(the 2nd appellant) was admittedly born on 13.7.1994. The<\/p>\n
marital tie was dissolved on 17.8.1995.\n<\/p>\n
      3.   Long later, the respondent-husband alleged that<\/p>\n
he came to know that his name has been entered in the<\/p>\n
records of the Local Authority as the father of the child. He<\/p>\n
called upon the Local Authority by Exhibit A4 lawyer notice<\/p>\n
dated 20.2.2001 to reverse the entry regarding paternity in<\/p>\n
the records. He received Exhibit A5 reply dated 24.3.2001<\/p>\n
that it was not possible to do so. According to him, he then<\/p>\n
had a cause of action and he came to the court for a<\/p>\n
declaration that the child\/second appellant herein is not a<\/p>\n
legitimate child born to him in his relationship with the first<\/p>\n
appellant herein.\n<\/p>\n
      4.   The foundation of the claim for declaration is that<\/p>\n
the husband was working abroad and had come back to<\/p>\n
India only on 17.12.1993. 17.12.1993 is the earliest date on<\/p>\n
which possible access was there between the spouses for<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -3-<\/span><\/p>\n
such pregnancy. The date of birth of the child is 13.7.1994.<\/p>\n
There was only a gap of 209 days. From this, he concluded<\/p>\n
that the child born during the subsistence of the matrimony<\/p>\n
is not at all begotten to him in the marital tie. Hence, he<\/p>\n
prayed for a declaration that the child is not his legitimate<\/p>\n
child.\n<\/p>\n
     5.    The application was resisted on various grounds.<\/p>\n
It was contended that the husband has more than one<\/p>\n
passport and it is not correct to say that he was in India only<\/p>\n
on 17.12.1993 and thereafter. He was in India earlier. In<\/p>\n
these circumstances, it was contended that access was<\/p>\n
there even prior to 17.12.1993. It was further contended<\/p>\n
that at any rate the presumption under Section 112 of the<\/p>\n
Evidence Act applies and continues to remain in force.<\/p>\n
Legitimacy of the child born in such relationship must be<\/p>\n
conclusively presumed under Section 4 of the Evidence Act,<\/p>\n
it was contended.\n<\/p>\n
     6.    Parties went to trial on all these contentions. On<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -4-<\/span><\/p>\n
the side of the respondent\/petitioner, a Doctor, who<\/p>\n
attended on the first appellant for the delivery was<\/p>\n
examined as PW1. The respondent herein examined himself<\/p>\n
as PW2. The first appellant examined herself as RW1. While<\/p>\n
Exhibits A1 to A8 were marked on the side of the<\/p>\n
respondent, through PW1 Doctor, Exhibit X1 case sheet was<\/p>\n
also marked. Before the court below, there was a prayer<\/p>\n
that the parties may be permitted to undergo a DNA finger<\/p>\n
printing test. That prayer of the respondent herein was not<\/p>\n
allowed, in view of the opposition of the first appellant.<\/p>\n
     7.    The court below on an anxious consideration of<\/p>\n
the relevant inputs came to the conclusion that the child<\/p>\n
could not have been begotten on or after 13.12.1993 and<\/p>\n
consequently, it was held that the presumption under<\/p>\n
Section 112 of the Evidence Act will not be available in<\/p>\n
favour of the appellants. Accordingly, the court proceeded<\/p>\n
to pass the impugned order.\n<\/p>\n
     8.    Before us, the learned counsel for the appellants<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -5-<\/span><\/p>\n
and the respondent have advanced their arguments. The<\/p>\n
learned counsel for the appellants assails the impugned<\/p>\n
order on the following three grounds.\n<\/p>\n
          (1). The court below must have held that the<\/p>\n
     petition filed by the respondent is barred by<\/p>\n
     limitation under Article 58 of the Indian Limitation<\/p>\n
     Act.\n<\/p>\n
          (2) The court below ought to have held that<\/p>\n
     declaration of illegitimacy cannot be claimed or<\/p>\n
     granted under explanation (e) to Section 7(1) of<\/p>\n
     the Family Courts Act.\n<\/p>\n
          (3) At any rate the court below erred grossly<\/p>\n
     in coming to the conclusion that the presumption<\/p>\n
     under Section 112 of the Evidence Act does not<\/p>\n
     apply and the same stands rebutted from the<\/p>\n
     simple fact that there was only a period of 209<\/p>\n
     days between 17.12.1993, the date from which<\/p>\n
     alone access could have been there and the date<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03       -6-<\/span><\/p>\n
     of birth of the child, i.e., 13.7.1994.\n<\/p>\n
      8.   We shall now proceed to the three grounds raised.<\/p>\n
      9.   Ground No.1:           The learned counsel for the<\/p>\n
appellant contends that under Article 58 of the Limitation<\/p>\n
Act, to obtain any declaration, not specified earlier, three<\/p>\n
years is the period of limitation and such period of limitation<\/p>\n
starts when the right to sue first accrues.        The counsel<\/p>\n
contends that if the appellant had any misgivings about the<\/p>\n
legitimacy of the child, the same must have been in<\/p>\n
existence on the date of birth of the child, i.e., 13.7.1994 or<\/p>\n
at least on the date of divorce, i.e., 17.8.1995. The right to<\/p>\n
sue must then be held to have accrued first at least on<\/p>\n
17.8.1995.      The proceedings have been initiated only in<\/p>\n
2002 and in these circumstances, the prayer is barred by<\/p>\n
limitation, it is contended.\n<\/p>\n
      10. The learned counsel for the respondent points out<\/p>\n
that this is not a plea which was raised before the court<\/p>\n
below or even before this Court in appeal. The counsel does<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -7-<\/span><\/p>\n
not dispute the proposition that plea of limitation can be<\/p>\n
raised even when pleadings are not there specifically. There<\/p>\n
can be no dispute on that proposition of law also. If the<\/p>\n
facts duly proved or admitted, clearly show that the claim is<\/p>\n
barred by limitation, notwithstanding the fact that the plea<\/p>\n
had not earlier been raised, the court at any stage is entitled<\/p>\n
to consider that plea. But, we find merit and accept the<\/p>\n
contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that<\/p>\n
the clock of limitation can start ticking only when the right to<\/p>\n
sue first accrues. The question as to the date on which the<\/p>\n
right to sue accrues is a question of fact. The relevant facts<\/p>\n
have to be pleaded.          Adversary must be given an<\/p>\n
opportunity to know, understand and meet the plea of<\/p>\n
limitation founded on a fact. Such a fact has to be pleaded.<\/p>\n
In this case, the right to sue first accrued not on the date<\/p>\n
when divorce was effected, but only on the date when the<\/p>\n
respondent received Exhibit A5 reply        dated 24.3.2001(in<\/p>\n
reply to Exhibit A4 notice dated 20.2.2001) refusing to<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -8-<\/span><\/p>\n
reverse a relevant entry in the birth register showing him as<\/p>\n
the father of the child. Till then there was no dispute on that<\/p>\n
aspect.    In this context, the counsel for the respondent<\/p>\n
brings to the notice of the court Exhibit A2 agreement<\/p>\n
executed between the parties on 16.8.2000, the recitals in<\/p>\n
which clearly suggest that no dispute was raised even at<\/p>\n
that point of time about the respondent’s responsibility for<\/p>\n
the second child born on 13.7.1994.          According to the<\/p>\n
respondent’s counsel, the first appellant had accepted that<\/p>\n
the respondent was not the father of the child.<\/p>\n
     11. We need only mention that the plea of limitation<\/p>\n
now raised, founded on a specific fact was not pleaded and<\/p>\n
the respondent did not have opportunity to join issue with<\/p>\n
the appellants on that aspect and adduce evidence. That<\/p>\n
being so, we are satisfied that the plea of limitation raised<\/p>\n
now cannot be accepted.        The challenge on Ground No.1<\/p>\n
hence fails.\n<\/p>\n
     12. Ground No.2:           The counsel for the appellants<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -9-<\/span><\/p>\n
contends that proceedings for declaration as to legitimacy of<\/p>\n
any person alone can be taken cognizance of under<\/p>\n
explanation (e) to Section 7(1). According to the learned<\/p>\n
counsel for the appellants, in the instant case, what is<\/p>\n
sought to be declared is not the legitimacy of the 2nd<\/p>\n
appellant, but her illegitimacy. The counsel contends that<\/p>\n
explanation (e) to Section 7(1) has to be construed strictly<\/p>\n
and the same cannot take in any proceedings for declaration<\/p>\n
of illegitimacy of any person. Hence, the very proceedings is<\/p>\n
not maintainable before the Family Court, contends the<\/p>\n
learned counsel for the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
      13. The learned counsel for the respondent on the<\/p>\n
contrary contends that the expression “declaration as to the<\/p>\n
legitimacy of any person” must necessarily include a<\/p>\n
declaration as to illegitimacy of such person also.         In<\/p>\n
proceedings for declaration of legitimacy, the question<\/p>\n
whether the person is legitimate or illegitimate will certainly<\/p>\n
have to be considered and it would be idle to contend that<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -10-<\/span><\/p>\n
the parties will have to approach the ordinary civil court and<\/p>\n
not the Family Court for a declaration of illegitimacy while a<\/p>\n
declaration of legitimacy can be granted by the Family<\/p>\n
Court. This contention does not stand to reason or logic,<\/p>\n
contends the learned counsel for the respondent.<\/p>\n
     14. The learned counsel for the appellants points out<\/p>\n
that it is now trite law that the declaration of illegitimacy<\/p>\n
cannot be granted by a Family Court under Section 7(1)(e).<\/p>\n
The counsel relied on two binding precedents in support of<\/p>\n
this contention. He, first of all contends that the Hon’ble<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Renubala Moharana and another v.<\/p>\n
Mina Mohanty and others (2004(4) SCC 215) in<\/p>\n
paragraph        6     had      made         the     following<\/p>\n
observations\/conclusions and that must show that a<\/p>\n
proceedings     for  declaration   of  illegitimacy   is   not<\/p>\n
maintainable under Section 7(1)(e).\n<\/p>\n
           “6. The view taken by the High Court as<\/p>\n
     regards the first prayer has been assailed before<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -11-<\/span><\/p>\n
     us. Under Section 7(1) read with clause (e) of<\/p>\n
     the Explanation, a suit or proceeding for a<\/p>\n
     declaration “as to the legitimacy of any person”<\/p>\n
     is within the jurisdiction of the Family Court.<\/p>\n
     According to the appellants, the child was born<\/p>\n
     on account of extramarital relationship of<\/p>\n
     Respondent 1 with their son, the late Samuel<\/p>\n
     Maharana. Accepting the case of the appellants,<\/p>\n
     the child cannot obviously be treated as a<\/p>\n
     legitimate child of Samuel and Mina Mohanty (R-<\/p>\n
     1). The question of status of the child in relation<\/p>\n
     to the parties to the petition can be incidentally<\/p>\n
     gone into by the Family Court if necessary while<\/p>\n
     deciding the guardianship petition. That liberty<\/p>\n
     has been granted to the Family Court. However,<\/p>\n
     as rightly held by the Family Court and the High<\/p>\n
     Court, the declaratory relief as regards the<\/p>\n
     illegitimacy of the child cannot be granted. In<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -12-<\/span><\/p>\n
      effect, that is what the appellants want under<\/p>\n
      prayer(a).”               (emphasis supplied).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The learned counsel for the appellant further relies on the<\/p>\n
decision in Bharat Kumar v.Selma Mini (2007(1)KLT<\/p>\n
945) in which the dictum in Renubala is followed by a<\/p>\n
Division Bench of this Court.\n<\/p>\n
      15. The learned counsel for the respondent submits<\/p>\n
that it would be myopic to understand the decision in<\/p>\n
Renubala as laying down the rigid proposition of law that<\/p>\n
dispute regarding illegitimacy or otherwise of a child born<\/p>\n
during the currency of a valid matrimony cannot be the<\/p>\n
subject matter of a proceedings between the spouses under<\/p>\n
explanation (e) to Section 7(1). The learned counsel for the<\/p>\n
respondent points out that the decision in that case is valid<\/p>\n
only for the proposition that declaration as to legitimacy or<\/p>\n
illegitimacy of any person without any claim for marital<\/p>\n
relationship is not entertainable by the Family Court, as such<\/p>\n
a child born outside matrimony can never be legitimate. The<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -13-<\/span><\/p>\n
learned counsel contends that the facts in Renubala’s case<\/p>\n
have to be alertly evaluated and assessed to correctly<\/p>\n
understand the dictum laid down in Renubala’s case. In<\/p>\n
this context, the counsel relied on paragraph 5 of<\/p>\n
Renubala’s case to highlight the facts. He contends that<\/p>\n
the Supreme Court in that case was concerned only with the<\/p>\n
question as to whether declaration as to legitimacy of any<\/p>\n
person without any claim of marital relationship is<\/p>\n
entertainable by the Family Court.           It will be totally<\/p>\n
erroneous and puerile to conclude from the observations in<\/p>\n
paragraph 6 that a dispute between the spouses as to<\/p>\n
whether a child born in the matrimonial relationship<\/p>\n
between the parties is legitimate or illegitimate would not be<\/p>\n
maintainable under Section 7(1)(e).       A declaration either<\/p>\n
way can be sought by one of the spouses in respect of a<\/p>\n
child born during the currency of such matrimony, contends<\/p>\n
the learned counsel. To highlight this aspect, counsel relies<\/p>\n
on the following observations in paragraph 5 in which the<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -14-<\/span><\/p>\n
precise challenge which the Supreme Court considered in<\/p>\n
Renubala is highlighted.\n<\/p>\n
            “5. After trial, the Family Court, by its<\/p>\n
      judgment dated 2.5.2000 dismissed the petition<\/p>\n
      on the ground that the petition itself was not<\/p>\n
      maintainable in the light of Section 7 of the<\/p>\n
      Family Courts Act. As regards the prayer for<\/p>\n
      guardianship, the learned Judge observed that<\/p>\n
      Respondent 1 being the natural mother against<\/p>\n
      whom there was no adverse allegation, there<\/p>\n
      was no need to appoint any other person as<\/p>\n
      guardian.  On appeal to the High Court, the<\/p>\n
      Division Bench of the High Court agreed with<\/p>\n
      the conclusion of the Family Court that the first<\/p>\n
      relief sought for by the appellants cannot be<\/p>\n
      granted by the Family Court for the reason that<\/p>\n
      declaration as to the legitimacy of any person<\/p>\n
      without any claim of marital relationship is not<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -15-<\/span><\/p>\n
      directly entertainable by the Family Court. In<\/p>\n
      view    of the   admitted  fact  that   Samuel<\/p>\n
      Maharana and Respondent 1 were not married,<\/p>\n
      the child   allegedly  born through Samuel<\/p>\n
      Maharana can never be a legitimate child.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                              (emphasis supplied).<\/p>\n
      16. The learned counsel contends that the dictum in<\/p>\n
Renubala is only that declaration under Section 7(1)(e) can<\/p>\n
only be regarding legitimacy and in the admitted absence of<\/p>\n
a marriage no declaration regarding legitimacy can be<\/p>\n
granted. Legitimacy presupposes a valid marriage. In the<\/p>\n
absence of a valid marriage, there can be no question of<\/p>\n
legitimacy or otherwise at all.    A child born admittedly<\/p>\n
outside matrimony in the extra marital relationship between<\/p>\n
the man and woman can never be legitimate. Dispute about<\/p>\n
paternity between such man and woman is not a dispute<\/p>\n
regarding legitimacy and such a mere dispute of paternity<\/p>\n
between a man and woman not united in valid matrimony is<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -16-<\/span><\/p>\n
outside the sweep of Section 7(1)(e).         This is all what<\/p>\n
Renubala lays down, contends counsel. Renubala is not<\/p>\n
authority for the proposition canvassed by the appellants’<\/p>\n
counsel that a dispute between the spouses – validly<\/p>\n
married admittedly, regarding legitimacy\/illegitimacy of a<\/p>\n
child   born   during     such  matrimony     is  beyond   the<\/p>\n
jurisdictional competence of the Family Court, urges the<\/p>\n
learned counsel Shri E.S.M.Kabeer. We find merit in this<\/p>\n
contention.\n<\/p>\n
     17. We extract Section 7 of the Family Courts Act<\/p>\n
below:\n<\/p>\n
      “7. Jurisdiction:(1) Subject to the other provisions<\/p>\n
           of this Act, a Family Court shall –\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (a) Have     and    exercise  all  the   jurisdiction<\/p>\n
           exercisable by any district court or any<\/p>\n
           subordinate civil court under any law for the<\/p>\n
           time being in force in respect of suits and<\/p>\n
           proceedings of the nature referred to in the<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03       -17-<\/span><\/p>\n
           explanation; and<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      (b) Be deemed, for the purpose of exercising<\/p>\n
           such jurisdiction under such law, to be a<\/p>\n
           district court or, as the case may be, such<\/p>\n
           subordinate civil court for the area to which<\/p>\n
           the jurisdiction of the Family Court extends.<\/p>\n
     Explanation.- The suits and proceedings referred to<\/p>\n
     in this sub-section are suits and proceedings of the<\/p>\n
     following nature, namely:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (a)  A suit or proceeding between the parties to a<\/p>\n
           marriage for a decree of nullity of marriage<\/p>\n
           (declaring the marriage to be null and void<\/p>\n
           or, as the case may be, annulling the<\/p>\n
           marriage) or restitution of conjugal rights or<\/p>\n
           judicial separation or dissolution of marriage;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      (b)  A suit or proceeding for a declaration as to<\/p>\n
           the validity of a marriage or as to the<\/p>\n
           matrimonial status of any person;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -18-<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      (c)  A suit or proceeding between the parties to a<\/p>\n
           marriage with respect to the property of the<\/p>\n
           parties or of either of them;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (d)  A suit or proceeding for an order or injunction<\/p>\n
           in circumstances arising out of a marital<\/p>\n
           relationship;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (e)  A suit or proceeding for a declaration as to<\/p>\n
           the legitimacy of any person;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (f)  A suit or proceeding for maintenance.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      (g)  A suit or proceeding in relation to the<\/p>\n
           guardianship of the person or the custody of,<\/p>\n
           or access to, any minor.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, a<\/p>\n
     Family Court shall also have and exercise-<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
           (a) The    jurisdiction    exercisable  by    a\n\n               Magistrate of the First Class under\n\n               Chapter    IX    (relating  to   order  for\n\n               maintenance      of   wife,  children  and\n\nMat.A.No.103\/03     -19-<\/span>\n\n\n\n               parents)  of   the  Code    of  Criminal\n\n               Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974); and\n\n           (b) Such other jurisdictions as may be\n\n<\/pre>\n
               conferred on it by any other enactment.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                                  (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
     18. The learned counsel for the appellants has then<\/p>\n
placed reliance on the decision of a Division Bench of this<\/p>\n
Court in Bharat Kumar v.Selma Mini and Another (2007<\/p>\n
(1) KLT 945). In that decision, the earlier decision of the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Renubala was considered and the dictum<\/p>\n
was accepted. In paragraph 4 of Bharat Kumar’s case, the<\/p>\n
dictum of the Supreme Court is understood by the Division<\/p>\n
Bench as follows:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           “It may also arise in situations covered by<\/p>\n
      explanation (g) of S.7(1), as held by the Supreme<\/p>\n
      Court in Renubala Moharana v.Mina Mohanty, 2004<\/p>\n
      KHC 778 : 2004(2) KLT SN 42: AIR 2004 SC 3500 :<\/p>\n
      2004   (110)  DLT   521   :  2004(2)   CHN  180   :<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03       -20-<\/span><\/p>\n
      2004 (18) AIC 207(SC) : 2004 (4) SCC 215. It was<\/p>\n
      also held by the Supreme Court in the said decision<\/p>\n
      that   the   Family   Court   cannot   entertain  any<\/p>\n
      proceedings for declaration as to the legitimacy of<\/p>\n
      any person without any claim on marital relationship.<\/p>\n
      In the case before us the petitioner before the Family<\/p>\n
      Court, the first respondent herein, does not have a<\/p>\n
      case of marital relationship with the petitioner<\/p>\n
      herein.    The case admittedly is of extra marital<\/p>\n
      relationship.    The dispute is with regard to the<\/p>\n
      paternity of a child born in the said extra marital<\/p>\n
      relationship. That is not a matter falling within the<\/p>\n
      jurisdiction of the Family Court. Paternity of a child<\/p>\n
      can be gone into as incidental to a dispute on the<\/p>\n
      legitimacy arising only out of a claim on marital<\/p>\n
      relationship between the parties. Such a question<\/p>\n
      also may incidentally arise in deciding a guardianship<\/p>\n
      petition. No such situation arises in this case.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -21-<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
     19. We are persuaded to agree with the learned<\/p>\n
counsel for the respondent that Bharat Kumar also<\/p>\n
supports his contention only. Renubala was a case where<\/p>\n
parents of Samuel, a deceased man, inter alia, sought a<\/p>\n
declaration that the child born to respondents 1 and 2<\/p>\n
(spouses) during their valid matrimony is not the child of the<\/p>\n
second respondent\/husband, but was that of Samuel, with<\/p>\n
whom the first respondent wife had alleged illicit extra<\/p>\n
marital relationship. Similarly, in Bharat Kumar’s case also<\/p>\n
the woman and the child had sued for a declaration that<\/p>\n
though the marital tie with the second respondent subsisted,<\/p>\n
the first respondent in that case who had illicit relationship<\/p>\n
with the woman during her valid matrimony with the 2nd<\/p>\n
respondent was the father of the child. What is crucial to<\/p>\n
note is that a declaration of legitimacy can be granted only<\/p>\n
when there is admitted matrimonial relationship.        Where<\/p>\n
matrimonial    relationship  is   not  there  between     the<\/p>\n
contestants, the dispute can be only about paternity and not<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -22-<\/span><\/p>\n
legitimacy. Section 7(1)(e) of the Family Courts Act does not<\/p>\n
cover a dispute regarding paternity by itself. It covers only a<\/p>\n
dispute regarding legitimacy of a child born. It is in that<\/p>\n
context that both the cases – Renubala and Bharat<\/p>\n
Kumar, took the view that it is essential that there must be<\/p>\n
a matrimonial relationship to attract      explanation (e) to<\/p>\n
Section 7(1). It will be interesting to note the very question<\/p>\n
framed for consideration in Bharat Kumar’s case in<\/p>\n
paragraph 1, which reads as follows:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     ” Whether paternity of the child is an issue to be<\/p>\n
     considered by the Family Court under S.7(1)(e) of<\/p>\n
     the Family Court Act, 1984, without a matrimonial<\/p>\n
     cause, is the question to be considered in this<\/p>\n
     case.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The dictum in Renubala and Bharat Kumar properly<\/p>\n
understood, according to us is only that a mere dispute<\/p>\n
about paternity where there is admittedly no matrimony<\/p>\n
between the mother and the alleged father is not one that<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -23-<\/span><\/p>\n
can be entertained under Section 7(1)(e). Existence of valid<\/p>\n
matrimony is sine qua non for jurisdiction to entertain a<\/p>\n
proceedings under Section 7(1)(e) of the Family Courts Act.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
When admittedly there is no matrimony, there can be no<\/p>\n
question of legitimacy and in such a situation no relief under<\/p>\n
Section 7(1)(e) can be granted.     That and that alone, it<\/p>\n
appears to us, is the dictum laid down in the two decisions.<\/p>\n
At least, it is evident that the Division Bench in Bharat<\/p>\n
Kumar understood the dictum in Renubala thus. We are in<\/p>\n
total and complete agreement with the view taken by the<\/p>\n
Diviison Bench in Bharat Kumar on the interpretation of<\/p>\n
the dictum in Renubala.\n<\/p>\n
     20. In these circumstances we take the view that the<\/p>\n
dispute between the first appellant and the respondent<\/p>\n
about the legitimacy\/illegitimacy of the second appellant<\/p>\n
born admittedly during the subsistence of the marital tie is a<\/p>\n
dispute which can be taken cognizance of and adjudicated<\/p>\n
under Section 7(1)(e) of the Family Courts Act. We take the<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -24-<\/span><\/p>\n
view that a declaration of not only legitimacy but also<\/p>\n
illegitimacy of a child born to the mother can be granted<\/p>\n
under Section 7(1)(e), provided the disputants have a claim<\/p>\n
to be legally wedded and the fact that they are legally<\/p>\n
married is admitted or proved. We reckon Renubala and<\/p>\n
Bharat Kumar as authorities only for the proposition that a<\/p>\n
mere declaration of paternity, when there is admittedly no<\/p>\n
valid matrimony between the father and mother is outside<\/p>\n
the sweep of Section 7(1)(e) of the Family Courts Act. The<\/p>\n
challenge raised on Ground No.2 must hence fail.<\/p>\n
      21. Ground No.3. That takes us perhaps to the most<\/p>\n
crucial and relevant ground raised by the appellants. It will<\/p>\n
be only apposite for us to refer to Section 4 of the Evidence<\/p>\n
Act, which speaks about conclusive presumptions and their<\/p>\n
impact and play.     We extract the definition of conclusive<\/p>\n
proof in Section 4 of the Evidence Act.\n<\/p>\n
      “4. Conclusive proof.- When one fact is declared<\/p>\n
      by this Act to be conclusive proof of another, the<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -25-<\/span><\/p>\n
      Court shall, on proof of the one fact, regard the<\/p>\n
      other as proved, and shall not allow evidence to be<\/p>\n
      given for the purpose of disproving it.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      22. We shall now consider Section 112 of the Evidence<\/p>\n
Act which enacts the conclusive presumption regarding the<\/p>\n
legitimacy of a child born during the subsistence of marriage<\/p>\n
and 280 days thereafter. It reads as follows:<\/p>\n
           “112. Birth during marriage, conclusive<\/p>\n
      proof of legitimacy.- The fact that any person<\/p>\n
      was born during the continuance of a valid<\/p>\n
      marriage between his mother and any man, or<\/p>\n
      within two hundred and eighty days after its<\/p>\n
      dissolution, the mother remaining unmarried,<\/p>\n
      shall be conclusive proof that he is the legitimate<\/p>\n
      son of that man, unless it can be shown that the<\/p>\n
      parties to the marriage had no access to each<\/p>\n
      other at any time when he could have been<\/p>\n
      begotten.”                (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -26-<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      23. The advent of science and technology, it is now<\/p>\n
trite, makes it possible to authentically ascertain whether a<\/p>\n
person is or is not the biological father of a child. Section<\/p>\n
112 was enacted at a time when the advantage of science<\/p>\n
and technology on this aspect was not available.      In the<\/p>\n
interests of the health, order and peace in society, certain<\/p>\n
axiomatic presumptions had to be drawn. The conclusive<\/p>\n
presumption of paternity under Section 112 of the Evidence<\/p>\n
Act is one such presumption.      That a child born in valid<\/p>\n
matrimony is the child of the legally wedded husband of the<\/p>\n
woman who gives birth to the child was thus presumed<\/p>\n
conclusively under Section 112 of the Evidence Act.      The<\/p>\n
proof of one fact alone could rebut the said presumption and<\/p>\n
that is non-access between the spouses. Precedents galore<\/p>\n
to show that sufficient, clinching and conclusive proof must<\/p>\n
be made available of such non-access to rebut the<\/p>\n
presumption under Section 112.          Consequence of not<\/p>\n
drawing the presumption and permitting the rebuttal of the<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03       -27-<\/span><\/p>\n
presumption is to bastardise a child born during valid<\/p>\n
matrimony and that explains why the law leans in favour of<\/p>\n
the presumption of legitimacy when the child is born during<\/p>\n
matrimony or 280 days thereafter, the wife remaining<\/p>\n
unmarried.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     24. An analysis of the provisions of Section 112 clearly<\/p>\n
shows that the presumption is available if it is simply shown<\/p>\n
that there was a valid marriage and the child was born<\/p>\n
thereafter till termination of the marriage or 280 days<\/p>\n
thereafter. It is not as though the presumption is not<\/p>\n
available if the child is born on the first day or the first week<\/p>\n
or the first month after marriage. The presumption literally<\/p>\n
applies if the child is born at any time after the marriage and<\/p>\n
before the elapse of 280 days from the termination of<\/p>\n
marriage, the mother remaining unmarried. The expression,<\/p>\n
“mother remaining unmarried” is according to us crucial,<\/p>\n
because the law appears to have assumed that if the mother<\/p>\n
re-marries and the birth of the child is thereafter, the<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -28-<\/span><\/p>\n
presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 can apply not<\/p>\n
to the previous husband, but to the husband legally married<\/p>\n
to her before the birth of the child. That is the only manner<\/p>\n
in which Section 112 can be understood. The presumption<\/p>\n
of legitimacy applies even if the child is born immediately<\/p>\n
after marriage, unless non-access to each other at the time<\/p>\n
when the child could have been begotten is proved. It is<\/p>\n
crucial that there is no exclusion under Section 112 of any<\/p>\n
initial period of matrimony to attract the conclusive<\/p>\n
presumption.    The conclusive presumption under Section<\/p>\n
112 read with Section 4 comes into play from the date of<\/p>\n
marriage.    The legislature which extended the period of<\/p>\n
operation of the presumption by 280 days after dissolution<\/p>\n
of marriage did not, it is significant choose to exclude any<\/p>\n
minimum initial period of matrimony for the application of<\/p>\n
the presumption.\n<\/p>\n
      25. Even for a child born immediately after marriage,<\/p>\n
presumption of legitimacy under Section 112 would apply.<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -29-<\/span><\/p>\n
But the same can be rebutted by showing that prior to the<\/p>\n
marriage there was no possibility of access between the<\/p>\n
spouses.\n<\/p>\n
     26. The existence of the presumption for a further<\/p>\n
period of 280 days after the dissolution of marriage subject<\/p>\n
only to the condition that the mother has remained<\/p>\n
unmarried, does also show that the presumption is to apply<\/p>\n
so long as the marriage is subsisting and for 280 days<\/p>\n
thereafter.    The period of 280 days is fixed obviously<\/p>\n
because the law presumes safely that a child is not likely to<\/p>\n
remain in the womb at any rate beyond 280 days. It would<\/p>\n
be idle to conclude that law assumed that 280 days is the<\/p>\n
minimum period of gestation for ascertaining the time when<\/p>\n
the child “could have been begotten” under Section 112.<\/p>\n
     27. We now come back to the facts of the case. The<\/p>\n
child was admittedly born during the subsistence of the<\/p>\n
matrimony which remained from 24.6.1985 to 17.8.1995.<\/p>\n
The child was born on 13.7.1994. The presumption under<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03       -30-<\/span><\/p>\n
Section 112 must hence squarely apply. The only question<\/p>\n
is whether non-access of the spouses to each other is proved<\/p>\n
at any time when the child could have been begotten.<\/p>\n
     28. That takes us to the question as to when the child<\/p>\n
could have been begotten.          Notwithstanding the    valiant<\/p>\n
efforts of the first appellant, it is now evident that they could<\/p>\n
not have had access to each other prior to 17.12.1993.<\/p>\n
From 17.12.1993, the spouses had access to each other. It<\/p>\n
is submitted that the respondent\/husband had returned to<\/p>\n
his place of employment on 1.2.1994. From 17.12.1993 to<\/p>\n
1.2.1994     spouses had opportunity for access and did<\/p>\n
admittedly have access. The wife had conceived and the<\/p>\n
husband appears to have been under the impression,<\/p>\n
without any doubt, that it was his own child. Only after the<\/p>\n
child was born on 13.7.1994, does he appear to have<\/p>\n
entertained reservations about the legitimacy of the child or<\/p>\n
his responsibility for the conception.\n<\/p>\n
     29. Could the child born on 13.7.1994 have been<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -31-<\/span><\/p>\n
begotten on and after 17.12.1993 is the only question that<\/p>\n
remains for consideration. The burden, undoubtedly, is on<\/p>\n
the respondent to show that the child could not have been<\/p>\n
begotten on account of the access\/intercourse on and after<\/p>\n
17.12.1993. That burden rests squarely on the shoulders of<\/p>\n
the respondent.\n<\/p>\n
     30. Has he discharged the burden? We have evidence<\/p>\n
to show that it was a normal delivery. But was the child a<\/p>\n
full grown child or not? There is no specific evidence either<\/p>\n
way. PW1 was examined. Exhibits A1, A1(a) and X1 have<\/p>\n
been pressed into service. Exhibit A1 and A1(a) definitely<\/p>\n
support the case of the first appellant. Those documents<\/p>\n
show that LMP was on the 27th of December, 1993.          On<\/p>\n
4.2.1994 when the first appellant was examined by PW1, the<\/p>\n
prescription shows that the foetus was 14 weeks old and on<\/p>\n
28.5.1994 when the first appellant was examined by PW1,<\/p>\n
the foetus was 20 weeks old. These entries in Exhibits A1<\/p>\n
and A1(a) are absolutely consistent with the first appellant’s<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03       -32-<\/span><\/p>\n
case that she had conceived on account of the intercourse<\/p>\n
on and after 17.12.1993.        The evidence of PW1 suggests<\/p>\n
that assessment of age of the foetus clinically (as shown in<\/p>\n
Exhibits A and A1(a)) can vary for a period of three weeks.<\/p>\n
     31.     It is significant that not one question was put to<\/p>\n
PW1 that the child (2nd appellant) could not have been<\/p>\n
begotten\/conceived on account of the access\/intercourse on<\/p>\n
and after 17.12.1993.       That to our mind is crucial.  It is<\/p>\n
unquestionable that the burden must rest heavily on the<\/p>\n
shoulders of the respondent to show that the child born on<\/p>\n
13.7.1994 as per Exhibit X1, though in a normal delivery<\/p>\n
could not have been begotten from the intercourse\/access<\/p>\n
on or after 17.12.1993. We have gone through the evidence<\/p>\n
of PW1 and Exhibits A1, A1(a) and X1 and all other evidence.<\/p>\n
There is absence of any semblance of evidence to establish<\/p>\n
conclusively that the child born after a normal delivery at<\/p>\n
the Hospital on 13.7.1994 going by its features perceived by<\/p>\n
PW1 and others could not have been begotten as a result of<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -33-<\/span><\/p>\n
intercourse\/access on or after 17.12.1993. For that simple<\/p>\n
reason, the appeal must succeed and the proceedings<\/p>\n
initiated by the respondent must necessarily fail.<\/p>\n
      32. When could the child have been begotten? How<\/p>\n
many days must elapse between the date of conception and<\/p>\n
a normal delivery of the child? It appears to be difficult to<\/p>\n
specify any definite period. Courts had occasion to consider<\/p>\n
the very same question earlier several times.      We may<\/p>\n
advantageously refer to paragraph 11 of the judgment of the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Dukhtar Jahan v. Mohammed Farooq<\/a><\/p>\n
(1987 (1) SCC 624).\n<\/p>\n
      “11. Examining the matter, we feel the learned<\/p>\n
      Judge has failed to view the case in its entire<\/p>\n
      conspectus and this has led to miscarriage of<\/p>\n
      justice. On the sole ground that the child had<\/p>\n
      been born in about 7 months’ time after the<\/p>\n
      marriage it cannot be concluded that the child<\/p>\n
      should have been conceived even before the<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -34-<\/span><\/p>\n
     respondent had consummated the marriage.<\/p>\n
     Giving birth to a viable child after 28 weeks’<\/p>\n
     duration of pregnancy is not biologically an<\/p>\n
     improbable or impossible event.       In “Combined<\/p>\n
     Textbook of Obsterics and Gynaecology” by Sir<\/p>\n
     Gugald Baird 7th edn. At page 162 it is reported as<\/p>\n
     under:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                In the case of Clark v. Clark, (1939)<\/p>\n
           P.228 an extremely small baby, born<\/p>\n
           alive 174 days after last possible date<\/p>\n
           when intercourse with the husband could<\/p>\n
           have taken place, and which survived,<\/p>\n
           was held to be legitimate.     While it is<\/p>\n
           most unusual for babies of this weight or<\/p>\n
           gestation period to survive it does<\/p>\n
           occasionally happen.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
     The learned Judge ought not, therefore, to have<\/p>\n
     rushed to the conclusion that a child born in about<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03     -35-<\/span><\/p>\n
     7 months’ time after the marriage of the parents<\/p>\n
     should have necessarily been conceived even<\/p>\n
     before the marriage took place.      Insofar as the<\/p>\n
     second aspect is concerned, viz. about the<\/p>\n
     appellant’s statement that the child was not born<\/p>\n
     prematurely, the High Court has failed to bear in<\/p>\n
     mind that the appellant is a rustic and illiterate<\/p>\n
     woman and as such her opinion could suffer from<\/p>\n
     error of judgment.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     33. The wife did not agree for the DNA test.          This<\/p>\n
circumstance is used against her to contend that an adverse<\/p>\n
inference must be drawn. The DNA test is an authentic test<\/p>\n
and hence her failure to take that test must persuade the<\/p>\n
Court to draw an adverse inference against her. In the light<\/p>\n
of the giant leaps which science and technology have made<\/p>\n
in the area\/zone of identification of the biological father, the<\/p>\n
presumption under Section 112 can be criticised as<\/p>\n
anachronistic.   The presumption under Section 112 may be<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -36-<\/span><\/p>\n
shivering in its shoes. The legislature may intervene on a<\/p>\n
later date and modify the presumption under Section 112<\/p>\n
and make it only one of the ‘may presume’ or ‘shall<\/p>\n
presume’ variety under Section 4 of the Evidence Act.       It<\/p>\n
may not continue for a long time as a conclusive<\/p>\n
presumption. But that is the domain or realm of legislation.<\/p>\n
At what point of time in the development of a society, and<\/p>\n
its scientific and technological capabilities that presumption<\/p>\n
can be dispensed with or rigour of that presumption can be<\/p>\n
reduced is certainly to be considered by the legislature and<\/p>\n
not by a court interpreting a legislation. We must alertly<\/p>\n
note that there is no challenge before us against the<\/p>\n
constitutionality of Section 112 on the anvil of Articles 14<\/p>\n
and 21 of the Constitution on the ground that the statutory<\/p>\n
stipulation is not fair, just and reasonable and is arbitrary,<\/p>\n
capricious, unjust and oppressive.       In the post Maneka<\/p>\n
Gandhi     era such a challenge does not appear to be<\/p>\n
impossible. We need only say that such a challenge is not<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03       -37-<\/span><\/p>\n
raised before us or considered by us. As the law now stands<\/p>\n
in a case where Section 112 applies and non-access is not<\/p>\n
pleaded and proved, even a negative DNA test report cannot<\/p>\n
help to rebut the presumption drawn under Section 112 of<\/p>\n
the Evidence Act. The unwillingness by the wife to undergo<\/p>\n
the DNA test cannot hence tilt the scales against her.<\/p>\n
     34. We need not repeat the anxiety of the courts to<\/p>\n
avoid bastardisation of children born in valid matrimony<\/p>\n
unless there be convincing and compelling reasons. We are<\/p>\n
unable to find any such compelling and convincing reasons<\/p>\n
in the case. Of course, it may not be inapposite to note that<\/p>\n
some doubts are raised in the mind of the court about the<\/p>\n
attitude\/stand of the spouses about the paternity\/ legitimacy<\/p>\n
of the child. We say so because Exhibit A2 divorce deed is<\/p>\n
significantly silent about the second child born on 13.7.1994.<\/p>\n
But that dissatisfaction\/inadequacy is certainly insufficient<\/p>\n
to dislodge or rebut the conclusive presumption available<\/p>\n
Mat.A.No.103\/03      -38-<\/span><\/p>\n
 under Section 112       as defined under Section 4 of the<\/p>\n
Evidence Act. Lingering vague doubts in the mind of the<\/p>\n
courts are not sufficient to dislodge the presumption under<\/p>\n
Section 112. For the reason that it has not been established<\/p>\n
that the child could not have been begotten on account of<\/p>\n
the relationship between spouses on and after 17.12.1993,<\/p>\n
this appeal is to succeed and the prayer of the respondent<\/p>\n
must be rejected.\n<\/p>\n
     35. In the result,<\/p>\n
           (a) this appeal is allowed.\n<\/p>\n
            (b) the impugned order passed by the Family<\/p>\n
            Court is set aside.\n<\/p>\n
           (c)  the parties shall suffer their respective costs.<\/p>\n
                               R.BASANT, JUDGE.\n<\/p>\n
                               M.C.HARI RANI, JUDGE.\n<\/p>\n
dsn<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Kerala High Court Laila vs Muhammedali on 2 July, 2009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KERALA AT ERNAKULAM Mat.Appeal.No. 103 of 2003(F) 1. LAILA, D\/O.KAVATHANVEETTIL HAMZA HAJI, … Petitioner 2. FATHIMATH SHABEEBA, Vs 1. MUHAMMEDALI, S\/O.VAKKAYIL MODUNNI, … Respondent For Petitioner :SRI.T.KRISHNAN UNNI (SR.) For Respondent :SRI.ESM.KABEER The Hon’ble MR. Justice R.BASANT The Hon’ble MRS. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,21],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-154477","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-kerala-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nLaila vs Muhammedali on 2 July, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Laila vs Muhammedali on 2 July, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2009-07-01T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-05-12T15:56:11+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"30 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Laila vs Muhammedali on 2 July, 2009\",\"datePublished\":\"2009-07-01T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-05-12T15:56:11+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009\"},\"wordCount\":5946,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"High Court\",\"Kerala High Court\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/laila-vs-muhammedali-on-2-july-2009\",\"name\":\"Laila vs Muhammedali on 2 July, 2009 - 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