{"id":154784,"date":"1989-08-30T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1989-08-29T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sodan-singh-etc-etc-vs-new-delhi-municipal-committee-on-30-august-1989"},"modified":"2019-03-10T20:48:49","modified_gmt":"2019-03-10T15:18:49","slug":"sodan-singh-etc-etc-vs-new-delhi-municipal-committee-on-30-august-1989","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/sodan-singh-etc-etc-vs-new-delhi-municipal-committee-on-30-august-1989","title":{"rendered":"Sodan Singh Etc. Etc vs New Delhi Municipal Committee & … on 30 August, 1989"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Sodan Singh Etc. Etc vs New Delhi Municipal Committee & … on 30 August, 1989<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 1988, \t\t 1989 SCR (3)1038<\/div>\n
Author: L Sharma<\/div>\n
Bench: Venkataramiah, E.S. (Cj), Natrajan, S. (J), Sharma, L.M. (J), Ojha, N.D. (J), Kuldip Singh (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nSODAN SINGH ETC. ETC.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nNEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COMMITTEE & ANR. ETC.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT30\/08\/1989\n\nBENCH:\nSHARMA, L.M. (J)\nBENCH:\nSHARMA, L.M. (J)\nVENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (CJ)\nNATRAJAN, S. (J)\nOJHA, N.D. (J)\nKULDIP SINGH (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1989 AIR 1988\t\t  1989 SCR  (3)1038\n 1989 SCC  (4) 155\t  JT 1989 (3)\t553\n 1989 SCALE  (2)430\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1992 SC1153\t (1,3)\n\n\nACT:\n    Constitution  of India, 1950:  Article  19(1)(g)--Street\ntrading-An age old vocation adopted by human beings to\tearn\nliving--No  justification  to deny citizens  right  to\tearn\nlivelihood    using    public\tstreets\t  for\t trade\t  or\nbusiness--Regulatory  measures and  reasonable\trestrictions\ncan be imposed.\n    Delhi   Municipal\tCorporation   Act,   1957:    Street\ntrading--Necessity  to provide\tregulatory  measures--Empha-\nsised.\n    Punjab Municipal Act, 1911: Street trading--Necessity to\nprovide regulatory measures--Emphasised.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n    The\t petitioners  in these special leave  petitions\t and\nwrit petitions claim the right to engage in trading business\non the pavements of roads of the city of Delhi. The  special\nleave petitions are against the judgments of the Delhi\tHigh\nCourt dismissing their claim.\n    It\tis contended on behalf of the petitioners  that\t (i)\nthey  were  allowed  by the respondents\t to  transact  their\nbusiness by occupying a particular area on the pavements  on\npayment\t of certain charges described as Tehbazari  and\t the\nrefusal\t by  the  municipal authorities to  permit  them  to\ncontinue with their trade is violative of their\t fundamental\nright guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution;\nand (ii) the petitioners are poor people and depend on their\nbusiness for their livelihood and if they are not allowed to\noccupy some specific places demarcated on the pavements on a\npermanent  basis  for  conducting their\t business  they\t may\nstarve\twhich  will lead to violation of  their\t fundamental\nright under Article 21 of the Constitution.\n    The respondents, on the other hand, contend that  nobody\nhas  got  a legal right to occupy exclusively  a  particular\narea  on the road-pavement for pursuing a  trading  business\nand  nobody can claim any fundamental right in\tthis  regard\nwhatsoever.\n1039\n    Disposing  of the petitions and remitting the  cases  to\nthe appropriate Division Bench for final disposal in accord-\nance with this judgment, this Court,\n    HELD: E.S. Venkataramiah, C J, S. Natarajan, L.M. Sharma\nand N.D. Ojha ,JJ.]\nPer L.M. Sharma, J.\n    (1)\t A  member of the public is entitled  to  legitimate\nuser  of the road other than actually passing or  re-passing\nthrough it, provided that he does not create an unreasonable\nobstruction  which  may inconvenience other  persons  having\nsimilar right to pass and does not make excessive use of the\nroad to the prejudice of the others. Liberty of an individu-\nal  comes to an end where the liberty of another  commences.\n[1050C, A-B]\n    (2) What will constitute public nuisance and what can be\nincluded  in the legitimate user can be ascertained only  by\ntaking into account all the relevant circumstances including\nthe  size of the road, the amount of traffic and the  nature\nof  the\t additional  use one wants to  make  of\t the  public\nstreets.  This has to be judged objectively and\t here  comes\nthe role of public authorities. [1051E]\n    (3) The right to carry on trade or business mentioned in\nArticle\t 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, on street  pavements,\nif  properly regulated, cannot be denied on the ground\tthat\nthe streets are meant exclusively for passing or  re-passing\nand  for  no  other use. Proper regulation  is,\t however,  a\nnecessary  condition as otherwise the very object of  laying\nout roads--to facilitate traffic--may be defeated.  Allowing\nthe right to trade without appropriate control is likely  to\nlead  to unhealthy competition and quarrel  between  traders\nand  traveling\tpublic\tand sometimes  amongst\tthe  traders\nthemselves  resulting  in  chaos. The right  is\t subject  to\nreasonable  restrictions  under clause (6)  of\tArticle\t 19.\n[1052C-D]\n    (4) The proposition that all public streets and roads in\nIndia  vest  in the State but that the State holds  them  as\ntrustee\t on  behalf  of the public and the  members  of\t the\npublic are entitled as beneficiaries to use them as a matter\nof right, and that this right is limited only by the similar\nrights possessed by every other citizens to use the pathways\nand further that the State as trustee is entitled to  impose\nall necessary limitations on the character and extent of the\nuser,  should  be treated as of universal  application.\t The\nprovisions of the Municipal Acts should be\n1040\nconstrued  in  the light of the above proposition  and\tthey\nshould receive a beneficent interpretation. [1052E-G]\n    M.A.  Pal Mohd. v. R.K. Sadarangani, A.I.R.\t (1985)\t Mad\n23;  C.S.S. Motor Service v. Madras State, A.I.R. 1953\tMad.\n279; Saghir Ahmad v. The State of U.P. & Ors.,<\/a> [1955] 1\t SCR\n707;  liarper v. G.N. Haden & Sons Ltd., [1933] 1  Ch.\t298;\nBombay Hawkers Union & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal\t Corporation\nJUDGMENT<\/a>:\n<\/pre>\n
    (5)\t The  petitioners do have the fundamental  right  to
\ncarry on a trade or business of their choice, but not to  do
\nso  on\ta particular place, as circumstances are  likely  to
\nchange\tfrom time to time. But that does not mean  that\t the
\nlicence has to be granted on a daily basis; that arrangement
\ncannot\tbe convenient to anybody, except in special  circum-
\nstances. [1053F, 1057F]
\n    Fertilizer\tCorporation Kamgar Union v. Union of  India,<\/a>
\n[1981] 2 SCR 52; K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu,<\/a> [1982]
\n3 SCR 628, referred to.\n<\/p>\n
    (6) Article 21 is not attracted in the case of trade  or
\nbusiness-either\t big  or small. The right to  carry  on\t any
\ntrade  or  business  and the concept of\t life  and  personal
\nliberty\t within\t Article 21 are too remote to  be  connected
\ntogether. [1054G]
\n    Olga  Tellis  & Ors.v. Bombay  Municipal  Corporation  &
\nOrs., [1985] 3 SCC 545, distinguished.\n<\/p>\n
    (7)\t The provisions of the Delhi  Municipal\t Corporation
\nAct, 1957, are clear and the Municipal Corporation of  Delhi
\nhas  full authority to permit hawkers and squatters  on\t the
\nside walks where they consider it practical and\t convenient.
\n[1052G-H]
\n    (8) The provisions of the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as
\napplicable  to\tNew  Delhi area, should\t receive  a  liberal
\nconstruction  so that the New Delhi Municipal Committee\t may
\nbe in a position to exercise full authority to permit  hawk-
\ners and squatters on pavements in certain areas. [1053A-C]
\nPyarelal v. N.D.M.C., [1967] 3 SCR 747 overruled.
\n(9) A scheme should be drawn up as soon as possible contain-
\ning
\n1041<\/span>
\ndetailed  necessary  provisions dealing\t with  all  relevant
\naspects, and capable of solving the problems arising in\t the
\nsituation in a fair and equitable manner. [1057B-C]
\n    (10) The demand of the petitioners that hawkers must  be
\npermitted on every road in the city cannot be allowed. If  a
\nroad  is not wide enough to conveniently manage the  traffic
\non  it, no hawking may be permitted at all, or may be  sanc-
\ntioned\tonly once a week, say on Sundays when the rush\tcon-
\nsiderably thins out. Hawking may also be justifiably prohib-
\nited near hospitals or where necessity of security  measures
\nso demands. There may still be other circumstances  justify-
\ning  refusal to permit any kind of business on a  particular
\nroad. [1057E]
\n    (11) Some of the hawkers in big cities are selling\tvery
\ncostly\tluxury articles including  sophisticated  electronic
\ngoods, sometimes imported or smuggled. The authorities\twill
\nbe  fully  justified to deny to such hawkers  any  facility.
\nThey may frame rules in such manner that it may benefit only
\nthe poor hawkers incapable of investing a substantial amount
\nfor  starting the business. Attempt should be made  to\tmake
\nthe  scheme comprehensive, dealing with every  relevant\t as-
\npect,  for example, the charges to be levied, the  procedure
\nfor grant and revocation of the licences, etc. [1057H-1058B]
\nPer Kuldip Singh, J.\n<\/p>\n
    (1)\t The  guarantee under Article  19(1)(g)\t extends  to
\npractice  any  profession, or to carry\ton  any\t occupation,
\ntrade  or business. The object of using four  analogous\t and
\noverlapping words in Article 19(1)(g) is to make the guaran-
\nteed  right as comprehensive as possible to include all\t the
\navenues\t and modes through which a man may earn his  liveli-
\nhood.  In a nut-shell the guarantee takes into its fold\t any
\nactivity  carried on by a citizen of India to earn his\tliv-
\ning. The activity must of course be legitimate and no  anti-
\nsocial\tlike  gambling, trafficking in women and  the  like.
\n[1058H-1059C]
\n    (2) Once street-trading is accepted as legitimate trade,
\nbusiness  or  occupation it automatically comes\t within\t the
\nprotection guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the  Consti-
\ntution of India. [1062E]
\n    (3)\t Street\t trading is an age-old vocation\t adopted  by
\nhuman beings to earn living. It is one of the  traditionally
\nrecognised business or trade in England. This is so in spite
\nof the fact that there is a complete social security in that
\ncountry and as such no compulsion on the citizens to be
\n1042<\/span>
\ndriven to street trading out of poverty or unemployment.  On
\nthe  other hand, abysmal poverty in India warrants  outright
\nrejection of the argument that nobody has a right to  engage
\nhimself in ‘street trading’. [1059D,1062A-B]
\n    (4)\t There is no justification to deny the\tcitizens  of
\ntheir  right to earn livelihood by using the public  streets
\nfor the purpose of trade and business. [1063B]
\n    Saghir  Ahmad v. The State of U.P. & Ors.,<\/a> [1955] 1\t SCR
\n707;  Manjur Hasan v. Mohammed Zaman, 52 I.A. 61; Himat\t Lal
\nK. Shah v. Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad & Anr.,<\/a> [1973] 2
\nSCR 266, referred to.\n<\/p>\n
    (5)\t Street trading being a fundamental right has to  be
\nmade  available to the citizens subject to Article 19(6)  of
\nthe  constitution. It is within the domain of the  State  to
\nmake any law imposing reasonable restrictions in the  inter-
\nest  of general public. This can be done by an enactment  on
\nthe same lines as in England or by any other law permissible
\nunder Article 19(6) of the Constitution. [1064B]
\n    Bombay Hawkers Union & Ors. v. Bombay Municipal Corpora-<\/a>
\ntion  &\t Ors., [1985] 3 SCR 528;  Municipal  Corporation  of
\nDelhi v. Gurnam Kaur, A.I.R.<\/a> 1989 S.C. 38, referred to.
\n    (6)\t The  skeletal\tprovisions in  the  Delhi  Municipal
\nCorporation Act, 1957 and the Punjab Municipal Act, 1911 can
\nhardly\tprovide any regulatory measures to the enormous\t and
\ncomplicated  problems  of  street trading  in  these  areas.
\n[1063D]<\/p>\n
&
\n    CIVIL  APPELLATE\/ORIGINAL  JURISDICTION:  Special  Leave
\nPetition (C) No. 15257 of 1987. etc. etc.
\n    From the Judgment and Order dated 23.4.1987 of the Delhi
\nHigh Court in CMP No. 268 of 1987.\n<\/p>\n
    V.M. Tarkunde, D.D. Thakur, Govinda Mukhoty, A.P. Singh,
\nK.N. Rai, S. Balakrishnan, R.N. Keswani, R.F. Nariman,\tP.H.
\nParekh,\t D.Y. Chanderchud, J.P. Pathak, Shishir Sharma,\t Ms.
\nGitanjali, Mrs. Biraj Tiwari, Ms. Sunita Sharma, N.K. Sahoo,
\nArun Jaitley, Ms. Bina Gupta, Ms. Madhu Khatri, L.K.  Gupta,
\nR.C.  Kaushik, Rajiv Sharma, B.S. Bali, M.C.  Dhingra,\tA.S.
\nBawa, V.K. Verma, Kirpal Singh, A.S. Pundir, S.\t Srinivasan,
\nMrs. Sushadra, B.B.\n<\/p>\n
1043<\/span><\/p>\n
Tawakley,  S.K. Mehta, Dhruv Mehta, Atul Nanda, Ms.  Mridula
\nRay,  R.M. Tewari, Ms. Rani Jethmalani, Ajit Singh Bawa\t and
\nVijay Verma for the Petitioners.\n<\/p>\n
    G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, R.B.  Datar,
\nO.P. Sharma, Dr. L.M. Singhvi, A.K. Sen, Ranjit Kumar,\tR.C.
\nGubrele,  R.K.\tMaheshwari, Mensoor Ali,  A.M.\tSinghvi,  D.
\nBhandari, N. Waziri, Mrs. Madhu Bhandari, K.B. Rohtagi, S.K.
\nDhingra,  Baldev  Atreya, S.B. Saharya, V.B.  Saharya,\tK.R.
\nGupta, R.K. Sharrna, Vimal Sharda, Vivek Sharda, Mrs. Nanita
\nShanaa,\t Aruneshwar  Gupta, Inderbir Singh Alag\t and  Sushil
\nKumar for the Respondents.\n<\/p>\n
    Mrs. Sushma Suri, B.B. Sawhney, P.K. Manohar, Mrs. Indra
\nSawhney,  Mrs.\tAbha Jain, P.K. Jain,  S.S.  Hussain,  Amlan
\nGhosh,\tJitendra  Sharma,  R.D. Upadhyay,  Y.K.\t Jain,\tD.D.
\nShanaa,\t Rajesh,  Naresh Kabkshi, Mrs.\tUrmila\tKapur,\tM.M.
\nKashyap,  Anis\tAhmad Khan, Manjeet Chawla, S.N.  Bhatt,  N.
\nGanpathy,  P. Parmeshwaran, A.S. Pundir,  Pandey  Associate,
\nArun K. Sinha, M.B. Lal, A.K. Sanghi and S.M. Ashri for\t the
\nappearing parties.\n<\/p>\n
The following Judgments of the Court were delivered:\n<\/p>\n
    SHARMA, J. The petitioners in all these cases claim\t the
\nright  to  engage in trading business on  the  pavements  of
\nroads  of  the city of Delhi. They have asserted  that\tthey
\nhave  been pursuing their trade with the permission  of\t the
\nmunicipal authorities for some time, but recently there\t has
\nbeen  illegal interference by them. Some of the\t petitioners
\nhave  moved this Court under Article 32 of the\tConstitution
\nand others impugn adverse judgments of the Delhi High  Court
\ndismissing their claim.\n<\/p>\n
    2. As the petitioners have challenged the correctness of
\nthe  decision of a Division Bench of this Court in  Pyarelal
\nv.  N.D.M.C and another, (1967) 3 SCR page 747, these  cases
\nwere placed for hearing before a larger Bench.\n<\/p>\n
    3.\tThe petitioners, in their applications\tbefore\tthis
\nCourt,\thave alleged that they were allowed by the  respond-
\nents  to transact their business by occupying  a  particular
\narea  on  the pavements, on payment of certain\tcharges\t de-
\nscribed\t as  Tehbazari. It is contended that  the  municipal
\nauthorities  by their refusal to permit the  petitioners  to
\ncontinue  with their trade are violating  their\t fundamental
\nright  guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) and 21 of the\tCon-
\nstitution. They have also
\n1044<\/span>
\ncomplained  of mala fides, arbitrariness and  discriminatory
\nconduct attracting Article 14 of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
    4. The respondents, besides denying the facts alleged by
\nthe petitioners, contended that nobody has got a legal right
\nto  occupy exclusively a particular area on  the  road-pave-
\nments for pursuing a trading business, and nobody can  claim
\nany fundamental right in this regard whatsoever. It has been
\nstrenuously  urged that the roads are meant for the  use  of
\ngeneral\t public for passing and re-passing and they are\t not
\nlaid to facilitate the carrying on of private business.\n<\/p>\n
    5.\tThe main argument on behalf of the  petitioners\t was
\naddressed by Mr. Tarkunde, who appeared for petitioner Sodan
\nSingh in S.L.P. No. 15257 of 1987. Several learned advocates
\nrepresenting  the  other petitioners, besides  adopting\t the
\nmain  argument,\t made brief supplementary  submissions.\t The
\nplace where petitioner Sodan Singh claims to have the  right
\nto  squat  for\tsoiling ready-made garments  is\t within\t New
\nDelhi. Several other petitioners have similar claims against
\nthe New Delhi Municipal Committee. The remaining petitioners
\nallege that they have been pursuing their squatting business
\nwithin Delhi, as defined in the Delhi Municipal\t Corporation
\nAct,  which  is\t administered by  the  respondent  Municipal
\nCorporation  of Delhi. Separate arguments have been made  on
\nbehalf of the New Delhi Municipal Committee and the  Munici-
\npal Corporation of Delhi.\n<\/p>\n
    6.\tMr. Tarkunde urged that petitioner Sodan Singh is  a
\npoor hawker making his both ends meet by selling  ready-made
\ngarments  on an area of 8′ x 24′ near Electric Pole No.\t 12,
\nJanpath\t Lane, New Delhi as illustrated in the attached\t map
\nAnnexure–‘A’  to the petition. Earlier he was permitted  to
\nhawk  from time to time by the respondent under licences  as
\nper Annexure ‘A-2’, but now the privilege is being denied to
\nhim  and his goods were removed forcibly from  the  pavement
\nand  were later released only on payment of cost of  removal
\ncharges.  In  the counter affidavit of\tthe  respondent\t the
\nallegations  have  been denied and it has been\tpointed\t out
\nthat  the  photo copy of the licence Annexure  ‘A-2’  itself
\nshows that the petitioner was permitted to sell ‘Channa’ and
\n‘Moongphali’ on a ‘Vehngi’ on and around Bus-stop No. 430 on
\nPt.  Pant  Marg; and he was at no point of time\t allowed  to
\noccupy a fixed place for carrying on business in  ready-made
\ngarments. We do not propose to go into the facts of this  or
\nthe other petitions and would leave the individual cases  to
\nbe  dealt  with by the Division Bench in the  light  of\t the
\ngeneral principle which will be discussed in this judgment.\n<\/p>\n
1045<\/span><\/p>\n
    7. The Municipal Corporation of Delhi was established by
\na  notification\t issued under s. 3 of  the  Delhi  Municipal
\nCorporation  Act, 1957, and the provisions of that  Act\t are
\nrelevant  for the majority of the present cases.  The  other
\ncases  relate to the other areas forming part of  the  Union
\nTerritory of Delhi governed by the provisions of the  Punjab
\nMunicipal  Act, 1911. However, the main submissions  in\t all
\nthese  cases  made on behalf of both sides  have  been\twith
\nrespect to the general principles applicable in India  about
\nthe right to carry on business by squatting on pavements  of
\npublic streets.\n<\/p>\n
    8. Mr. Tarkunde contended that the petitioners are\tpoor
\npeople and depend on their business for their livelihood. If
\nthey  are  not\tallowed to occupy some\tspecific  place\t for
\nconducting  their business, they may starve. This will\tlead
\nto violation of their fundamental right under Article 21  of
\nthe  Constitution.  Reliance was placed on the\tdecision  in
\nOlga  Tellis and others v. Bombay Municipal Corporation\t and
\nothers<\/a>,\t [1985] 3 SCC 545. The learned counsel further\tsaid
\nthat  the  two respondents have been in\t the  past  allowing
\nsquatter  traders on the pavements on payment  of  Tehbazari
\ncharges.  He drew our attention to the counter affidavit  of
\nthe  respondent in S.L.P. Nos. 4519-23 of 1986 at  page\t 146
\nwhere a resolution by the New Delhi Municipal Committee\t has
\nbeen mentioned in paragraph III. In the case of Delhi Munic-
\nipal  Corporation  also several documents have\tbeen  relied
\nupon for showing that specific areas have been allowed to be
\noccupied  for the purpose of trading business from  time  to
\ntime. The learned counsel argued that since the two  munici-
\npalities  have been settling specific areas for the  purpose
\nof  squatting,\tit  is not open to them\t to  deny  squatting
\nrights\tto  the petitioners and other  persons\tsituated  in
\nsimilar circumstances.\n<\/p>\n
    9.\tIn Pyare Lal etc. v. N.D.M.C., [1967] 3 SCR 747\t the
\nNew  Delhi  Municipal Committee banned the  sale  of  cooked
\nedibles\t on public streets, and prevented  the\tpetitioners,
\nlicensed  vendors  of potato chops and other  edibles,\tfrom
\ncontinuing with their business. After unsuccessfully  moving
\nthe Punjab High Court, they came to this Court. The  appeals
\nwere dismissed holding that persons in India cannot claim  a
\nlawful right to pursue street trading, and the N.D.M.C.\t was
\nperfectly  authorised  to  take steps under s.\t173  of\t the
\nPunjab Municipal Act for stopping the business. It was\talso
\nobserved  that the N.D.M.C. was not empowered under the\t Act
\nto  allow trade on public streets on a permanent  basis\t and
\nthat  permission for sale of goods could be granted only  on
\nspecial\t occasions  on\ttemporary basis as in  the  case  of
\nfestivals etc. Reliance had been placed on behalf of the
\n1046<\/span>
\npetitioners  on\t certain passages from\tHalsbury’s  Laws  of
\nEngland,  which the Court distinguished on the\tground\tthat
\nstreet trading was regulated by certain statutes in England,
\nand  there were no such provisions applicable in  the  cases
\nbefore\tthis  Court. The right to pursue street\t trading  in
\nIndia was thus negatived. Mr. Tarkunde contended that it  is
\nnot correct to deny the members of the public their right to
\nengage in business on the public streets in the country.  He
\nsaid  that this is one of the fundamental rights  guaranteed
\nboth,  under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 21.  According  to
\nthe  learned counsel, the practice of the street trading  is
\nwell  established for a considerable time in all  the  civi-
\nlised  countries of the world including India,\tEngland\t and
\nUnited\tStates of America. Refuting the suggestion  made  on
\nbehalf\tof  the respondents that it was only  a\t hawker\t who
\nsells his goods while moving from door to door and place  to
\nplace  who  is allowed on the public streets,  Mr.  Tarkunde
\nreferred to Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol. 40,  paragraphs
\n431  to\t 446 under the heading ‘Street\tTrading\t in  Greater
\nLondon’.  It was suggested that the right of the members  of
\nthe  public  in this regard was rounded on  the\t common\t law
\nright.\tThe  learned  counsel further relied  on  the  third
\nparagraph  of s. 253 of the Chapter ‘Highways, Streets,\t and
\nBridges’  of 39 American Jurisprudence (2nd  Edition)  which
\nreads as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “A municipality’s power to regulate the use of
\n\t      streets  for private gain is to  be  liberally
\n\t      construed. The purpose of such regulations  is
\n\t      to promote public safety, and not to  regulate
\n\t      and control indirectly the user’s business  as
\n\t      such. There is no authority in a\tmunicipality
\n\t      to  prohibit  the\t use of the  street  by\t any
\n\t      citizen or corporation in the carrying on of a
\n\t      legitimate  business, harmless in\t itself\t and
\n\t      useful to the community, which is\t independent
\n\t      of  the  police power under  which  reasonable
\n\t      regulations  in  the promotion of\t the  public
\n\t      order,   safety,\thealth,\t and   welfare\t are
\n\t      proper.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    10.\t In his reply Mr. Singhvi, the learned\tcounsel\t for
\nN.D.M.C.  pointed out that the first two paragraphs  of\t the
\naforementioned\ts. 253 which are quoted’ below negative\t the
\nright asserted on behalf of the petitioners and paragraph  3
\nmentioned above has to be read in that light.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “S. 253. Business purposes:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\tIndividuals do not have the inherent
\n\t      right to conduct their private business in the
\n\t      streets, nor can they acquire a
\n\t      1047<\/span>
\n\t      vested  right to use the streets for  carrying
\n\t      on a commercial business. However, individuals
\n\t      do  have the right to use the streets to\tsome
\n\t      extent for the purpose of bartering or trading
\n\t      with  each other, or for prosecuting  a  busi-
\n\t      ness, trade, or calling, although they  cannot
\n\t      legally carry on any part of their business in
\n\t      the  public  streets to the annoyance  of\t the
\n\t      public,  or supply the deficiencies  in  their
\n\t      own  premises  by monopolizing the  street  or
\n\t      walk.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\tThe use of public streets as a place
\n\t      for the prosecution of a private business\t for
\n\t      gain  is generally recognised as a special  or
\n\t      extraordinary use which the controlling public
\n\t      authority may prohibit or regulate as it deems
\n\t      proper.  When a municipality does permit\tpri-
\n\t      vate individuals to have exclusive  possession
\n\t      of  the street surface for a private  business
\n\t      use, such permit is so unusual, and beyond the
\n\t      ordinary authority and power of a\t municipali-
\n\t      ty, that it may not issue such a permit in the
\n\t      absence of special enabling state legislation.
\n\t      Assuming that such power exists, the  granting
\n\t      of  permission to a private person to  so\t use
\n\t      the  streets is totally within the  discretion
\n\t      of the municipality.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  learned counsel contended that the grant  of  exclusive
\nright to occupy any part of the road amounts to the negation
\nof the Common Law theory of dedication of a road for  public
\nuse.\n<\/p>\n
   11. Reference was also made on behalf of the\t petitioners
\nto  the\t judgment  in M.A. Pal Mohd.  v.  R.K.\tSadarangani,
\nA.I.R.\t1985 Madras 23, wherein it was observed that  hawker
\ntrade so long as it is properly regulated by public authori-
\nties could never be a public nuisance; rather it serves\t the
\nconvenience  of the public. and is found not only  in  India
\nbut also in other countries.\n<\/p>\n
    12.\t The  question of applicability of the\tEnglish\t and
\nAmerican  laws\ton the present aspect was  considered  by  a
\nDivision  Bench\t of the Madras High Court  in  C.S.S.  Motor
\nService\t v.  Madras State, A.I.R. 1953 Madras  279  and\t the
\ndecision was later approved by this Court in Saghir Ahmad v.
\nThe  State  of U.P. and others<\/a>, [1955] 1 SCR  707.  After  a
\nthorough consideration of the relevant materials Venkatarama
\nAiyar, J. who delivered the judgment pointed out some of the
\nbasic differences in the law of this country on the  present
\nsubject from the American and English laws, which render the
\nAmerican  decisions  inapplicable on  certain  aspects.\t The
\nright to carry on business,
\n1048<\/span>
\nalthough recognised as one of the liberties protected by the
\nAmerican  Constitution, did not acquire the full  status  of
\nthe  freedoms expressly mentioned in the Constitution,\tsuch
\nas,  the freedom of speech, of person, and of religion;\t and
\nwas viewed somewhat in the light of an interloper or parvenu
\namong them. The freedoms expressly mentioned in the American
\nConstitution occupy an exalted position which was denied  to
\nthe  unexpressed  freedoms including the right to  carry  on
\nbusiness. Under the Indian Constitution this right is one of
\nthe freedoms expressly protected under Article 19(1)(g)\t and
\nis  placed  on the same footing as freedom of  speech,\tetc.
\nFurther only some trades could be carried on by the American
\ncitizens  as a matter of right and the others including\t the
\ntransport business on public roads only if the State permit-
\nted. The learned Judge observed that this is called a  ‘fra-
\nnchise’ or a ‘privilege’ and has an English origin. That  is
\nnot  the case in this country, inasmuch as Article  19(1)(g)
\ndoes  not make any distinction from trade to trade.  So\t far
\nEngland\t is  concerned,\t the rights of\tcitizens  to  public
\npathways  originated  in feudal times when  the\t lands\twere
\nowned  by  individuals. The public highways  generally\tpass
\nthrough these lands and since the citizens were using  these
\nroads  the law inferred a dedication of the pathways by\t the
\nowners\tfor user by the public, but the extent of this\tuser
\nwas  limited to the passing and re-passing on the road.\t The
\nposition in India has always remained somewhat different and
\nhas  been  summarized  in paragraph 24 of  the\tjudgment  of
\nVenkatarama Aiyar J., in the following terms, which has been
\nquoted with approval by this Court in Saghir Ahmad’s case.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t“The true position then is that\t all
\n\t      public streets and roads vest in the State but
\n\t      that the State holds them as trustee on behalf
\n\t      of  the public. The members of the public\t are
\n\t      entitled\tas  beneficiaries to use them  as  a
\n\t      matter of right and this right is limited only
\n\t      by the similar rights possessed by every other
\n\t      citizen  to  use the pathways.  The  State  as
\n\t      trustees\ton behalf of the public is  entitled
\n\t      to impose all such limitations on the  charac-
\n\t      ter and extent of the user as may be requisite
\n\t      for protecting the rights of the public gener-
\n\t      ally. Thus the nature of the road may be\tsuch
\n\t      that it may not be suitable for heavy  traffic
\n\t      and  it will be within the competence  of\t the
\n\t      legislature to limit the use of the streets to
\n\t      vehicles which do not exceed specified size or
\n\t      weight. Such regulations have been held to  be
\n\t      valid as within the police power of the  State
\n\t      in  America. Vide ‘Morris v. Budy’, [1927]  71
\n\t      Law  Ed. 968, Sproles v. Bindford’, [1932]  76
\n\t      Law  Ed.\t1167, and–South Carolina  State  v.
\n\t      Barnwell
\n\t      1049<\/span>
\n\t      Bros.'[1938]  82\tLaw Ed. 734.  For  the\tsame
\n\t      reason  the  State  might\t even  prohibit\t the
\n\t      running  of  transport buses  and\t lorries
\n\t      on particular streets or roads if such running
\n\t      would interfere with the rights of pedestrians
\n\t      to pass and re-pass as it might if the  street
\n\t      is  narrow  or conjested but subject  to\tsuch
\n\t      limitations the right of a citizen to carry on
\n\t      business\tin  transport  vehicles\t on   public
\n\t      pathways cannot be denied to him on the ground
\n\t      that the State owns the highways.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    13.\t Mr.  Singhvi is correct in pointing  out  that\t the
\npassages of the American and English laws, as relied upon on
\nbehalf\tof the petitioners, do not establish their right  to
\ncarry  on trading business on public streets, but  for\tthat
\nreason\ttheir claim cannot be rejected either. The  question
\nrequires  to  be examined further. The observations  in\t the
\njudgment  of Venkatarama Aiyer, J. quoted above prima  facie
\nsupport\t the petitioners. They received express approval  of
\nthis Court in Saghir Ahmad’s case, but there is an important
\ndistinction between those cases and the present matter which
\ncannot\tbe ignored. In both the above cases the\t petitioners
\nwere  claiming the right to ply transport vehicles for\thire
\non  public streets; in other words, they wanted to  use\t the
\nroads for transport, for which the roads were primarily laid
\nout  and  while\t so doing attempted to earn  money.  In\t the
\npresent\t cases\tbefore us the petitioners  are\tdesirous  of
\nconducting  their  trade business by sale of  goods  on\t the
\nroads  from stationary points; they do not want to make\t use
\nof the roads for movement of persons or goods. The  question
\nis whether this makes a material difference.\n<\/p>\n
    14. The primary object of building roads is\t undoubtedly
\nto  facilitate people to travel from one point\tto  another.
\nQuoting several authorities Byron K. Elliott and William  F.
\nElliott\t in their treatise on the Law of Roads\tand  Streets
\nhave  defined  a street as a road or public way in  a  city,
\ntown or village. A way over land set apart for public travel
\nin a town or city is a street, no matter by what name it may
\nbe  called. If a way is free to all people it is a  highway.
\nP.  Duraiswami Aiyangar in his book dealing with the Law  of
\nMunicipal  Corporation\tin  British India  (1914  Edn.)\t has
\nobserved that the primary and paramount use of the street is
\npublic\ttravel\tfor man, beast and carriage  for  goods.  On
\nbehalf\tof the respondents reliance has been placed  on\t the
\noft-repeated  adage that public have a right of passing\t and
\nrepassing through a street but have no right “to be on\tit”,
\nwhich  Sri  Aiyangar also has mentioned at page 542  of\t his
\nbook. Halsbury, relied upon by both sides, has stated  (Vol.
\n21 paragraph 107) that the right of
\n1050<\/span>
\nthe  public is a right to pass alone a highway for the\tpur-
\npose of legitimate travel, not to be on it, except so far as
\nthe  public’s presence is attributable to a  reasonable\t and
\nproper\tuser of the highway as such. These  statements\tcer-
\ntainly\tdo not mean that a traveler has to be  in  perpetual
\nmotion\twhen he is in a public street. It may  be  essential
\nfor him to stop sometime for various reasons–he may have to
\nalight\tfrom a vehicle or pick up a friend, collect  certain
\narticles  or unload goods or has to take some rest  after  a
\nlong and strenuous journey, What is, required of him is that
\nhe  should not create an unreasonable obstruction which\t may
\ninconvenience other persons having similar right to pass; he
\nshould\tnot make excessive use of the road to the  prejudice
\nof  the\t others. Liberty of an individual comes\t to  an\t end
\nwhere  the liberty of another commences. Subject to this,  a
\nmember\tof the public is entitled to legitimate user of\t the
\nroad other than actually passing or re-passing through it.\n<\/p>\n
    15. It has been sometimes argued that since a person  is
\nentitled  to the user of every part of a public\t street,  he
\ncannot\tbe  deprived of the use of any\tportion\t thereof  by
\nputting\t up  of\t any obstruction. This\tproposition  in\t its
\nextreme\t form  cannot be accepted without subjecting  it  to
\nseveral restrictions. A similar argument was pressed  before
\nthe Madras High Court in the case of M.A. Pal Mohd. v.\tR.K.
\nSadarangani,  (supra) based on the provisions of the  Madras
\nCity  Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, and was\trightly\t re-
\npelled\tby  pointing  out that since the  pavement  is\talso
\nincluded  within  the expression ‘street’, a member  of\t the
\npublic relying upon the aforesaid proposition can insist  on
\nhis right to walk over a flower-bed or structure erected  by
\nthe public authorities for regulating traffic which will  be
\nwholly unpractical. The authorities are duty bound to locate
\npost boxes, fire hydrants with water tanks, milk booths, bus
\nor jutka stands, rubbish bine etc., in appropriate places in
\na  public street and it would be preposterous to  hold\tthat
\nthis cannot be done as somebody may insist on keeping  every
\ninch  of the street available for actual  passage.  Winfield
\nand  Jolowicz  in their book on Tort (12th Edn.)  have\tsaid
\nthat nuisance may be defined, with reference to highways, as
\nany wrongful act or omission upon or near a highway, whereby
\nthe  public are prevented from freely, safely,\tand  conven-
\niently\tpassing along the highway and that the law  requires
\nof users of the highway a certain amount of “give and take”.
\nThe case of Harper v. G.N. Maden and Sons, Limited, [1933] 1
\nCh. 298 illustrates this point. The defendants there who had
\ntheir  house abutting the road decided to add another  floor
\nto  their  existing premises. Before  starting\tconstruction
\nthey erected “scaffolding” resting On the footpath, and\t put
\nup a wooden hoarding
\n1051<\/span>
\nnext door to the plaintiff’s shop for the purpose of enclos-
\ning  a\tspace to be used, during the  alterations  to  their
\nbuilding,  for depositing bricks and other materials. In  an
\naction\tby  the plaintiff, for injunction and  damages,\t the
\ntrial Judge held that although the scaffolding and  hoarding
\nwere reasonably necessary for the construction and they\t did
\nnot  cause any greater obstruction or remain for any  longer
\nperiod\tthan was reasonably necessary, the  obstruction\t was
\nillegal\t and that the plaintiff was entitled to damages.  On
\nappeal\tthe judgment Was reversed holding that the  obstruc-
\ntion to the highway and to the enjoyment by the plaintiff of
\nhis  adjoining\tpremises being of  temporary  character\t and
\nbeing  reasonable  in quantum and in duration did  not\tgive
\nrise to a legal remedy. It was very well said that:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  law relating to the user of highways  is
\n\t      in  truth the law of give and take. Those\t who
\n\t      use  them\t must in doing\tso  have  reasonable
\n\t      regard  to  the  convenience  and\t comfort  of
\n\t      others,  and  must  not  themselves  expect  a
\n\t      degree of convenience and comfort only obtain-
\n\t      able  by\tdisregarding that of  other  people.
\n\t      They must expect to be obstructed\t occasional-
\n\t      ly. It is the price they pay for the privilege
\n\t      of obstructing others.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    As to what will constitute public nuisance and what\t can
\nbe  included in the legitimate user can be ascertained\tonly
\nby  taking into account all the relevant  circumstances\t in-
\ncluding the size of the road, the amount of traffic and\t the
\nnature of the additional use one wants to make of the public
\nstreets.  This has to be judged objectively and\t here  comes
\nthe role of public authorities.\n<\/p>\n
    16.\t So  far as right of a hawker to  transact  business
\nwhile  going from place to place is concerned, it  has\tbeen
\nadmittedly  recognised\tfor a long period. Of  course,\tthat
\nalso  is  subject to proper regulation in  the\tinterest  of
\ngeneral\t convenience  of  the public  including\t health\t and
\nsecurity  considerations. What about the right to  squat  on
\nthe  road  side\t for engaging in trading  business?  As\t was
\nstated\tby this Court in Bombay Hawkers Union and others  v.
\nBombay\tMunicipal Corporation and others<\/a>, [1985] 3 SCR\t528,
\nthe public streets by their nomenclature and definition\t are
\nmeant  for the use of the general public: they are not\tlaid
\nto facilitate the carrying on of private business. If  hawk-
\ners  were  to be conceded the right claimed  by\t them,\tthey
\ncould  hold the society to ransom by squatting on  the\tbusy
\nthoroughfares,\tthereby paralysing all civic life.  This  is
\none  side  of the picture. On the other\t hand,\tif  properly
\nregulated  according to the exigency of\t the  circumstances,
\nthe small
\n1052<\/span>
\ntraders\t on the said walks can considerably add to the\tcom-
\nfort and convenience of general public, by making  available
\nordinary  articles  of\tevery day use  for  a  comparatively
\nlesser\tprice. An ordinary person, not very affluent,  while
\nhurrying towards his home after day’s work can pick up these
\narticles  without  going out of his way to  find  a  regular
\nmarket.\t If  the circumstances are appropriate and  a  small
\ntrader\tcan do some business for personal gain on the  pave-
\nment to the advantage of the general public and without\t any
\ndiscomfort  or\tannoyance to the others, we do not  see\t any
\nobjection to his carrying on the business. Appreciating this
\nanalogy the municipalities of different cities and towns  in
\nthe  country have been allowing such traders. The  right  to
\ncarry on trade or business mentioned in Article 19(1)(g)  of
\nthe Constitution, on street pavements, if properly regulated
\ncannot\tbe denied on the ground that the streets  are  meant
\nexclusively for passing or re-passing and for no other\tuse.
\nProper\tregulation  is, however, a  necessary  condition  as
\notherwise the very object of laying out roads-to  facilitate
\ntraffic–may be defeated. Allowing the right to trade  with-
\nout  appropriate  control  is likely to\t lead  to  unhealthy
\ncompetition  and  quarrel  between  traders  and  travelling
\npublic and sometimes amongst the traders themselves  result-
\ning  in chaos. The right is subject to\treasonable  restric-
\ntions  under  clause  (6) of Article 19. If  the  matter  is
\nexamined  in  this light it will appear that  the  principle
\nstated\tin Saghir Ahmad’s case in connection with  transport
\nbusiness applies to the hawkers’ case also. The\t proposition
\nthat all public streets and roads in India vest in the State
\nbut  that the State holds them as trustee on behalf  of\t the
\npublic, and the members of the public are entitled as  bene-
\nficiaries  to use them as a matter of right, and  that\tthis
\nright  is  limited only by the similar fights  possessed  by
\nevery  other citizen to use the pathways, and  further\tthat
\nthe  State  as trustee is entitled to impose  all  necessary
\nlimitations on the character and extent of the user,  should
\nbe treated as of universal application.\n<\/p>\n
    17.\t The  provisions  of the Municipal  Acts  should  be
\nconstrued in the light of the above proposition. In case  of
\nambiguity, they should receive a beneficial  interpretation,
\nwhich  may enable the municipalities to\t liberally  exercise
\ntheir authority both, in granting permission to\t individuals
\nfor making other uses of the pavements, and, for removal  of
\nany encroachment which may, in their opinion, be  constitut-
\ning  undesirable obstruction to the travelling\tpublic.\t The
\nprovisions of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, are
\nclear  and  nobody  disputes before us\tthat  the  Municipal
\nCorporation  of Delhi has full authority to  permit  hawkers
\nand  squatters\ton  the side walks where  they\tconsider  it
\npractical and convenient. In so far the Punjab Municipal Act
\n1911<\/span>
\n1053<\/span>
\napplying  to  the  New Delhi area is  concerned,  the  Bench
\nconstituted by three learned Judges observed in Pyare  Lal’s
\ncase [1967] 3 SCR 747 that the provisions did not  authorise
\nthe  municipality  to  permit stalls to be  set\t up  in\t the
\nstreets except temporarily on special occasions, like festi-
\nvals, etc. and that the permission to the petitioner in that
\ncase  had  been wrongly granted initially. We do  not  agree
\nwith  these  observations, although it appears that  in\t the
\nlight of the other circumstances, indicated in the judgment,
\nthe  decision was a correct one. The provisions of both\t ss.
\n173 and 188 should receive liberal construction, so that the
\nNew Delhi Municipal Committee may be in a position to  exer-
\ncise  full  authority. Indeed some of the documents  on\t the
\nrecords\t before us indicate that the Committee had  been  in
\nthe past actually permitting hawkers and squatters on  pave-
\nments in certain areas.\n<\/p>\n
    18.\t The  controversy  in the  present  cases,  however,
\ncannot\tbe settled by what has been said earlier. The  claim
\nof the petitioners before us is much higher. They assert the
\nright  to occupy specific places on road pavements  alleging
\nthat they have been so doing in the past. As has been stated
\nearlier,  the facts have been disputed and individual  cases
\nwill  be considered separately in the light of\tthe  present
\njudgment.  The argument, however, which has been pressed  on
\nbehalf of the petitioners is that they have their  fundamen-
\ntal rights guaranteed by Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitu-
\ntion  to occupy specific places demarcated on the  pavements
\non  a permanent basis for running their business. We do\t not
\nthink there is any question of application of Article 21 and
\nwe  will be briefly indicating our reasons therefore  later.
\nBut can there be at all a fundamental right of a citizen  to
\noccupy a particular place on the pavement where he can squat
\nand  engage  in trading business? We have no  hesitation  in
\nanswering the issue against the petitioners. The petitioners
\ndo  have the fundamental right to carry on a trade or  busi-
\nness  of  their\t choice, but not to do so  on  a  particular
\nplace.\tThe position can be appreciated better in the  light
\nof  two\t decisions of this Court in  Fertilizer\t Corporation
\nKamgar\tUnion  v. Union of India,<\/a> [1981] 2 SCR\t52,  and  K.
\nRajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu,<\/a> [1982] 3 SCR 628.\n<\/p>\n
    19.\t In the Fertilizer Corporation case the\t workmen  of
\nthe  respondent Corporation challenged the legality  of\t the
\nsale  of certain plants and equipments of the Sindri  Ferti-
\nlizer  Factory inter alia on the ground that a large  number
\nof workers would be retrenched as a result of the sale. They
\nargued that the sale would deprive them of their fundamental
\nright under Article 19(1)(g) to carry on their occupation as
\nindustrial  workers.  A Bench of five Judges of\t this  Court
\nrejected the
\n1054<\/span>
\nplea  holding  that  Article 19(1)(g) confers  a  broad\t and
\ngeneral\t right which is available to all persons to do\twork
\nof  a particular kind and of their choice, but it  does\t not
\nconfer\tthe  right to hold a particular job or to  occupy  a
\nparticular  post  of  one’s choice. The right  to  pursue  a
\ncalling\t or to carry on an occupation is not the same  thing
\nas  the right to work in a particular post. If\tthe  workers
\nwere  retrenched consequent upon and on account of the\tsale
\nit would be open to them to pursue their rights and remedies
\nunder  the labour laws. But the closure of an  establishment
\nin  which a workman for the time being was employed did\t not
\nby  itself  infringe his fundamental right to  carry  on  an
\noccupation  which  is guaranteed by Article  19(1)(g).\t“The
\nchoice\tand  freedom of the workers to\twork  as  industrial
\nworkers\t is  not affected by the sale. The sale may  at\t the
\nhighest\t affect\t their locum, but it does not  affect  their
\nlocus,\tto  work  as industrial worker”\t This  decision\t was
\nfollowed in K. Rajendran v. State of Tamil Nadu,<\/a> which arose
\nout of a policy decision taken by the State of Tamil Nadu to
\nabolish\t all  the posts of part-time  Village  Officers.  An
\nOrdinance  was\tpromulgated for this purpose and  was  later
\nreplaced  by an Act. Rejecting the appeal of the  appellants
\nthis Court held that the impugned Act did not violate  Arti-
\ncle  19(1)(g) as it did not affect the right of\t the  incum-
\nbents  of posts to carry on any occupation of their  choice,
\neven  though  they may not be able to stick on to  the\tpost
\nwhich they were holding. The ratio of these decisions  apply
\nwith  full  force to the cases where the right to  pursue  a
\ntrade or business is involved. If the opposite view is taken
\nand the plea of the petitioners is allowed a chaotic  situa-
\ntion  may follow. They may be entitled to insist  that\tthey
\nwould carry on their business anywhere they like, either  on
\nthe roads or in the government schools or hospitals or other
\npublic buildings. They may like to enter the class-rooms  or
\nthe  patient  wards or any public office  to  advance  their
\nprospects. As was observed in the Bombay Hawkers case [1985]
\n3 SCC 528, they can hold the society to ransom by  squatting
\non the busy thoroughfare, thereby paralysing all civic life.\n<\/p>\n
    20. We do not find any merit in the argument rounded  on
\nArticle 21 of the Constitution. In our opinion Article 21 is
\nnot attracted in a case of trade or business–either big  or
\nsmall.\tThe right to carry on any trade or business and\t the
\nconcept\t of life and personal liberty within Article 21\t are
\ntoo remote to be connected together. The case of Olga Tellis
\nand  others  v.\t Bombay Municipal  Corporation\tand  others<\/a>,
\n[1985]\t3  SCC\t545, heavily relied upon on  behalf  of\t the
\npetitioners, is clearly distinguishable. The petitioners  in
\nthat  case  were very poor persons who\thad  made  pavements
\ntheir  homes  existing in the midst of\tfilth  and  squalor,
\nwhich had to be seen to be believed. Rabid dogs in search of
\n1055<\/span>
\nstinking  meat and cats in search of hungry rats  kept\tthem
\ncompany.  They\tcooked and slept where they  cased,  for  no
\nconveniences were available to them. Their daughters, coming
\nof age, bathed under the nosy gaze of passers-by,  unmindful
\nof  the feminine sense of bashfulness. They had to  stay  on
\nthe pavements, so that they could get odd jobs in the  city.
\nIt  was not a case .of a business of selling articles  after
\ninvesting some capital, howsoever meagre. It is\t significant
\nto note that the judgment in Bombay Hawkers Union and others
\nv.  Bombay  Municipal Corporation and Others,<\/a> [1985]  3\t SCR
\n528,  and that in Olga Telils were delivered within a  week,
\nboth  by  Y.V.\tChandrachud, C.J. and some  of\tthe  counsel
\nappearing  m two cases were common, and that  while  dealing
\nwith the rights of the squatting hawkers in the former\tcase
\nthe learned Chief Justice confined the consideration of\t the
\nright  under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.  Besides,
\nthe Court in the Olga Tellis affirmed the validity of s. 314
\nof the Bombay Municipal Corporation Act on the ground that
\n\t      “Removal of encroachments on the footpaths  or
\n\t      pavements over which the public has the  right
\n\t      of  passage or access, cannot be\tregarded  as
\n\t      unreasonable, unfair or unjust.”\n<\/p>\n
In this connection the Court further proceeded to say,
\n\t      “Footpaths or pavements are public  properties
\n\t      which are intended to serve the convenience of
\n\t      the  general  public. They are  not  laid\t for
\n\t      private  use and indeed, their use for a\tpri-
\n\t      vate  purpose frustrates the very\t object\t for
\n\t      which  they  are carved out from\tportions  of
\n\t      public streets. The main reason for laying out
\n\t      pavements\t is to ensure that  the\t pedestrians
\n\t      are able to go about their daily affairs\twith
\n\t      a\t reasonable measure of safety and  security.
\n\t      That facility, which has matured into a  right
\n\t      of the pedestrians, cannot be set at naught by
\n\t      allowing\tencroachments  to  be  made  on\t the
\n\t      pavements. There is no substance in the  argu-
\n\t      ment  advanced  on behalf of  the\t petitioners
\n\t      that the claim of the pavement dwellers to put
\n\t      up constructions on pavements and that of\t the
\n\t      pedestrians  to make use of the pavements
\n\t      for  passing repassing, are  competing  claims
\n\t      and that the former should be preferred to the
\n\t      latter. No one has the right to make use of  a
\n\t      public property for a private purpose  without
\n\t      the requisite authorisation and, therefore, it
\n\t      is  erroneous  to contend\t that  the  pavement
\n\t      dwellers have the
\n\t      1056<\/span>
\n\t      right to encroach upon pavements by construct-
\n\t      ing  dwellings  thereon.\tPublic\tstreets,  of
\n\t      which  pavements\tform a part,  are  primarily
\n\t      dedicated for the purpose of passage and, even
\n\t      the pedestrians have but the limited right  of
\n\t      using pavements for the purpose of passing and
\n\t      repassing. So long as a person does not trans-
\n\t      gress the limited purpose for which the  pave-
\n\t      ments are made, his use thereof is  legitimate
\n\t      and  lawful. But, if a person puts any  public
\n\t      property to a use for which it is not intended
\n\t      and is not authorised to use it, he becomes  a
\n\t      trespasser. The common example which is  cited
\n\t      in  some of the English cases (see, for  exam-
\n\t      ple, Hicknan v. Maisey, ) is that if a person,
\n\t      while  using a highway for passage, sits\tdown
\n\t      for a time to rest himself by the side of\t the
\n\t      road, he does not commit a trespass. But, if a
\n\t      person  puts  up a dwelling on  the  pavement,
\n\t      whatever\tmay  be\t the  economic\t compulsions
\n\t      behind  such an act, his user of the  pavement
\n\t      would become unauthorised.”\n<\/p>\n
It  is also worth noting that assurances had been  given  on
\nbehalf\tof the State Government in its pleading before\tthis
\nCourt which was repeatedly mentioned in the judgment.\n<\/p>\n
    21. On behalf of some of the petitioners it was contend-
\ned that in view of the inclusion of the word “socialist”  in
\nthe  Preamble  of  the Constitution by\tthe  42nd  Amendment
\ngreater\t concern must be shown to improve the  condition  of
\nthe poor population in the country, and every effort  should
\nbe  made to allow them as much benefit as may  be  possible.
\nThere cannot be any quarrel with this proposition, but\tthat
\nby itself cannot remedy all the problems arising from pover-
\nty. Even the Constitution as it stood originally was commit-
\nted  to economic justice and welfare of the needy.  But\t for
\nthat  reason either then or now the other provisions of\t the
\nConstitution  and the laws cannot be ignored. It is,  there-
\nfore, not possible to interpret the decision in Olga  Tellis
\nin  the manner to interpret the decision in Olga  Tellis  in
\nthe manner suggested on behalf of the petitioners to bolster
\ntheir case with the aid of Article 21.\n<\/p>\n
    22. During his argument Mr. Tarkunde fairly stated\tthat
\nthe  Municipal\tCommittee may be entitled  to  regulate\t the
\nsquatting  business of the petitioners, but they  must\tmake
\ndetailed schemes in this regard. A serious concern was shown
\nin the argument of the other learned advocates also alleging
\nthat corruption at large scale was
\n1057<\/span>
\nrampant and huge amounts of money were being realised  ille-
\ngally by some of the servants of the Municipalities from the
\npoor hawkers. No rules have been framed with respect to\t the
\nchoice of the persons, the area to be allowed to them or the
\nrate of Tehbazari charges. The permission to squat was being
\ngranted\t on  daily basis or for very short  periods  to\t the
\ngreat  inconvenience  to the hawkers and  no  machinery\t was
\navailable to hear their grievances. A draft scheme has\tbeen
\nprepared  and  filed  on behalf of the\tpetitioners  with  a
\nsuggestion that the respondents may be directed to adopt it.
\nOn  behalf  of the respondents it was  said  that  statutory
\nprovisions are already there in this regard, but they had to
\nconcede\t that they are too sketchy and incapable of  meeting
\nthe  need.  We are, in the circumstances, of the  view\tthat
\ndetailed  necessary  provisions, dealing with  all  relevant
\naspects, and capable of solving the problems arising in\t the
\nsituation  in a fair and equitable manner, should  be  made;
\nand, the respondents should proceed as soon as may be possi-
\nble.  They will be well advised to consider the\t suggestions
\nof the petitioners while finalising the schemes. Due  regard
\nto the requirements of the relevant laws, e.g., Delhi Police
\nAct,  1978  and\t the Delhi Control of  Vehicular  and  other
\nTraffic\t on Roads and Streets Regulation, 1980 will have  to
\nbe given.\n<\/p>\n
    23. We would, however, make’it clear that the demand  of
\nthe petitioners that the hawkers must be permitted on  every
\nroad  in the city cannot be allowed. If a road is  not\twide
\nenough to conveniently manage the traffic on it, no  hawking
\nmay  be permitted at all, or may be sanctioned only  once  a
\nweek,  say on Sundays when the rush considerably thins\tout.
\nHawking may also be justifiably prohibited near hospitals or
\nwhere  necessity of security measures so demands. There\t may
\nstill  be other circumstances justifying refusal  to  permit
\nany  kind  of business on a particular road. The  demand  on
\nbehalf\tof  the petitioners that permission to\tsquat  on  a
\nparticular place must be on a permanent basis also has to be
\nrejected as circumstances are likely to change from time  to
\ntime.  But  this does not mean that the licence\t has  to  be
\ngranted\t on  the  daily basis; that  arrangement  cannot  be
\nconvenient to anybody, except in special circumstances.\n<\/p>\n
    24.\t The  authorities, while adopting a  scheme,  should
\nalso  consider\tthe  question as to which  portions  of\t the
\npavements should be left free for pedestrians and the number
\nof  the squatters to be allowed on a particular road.  There
\nshould be rational basis for the choice of the licensees.  A
\npolicy\tdecision should be taken in regard to  the  articles
\nwhich should be permitted to be sold on the pavements. It is
\ncommon\tknowledge  (as was taken note of in  Bombay  Hawkers
\ncase) that some
\n1058<\/span>
\nof the hawkers in big cities are selling very costly  luxury
\narticles including sophisticated electronic goods, sometimes
\nimported  or smuggled. The authorities will be fully  justi-
\nfied  to deny to such hawkers any facility. They  may  frame
\nrules  in  such a manner that it may benefit only  the\tpoor
\nhawkers\t incapable  of investing a  substantial\t amount\t for
\nstarting  the business. Attempt should be made to  make\t the
\nscheme\tcomprehensive, dealing with every  relevant  aspect,
\nfor  example,  the charges to be levied, the  procedure\t for
\ngrant and revocation of the licences, et cetera.\n<\/p>\n
    25.\t We  as a Court in a welfare State  do\trealise\t the
\nhardship to which many of the petitioners may be exposed  if
\nthey  are prevented from carrying on the business. The\tonly
\nsolution  for  this is the adoption of the  policy  of\tfull
\nemployment, which even according to leading economists\tlike
\nKeynes will alleviate the problems of the unemployed to some
\nextent.\t But as students of economics we also  realise\tthat
\nevery human activity has the ‘optimum point’ beyond which it
\nbecomes\t wholly\t unproductive. It is for the  Government  to
\ntake  reasonable  steps to prevent movement of\tpeople\tfrom
\nrural areas to urban areas. That can be done by the develop-
\nment of urban centers in rural areas removed from each other
\nat  least  by one hundred miles. This is more  a  matter  of
\nexecutive  policy than for judicial fiat. We hope and  trust
\nthat in administering the laws in force the authorities will
\nkeep in view humane considerations. With these\tobservations
\nwe  dispose of these petitions and remit them to the  appro-
\npriate Division Bench for final disposal in accordance\twith
\nthis judgment.\n<\/p>\n
    KULDIP  SINGH,  J. I have read the erudite\tjudgment  of
\nL.M.  Sharma, J, wherein it has been held that street  trad-
\ning,  whether as an itinerant vendor\/hawker or from  a\tsta-
\ntionary position\/receptacle\/ kiosk\/foot-path, is a fundamen-
\ntal right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitu-
\ntion  of India. The said right is obviously subject to\trea-
\nsonable\t restrictions  imposed by the  State  under  Article
\n19(6)  of  the Constitution. It has further been  held\tthat
\nthere  is  no  fundamental right of a citizen  to  occupy  a
\nparticular  place in any street for the purpose of  engaging
\nhimself in ‘street trading.’ I respectfully agree with these
\nfindings  arrived at by Sharma, J. I may, however,  add\t few
\nwords to support these findings.\n<\/p>\n
    The guarantee under Article 19(1)(g) extends to practice
\nany  profession,  or to carry on any  occupation,  trade  or
\nbusiness.  ‘Profession’ means an occupation carried on by  a
\nperson by virtue of his personal and specialised  qualifica-
\ntions, training or skill. The word
\n1059<\/span>
\n‘ocCupation’  has a wide meaning such as any  regular  work,
\nprofession, job, principal activity, employment, business or
\na calling in which an individual is engaged. ‘Trade’ in\t its
\nwider sense includes any bargain or sale, any occupation  or
\nbusiness carried on for subsistence or profit, it is an\t act
\nof buying and selling of goods and services. It may  inclUde
\nany business carried on with a view to profit whether manual
\nor  mercantile.\t ‘Business’ is a very wide  term  and  would
\ninclude\t anything  which occupies the  time,  attention\t and
\nlabour of a man for the purpose of profit. It may include in
\nits form trade, profession, industrial and commercial opera-
\ntions,\tpurchase and sale of goods, and would  include\tany-
\nthing which is an occupation as distinguished from pleasure.
\nThe object of using four analogous and overlapping words  in
\nArticle 19(l)(g) is to make the guaranteed right as  compre-
\nhensive\t as  possible to include all the avenues  and  modes
\nthrough which a man may earn his livelihood. In a  nut-shell
\nthe  guarantee takes into fold any activity carried on by  a
\ncitizen\t of India to earn his living. The activity  must  of
\ncourse\tbe  legitimate and not\tanti-social  like  gambling,
\ntrafficking in women and the like.\n<\/p>\n
    Street  trading is an age-old vocation adopted by  human
\nbeings to earn living. In the olden days the venue of  trad-
\ning and business has always been the public streets but,  in
\nthe course of time fairs, markets, bazars and more  recently
\nbig shopping complexes and fashionable plazas have come\t up.
\nIn  spite of this evolution in business and  trade  patterns
\nthe  ‘street trading’ is accepted as one of  the  legitimate
\nmodes of earning livelihood even in the most affluent  coun-
\ntries  of  the world. In England ‘street trading’  has\tbeen
\nregulated by various Acts of Parliament. Paras 425 to 448 of
\nHalsbury’s  Laws of England, Fourth edition, Volume 40\tdeal
\nwith  this  subject.  Paras 427 to 430\tpertain\t to  ‘street
\ntrading’  in  districts as regulated by\t the  provisions  of
\nLocal Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1982. Paras
\n427 and 428 are reproduced as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “427–  Adoption\tof street trading  code\t and
\n\t      designation of streets. A district council may
\n\t      resolve  that  the street trading code  is  to
\n\t      apply to its district as from a specified day.
\n\t\t\tWhere  it  has done so,\t it  may  by
\n\t      resolution  designate any street in  its\tdis-
\n\t      trict as a ‘prohibited street’ in which street
\n\t      trading  is prohibited, a ‘licence street’  in
\n\t      which  steet trading is prohibited  without  a
\n\t      licence granted by the district council, or  a
\n\t      ‘consent\tstreet’ in which street\t trading  is
\n\t      prohibited without its consent.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      1060<\/span><\/p>\n
“428.–Street trading licences. Application for the grant or
\nrenewal of a street trading licence under the street trading
\ncode  may  be made by any person aged seventeen or  over  in
\nwriting to the district council. The council is under a duty
\nto  grant the application unless it considers that it  ought
\nto be refused on one or more of the following grounds:
\n(1)  that  there is not enough space for  the  applicant  to
\ntrade without causing undue interference or inconvenience to
\nstreet users;\n<\/p>\n
(2)  that  there are already enough traders trading  in\t the
\nstreet from shops or otherwise in the particular goods;
\n(3)  that the applicant desires to trade on fewer  than\t the
\nminimum number of days resolved on by the council;
\n(4)  that  by reason of some conviction or otherwise  he  is
\nunsuitable;\n<\/p>\n
(5)  that he has been licensed by the council but  has\tper-
\nsistently refused or neglected to pay its fees or charges;
\n(6) that he has been granted a street trading consent by the
\ncouncil but has refused or neglected to pay its fees;
\n(7)  that he has without reasonable excuse failed  to  avail
\nhimself to a reasonable extent of a previous licence.
\n\t  The licence specifies the street in which, days on
\nwhich and times between which, and describes the articles in
\nwhich,\tthe  licence holder is permitted to trade,  and\t may
\ncontain such subsidiary terms as the council thinks reasona-
\nble.  Unless previously revoked or surrendered,\t it  remains
\nvalid  for twelve months or such period as is  specified  in
\nit,  although  if the council resolves that  the  street  be
\ndesignated  a  prohibited street the licence  ceases  to  be
\nvalid  when the resolution takes affect. The council may  at
\nany  time revoke a licence on grounds similar to heads\t(1),
\n(4),  (5) and (7) above, and the licence holder may  at\t any
\ntime surrender his licence to the council.
\nOn receiving an application for the grant or renewal of a
\n1061<\/span>
\n\t      licence, the council must within a  reasonable
\n\t      time either grant the licence as applied\tfor,
\n\t      or serve on the applicant a notice specifying,
\n\t      with  its grounds, its proposal to refuse\t the
\n\t      application,  to grant a licence on  different
\n\t      principal terms, to grant a licence limited to
\n\t      a\t particular place in a street, to  vary\t the
\n\t      principal\t terms or to revoke a  licence,\t and
\n\t      stating  that within seven days  of  receiving
\n\t      the notice the applicant may by written notice
\n\t      require the council to give him the opportuni-
\n\t      ty of making representations. In this case the
\n\t      council  may  not determine the  matter  until
\n\t      either the applicant has made representations,
\n\t      or  the time for doing so has elapsed, or\t the
\n\t      applicant\t has failed to make the\t representa-
\n\t      tions  which he required the council to  allow
\n\t      him to make.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t       A person aggrieved by certain  refus-\n<\/p>\n
\t      als or decisions of a council may appeal to  a
\n\t      magistrates’ court, and appeal from the magis-
\n\t      trates’ decision lies to the Crown Court.\t The
\n\t      council must give effect to the court’s  deci-
\n\t      sion.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t       If  a licence holder applies for\t the
\n\t      renewal  of a licence before it  expires,\t the
\n\t      old licence remains valid until a new  licence
\n\t      is granted or during the time for appealing or
\n\t      whilst  an  appeal  is pending,  and  where  a
\n\t      council decides to vary the principal terms of
\n\t      a\t licence or to revoke it, the  variation  or
\n\t      revocation  does\tnot take effect\t during\t the
\n\t      time  for\t appealing or whilst  an  appeal  is
\n\t      pending.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t       A  licence holder may employ  assist-\n<\/p>\n
\t      ance  without  any further licence  being\t re-
\n\t      quired.”\n<\/p>\n
    Paras  431 to 448 relate to ‘street trading’ in  Greater
\nLondon\tand  in the city of London. London  Country  Council
\n(General  Powers)  Act,\t 1947 and City\tof  London  (Various
\nPowers) Act, 1965 provide for designation of streets by\t the
\nLondon Borough Council in respect of which applications\t for
\ngrant  of ‘street trading’ licences are\t entertained.  There
\nare  provisions for the registration of street traders.\t The
\nprocedure,  for grant of Annual licences and the grounds  on
\nwhich  such  licences may be refused,  has  been  laid-down.
\nThere is a complete code, in the shape of various  statutes,
\nwhich regulates the business of ‘street trading’ in England.
\nTrading in the streets of London from a stationary  position
\nis a common sight. Even in the famous Oxford street which is
\nalways over-crowded, there are kiosks, receptacles and
\n1062<\/span>
\nstalls\tat every street-junction from where fruits,  confec-
\ntionary,  soft\tdrinks, souvenirs,  newspapers\tand  various
\nother articles are sold. ‘Street trading’ is thus one of the
\ntraditionally recognised business or trade in England.\tThis
\nis  so in spite of the fact that there is a complete  social
\nsecurity  in that country and as such no compulsion  on\t the
\ncitizens  to be driven to street trading out of\t poverty  or
\nunemployment.  On  the other hand abysmal poverty  in  India
\nwarrants outright rejection of the argument that nobody\t has
\na  right  to engage himself in ‘street\ttrading’.  “Justice,
\nsocial, economic and political” and “citizens, men and women
\nequally, have the right to an adequate means to\t livelihood”
\nwhich the Constitution of India promises is still a distinct
\ndream.\tThis Court, in various judgments, has  reminded\t the
\nGovernment  of its constitutional obligations to  ameliorate
\nthe  lot  of  the  poor in  India.  Nothing  much  has\tbeen
\nachieved.  An alarming percentage of population in India  is
\nstill  living  below  poverty-line. There  are\tmillions  of
\nregistered unemployed. The Government, in spite of constitu-
\ntional\tmandate is unable to provide them  with\t employment.
\nBut when, by gathering meagre resources, they try to  employ
\nthemselves  as\thawkers or street-traders,  they  cannot  be
\nstopped\t on the pretext that they have no right, rather\t the
\nGovernment should render all help to rehabilitate them.
\n   Mr.\tTarkunde  contended  that  street-trading,  being  a
\ncommon\tlaw right, has to be treated as a fundamental  right
\nunder  Article 19(l)(g) of the Constitution of India. It  is
\nnot  necessary to examine the matter from this aspect.\tOnce
\nstreet-trading is accepted as legitimate trade, business  or
\noccupation  it\tautomatically comes  within  the  protection
\nguaranteed  under  Article 19(1)(g) of the  Constitution  of
\nIndia. There is no dispute that public streets are primarily
\nto  be used by the public generally as pathways for  passing
\nand  repassing\tbut there are other ancillary  purposes\t for
\nwhich the public streets can be used as of right. In  Manzur
\nHasan  v. Muhammed Zaman, 52 I.A. 61 the Privy Council\theld
\nas under:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “In  India,  there  is a right  to  conduct  a
\n\t      religious\t  processionwith   its\t appropriate
\n\t      observances through a public street so that it
\n\t      does  not interfere with the ordinary  use  of
\n\t      the  street  by  the public,  and\t subject  to
\n\t      lawful directions by the magistrates. A  civil
\n\t      suit for a declaration lies against those\t who
\n\t      interfere\t with a religious procession or\t its
\n\t      appropriate observance.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In  Saghir Ahmed v. The State of U. P. and others, [1955]  1
\nS.C.R.\n<\/p>\n
1063<\/span><\/p>\n
707, this Court held that a business of transporting passen-
\ngers with the aid of vehicles was a trade or business and as
\nsuch was guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the  Constitu-
\ntion  of  India.  In Himat Lal K. Shah\tv.  Commissioner  of
\nPolice,\t Ahmedabad  and<\/a> another, [1973] 2 S.C.R.  266,\tthis
\nCourt  held that right to hold a public meeting on a  public
\nstreet is a fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a) and (b)
\nof  the Constitution of India and the same cannot  be  arbi-
\ntrarily\t denied. There is thus no justification to deny\t the
\ncitizens  of  their right to earn livelihood  by  using\t the
\npublic streets for the purpose of trade and business.
\n    In\tIndia there are large number of people who  are\t en-
\ngaged in the business of ‘street trading’. There is hardly a
\nhousehold  where hawkers do not reach. The house-wives\twait
\nfor  a vegetable vendor or a fruit seller  who\tconveniently
\ndelivers  the daily-needs at the door-step. The\t petitioners
\nbefore\tus are street-traders of Delhi and New Delhi  areas.
\nSome of them have licences\/Tehbazari from Municipal Corpora-
\ntion of Delhi\/New Delhi Municipal Committee but most of them
\nare squatters. There is practically no law regulating street
\ntrading\t in Delhi\/New Delhi. The skeletal provisions in\t the
\nDelhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 and the Punjab Munici-
\npal Act, 1911 can hardly provide any regulatory measures  to
\nthe  enormous and complicated problem of street\t trading  in
\nthese areas.\n<\/p>\n
    In Bombay Hawkers’ Union and others v. Bombay  Municipal
\nCorporation  and  others<\/a>,  [1985] 3 S.C.C.  525\t this  Court
\nsuggested  that\t schemes be framed to regulate\tthe  hawking
\nbusiness by creating hawking and non-hawking zones. Again in
\nMunicipal  Corporation of Delhi v. Gumam Kaur,\tA.I.R.<\/a>\t1989
\nS.C. 38 this Court observed as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t      ”\t ……\t We feel that the Municipal Corpora-
\n\t      tion  authorities\t in  consultation  with\t the
\n\t      Delhi  Development Authority should  endeavour
\n\t      to  find a solution on the lines as  suggested
\n\t      in  Bombay  Hawkers’ Union  i.e.\tby  creating
\n\t      Hawking and Non-Hawking Zones and shifting the
\n\t      pavement\tsquatters to Areas other  than\tNon-
\n\t      Hawking  Zones. The authorities in devising  a
\n\t      scheme must endeavour to achieve a twin object
\n\t      viz., to preserve and maintain the beauty\t and
\n\t      the  grandeur of this great historic  city  of
\n\t      Delhi  from  an aesthetic point  of  view,  by
\n\t      reducing congestion on the public streets\t and
\n\t      removing\tall  encroachments which  cause\t ob-
\n\t      structions  to the free flow of traffic,\tand-
\n\t      rehabilitate those unfortunate persons who  by
\n\t      force or circumstances,
\n\t      1064<\/span>
\n\t      are  made\t to ply their trade or\tbusiness  on
\n\t      pavements or public streets.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    Street Trading being a fundamental right has to be\tmade
\navailable  to the citizens subject to Article 19(6)  of\t the
\nConstitution.  It is within the domain of the State to\tmake
\nany law imposing reasonable restrictions in the interest  of
\ngeneral public. This can be done by an enactment on the same
\nlines  as in England or by any other law  permissible  under
\nArticle\t 19(6)\tof the Constitution. In\t spite\tof  repeated
\nsuggestions  by\t this Court nothing has been  done  in\tthis
\nrespect. Since a citizen has no right to choose a particular
\nplace  in  any street for trading, it is for  the  State  to
\ndesignate  the\tstreets and earmark the\t places\t from  where
\nstreet\ttrading\t can be done. In-action on the part  of\t the
\nState would result in negating the fundamental right of\t the
\ncitizens. It is expected that the State will do the  needful
\nin  this respect within a reasonable time failing  which  it
\nwould  be  left to the courts to protect the rights  of\t the
\ncitizens.\n<\/p>\n
R.S.S.\t\t\t\t\t    Petitions\tdis-\nposed of.\n1065<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Sodan Singh Etc. Etc vs New Delhi Municipal Committee & … on 30 August, 1989 Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 1988, 1989 SCR (3)1038 Author: L Sharma Bench: Venkataramiah, E.S. (Cj), Natrajan, S. (J), Sharma, L.M. (J), Ojha, N.D. (J), Kuldip Singh (J) PETITIONER: SODAN SINGH ETC. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: NEW DELHI […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-154784","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nSodan Singh Etc. 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