{"id":15731,"date":"1964-02-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1964-02-06T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/lalji-haridas-vs-state-of-maharashtra-and-another-on-7-february-1964"},"modified":"2019-04-11T15:27:27","modified_gmt":"2019-04-11T09:57:27","slug":"lalji-haridas-vs-state-of-maharashtra-and-another-on-7-february-1964","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/lalji-haridas-vs-state-of-maharashtra-and-another-on-7-february-1964","title":{"rendered":"Lalji Haridas vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 7 February, 1964"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Lalji Haridas vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 7 February, 1964<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 1154, \t\t 1964 SCR (6) 700<\/div>\n
Author: B P Sinha<\/div>\n
Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Sarkar, A.K., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nLALJI HARIDAS\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSTATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n07\/02\/1964\n\nBENCH:\nSINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)\nBENCH:\nSINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)\nSARKAR, A.K.\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\n\nCITATION:\n 1964 AIR 1154\t\t  1964 SCR  (6) 700\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1969 SC 724\t (20)\n RF\t    1971 SC  44\t (32,33,37)\n D\t    1988 SC2267\t (32)\n\n\nACT:\nIncome Tax-False evidence in the proceedings before  Income-\ntax Officer-For the purpose of s. 195(1)(b) Code of Criminal\nProcedure the proceedings if proceedings in a  court-whether\nComplaint  has to be made by the  Income-tax  Officer-Indian\nIncome-tax  Act, 1922 (11 of 1922), s. 37-Code\tof  Criminal\nProcedure,  1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 195(1)(b)-Indian  Penal\nCode, 1860 (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 193, 228.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe appellant filed a criminal complaint against  respondent\nNo. 2 alleging that he had committed an offence under s. 193\nof  the Indian Penal Code, 1860 by giving false evidence  in\ncertain\t proceedings before the Income-tax Officer under  s.\n37  of\tthe Indian Income-tax Act, 1922.  Respondent  No.  2\nraised\ta preliminary objection that the learned  Magistrate\ncould not take cognizance of the said complaint, because the\nproceedings  in\t which he was alleged to have made  a  false\nstatement on oath were proceedings before a court within the\nmeaning\t of s. 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,\n1898, and since no complaint in writing had been made by the\ncourt  of  the\tIncome-tax  Officer  the  provision  of\t  s.\n195(1)(b)  created  a  bar against  the\t competence  of\t the\nappellant's complaint.\tOn the rejection of this preliminary\nobjection  respondent  No. 2 preferred a  criminal  revision\napplication  before  the Bombay High  Court  impleading\t the\nState  of  Maharashtra as respondent No. 1. The\t High  Court\nallowed\t the revision application.  Thereupon the  appellant\nappealed  to this Court on a certificate issued\t under\tArt.\n134(1)(c) of the Constitution.\nThe  short  question  before  this  court  was\twhether\t the\nproceedings before an Income-tax Officer under s. 37 of\t the\nIncome-tax  Act can be said to be a proceeding in any  court\nwithin\tthe  meaning  of  s.  195(1)(b)\t Code  of   Criminal\nProcedure.\nHeld  (per P. B. Gajendragadkar, C.J., K. N. Wanchoo and  N.\nRajagopala  Ayyangar JJ.) (i) While the\t Income-tax  Officer\nexercises  his\tpowers\tunder s. 37(1),\t (2)  and  (3),\t the\nproceedings  held  by him are judicial proceedings  for\t the\npurposes  of ss. 193, 196 and 228 Indian Penal Code and\t the\nfalse statement alleged to have been made by respondent\t No.\n2 was Made in a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s.\n193, Indian Penal Code.\n(ii)It\tis  not necessary to decide  the  general  question\nwhether\t the  Income-tax Officer is a Court or\tnot  for  s.\n37(4) of the Income-tax\n\t\t\t    701\nAct  makes  the proceedings before the\tIncome-tax  Officer,\njudicial proceedings for the purposes of s. 193 Indian Penal\nCode  and  these  judicial proceedings must  be\t treated  as\nproceedings  in\t any court for the purpose of  s.  195(1)(b)\nCode  of  Criminal Procedure.  The High Court was  right  in\nallowing  the  revision application on the ground  that\t the\ncondition  precedent  prescribed  by s.\t 195(1)(b)  Code  of\nCriminal  Procedure  had  not  been  complied  with  as\t  no\ncomplaint has been filed by the Income-tax Officer.\nJagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh,<\/a> [1963] 2  S.C.R.\n850  and  Puran Chand Maneklal, in re: I.L.R. 38  Bom.\t642,\ndistinguished.\nPer  Sarkar  and  Das Gupta JJ. (dissenting)  (i)  From\t the\nnature\tof  functions under the various\t provisions  of\t the\nIncome-tax Act it is clear that the Income-tax Officer is  a\npart  and parcel of the executive organ of the\tState.\t The\nfact that for carrying out some of these executive functions\nhe  will have the powers as are vested in a court under\t the\nCode  of  Civil Procedure will not make him a  limb  of\t the\njudicial  organ.  Neither does the fact that he is a  quasi-\njudicial authority make him a court.\n(ii)In Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Lakshmi Chand. [1963] Supp. 1\nS.C.R.\t242 this court has held that the Income-tax  Officer\nis not a Tribunal and therefore it is obvious that he cannot\nbe a court.\n(iii)To\t say  that the legislature in providing\t in  s.\n37(4) of the   Indian  Income-tax  Act\tthat  a\t  proceeding\nbefore the specifiedauthority\t   shall  be deemed  to\nbe a judicial proceeding within the meaningof  s. 193  and\ns. 228 Indian Penal Code intended also to say that suchauthority\nshall be deemed to be a court within the meaning of s. 195Code\nof   Criminal\tProcedure   would  be  to  impute   to\t the\nlegislature anintention\t     of\t which\tit  itself  had\t no\nknowledge.\n(iv)The\t words\tused  in s. 37(4)  of  the  Income-tax\tAct\nfurnishes  no  reason to alter the legal  position  that  is\ninescapable  on\t a  consideration of the  functions  of\t the\nIncome-tax Officer that he is not a court within the meaning\nof s. 195 Code of Criminal Procedure.\nJagannath Prasad v. State of Uttar Pradesh,<\/a> [1963] 2  S.C.R.\n850,  Punamchand Manaklal, re: I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642, State  v.\nNemchatid  Pesvir,  57\tBom.   L.R,  1056,  Indochina  Steam\nNavigation Co. Ltd. v. The Additional Collector of  Customs,<\/a>\n[1964] 6 S.C.R. 394, referred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 141  of
\n1962.\n<\/p>\n
Appeal\tfrom the judgment and order dated January 30,  1962,
\nof  the Bombay High Court in Criminal  Revision\t Application
\nNo. 1142 of 1960.\n<\/p>\n
S.V.  Gupte,  Additional Solicitor-General, J.\tB.  Dada-
\nchanji, O. C. Mathur and Ravinder Narain, for the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
702<\/span><\/p>\n
S.   K. Kapur and R. H. Dhebar., for respondent No. 1.
\nS.   T.\t Desai,\t J.  L.\t  Jain\tand  V.\t J.  Merchant,\t for
\nrespondent No. 2.\n<\/p>\n
February  7,  1964.  The Judgment  of  Gajendragadkar  C.J.,
\nWanchoo\t and  Rajagopala  Ayyangar  JJ.\t was  delivered\t  by
\nGajendragadkar C.J. The dissenting opinion of Sarkar and Das
\nGupta JJ. was delivered by Das Gupta J.\n<\/p>\n
GAJENDRAGADKAR\tC.J.-The short question of law which  arises
\nfor  our  decision  in the present  appeal  is\twhether\t the
\nproceeding before an Income-tax Officer under section 37  of
\nthe   Indian  Income-tax  Act,\t1922  (No.   XI\t  of   1922)
\n(hereinafter called the Act) can be said to be a  proceeding
\nin any court within the meaning of s. 195(1)(b) of the\tCode
\nof  Criminal Procedure.\t This question arises in  this\tway.
\nThe  appellant\tLalji  Haridas and respondent  No.  2  Mulii
\nManiial\t Kamdar\t are businessmen and they  carry  oil  their
\nbusiness  in  Jamnagar and Bombay respectively.\t  They\thave
\nknown  each  other for several years past in the  course  of
\ntheir  ordinary\t business  activities.\t In  the  income-tax
\nassessment  proceedings of the appellant for the  assessment
\nyears 1949-50 and 1950-51, respondent No. 2 gave evidence on
\noath before the Income-tax Officer, Ward A, Jamnagar on\t the
\n4th December, 1958.  In his evidence he denied that he had a
\nson  named Nihal Chand and that he had done any business  in
\nthe name of M\/s.  Nihal Chand & Co. at Jamnagar.   According
\nto  the\t appellant, the said statements were  false  to\t the
\nknowledge  of  respondent  No. 2 and were  made\t by  him  to
\nmislead the Income-tax Officer and to avoid the incidence of
\nincome-tax  on\thimself.  As a re. sult of  the\t said  false
\nstatements, the appellant was heavily taxed.
\nOn  the 24th November, 1959, the appellant filed a  criminal
\ncomplaint against respondent No. 2 under section 193 of\t the
\nIndian\tPenal Code (No. 452\/S of 1959) in the Court  of\t the
\nPresidency  Magistrate, 19th Court, Esplanades,\t Bombay.  At
\nthe hearing of the said complaint, respondent No. 2 raised a
\npreliminary objection that the learned Magistrate could\t not
\ntake cognizance of the said complaint, because the
\n\t\t\t    703<\/span>
\nproceedings  in\t which he was alleged to have made  a  false
\nstatement on oath were proceedings before a Court within the
\nmeaning of s. 195 (1) (b) Cr.  P.C., and since no  complaint
\nin  writing  had been made by the Court\t of  the  Income-tax
\nOfficer\t before which the said proceedings  were  conducted,
\nthe provisions of s. 1 95 (1) (b) created a bar against\t the
\ncompetence of the appellant’s complaint.  The learned Presi-
\ndency Magistrate held that the Income-tax Officer was not  a
\nCourt  within the meaning of s. 195(1) (b), Cr.\t  P.C.,\t and
\nso,   he  rejected  the\t preliminary  objection\t raised\t  by
\nrespondent No. 2.\n<\/p>\n
Against\t the  said decision of\tthe  Presidency\t Magistrate,
\nrespondent  No. 2 preferred a Criminal Revision\t Application
\n(No. 1142 of 1960) before the Bombay High Court.  The  State
\nof Maharashtra was impleaded as respondent No. 1 to the said
\nRevision  Application.\t A Division Bench of the  said\tHigh
\nCourt  reversed the conclusion of the Presidency  Magistrate
\nand held that the Income-tax Officer was a Court within\t the
\nmeaning\t of s. 195(1) (b), Cr.\tP.C., and so, it upheld\t the
\npreliminary  objection\traised by respondent No. 2.  In\t the
\nresult, the complaint filed by the appellant was ordered  to
\nbe dismissed.  The appellant then applied for and obtained a
\ncertificate from the Bombay High Court under Art. 134(1) (c)
\nof the Constitution and it is with the said certificate that
\nhe  has brought the present appeal before us.  That  is\t how
\nthe  narrow  question which arises for our decision  in\t the
\npresent appeal is whether the proceedings before an  Income-
\ntax Officer are proceedings in any Court under s. 195(1)(b),
\nCr.   P.C. The question thus raised is undoubtedly  a  short
\none,  but  its decision is not easy, because  the  arguments
\nurged  in  support of the two respective  constructions\t are
\nfairly balanced and the task of preferring one\tconstruction
\nto the other presents some difficulty.\n<\/p>\n
The proceedings before the Income-tax Officer during  which,
\naccording  to the appellant, respondent No. 2 made  a  false
\nstatement on oath, were held by the Income-tax Officer under
\ns.  37 of the Act.  Section 37(1) deals with the  powers  of
\nIncome-tax  authorities and provides, inter alia,  that\t the
\nIncome-tax  Officer shall, for the purposes of the Act\thave
\nthe  same powers as are vested in a Court under the Code  of
\nCivil  Procedure, 1908 (No.  V of 1908), when trying a\tsuit
\nin
\n704<\/span>
\nrespect\t of  the matters specified by clauses  (a)  to\t(d).
\nSection\t 37(2) confers upon the Income-tax  Officer  certain
\nadditional  powers  which can be exercised  subject  to\t any
\nrules  made  in that behalf, provided the  said\t Officer  is
\nspecially authorised by the Commissioner in that behalf, and
\nin  exercising these powers, the provisions of the  Code  of
\nCriminal Procedure 1898 relating to searches apply.  Section
\n37(3)  deals with the question of impounding  and  retaining
\nany  books of account or other documents.  That takes us  to
\ns.  37(4)  which is relevant for our purpose;  this  section
\nprovides  that any proceeding before any authority  referred
\nto  in\tthis  section  shall be\t deemed\t to  be\t a  judicial
\nproceeding  within the meaning of sections 193 and 228,\t and
\nfor  the purposes of section 196 of the Indian\tPenal  Code.
\nIt is thus clear that while the Income-tax Officer exercises
\nhis powers under s. 37(1), (2) and (3) the proceedings\theld
\nby  him\t arc judicial proceedings for the  purposes  of\t the
\nthree  sections of the Indian Penal Code mentioned  in\tsub-
\nsection\t (4).\tTherefore, the question as  to\twhether\t the
\nfalse statement alleged to have been made by respondent\t No.
\n2  was\tmade by him at any stage of  a\tjudicial  proceeding
\nwithin the meaning of s. 193 I.P.C., must be answered in the
\naffirmative.   That is the plain effect of s. 37(4)  of\t the
\nAct.\n<\/p>\n
Section\t 193  of the Indian Penai Code. with  which  we\t are
\ndirectly  concerned  in\t the  present  appeal  provides\t for
\npunishment  for\t intentionally giving  false  evidence.\t  It
\nconsists  of  two parts; the first part deals,\tinter  alia,
\nwith  false evidence intentionally given in any stage  of  a
\njudicial  proceeding, and prescribes that the  person  found
\nguilty\tof  having given such false evidence in\t a  judicial
\nproceeding  shall  be punished with imprisonment  of  either
\ndescription for a term which may extend to seven years,\t and
\nshall  also  be liable lo fine; the second part\t deals\twith
\ncases  where false evidence has been intentionally given  in
\nany  other case, and it prescribes the maximum\tsentence  of
\nthree  years as well as fine.  In other words, if the  false
\nevidence  has  been  intentionally  given  in  any  judicial
\nproceeding, the sentence awardable is higher than that where
\nfalse  evidence is intentionally given in proceedings  which
\nare  not judicial.  There are three explanations to s.\t193.
\nExpln.\tI provides that a trial before a Court-martial is  a
\njudicial proceeding; expln. 2 lays down that an investi-\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    705<\/span><\/p>\n
gation directed by law preliminary to a proceeding before  a
\nCourt  of  Justice,  is a stage of  a  judicial\t proceeding,
\nthough that investigation may not take place before a  Court
\nof  Justice;  this  explanation\t takes\tin,  for   instance,
\ncommittal  proceedings.\t  Under expln. 3,  an  investigation
\ndirected  by  a\t Court ,of Justice  according  to  law,\t and
\nconducted  under the authority of a Court of Justice,  is  a
\nstage  of a judicial proceeding, though\t that  investigation
\nmay  not  take\tplace  before  a  Court\t of  Justice.\tThis
\nexplanation  covers  enquiries before  officers\t deputed  by
\nCourts\tof Justice to ascertain, for instance, on  the\tspot
\nthe  boundaries of land.  It would thus be seen that  having
\nprovided  for a higher sentence in regard to the offence  of
\ngiving false evidence in any stage of a judicial proceeding,
\nthe  three  explanations  of  s.  193  include\twithin\t the
\nexpression  “judicial proceeding” certain proceedings  which
\non a strict construction of the said expression may not have
\nbeen  included\tunder it.  For the purpose  of\tthe  present
\nappeal,\t however, the only point to notice at this stage  is
\nthat  s.  37(4)\t of the Act makes  a  proceeding  before  an
\nIncome-tax Officer, held under the said section, a  judicial
\nproceeding for the purposes of s. 193, I.P.C. and that means
\nthat  if  an offence of giving false evidence is  proved  to
\nhave  been committed by a person in a proceeding before\t the
\nIncome-tax  Officer,  he  would be  liable  for\t the  higher
\nsentence awardable under the first part of section 193.
\nThat  takes  us\t to  section 195 of  the  Code\tof  Criminal
\nProcedure.  It is well-known that s. 195 provides for an ex-
\nception\t to  the ordinary rule that any person\tcan  make  a
\ncomplaint in respect of the commission of an offence triable
\nunder  the  Cr.\t P. C. Section 4(h) of this Code  defines  a
\n“complaint”  as\t meaning the allegation made  orally  or  in
\nwriting\t to a Magistrate, with a view to his  taking  action
\nunder the Code, that some person, whether known or  unknown,
\nhas committed an offence, but does not include the report of
\na police officer.  This definition shows that any person can
\nmake a complaint in respect of the commission of an offence.
\nSection 190 requires that the Magistrate to whom a complaint
\nhas been made should take cognizance of the said  complaint,
\nsubject\t to the provisions of the said section.\t  Thus,\t the
\ngeneral rule is that any person can make a complaint, and s.
\n195 provides for an exception.\tSection 195(1)
\n134-159 S.C.-45
\n706<\/span>\n<\/p>\n
(b)with which we are concerned, provides that no Court shall
\ntake cognizance of any offence punishable under the sections
\ntherein mentioned, when such offence is alleged to have been
\ncommitted  in,\tor  in relation to, any\t proceeding  in\t any
\nCourt, except the complaint in writing of such Court, or  of
\nsome other Court to which such Court is subordinate, amongst
\nthe  sections mentioned are sections 193 and 228 I.P.C.\t The
\neffect of these provisions is that if an offence is  alleged
\nto have been committed either under s. 193 or s. 228 I.P.C.,
\nand  it\t appears  that the said\t offence  was  committed  in
\nrelation  to any proceeding in any Court, it is only if\t the
\nsaid Court, or the Court to which it is subordinate, makes a
\ncomplaint  in that behalf that cognizance will be  taken  of
\nthe  said  complaint.  A person cannot make a  complaint  in
\nrespect\t of  the alleged commission of any of  the  offences
\nspecified in s. 195(1)(b); that is its plain effect.
\nSection\t 195(2)\t which was added in 1923  when\tthe  earlier
\nsection\t 195  was substantially amended,  provides  that  in
\nclauses (b) and (c) of sub-section (1) the term “Court”\t in-
\ncludes\ta Civil, Revenue or Criminal Court, but it does\t not
\ninclude a Registrar or Sub-Registrar under the Indian Regis-
\ntration\t Act,  1877.   It is unnecessary to  deal  with\t the
\neffect of this provision, because, as will presently  appear
\nwe  do not propose to base our decision on the\tground\tthat
\nthe  Income-tax Officer is a Revenue Court under  this\tsub-
\nsection.   The\tonly  point  of interest  to  which  we\t may
\nincidentally  refer  is\t that  this  sub-section  gives\t  an
\ninclusive,  though not an exhaustive, definition  and  takes
\nwithin\tits purview not only Civil and Criminal Courts,\t but
\nalso  Revenue  Courts, while excluding a Registrar  or\tSub-
\nRegistrar under the Indian Registration Act.
\nIn  dealing with the question which has been raised  in\t the
\npresent appeal what we are required to determine is  whether
\na proceeding before an Income-tax Officer which by virtue of
\nthe  operation of s.37(4) of the Act, must be held to  be  a
\njudicial proceeding under s. 193, I.P.C. is a proceeding  in
\nany Court under s. 195.\t Cr.  P. C. Section 193 makes a dis-
\ntinction between offences committed in any judicial proceed-
\ning  and those committed in proceedings other than  judicial
\nproceedings, whereas s. 195(1)(b), Cr.\tP. C. does not refer
\nto judicial proceedings as such, but mentions proceedings in
\n707<\/span>
\nany Court.  That is why the controversy between the  parties
\nin  the\t present appeal lies within a very  narrow  compass.
\nCan  it\t be  said that the proceeding which  is\t a  judicial
\nproceeding  under  s.  193, I.P.C., must be  held  to  be  a
\nproceeding  in any Court under s. 195(1)(b), Cr.  P. C.?  It
\nis on this aspect of the dispute that the arguments on\tboth
\nsides are fairly balanced.\n<\/p>\n
In dealing with this question, it is unnecessary to consider
\nwhat would have been the position of the Income-tax  Officer
\nacting under s. 37(1), (2) and (3), and what would have been
\nthe  character of the proceedings taken before him  if\tsub-
\nsection\t (4) had not been enacted.  In Jagannath  Prasad  v.
\nThe  State  of Uttar Pradesh<\/a>(1), it has been  held  by\tthis
\nCourt that the Sales-tax Officer functioning under the\tU.P.
\nSales Tax Act, 1948 (No. 15 of 1948) was not a Court  within
\nthe  meaning  of  s.  195, Cr.\tP.C., and  so,\tit  was\t not
\nnecessary for him to make a complaint for the prosecution of
\nany person against whom it was alleged that he had committed
\nan  offence,under s. 471 I.P.C. This decision would tend  to
\nindicate  that\tin  the absence of s. 37(4)  it\t would\thave
\nbecome necessary to hold that the Income-tax Officer  acting
\nunder  s. 37(1), (2) and (3), would not be a Court under  s.
\n195,  Cr.  P.C., and in that sense the provisions of s.\t 195
\ncould  not  have  been\tattracted.   This  position  is\t not
\ndisputed by Mr. Desai who appears for respondent No. 2.
\nHe, however, contends that the provisions of s. 37(4)  which
\nhave  been  inserted  in  the  Act  in\t1956  make  all\t the
\ndifference, and according to him, this sub-section was added
\nin  order to make s. 195 (1) (b), Cr.  P. C., applicable  to
\nthe proceedings before the Income-tax Officer.\tOn the other
\nhand,  the  Additional\tSolicitor-General  has\t strenuously
\nargued that the purpose which the legislature had in mind in
\ninserting  sub-section (4) in s. 37 was merely to  make\t the
\nproceedings   before   the   Income-tax\t  Officer   judicial
\nproceedings within the meaning of s. 193, I.P.C., and not to
\nmake  s. 195 (1) (b), Cr. P. C. applicable to them.  If\t the
\nintention   of\tthe  legislature  had  been  to\t  take\t the
\nproceedings   before  the  Income-tax  Officer\twithin\t the
\nmischief  of  the  said\t section  of  the  Cr.\t P.C.,\t the
\nlegislature would have expressly said so in terms.  The
\n(1)  [1953]2 S.C.R. 850
\n708<\/span>
\nomission to refer to the relevant provision of the Cr.\tP.C.
\nin  s.\t37(4)  is not accidental, but  deliberate,  and\t so,
\nthough\tthe proceeding before the Income-tax Officer may  be
\nand  has  to be regarded as a judicial proceeding  under  s.
\n193,  I.P.C., it cannot be said to be a proceeding before  a
\nCourt, because the Income-tax Officer is not a Court.
\nIn support of his argument, the Additional Solicitor General
\nhas  referred us to several statutes where  the\t legislative
\nintention to extend the provisions of s. 195, Cr.  P.C.,  to
\nspecific  proceedings  has  been carried out  by  making  an
\nexpress\t provision in that behalf.  Section 23 of the  Work-
\nmen’s  Compensation Act, 1923 (No. 8 of 1923) provides\tthat
\nthe Commissioner shall have all the powers of a Civil  Court
\nfor the purposes therein indicated, and by an amendment made
\nin 1929, it further lays down that the Commissioner shall be
\ndeemed\tto be a Civil Court for all the purposes of  s.\t 195
\nand  Chapter  35  of the Code of  Criminal  Procedure.\t The
\nargument is that where the legislature wanted to extend\t the
\nprovisions  of s. 195, Cr.  P.C. to the\t proceedings  before
\nthe Commissioner held under the Workmen’s Compensation\tAct,
\nit  thought  it\t necessary to make a  specific\tand  express
\nprovision in that behalf.. A similar provision is  contained
\nin s. 18 of the Payment of Wages Act, 1936 (No. 4 of  1936).
\nIn  the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947),\t the
\nposition  is  similar to that in the case of  the  Workmen’s
\nCompensation  Act; section 11(4) confers on the\t authorities
\ntherein\t specified powers as are vested in a Civil Court  in
\nrespect\t of  the matter mentioned therein.   In\t 1950,\tsub-
\nsection (8) was added to section II by which it was provided
\nthat every Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall
\nbe deemed to be Civil Court for the purposes of sections 480
\nand 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.  This scheme also
\nshows, says the Additional Solicitor-General, that where the
\nlegislature wants to make any Tribunal or authority a Court,
\nit  uses  express and appropriate language in  that  behalf.
\nSection\t 45 of the Administration of Evacuee  Property\tAct,
\n1950  (No.  31 of 1950) likewise confers powers of  a  Civil
\nCourt\ton  the\t Custodian  and\t expressly  adds  that\t the
\nproceedings  before  him  shall be  deemed  to\tbe  judicial
\nproceedings  within the meaning of sections 193 and  228  of
\nthe Indian Penal Code, and the Custodian shall be deemed
\n709<\/span>
\nto be a Court within the meaning of sections 480 and 482  of
\nthe Code of Criminal Procedure.\t The same provision is\tmade
\nby s. 17 of the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act. 1951 (Act
\n64  of\t1951),\tas well as by section 26  of  the  Displaced
\nPersons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1954 (No.  44
\nof 1954).\n<\/p>\n
On  the other hand, s. 51 of the ministrator-General’s\tAct,
\n1913  (No.  3  of 1913) provides that  whoever,\t during\t any
\nexamination authorised by this Act, makes a false  statement
\non oath knowingly, he shall be deemed to have  intentionally
\ngiven false evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding The
\nargument  is  that in this case, the legislature  wanted  to
\nequate the proceedings under this Act with judicial proceed-
\nings  under s. 193, I.P.C., and did not intend to make\tsec-
\ntion 195, Cr.  P.C., applicable to them, because it does not
\nmake  the authority under this Act a Court, or does not,  in
\nterms, extend the provisions of the said section to the pro-
\nceedings  held before such an authority.  The  same  comment
\nhas  been  made on the provisions of s. 171A(4) of  the\t Sea
\nCustoms\t Act,  1878 (No. 8 of 1878).   Thus  presented,\t the
\nargument  is no doubt attractive and cannot be\trejected  as
\nwithout any substance.\n<\/p>\n
The  expression “judicial proceeding” is not defined in\t the
\nIndian\tPenal Code, but we have the definition of  the\tsaid
\nexpression  under  s.,\t4(m) of\t the  Cr.   Procedure  Code.
\nSection\t 4(m) provides that “judicial  proceeding”  includes
\nany proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may  be
\nlegally\t taken\ton  oath.  The\texpression  “Court”  is\t not
\ndefined either by the Cr.  P.C. or the I.P.C. though  ‘Court
\nof  Justice’  is  defined by s. 20 of  the  latter  Code  as
\ndenoting  a Judge who is empowered by law to act  judicially
\nalone, or a body of Judges which is empowered by law to\t act
\njudicially  as a body, when such Judge or body of Judges  is
\nacting judicially.  Section 3 of the Evidence Act defines  a
\n“Court”\t as  including all Judges and  Magistrates  and\t all
\npersons\t except the Arbitrators legally authorised  to\ttake
\nevidence.   Prima facie, there is some force in the  conten-
\ntion  that  it would not be reasonable\tto  predicate  about
\nevery ,judicial proceeding that it is a proceeding before  a
\nCourt,\tand  so, it is open to the appellant  to  urge\tthat
\nthough the proceeding before an Income-tax Officer may be  a
\njudicial
\n710<\/span>
\nproceeding  under s. 193, I.P.C., it would not\tfollow\tthat
\nthe  said judicial proceeding is a proceeding in a Court  as
\nrequired by s. 195(i)(b), Cr.  P.C.\n<\/p>\n
It  is somewhat remarkable that though section 193,  I.P.C.,
\nrefers\tto  a judicial proceeding, section  195,  Cr.\tP.C.
\nrefers\tto  a  proceeding in any Court; it does\t not  say  a
\njudicial  proceeding in any Court.  Mr. Desai contends\tthat
\nreading\t section  193  I.P.C. and s.  195(1)(b)\t Cr.   P.C.,
\ntogether.  it  would  not  be  unreasonable  to\t hold\tthat
\nproceedings  which are judicial under the former, should  be
\ntaken to be proceedings in any Court under the latter.\t The
\nwhole basis of providing for a higher sentence in regard  to
\noffences  committed  at any stage of a\tjudicial  proceeding
\nappears\t to be that the legislature took the view  that\t the
\nsaid  offences\twere more serious in character, and  so,  it
\ndistinguished  the  said  offences  from  similar   offences
\ncommitted  at any stage of other proceedings.  The  argument
\nis that while providing for a higher sentence in respect  of
\nthis  more serious class of offences committed at any  stage
\nof judicial proceedings, the legislature intended that there
\nshould be a safeguard in respect of complaint as regards the
\nsaid   offences\t and  that  safeguard  is  provided  by\t  s.
\n195(1)(b),  Cr.P.C.  In\t other words, an  offence  which  is
\ntreated\t as more serious by the first paragraph of  s.\t193,
\nI.P.C. because it is an offence committed during the  course
\nof  a  judicial proceeding should be held to be\t an  offence
\ncommitted in any proceeding in any Court for the purpose  of
\ns.  195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. On this argument, it is  necessary  to
\nconsider  whether the Income-tax Officer is a Court or\tnot,
\nfor,  in  substance, the contention is that as\tsoon  as  s.
\n37(4)  of  the Act was enacted, the  proceedings  before  an
\nIncome-tax  Officer  became  judicial  proceedings  for\t the
\npurpose\t of s. 193, I.P.C. and since they are classed  under
\nthe  first paragraph of the said section, they\tattract\t the
\nprotection of s. 195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. In our opinion, there is
\nconsiderable  force in this argument, and, on the whole.  we
\nare  inclined  to prefer the construction suggested  by\t Mr.
\nDesai  to that pressed before us by the\t learned  Additional
\nSolicitor-General.\n<\/p>\n
It  is\ttrue, the Additional  Solicitor-General\t has  mainly
\nrelied\tupon the relevant provisions of several statutes  in
\nsupport of his construction and in so far as it appears that
\n\t\t\t    711<\/span>
\ncertain\t provisions  in some of the said statutes  in  terms
\nextend\tthe  application  of  s.  195,\tCr.   P.C.  to\t the
\nproceedings to which they relate, the argument does  receive
\nsupport, but we hesitate to hold that the omission to  refer
\nto  s.\t195(1)\t(b),  Cr.  P.C.\t in  s.\t 37(4)\tof  the\t Act
\nnecessarily  means that the intention of the legislature  in
\nenacting  s.  37(4) was merely and solely to provide  for  a
\nhigher\tsentence  in  regard to the offence  under  s.\t193,
\nI.P.C. if it was committed in proceedings before the Income-
\ntax  Officer.\tIt  is plain that if  the  argument  of\t the
\nAdditional  Solicitor-General is accepted, the result  would
\nbe  that  a complaint like the present can be  made  by\t any
\nperson\tand  if the offence alleged is proved,\tthe  accused
\nwould  be liable to receive hi-her penalty  awardable  under
\nthe first paragraph of s. 193, I.P.C. without the  safeguard
\ncorrespondingly provided by s. 195(1)(b), Cr.  P.C. Could it
\nhave  been  the intention of the legislature in\t making\t the
\noffence\t committed during the course of a proceeding  before
\nan  Income-tax\tOfficer\t more serious  without\taffording  a
\ncorresponding  safeguard in respect of the complaints  which\n<\/p>\n
-can  be made in that behalf?  We are inclined to hold\tthat
\nthe  answer to this question must be in the negative.\tThat
\nis  why\t after careful consideration. we have  come  to\t the
\nconclusion  that  the view taken by the\t Bombay\t High  Court
\nshould\tbe  upheld though for  different  reasons.   Section
\n37(4)  ,of the Act makes the proceedings before the  Income-
\ntax  Officer  judicial proceedings under s. 193\t I.P.C.\t and
\nthese judicial proceedings must be treated as proceedings in
\nany  Court for the purpose of s. 195(1)(b), Cr.\t P.C.  That.
\nwe  think,  would  really carry out  the  intention  of\t the
\nlegislature in enacting s. 37(4) of the Act.
\nIn this connection. there is another consideration which has
\nweighed in our minds.  We have already noticed that s. 37(4)
\nmakes the proceedings before the Income-tax Officer judicial
\nproceedings within the meaning of s. 228 I.P.C. When we turn
\nto the latter section, we notice that the said section deals
\nwith   the  offence  of\t intentionally\tcausing\t insult\t  or
\ninterruption to public servant sitting in judicial  proceed-
\ning.  It is obvious that the offence with which s. 228 deals
\nis an offence committed against a public servant sitting  in
\na judicial proceeding.\tThis section is one of the  sections
\nmentioned in s. 195(1)(b), Cr.\tP.C., and so. any  complaint
\nin
\n712<\/span>
\nrespect of the offence alleged to have been committed  under
\ns.  228,  I.P.C. has to be made by the\tCourt  in  question.
\nThere can be little doubt that if a person offers an  insult
\nto  a  public servant sitting in a judicial  proceeding,  or
\ncauses.\t interruption to him while he is so sitting  at\t any
\nstage  of  the\tjudicial proceeding, the  complaint  has  to
\nproceed from the public servant himself; that is the  effect
\nof  s.\t195(1)(b) Cr. P.C. Before s. 37(4) of  the  Act\t was
\nenacted,  an  insult  given  to\t an  Income-tax\t Officer  or
\ninterruption  caused  to  his  proceedings  whilst  he\t was
\nconducting  his proceedings, would not have amounted  to  an
\noffence\t  under\t s.  228,  I.P.C.  Section  37(4)  makes   a
\nproceeding before the Income-tax Officer a proceeding  under
\ns. 228 I.P.C. and thus, an interruption in his\tproceedings,
\nor  an insult given to him, has now become punishable  under
\nthe  said  section.   Could it have  been  intended  by\t the
\nlegislature  in\t enacting s. 37(4) that\t whereas  an  insult
\noffered\t  to   a  public  servant  acting   judicially,\t  or
\ninterruption  caused  in his proceedings would\tnormally  be
\ncognizable only on the complaint of the public servant\thim-
\nself,  the  same  offence, if committed in  respect  of\t the
\nproceedings   before  an  Income-tax  Officer,\t should\t  be
\ncognizable at the complaint of a private party?\t The anomaly
\nwhich  would  result if the construction  suggested  by\t the
\nAdditional   Solicitor-General\tis  accepted,  is,  in\t our
\nopinion, so glaring that the alternative contention urged by
\nMr.  Desai and upheld by the Bombay High Court which  avoids
\nthe  said  anomaly appears to be more  reasonable  and\tmore
\nconsistent with the true intention of the legislature.\tThat
\nis  why\t we  are  not prepared\tto  accept  the\t appellant’s
\nargument  that\tthe  Bombay  High  Court  was  in  error  in
\ndismissing  his complaint on the ground that  the  condition
\nprecedent prescribed by s. 195(1) (b)\tCr.  P.C.  had\t not
\nbeen complied with as no complaint had\tbeen  filed  by\t the
\nIncome-tax Officer.\n<\/p>\n
It  appears  that In re: Punam Chand  Maneklal(1)  the\tFull
\nBench  of the Bombay High Court had taken the view  that  an
\nIncome-tax  Collector is a Revenue Court within the  meaning
\nof  that term as used in clauses (b) and (c) of s. 195,\t Cr.
\nP  C.,\t1898.  Scott, C. J. who spoke for  the\tFull  Bench,
\nobserved that it could not be contended that the  Income-tax
\nCollector  was\ta  Civil  or  Criminal\tCourt,\tand  so,  he
\naddressed himself
\n(1)  I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642.\n<\/p>\n
713<\/span><\/p>\n
to the narrow question as to whether he was a Revenue Court.
\nDealing\t with the question on that footing, he examined\t the
\nfunctions of the Income-tax Collector under Act 11 of  1886,
\nand  held  that\t he was a Revenue Court.   He  rejected\t the
\ncontention  that he could be treated as a Registrar or\tSub-
\nRegistrar  under the Registration Act, and so, he  found  no
\ndifficulty in coming to the conclusion that he was a Revenue
\nCourt.\t The  Bombay  High Court in  the  present  case\t has
\nsubstantially based itself on this decision in reversing the
\nconclusion  of the Presidency Magistrate and directing\tthat
\nthe  complaint filed by the appellant should  be  dismissed.
\nIt is unnecessary to consider whether the view taken by\t the
\nFull Bench in re: Punam Chand Maneklal(1) is right,  because
\nthe  relevant  provisions of the Income-tax  Act  have\tbeen
\nsubsequently  modified in 1922 and different  considerations
\nhave  now assumed importance.  It is no longer\tpossible  to
\nhold  that the Income-tax Officer is a Revenue\tCourt,\tand,
\nindeed, that has not been the contention raised before us by
\nMr. Desai.\n<\/p>\n
In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed.
\nDAS  GUPTA,  J.-Is an Income-tax Officer  under\t the  Indian
\nIncome-tax Act, 1922, a court within the meaning of cl.\t (b)
\nin  sub-section\t (1)  of  s. 195 of  the  Code\tof  Criminal
\nProcedure?   That is the short but difficult  question\tthat
\narises\tin this appeal against a decision of the High  Court
\nof  Judicature\tat  Bombay.   On  November  24,\t 1949,\t the
\nappellant  filed a complaint in the Court of the  Presidency
\nMagistrate, Bombay, alleging that when the respondent  Mulji
\nManilal Kamdar was examined on commission by the  Income-tax
\nOfficer,  Jamnagar Circle, Jamnagar, he gave  answers  which
\nwere  false  to his knowledge.\tHe prayed for the  issue  of
\nprocess\t against the said Mulji Manilal Kamdar, so  that  he
\nmight  be  dealt with according to law.\t  An  objection\t was
\nraised by the accused that in the absence of a complaint  by
\nthe  Income-tax Officer before whom the false statement\t was
\nalleged\t to have been made the Magistrate was debarred\tfrom
\ntaking cognizance of the case.\tThis contention was based on
\na submission that the Income-tax Officer was a court  within
\nthe meaning of s. 195(1)(b).  This objection was rejected by
\nthe Presidency Magistrate.\n<\/p>\n
(1)  I.L.R. 38 Boni. 642.\n<\/p>\n
714<\/span><\/p>\n
The  High Court of Bombay was moved against  the  Presidency
\nMagistrate’s order.  But considering itself bound by a\tFull
\nBench\tdecision  of  the  Court  in  in   re:\t Punainchand
\nManieklal(1)  and  the later decision in State\tv.  Nemchand
\nPeshvir\t (2) the High Court held that an income-tax  Officer
\nwhen holding proceedings under s. 23 of the Income-tax\tAct,
\n1922  is  a Revenue Court within the meaning of cl.  (b)  in
\nsub-section (1) of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
\nThe  correctness  of  the High Court’s\tview  is  challenged
\nbefore\t us  by\t the  complainant  on  the  strength  of   a
\ncertificate granted by the High Court finder Art. 134(1) (c)
\nof the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
Section\t 195(1)(b)  is one of the group of sections  in\t the
\nCode  of Criminal Procedure which have laid down  exceptions
\nto   the  general  rule\t of  criminal  law   that   criminal
\nproceedings can be instituted in a court by any person.\t  To
\nthis  rule s. 195 along with ss. 196, 196A, 197, 197A,\t198,
\n198A,  and 199 provide exceptions.  Section 195 mentions  in
\nits first sub-section a number of offences of which no court
\nshall take cognizance except on the complaint in writing  of
\nthe  persons  as indicated.  Three classes of  offences\t are
\ndealt  with  in\t three cls. (a), (b) and (c)  of  this\tsub-
\nsection.   Section 195(1)(a) deals with offences  punishable
\nunder  ss. 172 to 188 of the Indian Penal Code and  provides
\nthat  no Court shall take cognizance of any of these  except
\non the complaint in writing “of the public servant concerned
\nor of some other public servant to whom he is  subordinate.”
\nSection\t 195(1)(b) deals with offences punishable under\t ss.
\n193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209,\t210,
\n211  and  228  and provides that when any  such\t offence  is
\nalleged\t to  have been committed in or in  relation  to\t any
\nproceeding  in any court, no court shall take cognizance  of
\nit except on the complaint in writing of such Court or\tsome
\nother  court  to which such court is  subordinate.   Section
\n195(1)(c) deals with offences punishable under ss. 463, 471,
\n475  and  476  and provides that when any  such\t offence  is
\nalleged to have been committed by a party to any  proceeding
\nin any court in respect of any document produced
\n(1)  I.L.R. 38 Bom. 642.\n<\/p>\n
(2) 57 Bom.   L.R. 1056.\n<\/p>\n
715<\/span><\/p>\n
or given in evidence in such proceeding, no court shall take
\ncognizance of the same except on the complaint in writing of
\nsuch  court,  or  some other court to which  such  court  is
\nsubordinate.\n<\/p>\n
The second sub-section of s. 195 runs thus
\n\t      “In  clauses (b) and (c) of  sub-section\t(1),
\n\t      the term “court” includes a Civil, Revenue  or
\n\t      Criminal\t Court,\t but  does  not\t include   a
\n\t      Registrar,  or SubRegistrar, under the  Indian
\n\t      Registration Act, 1877.  ”\n<\/p>\n
In this appeal we are concerned directly with cl. (b) of  s.
\n195(1).\t  The  appellant’s complaint before  the  Magistrate
\nalleged\t the  commission of an offence under s. 193  of\t the
\nIndian\tPenal Code in the course of the examination on\toath
\nby  the\t Income-taxx  Officer,\tWard  A,  Jamnagar   Circle,
\nJamnagar.  The examination itself took place in relation  to
\nassessment proceedings against the complainant for the years
\n1949-50, and 1950-51.  If the Income-tax Officer is a  Court
\nit necessarily follows that the Magistrate was not  entitled
\nto  take cognizance of this offence except on the  complaint
\nof the Income-tax Officer.  That is how the question whether
\nthe  Income-tax\t Officer  is  a Court or  not  falls  to  be
\nconsidered.\n<\/p>\n
Section 5 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, mentions six  classes
\nof Income-tax Authorities for ;the purposes of the Act,\t The
\nprimary function of an Income-tax Officer is the  assessment
\nof  income that is chargeable to tax under s. 3 of  the\t Act
\nand  the determination of the tax payable on it.  He has  to
\nperform\t other functions under the Act that  are  subsidiary
\nand  ancillary\tto this main function.\tUnder s. 5  (7)\t the
\nIncome-tax  Officers  are  subordinate to  the\tDirector  of
\nInspection,   the   Commissioner  of  Income-tax   and\t the
\nInspecting Assistant Commissioner of Income-tax within whose
\njurisdiction  they perform their functions.  Under  s.\t5(8)
\nthey have to observe and follow the orders, instructions and
\ndirections of the Central Board of Revenue.  Chapter III  of
\nthe Act in its several sections state what heads of  income-
\nprofits\t and  gains shall be chargeable\t to  income-tax\t and
\nindicates the duties which the Income-tax Officer
\n716<\/span>
\nhas  to\t perform  for the purpose of his  main\tfunction  of
\nassessing  the chargeable income.  For instance,  deductions
\nunder  s. 7 (2) (iia) in respect of conveyance owned by\t the
\nassessee   or\tused  by  him  for  the\t  purpose   of\t his
\nemployment”shall  be such sum as the Income-tax Officer\t may
\nestimate,……..”The\tallowances  permissible\t  under\t  s.
\n10(2)(i)  “shall be such sum as the Income-tax\tOfficer\t may
\ndetermine”;  the allowances under s. 10 (2) (ix) also  shall
\nbe such sum in respect of loans made in the ordinary  course
\nof  business  as the Income-tax Officer may estimate  to  be
\nirrecoverable.\t Again, the allowances mentioned in cl.\t (a)
\nand  cl.  (b)  of s. 10(4) (a) cannot be  made\t“if  in\t the
\nopinion\t of  the Income-tax Officer any\t such  allowance  is
\nexcessive or unreasonable.” The proviso to s. 10(5) requires\n<\/p>\n
-the  Income-tax  Officer to satisfy himself  in  the  cases
\ndealt with there whether the main purpose of the transfer of
\nassets\twas  the reduction of liability\t to  income-tax\t and
\nprovides  that where he is so satisfied the actual  cost  of
\nthe  assets shall be such amount as the\t Income-tax  Officer
\nmay determine.\tOther sections showing the different matters
\nin  which the Income-tax Officer has to be satisfied  or  to
\nform an opinion for the purpose of assessment are ss. 12(a),
\n13 and 17.  Chapter IV of the Act,which lays down the proce-
\ndure to be followed in making the assessment, imposes  inter
\nalia  the duty of calling for returns of income (s. 22);  of
\nmaking\tassessment  of the Income and to determine  the\t sum
\npayable\t by  the  assessee  (s. 23);  the  power  to  assess
\nCompanies  to super-tax (s. 23A); the power to\tmake  provi-
\nsional assessment in advance of regular assessment (s. 23B).
\nIt  is obvious however that for carrying out  these  several
\nfunctions  properly  it\t is  necessary\tfor  the  Income-tax
\nOfficer\t to examine documents and persons.  Power  for\tthis
\npurpose are conferred on the Income-tax Officer (and certain
\nother  Income-tax  Authorities) in s. 37 of  the  Act.\t The
\nfirst subsection of s. 3 7 runs thus :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  Income-tax Officer, Appellate  Assistant
\n\t      Commissioner and Appellate Tribunal shall, for
\n\t      the purposes of this Act, have the same powers
\n\t      as  are  vested in a court under the  Code  of
\n\t      Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908)
\n\t\t\t\t   717<\/span>
\n\t      when trying a suit in respect of the following
\n\t      matters, namely :-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a)   discovery and inspection.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)   enforcing the attendance of any  person,
\n\t      including\t any officer of a  banking  company,
\n\t      and examining him on oath,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (c)   compelling\tthe production of  books  of
\n\t      account and other documents; and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (d)   issuing summons.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  second  subsection\t empowers  any\tIncome-tax   Officer
\nspecially authorised by the Commissioner to enter and search
\nany building and seize books of account and other documents.
\nUnder  the  third  sub-section the  Income-tax\tOfficer\t may
\nimpound\t or retain the books of account and other  documents
\nafter  following certain procedure.  The fourth\t sub-section
\nof  this  section which does not confer any powers  but\t has
\nbeen relied on strongly by the respondent will be dealt with
\nin full detail later in this judgment.\n<\/p>\n
From the brief summary of the Income-tax Officer’s functions
\ngiven above it is clear that he is a part and parcel of\t the
\nexecutive  organ of the State.\tThe fact that  for  carrying
\nout  some  of  these executive functions he  will  have\t the
\npowers\tas  are vested in a court under the  Code  of  Civil
\nProcedure  has not the effect of converting him into a\tlimb
\n,of  the  judicial  organ.  It has been held that  he  is  a
\nquasi judicial authority.  That is not sufficient however to
\nmake  him a court.  Before we can call him a court, he\tmust
\nbe  shown to be a part of the judicial organ of\t the  State.
\nLeaving\t out for later consideration the effect of s.  37(4)
\nit is clear that an Income-tax Officer is not a court.
\nWe  have not thought it necessary to refer to  the  numerous
\ndecisions  of the High Courts in India, of this Court or  of
\nthe  Privy Council in which the question of what is a  court
\nhas been considered.  We have considered this unnecessary in
\nview especially of the fact that most of these were  noticed
\nin a recent decision of this Court in Jagannath
\n718<\/span>
\nProsad\tv.  State  of Uttar Pradesh(1)\twhere  the  question
\nwhether\t a Sales Tax Officer was a court or not\t within\t the
\nmeaning\t of  s. 195(2) of the Criminal\tProcedure  Code\t was
\nconsidered.   This Court held that the Sales Tax Officer  is
\nnot  a\tCourt within the meaning of that section.   All\t the
\nreasons\t set out in this judgment which Kapur  J.  delivered
\nfor  the Court are applicable to the case of the  Income-tax
\nOfficer\t and  if the reasoning in that case is taken  to  be
\ncorrect,  as it must be, ;the Income-tax Officer  also\tmust
\nbe,  held to be not a court-unless any different  conclusion
\nis. justified from the provisions of s. 37(4) of the Act.
\nIt  will  not  be out of place to  mention  here  what\tthem
\nConstitution Bench of this Court said in Jaswant Sugar Mills
\nv.  Lakshmi Chand(2) as regards the nature of the  functions
\nof  Income-tax\tOfficers.   The\t question  for\tthe  court’s
\ndecision  in  that case was whether a  Conciliation  Officer
\nunder  cl. 29 of the Government Order under ss. 3 and  8  of
\nthe U.P. Industrial Disputes Act was a “Tribunal” within the
\nmeaning\t of Art. 136 of the Constitution and the Court\theld
\nthat it was not such a tribunal.  As illustrations of  other
\nauthorities  whose primary function is\tadministrative\teven
\nthough\tthey  have  the\t duty to  act  judicially,  Shah  J.
\nspeaking for the Court said :-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The  duty to act judicially imposed  upon  an
\n\t      authority\t by  statute  does  not\t necessarily
\n\t      clothe  the authority with the judicial  power
\n\t      of   the\t State.\t  Even\t administrative\t  or
\n\t      executive\t authorities are often by virtue  of
\n\t      their constitution, required to act judicially
\n\t      in dealing with question affecting the  rights
\n\t      of  citizens.   Boards  of  Revenue,   Customs
\n\t      Authorities,   Motor   Vehicles\tAuthorities,
\n\t      Income-tax   and\t Sales\tTax   Officers\t are
\n\t      illustrations    prima\tfacie\t of\tsuch
\n\t      administrative authorities, who though under a
\n\t      duty to act judicially, either by the  express
\n\t      provisions  of the statutes constituting\tthem
\n\t      or  by the rules framed thereunder or  by\t the
\n\t      implication  either  of the  statutes  or\t the
\n\t      powers conferred upon them are
\n\t      (1) [1963] Supp. 1 S.C.R. 242.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      719<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      still  not delegates of the judicial power  of
\n\t      the   State.    Their  primary   function\t  is
\n\t      administrative and not judicial.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  is true that the question whether an Income-tax  Officer
\nwas  a court or a tribunal was not directly for decision  in
\njaswant Sugar Mills’ case(1).  It is clear however that as a
\npart of the reasoning which the court applied for coming  to
\nthe  conclusion\t that  the Conciliation\t Officer  is  not  a
\nTribunal  this\tCourt  was of  opinion\tthat  an  Income-tax
\nOfficer\t is also not a “Tribunal”.  Obviously, if it is\t not
\neven a Tribunal it cannot be a court.\n<\/p>\n
It  is\tnot  seriously disputed by Mr.\tDesai  who  appeared
\nbefore\tus for the respondent that looking at the  functions
\nof an Income-tax Officer it is not possible to say that\t the
\nIncome-tax  Officer is a court specially after this  Court’s
\ndecision  in  Jagannath Prasad’s case(‘,)  mentioned  above.
\nHis  main  contention  is that even  though  the  Income-tax
\nOfficer was not originally a court within the meaning of  s.
\n195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the deeming provision
\nin  s. 37(4) has made him a court.  Section 37(4) runs\tthus
\n:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Any proceeding before any authority  referred
\n\t      to  in  this section shall be deemed to  be  a
\n\t      judicial proceeding within the meaning of\t ss.
\n\t      193 and 228, and for the purposes of s. 196 of
\n\t      the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The authorities mentioned in the section are the  Income-tax
\nOfficer,  the  Appellate  Assistant  Commissioner  and\t the
\nAppellate Tribunal.  The direct effect of subsection 4 of s.
\n37  therefore  is  that\t proceedings  before  an  Income-tax
\nOfficer “shall be deemed to be a judicial proceedings within
\nthe meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 and for the purposes of  s.
\n196 of the Indian Penal Code.  As we read the section it  at
\nonce leaps to the eye that there is no mention in this of s.
\n195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\tIn introducing\tthis
\ndeeming provision in 1956
\n(1)  [1963] Supp.  1 S.C.R. 242.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1963] 2 S.C.R. 850.\n<\/p>\n
720<\/span><\/p>\n
Parliament did not think it necessary to extend the  deeming
\nprovision for the purpose of s. 195.  If Parliament intended
\nthis provision to produce the consequence that the  authori-
\nties  in the section should be deemed to be a  court  within
\nthe meaning of s. 195 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
\nit is reasonable to expect that Parliament would have  added
\nthe  words  “and shall be deemed to be a  court\t within\t the
\nmeaning of s. 195 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure”, or
\n“shall\tbe deemed to be a court for the purpose of s.195  of
\nthe Code of Criminal Procedure” or some similar Phraseology.
\nThe  omission  to  use\tany  such  words  is  all  the\tmore
\nremarkable  when we notice that on several occasions  before
\n1956  Parliament  had  in expressing  an  intention  that  a
\nparticular authority should be a court for the purpose of s.
\n195 added express words to give effect to that intention.
\nThus,  in  the Payment of Wages Act, which  was\t enacted  in
\n1936,  s.  18 after stating that every\tauthority  appointed
\nunder  sub-s.  (1) of s. 15 shall have all the powers  of  a
\ncivil  court under the Code of Civil Procedure\tfor  certain
\npurposes, proceeded to say that “every such authority  shall
\nbe deemed to be a civil court for the purposes of s. 195 and
\nChapter\t XXXV  of  the Code of\tCriminal  Procedure,  1898.”
\nAgain,\tin  s. 23 of the Workmen’s  Compensation  Act  which
\nconfers\t on the Commissioner for workmen’s Compensation\t all
\nthe  powers  of\t a  civil court\t under\tthe  Code  of  Civil
\nProcedure, 1908 the legislature added in 1929 the  following
\nwords:-“and  the Commissioner shall be deemed to be a  civil
\ncourt  for  all the purposes of s. 195 and of  Chapter\tXXXV
\nof,the\tCode  of  Criminal Procedure, 1898”.   It  is  worth
\nnoticing  also\tthat in several\t other\tstatutes  parliament
\nafter  stating that certain proceeding shall be\t a  judicial
\nproceeding  within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228  of\t the
\nIndian Penal Code proceeded to say that for certain purposes
\nit shall also be deemed to be a court.\tThe Evacuee property
\nAct of 1950 after stating that the enquiry by the  custodian
\nshall  be  deemed  to be a judicial  proceeding\t within\t the
\nmeaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code,\tgoes
\non  to say “and the Custodian shall be deemed to be a  court
\nwithin\tthe  meaning  of  ss. 480 and 482  of  the  Code  of
\nCriminal Procedure, 1898”.  Another instance of similar
\n721<\/span>
\nlegislation is to be found in s. 17 of the Evacuee  Interest
\n(Separation)  Act,  195\t 1, which  after  stating  that\t any
\nproceeding  before  the competent officer or  the  appellate
\nofficer\t shall be judicial proceeding within the meaning  of
\ns.  193\t and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code adds  “and\t the
\ncompetent  Officer or the appellate officer shall be  deemed
\nto be a civil court within the meaning of s. 480 and s.\t 482
\nof  the\t Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898”.   The  Displaced
\nPersons’  (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act,  1954\tuses
\nexactly similar words in s. 26.\t That section first  confers
\non every officer appointed under the Act the same powers  in
\nrespect\t of certain specified matter,-, for the\t purpose  of
\nmaking\tany enquiry or hearing any appeal under the  Act  as
\nare  vested  in\t a  Civil court\t under\tthe  Code  of  Civil
\nProcedure and then proceeds thus “any proceeding before\t any
\nsuch  officer  shall be deemed to be a\tjudicial  proceeding
\nwithin the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian  Penal
\nCode  and every such Officer shall be deemed to be  a  civil
\ncourt  within the meaning of s. 480 and 482 of the  Code  of
\nCriminal   Procedure,  1898.”  Similarly,   the\t  Industrial
\nDisputes  Act,\t1947 after providing in sub-section  (3)  of
\nsection\t 11 that every enquiry or investigation by a  Board,
\nCourt,\tLabour Court.  Tribunal or National Tribunal,  shall
\nbe deemed to be a judicial proceeding within the meaning  of
\ns.  193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code adds  in  sub-s.
\n(8)  of\t the same section the provision that  “every  Labour
\nCourt, Tribunal or National Tribunal shall be deemed to be a
\ncivil  court  for the purposes of s. 480 and s. 482  of\t the
\nCode  of  Criminal Procedure, 1892.”  This  sub-section\t was
\nadded in 1950.\n<\/p>\n
In  clear contrast with these are the statutes\twhich  after
\nsaying that certain proceedings shall be judicial proceeding
\nrefrain from adding that the authority will be deemed to  be
\na court.  One such statute is the Sea Customs Act, which  in
\ns.  171A(4) lays down that every enquiry under that  section
\nshall  be  deemed  to be a judicial  proceeding\t within\t the
\nmeaning\t of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal  Code\t and
\nstops  there.\tA  somewhat  similar  provision,  though  in
\ndifferent  phraseology, appears in s. 51 of the\t Administra-
\ntor-General’s  Act,  (111 of 1913) which  runs\tthus:134-159
\nS.C.-46
\n722<\/span>
\n\t      “Whoever, during any examination authorised by
\n\t      this Act, makes upon oath a statement which is
\n\t      false and which he either knows or believes to
\n\t      be false or does not believe to be true, shall
\n\t      be  deemed to have intentionally\tgiven  false
\n\t      evidence in a stage of a judicial proceeding.”
\nThe  learned  Solicitor-General, who appealed before  us  on
\nbehalf\tof the appellant, strongly urged that if the  inten-
\ntion  of the legislature had ever been that  the  Income-tax
\nOfficer\t or other authorities mentioned in s. 37  should  be
\ndeemed\tto be a court for the purpose of s. 195 of the\tCode
\nof  Criminal Procedure it would have taken care\t to  express
\nthat  intention in clear phraseology.  In any  case,  argues
\nlearned counsel, when in 1956 the old section 37 was  wholly
\nrecast\tthe Parliament which at least then had before  it  a
\nwell  established  pattern  of\tlegislative  forms  in\t the
\nnumerous   statutes  mentioned\tabove.\tfor  expressing\t  an
\nintention  that an authority shall be deemed to be  a  court
\nfor the purpose of s. 195 or any other provision of the Code
\nof Criminal Procedure, there could be no conceivable  reason
\nfor  the  failure to follow that pattern.  In  our  opinion,
\nthere is considerable force in this argument.
\nOn  behalf of the accused-respondent Mr. Desai suggets\tthat
\nthe  words actually used, viz., “that proceeding before\t the
\nauthority shall be a judicial proceeding within the  meaning
\nof  s.\t193  and s. 228 of the Indian Penal  Code”  were  by
\nthemselves  sufficient to give effect to an  intention\tthat
\nauthority  shall  also be deemed to be a  court\t within\t the
\nmeaning\t of  s.\t 195  of  the  Code  of\t Criminal  Procedure
\nAccording  to  the learned Counsel,  a\tjudicial  proceeding
\nwith. in the meaning of s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code\t can
\nonly be before a court.\t For this proposition we can find no
\nsupport either in principle or authority.  It seems clear to
\nus on the contrary ;that proceedings before tribunals  which
\nare quasi judicial and not a court may well be considered to
\nbe judicial proceedings within the meaning of s. 193 of\t the
\nIndian\tPenal Code.  Though the words “judicial\t proceeding”
\nhave been used in numerous sections of the Indian
\n723<\/span>
\nPenal  Code, it has not defined the words, though the  words
\ncourt of justice” as also the words “a judge” have been\t de-
\nfined.\t The  Code of Criminal Procedure in which  also\t the
\nphrase “judicial proceeding” occurs in several sections\t has
\n,defined  it in s. 4(m) thus: “Judicial proceeding  includes
\nany proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may  be
\nlegally\t taken on oath”.  This definition of  judicial\tpro-
\nceeding\t was  included in the Code  of\tCriminal  Procedure,
\n1898, from the very beginning.\tThe fact that for all  these
\nyears since 1898 Parliament has not thought fit to give\t any
\ndefinition of the words “judicial proceeding” in the  Indian
\nPenal Code is some justification for thinking that the words
\n“judicial  proceeding” in the Indian Penal Code may  reason-
\nably  be  held to have the same meaning as in  the  Code  of
\nCriminal Procedure.  In other words, it would be  reasonable
\nto  think  that\t in  the Indian Penal  Code  also  the\tword
\n“judicial  proceeding”\thas been used to include  “any\tpro-
\nceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legally
\ntaken  on oath.” That would bring within the meaning of\t the
\nwords\t“judicial  proceeding  before  many   quasi-judicial
\nauthorities  which are not courts, e.g., a ,Customs  Officer
\nor a Sales Tax Officer.\n<\/p>\n
It  is\tunnecessary for our present purpose  to\t attempt  an
\nexact definition of the words “judicial proceeding” as\tused
\nin s. 193 or in any other section of the Indian Penal  Code.
\nEven  without any such definition however it  appears  clear
\nthat  the  phrase “judicial proceeding’ is  wide  enough  to
\ninclude\t not only proceedings before courts but\t proceedings
\nbefore\tcertain other tribunals.  It is pertinent  to  point
\nout that if a proceeding before any other authority except a
\ncourt could not be a judicial proceeding within the  meaning
\nof  s. 193 of the Indian Penal Code, it would not have\tbeen\n<\/p>\n
-necessary for Parliament in the Evacuee Property Act, 1950,
\nin  the Evacuee Interest (Separation) Act, 1950, and in\t the
\nDisplaced  Persons’ (Compensation and  Rehabilitation)\tAct,
\n1954, to add, after laying down that the proceedings  before
\ncertain authorities shall be judicial proceedings within the
\nmeaning\t of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal  Code\t the
\nfurther words, that “the authority shall be, deemed to be  a
\ncivil court” for certain purposes of the Code of Criminal
\n724<\/span>
\nProcedure.   It\t is especially interesting to note  in\tthis
\nconnection  the provisions of s. 11(3) and s. 11(8)  of\t the
\nIndustrial  Disputes Act to which we have already  referred.
\nUnder  s.  11(3)  as originally\t enacted  every\t enquiry  or
\ninvestigation by a Board, Court or Tribunal shall be  deemed
\nto be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and
\ns.  228 of the Indian Penal Code.  When Parliament added  to
\nthis section sub-section (8) what was enacted was that every
\ntribunal shall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose
\nof s. 480 and s. 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898.   After
\nthe  amendment by the Act 36 of 1956 the concluding  portion
\nof s. 11 (3) ran thus :-“Every enquiry or investigation by a
\nBoard,\tCourt, Labour Court, Tribunal or  National  Tribunal
\nshall  be  deemed  to be a judicial  proceeding\t within\t the
\nmeaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code.”\t The
\nsame  Act  substituted\tin s. 8\t the  words  “Labour  Court,
\nTribunal or National Tribunal” for the words “Tribunal”.  In
\nspite\tof   the  fact\thowever\t that\tevery\tenquiry\t  or
\ninvestigation  by a Board has to be deemed to be a  judicial
\nproceeding  within the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228  of\t the
\nIndian\tPenal Code Parliament refrained from saying  that  a
\nBoard  shall  also  be deemed to be a civil  court  for\t the
\npurpose\t of  s.\t 480  and s. 482 of  the  Code\tof  Criminal
\nProcedure.   This emphasises the fact that  the\t legislature
\ndid not think that the necessary effect of legislating\tthat
\na  proceeding  before an authority shall be deemed to  be  a
\njudicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and s.\t 228
\nof the Indian Penal Code would be that authority shall\talso
\nbe deemed to be a court.  To say now that the legislature in
\nproviding  in s. 37(4) of the Indian Income-tax Act  that  a
\nproceeding before the specified authorities shall be  deemed
\nto be a judicial proceeding within the meaning of s. 193 and
\ns.  228 of the Indian Penal Code, intended also to say\tthat
\nsuch  authority\t shall be deemed to be a  court\t within\t the
\nmeaning of s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure would be
\nto impute to the legislature an intention of which it itself
\nhad no knowledge.\n<\/p>\n
Learned\t counsel  for the accused-respondent then  drew\t our
\nattention  to the use of the words “judicial proceeding”  in
\ns. 476 and s. 479A of the Code of Criminal Procedure
\n\t\t\t    725<\/span>
\nand  argued that in these sections the words “judicial\tpro-
\nceeding”  have\tbeen used as equivalent to proceeding  in  a
\ncourt.\t That may well be so.  Section 476 lays down  proce-
\ndure in cases mentioned in s. 195(1)(b) and (c) of  offences
\nthat  appear to have been committed in or in relation  to  a
\nproceeding  in a court.\t It was quite correct  therefore  to
\nrefer  to such proceeding in a later part of the section  as
\njudicial  proceeding.  Section 479A lays down the  procedure
\nin  certain  cases of offences of giving false\tevidence  in
\ncivil, revenue or criminal courts and necessarily speaks  of
\nthe  proceeding before those courts as judicial\t proceeding.
\nIt  is difficult to see how the use of the  words  “judicial
\nproceeding”  in these sections support the  contention\tthat
\n“judicial  proceeding”\tcan only be a  proceeding  before  a
\ncourt.\tThere can be no doubt that every proceeding before a
\ncourt  is  a  “judicial proceeding”.   It  does\t not  follow
\nhowever\t that  every  judicial proceeding  is  a  proceeding
\nbefore a court.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.  Desai drew a grim picture of what would happen  if\t the
\nauthority  a  proceeding  before which was deemed  to  be  a
\njudicial  proceeding  within the meaning of s.\t228  of\t the
\nIndian\tPenal  Code was not at the same\t time  considered  a
\ncourt  within the meaning of s. 195.  He rightly points\t out
\nthat  one consequence will be that if any person offers\t any
\ninsult or causes any obstruction to a public servant when he
\nis sitting in any such judicial proceeding and thus  commits
\nan offence under s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code it will  be
\npossible  for  persons\tother than the\tpublic\tservants  to
\ninstitute a criminal case for such offence.  This, says\t the
\nlearned counsel, would be a very undesirable thing.  We fail
\nto see why this should be considered to be undesirable.\t But
\nassuming this is so, that is not to our mind a consideration
\nwhich\tshould\tcompel\tus  to\tgive  the  words   “judicial
\nproceeding” a meaning which they do not bear.
\nIt  may be mentioned here, as already stated, that under  s.
\n171A(4) of the Sea Customs Act, 1874, every enquiry before a
\nCustom Officer “shall be deemed to be a judicial  proceeding
\nwithin the meaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the
\n726<\/span>
\nIndian\tPenal  Code”.  In spite of  this,  the\tConstitution
\nBench  of  this Court held in its recent decision  in  Indo-
\nChina\tSteam  Navigation,  Co.\t  Ltd.\tv.  The\t  Additional
\nCollector of<\/a> customs(1) that a Customs Officer is not even a
\nTribunal.   After  discussig several previous  decisions  of
\nthis  Court  Gajendragadkar  C.J., speaking  for  the  Court
\nobserved thus:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The result therefore is that it is no  longer
\n\t      open to doubt that the Customs Officer is\t not
\n\t      a court’ or tribunal.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  is\tdifficult to see how if the presence  of  the  words
\n“shall\tbe  deemed to be a judicial  proceeding\t within\t the
\nmeaning of s. 193 and s. 228 of the Indian Penal Code” in s.
\n171A(4)\t have not the effect of making a Customs  Officer  a
\ncourt  or  a tribunal, the presence of similar words  in  s.
\n37(4) in the Indian Income-tax Act, can have that effect.
\nIn our opinion, the words used in s. 37(4) of the Income-tax
\nAct  furnish no reason to alter the legal position  that  is
\ninescapable  on\t a  consideration of the  functions  of\t the
\nIncome-tax Officer that he is not a court within the meaning
\nof s. 195 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n<\/p>\n
We  would  therefore allow the appeal, set aside  the  order
\npassed\tby  the High Court and direct  that  the  Presidency
\nMagistrate,  Bombay,  should  now dispose  of  the  case  in
\naccordance with law.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t   ORDER
\nIn accordance with the opinion of the majority, this  appeal
\nfails and is dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
(1)  [1964] 6 S.C.R. 594,
\n 727<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Lalji Haridas vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 7 February, 1964 Equivalent citations: 1964 AIR 1154, 1964 SCR (6) 700 Author: B P Sinha Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Sarkar, A.K., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala PETITIONER: LALJI HARIDAS Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ANOTHER DATE OF […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-15731","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nLalji Haridas vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 7 February, 1964 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/lalji-haridas-vs-state-of-maharashtra-and-another-on-7-february-1964\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Lalji Haridas vs State Of Maharashtra And Another on 7 February, 1964 - 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