{"id":157412,"date":"2006-08-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2006-08-07T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006"},"modified":"2018-04-01T06:34:56","modified_gmt":"2018-04-01T01:04:56","slug":"rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006","title":{"rendered":"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & … vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & … vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006<\/div>\n
Author: S.B. Sinha<\/div>\n
Bench: S.B. Sinha, Dalveer Bhandari<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  3420 of 2006\n\nPETITIONER:\nRashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & Anr.\t\t\t\t\n\nRESPONDENT:\nM\/s Verma Transport Company\t\t\t\t\t\t\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 08\/08\/2006\n\nBENCH:\nS.B. Sinha & Dalveer Bhandari\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
J U D G M E N T
\n[Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 1136-37 of 2005]<\/p>\n
S.B. SINHA, J :\n<\/p>\n
\tLeave granted.\n<\/p>\n
\tInterpretation and application of Section 8 of the Arbitration and
\nConciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the 1996’ Act) is in question in these
\nappeals which arise out of a judgment and order dated 10.02.2003 passed by
\na learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana, dismissing
\nthe Civil Revision Application filed by the Appellants herein from a
\njudgment and order dated 03.10.2002 passed by the Civil Judge (Junior
\nDivision), Jalandhar and order dated 15.09.2004  refusing to review the said
\norder.\n<\/p>\n
FACTS :\n<\/p>\n
\tThe Appellant No.1 is a Public Sector Undertaking.  It is engaged,
\ninter alia, in the business of manufacturing and marketing of iron and steel
\nproducts. The Respondent is a partnership firm.  It is engaged in the business
\nof consignment agents. It has its office at Jalandhar.  A contract was entered
\ninto by and between the parties hereto in regard to the handling and storage
\nof iron and steel materials of the Appellant at Ludhiana.  The Appellants
\ncontend that one Shri Anil Verma, Partner of the Respondent-Firm had
\nconstituted various firms and companies and obtained several consignment
\nagency contracts from the Appellant pertaining to Delhi,  Faridabad,
\nChandigarh and Ludhiana etc. who conspired with certain officials of the
\nAppellants  and obtained payments @ Rs.140\/- per M.T. in place of Rs.36\/-
\nper M.T. on a false plea that the Transport Union at Bahadurgarh did not
\npermit transportation of goods without levy of a fee of Rs.100\/- per M.T. on
\ntransportation of such goods.  An investigation was conducted by the Central
\nBureau of Investigation and a criminal case was initiated against Shri Anil
\nVerma and the concerned officials of the Appellants.  Allegedly, with the
\nobject of presenting a clean image to the Appellants and with a view to
\navoid termination of all the contracts by them, a  plea was put forth  that Shri
\nAnil Verma had resigned from the partnership firm as also from his other
\nfirms\/companies.  According to the Appellants, the said Shri Anil Verma
\nwas replaced by his family members as a partner of the said firm but he
\ncontinued to be in complete control over the firms\/companies. The contract
\nof the Respondent was terminated by the Appellants on 23.05.2002.  On the
\nsame day, a show cause notice was also issued to Shri Anil Verma as to why
\nhe and his firms\/companies should not be black listed.\n<\/p>\n
The Respondent-Firm, however, filed a suit being Suit No.122 of
\n2002 for grant of permanent injunction restraining the Appellants herein
\nfrom in any manner blacklisting the Respondent-Firm or terminating the
\nconsignment agency contract.  On an application for injunction having been
\nfiled, the Civil Judge, Junior Division, directed the parties to maintain status
\nquo in regard to the status of the Respondent-Plaintiff herein qua termination
\nof the contract as also the order of  blacklisting.  The Appellants appeared to
\nhave sought for time to file written statement.  They also filed a rejoinder to
\nthe counter affidavit to the application for injunction wherein it took a
\nspecific plea that the subject-matter of the suit being covered by the
\narbitration agreement entered into by and between the parties, it was not
\nmaintainable. On 07.06.2002, they filed an application under Section 8 of
\nthe 1996 Act,  which was rejected by the Civil Judge, Junior Division by an
\norder dated 03.10.2002, holding :\n<\/p>\n
“The applicants\/defendants have already filed a
\nreply to application u\/o 39 Rules 1 and 2 read with Section
\n151 CPC and sought 15 days time to file written statement
\nclearly proves that the process of the suit has already
\nbegun and the defendants have already entered into a
\ndefence of the suit meaning thereby they have subjected
\nthemselves to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court.  The
\ndefendants have not spelt out as to what is the dispute or
\ndifference between the parties.  Rather, they have
\nstraightaway black listed the plaintiff firm, without giving
\nthem any notice regarding any dispute or difference, which
\nwas mandatory.  From the perusal of the record, it is very
\nmuch clear that there is no dispute or difference between
\nthe present firm and the company with regard to any of the
\ntransactions in the business between both of them.  Rather,
\nthe company is at a dispute with a person, who no more
\nexists as a partner in the plaintiff firm.  The company also
\nwrote appreciation letter to the Plaintiff firm for their
\ncooperation for achieving the desired targets for the year
\n2001-02.  The same was made possible because of untiring
\nefforts made by the plaintiff of the present case.  In the
\npresent case, the straightaway of black listing the firm is
\nnot justified, even the principal of natural justice goes in
\nfavour of the respondent\/plaintiff”\n<\/p>\n
A Revision Application filed by the Appellants before the High Court
\nthereagainst  was dismissed by the impugned judgment, inter alia, on the
\npremise that the application filed by them  being not accompanied by the
\noriginal arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy thereof, the same was
\nnot maintainable.  A Review Application filed thereagainst pointing out that
\nsuch certified copy had in fact been filed, however, was not entertained.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. R.F. Nariman, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
\nthe Appellants, inter alia, would submit that the learned Civil Judge and the
\nHigh Court committed a serious error in construing the provisions of Section
\n8 of the 1996 Act, insofar as they failed to take into consideration that :\n<\/p>\n
(1)\tSection 8 of the 1996 Act cannot be equated with Section 34 of
\nthe Arbitration Act, 1940, (for short, ‘the 1940 Act) having
\nbeen made in terms of UNCITRAL Model Rules and having
\nundergone a thorough change.\n<\/p>\n
(2)\tFiling an opposition to the interim injunction would not
\npreclude a defendant from filing an application under  Section 8
\nof the 1996 Act.\n<\/p>\n
(3)\tThe High Court committed a serious error in entertaining the
\nplea raised by the Respondent for the first time before it in
\nholding that the application filed by the Appellants was not
\naccompanied by a certified copy of the arbitration agreement.
\n(4)\t Despite the fact that attention of the High Court was
\nspecifically drawn that the said finding was factually incorrect
\nin the review application, the High Court did not address itself
\non the said question.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. Nagendra Rai, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
\nthe Respondent, on the other hand, submitted that :\n<\/p>\n
(1)\tThe  premise  on  which  the  contract  was  terminated  being
\nde ‘hors the conditions of the contract, the same would not be
\narbitrable.\n<\/p>\n
(2)\tThe suit  having been filed questioning both blacklisting as also
\ntermination of contract being outside the purview of arbitration,
\nthe application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act was not
\nmaintainable.\n<\/p>\n
 (3) \tThe Appellants in their rejoinder having disclosed the substance
\nof the dispute were not entitled to file the said application.
\n(4) \tAn application for time having been filed to file written
\nstatement, the impugned orders do not suffer from any
\ninfirmity.\n<\/p>\n
The High Court  in its judgment, inter alia,  held :
\n(1)\tNo notice having been served upon the Respondent before
\npassing an order of blacklisting, the same was bad in law.
\n(2)\tThe Chairman of the First Appellant having not nominated an
\narbitrator in terms of the arbitration agreement, the application
\nunder Section 8 of the 1996 Act was not maintainable.
\n(3)\tThe Appellants having filed the reply to the interim application
\nof the Respondent and their counsel having made a specific
\nstatement that he wanted to argue on both the applications
\ntogether i.e. application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read
\nwith Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure as also the
\napplication under Section 8 of the 1996 Act, joined the process
\nof the suit in their defence and subjected themselves to the
\njurisdiction of the Civil Court.\n<\/p>\n
(4)\tThe Appellants have not spelt out the dispute and differences
\nbetween the parties and have straightaway blacklisted the
\nRespondent-Firm.\n<\/p>\n
(5)\tAnil Verma against whom the allegations had been made
\nhaving resigned, the application under Section 8 was not
\nmaintainable.\n<\/p>\n
(6)\tThe original arbitration agreement or the certified copy of the
\nagreement having not been annexed with the application, the
\nsame was not maintainable.\n<\/p>\n
The 1996 Act makes a radical departure from the 1940 Act. It has
\nembodied the relevant rules of the modern law but does not contain all the
\nprovisions thereof.  The 1996 Act, however, is not as extensive as the
\nEnglish Arbitration Act.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe 1996 Act was enacted by the Parliament in the light of the
\nUNCITRAL Model Rules.  In certain respects, the Parliament of India while
\nenacting the said Act has gone beyond the scope of the said Rules.\n<\/p>\n
With a view to appreciate the said question, we may at the outset
\nnotice the provisions of Section 4 of the English Arbitration Act, 1899,
\nwhich was bodily lifted in enacting Section 34 of the 1940 Act,  in the
\nfollowing terms :\n<\/p>\n
“4. Power to stay proceedings where there is a
\nsubmission.-If any party to a submission, or any person
\nclaiming through or under him, commences any legal
\nproceedings in any Court against any other party to the
\nsubmission, or any person claiming through or under him,
\nin respect of any matter agreed to be referred, any party to
\nsuch legal proceedings may at any time after appearance ,
\nand before delivering any pleadings or taking any other
\nsteps in the proceedings, apply to that Court to stay the
\nproceedings, and that Court or a judge thereof, if satisfied
\nthat there is not sufficient reason why the matter should not
\nbe referred in accordance with the submission, and that the
\napplicant was at the time when the proceedings were
\ncommenced, and still remains, ready and willing to do all
\nthings necessary to the proper conduct of the arbitration,
\nmay make an order staying the proceedings.”\n<\/p>\n
\tSection 34 of the 1940 Act reads as under :\n<\/p>\n
“34.-Power to stay legal proceedings where there is an
\narbitration agreement.- Where any party to an arbitration
\nagreement or any person claiming under him commences
\nany legal proceedings against any other party to the
\nagreement or any person claiming under him in respect of
\nany matter agreed to be referred, any party to such legal
\nproceedings may, at any time before filing a written
\nstatement or taking any other steps in the proceedings,
\napply to the judicial authority before which the
\nproceedings are pending to stay the proceedings; and if
\nsatisfied that there is no sufficient reason why the matter
\nshould not be referred in accordance with the arbitration
\nagreement and that the applicant was, at the time when the
\nproceedings were commenced, and still remains, ready and
\nwilling to do all things necessary to the proper conduct of
\nthe arbitration, such authority may make an order staying
\nthe proceedings.”\n<\/p>\n
\tWe may furthermore notice that Section 3 of the Arbitration (Protocol
\nand Convention) Act, 1937 and Section 3 of the Foreign Awards
\n(Recognition and Enforcement) Act, 1961 contained similar provisions.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe expression ‘steps in the proceedings’, however,  used in Article 8
\nof the Rules and Section 8 of the 1996 Act in contrast to the aforementioned
\nprovisions and in particular Section 34 of the 1940 Act, may be noticed :\n<\/p>\n
\tArticle 8 of the Model Rules is as under :\n<\/p>\n
\t“(1) A court before which an action is brought in
\na matter which is the subject of an arbitration
\nagreement shall, if a party requests not later than when
\nsubmitting his first statement on the substance of the
\ndispute, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds
\nthat the agreement is null and void, inoperative or
\nincapable of being performed.\n<\/p>\n
\t(2) Where, in such case, arbitral proceedings
\nhave already commenced, the arbitral tribunal may
\ncontinue the proceedings while the issue of its
\njurisdiction is pending with the court.”\n<\/p>\n
\tSection 8 of the 1996 Act reads as follows :\n<\/p>\n
“8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is
\nan arbitration agreement.-(1)  A judicial authority
\nbefore which an action is brought in a matter which is the
\nsubject of an arbitration agreement shall, if a party so
\napplies not later than when submitting his first statement
\non the substance of the dispute refer the parties to
\narbitration.\n<\/p>\n
(2)\tThe application referred to in sub-section (1)
\nshall not be entertained unless it is accompanied by the
\noriginal arbitration agreement or a duly certified copy
\nthereof.\n<\/p>\n
(3)\tNotwithstanding that an application has
\nbeen made under sub-section (1) and that the issue is
\npending before the judicial authority, an arbitration may
\nbe commenced or continued and an arbitral  award
\nmade.”\n<\/p>\n
Section 8 of the 1996 Act, however, although lifted the first part of the
\nsaid Article 8 did not contain the expression contained in the second part
\ntherein.  The Indian Parliament has gone beyond the recommendations made
\nby the UNCITRAL Model Rules in enacting Sections  8 and 16 of the 1996
\nAct.\n<\/p>\n
The provisions of Sections  8 and 16 of the 1996 Act may be
\ncompared with Sections 45 and 54 thereof.  Section 45 deals with New York
\nConvention, whereas Section 54 deals with Geneva Convention Awards.
\nThe difference can be immediately noticed.  Whereas under Sections 45 and
\n54, the Court exercises its supervisory jurisdiction in relation to arbitration
\nproceedings, in terms of Section 16 of the 1996 Act, the arbitrator is entitled
\nto determine his own jurisdiction.  We, however, do not mean to suggest that
\nPart II of the 1996 Act does not contemplate determination of his own
\njurisdiction by the arbitral tribunal as we are not called upon to determine
\nthe said question.  We have referred to the aforementioned provisions only
\nfor the purpose of comparing  the difference in the language used by the
\nIndian Parliament while dealing with the domestic arbitration vis-`-vis the
\nInternational arbitration.\n<\/p>\n
Section 8 confers a power on the judicial authority.  He must refer the
\ndispute which is the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement if an action is
\npending before him, subject to the fulfillment of the conditions precedent.
\nThe said power, however, shall be exercised if a party so applies not later
\nthan when submitting his first statement on the substance of the dispute.\n<\/p>\n
What is the scope and effect of the expression ‘substance of the
\ndispute’ is also in question to which we shall advert to a little later.\n<\/p>\n
The arbitration agreement is contained in clause 44(a) of the contract
\nentered into by and between the parties which reads as under :-\n<\/p>\n
“If at any time any question, dispute or difference
\nwhatsoever shall arise between the company and the
\nConsignment Agent upon or in relation to or in
\nconnection with the contract, either party may forthwith
\ngive to the other notice in writing of the existence of such
\nquestion, dispute or difference and the same shall be
\nreferred to the adjudication of an arbitrator to be
\nnominated by the Chief Executive of the Company.  The
\naward of the arbitrator shall be final and binding on both
\nthe parties and the provisions of the Indian Arbitrator
\nAct, 1940 and the rules thereunder and any statutory
\nmodification thereof shall be deemed to apply to and be
\nincorporated in this contract.”\n<\/p>\n
The scope and purport of such a clause was considered in Heyman
\nand Another v. Darwins Ltd. [(1942) 1 All ER 337]  and it was stated :
\n“The answer to the question whether a dispute falls
\nwithin an arbitration clause in a contract must depend on\n<\/p>\n
(a) what is the dispute, and (b) what disputes the
\narbitration clause covers.  To take (b) first, the language
\nof the arbitration clause in this agreement is as broad as
\ncan well be imagined.  It embraces any dispute between
\nthe parties “in respect of ” the agreement or in respect of
\nany provision in the agreement or in respect of anything
\narising out of it.  If the parties are at one on the point that
\nthey did enter into a binding agreement in terms which
\nare not in dispute, and the difference that has arisen
\nbetween them is as to their respective rights under the
\nadmitted agreement in the events that have hampered
\ne.g. as to whether the agreement has been broken by
\neither of them; or as to the damage resulting from such
\nbreach; or as to whether the breach by one of them goes
\nto the root of the contract and entitles the other party to
\nclaim to be discharged from further performance; or as to
\nwhether  events supervening since the agreement was
\nmade have brought  the contract to an end so that neither
\nparty is required to perform further  in all such cases it
\nseems to me that the difference is within such an
\narbitration clause as this.  In view, however, of phrases to
\nbe found in the report of some earlier decisions, the
\navailability of the arbitration clause when “frustration” is
\nalleged to have occurred will require closer
\nconsideration.”\n<\/p>\n
In the instant case, the existence of a valid agreement stands admitted.
\nThere cannot also be any dispute that the matter relating to termination of
\nthe contract would be a dispute arising out of a contract and, thus, the
\narbitration agreement contained in clause 44 of the contract would be
\nsquarely attracted.  Once the conditions precedent contained in the said
\nproceedings are satisfied, the judicial authority is statutorily mandated to
\nrefer the matter to arbitration.  What is necessary to be looked into therefor,
\ninter alia, would be as to whether the subject-matter of the dispute is covered
\nby the arbitration agreement or not.\n<\/p>\n
Section 34 of the repealed 1940 Act employs the expression ‘steps in
\nthe proceedings’.  Only in terms of Section 21 of the 1940 Act, the dispute
\ncould be referred to arbitration provided parties thereto agreed.  Under the
\n1940 Act, the suit was not barred.  The Court would not automatically refer
\nthe dispute to an arbitral tribunal. In the event, it having arrived at
\nsatisfaction that there is no sufficient reason that the dispute should not be
\nreferred and no step in relation thereto was taken by the applicant, it could
\nstay the suit.\n<\/p>\n
Section 8 of the 1996 Act contemplates some  departure from Section
\n34 of the 1940 Act.  Whereas Section 34 of the 1940 Act contemplated stay
\nof the suit; Section 8 of the 1996 Act mandates a reference.  Exercise of
\ndiscretion by the judicial authority, which was the hallmark of Section 34 of
\nthe 1940 Act,  has been taken away under the 1996 Act.  The direction to
\nmake reference is not only mandatory, but the arbitration proceedings to be
\ncommenced or continued and conclusion thereof by an arbitral award remain
\nunhampered by such pendency.  [See  O.P. Malhotra’s  ‘The Law and
\nPractice of Arbitration and Conciliation’, 2nd Edition, pp. 346-347]      <\/p>\n
Scope of the said provision fell for consideration before a Division
\nBench of this Court in P. Anand Gajapathi Raju and Others v. P.V.G.  Raju
\n(Dead) and Others<\/a> [(2000) 4 SCC 539], wherein this Court held :\n<\/p>\n
“In the matter before us, the arbitration agreement
\ncovers all the disputes between the parties in the
\nproceedings before us and even more than that. As
\nalready noted, the arbitration agreement satisfies the
\nrequirements of Section 7 of the new Act. The language
\nof Section 8 is peremptory. It is, therefore, obligatory for
\nthe Court to refer the parties to arbitration in terms  of
\ntheir arbitration agreement. Nothing remains to be
\ndecided in the original action or the appeal arising
\ntherefrom. There is no question of stay of the
\nproceedings till the arbitration proceedings conclude and
\nthe award becomes final in terms of the provisions of the
\nnew Act. All the rights, obligations and remedies of the
\nparties would now be governed by the new Act including
\nthe right to challenge the award. The court to which the
\nparty shall have recourse to challenge the award would
\nbe the court as defined in clause (e) of Section \t2 of
\nthe new Act and not the court to which an application
\nunder Section 8 of the new Act is made. An application
\nbefore a court under Section 8 merely brings to the
\ncourt’s notice that the subject-matter of the action before
\nit is the subject-matter of an arbitration agreement. This
\nwould not be such an application as contemplated under
\nSection 42 of the Act as the court trying the action may
\nor may not have had jurisdiction to try the suit to start
\nwith or be the competent court within the meaning of
\nSection 2(e) of the new Act.”\n<\/p>\n
\tIn Smt. Kalpana Kothari v. Smt. Sudha Yadav and Others<\/a>  [(AIR
\n2002 SC 404], this Court observed :\n<\/p>\n
“No doubt, at the appellate stage, after filing a written
\napplication for dismissal of the applications filed by the
\nappellants under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, 1940,
\nas not pressed in view of the repeal of the 1940 Act and
\ncoming into force of the 1996 Act and getting orders
\nthereon, the appellants herein have once again moved the
\nHigh Court under Section 8 of the Act, with a request for
\nstay of proceedings before the High Court as well as the
\ntrial court, but the application came to be rejected by the
\nlearned Judge in the High Court that no such application
\ncould be filed, once the application earlier filed under the
\n1940 Act was got dismissed as not pressed and also on
\nthe ground of estoppel, based on the very fact. We are of
\nthe view that the High Court did not properly appreciate
\nthe relevant and respective scope, object and purpose as
\nalso the considerations necessary for dealing with and
\ndisposing of the respective applications envisaged under
\nSection 34 of the 1940 Act and Section 8 of the 1996
\nAct. Section 34 of the 1940 Act provided for filing an
\napplication to stay legal proceedings instituted by any
\nparty to an arbitration agreement against any other party
\nto such agreement, in derogation of the arbitration clause
\nand attempts for settlement of disputes otherwise than in
\naccordance with the arbitration clause by substantiating
\nthe existence of an arbitration clause and the judicial
\nauthority concerned may stay such proceedings on being
\nsatisfied that there is no sufficient reason as to why the
\nmatter should not be referred to for decision in
\naccordance with the arbitration agreement, and that the
\napplicant seeking for stay was at the time when the
\nproceedings were commenced and still remained ready
\nand willing to do all things necessary to the proper
\nconduct of the arbitration. This provision under the 1940
\nAct had nothing to do with actual reference to the
\narbitration of the disputes and that was left to be taken
\ncare of under Sections 8 and 20 of the 1940 Act. In
\nstriking contrast to the said scheme underlying the
\nprovisions of the 1940 Act, in the new 1996 Act, there is
\nno provision corresponding to Section 34 of the old Act
\nand Section 8 of the 1996 Act mandates that the judicial
\nauthority before which an action has been brought in
\nrespect of a matter, which is the subject-matter of an
\narbitration agreement, shall refer the parties to arbitration
\nif a party to such an agreement applies not later than
\nwhen submitting his first statement. The provisions of the
\n1996 Act do not envisage the specific obtaining of any
\nstay as under the 1940 Act, for the reason that not only
\nthe direction to make reference is mandatory but
\nnotwithstanding the pendency of the proceedings before
\nthe judicial authority or the making of an application
\nunder Section 8(1) of the 1996 Act, the arbitration
\nproceedings are enabled, under Section 8(3) of the 1996
\nAct to be commenced or continued and an arbitral award
\nalso made unhampered by such pendency. We have to
\ntest the order under appeal on this basis.”\n<\/p>\n
See also Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Pinkcity Midway
\nPetroleums<\/a> [(2003) 6 SCC 503].\n<\/p>\n
\tThe High Court, in our opinion, proceeded on a wrong premise.  It
\nposed unto itself wrong question.  It refused to interfere in the matter
\nopining that no notice had been served by the Chairman of the First
\nAppellant in terms of the arbitration agreement. For maintaining an
\napplication under Section 8 of the 1996 Act, service of notice under the
\narbitration agreement was not mandatory.  The said stage was yet to be
\nreached.   What was necessary was existence of an arbitration agreement.\n<\/p>\n
So far as the question of blacklisting is concerned, an error was
\ncommitted by the High Court in opining that the Respondent-Firm had been
\nblacklisted without issuing any notice.  In fact, from a perusal of the notice
\ndated 23.05.2002, it appears, upon recital of the relevant facts, it was stated :\n<\/p>\n
“6.\tIn view of the above, before taking a final decision
\non black listing you and debarring you from participating
\nin tenders floated by RINL, VSP or entering into any
\nagreement with RINL, VSP, you are hereby calling upon
\nto explain as to why you should not be black listed and
\ndebarred as mentioned above.  You may submit your
\nexplanation within seven days of receipt of this notice.
\nIn case we do not receive your explanation within the
\nabove mentioned period, it will be presumed that you
\nhave nothing to say in the matter and decision on further
\nsuitable action will be taken accordingly.”\n<\/p>\n
\tNo final decision had, therefore, been taken.   The basic question  was
\nwhether there had been breaches of contract on the part of the Respondents.
\nThe contention of the Respondent before the trial court had been that the
\norder of blacklisting had arisen from the terms of the contract itself, as
\nwould appear from the following averments :\n<\/p>\n
“14.\tThat the plaintiff have learnt that the defendants
\nwithout following the basic principles of natural justice
\nare intending to terminate the consignment agency
\ncontract of the plaintiff and to blacklist the plaintiff on
\nalleged ground that one of Ex-partner of the plaintiff is
\nclaimed to be guilty of misrepresentation of overcharging
\nthe freight by misrepresentation from the different
\ncompany.  Anyhow this is no ground to do so.”\n<\/p>\n
\tThe principal grievance of the Plaintiff-Respondent was the action on
\nthe part of the Appellants terminating the contract.  Grounds on which the
\norder of termination were based, had been questioned in the plaint.  Such
\ncontentions could well be raised before the Arbitrator.\n<\/p>\n
\tShri Anil Verma was also acting on behalf of the partnership firm.  It
\nhas not been found that he had no authority to represent the firm.  His
\nsubsequent resignation as a partner was irrelevant for the purpose of
\nconsideration in regard to the maintainability of the application under
\nSection 8 of the 1996 Act.\n<\/p>\n
\tFiling of a  reply to the injunction application could also not have
\nbeen a ground to refuse to entertain the plea taken by the Appellants that the
\nsuit should be referred to arbitral tribunal  particularly when in its reply to
\ninjunction application, the appellant categorically stated :\n<\/p>\n
\t“1.\tThat the present application under Order 39
\nRules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC  is liable to be
\ndismissed on the short ground that the plaintiff has
\nhimself admitted the existence of the arbitration clause
\nand therefore, the present application under Order 39
\nRules 1 and 2 read with Section 151 CPC is not
\nmaintainable and consequently the order of this Hon’ble
\nCourt is liable to be vacated.”\n<\/p>\n
\tThus, they did not submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
\nThey did not waive their right.  They in effect and substance  questioned the
\njurisdiction of the court in proceeding with the matter.  In fact, in its
\napplication filed under Section 8 of the 1996 Act, the Appellant raised a
\ncontention that the suit was liable to be dismissed and the order of injunction
\nvacated in view of the arbitration clause.\n<\/p>\n
\tThis aspect of the matter was considered by this Court in Food
\nCorporation of India & Anr. v. Yadav Enginner & Contractor<\/a> [1983 (1) SCR
\n95].  Therein this Court opined that interlocutory proceedings are only
\nincidental proceedings to the main proceedings and, thus, any step taken in
\nthe interlocutory proceedings does not come within the purview of main
\nproceedings, stating :\n<\/p>\n
“When ex parte orders are made at the back of the party
\nthe other party is forced to come to the court to vindicate
\nits right. Such compulsion cannot disclose an unambiguous
\nintention to give up the benefit of the arbitration
\nagreement. Therefore, taking any other steps in the
\nproceedings must be confined to taking steps in the
\nproceedings for resolution of the substantial dispute in the
\nsuit. Appearing and contesting the interlocutory
\napplications by seeking either vacation thereof or
\nmodification thereof cannot be said to be displaying an
\nunambiguous intention to acquiesce in the suit and to
\nwaive the benefit of the arbitration agreement. Any other
\nview would both be harsh and inequitous and contrary to
\nthe underlying intendment of the Act. The first party which
\napproaches the court and seeks an ex parte interim order
\nhas obviously come to the court in breach of the arbitration
\nagreement. By obtaining an ex parte order if it forces the
\nother party to the agreement to suffer the order, or by
\nmerely contesting be imputed the intention of waiving the
\nbenefit of arbitration agreement, it would enjoy an
\nundeserved advantage. Such could not be the underlying
\npurpose of Section 34. Therefore, in our opinion, to
\neffectuate the purpose underlying Section 34 the narrow
\nconstruction of the expression “taking any other steps in
\nthe proceedings” as hereinabove set out appears to advance
\nthe object and purpose underlying Section 34 and the
\npurpose for which the Act was enacted.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe expression ‘first statement on the substance of the dispute’
\ncontained in Section 8(1) of the 1996 Act must be contra-distinguished with
\nthe expression  ‘written statement’.  It employs submission of the party to
\nthe jurisdiction of the judicial authority.  What is, therefore, is needed is a
\nfinding on the part of the judicial authority that the party  has waived his
\nright to invoke the arbitration clause.  If an application is filed before
\nactually filing the first statement on the substance of the dispute, in our
\nopinion, the party cannot be said to have waived his right or acquiesced
\nhimself to the jurisdiction of the court.  What is, therefore, material is as to
\nwhether the petitioner has filed his first statement on the substance of the
\ndispute or not, if not, his application under Section 8 of the 1996 Act, may
\nnot be held wholly  unmaintainable.  We would deal with this question at
\nsome details, a little later.\n<\/p>\n
\tOur attention, however, was drawn by the learned counsel for the
\nRespondent to  The State of Uttar Pradesh and Another v. M\/s. Janki Saran
\nKailash Chandra and Another<\/a> [(1973) 2 SCC 96], which was distinguished
\nin Food Corporation of India (supra), inter alia, stating that the view taken
\ntherein did not run counter to the view the court had taken.
\n\tIn Janki Saran Kailash Chandra (supra), an application for time to file
\nwritten statement was considered to be a step in the proceedings.  We have
\nnoticed hereinbefore the respective scope of Section 34 of the 1940 Act vis-
\n`-vis the scope of Section 8 of the 1996 Act.  In view of the changes brought
\nabout by the 1996 Act, we are of the opinion that what is necessary is
\ndisclosure of the entire substance in the main proceeding itself and not
\ntaking part in the supplemental proceeding.\n<\/p>\n
\tBy opposing the prayer for interim injunction, the restriction
\ncontained in sub-section (1) of Section 8 was  not attracted.  Disclosure of a
\ndefence for the purpose of opposing a prayer for injunction would not
\nnecessarily mean that substance of the dispute has already been disclosed in
\nthe main proceeding. Supplemental and  incidental proceeding  are not part
\nof the main proceeding.  They are dealt with separately in the Code of Civil
\nProcedure itself.   Section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with
\nsupplemental proceedings.  Incidental proceedings are those which arise out
\nof the main proceeding.  In view of the decision of this Court in Food
\nCorporation of India (supra), the distinction between the main proceeding
\nand supplemental proceeding must be borne in mind.
\nWe may notice that a distinction has been made between supplemental
\nproceedings and incidental proceedings by one of us in Vareed Jacob v.
\nSosamma Geevarghese and Others<\/a>  [(2004) 6 SCC 378].\n<\/p>\n
\tThis aspect of the matter came up for consideration before this Court
\nagain in Sadhu Singh Ghuman v. Food Corporation of India & Ors.<\/a> [(1990)
\n2 SCC 68], wherein it was categorically stated that seeking a direction to the
\nplaintiff to produce the original agreement does not amount to submit to the
\njurisdiction of the court, which decides the case on merits, opining :\n<\/p>\n
“The right to have the dispute settled by arbitration has
\nbeen conferred by agreement of parties and that right
\nshould not be deprived of by technical pleas. The court
\nmust go into the circumstances and intention of the party
\nin the step taken. The court must examine whether the
\nparty has abandoned his right under the agreement. In the
\nlight of these principles and looking to the substance of
\nthe application dated January 4, 1985, we cannot form an
\nopinion that the defendants have abandoned their right to
\nhave the suit stayed and took a step in the suit to file the
\nwritten statement.”\n<\/p>\n
\tWaiver of a right on the part of a defendant to the lis must be gathered
\nfrom the fact situation obtaining in each case.  In the instant case, the court
\nhad already passed an ad interim ex pare injunction.  The Appellants were
\nbound to respond to the notice issued by the Court.  While doing so, they
\nraised a specific plea of bar of the suit in view of the existence of an
\narbitration agreement.  Having regard to the provisions of the Act,  they had,
\nthus, shown  their unequivocal intention to question the maintainability of
\nthe suit on the aforementioned ground.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe submission of the learned counsel for the Respondents that the
\ntwo different causes of action having been raised, namely, illegal
\ntermination of contract and blacklisting of the firm, Section 8 of the 1996
\nAct was not attracted is devoid of merit; inasmuch as according to the
\nRespondents themselves, both the causes of action arose out of the terms of
\nthe contract.   What was necessary was to consider the substance of the
\ndispute.  Once it is found that the dispute between the parties arose out of the
\ncontract, Section 8 of the 1996 Act would be attracted.
\nFurthermore, as noticed hereinbefore, the High Court committed a
\nmanifest error in holding  that the Respondent-Firm had been blacklisted
\nwithout any notice  as only a notice to show cause in that behalf had been
\nissued.  A final decision in regard to  blacklisting of the Respondent-Firm
\nwas yet to be taken.  The Respondents could file their show cause and could
\nhave satisfied the authorities of the Appellant No.1 that no case has been
\nmade out for blacklisting.\n<\/p>\n
\tReliance placed by the learned counsel on Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd.
\nv. Jayesh H. Pandya and Another<\/a> [(2003) 5 SCC 531] is misplaced..
\nTherein, not only a suit for dissolution of the firm was filed, but a different
\ncause of action had arisen in relation whereto apart from parties to the
\narbitration agreement, other parties had also been impleaded.  In the
\naforementioned fact situation, this Court held :\n<\/p>\n
“Secondly, there is no provision in the Act that when
\nthe subject-matter of the suit includes subject-matter of
\nthe arbitration agreement as well as other disputes, the
\nmatter is required to be referred to arbitration. There is
\nalso no provision for splitting the cause or parties and
\nreferring the subject-matter of the suit to the arbitrators.\n<\/p>\n
It was further stated :\n<\/p>\n
“The next question which requires consideration is
\neven if there is no provision for partly referring the
\ndispute to arbitration, whether such a course is possible
\nunder Section 8 of the Act. In our view, it would be
\ndifficult to give an interpretation to Section 8 under
\nwhich bifurcation of the cause of action, that is to say, the
\nsubject-matter of the suit or in some cases bifurcation of
\nthe suit between parties who are parties to the arbitration
\nagreement and others is possible. This would be laying
\ndown a totally new procedure not contemplated under the
\nAct. If bifurcation of the subject-matter of a suit was
\ncontemplated, the legislature would have used
\nappropriate language to permit such a course. Since there
\nis no such indication in the language, it follows that
\nbifurcation of the subject-matter of an action brought
\nbefore a judicial authority is not allowed.\n<\/p>\n
Secondly, such bifurcation of suit in two parts, one to
\nbe decided by the Arbitral Tribunal and the other to be
\ndecided by the civil court would inevitably delay the
\nproceedings. The whole purpose of speedy disposal of
\ndispute and decreasing the cost of litigation would be
\nfrustrated by such procedure. It would also increase the
\ncost of litigation and harassment to the parties and on
\noccasions there is possibility of conflicting judgments
\nand orders by two different forums.”\n<\/p>\n
\tSuch a question does not arise herein as the parties herein are parties
\nto the arbitration agreement and the question in regard to the jurisdiction of
\nthe arbitrator, if any,  can be determined by the arbitrator himself in terms of
\nSection 16 of the 1996 Act.\n<\/p>\n
\tStrong reliance has been placed by Mr. Rai on a decision of this Court
\nin Union of India  v. Birla Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Ltd.<\/a>  [AIR
\n1967 SC 688] contending that when the dispute arises de’ hors the
\nagreement, Section 8 of the 1996 Act would not be applicable.  The said
\ndecision has no application in the instant case as a finding of fact was
\narrived at therein that the Union of India had withheld payment of a large
\nsum of money on the specious plea that some amount in relation to another
\ncontract was due to it.  The submission of the respondent therein was that no
\nsuch contract had been executed by it.  In the fact situation obtaining therein,
\nthis Court held  :\n<\/p>\n
“The evidence recorded by the Trial Court discloses that
\nthere was no dispute between the Company and the
\nUnion arising under the contract on which the suit was
\nfiled. The Union accepted liability to pay the amount
\nclaimed by the Company in the suit. The Union still
\ndeclined to pay the amount asserting that an amount was
\ndue from the Company to the Union under a distinct
\ncontract. This amount was not sought to be set-off under
\nany term of the contract under which the Company made
\nthe claim. The dispute raised by the Union was therefore
\nnot in respect of the liability under the terms of the
\ncontract which included the arbitration clause, but in
\nrespect of an alleged liability of the Company under
\nanother contract which it may be noted had already been
\nreferred to arbitration. The Union had no defence to the
\naction filed by the Company : it was not contended that
\nthe amount of Rs. 10,625\/- was not due to the Company
\nunder the contract relied upon by the Company. For
\nenforcement of the arbitration clause there must exist a
\ndispute : in the absence of a dispute between the parties
\nto the arbitration agreement, there can be no reference.”\n<\/p>\n
Such is not the case here.\n<\/p>\n
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion that the application
\nfiled by the Appellants under Section 8 of the 1996 Act was maintainable.
\nBefore parting with the case, we may notice a disturbing state of
\naffairs.  Mr. Nariman made a statement before us that in view of the order of
\nstatus quo passed by the learned Civil Judge, the Respondents have not only
\nbeen working for the full term of five years contemplated under the
\nagreement but also for the extended the period of ten years, to which they
\nwere not entitled.  The order of injunction passed by the learned Trial Judge
\nis not before us.  The contention raised by Mr. Nariman if correct, we are
\nsure that corrective measures shall immediately be taken by the court
\nconcerned.\n<\/p>\n
 For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgments cannot be
\nsustained which are set aside.  The appeal is allowed with costs.  Counsel fee
\nis quantified at Rs.15,000\/-.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & … vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S.B. Sinha, Dalveer Bhandari CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 3420 of 2006 PETITIONER: Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & Anr. RESPONDENT: M\/s Verma Transport Company DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08\/08\/2006 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Dalveer […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-157412","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nRashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & ... vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & ... vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2006-08-07T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-04-01T01:04:56+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"33 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & … vs M\\\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006\",\"datePublished\":\"2006-08-07T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-04-01T01:04:56+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006\"},\"wordCount\":6546,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006\",\"name\":\"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & ... vs M\\\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2006-08-07T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-04-01T01:04:56+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & … vs M\\\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & ... vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & ... vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2006-08-07T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-04-01T01:04:56+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"33 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & … vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006","datePublished":"2006-08-07T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-04-01T01:04:56+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006"},"wordCount":6546,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006","name":"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & ... vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2006-08-07T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-04-01T01:04:56+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/rashtriya-ispat-nigam-limited-vs-ms-verma-transport-company-on-8-august-2006#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Limited & … vs M\/S Verma Transport Company on 8 August, 2006"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/157412","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=157412"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/157412\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=157412"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=157412"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=157412"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}