{"id":160552,"date":"1979-02-20T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1979-02-19T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979"},"modified":"2015-12-25T23:03:54","modified_gmt":"2015-12-25T17:33:54","slug":"bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979","title":{"rendered":"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1979 AIR 993, \t\t 1979 SCR (3) 291<\/div>\n
Author: A Koshal<\/div>\n
Bench: Koshal, A.D.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nBAI VAJIA (DEAD) BY L. RS.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nTHAKORBHAI CHELABHAI AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT20\/02\/1979\n\nBENCH:\nKOSHAL, A.D.\nBENCH:\nKOSHAL, A.D.\nKAILASAM, P.S.\nDESAI, D.A.\n\nCITATION:\n 1979 AIR  993\t\t  1979 SCR  (3) 291\n 1979 SCC  (3) 300\n CITATOR INFO :\n E\t    1987 SC2251\t (8,8A)\n D\t    1991 SC1581\t (8,9,10)\n\n\nACT:\n     Hindu Succession  Act, 1956,  Section  14(1)  and\t(2),\nScope  of-Interpretaion\t  of  Statute-Legislature  does\t not\nemploy meaningless language.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     As per the decree in a partition suit dated August, 18,\n1909  Motabhai\t and  two   sons  of   Mohanbhai  being\t two\npredecessors in\t interest of the plaintiffs respondents were\nburdened  with\t the  responsibility  of  paying  an  yearly\nmaintenance allowance  of Rs. 42\/- to Bai Vajia appellant on\nMagsher Sud  2 of  every year.\tThe decree  further provided\nthat in\t the event  of default\tin payment of such allowance\ncontinuing for\ta period  of a month after the due date, Bai\nVajia would  be entitled  to take  possession  of  the\tland\nallotted to  them under the decree viz. Survey Nos. 31, 403,\n591, 611,  288 and  659\/3 in lieu of the maintenance awarded\nto her\tand would  enjoy the  income thereof without however\nbeing  competent   to  sell,  mortgage,\t bequeath,  gift  or\notherwise transfer  the same.  The decree  declared that any\nalienation  made  by  Bai  Vajia  in  contravention  of\t the\ndirection given\t by the decree in that behalf would be void.\nBy clause  8 of\t the decree  Motabhai and  sons of Mohanbhai\nwere also  deprived of\tthe right  of alienation of the land\nduring the  lifetime of\t Bai Vajia. Default having been made\nin the\tpayment of maintenance to her according to the terms\nof  the\t decree,  the  appellant,  took\t out  execution\t and\nobtained possession  of the  lands in  question,  which\t she\ncontinued to  enjoy till  October 21,  1963 when  she made a\nsale of Survey No. 31 in favour of one D. P. Desai. The sale\nwas challenged\tby the\tplaintiffs in  Civil Suit No. 110\/66\nwhich was  decreed by the trial Court. The District Court in\nfirst appeal  confirmed it  and the  High  Court  in  second\nappeal upheld the decree of Bai Vajia.\n     Allowing the  appeal of  the  Legal  Representative  by\nspecial leave. the Court.\n^\n     HELD: 1. A combined reading of sub-sections (1) and (2)\nof  Section   14  of   the  Hindu  Succession  Act  and\t the\nExplanation following  sub section  (1) makes it clear, that\nsub-section (2)\t does not  operate to take property acquired\nby a  Hindu female  in lieu  of maintenance  or\t arrears  of\nmaintenance (which  is property specifically included in the\nenumeration  contained\tin  this  Explanation)\tout  of\t the\npurview of sub-section (1). [311 D-E]\n     2. For  the applicability of sub-section (1) of Section\n14 two conditions must coexist namely.\n     (1) the  concerned female\tHindu must  be possessed  of\nproperty; and\n292\n     (2) such  property\t must  be  possessed  by  her  as  a\n\"limited owner\".\n     If these  two conditions are fulfilled, the sub section\ngives her  the right  to hold  the property  as a full owner\nirrespective of\t the fact  whether she acquired it before or\nafter the commencement of the Act. [309 D-F]\n     The Explanation declares that the property mentioned in\nsub section (1) includes both movable and immovable property\nand then  proceeds to  enumerate the modes of acquisition of\nvarious\t kinds\tof  property  which  the  sub-section  would\nembrace. Two  such modes  are \"in  lieu\t of  maintenance  or\narrears of  maintenance\", and \"any such property held by her\nas Stridhana\"  immediately before  the commencement  of\t the\nAct. It,  therefore, follows  that the\tLegislature  in\t its\nwisdom took pains to specify all kinds of \"Stridhana\" in the\nExplanation and declared that the same would form \"property\"\nwithin the  meaning of that word as used in sub-section (i).\nThis was done \"to achieve a social purpose by bringing about\nchange in the social and economic position of women in Hindu\nSociety\". It  was a  step  in  the  direction  of  practical\nrecognition of\tequality of  the  sexes\t and  was  meant  to\nelevate women  from a  subservient position  in the economic\nfield to a pedestal where they could exercise full powers of\nenjoyment and  disposal of  the property  held\tby  them  as\nowners, untrammelled  by artificial  limitations  placed  on\ntheir right  of ownership  by a society in which the will of\nthe dominant  male prevailed to bring about a subjugation of\nthe opposite  sex. It  was also\t a step calculated to ensure\nuniformity in the law relating to the nature of ownership of\n'Stridhana'. This  dual purpose\t underlying the\t Explanation\nmust be\t borne in  mind and given effect to when the section\nis subjected to analysis and interpretation, and sub-section\n(2) is\tnot to\tbe given  a meaning  which would defeat that\npurpose and negative the legislative intent, if the language\nused so warrants. [309 F, 311 A-D]\n     3. It  is true  that it  is only  some kind of \"limited\nownership\" that\t would get  enlarged into full ownership and\nthat where no ownership at all vested in the concerned Hindu\nFemale, no  question of\t the applicability of subsection (1)\nof section 14 of the Act, would arise. [306 B-C]\n     4. A  plain reading of sub-section (1) of section 14 of\nthe Act\t makes it clear that the concerned Hindu female must\nhave limited  ownership in property, which limited ownership\nwould get  enlarged by the operation of that sub section. If\nit was\tintended to  enlarge any sort of a right which could\nin no  sense be\t described as ownership, the expression \"and\nnot as\ta limited  owners\", would  not have been used at all\nand becomes  redundant, which  is  against  the\t well  known\nprinciple of interpretation of statutes that the Legislature\ndoes not employ meaningless language. [306 H, 307 A]\n     Eramma v.\tVeerappanna and\t Ors.,\t[1966]\t2  SCR\t626;\nMangal Singh  and Ors.\tv. Srimati  Rattno &  Anr.,<\/a> [1967] 3\nS.C.R. 454; reiterated.\n     5. Limited\t ownership in  the concerned Hindu female is\nthus a sine qua non for the applicability of sub section (1)\nof section  14 of the Act. In a case where this condition is\nfulfilled the  Hindu female represents the estate completely\nand the\t reversioners  of  her\thusband\t have  only  a\tspes\nsuccession is i.e. a mere chance of\n293\nsuccession which  is not a vested interest and a transfer of\nwhich is  a nullity.  The widow\t is competent to protect the\nproperty from  all kinds  of trespass and to sue and be sued\nfor all\t purposes in  relation thereto\tso long\t as  she  is\nalive. Ownership  in the fullest sense is a sum-total of all\nthe rights  which may  possibly flow from title to property,\nwhile limited  ownership in its very nature must be a bundle\nof rights  constituting in their totality not full ownership\nbut something less. [308 E-H]\n     When a  widow holds  the property\tfor her enjoyment as\nlong as\t she lives,  nobody is entitled to deprive her of it\nor to deal with the property in any manner to her detriment.\nThe property  is for  the time\tbeing beneficially vested in\nher and\t she has  the occupation, control and usufruct of it\nto the\texclusion of  all others.  Such\t a  relationship  to\nproperty falls squarely within the meaning of the expression\n\"limited owner\"\t as used in sub section (1) of Section 14 of\nthe Act. [308 H, 309A]\n     6. In  the instant\t case: Bai Vajia became a full owner\nof the\tland in\t dispute under the provisions of sub-section\n(1) of\tsection 14  of the  Act\t and  that  sub-section\t (2)\nthereof has no application to her case, the land having been\ngiven to  her as  a limited  owner and in recognition of her\npre-existing right  against property.  So long as she lived,\nshe was\t to have full enjoyment of and complete control over\nthe land, barring any right to alienate it. Such a right was\nalso taken away from Motabhai and two sons of Mohanbhai. The\narrangement meant  that whatever  rights existed in relation\nto  the\t  land\tduring\tthe  life-time\tof  Bai\t Vajia\twere\nexercisable by\ther alone  and by  nobody else. Not even the\nsaid three  persons could  deal with  the land in any manner\nwhatsoever, and if they did, Bai Vajia had the right to have\ntheir acts  declared null  and void  during  her  life-time.\nAfter the land was made over to her she became its owner for\nlife although  with a  limited right and therefore only as a\nlimited owner.\tUnder the decree the land vested in Motabhai\nand sons  of  Mohanbhai\t only  so  long\t as  they  were\t not\ndispossessed  of   it  at  the\tinstance  of  Bai  Vajia  in\naccordance with\t the terms  stated therein.  As soon  as Bai\nVajia took  possession of  the land,  no rights\t of any kind\nwhatsoever in  relation thereto\t remained with them and thus\nthey ceased  to be  the owners\tfor the\t span of Bai Vajia's\nlife. [311 G-H, 312 A-D]\n     V. Tulasamma  and Ors.  v. Sesha Reddy,<\/a> [1977] 3 S.C.R.\n261; discussed in extenso and followed.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2434 of
\n1977.\n<\/p>\n
     Appeal by\tSpecial Leave  from the\t Judgment and  Order
\ndated 4\/5th  November, 1976 of the Gujrat High Court in S.A.
\nNo. 685\/69.\n<\/p>\n
     U. R.  Lalit (A.C.),1.  N. Shroff and H. S. Parihar for
\nthe Appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     S. T.  Desai, Vimal  Dave and  Miss K.  Mehta  for\t the
\nRespondent.\n<\/p>\n
     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by,
\n     KOSHAL, J.-The  facts giving  rise to  this  appeal  by
\nspecial leave against a decree dated November 5, 1976 of the
\nHigh Court of Gujarat
\n294<\/span>
\n     may  be   better  appreciated  with  reference  to\t the
\nfollowing pedigreetable:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t NARANJI\n<\/p>\n
————————————————————\n<\/p>\n
   |\t\t\t\t\t|\nDahyabhai\t\t\t    Haribhai\n   |\t\t\t\t\t|\n   |\t\t\t\t\t|\nRanchhodji\t\t      |\t\t\t |\n\t\t\t      -------------------\n\t\t\t      |\t\t\t |\n\t\t\t Bhimbhai\t      Mohanbhai\n\t\t\t (died childless in\t |\n\t\t\t  1913)\t\t\t |\n\t\t\t      ------------------------------\n\t\t\t      |\t\t\t\t   |\n\t\t\t Parvatiben=Dayalji\tDahyabhai\n\t\t\t (Plaintiff 8\t\t(Plaintiff 7\n\t\t\t      |\n<\/pre>\n
     ——————————————————-\n<\/p>\n
     |\t\t     |\t\t     |\t\t     |\nBhikhubhai\t Thakorbhai\t Nirmalben\t   Padmaben\n<\/pre>\n
(Plaintiff 5)  (Plaintiff 6)  (Plaintiff 7)   (Plaintiff 10)\n<\/p>\n
————————————————————\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    NARANJI (contd…)
\n\t\t    |\t\t\t     |
\n\t       Gulabhai\t\t\tVallabhhai
\n\t\t    |\t\t\t     |
\n\t\t   Motabhai\t     ——————\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t    |\t\t\t\t       |\n\t\t    |\t\tNichhabhai=\tSurbhai\n\t\t    |\t\tAmba Bai      Bai Vijia\n\t\t    |\t\t\t     (Defendant 1)\n\t\t    |\n<\/pre>\n
\t  ————————————————-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  |\t\t|\t       |\t\t   |\n     Ghelabhai\t    Lallubhai\t    Chhotubhai\t    Manibhai\n      |\t\t    (Plaintiff 3)   (Plaintiff 4)\n   ----------------------------\n   |\t\t\t       |\nThakorbhai\t\t Ramanbhai\n(Plaintiff 1)\t\t (Plaintiff 2)\n<\/pre>\n
     2.\t In  the  year\t1908  Ranchhodji  son  of  Dahyabhai
\ninstituted Civil  Suit No.  403 of 1908 against Bhimbhai son
\nof  Haribhai,  Dayalji\tand  Dahyabhai\tsons  of  Mohanbhai,
\nMotabhai son  of Gulabbhai, Bai Amba widow of Nichhabhai and
\nBai Vajia  widow of  Surbhai, for  a partition\tof the joint
\nHindu family  properties belonging  to the parties. The suit
\nresulted in  a decree  dated August 18, 1909 which provided,
\ninter alia,  that Dayalji  and Dahyabhai  sons of Mohanbhai,
\nand Motabhai son of Gulabbhai would be full owners of Survey
\nNos. 31\t and 403  and also  owners of a half share in Survey
\nNos. 591, 611, 288<\/span>
\n295<\/span>
\nand 659\/3.  These persons  were burdened  by the decree with
\nthe responsibility to pay an yearly maintenance allowance of
\nRs. 42\/- to Bai Vajia on Magsher Sud 2 of every year and the
\ndecree further\tprovided that  in the  event of\t default  in
\npayment of such allowance continuing for a period of a month
\nafter the  due date,  Bai Vajia\t would be  entitled to\ttake
\npossession of  the  land  above-mentioned  in  lieu  of\t the
\nmaintenance awarded  to\t her  and  would  enjoy\t the  income
\nthereof without\t however being\tcompetent to sell, mortgage,
\nbequeath, gift\tor otherwise  transfer the  same. The decree
\ndeclared  that\t any  alienation   made\t by   Bai  Vajia  in
\ncontravention of  the direction\t given by the decree in that
\nbehalf would  be void.\tBy clause  8 of\t the decree  sons of
\nMohanbhai as  well as  Motabhai were  also deprived  of\t the
\nright of  alienation of\t the land during the lifetime of Bai
\nVajia.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Default having  been made in the payment of maintenance
\nto Bai\tVajia according to the terms of the decree, she took
\nout execution  and obtained  possession of  the\t land  above
\ndetailed. Thereafter Dayalji and Dahyabhai sons of Mohanbhai
\ndeposited in  court the\t arrears of maintenance and filed an
\napplication with  a prayer that the land of which possession
\nhad been  given to  Bai Vajia  in execution of the decree be
\nrestored to  them. That application was dismissed on the 8th
\nMarch 1912  and more  than 2  1\/2 years later, i.e., on 27th
\nOctober 1914,  Dahyabhai son  of Mohanbhai  instituted Civil
\nSuit No.  576 of  1914 in  the court  of the Additional Sub-
\nJudge, Valsal,\tfor a  declaration that the dismissal of his
\napplication was null and void and for recovery of possession
\nof the\tland which  Bai Vajia  had taken in execution of the
\ndecree. The  suit was  decreed by  the trial  court but\t was
\ndismissed in first appeal on the 13th March 1918.\n<\/p>\n
     Bai Vajia\tcontinued to  enjoy the\t land till  the 21st
\nOctober 1963 when she made a sale of Survey No. 31 in favour
\nof one\tDhirubhai Paragji  Desai. The sale was challenged in
\nCivil Suit  No. 110 of 1966 by 10 persons being the heirs of
\nMohanbhai and Motabhai as shown in the pedigree table above,
\nthe defendants\tbeing  Bai  Vajia  and\tthe  said  Dhirubhai
\nParagji Desai.\tIt was\tclaimed by  the plaintiffs  that Bai
\nVajia had  no right  to alienate  in  any  manner  the\tland
\nobtained by her in execution as per the terms of the decree,
\nthat sub-section  (1) of  section 14 of the Hindu Succession
\nAct (hereinafter  referred to as the Act) had no application
\nto her\tcase which  was covered\t by sub-section\t (2) of that
\nsection and  that the sale by her in favour of defendant No.
\n2 was  null and\t void. Bai  Vajia  contested  the  suit\t and
\ncontended that\tthe sale  was good in view of the provisions
\nof subsection  (1) abovementioned which enlarged her limited
\nownership
\n296<\/span>
\ninto full  and absolute\t ownership and\tthat sub-section (2)
\naforesaid did  not cover  her case.  The suit was decreed by
\nthe trial  court and  Bai Vajia remained unsuccessful in the
\nappeal which  she instituted  in the  court of\tthe District
\nJudge, Bulsar.\tA second  appeal was filed by her before the
\nHigh Court  of Gujarat\tand during  the pendency thereof she
\nexpired when one Dhirubhai Dayalji Desai was substituted for
\nher as\ther sole  heir and  legal representative. The appeal
\ncame up\t for hearing  before a\tlearned Single\tJudge of the
\nHigh Court  who by  its judgment  dated 5th  November,\t1976
\ndismissed it  holding that  the decree\tpassed in Civil Suit
\nNo. 403\t of 1908  did not recognise any “pre-existing” right
\nof Bai\tVajia in  the property in dispute. In coming to this
\nconclusion, the\t learned Judge followed Naraini Devi v. Smt.
\nRamo Devi and others<\/a>.(1)
\n     The legal\trepresentative of  Bai\tVajia  is  the\tsole
\nappellant in  the appeal  before us, the respondents thereto
\nbeing nine  of the  plaintiffs and six legal representatives
\nof plaintiff  No. 5 as also the purchaser from Bai Vajia who
\nis arraigned as respondent No. 11.\n<\/p>\n
     2. At  the outset\tit was\tpointed out  by\t Mr.  I.  N.
\nShroff, learned\t counsel for  the  appellant,  that  Naraini
\nDevi’s\tcase  (supra)  has  since  been\t over-ruled  by\t the
\ndecision of  this Court in V. Tulasamma & others v. V. Sesha
\nReddi<\/a>(2) and  we find  that this  is so.  In the  case\tlast
\nmentioned, the\tfacts were  these. The\thusband of Tulasamma
\ndied in the year 1931 in a state of jointness with his step-
\nbrother V.  Sesha Reddi. A decree for maintenance was passed
\nin favour  of Tulasamma\t against V.  Sesha Reddi on June 29,
\n1946. On  the 30th  July  1949,\t a  compromise\tbetween\t the
\ncontending parties was certified by the Court executing that
\ndecree. Under the compromise, Tulasamma was allotted certain
\nproperties in  lieu of\tmaintenance, her right being limited
\nto enjoyment  thereof coupled  with the\t specific  condition
\nthat she  would not have any right of alienation whatsoever.
\nTulasamma took\tpossession of those properties and continued
\nto enjoy  them till the early sixties. On 12th of April 1960
\nshe leased  out some of the properties to two persons and on
\nthe 26th  of May  1961 made a sale of some others to another
\nperson. V.  Sesha Reddi\t filed a suit on July 31, 1961 for a
\ndeclaration that  the alienations made by Tulasamma were not
\nbinding on  him and  could remain  valid only so long as she
\nwas alive.  The basis  of  the\taction\twas  that  Tulasamma
\nacquired  a   restricted  estate  under\t the  terms  of\t the
\ncompromise and that her interest could not be enlarged under
\nsub-section (1)\t of section  14 of  the Act  in view of sub-
\nsection (2) of that section. The
\n297<\/span>
\nsuit was  decreed by  the trial court whose decision however
\nwas reversed in appeal by the District Judge, with a finding
\nthat the  allotment of\tproperties to Tulasamma by the terms
\nof the\tcompromise had\tbeen made  in recognition of a “pre-
\nexisting” right-a  finding which  was reversed\tby the\tHigh
\nCourt, who  restored the  decree passed\t by the trial court.
\nThe matter  came up to this Court in appeal by special leave
\nand Fazal  Ali, J.,  who wrote\tan exhaustive  judgment thus
\nformulated the two points falling for determination:\n<\/p>\n
\t  (1)  Whether the  instrument of  compromise  under
\n\t       which  the   properties\twere  given  to\t the
\n\t       appellant   Tulasamma\tbefore\t the   Hindu
\n\t       Succession Act  in lieu\tof maintenance falls
\n\t       within section 14(1) or is covered by section
\n\t       14(2) of that Act.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (2)  Whether a Hindu widow has a right to property
\n\t       in lieu\tof her\tmaintenance, and  if such  a
\n\t       right is conferred on her subsequently by way
\n\t       of  maintenance\t it  would  amount  to\tmere
\n\t       recognition of  a  pre-existing\tright  or  a
\n\t       conferment  of\tnew  title  so\tas  to\tfall
\n\t       squarely within\tsection 14(2)  of the  Hindu
\n\t       Succession Act.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Fazal Ali, J., was of the opinion that the resolution of the
\ndispute made  it necessary that the real legal nature of the
\nincidents  of  a  Hindu\t widow’s  right\t to  maintenance  be
\nconsidered. He\treferred  to  various  works  by  celebrated
\nauthors on  Hindu Law  and in  doing so\t cited passages from
\n‘Digest of  Hindu Law’\tby Colebrooke,\t‘Hindu Law’ by G. S.
\nSastri, ‘Hindu\tLaw and\t Usage’ by  Mayne and ‘Principles of
\nHindu Law’  by Mulla  and came\tto the\tconclusion that\t the
\nwidow’s right  to maintenance,\tthough not  an\tindefeasible
\nright to  property, is undoubtedly a “pre-existing” right. A
\nsurvey\tof   various  judicial\t pronouncements\t  was\tthen
\nundertaken by  Fazal Ali, J., and as a consideration thereof
\nhe arrived at the following propositions :-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “(1) A Hindu\twoman’s right  to maintenance  is  a
\n\t       personal obligation  so far as the husband is
\n\t       concerned, and it is his duty to maintain her
\n\t       even if\the has\tno property.  If the husband
\n\t       has property  then the  right of the widow to
\n\t       maintenance becomes  an equitable  charge  on
\n\t       his property  and any  person who succeeds to
\n\t       the  property   carries\twith  it  the  legal
\n\t       obligation to maintain the widow.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
298<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  (2)  Though the  widow’s right  to maintenance  is
\n\t       not a right to property but it is undoubtedly
\n\t       a pre-existing right in property, i.e., it is
\n\t       a jus  ad rem,  not jus in rem, and it can be
\n\t       enforced by  the widow  who can\tget a charge
\n\t       created for  her maintenance  on the property
\n\t       either by  an agreement\tor  by\tobtaining  a
\n\t       decree from the civil court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (3)  The right  of  maintenance  is  a  matter  of
\n\t       moment and is of such importance that even if
\n\t       the joint  property is sold and the purchaser
\n\t       has  notice   of\t  the\twidow’s\t  right\t  to
\n\t       maintenance, the\t purchaser is  legally bound
\n\t       to provide for her maintenance.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (4)  The right  to maintenance  is  undoubtedly  a
\n\t       pre-existing right which existed in the Hindu
\n\t       Law long\t before the  passing of\t the Act  of
\n\t       1937(1)\tor   the  Act  of  1946,(2)  and  is
\n\t       therefore, a pre-existing right.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (5)  The  right  to  maintenance  flows  from\t the
\n\t       social and  temporal relationship between the
\n\t       husband and  the wife  by virtue of which the
\n\t       wife  becomes  a\t sort  of  co-owner  in\t the
\n\t       property\t of  her  husband,  though  her\t co-
\n\t       ownership is of a subordinate nature.
\n\t  (6)  Where a\tHindu widow  is in possession of the
\n\t       property of  her husband,  she is entitled to
\n\t       retain  the   possession\t in   lieu  of\t her
\n\t       maintenance unless the person who succeeds to
\n\t       the property  or purchases  the same  is in a
\n\t       position\t to   make  arrangements   for\t her
\n\t       maintenance.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Fazal Ali,\t J., then embarked on a consideration of the
\nscope and  meaning of  section 14 of the Act in the light of
\nvarious pronouncements\tmade by\t this Court  as also  of the
\ndecisions rendered by various High Courts in relation to the
\npoints in  dispute. During  the course\tof the discussion he
\nmade the following pertinent observations:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It is  true that  a widow’s claim for maintenance
\n     does not  ripen into  a full-fledged right to property,
\n     but nevertheless  it  is  undoubtedly  right  which  in
\n     certain cases  can amount\tto a right to property where
\n     it is  charged. It cannot be said that where a property
\n     is given to a widow in lieu of
\n299<\/span>
\n     maintenance, it  is given to her for the first time and
\n     not in  lieu of  a pre-existing  right.  The  claim  to
\n     maintenance, as  also the\tright to  claim property  in
\n     order  to\t maintain  herself,  is\t an  inherent  right
\n     conferred by the Hindu Law and, therefore, any property
\n     given to  her in  lieu  of\t maintenance  is  merely  in
\n     recognition of  the claim\tor  right  which  the  widow
\n     possessed from  before. It\t cannot be  said that such a
\n     right has\tbeen conferred\ton her for the first time by
\n     virtue  of\t  the  document\t concerned  and\t before\t the
\n     existence of the document the widow had no vestige of a
\n     claim or  right at all. Once it is established that the
\n     instrument merely\trecognised the\tpre-existing  right,
\n     the widow\twould acquire  absolute interest.  Secondly,
\n     the Explanation  to section  14(1) merely\tmentions the
\n     various modes  by which  a widow can acquire a property
\n     and the property given in lieu of maintenance is one of
\n     the modes\tmentioned in the Explanation. Subsection (2)
\n     is merely\ta proviso  to section 14(1) and it cannot be
\n     interpreted in  such a  manner as\tto destroy  the very
\n     concept of\t the right  conferred on a Hindu woman under
\n     section 14(1). Sub-section (2) is limited only to those
\n     cases where by virtue of a certain grant or disposition
\n     a right  is conferred  on the  widow for the first time
\n     and the said right is restricted by certain conditions.
\n     In other  words, even  if by  a grant  or disposition a
\n     property is  conferred on\ta Hindu\t male under  certain
\n     conditions, the  same are\tbinding\t on  the  male.\t The
\n     effect of\tsub-section (2) is merely to equate male and
\n     female in\trespect of  grant  conferring  a  restricted
\n     estate.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Finally, Fazal  Ali, J.,  made a  reference to  Naraini
\nDevi’s case  (supra) to\t which he himself was a party (apart
\nfrom Sarkaria,\tJ., who delivered the judgment of the Court)
\nand in relation thereto made the following observations:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “This case  is no doubt directly in point and this
\n     Court by  holding that where under an award an interest
\n     is created\t in favour  of a  widow that  she should  be
\n     entitled to rent out the property for her life-time, it
\n     was  held\tby  this  Court\t that  this  amounted  to  a
\n     restricted estate\tunder section 14(2) of the 1956 Act.
\n     Unfortunately the\tvarious aspects,  namely, the nature
\n     and extent\t of the\t Hindu women’s right to maintenance,
\n     the limited scope of sub-section (2) which
\n300<\/span>
\n     is a  proviso to  sub-section (1) of section 14 and the
\n     effect of\tthe Explanation,  etc.,\t to  which  we\thave
\n     adverted in  this Judgment, were neither brought to our
\n     notice  nor   were\t argued\t before\t us  in\t that  case.
\n     Secondly, the  ground on which this Court distinguished
\n     the earlier  decision of this Court in Badri Parshad v.
\n     Smt. Kanso\t Devi<\/a>(1) was  that in the aforesaid decision
\n     the Hindu widow had a share or interest in the house of
\n     her husband  under the  Hindu Law\tas it was applicable
\n     then, and,\t therefore, such  a share amounted to a pre-
\n     existing right.  The attention  of this  Court however,
\n     was not  drawn to\tthe language  of the  Explanation to
\n     section 14(1)  where a  property given  to a widow at a
\n     partition or  in lieu of maintenance had been placed in
\n     the same  category, and  therefore, the reason given by
\n     this Court does not appear to be sound. For the reasons
\n     that we  have already  given, after  taking an  overall
\n     view of  the  situation,  we  are\tsatisfied  that\t the
\n     Division Bench decision of this Court in Naraini Devi’s
\n     case (supra) was not correctly decided and is therefore
\n     overruled.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Summarising the\t conclusions of\t law which  Fazal  Ali,\t J.,
\nreached after  an exhaustive  consideration of the texts and
\nauthorities mentioned by him, he enumerated them thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “(1) The  Hindu female’s  right to  maintenance is
\n     not an  empty formality  or  an  illusory\tclaim  being
\n     conceded as  a matter of grace and generosity, but is a
\n     tangible right  against property  which flows  from the
\n     spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife
\n     and is  recognised and  enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu
\n     Law and  has been strongly stressed even by the earlier
\n     Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a
\n     right may\tnot be a right to property but it is a right
\n     against  property\t and  the  husband  has\t a  personal
\n     obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family
\n     has property,  the female\thas the\t legal right  to  be
\n     maintained therefrom.  If a  charge is  created for the
\n     maintenance of  a female,\tthe  said  right  becomes  a
\n     legally enforceable  one. At  any rate,  even without a
\n     charge the\t claim for  maintenance is  doubtless a pre-
\n     existing  right  so  that\tany  transfer  declaring  or
\n     recognising such  a right does not confer any new title
\n     but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing right.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
301<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  “(2) Section\t14(1) and  the\tExplanation  thereto
\n     have been couched in the widest possible terms and must
\n     be liberally  construed in\t favour of  females so as to
\n     advance the  object of  the 1956  Act and\tpromote\t the
\n     socio-economic ends sought to be achieved by this long-
\n     needed legislation.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “(3) Sub-section  (2) of  section  14\t is  in\t the
\n     nature of\ta proviso and has a field of its own without
\n     interfering  with\t the  operation\t  of  section  14(1)
\n     materially. The  proviso should  not be  construed in a
\n     manner  so\t as  to\t destroy  the  effect  of  the\tmain
\n     provision or the protection granted by section 14(1) or
\n     in a  way so as to become totally inconsistent with the
\n     main provision.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “(4) Sub-section  (2) of  section 14\tsupplies  to
\n     instruments, decrees, awards, gifts, etc., which create
\n     independent and new titles in favour of females for the
\n     first time\t and has no application where the instrument
\n     concerned merely  seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or
\n     recognise\tpre-existing   rights.\tIn   such  cases   a
\n     restricted estate\tin favour  of a\t female\t is  legally
\n     permissible and  section 14(1) will not operate in this
\n     sphere. Where,  however, an  instrument merely declares
\n     or recognises  a pre-existing right, such as a claim to
\n     maintenance or  partition or  share to which the female
\n     is\t entitled,   the  sub-section\thas  absolutely\t  no
\n     application and  the female’s  limited  interest  would
\n     automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force
\n     of section\t 14(1) and  the restrictions placed, if any,
\n     under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where
\n     a property\t is allotted  or transferred  to a female in
\n     lieu of  maintenance  or  a  share\t at  partition,\t the
\n     instrument is  taken out of the ambit of subsection (2)
\n     and would\tbe governed  by section\t 14(1)\tdespite\t any
\n     restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.
\n\t  “(5) The  use\t of  express  terms  like  “property
\n     acquired by a female Hindu at a partition”, “or in lieu
\n     of maintenance”  “or arrears  of maintenance”, etc., in
\n     the Explanation  to section  14(1) clearly\t makes\tsub-
\n     section (2) inapplicable to these categories which have
\n     been expressly  excepted from  the\t operation  of\tsub-
\n     section (2).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “(6)\tThe   words  “possessed\t  by”  used  by\t the
\n     Legislature in section 14(1) are of the widest possible
\n     amplitude and  include the\t state of  owning a property
\n     even though  the owner  is not  in actual\tor  physical
\n     possession of the same.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
302<\/span><\/p>\n
     Thus, where  a widow gets a share in the property under
\n     a preliminary  decree before  or at  the time  when the
\n     1956 Act  had been passed but had not been given actual
\n     possession under  a final decree, the property would be
\n     deemed to\tbe possessed  by her and by force of section
\n     14(1) she\twould get absolute interest in the property.
\n     It is  equally well  settled that the possession of the
\n     widow, however,  must be under some vestige of a claim,
\n     right  or\t title,\t because   the\tsection\t  does\t not
\n     contemplate  the  possession  of  any  rank  trespasser
\n     without any right or title.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “(7) That  the words\t“restricted estate”  used in
\n     section  14(2)  are  wider\t than  limited\tinterest  as
\n     indicated in  section 14(1)  and they  include not only
\n     limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation
\n     that may be placed on the transferee”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Applying these principles Fazal Ali J., held:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “(i) that  the properties in suit were allotted to
\n     the appellant  Tulasamma  on  July\t 30,  1949  under  a
\n     compromise certified by the Court;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (ii) that  the appellant  had taken  only  a\tlife
\n     interest in  the  properties  and\tthere  was  a  clear
\n     restriction  prohibiting\ther  from   alienating\t the
\n     properties;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (iii)\t that\tdespite\t these\t restrictions,\t she
\n     continued to  be in  possession of\t the properties till
\n     1956 when the Act of 1956 came into force; and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (iv) that  the alienations  which she\t had made in
\n     1960 and  1961 were  after she had acquired an absolute
\n     interest in the properties.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In this view of the matter Fazal Ali, J., allowed the appeal
\nof Tulasamma’s legal representatives.\n<\/p>\n
     Bhagwati, J.,  wrote a separate judgment in Tulasamma’s
\ncase and  A. C.\t Gupta, J., agreed with him. He also allowed
\nthe appeal substantially for the same reasons as had weighed
\nwith Fazal Ali, J., and in doing so observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Now, sub-section  (2) of section 14 provides that
\n     nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any
\n     property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any
\n     other instrument  or under a decree or order of a civil
\n     court or  under an\t award where  the terms of the gift,
\n     will or other
\n303<\/span>
\n     instrument or  the decree,\t order or  award prescribe a
\n     restricted estate\tin such\t property. This provision is
\n     more in  the nature  of a\tproviso or exception to sub-
\n     section (1)  and it  was regarded as such by this Court
\n     in Badri  Pershad v.  Smt. Kanso  Devi.<\/a>(1)\t It  excepts
\n     certain kinds  of acquisition  of property\t by a  Hindu
\n     female from  the operation of sub section (1) and being
\n     in the  nature of\tan exception to a provision which is
\n     calculated to  achieve a  social  purpose\tby  bringing
\n     about change  in the  social and  economic position  of
\n     women in  Hindu society,  it must be construed strictly
\n     so as  to impinge\tas little  as possible\ton the broad
\n     sweep of  the ameliorative\t provision contained in sub-
\n     section (1). It cannot be interpreted in a manner which
\n     would rob sub section (1) of its efficacy and deprive a
\n     Hindu female  of the  protection sought  to be given to
\n     her by sub-section (1). The language of sub-section (2)
\n     is apparently  wide enough\t to include  acquisition  of
\n     property by  a Hindu  female under\t an instrument\tor a
\n     decree or\torder or award where the instrument, decree,
\n     order or  award prescribes\t a restricted estate for her
\n     in the  property and this would apparently cover a case
\n     where  property  is  given\t to  a\tHindu  female  at  a
\n     partition or in lieu of maintenance and the instrument,
\n     decree, order  or award giving such property prescribes
\n     limited interest  for her\tin the\tproperty.  But\tthat
\n     would virtually  emasculate   sub-section (1),  for  in
\n     that event,  a large  number of cases where property is
\n     given to  a Hindu\tfemale at  a partition or in lieu of
\n     maintenance under\tan instrument,\torder or award would
\n     be\t excluded  from\t the  operation\t of  the  beneficent
\n     provision enacted\tin sub-section (1), since in most of
\n     such cases,  where property  is allotted  to the  Hindu
\n     female prior  to the  enactment of the Act, there would
\n     be a  provision, in consonance with the old Sastric law
\n     then prevailing,  prescribing limited  interest in\t the
\n     property and  where property  is  given  to  the  Hindu
\n     female subsequent to the enactment of the Act, it would
\n     be the  easiest thing  for the dominant male to provide
\n     that the  Hindu female  shall have\t only  a  restricted
\n     interest in  the property\tand thus  make a  mockery of
\n     subsection (1).  The  Explanation\tto  sub-section\t (1)
\n     which includes  within the\t scope of  that\t sub-section
\n     property acquired\tby a  female Hindu at a partition or
\n     in\t lieu\tof  maintenance\t  would\t also\tbe  rendered
\n     meaningless, because there
\n304<\/span>
\n     would hardly  be a\t few  cases  where  the\t instrument,
\n     decree, order  or award  giving  property\tto  a  Hindu
\n     female at\ta partition  or in lieu of maintenance would
\n     not contain  a provision  prescribing restricted estate
\n     in the property
\n     The social\t purpose of  the law would be frustrated and
\n     the reformist  zeal underlying  the statutory provision
\n     would be chilled. That surely could never have been the
\n     intention of  the Legislature  in enacting\t sub-section
\n     (2).”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Bhagwati, J., laid down the nature of the right which a
\nHindu widow  has to  be maintained  out of  the joint family
\nestate in the following terms:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It is  settled law  that a  widow is\t entitled to
\n     maintenance  out  of  her\tdeceased  husband’s  estate,
\n     irrespective whether that estate may be in the hands of
\n     his male  issue or\t it may\t be  in\t the  hands  of\t his
\n     coparceners. The  joint  family  estate  in  which\t her
\n     deceased  husband\t had  a\t share\tis  liable  for\t her
\n     maintenance and she has a right to be maintained out of
\n     the joint\tfamily properties and though, as pointed out
\n     by this Court in Rani Bai v. Shri Yadunandan Ram<\/a>(1) her
\n     claim for\tmaintenance is\tnot a  charge upon any joint
\n     family property  until  she  has  got  her\t maintenance
\n     determined\t and   made  a\tspecific  charge  either  by
\n     agreement or a decree or order of a Court, her right is
\n     “not liable  to be\t defeated except  by transfer  to  a
\n     bonafide purchaser\t for value  without  notice  of\t her
\n     claim or  even with  notice of  the  claim\t unless\t the
\n     transfer was  made with  the intention of defeating her
\n     right”.  The   widow  can\t for  the   purpose  of\t her
\n     maintenance follow\t the joint family property “into the
\n     hands of  any one\twho takes  it as a volunteer or with
\n     notice of\ther having  set up a claim for maintenance”.
\n     The courts\t have even  gone to the length of taking the
\n     view that\twhere  a  widow\t is  in\t possession  of\t any
\n     specific property for the purpose of her maintenance, a
\n     purchaser buying  with  notice  of\t her  claim  is\t not
\n     entitled to  possession of\t that property without first
\n     securing proper  maintenance for  her, vide  Rachawa  &
\n     Ors.  v.\tShivayanappa(2)\t cited\t with  approval\t  in
\n     Ranibai’s case  (supra). It  is, therefore,  clear that
\n     under
\n305<\/span>
\n     the Sastric  Hindu Law  a\twidow  has  a  right  to  be
\n     maintained out  of joint family property and this right
\n     would ripen  into a  charge  if  the  widow  takes\t the
\n     necessary steps  for having her maintenance ascertained
\n     and specifically  charged in  the joint family property
\n     and even  if no  specific charge is created, this right
\n     would be  enforceable against  joint family property in
\n     the hands\tof a volunteer or a purchaser taking it with
\n     notice of\ther claim.  The right  of the  widow  to  be
\n     maintained is of course not a jus in rem, since it does
\n     not give  her any interest in the joint family property
\n     but it  is certainly  jus ad rem, i.e., a right against
\n     the family\t property. Therefore, when specific property
\n     is allotted  to the  widow in  lieu of  her  claim\t for
\n     maintenance, the  allotment would be in satisfaction of
\n     her jus ad rem,  namely, the right to be maintained out
\n     of the  joint family  property. It would not be a grant
\n     for the  first time  without any  pre-existing right in
\n     the widow.\t The widow  would be getting the property in
\n     virtue of her pre-existing right, the instrument giving
\n     the property  being merely a document effectuating such
\n     pre existing  right and  not  making  a  grant  of\t the
\n     property  to   her\t for  the  first  time\twithout\t any
\n     antecedent\t right\tor  title.  There  is  also  another
\n     consideration which  is very relevant to this issue and
\n     it is  that, even\tif the\tinstrument were silent as to
\n     the nature\t of the\t interest given\t to the widow in the
\n     property and  did not, in so many terms, prescribe that
\n     she would\thave a\tlimited interest,  she would have no
\n     more than\ta limited interest in the property under the
\n     Hindu Law as it stood prior to the enactment of the Act
\n     and hence\ta provision  in the  instrument\t prescribing
\n     that she  would have  only a  limited interest  in\t the
\n     property would  be, to quote the words of this Court in
\n     Nirmal Chand’s case (supra), “merely recording the true
\n     legal  position”\tand  that   would  not\tattract\t the
\n     applicability of  sub-section (2) but would be governed
\n     by sub-section (1) of section 14.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     All the  three Judges  were thus unanimous in accepting
\nthe  appeal   on  the\tground\tthat  Tulasamma’s  right  to
\nmaintenance was\t a  pre\t existing  right,  that\t it  was  in
\nrecognition of such a right that she obtained property under
\nthe compromise\tand that  the compromise  there fore did not
\nfall within  the ambit\tof sub-section\t(2) of section 14 of
\nthe Act\t but would attract the provisions of sub-section (1)
\nthereof coupled\t with the  Explanation thereto. With respect
\nwe  find   our\tselves\t in  complete\tagreement  with\t the
\nconclusions arrived at by
\n306<\/span>
\nBhagwati and  Fazal Ali,  JJ., as  also\t the  reasons  which
\nweighed with them in coming to those conclusions.\n<\/p>\n
     4. Mr. S. T. Desai, learned counsel for the plaintiffs-
\nrespondents, and  Mr. U. R. Lalit who very ably assisted the
\nCourt at  its request,\tcontended that for a Hindu female to
\nbe given  the benefit of subsection (1) of section 14 of the
\nAct she\t must first  be an owner, albeit a limited owner, of
\nthe property  in question  and that  Tulasamma not  being an
\nowner at  all, the  Bench presided over by Bhagwati, J., did
\nnot reach a correct decision in holding that the sub-section
\naforesaid covered  her case.  We find that only that part of
\nthis argument  which is interpretative of sub-section (1) is
\ncorrect, namely,  that it  is only  some  kind\tof  “limited
\nownership” that\t would get  enlarged into full ownership and
\nthat where no ownership at all vested in the concerned Hindu
\nfemale, no  question of the applicability of the sub-section
\nwould arise.  We may here reproduce in extenso section 14 of
\nthe Act with advantage:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “14(1) Any  property possessed  by a female Hindu,
\n     whether acquired  before or  after the  commencement of
\n     this Act,\tshall be  held by  her as full owner thereof
\n     and not as a limited owner.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     “Explanation:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  In  this  sub-section,  “property”  includes\tboth
\n     movable and  immovable property  acquired by  a  female
\n     Hindu by  inheritance or  devise, or at a partition, or
\n     in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by
\n     gift from\tany  person,  whether  a  relative  or\tnot,
\n     before, at\t or after  her marriage, or by her own skill
\n     or exertion,  or by  purchase or by prescription, or in
\n     any  other\t manner\t what-so-ever,\tand  also  any\tsuch
\n     property held  by her as “Stridhana” immediately before
\n     the commencement of this Act.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “(2) Nothing\tcontained in  sub-section (1)  shall
\n     apply to  any property acquired by way of gift or under
\n     a will  or any  other instrument  or under\t a decree or
\n     order of  a civil\tCourt or  under an  award where\t the
\n     terms of  the gift,  will or  other instrument  or\t the
\n     decree, order  or award  prescribed a restricted estate
\n     in such property.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     A plain  reading of sub-section (1) makes it clear that
\nthe concerned  Hindu female  must have\tlimited ownership in
\nproperty, which\t limited ownership would get enlarged by the
\noperation of that sub section. If it was intended to enlarge
\nany sort of a right which could
\n307<\/span>
\nin no  sense be\t described as ownership, the expression “and
\nnot as\ta limited owner” would not have been used at all and
\nbecomes redundant,  which  is  against\tthe  well-recognised
\nprinciple of interpretation of statutes that the Legislature
\ndoes not  employ meaningless language. Reference may also be
\nmade in\t this connection to Eramma v. Verrupanna & others<\/a>(1)
\nwhere in  Ramaswami, J.,  speaking  on\tbehalf\tof  himself,
\nGajendragadkar, C.J.,  and Hidayatullah, J., interpreted the
\nsub-section thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The property\t possessed by  a  female  Hindu,  as
\n     contemplated in  the section,  is clearly\tproperty  to
\n     which she\thas acquired  some  kind  of  title  whether
\n     before or\tafter the commencement of the Act. It may be
\n     noticed that  the Explanation to section 14(1) sets out
\n     the various  modes of  acquisition of the property by a
\n     female Hindu  and indicates  that the  section  applies
\n     only to property to which the female Hindu has acquired
\n     some kind\tof title,  however restricted  the nature of
\n     her interest  may be.  The words “as full owner thereof
\n     and not  as a  limited owner”  as\tgiven  in  the\tlast
\n     portion  of  sub-section  (1)  of\tsection\t 14  clearly
\n     suggest that  the legislature intended that the limited
\n     ownership of a Hindu female should be changed into full
\n     ownership. In  other words,  section 14(1)\t of the\t Act
\n     contemplates that a Hindu female who, in the absence of
\n     this provision,  would have  been limited\towner of the
\n     property, will  now become\t full owner  of the  same by
\n     virtue of this section. The object of the section is to
\n     extinguish\t the   estate  called  ‘limited\t estate’  or
\n     ‘widow’s estate’  in Hindu\t Law and  to  make  a  Hindu
\n     woman, who\t under the  old law  would have\t been only a
\n     limited owner,  a full  owner of  the property with all
\n     powers of\tdisposition and to make the estate heritable
\n     by her own heirs and not revertible to the heirs of the
\n     last\t\t\t\t\t\tmale
\n     holder………………………………………….
\n     ……………………………………………….
\n     ……………………………………………….
\n     ……………………………………………….
\n     …………..It does  not in any way confer a title on
\n     the female\t Hindu where she did not in fact possess any
\n     vestige of\t title.\t It  follows,  therefore,  that\t the
\n     section cannot  be interpreted  so as  to validate\t the
\n     illegal possession\t of a  female Hindu  and it does not
\n     confer any\t title on a mere trespasser. In other words,
\n     the provisions  of section\t 14(1) of  the Act cannot be
\n     attracted in  the case  of a  Hindu female\t who  is  in
\n     possession
\n308<\/span>
\n     of the  property of the last male holder on the date of
\n     the  commencement\tof  the\t Act  when  she\t is  only  a
\n     trespasser with out any right to property.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     This interpretation  of sub-section  (1) was cited with
\napproval in  Mangal Singh  and Others  v. Shrimati  Rattno &
\nAnother<\/a>(1) by  Bhargava, J.,  who delivered  the judgment of
\nthe Court and observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “This\t case\talso,  thus,   clarifies  that\t the
\n     expression “possessed by” is not intended to apply to a
\n     case of  mere possession  without title,  and that\t the
\n     legislature intended this provision for cases where the
\n     Hindu female  possesses the  right of  ownership of the
\n     property in  question. Even mere physical possession of
\n     the property  without the\tright of  ownership will not
\n     attract the provisions of this section. This case also,
\n     thus, supports  our view that the expression “possessed
\n     by” was  used  in\tthe  sense  of\tconnoting  state  of
\n     ownership and,  while the\tHindu female  possesses\t the
\n     rights of ownership, she would become full owner if the
\n     other  conditions\t mentioned  in\t the   section\t are
\n     fulfilled. The  section will, however, not apply at all
\n     to cases  where the  Hindu female\tmay have parted with
\n     her rights\t so as\tto place herself in a position where
\n     she  could,  in  no  manner,  exercise  her  rights  of
\n     ownership in that property any longer.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Limited ownership in the concerned Hindu female is thus
\na sine\tqua non\t for the applicability of sub-section (1) of
\nsection 14  of the  Act but  then this\tcondition was  fully
\nsatisfied in  the case of Tulasamma to whom the property was
\nmade over  in  lieu  of\t maintenance  with  full  rights  of
\nenjoyment thereof  minus the  power of alienation. These are
\nprecisely the incidents of limited ownership. In such a case
\nthe Hindu  female represents  the estate  completely and the
\nreversioners of\t her husband  have only a spes successionis,
\ni.e., a\t mere chance  of succession,  which is\tnot a vested
\ninterest and  a transfer of which is a nullity. The widow is
\ncompetent to protect the property from all kinds of trespass
\nand to\tsue and be sued for all purposes in relation thereto
\nso long as she is alive. Ownership in the fullest sense is a
\nsum-total of  all the  rights which  may possibly  flow from
\ntitle to  property, while  limited  ownership  in  its\tvery
\nnature must  be a  bundle of  rights constituting  in  their
\ntotality not full ownership but something less. When a widow
\nholds the  property for\t her enjoyment as long as she lives,
\nnobody is  entitled to deprive her of it or to deal with the
\nproperty in any manner to her detriment. The
\n309<\/span>
\nproperty is  for the  time being  beneficially vested in her
\nand she\t has the  occupation, control  and usufruct of it to
\nthe exclusion of all others. Such a relationship to property
\nin our\topinion falls  squarely within\tthe meaning  of\t the
\nexpression “limited  owner” as\tused in\t sub-section (1)  of
\nsection 14  of the  Act. In  this view\tof  the\t matter\t the
\nargument  that\t the  said  sub-section\t did  not  apply  to
\nTulasammas’s case  (supra) for\tthe reason  that she did not
\nfulfil the  condition precedent\t of being a limited owner is
\nrepelled.\n<\/p>\n
     5. The  next contention  raised by\t Mr. Desai  and\t Mr.
\nLalit also  challenged the  correctness of  the decision  in
\nTulasamma’s case.  They argued\tthat in\t any case  the\tonly
\nright which Tulasamma had prior to the compromise dated July
\n30, 1949  was a\t right to maintenance simpliciter and not at
\nall a right to or in property. For the reasons which weighed
\nwith Bhagwati and Fazal Ali, JJ., in rejecting this argument
\nwe find\t no substance in it as we are in full agreement with
\nthese reasons  and the\tsame may  not  be  reiterated  here.
\nHowever we  may emphasize  one aspect  of the  matter  which
\nflows from a scrutiny of subsection (1) of section 14 of the
\nAct  and   the\texplanation   appended\tthereto.   For\t the
\napplicability of  sub-section (1)  two conditions  must\t co-
\nexist, namely:\n<\/p>\n
\t  (1)\tthe concerned female Hindu must be possessed
\n\t       of property and
\n\t  (2)  such property  must be  possessed by her as a
\n\t       limited owner.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     If these  two conditions are fulfilled, the sub-section
\ngives her  the right  to hold  the property  as a full owner
\nirrespective of\t the fact  whether she acquired it before or
\nafter the commencement of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
     The Explanation declares that the property mentioned in
\nsub section (1) includes both movable and immovable property
\nand then  proceeds to  enumerate the modes of acquisition of
\nvarious\t kinds\tof  property  which  the  sub-section  would
\nembrace. Such modes of acquisition are:\n<\/p>\n
\t  (a)  by inheritance,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (b)  by devise,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (c)  at a partition,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (d)\t  in  lieu  of\tmaintenance  or\t arrears  of
\n\t       maintenance,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (e)  by gift\tfrom any  person, whether a relative
\n\t       or not, before, at or after her marriage,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (f)  by her own skill or exertion,
\n310<\/span>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (g)  by purchase,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (h)  by prescription,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (i) in any other manner what-so-ever, and\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (j)  any such\t property held by her as “stridhana”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t       immediately before  the commencement  of this
\n\t       Act.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     A\treference   to\tthe   Hindu  law   as  it  prevailed
\nimmediately before  the commencement  of the  Act would lead
\none to the conclusion that the object of the Explanation was
\nto make\t it clear  beyond doubt\t that all  kinds of property
\nwhich fell within the ambit of the term “stridhana” would be
\nheld by\t the owner  thereof as\ta full\towner and  not as  a
\nlimited owner.\tReference may  in this connection be made to
\nthe following enumeration of “Stridhana” in paragraph 125 of
\nMulla’s Hindu law:\n<\/p>\n
\t  (1)  Gifts and bequests from relations.
\n\t  (2)  Gifts and bequests from strangers.
\n\t  (3)  Property obtained on partition.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (4)  Property given in lieu of maintenance.
\n\t  (5)  Property acquired by inheritance.
\n\t  (6)  Property acquired by mechanical arts
\n\t  (7)  Property obtained by compromise.
\n\t  (8)  Property acquired by adverse possession.
\n\t  (9)\tProperty purchased  with stridhana  or\twith
\n\t       savings of income of stridhana.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (10) Property acquired  from\tsources\t other\tthan
\n\t       those mentioned above.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     These heads  of property  are then dealt with at length
\nby Mulla  in paragraphs 126 to 135 of his treatise. Prior to
\nthe commencement  of the Act, the Hindu female did not enjoy
\nfull ownership\tin respect  of all  kinds of “Stridhana” and
\nher powers  to deal  with it  further varied  from school to
\nschool. There  was a sharp difference in this behalf between
\nMitakshara and\tDayabhaga. And\tthen  the  Bombay,  Benaras,
\nMadras and  Mithila schools also differed from each other on
\nthe point.  Succession to different kinds of “Stridhana” did
\nnot follow a uniform pattern. The rights of the Hindu female
\nover “Stridhana” varied according to her status as a maiden,
\na married  woman and  a widow.\tThe source and nature of the
\nproperty acquired  also placed\tlimitations on her ownership
\nand made  a difference\tto the mode of succession thereto. A
\ncomparison of  the contents of the Explanation with those of
\nparagraph 125 of Mulla’s Hindu Law would show that
\n311<\/span>
\nthe two\t are practically  identical.  It  follows  that\t the
\nLegislature  in\t  its  wisdom\ttook  pains   to   enumerate
\nspecifically all kinds of “Stridhana” in the Explanation and
\ndeclared that  the same\t would form  “property”\t within\t the
\nmeaning of  that word  as used\tin sub-section (1). This was
\ndone, in  the words  of Bhagwati,  J, “to  achieve a  social
\npurpose by  bringing about change in the social and economic
\nposition of  women in  Hindu society”.\tIt was a step in the
\ndirection of  practical recognition of equality of the sexes
\nand was\t meant to  elevate women from a subservient position
\nin the\teconomic  field\t to  a\tpedestal  where\t they  could
\nexercise full  powers  of  enjoyment  and  disposal  of\t the
\nproperty held  by them as owners, untrammelled by artificial
\nlimitations placed  on their right of ownership by a society
\nin which  the will  of the  dominant male prevailed to bring
\nabout a\t subjugation of the opposite sex. It was also a step
\ncalculated to  ensure uniformity  in the law relating to the
\nnature\tof  ownership  of  “Stridhana”.\t This  dual  purpose
\nunderlying the\tExplanation must  be borne in mind and given
\neffect to  when the  section is\t subjected to  analysis\t and
\ninterpretation, and  sub-section (2)  is not  to be  given a
\nmeaning which  would defeat  that purpose  and negative\t the
\nlegislative intent,  if the  language used  so\twarrants.  A
\nCombined reading of the two sub-sections and the Explanation
\nleaves no  doubt in  our minds that sub-section (2) does not
\noperate to  take property acquired by a Hindu female in lieu
\nof maintenance\tor arrears of maintenance (which is property
\nspecifically included  in the  enumeration contained  in the
\nExplanation) out of the purview of sub-section (1).\n<\/p>\n
     6. Tulasamma’s case (supra) having, in our opinion been
\ndecided correctly,  the appeal\tin hand\t must succeed as the
\nfacts in  the latter  are on  all fours\t with those  in\t the
\nformer. Mr.  Desai did vehemently argue that this was not so
\ninasmuch  as  by  the  decree  dated  August  18,  1909\t the
\nownership of  the land\tin dispute was vested in Dayalji and
\nDayabhai sons  of Mohanbhai  and Motabhai  son of  Gulabbhai
\nwhile Bai  Vajia was  only given the right to possess it for
\nher life-the ownership remaining all along in the said three
\npersons, but  this argument does not find favour with us. It
\nhas to\tbe noted that so long as she lived, Bai Vajia was to
\nhave full  enjoyment of\t and complete control over the land,
\nbarring any  right to  alienate it.  Such a  right was\talso
\ntaken away  from the  said three  persons.  The\t arrangement
\nmeant that  whatever rights  existed in relation to the land
\nduring the  life-time of  Bai Vajia, were exercisable by her
\nalone and  by nobody  else. Not\t even the said three persons
\ncould deal  with the  land in  any manner whatsoever, and if
\nthey did,  Bai Vajia  had  the\tright  to  have\t their\tacts
\ndeclared null and void during her life-time. After the land
\n312<\/span>
\nwas made  over to her she became its owner for life although
\nwith a\tlimited right and therefore only as a limited owner.
\nUnder the  decree the  land vested in the said three persons
\nonly so\t long as  they were  not dispossessed  of it  at the
\ninstance of  Bai Vajia\tin accordance  with the terms stated
\ntherein. As  soon as  Bai Vajia took possession of the land,
\nno  rights  of\tany  kind  whatsoever  in  relation  thereto
\nremained with them and thus they ceased to be the owners for
\nthe span of Bai Vajia’s life.\n<\/p>\n
     7. Following  Tulsamma’s case  we hold  that Bai  Vajia
\nbecame a  full owner  of  the  land  in\t dispute  under\t the
\nprovisions of  sub-section (1)\tof section 14 of the Act and
\nthat sub-section (2) thereof has no application to her case,
\nthe land  having been given to her as a limited owner and in
\nrecognition of\ther pre-existing  right against property. In
\nthe result  therefore, the  appeal succeeds and is accepted.
\nThe judgment  and the decree of the High Court are set aside
\nand the suit giving rise to this appeal is dismissed. In the
\ncircumstances of  the case, however, we leave the parties to
\nbear their own costs throughout.\n<\/p>\n
S.R.\t\t\t\t\t     Appeal allowed.\n313<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979 Equivalent citations: 1979 AIR 993, 1979 SCR (3) 291 Author: A Koshal Bench: Koshal, A.D. PETITIONER: BAI VAJIA (DEAD) BY L. RS. Vs. RESPONDENT: THAKORBHAI CHELABHAI AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT20\/02\/1979 BENCH: KOSHAL, A.D. BENCH: KOSHAL, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-160552","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nBai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1979-02-19T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-12-25T17:33:54+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"43 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979\",\"datePublished\":\"1979-02-19T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-12-25T17:33:54+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979\"},\"wordCount\":7229,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979\",\"name\":\"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1979-02-19T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-12-25T17:33:54+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1979-02-19T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2015-12-25T17:33:54+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"43 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979","datePublished":"1979-02-19T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-12-25T17:33:54+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979"},"wordCount":7229,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979","name":"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1979-02-19T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-12-25T17:33:54+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bai-vajia-dead-by-l-rs-vs-thakorbhai-chelabhai-and-ors-on-20-february-1979#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Bai Vajia (Dead) By L. Rs vs Thakorbhai Chelabhai And Ors on 20 February, 1979"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/160552","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=160552"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/160552\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=160552"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=160552"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=160552"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}