{"id":163705,"date":"1989-01-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1989-01-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989"},"modified":"2016-09-11T01:07:29","modified_gmt":"2016-09-10T19:37:29","slug":"kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989","title":{"rendered":"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 714, \t\t 1989 SCR (1)\t 20<\/div>\n
Author: N Ojha<\/div>\n
Bench: Ojha, N.D. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nKIRAN BEDI & ORS.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nCOMMITTEE OF INQUIRY & ANR.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT04\/01\/1989\n\nBENCH:\nOJHA, N.D. (J)\nBENCH:\nOJHA, N.D. (J)\nVENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)\nDUTT, M.M. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1989 AIR  714\t\t  1989 SCR  (1)\t 20\n 1989 SCC  (1) 494\t  JT 1989 (1)\t 21\n 1989 SCALE  (1)10\n\n\nACT:\n    Commissions of Inquiry Act,\t 1952\/Commissions of Inquiry\n(Central)    Rules,   1972:   Sections\t 4   and    8-B\/Rule\n5(5)(a)--Commission\t of\tInquiry--Examination\t  of\nwitnesses--Sequence  of--Issuance of formal notice under  s.\n8-B--When arises--Holding persons not entitled to be covered\nby  s. 8-B, and compelling them to enter witness box at\t the\ninception  while directing similarly placed persons to\twhom\nnotice\t issued\t  to  be  examined   at\t  the\tend--Whether\njustified--Whether   discriminatory-Persons  whose   conduct\nbeing inquired into called upon for being cross-examined  at\nthe inception of the inquiry while persons similarly  placed\ndirected  to  be enquired at the end--Refuse to\t bind  them-\nselves by oath and affirmation believing to be covered by s.\n8-B-Whether can avoid consequences--Refusal--When justified.\n    Indian  Penal  Code. 1860:\tSection\t 178--Commission  of\nInquiry---Directing filing of complaint for prosecution\t for\nfailure to enter witness box--Whether complaint liable to be\nquashed for infringement of fundamental right.\n    Constitution of India, 1950: Articles 14, 21, 32, 136  &\n142-Commission of Inquiry--Holding persons not covered by s.\n8-B of Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 and compelling\tthem\nto  enter  witness box. while directing issue of  notice  to\nsimilarly    placed    persons-Whether\t  discriminatory--On\nrefusal--Directing   filing  of\t complaints  under  s.\t 178\nIPC--Whether infringement of fundamental rights--Writ  Peti-\ntion\/Special  Leave  Petition filed  challenging  order\t for\nfiling\t complaints--Summons   by   Magistrate\t not   chal-\nlenged--Maintainability\t   of--Interference    by    Supreme\nCourt--Whether called for.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n    A  Committee consisting of two Judges of the High  Court\nwas  constituted  by Delhi Administration  to  enquire\tinto\ncertain incidents in January 1988, involving the lawyers and\nthe police sequel to an alleged incident of a lawyer,  being\napprehended by the students of a College, and banded over to\nthe police on the accusation of committing an offence within\nthe  campus of the said College and his\t subsequently  being\nbrought\t in handcuffs by the police for production before  a\nMagistrate,\n21\nwho ultimately discharged him with direction to the  Commis-\nsioner\tof Police to take action against the  guilty  police\nofficials.\n    In\tits interim report, the Committee observed  that  it\nhad 10 examine the conduct of various police officers,\tand,\nin particular, among others, the petitioners and recommended\nthe transfer of the petitioners from their posts.\n    In\tpursuance of a notice issued by the Committee  under\nRule 5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of cases on behalf  of\nthe  High  Court  Bar Association and  the  Commissioner  of\nPolice\ttogether with the supporting affidavits\t were  filed\nbefore\tthe Committee. The Police were required to be  ready\nfor  examination from May 16, 1988 onwards but\tthe  counter\naffidavit and the list of witnesses had not been filed\ttill\n17th  May,  1988, on which date the Commissioner  of  Police\nsubmitted  two\tapplications  praying  for  postponement  of\nhearing\t and for calling upon the Bar Association  to  start\ntheir  evidence first and to call upon the  Commissioner  of\nPolice\tto adduce the evidence thereafter.  Rejecting  these\napplications,  the  Committee passed an\t order\tsaying\tthat\nsince the Police had failed to file their counter  affidavit\nor  list of witnesses, the petitioners should be present  in\nCourt on May 19, 1988 for crossexamination.\n    On\tthe petitioners' refusing to enter  the\t witness-box\nfor taking oath for cross-examination, the Committee decided\nto  file complaints against the petitioners for\t an  offence\nunder  s. 178 of the Indian Penal Code and in  pursuance  of\nwhich  complaints were filed against the petitioners in\t the\nChief Metropolitan Magistrate's Court under sub-s. (4) of s.\n5  of the Commissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 read with s.\t 346\nof the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.\n    The petitioners challenged these orders in this Court by\nway  of\t writ petitions and Special  Leave  Petitions.\tThis\nCourt passed an order on June 2, 1988 directing the  Commit-\ntee  to reconsider the whole question relating to the  order\nin which the witnesses had to be examined in the case.\n    In\tpursuance  of  the aforesaid  order,  the  Committee\npassed an order on 29th June, 1988 holding that the  concept\nof burden of proof was not quite relevant in the proceedings\nbefore\ta  Commission, under the Act, which had\t been  given\nfree hand to lay down its own procedure subject, of  course,\nto  the provisions of the Act and the rules made  thereunder\nand that it would be difficult for the committee to lay down\n22\nthe  manner  in\t which the witnesses were  to  be  examined,\nforegoing its right to examine any witness at any stage,  if\nhis  statement appeared to be relevant, that merely  because\nthere were allegations against a particular person he  would\nnot  be\t said to be covered under s. 8-B, which\t required  a\npositive order from the Committee, and that when the Commit-\ntee mentioned that it was to examine the conduct of  various\nPolice\tOfficers and others, it did not have in view s.\t 8-B\nof  the Act. The Committee specifically held that the  three\nother  persons to whom notices had been issued under s.\t 8-B\nwould be examined at the end of the inquiry.\n    On August 18, 1988 this Court quashed the orders of\t the\nCommittee  directing  the filing of the complaints  and\t the\ncriminal  proceedings  against the  petitioners\t before\t the\nMetropolitan Magistrate and held (a) that the Delhi Adminis-\ntration\t had to examine first all its witnesses as  required\nby  Rule  5(5)(a) of the Rules framed under  the  Act;\teven\nthose  witnesses who may have filed affidavits\talready\t may\nfirst be examined in-chief before they were  cross-examined,\nsince it was stated that when the affidavits were filed\t the\ndeponents  did not know what the other parties who had\talso\nfiled  affidavits had stated in their affidavits; the  ques-\ntion  whether a party had the right of cross-examination  or\nnot shall be decided by the Committee in accordance with  s.\n8-C of the Act; the direction to the Delhi Administration to\nexamine its witnesses first did not apply to those witnesses\nwho fell under s. 8-B of the Act, who had to be examined  at\nthe  end of the inquiry, as opined by the Committee  itself;\n(b) that the petitioners were persons, who fell under s. 8-B\nof  the\t Act and had to be dealt with accordingly,  and\t (c)\nthat  if the three persons to whom notices under s. 8-B\t had\nbeen  issued  were  to be examined, even  according  to\t the\nCommittee, at the end of the inquiry there was no  justifia-\nble reason to deny the same treatment to the petitioners who\nwere in the same position as those three persons; the action\nof the Committee in asking them to be cross-examined at\t the\nbeginning  of  the inquiry was,\t therefore,  discriminatory;\nmere non-issue of notices to them under s. 8-B ought not  to\nmake  any difference if they otherwise satisfied the  condi-\ntions  mentioned in s. 8-B; the issue of such a\t notice\t was\nnot  contemplated under s. 8-B of the Act; it was enough  if\nat  any\t stage\tthe Commission considered  it  necessary  to\ninquire into the conduct of any person and such person would\nthereafter  be\tgoverned by s. 8-B of the Act.\tReasons\t for\nthis order were to be given later.\nGiving reasons for the above order the Court,\nHELD: 1. Recourse to procedure under s. 8-B of the Commis-\n23\nsions of Enquiry Act, 1972 is not confined to any particular\nstage  and if not earlier, at any rate, as soon as the\tCom-\nmittee made the unequivocal declaration of its intention, in\nits  interim report to examine the conduct of the two  peti-\ntioners it should have issued notice under s. 8-B to the two\npetitioners, if it was of the view, for which view there  is\nno justification, that issue of a formal notice under s. 8-B\nwas  the  sine-qua-non for attracting that Section.  At\t all\nevents,\t the  Committee could not deny the  petitioners\t the\nstatutory  protection  of s. 8-B by merely  refraining\tfrom\nissuing\t a  formal notice even though on  its  own  declared\nintention, the section was clearly attracted. [42C-E]\n    State  of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi  Ghulam  Mohammad,<\/a>\n[1966]\tSuppl.\tS.C.R. page 401 and State  of  Karnataka  v.\nUnion of India & Another,<\/a> [1978] 2 S.C.R. page 1, relied on.\n    2.1 The use of the word 'or' between clauses (a) and (b)\nof  s.\t8-B of the Act makes it clear that s. 8-B  would  be\nattracted if requirement of either clause (a) or clause\t (b)\nis fulfilled. Clause (a) of s. 8-B applies when the  conduct\nof  any\t person is to be enquired into\twhereas\t clause\t (b)\napplies to a case where reputation of a person is likely  to\nbe prejudicially affected. [42B]\n    2.2 The fact that no formal notice had been issued under\ns. 8-B would constitute no justification for not treating  a\nperson to be covered by that section if otherwise the ingre-\ndients of the said section were made out. Having once stated\nin its interim report in unequivocal terms, that the conduct\nof these two petitioners among others was to be examined, it\nwas  not open to the Committee to still take the stand\tthat\ns.  8-B was not attracted in so far as they were  concerned.\n[42B-C]\n    2.3\t Keeping in view the nature of the allegations\tmade\nin  the\t statements of case and\t the  supporting  affidavits\nfiled  on behalf of the various Bar  Associations  including\nthe  Delhi High Court Bar Association, requirement  of\teven\nclause\t(b)  of s. 8-B was fulfilled inasmuch  as  if  those\nallegations  were proved they were likely  to  prejudicially\naffect the reputation of the two petitioners. In view of the\nspecific  term\tof reference which  contemplated  taking  of\n\"stringent  action\" against all those responsible, even\t the\ncareer\tof the petitioners as police officers was likely  to\nbe affected in case an adverse finding was recorded  against\nthem  and the principle that the report of a  Commission  of\nEnquiry has no force proprio vigore does not, on a pragmatic\napproach to the consequences, seem to constitute  sufficient\nsafeguard so far as the petitioners are concerned. [43C-E]\n24\n    The\t reason for the importance attached with  regard  to\nthe matter of safeguarding the reputation of a person  being\nprejudicially affected in cl. (b) ors. 8-B of the Act is not\nfar to seek. [43E-F]\n    Blackstone's  Commentary of the laws of  England  Vol-I,\nIVth Edition, Corpus Juris Secundum Vol. 77 at page 268\t and\nD.F.  Marion  v.  Davis, 55 American Law  Reports  page\t 171\nreferred to.\n    3.1\t Section 8-B inter alia contemplates an\t opportunity\nbeing  given to the person governed by the said\t section  to\nproduce\t evidence in his defence whereas s. 8-C\t inter\talia\ngives  him  the\t right to cross examine\t the  witnesses\t who\ndepose against him. [45D]\n    Not\t only that calling upon a person governed by s.\t 8-B\nto produce evidence in his defence at the very inception  of\nthe inquiry is a contradiction in terms inasmuch as in\tthis\nsituation such a person would really be required to disprove\nstatements prejudicial to him of such witnesses who are\t yet\nto be examined, it would also reduce the right of crossexam-\nination\t by such person to a mere formality for the  obvious\nreason\tthat by the time the witnesses who are to be  crass-\nexamined  are  produced, the defence of\t such  person  which\nwould normally constitute the basis for the line and  object\nof cross-examination would already be known to such witness-\nes and they are likely to refashion their statements accord-\ningly. [45E-F]\n    3.2 Perhaps in a case where there is no other witness to\ngive information about the alleged incident about which\t the\ninquiry\t is  being held and the only person or\tpersons\t who\ncould give such information is or are the person or  persons\nwho  are likely to be adversely affected by the inquiry,  it\nmay  be necessary to depart from the above view as a  matter\nof  necessity.\tBut  this is not one such  case.  There\t are\nadmittedly any number of other persons who can give evidence\nabout what happened on the relevant dates. [45G]\n    Since the two petitioners clearly fell within the  cate-\ngory  of persons contemplated by s. 8-B of the Act and\twere\nconsequently  entitled\tto the same treatment  as  has\tbeen\naccorded by the Committee to the persons to whom notice\t has\nbeen issued by it under the said section, the Committee\t was\nnot  justified in calling upon the two petitioners to  stand\nin the witness box for cross-examination at the very initial\nstage of the enquiry. [54B-D]\n3.3  The apprehension that in case a person governed  by  s.\n8-B\n25\nwas to be examined at the end and at that stage such  person\neven  at  the risk of not producing his\t defence,  for\tsome\nreason,\t chooses not to appear as a witness,  the  Committee\nwould  be deprived of knowing the facts in the knowledge  of\nsuch  person  and such a course would obviously\t hamper\t the\nenquiry is more imaginary than real inasmuch as the power of\nthe  Commission to call upon any person to appear as a\twit-\nness under s. 4 of the Act, which in terms is very wide\t and\nis not circumscribed by fetters of stage, would be available\nto  the\t Commission and it would be entitled  to  call\tsuch\nperson as a witness even at that stage. [46A-C]\n    4.1 In view of the provisions contained in ss. 4 to 6 of\nthe Act, and the rules framed thereunder a person could not,\non  the\t belief\t that he was covered by s.  8-B,  avoid\t the\nconsequence of ss. 178 and 179, by claiming absolute immuni-\nty  from binding himself by an oath or affirmation  for\t an-\nswering questions put to them. [51H; 52A]\n    Mc Grain v. Daugherty, 71 L. ed. 580; Uphaus v. Wyman, 3\nL.ed.  2d  1090; Sinclair v. United States,  73\t L.ed.\t692;\nKastigar  v.  United States, 32 L. Ed. 2d 212 and  Brown  v.\nWalker40 L.ed. 819, referred to.\n    However, a valid justification put forth by the  witness\nwas  sufficient ground to make him immune from\tprosecution.\n[52F]\n    Watkins  v.\t United States, 1 L.ed. 2d 1273;  Flaxer  v.\nUnited\tStates,\t 3  L.ed. 2d 183 and  Murphy  v.  Waterfront\nCommission of New York, 12 L.ed. 2d 678 referred to.\n    In\tthe instant case, the petitioners are not  asserting\nthat  they could not be required at all to appear as a\twit-\nness before the Committee and make statement on oath. It was\nsubmitted  on their behalf that they did not either wish  to\ndelay  the proceedings or to show disrespect to the  Commit-\ntee, but only wanted to protect their own interest by making\nthe submission which they made before the Committee, as\t per\nlegal  advice given to them, namely that they being  covered\nby  s. 8-B of the Act their defence would be put to  serious\njeopardy  and  will be prejudicially affected if  they\twere\nrequired  to appear in the witness box for  crossexamination\nat the very inception of the inquiry even before  statements\nof witnesses proving the accusations against the petitioners\nhad been recorded which they were entitled to defend.  [52B-\nE]\n    4.2 On the view of the Committee that persons covered by\n8-B were to be examined at the end of the enquiry, the\tfact\nthat  an  affidavit of the petitioner was  on  record  could\nhardly justify the petitioner being\n26\ncalled upon to enter the witness box at the very  inception.\n[55C]\n    Smt. Indira Gandhi and another v. Mr. J.C. Shah  Commis-\nsion of Inquiry, ILR 1980(1) Delhi 552 referred to.\n    4.3\t Had  the  Committee not been  labouring  under\t the\nmisapprehension that the petitioners were not covered by  s.\n8-B,  because no notices under that section had been  issued\nto them, notwithstanding the fact that their conduct was  to\nbe  examined on its own declared, intention, it would  obvi-\nously  not  have required the petitioners to take  oath\t for\nbeing  cross-examined at the stage at which it did  so.\t The\nsubsequent  orders of the Committee directing complaints  to\nbe  filed against the petitioners for an offence  punishable\nunder s. 178 IPC and the act of filing such complaints\twere\nthe consequences of the said misapprehension. [55F-G]\n    Since the petitioners were covered by s. 8-B, the action\nof the Committee in compelling the petitioners to enter\t the\nwitness box for being cross-examined, when even according to\nit  persons similarly situated were to do so at the  end  of\nthe inquiry, was in itself discriminatory. There was, there-\nfore, valid justification for the refusal by the petitioners\nto  take oath for cross-examination at the stage  when\tthey\nwere required to do so. [55H; 56A-B]\n    Therefore, the Committee should not have, in the instant\ncase,  directed the filing of a complaint against either  of\nthe petitioners for an offence punishable under s. 178\tIPC.\n[56C]\n    5. Since the action of the Committee in holding that the\npetitioners  were not covered by s. 8-B of the Act and\tcom-\npelling them to enter the witness box on the dates in  ques-\ntion  was discriminatory and the orders directing  complaint\nbeing  filed against the petitioners were illegal, it  is  a\ncase  involving\t infringement of Articles 14 and 21  of\t the\nConstitution.  In such a situation, the power of this  Court\nto pass an appropriate order in exercise of its jurisdiction\nunder  Articles\t 32 and 142 of the  Constitution  cannot  be\nseriously doubted, particularly having regard to the special\nfacts and circumstances of this case. [56D-El\n    The orders directing filing of complaints being invalid,\nthe  consequential  complaints and the\tproceedings  thereon\nincluding  the\torders\tof the\tMagistrate  issuing  summons\ncannot survive. [56E-F]\n6. If the petitioners are compelled to face prosecution.  in\nspite of\n27\nthe finding that the orders directing complaint to be  filed\nagainst them were illegal, it would cause prejudice to them.\nTherefore, this Court can interfere in the matter. [56G]\n    7.\tApart from the directions contained in this  Court's\norder  dated 18th August, 1988, it is not expedient  to\t lay\ndown  any particular rigid procedure to be followed  by\t the\nCommittee with regard to sequence in which witnesses were to\nbe examined by it. [41G-H]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
    ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 626  of
\n1988 etc. etc.
\n(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India)
\n    G. Ramaswamy, Additional Solicitor General, S. Murlidha-
\nran,  A.D.N.  Rao, A. Subba Rao and Krishnan Kumar  for\t the
\nPetitioners.\n<\/p>\n
    Kuldip Singh, Additional Solicitor General, K.K. Venugo-
\npal, Kapil Sibbal, Lal Chand, C.S. Vaidyanathan, H.S. Phool-
\nka,  N.S.  Das, Rajiv Khosla, P. Tripathi,  Kailash  Vasdev,
\nMiss A. Subhashini, Harish Salve and Ravinder Sethi, for the
\nRespondents.\n<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n    OJHA,  J.  In the writ petition and\t the  special  leave
\npetitions  filed by Smt. Kiran Bedi, the orders dated  17th,
\n20th  and 23rd May 1988 passed by the Committee\t of  Inquiry
\nconsisting of Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami and Mr. Justice\tD.P.
\nWadhwa\tof the High Court of Delhi (hereinafter referred  to
\nas  the Committee) are sought to be quashed whereas  in\t the
\nwrit  petition\tand the S.L.P. filed by\t Jinder\t Singh,\t the
\norder  dated 26th May, 1988 passed by the said Committee  is
\nsought to be quashed.\n<\/p>\n
    In\torder to appreciate the respective submissions\tmade
\nby  learned counsel for the parties, it would be  useful  to
\ngive  in brief the circumstances leading to the\t appointment
\nof  the Committee and also to quote the terms of  reference.
\nWhat  ultimately assumed the shape of confrontation  between
\nlawyers\t and police sparked off from an alleged\t unfortunate
\nincident on 15th January, 1988 of a lawyer being apprehended
\nby the students of St. Stephens College, University of Delhi
\nand  being  handed over to the police on the  accusation  of
\ncommitting an offence within the campus of the said College.
\nAccording to the statement of case filed before the  Commit-
\ntee on behalf of the Delhi
\n28<\/span>
\nHigh  Court Bar Association, the said lawyer was brought  by
\nthe police in handcuffs for production before a Metropolitan
\nMagistrate  on 16th January, 1988. The lawyers present\tpro-
\ntested against the handcuffing but their protest was ignored
\nby  the police officials. The Metropolitan Magistrate  ulti-
\nmately\tdischarged  the\t lawyer on the same  date  and\talso
\ndirected  the Commissioner of Police to take action  against
\nthe guilty police officials. In support of their demand\t for
\naction\tagainst\t the police officials, the lawyers  went  on
\nstrike from 18th January 1988. In the said statement of case
\nit was further stated that on 20th January, 1988, Smt. Kiran
\nBedi, Deputy Commissioner of Police, North District,  Delhi,
\nmade a statement in a Press conference justifying the action
\nof  police  and criticising the order of the  Magistrate  in
\ndischarging  a\t“thief” and that in order to  express  their
\ndeep  concern  and anguish a group of lawyers went  to\tmeet
\nSmt. Bedi on 21st January, 1988 in her office which at\tthat
\ntime  was situated in the Tis Hazari Court  Complex  itself.
\nSmt. Bedi, however, refused to come out and meet the lawyers
\nwhereupon they preferred to wait upon her till such time  as
\nshe  agreed  to meet them. They assert that while  they\t had
\nwaited\tfor 15-20 minutes the police took recourse to  lathi
\ncharge\ton  the lawyers at the orders of Smt. Bedi.  In\t the
\nsaid  statement\t of case it has further been  asserted\tthat
\nwhile the indefinite strike and the agitation of the lawyers
\ndemanding  a  judicial inquiry into the\t incident  of  lathi
\ncharge\tand suspension of Smt. Kiran Bedi was continuing,  a
\nmob  which eventually swelled to about 3000 persons came  to
\nTis  Hazari  Court  Complex on 17th  February  1988  raising
\nslogans\t in  support of Smt. Bedi and against  the  striking
\nlawyers. The mob used brickbats and stones causing injury to
\nsome lawyers and damage to property. According to them\tthis
\nmob attack was engineered by Smt. Kiran Bedi. A statement of
\ncase was also filed by Ved Prakash Marwah, the then  Commis-
\nsioner of Police, attaching thereto affidavits of 25  police
\nofficers including an affidavit of Smt. Kiran Bedi. There is
\na  denial on their part of the assertions  and\tinsinuations
\nmade  against them by the Delhi Bar Association referred  to
\nabove. With regard to the incident on 21st January 1988\t the
\ncase  of Smt. Kiran Bedi as is apparent from  her  affidavit
\nfiled along with the aforesaid statement of case is that she
\nalong with some other officers reached her Tis Hazari Office
\nat  about 11.15 A.M. and while a meeting was in progress  in
\nconnection  with the arrangements for the Republic Day\tsome
\ntime  around  22.00 noon, slogans were heard  “being  raised
\noutside\t by  an apparently large crowd\tapproaching  in\t our
\ndirection.  Before  we realised what was happening.  all  of
\nsudden\ta  group of lawyers stormed into my  office  pushing
\naside  the female constable on duty at my door. They  rushed
\ntowards me making violent gestures and uttering\t obsceneties
\nat me. They made physical gesture
\n29<\/span>
\nand threats to the effect  …….  The Police Officers\t who
\nwere sitting around my table jumped to their feet. They held
\nback one of hysterical persons who had actually advanced  in
\nmy  direction and formed a ring around the lawyers and\tman-
\naged  to move them out of my office while bolting me  inside
\nalong with my female constable and a female visitor who\t had
\ncome to see me for her own work”. We have thought it  proper
\nnot  to quote the actual words of threat stated in the\tsaid
\naffidavit. According to Smt. Kiran Bedi the situation there-
\nafter  outside her office was handled by the other  officers
\npresent while she remained inside the office.
\n    We\tare not concerned with the correctness or  otherwise
\nof  either of the two versions stated above and\t as  already
\npointed\t out we have referred to them only to  indicate\t the
\nbackground  in which the Committee was\tconstituted.  Having
\nreferred  in  brief to the circumstances which\tled  to\t the
\nappointment  of\t the  Committee we now quote  the  order  of
\nreference:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t   “F.No. 10\/9\/88-NP-II
\n\t       DELHI ADMINISTRATION: DELHI
\n\t\t  (HOME POLICE-II DELHI)
\n\t\t\t\tDated the 23rd Feb. 1988.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
ORDER
\n\t  Whereas the Administrator of the Union  Territory.
\nof Delhi is of the opinion that a judicial inquiry is neces-
\nsary into matters of public importance mentioned below;\t Now
\ntherefore,  the\t Administrator is pleased  to  constitute  a
\nCommittee,  in consultation with the Chief Justice of  Delhi
\nHigh  Court consisting of Mr. Justice N.N. Goswami  and\t Mr.
\nJustice\t D.P.  Wadhwa Hon’ble Judges of the  High  Court  to
\ninquire into and record their findings on the following:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t     (i)  The incident of the 15th  January,
\n\t      1988  in St. Stephen’s College, University  of
\n\t      Delhi  regarding apprehension of a  lawyer  by
\n\t      the police.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t     (ii)  The incident and reported  lathi-
\n\t      charge  on the 21st January, 1988 outside\t the
\n\t      office of the DCP\/North, Delhi.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      30<\/span><\/p>\n
\t\t   (iii)  Circumstances leading to  presence
\n\t      of a mob in Tis Hazari premises on 17th Febru-
\n\t      ary, 1988 and the resultant violence.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t   (iv)\t Any  other  incidental\t development
\n\t      connected with the above.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      The  Committee is requested to  ascertain\t the
\n\t      facts leading to the aforesaid incidents\twith
\n\t      a\t view to identifying those  responsible\t for
\n\t      the  incidents so that stringent action  could
\n\t      be taken against all those responsible.
\n\t\t       The Committee may, if it deems appro-
\n\t      priate, submit an interim report within  seven
\n\t      days of its first sitting suggesting action if
\n\t      any,  against  police officials or  any  other
\n\t      involved\tpersons\t pending submission  of\t the
\n\t      final report within a period of 3 months.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    Subsequently in pursuance of a direction issued by\tthis
\nCourt the aforesaid notification was modified by the  Admin-
\nistrator vide Notification dated 15th March, 1988 by direct-
\ning  that the provisions of Sections 4, 5, 5-A, 6,  8,\t8-A,
\n8-B. 8-C, 9, 10 and 10-A of the Commissions of Inquiry\tAct,
\n1952 and the rules made under Section 12 thereof shall apply
\nto the said Committee.\n<\/p>\n
    The Committee submitted an interim report on 9th  April,
\n1988 and during the course of proceedings before it thereaf-
\nter passed the aforesaid orders which are the subject matter
\nof these writ petitions and special leave petitions.
\n    After  having heard learned counsel for the\t parties  at
\nlength\twe  passed an order on 18th August,  1988  which  we
\nconsider  it  appropriate to reproduce here with a  view  to
\navoiding the repetition of the reasons already given therein
\nin support of the said order:\n<\/p>\n
“It is unfortunate that this case has arisen between lawyers
\nand police who are both guardians of law and who  constitute
\ntwo  important segments of society on whom the stability  of
\nthe country depends. It is hoped that cordiality between the
\ntwo sections will be restored soon.\n<\/p>\n
       In  order to avoid any further delay in the  proceed-
\nings before the Committee consisting of Goswamy and  Wadhwa,
\nJJ,
\n31<\/span>
\nconstituted  by Order dated 23rd February, 1988\t to  enquire
\ninto certain incidents which took place on the 15th January,
\n1988.  2 1st January, 1988 and 17th February, 1988, we\tpass
\nthe  following order now but we shall give detailed  reasons
\nin support of this order in due course.\n<\/p>\n
The order is as under:\n<\/p>\n
  1.  This  order  is passed on the basis  of  the  material
\navailable on record, the various steps already taken  before
\nthe Committee and other peculiar features to the case.\n<\/p>\n
  2.  The Delhi Administration has to examine first all\t its
\nwitnesses as required by Rule 5(5)(a) of the Commissions  of
\nInquiry\t (Central) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred  to  as
\nthe Rules) framed under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952
\n(hereinafter  referred to as the Act). Even those  witnesses
\nwho   may  have\t filed\taffidavits  already  may  first\t  be
\nexamined-in-chief  before they are cross-examined, since  it
\nis stated that when the affidavits were filed the  deponents
\ndid  not  know what the other parties who  have\t also  filed
\naffidavits  had\t stated in their  affidavits.  The  question
\nwhether\t a  party has the right of crossexamination  or\t not
\nshall be decided by the Committee in accordance with Section
\n8-C  of the Act. In the facts and circumstances of the\tcase
\nto  which  reference will be made hereafter  this  direction
\nissued to the Delhi Administration to examine its  witnesses
\nfirst  as provided by rule 5(5)(a) of the Rules referred  to
\nabove  does not apply to those witnesses falling under\tsec-
\ntion  8-B of the Act, who have to be examined at the end  of
\nthe inquiry as opined by the Committee itself.\n<\/p>\n
  3.  We have gone through the several affidavits and  other
\nmaterial  placed before the Committee and also\tthe  Interim
\nReport dated April 9, 1988 passed by the Committee. In\tpara
\n13 of the Interim Report the Committee has observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
    During the course of the inquiry, we have to examine the
\nconduct\t of various police officers and others and  particu-
\nlarly,\tas the record shows, of the DCP (North),  Addl.\t DCP
\n(North),  SHO,\tPS Samepur (Badli) and\tSI  Incharge  Police
\nPost, Tis Hazari and SI. Samepur (Badli).\n<\/p>\n
In para 14 of the Interim Report it is observed.\n<\/p>\n
32<\/span><\/p>\n
    Lawyers have seriously urged that this Committee  should
\nsend a report recommending suspension of the DCP (North)  Ms
\nKiran Bedi.\n<\/p>\n
    Ultimately the Committee recommended the transfer of the
\npetitioners  in\t these\tcases, namely, Ms  Kiran  Bedi,\t DCP
\n(North)\t and  Jinder  Singh SI, Incharge  Police  Post,\t Tis
\nHazari.\n<\/p>\n
Section 8-B of the Act reads:\n<\/p>\n
“8-B. If, at any stage of the inquiry, the Commission,\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    (a)\t considers it necessary\t to  inquire
\n\t      into the conduct of any person; or\n<\/p>\n
\t\t    (b) is of opinion that the reputation of
\n\t      any  person  is  likely  to  be  prejudicially
\n\t      affected by the inquiry,
\n\t      the  Commission  shall give to that  person  a
\n\t      reasonable  opportunity of being heard in\t the
\n\t      inquiry  and  to produce evidence in  his\t de-\n<\/p>\n
\t      fence:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t       Provided that nothing in this section
\n\t      shall  apply where the credit of a witness  is
\n\t      being impeached.”\n<\/p>\n
    In\tits Interim Report the Committee  has  unequivocally
\nobserved  that\tit  had to examine the\tconduct\t of  various
\npolice\tofficers,  and in particular among others  Ms  Kiran
\nBedi,  DCP  (North) and Jinder Singh,  SI,  Incharge  Police
\nPost, Tis Hazari.\n<\/p>\n
    Having  given our anxious consideration to all  the\t as-
\npects of the case we hold that the petitioners Ms Kiran Bedi
\nand  Jinder Singh are persons who fall under Section 8-B  of
\nthe Act and have to be dealt with accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
    4.\tAccording to the Committee’s own opinion  formed  in
\nthe  light of the facts and circumstances of the  case,\t all
\nthese  persons to whom notices under Section 8-B of the\t Act
\nare  issued have to be examined at the end of  the  inquiry.
\nThis  is obvious from the order of the Committee  passed  on
\nJune 29, 1988 after it was asked by this Court by its  order
\ndated June 2, 1988 to reconsider the whole question relating
\nto  the order in which the witnesses had to be\texamined  in
\nthe case. In its order dated June 29, 1988 the Committee has
\nobserved thus:\n<\/p>\n
33<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      “Without\tgoing into the controversy  if\tRule
\n\t      5(5) is an independent rule or is governed  by
\n\t      Sections\t8-B  and 8-C of the  Act,  we  would
\n\t      direct  that in the circumstances of the\tcase
\n\t      three  persons namely, the Additional  Commis-
\n\t      sioner of Police (Special Branch), DCP  (Traf-
\n\t      fic)  and\t Mr.  Gopal Das Kalra,\tSI  to\twhom
\n\t      notices under Section 8-B of the Act have been
\n\t      issued be examined at the end of the inquiry.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    If three persons referred to above to whom notices under
\nSection 8-B have been issued are to be examined even accord-
\ning  to the Committee at the end of the inquiry there is  no
\njustifiable  reason to deny the same treatment to the  peti-
\ntioners\t Ms Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh who are in the\tsame
\nposition as those three persons. The action of the Committee
\nin asking them to be cross-examined at the beginning of\t the
\ninquiry\t appears to us to be discriminatory. Mere  non-issue
\nof  notices to them under Section 8-B ought not to make\t any
\ndifference  if\tthey otherwise satisfy the  conditions\tmen-
\ntioned\tin  Section 8-B. The issue of such a notice  is\t not
\ncontemplated  under Section 8-B of the Act. It is enough  if
\nat  any stage the Commission considers it necessary  to\t in-
\nquire  into  the conduct of any person.\t Such  person  would
\nthereafter  be governed by Section 8-B of the Act. The\tCom-
\nmittee\tshould have considered whether the petitioners\twere
\nentitled to be treated as persons governed by Section 8-B of
\nthe  Act before asking them to get into the witness box\t for
\nbeing  cross-examined. If the Committee had found  that\t the
\npetitioners  were  covered under Section 8-B,  then  perhaps
\nthey  would not have been asked to get into the witness\t box
\nfor  being cross-examined till the end of the  inquiry.\t The
\nCommittee would have then asked them to give evidence  along
\nwith  others  who were similarly placed at the\tend  of\t the
\ninquiry.\n<\/p>\n
    On\tbehalf of both the petitioners it is submitted\tthat
\nthey did not either wish to delay the proceedings or to show
\ndisrespect to the Committee but only wanted to protect their
\nown interest by making the submission which they made before
\nthe Committee as per legal advice given to them.
\n    This is not a case where the circumstances in which\t the
\nseveral\t incidents  that had taken place were not  known  to
\nanybody\t else. The affidavits and other material before\t the
\nCommittee show that there were a large number of persons who
\nwere  eye-witnesses  to\t the incidents and  who\t could\tgive
\nevidence before the Committee.\n<\/p>\n
Taking\tinto  consideration all the aspects of the  case  we
\nfeel that
\n34<\/span>
\nthe  Committee should not have in the circumstances  of\t the
\ncase  directed the filing of a complaint against  either  of
\nthe petitioners for an offence punishable under Section\t 178
\nIPC.\n<\/p>\n
    In view of the foregoing we feel that the orders of\t the
\nCommittee  directing  the filing of the complaints  and\t the
\ncriminal  proceedings  initiated  against  the\t petitioners
\nbefore\tthe  Metropolitan Magistrate pursuant  to  the\tcom-
\nplaints\t filed on behalf of the Committee should be  quashed
\nand  we accordingly quash the said orders of  the  Committee
\nand also the criminal proceedings.\n<\/p>\n
A  judgment containing the reasons for this order will\tfol-
\nlow.\n<\/p>\n
    Before  concluding\tthis order we record  the  statement
\nmade  by  Shri Kuldip Singh,  learned  Additional  Solicitor
\nGeneral\t appearing  for the Delhi  Administration  that\t the
\nDelhi  Administration  and its police  officers\t will  fully
\ncooperate  with\t the  Committee so that\t the  Committee\t may
\ncomplete  its work as early as possible. We also record\t the
\nstatement  made\t by Shri G.  Ramaswamy,\t learned  Additional
\nSolicitor  General that he and his clients, the\t petitioners
\nin  this case hold the Committee in great respect  and\tthat
\nthey  never intended to show any kind of discourtesy to\t the
\nCommittee.  He also expresses apology for using one  or\t two
\nstrong\twords  against the Committee in the  course  of\t the
\narguments in this Court.\n<\/p>\n
    We\tnow proceed to give our detailed reasons in  support
\nof the aforesaid order:\n<\/p>\n
    We find it necessary to refer to some of the regulations
\nframed\tby the Committee to regulate its procedure. We\talso
\nfind it necessary to indicate the nature of the orders which
\nhave  been  challenged in these writ petitions\tand  special
\nleave  petitions.  It also seems appropriate  at  this\tvery
\nplace  to refer to the order of this Court passed  in  these
\nproceedings on 2nd June 1988 and the order of the  Committee
\npassed on 29th June, 1988 in pursuance of the order of\tthis
\nCourt dated 2nd June 1988. As is apparent from a copy of the
\nregulations filed in these proceedings, the Committee framed
\n“Regulations of procedure under Section 8 of the Commissions
\nof  Enquiry  Act, 1952 to be followed by  the  Committee  of
\nInquiry”.  Regulations\t8, 11, 14, 18, and 21 which  in\t our
\nopinion\t appear to be relevant for purposes of\tthese  cases
\nare reproduced as hereunder:\n<\/p>\n
“8. To avoid its proceedings being unduly prolonged and
\n35<\/span>
\n\t      protracted, the Committee may divide and group
\n\t      together the various persons, Associations and
\n\t      departments  before  it in such manner  as  it
\n\t      thinks  just  and proper for the\tpurposes  of
\n\t      producing oral evidence, cross-examination  of
\n\t      witnesses examined before it, and for address-
\n\t      ing arguments.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t       Provided, however, any person who  is
\n\t      likely to be prejudicially affected as provid-
\n\t      ed in Sec. 8-B of the Act shall be entitled to
\n\t      appear  personally  or through  an  authorised
\n\t      agent,  and to produce evidence in his or\t her
\n\t      defence.\n<\/p>\n
\t      11. The witness whose evidence is recorded  by
\n\t      the  Committee orally on oath will be  allowed
\n\t      to be cross-examined by the concerned  parties
\n\t      in accordance with the provisions of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t      14.  The affidavit or statement of case  filed
\n\t      by any deponent can be treated as his examina-
\n\t      tion-in-chief.\n<\/p>\n
\t      18.  Technical rules of the Evidence  Act,  as
\n\t      such,  shall  not\t govern\t the  recording\t and
\n\t      admissibility  of evidence before the  Commit-
\n\t      tee.  However, the principles of natural\tjus-
\n\t      tice and fair play shall be followed.\n<\/p>\n
\t      21. The Committee reserves the right to alter,
\n\t      modify, delete or add to any of these  regula-
\n\t      tions  of\t procedure at any  time\t during\t the
\n\t      inquiry, as and when it considers necessary.”
\n    In\tpursuance of a notice issued by the Committee  under
\nRule 5(2)(a) of the Rules, statements of case inter alia  on
\nbehalf\tof Delhi High Court Bar Association and the  Commis-
\nsioner\tof  Police which were accompanied by  affidavits  in
\nsupport of the facts set out in the respective statements of
\ncase  were filed before the Committee. On 8th  April,  1988,
\nthe  parties and their counsel stated that they\t would\tneed
\ntwo  weeks’ time to file counter affidavit and list of\twit-
\nnesses\tto  be\texamined by them. The time  prayed  for\t was
\ngranted. The proceedings on that date were adjourned to 22nd
\nApril, 1988. On that date an application was made on  behalf
\nof the Commissioner of Police and other police officers\t for
\nextension  of time to file counter affidavit which  was\t ex-
\ntended till 13th May, 1988. The following order, how-\n<\/p>\n
36<\/span><\/p>\n
ever,  was  simultaneously passed on that date.\t “Mr.  Vijay
\nShankar\t Das has been told to keep. his witnesses ready\t for
\nbeing  examined from 16th May, 1988. The Committee  proposes
\nto  hold the sitting from day-today w.e.f. 16th\t May,  1988.
\nFor further proceedings and recording of evidence to come up
\non  16th  May, 1988.” Here it may be pointed  out  that\t Mr.
\nVijay  Shankar Das was the counsel appearing for  the  Delhi
\nPolice\tand the effect of the order aforesaid was  that\t the
\nDelhi  Police was required to keep its witnesses  ready\t for
\nbeing  examined from 16th May, 1988. On 16th May  time\ttill
\n5.00 P.M. to all concerned to file their counter  affidavits
\nalong  with  the list of witnesses was granted\tand  further
\nproceedings  were adjourned for the next day. On  17th\tMay,
\n1988,  two applications were made on behalf of\tthe  Commis-
\nsioner\tof Police; one for postponement of heating  and\t the
\nother  for calling upon the Bar Association to\tstart  their
\nevidence  and  to call upon the Commissioner  of  Police  to
\nadduce\this evidence thereafter. The counter  affidavit\t and
\nthe  list  of  witnesses on behalf of  the  Commissioner  of
\nPolice\thad  not been filed even till 17th  May,  1988.\t The
\nCommittee dismissed both the applications referred to  above
\nand  passed an order saying that since the  Commissioner  of
\nPolice has failed to file the counter affidavit or the\tlist
\nof  witnesses, Mr. Jinder Singh, S.I., and Mrs. Kiran  Bedi,
\nthe  then D.C.P. (North) be present in Court on\t 19.5.88  at
\n10.30  A.M.  for being cross-examined. On  19th\t May,  1988,
\ncounsel for Delhi Police was directed to produce Mr.  Jinder
\nSingh, S.I., in the witness box for being cross-examined. On
\nbeing  informed by counsel for Delhi Police that Mr.  Jinder
\nSingh was not available, bailable warrant was ordered by the
\nCommittee to be issued for production of Mr. Jinder Singh at
\n10.30 A.M. on 23rd May, 1988. Thereafter Smt. Kiran Bedi who
\nwas present in Court was directed to come in the witness box
\nfor  cross-examination.\t The relevant portion of  the  order
\npassed thereafter on 19th May, 1988 reads as hereunder:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Mrs.  Bedi has been asked to take  oath,\t but
\n\t      she  has refused to do so. At this  stage,  we
\n\t      called upon Mr. G. Ramaswamy, Counsel  appear-
\n\t      ing for Delhi Police as also Mr. Vijay Shanker
\n\t      Dass, Counsel appearing for Mrs. Kiran Bedi to
\n\t      justify  the  action  of the  witness  in\t not
\n\t      taking the .oath. We call upon the counsel  to
\n\t      address  because according to us\tprima  facie
\n\t      offence is made out under Section 178 I.P.C.
\n\t\t       Mr. Ramaswamy relies on the  judgment
\n\t      of  this Court in Smt. Indira Gandhi and\tAnr.
\n\t      v.  Mr. J.C. Shah, Commission of Inquiry,\t ILR
\n\t      1980(1) Delhi 5522. We have been
\n\t      37<\/span>
\n\t      taken through certain passages of judgment and
\n\t      we  find that the facts of case  are  entirely
\n\t      different\t inasmuch as no affidavit  had\tbeen
\n\t      filed  by Smt. Indira Gandhi in that case\t and
\n\t      she had been summoned merely under Section 8-B
\n\t      of the Commission of Enquiry Act.
\n\t\t       In the present case, an affidavit  of
\n\t      Mrs.  Kiran Bedi is on record. She had  to  be
\n\t      given further opportunity to make any  further
\n\t      statement and her affidavit already filed\t has
\n\t      to be justified by cross-examination.
\n\t\t       Let  notice issue to Mrs. Kiran\tBedi
\n\t      to show cause why she should not be prosecuted
\n\t      under section 178 I.P.C. Since she is present,
\n\t      she  is accepting this notice. The  notice  is
\n\t      returnable  for tomorrow, the 20th May,  1988.
\n\t      Ordinarily directions have to be issued to her
\n\t      to  be present in court, but Mr. Shankar\tDass
\n\t      undertakes  that she will be present in  Court
\n\t      tomorrow and as such no further directions are
\n\t      necessary.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    On 20th May, 1988 as the order sheet of that date  indi-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
cates  counter\taffidavit along with list of  witnesses\t was
\nfiled on behalf of the Commissioner of Police and both\twere
\ntaken  on record. With regard to the notice issued  to\tSmt.
\nKiran  Bedi  on\t 19th May, 1988,  the  following  order\t was
\npassed:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “By  our order dated 19.5.88, we had issued  a
\n\t      notice  to Mrs. Bedi to show cause as  to\t why
\n\t      she should not be prosecuted under Section 178
\n\t      of the I.P.C. for refusing to take oath in the
\n\t      witness  box. Notice was made  returnable\t for
\n\t      today.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       Mr. Shankar Dass who appears for Mrs.
\n\t      Kiran  Bedi has refused to show any  cause  on
\n\t      the ground that notice was too short.
\n\t\t\tWe  have heard the arguments of\t Mr.
\n\t      K.K.  Venugopal on behalf of the Bar  Associa-
\n\t      tion.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t\tFor  orders to come up on 23rd\tMay,
\n\t      1988. Mrs. Kiran Bedi who is present today  is
\n\t      directed to be present in the Court on 23.5.88
\n\t      at 10.30 A.M.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      38<\/span><\/p>\n
    On\t23rd May, 1988, the Committee held that\t refusal  of
\nSmt. Kiran Bedi in not testifying on oath before the Commit-
\ntee was wholly unjustified and proceeded to file a complaint
\nfor  an offence under section 178 of the Indian Penal  Code.
\nAs  regards Mr. Jinder Singh, it seems that he could not  be
\nrequired to appear in the witness box on 23rd, 24th or\t25th
\nMay, 1988. On 26th May, 1988 the following order was passed:
\n“Mr. Jinder Singh was directed to come into the witness box.
\nWhen  asked by us to bind himself on oath or affirmation  to
\nstate  the truth, the witness refused to do so.\t Earlier  we
\nhad authorised the court master to administer him the  oath.
\nBut,  as we have already said, the witness refused  to\ttake
\nthe  oath. The witness states that he is willing to  make  a
\nstatement  without oath and would be prepared to answer\t all
\nthe  questions\tin cross-examination. When asked  if  he  is
\naware of the fact that his action in not taking the oath  is
\npunishable  under Section 178 of the Indian Penal  Code,  he
\nsays  he has nothing further to state. On consideration\t the
\nCommittee  is  of the opinion that since  this\twitness\t has
\nalready filed an affidavit which is a statement on oath,  it
\nis not possible to record any further statement or  crossex-
\namine  without oath. Mr. Jinder Singh, however, states\tthat
\nhe  is\tnot prepared to take the oath because he is  in\t the
\nnature\tof  an accused and he cannot be asked to  start\t the
\nevidence  and would be prepared to come in the\twitness\t box
\nafter the evidence of other party is recorded.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t       Mr.  Jinder Singh at present S.I.  at
\n\t      Police  Post,  Railway Station,  Subzi  Mandi,
\n\t      Delhi,  who  was\tS.I. in\t charge\t Tis  Hazari
\n\t      Courts,  Delhi  during January  and  February,
\n\t      1988, was summoned as a witness and was  asked
\n\t      to  step into the witness box.  His  statement
\n\t      was to be recorded on oath for the purpose  of
\n\t      cross-examination.  He,  however,\t refused  to
\n\t      bind  himself  by an oath\t or  affirmation  to
\n\t      state  the  truth\t when required\tso  to\tbind
\n\t      himself  by the Committee. The Committee\tcon-
\n\t      siders  that Mr. Jinder Singh who was  at\t the
\n\t      relevant\ttime  S.I. in charge at\t Tis  Hazari
\n\t      Courts, Delhi, where the incidents took  place
\n\t      is  a  very material witness and his  case  is
\n\t      identical\t to the case of Ms. Kiran Bedi.\t For
\n\t      the  reasons recorded in our order dated\t23rd
\n\t      May, 1988 regarding Ms. Kiran Bedi, we proceed
\n\t      to  file\ta  complaint for  an  offence  under
\n\t      section 178 of the Indian Penal Code.”\n<\/p>\n
\t      39<\/span><\/p>\n
    In pursuance of the orders dated 23rd May and 26th\tMay,
\n1988 complaints were filed by the Committee in the Court  of
\nthe  Chief  Metropolitan Magistrate, Delhi, for\t an  offence
\nunder section 178 of the Indian Penal Code and as is  appar-
\nent from a copy of one of the complaints produced before  us
\nthese  complaints  have been filed under  sub-section  4  of
\nsection 5 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952 read\twith
\nsection\t 346  of the Code of Criminal  Procedure,  1973.  As
\nalready\t indicated, it is the aforesaid orders\tdated  17th,
\n20th, 23rd and 26th May, 1988 which have been challenged  in
\nthese writ petitions and special leave petitions. These writ
\npetitions  and\tspecial leave petitions first  came  up\t for
\nconsideration’ before K.N. Singh, J. who was functioning  as
\nthe  Vacation Judge. After hearing the parties he passed  an
\norder  on 2nd June, 1988. The relevant portion of the  order
\nwhich  was passed by this Court on 2nd June, 1988  in  these
\nproceedings, reads as hereunder:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Learned\tcounsel for the parties\t agree\tthat
\n\t      the respondent Committee should be directed to
\n\t      re-examine  the  order and sequence  in  which
\n\t      parties  witnesses  as well as  the  witnesses
\n\t      summoned\tby the Committee should be  examined
\n\t      with  reference to the incidents mentioned  in
\n\t      the  Notification dated 23rd  February,  1988.
\n\t      The  Committee  is  accordingly  directed\t  to
\n\t      consider afresh the order in which the parties
\n\t      witnesses as well as witnesses summoned by the
\n\t      Committee\t on its own are to be examined\twith
\n\t      reference\t to the incidents mentioned  in\t the
\n\t      Notification  appointing the  Committee  after
\n\t      hearing counsel for the parties. The Committee
\n\t      is  further directed to consider the  question
\n\t      as to the stage when main witnesses on  behalf
\n\t      of the respective parties should be  examined.
\n\t      The Committee will pass a reasoned order after
\n\t      hearing the parties. Parties agree that  these
\n\t      questions should be considered by the  Commit-
\n\t      tee on 20th June, 1988 or any subsequent\tdate
\n\t      subject to its convenience.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In pursuance of the aforesaid order, the Committee after
\nhearing\t learned counsel for the parties passed an order  on
\n29th  June, 1988. It inter alia took the view that the\tcon-
\ncept of burden of proof did not appear to be quite  relevant
\nin  the proceedings before a Commission under the Act  which
\nhad  been  given  free hand to lay down\t its  own  procedure
\nsubject,  of  course, to the provisions of the Act  and\t the
\nrules made thereunder. It also held that it would be  diffi-
\ncult  for the committee to lay down the manner in which\t the
\nwitnesses are to be
\n40<\/span>
\nexamined  foregoing its right to examine any witness at\t any
\nstage if his statement appeared to be relevant.
\n    One\t of the submissions made by learned counsel for\t the
\nCommissioner  of Police was that since\tserious\t accusations
\nhave  been made by the lawyers against Smt. Kiran  Bedi\t and
\nthe  police with regard to the incidents dated 21st  January
\nand 17th February, 1988, the lawyers should be first  called
\nupon to lead evidence to substantiate their allegations\t and
\nthe  police personnel may be required to lead evidence\tonly
\nin  rebuttal. This submission, however, did not find  favour
\nwith  the Committee. It took the view that the whole  stress
\nof  learned counsel seemed to be on burden of proof and\t was
\nbased on certain misconceptions. Likewise, the argument that
\nSmt.  Kiran Bedi and Jinder Singh also fell within the\tpur-
\nview of Section 8-B of the Act did not find favour with\t the
\nCommittee.  In\tthis  connection, it was  pointed  out\tthat
\nexcept for the three officers namely, the Addl. Commissioner
\nof Police (Special Branch), New Delhi, D.C.P. (Traffic)\t and
\nMr. Gopal Das Kalra, S.I., Police Station, Samepur  (Badli),
\nto no other officer notice under section 8-B of the Act\t had
\nbeen  issued and that merely because there were\t allegations
\nagainst\t a  particular\tperson he could not be\tsaid  to  be
\ncovered\t under Section 8-B which required a  positive  order
\nfrom  the Committee. It was also pointed out that  a  person
\nhas  to be put on guard by the Committee if it considers  it
\nnecessary to inquire into his conduct or the Committee is of
\nthe opinion that the reputation of that person is likely  to
\nbe prejudicially affected by the inquiry. When its attention
\nwas  invited to the interim report where the  Committee\t had
\nmentioned  that conduct of various police officers  particu-
\nlarly  of the D.C.P. (North), Addl. D.C.P.  (North)  S.H.O.,
\nP.S.  Samepur  (Badli) and S.I. Incharge  Police  Post,\t Tis
\nHazari and S.I., Samaypur (Badli), was to be examined and it
\nwas  submitted\tthat consequently they\twere  covered  under
\nsection 8-B, the Committee took the view that the submission
\nwas misplaced inasmuch as when the Committee mentioned\tthat
\nit was to examine the conduct of various police officers and
\nothers,\t it  did not have in view section 8-B  of  the\tAct.
\nAccording  to  the Committee the plea that Section  8-B\t was
\nattracted appeared to be an afterthought.
\n    With regard to the three persons mentioned above to whom
\nnotices\t under section 8-B of the Act had been\tissued,\t the
\nCommittee  specifically\t held that those  persons  would  be
\nexamined at the end of the inquiry. The Committee emphasised
\non the circumstance that in the inquiry before it there\t was
\nno  “Lis” as is commonly understood while trying a  criminal
\nor  civil case and that principle of burden of proof had  no
\nrelevance.\n<\/p>\n
41<\/span><\/p>\n
    These  cases  were\tthen posted before  this  Bench\t for
\nhearing.  On  the  respective submissions  made\t by  learned
\ncounsel for the parties, the following points, in our  opin-
\nion, arise for consideration:\n<\/p>\n
\t\t  (i)  whether the procedure adopted by\t the
\n\t      Committee with regard to the sequence in which
\n\t      witnesses were to be examined was legal?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (ii)\tWhether Smt. Kiran Bedi\t and  Jinder
\n\t      Singh,  the two petitioners, fell\t within\t the
\n\t      category\tof persons contemplated\t by  Section
\n\t      8-B of the Act and were consequently  entitled
\n\t      to  the same treatment as was accorded by\t the
\n\t      Committee\t to the persons to whom\t notice\t had
\n\t      been issued by it under the said Section?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (iii) whether the Committee was  justified
\n\t      in  calling upon the two petitioners to  stand
\n\t      in the witness box for crossexamination almost
\n\t      at the very initial stage of the inquiry?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (iv)\twhether the orders of the  Committee
\n\t      directing\t prosecution of the two\t petitioners
\n\t      under Section 178 IPC are legal?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (v)  whether\tan  appeal  is\tmaintainable
\n\t      against filing of complaint, the same being an
\n\t      administrative Act?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (vi) whether a challenge to the filing  of
\n\t      the  complaint is infructuous inasmuch as\t the
\n\t      order  issuing  summons  to  the\t petitioners
\n\t      passed  by the Magistrate upon the  complaints
\n\t      filed against them had not been challenged?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t  (vii) whether it is a fit case for  inter-
\n\t      ference  by this Court at this stage with\t the
\n\t      filing  of  complaint, it being  open  to\t the
\n\t      petitioners to prove themselves to be innocent
\n\t      before the magistrate?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     With  regard  to point No. (i), we are of\tthe  opinion
\nthat  apart from the directions contained in paragraph 4  of
\nour  order  dated 18th August, 1988 regarding the  stage  at
\nwhich persons failing under Section 8B of the Act were to be
\nexamined  and also what has been observed in paragraph 2  of
\nthe said order, we do not find it expedient to lay down\t any
\nparticular  rigid procedure to be followed by the  Committee
\nwith regard to sequence in which witnesses were to be  exam-
\nined by it.\n<\/p>\n
42<\/span><\/p>\n
    Consequently, we find it unnecessary to consider in\t any
\nfurther\t detail,  the submissions made by  counsel  for\t the
\nparties\t on this point. In so far as point No. (ii) is\tcon-
\ncerned,\t it  would  be seen that the use of  the  word\t‘or’
\nbetween\t clauses (a) and (b) of Section 8B of the Act  makes
\nit  clear that Section 8B would be attracted if\t requirement
\nof either clause (a) or clause (b) is fulfilled. Clause\t (a)
\nof  Section 8B applies when the conduct of any person is  to
\nbe enquired into whereas Clause (b) applies to a case  where
\nreputation of a person is likely to be prejudicially affect-
\ned.  As regards the enquiry about the conduct of Smt.  Kiran
\nBedi  and  Jinder Singh, even the Committee in\tits  interim
\nreport\tspecifically  stated that the conduct of  these\t two
\npetitioners among others was to be examined. Having once  so
\nstated in unequivocal terms, it was not open to the  Commit-
\ntee to still take the stand that Section 8B was not attract-
\ned  in so far as they were concerned. Recourse to  procedure
\nunder  Section 8-B is not confined to any  particular  stage
\nand  if not earlier, at any rate, as soon as  the  Committee
\nmade the aforesaid unequivocal declaration of its  intention
\nin  its interim report, it should have issued  notice  under
\nsection 8-B to the two petitioners, if it was of the view as
\nit seems to be, for which view there is apparently no justi-
\nfication,  that issue of a formal notice under\tsection\t 8-B
\nwas  the  sine-qua-non for attracting that Section.  At\t all
\nevents,\t the  Committee could not deny the  petitioners\t the
\nstatutory  protection  of Section 8-B by  merely  refraining
\nfrom issuing a formal notice even though on its own declared
\nintention the section was clearly attracted.
\n    In State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad,<\/a>
\n[1966] Suppl. S.C.R. page 401, while dealing with Section 10
\nof  the Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Enquiry\t Act,  1962,
\nwhich  seems to be an amalgam of Section 8-B and 8-C of\t the
\nCommissions of Enquiry Act, 1952 and repelling the  argument
\nthat  section 10 applied only when the conduct of  a  person
\ncame  to  be  enquired into incidentally and  not  when\t the
\nCommission  had\t been set up to enquire\t directly  into\t the
\nconduct of a person, it was held:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “If a Commission is set up to inquire directly
\n\t      into  the conduct of a person, the  Commission
\n\t      must  find it necessary to inquire  into\tthat
\n\t      conduct and such a person would, therefore, be
\n\t      one  covered  by s. 10. It  would\t be  strange
\n\t      indeed  if  the Act provided for fights  of  a
\n\t      person  whose conduct incidentally came to  be
\n\t      enquired into but did not do so in the case of
\n\t      persons  whose conduct has directly to be\t in
\n\t      quired  into  under the order setting  up\t the
\n\t      Commission. It would
\n\t      43<\/span>
\n\t      be equally strange if the Act contemplated the
\n\t      conduct of a person being inquired into  inci-
\n\t      dentally\tand not directly. What can  be\tdone
\n\t      indirectly should obviously have been  consid-
\n\t      ered capable of being done directly.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In\tState  of  Karnataka v. Union of  India\t &  Another,<\/a>
\n[1978],\t 2 S.C.R., page 1, with reference to Section 8-B  of
\nthe  Act, it was held at page 108 of the report that it\t was
\nundeniable that the person whose conduct was being  enquired
\ninto was exposed to the fierce light of publicity.
\n    Keeping  in view the nature of the allegations  made  in
\nthe  statements of case and the supporting affidavits  filed
\non  behalf  of the various Bar\tAssociations  including\t the
\nDelhi High Court Bar Association requirement of even  Clause\n<\/p>\n
(b) of Section 8-B was filfilled inasmuch as if those  alle-
\ngations were proved they were likely to prejudicially affect
\nthe  reputation of the two petitioners. Indeed, in  view  of
\nthe  term of reference which contemplated taking of  “strin-
\ngent action” against all those responsible, even the  career
\nof  the\t petitioners  as Police officers was  likely  to  be
\naffected  in  case an adverse finding was  recorded  against
\nthem.  In view of the aforesaid specific term of  reference,
\nthe principle that the report of a Commission of Enquiry has
\nno force proprio vigore does not on a pragmatic approach  to
\nthe consequences seem to constitute sufficient safeguard  so
\nfar as the petitioners are concerned.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t reason for the importance attached with  regard  to
\nthe matter of safeguarding the reputation of a person  being
\nprejudicially  affected in Clause (b) of Section 8-B of\t the
\nAct is not far to seek.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t following words of caution uttered by the  Lord  to
\nArjun  in Bhagwad Gita with regard to dishonour or  loss  of
\nreputation may usefully be quoted:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Akirtinchapi\t Bhutani       Kathaishyanti
\n\t      te-a-vyayam,  Sambhavitasya  Chakirtir   mara-
\n\t      nadatirichyate.”\t(234) (Men will recount\t thy
\n\t      perpetual\t dishonour,  and to one\t highly\t es-
\n\t      teemed, dishonour exceedeth death. )
\n    In Blackstone’s commentary of the laws of England,\tVol-
\nI,  IVth  Edition, it has been stated at page 101  that\t the
\nright of personal security consists in a person’s legal\t and
\nuninterrupted  enjoyment of his life, his limbs,  his  body,
\nhis health and his reputation.\n<\/p>\n
44<\/span><\/p>\n
    In\tCorpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 77 at page 268 is to  be
\nfound the statement of law in the following terms:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “It  is  stated in the definition\t Person,  70
\n\t      C.J.S.p.\t688  note 66 that legally  the\tterm
\n\t      “person”\tincludes not only the physical\tbody
\n\t      and  members, but also every bodily sense\t and
\n\t      personal attribute, among which is the reputa-
\n\t      tion  a  man has acquired. Blackstone  in\t his
\n\t      Commentaries   classifies\t and   distinguishes
\n\t      those fights which are annexed to the  person,
\n\t      jura personarum, and acquired fights in exter-
\n\t      nal objects, jura rerum; and in the former  he
\n\t      includes personal security, which consists  in
\n\t      a\t person’s legal and uninterrupted  enjoyment
\n\t      of his life, his limbs, his body, his  health,
\n\t      and  his reputation. And he makes\t the  corre-
\n\t      sponding classification of remedies. The\tidea
\n\t      expressed is that a man’s reputation is a part
\n\t      of  himself,  as his body and limbs  are,\t and
\n\t      reputation  is  a sort of fight to  enjoy\t the
\n\t      goods opinion of others, and it is capable  of
\n\t      growth  and real existence, as an arm or\tleg.
\n\t      Reputation  is, therefore, a  personal  fight,
\n\t      and the right to reputation is put among those
\n\t      absolute personal fights equal in dignity\t and
\n\t      importance to security from violence.  Accord-
\n\t      ing  to  Chancellor Kent, “as a  part  of\t the
\n\t      rights of personal security, the\tpreservation
\n\t      of every person’s good name from the vile arts
\n\t      of detraction is justly included. The laws  of
\n\t      the  ancients,  no less than those  of  modern
\n\t      nations,\tmade private reputation one  of\t the
\n\t      objects of their protection.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       The fight to the enjoyment of a\tgood
\n\t      reputation is a valuable privilege, of ancient
\n\t      origin,  and  necessary to human\tsociety,  as
\n\t      stated  in  Libel and Slander S. 4,  and\tthis
\n\t      fight is within the constitutional guaranty of
\n\t      personal security as stated in  Constitutional
\n\t      La S. 205, and a person may not be deprived of
\n\t      this  fight  through  falsehood  and  violence
\n\t      without liability for the injury as stated  in
\n\t      Libel and Slander S. 4.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       Detraction from a man’s reputation is
\n\t      an  injury  to his personality,  and  thus  an
\n\t      injury  to  reputation is a  personal  injury,
\n\t      that  is,\t an injury to an  absolute  personal
\n\t      right.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In\tD.F. Marion v. Davis, 55 American Law Reports,\tpage
\n171, it was held:\n<\/p>\n
45<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      “The  right  to  the enjoyment  of  a  private
\n\t      reputation, unassailed by malicious slander is
\n\t      of  ancient origin, and is necessary to  human
\n\t      society.\tA good reputation is an\t element  of
\n\t      personal\tsecurity,  and is protected  by\t the
\n\t      Constitution  equally  with the right  to\t the
\n\t      enjoyment of life, liberty, and property.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In\tview  of the foregoing discussion  and\tthe  reasons
\nalready\t stated in our order dated 18th August 1988, we\t are
\nof the view that the two petitioners namely, Smt. Kiran Bedi
\nand Jinder Singh clearly fell within the category of persons
\ncontemplated by section 8-B of the Act and were consequently
\nentitled  to the same treatment as has been accorded by\t the
\nCommittee  to the persons to whom notice has been issued  by
\nit under the said section. As a consequence, we are  further
\nof the opinion that our answer to point No. (iii) has to  be
\nthat the Committee was not justified in calling upon the two
\npetitioners  to stand in the witness box for  cross-examina-
\ntion  at  the  very initial stage of the  enquiry.  In\tthis
\nconnection,  it\t has to be borne in mind  that\tSection\t 8-B
\ninter  alia contemplates an opportunity being given  to\t the
\nperson\tgoverned by the said section to produce evidence  in
\nhis  defence  whereas Section 8-C inter alia gives  him\t the
\nright to cross-examine the witnesses who depose against him.
\nNot only that calling upon a person governed by Section\t 8-B
\nto produce evidence in his defence at the very inception  of
\nthe inquiry is a contradiction in terms inasmuch as in\tthis
\nsituation such a person would really be required to disprove
\nstatements prejudicial to him of such witnesses who are\t yet
\nto  be\texamined, it would also reduce the right  of  cross-
\nexamination  by\t such  person to a mere\t formality  for\t the
\nobvious reason that by the time the witnesses who are to  be
\ncross-examined\tare  produced, the defence  of\tsuch  person
\nwhich  would normally constitute the basis for the line\t and
\nobject\tof crossexamination would already be known  to\tsuch
\nwitnesses and they are likely to refashion their  statements
\naccordingly.\n<\/p>\n
    Perhaps  in\t a case where there is no other\t witness  to
\ngive information about the alleged incident about which\t the
\ninquiry\t is  being held and the only person or\tpersons\t who
\nwould give such information is or are the person or  persons
\nwho  are likely to be adversely affected by the inquiry,  it
\nmay  be necessary to depart from the above view as a  matter
\nof  necessity.\tBut  this is not one such  case.  There\t are
\nadmittedly any number of other persons who can give evidence
\nabout what happened on the relevant dates.
\nLearned counsel for the various Bar Associations who shall
\n46<\/span>
\nhereinafter  be referred to as learned counsel for  the\t re-
\nspondent  expressed  an apprehension that in case  a  person
\ngoverned by Section 8-B was to be examined at the end and at
\nthat stage such person even at the risk of not producing his
\ndefence,  for some reason, chooses not to appear as  a\twit-
\nness,  the Committee would be deprived of knowing the  facts
\nin  the\t knowledge of such person and such  a  course  would
\nobviously hamper the enquiry. To us this apprehension  seems
\nto be more imaginary than real inasmuch as the power of\t the
\nCommission  to call upon any person to appear as  a  witness
\nunder  Section 4 of the Act which in terms is very wide\t and
\nis not circumscribed by fetters of stage, will be  available
\nto  the Commission and the Commission would be\tentitled  to
\ncall such person as a witness even at that stage.
\n    Before  parting with these points we may point out\tthat
\nlearned counsel for the respondent cited several authorities
\nin support of the principle that the report of a  Commission
\nof  Inquiry which was only a fact finding body did not\thave
\nforce proprio vigore and was only recommendatory in  nature.
\nSince  the principle is well-settled we have not  considered
\nit  necessary to deal with those authorities. Likewise\tsome
\ncases  were  cited with regard to claim of  privilege  by  a
\nwitness.  Since the petitioners are not claiming any  privi-
\nlege but are only claiming to be treated in a reasonable way
\nas  persons  governed by Section 8-B of the Act\t and  to  be
\nmeted out the same treatment which has been given to persons
\nfalling in that category, those cases also are not necessary
\nto be dealt with.\n<\/p>\n
    Now\t we  come  to the fourth point\tnamely\twhether\t the
\norders\tof the Committee directing prosecution of the  peti-
\ntioners\t under\tSection\t 178 I.P.C are legal.  In  order  to
\nappreciate the respective submissions of the learned counsel
\nfor the parties on this point it will be useful to reproduce
\nhere Sections 178 and 179 I.P.C They read:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “178.  Refusing oath or affirmation when\tduly
\n\t      required by public servant to make it.–Whoev-
\n\t      er  refuses  to  bind himself by\tan  oath  or
\n\t      affirmation to state the truth, when  required
\n\t      so to bind himself by a public servant legally
\n\t      competent\t to  require that he shall  so\tbind
\n\t      himself, shall be punished with simple impris-
\n\t      onment  for  a term which may  extend  to\t six
\n\t      months,  or with fine which may extend to\t one
\n\t      thousand rupees, or with both.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t\t       179. Refusing to answer public  serv-
\n\t      ant  authorised  to question.  Whoever,  being
\n\t      legally bound to state the truth
\n\t      47<\/span>
\n\t      on any subject to any public servant,  refuses
\n\t      to answer any question demanded of him  touch-
\n\t      ing that subject by such public servant in the
\n\t      exercise\tof the legal powers of\tsuch  public
\n\t      servant, shall be punished with simple impris-
\n\t      onment  for  a term which may  extend  to\t six
\n\t      months,  or with fine which may extend to\t one
\n\t      thousand rupees, or with both.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    The\t Committee had in the instant case directed  a\tcom-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
plaint\tto be filed against each of the petitioners  for  an
\noffence punishable under Section 178 I.P.C. and subsequently
\nfiled  complaints accordingly. The charge against the  peti-
\ntioners, therefore, was of refusal to bind themselves by  an
\noath or affirmation to state the truth on being called\tupon
\nto do so. Section 179 I.P.C. in the context becomes relevant
\nin  so far as it deals with the consequences of\t refusal  by
\nthe  person  concerned to answer questions demanded  of\t him
\ntouching  that subject with regard to which such person\t had
\nbound  himself\tto state the truth under  Section  178.\t The
\ncontext\t in which the two petitioners were required to\tbind
\nthemselves by an oath or affirmation to state the truth\t was
\nto  face cross-examination. The petitioners  were  obviously
\nplaced\ton the horns of a dilemma. If they refused  to\tbind
\nthemselves by an oath or affirmation to state the truth they
\nbecame liable to be punished with simple imprisonment for  a
\nterm  which may extend to six months or with fine which\t may
\nextend to one thousand rupees or with both. If on the  other
\nhand they had to bound themselves and thereafter refused  to
\nanswer\tany  question as contemplated by  Section  179\tthey
\nwould have again become vulnerable to identical punishment.
\n    The\t problem  in the aforesaid background  presents\t two
\npropositions:  (1)  whether  on the belief  that  they\twere
\npersons\t covered by Section 8-B of the Act  the\t petitioners
\ncould  avoid the consequences of Sections 178 and 179  I.P.C
\nby claiming absolute immunity from binding themselves by  an
\noath or affirmation for answering questions put to them\t and
\n(2) whether they could avoid those consequences if they\t had
\nvalid justification for refusing to take oath or affirmation
\nwithout\t claiming  an absolute immunity from  binding  them-
\nselves\tby an oath or affirmation. The answer to  the  first
\nproposition,  in  our  opinion, has to be  in  the  negative
\nwhereas\t of the second in the affirmative. Our\treasons\t for
\nthis conclusion are these:\n<\/p>\n
     In McGrain v. Daugherty, 71 L.ed. 580 one of the  ques-
\ntions\twhich  arose  for  consideration  was  whether\t the
\nSenate–or  the House of Representatives, both being on\t the
\nsame plane in this regard–has
\n48<\/span>
\npower, through its own process, to compel a private individ-
\nual  to appear before it or one of its committees  and\tgive
\ntestimony  needed  to enable it efficiently  to\t exercise  a
\nlegislative function belonging to it under the Constitution.
\nIt  was\t held  that the power of  inquiry–with\t process  to
\nenforce it–is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
\nlegislative function and that the provisions in this  behalf
\nare not of doubtful meaning, but “are intended to be  effec-
\ntively\texercised,  and therefore to carry  with  them\tsuch
\nauxiliary  powers as are necessary and appropriate  to\tthat
\nend.  While  the power to exact information in\taid  of\t the
\nlegislative  function was not involved in those\t cases,\t the
\nrule  of interpretation applied there is applicable here.  A
\nlegislative  body cannot legislate wisely or effectively  in
\nthe  absence of information respecting the conditions  which
\nthe  legislation is intended to affect or change; and  where
\nthe  legislative body does not itself possess the  requisite
\ninformation–which  not infrequently is true–recourse\tmust
\nbe  had to others who do possess it. Experience\t has  taught
\nthat  mere requests for such information often are  unavail-
\ning,  and also that information which is volunteered is\t not
\nalways accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion are
\nessential to obtain what is needed. All this was true before
\nand  when the Constitution was framed and adopted.  In\tthat
\nperiod\tthe  power of inquiry–with  enforcing\tprocess–was
\nregarded  and  employed as a necessary and  appropriate\t at-
\ntribute\t of the power to legislate–indeed, was\t treated  as
\ninhering in it. Thus there is ample warrant for thinking, as
\nwe  do, that the constitutional provisions which commit\t the
\nlegislative  function  to  the two houses  are\tintended  to
\ninclude\t this attribute to the end that the function may  be
\neffectively exercised.”\n<\/p>\n
    On these findings, with regard to refusal by the witness
\nto  appear  and testify before the Committee and  being\t at-
\ntached as a consequence thereof, it was held:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “We  conclude that the investigation  was\t or-
\n\t      dered  for a legitimate object; that the\twit-
\n\t      ness wrongfully refused to appear and  testify
\n\t      before  the  Committee and  was  lawfully\t at-
\n\t      tached;  that the Senate is entitled  to\thave
\n\t      him  give testimony pertinent to the  inquiry,
\n\t      either at its bar or before the committee; and
\n\t      that  the district court erred in\t discharging
\n\t      him from custody under the attachment.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In\tUphaus\tv. Wyman (3 L.ed 2d 1090) a  witness  at  an
\ninvestigation  by the Attorney General of the State  of\t New
\nHampshire,  conducted pursuant to a resolution of the  State
\nlegislature authorizing the
\n49<\/span>
\nAttorney General to determine whether there were subversives
\nwithin the state, refused to obey a subpoena calling for the
\nproduction  of a list of persons who were guests at  a\tcamp
\noperated within New Hampshire by a voluntary corporation  of
\nwhich the witness was executive director. On petition of the
\nAttorney  General,  the Merrimack Country Court\t called\t the
\nwitness\t before it and the witness again refused to  produce
\nthe  information, asserting, first, that, by the  Smith\t Act
\n(18  USC s. 2385), Congress had so completely  occupied\t the
\nfield of subversive activities that the states were  without
\npower to investigate in that area, and, second, that the due
\nprocess\t clause precluded enforcement of the  subpoena.\t The
\ncourt rejected the witness’ argument, and, upon his  contin-
\nued  refusal to produce the list, adjudged him\tin  contempt
\nand  committed him to jail until he should comply.  The\t Su-
\npreme Court of New Hampshire affirmed, and even after remand
\nby the United States Supreme Court it reaffirmed its  former
\ndecision.  On  appeal, while affirming the decision  of\t the
\nSupreme\t Court\tof New Hampshire the United  States  Supreme
\nCourt  held that since the Attorney General sought to  learn
\nif  subversive\tpersons\t were in the State  because  of\t the
\nlegislative  determination  that such  persons,\t statutorily
\ndefined\t with  a view toward the Communist  Party,  posed  a
\nserious threat to the security of the State, the  investiga-
\ntion was undertaken in the interest of self-preservation and
\nthis  governmental interest outweighed individual rights  in
\nan  associational  privacy  which, however,  real  in  other
\ncircumstances were here tenuous at best. It was further held
\nthat  “the  governmental interest  in  self-preservation  is
\nsufficiently  compelling  to  subordinate  the\tinterest  in
\nassociational privacy of persons who, at least to the extent
\nof the guest registration statute, made public at the incep-
\ntion  the association they now wish to keep private. In\t the
\nlight of such a record we conclude that the State’s interest
\nhas not been “pressed, in this instance, to a point where it
\nhas come into fatal collision with the overriding” constitu-
\ntionally  protected  rights of appellant and  those  he\t may
\nrepresent.”\n<\/p>\n
In Sinclair v. United States, (73 L.ed. 692 it was held:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Neither\tSenate Joint Resolution 54  nor\t the
\n\t      action  taken under it operated to divest\t the
\n\t      Senate  or the committee of power\t further  to
\n\t      investigate  the actual administration of\t the
\n\t      land laws. It may be conceded that Congress is
\n\t      without  authority to compel  disclosures\t for
\n\t      the  purpose  of\taiding\tthe  prosecution  of
\n\t      pending suits; but the authority of that body,
\n\t      directly or through its committees, to require
\n\t      pertinent\t disclosures in aid of its own\tcon-
\n\t      stitutional power, is
\n\t      50<\/span>
\n\t      not abridged because the information sought to
\n\t      be elicited may also be of use in such suits.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In\tKastigar  v.  United States, (32 LEd 2d\t 2  12)\t the
\nUnited\tStates\tDistrict Court for the Central\tDistrict  of
\nCalifornia’ ordered the petitioners to appear before a grand
\njury and to answer its questions under a grant of  immunity.
\nThe  immunity  was based upon a provision of  the  Organized
\nCrime Control Act of 1970 stating that neither the compelled
\ntestimony nor any information directly or indirectly derived
\nfrom  such  testimony  could be used  against  the  witness.
\nNotwithstanding\t the  grant  of\t immunity,  the\t petitioners
\nrefused to answer the grand jury’s questions and were  found
\nin  contempt.  The United States Court of  Appeals  for\t the
\nNinth  Circuit affirmed (440 F2d 954), rejecting  the  peti-
\ntioners’  contention that it violated  their  constitutional
\nprivilege  against  self-incrimination\tto  compel  them  to
\ntestify\t without granting them transactional  immunity\tfrom
\nprosecution for any offence to which the compelled testimony
\nmight relate.\n<\/p>\n
    On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed.
\nIt  held that the power of government to compel\t persons  to
\ntestify in court or before grand juries and other governmen-
\ntal  agencies was firmly established but was  not  absolute,
\nbeing subject to a number of exemptions, the most  important
\nof  which  was the Fifth Amendment privilege  against  self-
\nincrimination. With reference to Federal Statute (18 USCS s.
\n6002) it was held:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “That a federal statute permitting the govern-
\n\t      ment  to compel a witness to  give  testimony,
\n\t      but granting the witness immunity from the use
\n\t      in any criminal case of the compelled testimo-
\n\t      ny or any evidence derived therefrom, does not
\n\t      violate the Fifth Amendment privilege  against
\n\t      self-incrimination.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In Brown v. Walker, (40 L.ed. 819) the question involved
\nwas  with regard to an alleged incompatibility between\tthat
\nclause\tof  the\t 5th Amendment to  the\tConstitution,  which
\ndeclares that no person “shall be compelled in any  criminal
\ncase  to be a witness against himself” and the act  of\tCon-
\ngress  of  February  11, 1983 (27 Stat. at  L.\t443),  which
\nenacts\tthat” no person shall be excused from attending\t and
\ntestifying  or from producing books, papers,  tariffs,\tcon-
\ntracts,\t agreements  and  documents  before  the  Interstate
\nCommerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of\t the
\nCommission,   ……  on the ground or for the\treason\tthat
\nthe testimony or evidence, documentary
\n51<\/span>
\nor otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him  or
\nsubject him to a penalty or forfeiture. But no person  shall
\nbe prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture\t for
\nor on account of any transaction, matter, or thing  concern-
\ning  which he may testify, or produce evidence,\t documentary
\nor otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its
\nsubpoena, or either of them, or in any such case or proceed-
\ning.” It was held:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “it is entirely true that the statute does not
\n\t      purport,\tnor is it possible for any  statute,
\n\t      to  shield the witness from the personal\tdis-
\n\t      grace or opprobrium attaching to the  exposure
\n\t      of  his  crime; but, as we  have\talready\t ob-
\n\t      served, the authorities are numerous and\tvery
\n\t      nearly  uniform  to the effect  that,  if\t the
\n\t      proposed testimony is material to the issue on
\n\t      trial, the fact that the testimony may tend to
\n\t      degrade the witness in public estimation\tdoes
\n\t      not exempt him from the duty of disclosure.  A
\n\t      person who commits a criminal act is found  to
\n\t      contemplate  the consequences of\texposure  to
\n\t      his good name and reputation, and ought not to
\n\t      call upon the courts to protect that which  he
\n\t      has  himself  esteemed to be  of\tsuch  little
\n\t      value.  The  safety and welfare of  an  entire
\n\t      community\t should\t not be put into  the  scale
\n\t      against  the  reputation of  a  self-confessed
\n\t      criminal, who ought not, either in justice  or
\n\t      in  good\tmorals, to refuse to  disclose\tthat
\n\t      which may be of great public utility, in order
\n\t      that his neighbors may think well of him.\t The
\n\t      design of the constitutional privilege is\t not
\n\t      to aid the witness in vindicating his  charac-
\n\t      ter,  but\t to protect him against\t being\tcom-
\n\t      pelled to furnish evidence to convict him of a
\n\t      criminal\tcharge. If he secure legal  immunity
\n\t      from  prosecution, the possible impairment  of
\n\t      his good name is a penalty which it is reason-
\n\t      able  he\tshould be compelled to pay  for\t the
\n\t      common  good. If it be once conceded that\t the
\n\t      fact that his testimony may tend to bring\t the
\n\t      witness into disrepute, though not to incrimi-
\n\t      nate. him, does not entitle him to the  privi-
\n\t      lege  of silence, it necessarily follows\tthat
\n\t      if  it also tends to incriminate, but  at\t the
\n\t      same  time  operates as a pardon for  the\t of-
\n\t      fence,  the fact that the disgrace remains  no
\n\t      more  entitles  him to immunity in  this\tcase
\n\t      than in the other.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    It\tis  in this view of the matter and in  view  of\t the
\nprovisions  contained in Sections 4 to 6 of the Act and\t the
\nrules framed thereunder that we are of the opinion that\t the
\npetitioners on the belief that they
\n52<\/span>
\nwere  persons  covered\tby Section 8B could  not  avoid\t the
\nconsequences  of Sections 178 and 179 by  claiming  absolute
\nimmunity  from binding themselves by an oath or\t affirmation
\nfor answering questions put to them.\n<\/p>\n
    Indeed  in\tthe  instant case the  petitioners  are\t not
\nasserting  that they could not be required at all to  appear
\nas  a  witness before the Committee and\t make  statement  on
\noath. As is apparent from our order dated 18th August,\t1988
\non behalf of both the petitioners it was submitted that they
\ndid  not  either wish to delay the proceedings\tor  to\tshow
\ndisrespect to the Committee but only wanted to protect their
\nown interest by making the submission which they made before
\nthe  Committee as per legal advice given to them.  According
\nto  learned  counsel for the petitioners  the  legal  advice
\ngiven  to the petitioners was that since they  were  persons
\ncovered\t by  Section  8B of the Act they  were\tentitled  to
\nproduce evidence in defence and could as such be called upon
\nto enter the witness box at the end of the inquiry and could
\nnot be required to enter the witness box for  cross-examina-
\ntion almost as the first two witnesses before the Committee.
\nAccording to him the stand taken by the petitioners was that
\nthey  being covered by Section 8B of the Act  their  defence
\nwould  be put to serious jeopardy and will be  prejudicially
\naffected if they were required to appear in the witness\t box
\nfor  cross-examination at the very inception of the  inquiry
\neven before statements of witnesses proving the\t accusations
\nagainst\t the petitioners had been recorded which  they\twere
\nentitled  to  defend. That this was really the case  of\t the
\npetitioners  will be apparent from our discussion  a  little
\nlater. In this background we pass on to the second  proposi-
\ntion referred to above namely whether the petitioners  could
\navoid the consequences contemplated by Sections 178 and\t 179
\nI.P.C  by putting forth valid justification for refusing  to
\nbind themselves by oath or affirmation even without claiming
\nan  absolute immunity from binding themselves by an oath  or
\naffirmation.\n<\/p>\n
    In\tWatkins\t v. United States, 1 L.ed. 2d 1273  a  union
\nofficer, appearing as a witness before a subcommittee of the
\nHouse Committee on Un-American Activities, refused to answer
\nquestions  as to past Communist Party membership of  certain
\npersons, objecting to the questions on the ground of lack of
\npertinency to the subject under inquiry by the subcommittee.
\nIn a prosecution in the United States District Court for the
\nDistrict  of  Columbia, he was convicted  of  violating\t the
\nstatute\t providing  for\t criminal  punishment  of  witnesses
\nbefore\tcongressional  committees who refuse to\t answer\t any
\nquestion  pertinent to the question under inquiry,  and\t the
\nconviction was affirmed by the
\n53<\/span>
\nUnited States Court of Appeals for the District of  Columbia
\nCircuit.  On  certiorari, the United  States  Supreme  Court
\nreversed the conviction. Warren, Chief Justice, speaking for
\nthe  five  members  of the Court, ruled that  to  support  a
\nconviction  under  a statute a\tcongressional  investigating
\ncommittee  must, upon objection of a witness on the  grounds
\nof  pertinency, state for the record the subject  under\t in-
\nquiry  at that time and the manner in which  the  propounded
\nquestions  are\tpertinent thereto. Consequently\t refusal  to
\nanswer\ta question on the ground that it was not  pertinent,
\nwas found to be a valid justification.\n<\/p>\n
    In\tFlaxer v. United States, 3 L.ed. 2d 183\t relying  on
\nthe decision in Watkins (Supra) that the courts must  accord
\nto the defendants every right which is guaranteed to defend-
\nants  in  all other criminal cases it was held that  one  of
\nthese guarantees is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the
\nrefusal of the witness was deliberate and intentional.\tThis
\ndecision  is.  therefore~ an authority for  the\t proposition
\nthat  if the refusal of the witness was not  deliberate\t and
\nintentional but was for a valid cause such refusal could not
\nbe made the basis for prosecuting the witness.
\n    In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York, 12 L.ed.
\n2d 678 notwithstanding the grant of immunity under the\tlaws
\nof New Jersey and New York, petitioners, as witnesses before
\nthe  Waterfront\t Commission of New York Harbor,\t refused  to
\nanswer\tquestions on the ground that the answers might\ttend
\nto incriminate them under federal law, to which the grant of
\nimmunity did not purport to extend. Petitioners were  there-
\nupon  held in civil and criminal contempt of court. The\t New
\nJersey Supreme Court affirmed the civil contempt  judgments,
\nholding\t that a state may constitutionally compel a  witness
\nto give testimony which might be used in a federal  prosecu-
\ntion  against him. On certiorari, the United States  Supreme
\nCourt  vacated\tthe judgment of contempt  and  remanded\t the
\ncause to the New Jersey Supreme Court. It was held:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “…  We\thold the constitutional rule  to  be
\n\t      that  a state witness may not be compelled  to
\n\t      give  testimony  which  may  be  incriminating
\n\t      under federal law unless the compelled  testi-
\n\t      mony  and\t its fruits cannot be  used  in\t any
\n\t      manner by federal officials in connection with
\n\t      a\t criminal prosecution against him.  We\tcon-
\n\t      clude,  moreover, that in order  to  implement
\n\t      this  constitutional rule and accommodate\t the
\n\t      interests of the State and Federal Governments
\n\t      in
\n\t      54<\/span>
\n\t      investigating   and  prosecuting\tcrime,\t the
\n\t      Federal  Government  must be  prohibited\tfrom
\n\t      making any such use of compelled testimony and
\n\t      its  fruits.  This  exclusionary\trule,  while
\n\t      permitting  the States to\t secure\t information
\n\t      necessary\t  for  effective  law\tenforcement,
\n\t      leaves the witness and the Federal  Government
\n\t      in  substantially the same position as if\t the
\n\t      witness  had claimed his privilege in the\t ab
\n\t      sence of a state grant of immunity. It follows
\n\t      that petitioners here may now be compelled  to
\n\t      answer  the questions propounded to  them.  At
\n\t      the  time\t they refused  to  answer,  however,
\n\t      petitioners  had a reasonable fear,  based  on
\n\t      this  Court’s  decision in Feldman  v.  United
\n\t      States,  supra, that the\tfederal\t authorities
\n\t      might use the answers against them in  connec-
\n\t      tion  with a federal prosecution. We have\t now
\n\t      overruled\t Feldman and held that\tthe  Federal
\n\t      Government  may  make no such use of  the\t an-
\n\t      swers.  Fairness\tdictates  that\t petitioners
\n\t      should  now  be afforded\tan  opportunity,  in
\n\t      light  of\t this  development,  to\t answer\t the
\n\t      questions.  Accordingly, the judgment  of\t the
\n\t      New  Jersey  courts  ordering  petitioners  to
\n\t      answer  the questions may remain\tundisturbed.
\n\t      But  the judgment of contempt is\tvacated\t and
\n\t      the  cause remanded to the New Jersey  Supreme
\n\t      Court  for proceedings not  inconsistent\twith
\n\t      this opinion.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
    In\tthis case also it is, therefore, clear that a  valid
\njustification  put  forth by the witness was  considered  to
\nconstitute sufficient ground to make him immune from  prose-
\ncution.\n<\/p>\n
    We\thave  already pointed out in our  order\t dated\t18th
\nAugust, 1988 that if the Committee had found that the  peti-
\ntioners were covered by Section 8B of the Act it would\tmost
\nprobably  itself  not  have required them to  get  into\t the
\nwitness\t box  for being cross-examined till the end  of\t the
\ninquiry.  We have reached this conclusion from\tthe  circum-
\nstances that it is the Committee’s own view as expressed  in
\nits  order  dated 29th June, 1988 that\tpersons\t covered  by
\nSection\t 8B have to be examined at the end of  the  inquiry.
\nThat  the  case of the petitioners in not  taking  oath\t for
\nbeing cross-examined at the very initial stage was based  on
\nSection\t 8B  seems  to be apparent. The plea  taken  in\t the
\napplication made on behalf of the Commissioner of Police  on
\n17th May, 1988 for first calling upon the Bar Association to
\nstart  their evidence and to call upon the  Commissioner  of
\nPolice\tto  adduce  his evidence thereafter  was  the  first
\nindication  in\tthis behalf. This plea was, at\tall  events,
\nrelevant qua those police officers whose conduct was
\n55<\/span>
\nto be examined. Secondly, when on 19th May, 1988 the learned
\ncounsel\t for  Smt. Kiran Bedi was required  to\tjustify\t her
\nstand of not taking oath, Section 8B was specifically plead-
\ned  and reliance was placed on the decision in the  case  of
\nSmt.  Indira Gandhi and another v. Mr. J.C. Shah  Commission
\nof  Inquiry,  ILR 1980 1 Delhi 552 as is borne\tout  by\t the
\norder  of the Committee of that date. The  justification  so
\npleaded was repelled by the Committee on two grounds, namely
\nthat  Smt. Indira Gandhi in that inquiry had not  filed\t any
\naffidavit  and that she had been summoned under Section\t 8B.
\nOn  the view of the Committee expressed in its\torder  dated
\n29th June, 1988, which will, in the absence of any  material
\nto the contrary, be deemed to be its view even on 19th\tMay,
\n1988, that persons covered by Section 8B were to be examined
\nat  the\t end of the inquiry, the fact that an  affidavit  of
\nSmt. Kiran Bedi was on record could hardly justify her being
\ncalled upon to enter the witness box at the very  inception.
\nAs  regards the second ground we have already held that\t the
\nfact that no formal notice had been issued under Section  8B
\nwould constitute no justification for not treating a  person
\nto be covered by that section, if otherwise the\t ingredients
\nof the said section were made out.\n<\/p>\n
    As regards Jinder Singh the order of the Committee dated
\n26th  May, 1988 quoted earlier indicates that  Jinder  Singh
\nhad clearly stated that he is not prepared to take the\toath
\nbecause\t he is in the nature of an accused and he cannot  be
\nasked to start the evidence and would be prepared to come in
\nthe witness box after the evidence of other party is record-
\ned. Jinder Singh did not state that he was an accused before
\nthe  Committee. In saying that he was “in the nature of”  an
\naccused be obviously meant that since his conduct was to  be
\nexamined  as contemplated by Section 8B he was\tentitled  to
\nappear\tas a witness in his defence after the  witnesses  on
\nbehalf\tof  the Bar Association which was accusing  him\t had
\nbeen  examined. Had the Committee not been  labouring  under
\nthe misapprehension that the petitioners were not covered by
\nSection\t 8B, because no notices under that section had\tbeen
\nissued to them, notwithstanding the fact that their  conduct
\nwas  to be examined on its own declared intention, it  would
\nobviously not have required the petitioners to take oath for
\nbeing  cross-examined at the stage at which it did  so.\t The
\nsubsequent  orders of the Committee directing complaints  to
\nbe  filed against the petitioners for an offence  punishable
\nunder  Section\t178 I.P.C. and the act of filing  such\tcom-
\nplaints\t apparently were the consequences of  the  aforesaid
\nmisapprehension.  We have already held that the\t petitioners
\nwere  covered  by Section 8B of the Act. The action  of\t the
\nCommittee in compelling the petitioners to enter the witness
\nbox on the dates in question for being
\n56<\/span>
\ncross-examined,\t when  even according to it as\tis  apparent
\nfrom  its  order dated 29th June,  1988,  persons  similarly
\nsituated  were\tto do so at the end of the inquiry,  was  in
\nitself discriminatory. There was, therefore, valid  justifi-
\ncation\tfor the refusal by the petitioners to take oath\t for
\ncross-examination at the stage when they were required to do
\nso.  The  Committee could have on its own  reconsidered\t the
\nquestion whether the prosecutions should be pressed  further
\nwhen  the case was referred back to it by the learned  Vaca-
\ntion Judge of this Court by his order dated 2nd June,  1988.
\nFor these reasons and the reasons already given in our order
\ndated  18th  August,  1988 we are of the  opinion  that\t the
\nCommittee  should not have in the instant case directed\t the
\nfiling of a complaint against either of the petitioners\t for
\nan  offence  punishable under Section 178 I.P.C.  We  decide
\npoint (iv) accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
    As\tregards\t points (v), (vi) and (vii)  suffice  it  to
\npoint  out that the petitioners have apart from filing\tspe-
\ncial  leave petitions also filed writ petitions\t challenging
\nthe very same orders and since we have held that the  action
\nof  the Committee in holding that the petitioners  were\t not
\ncovered\t by  Section 8B of the Act and\tcompelling  them  to
\nenter the witness box on the dates in question was discrimi-
\nnatory\tand  the  orders  directing  complaint\tbeing  filed
\nagainst\t the  petitioners were illegal, it is  apparently  a
\ncase  involving\t infringement of Articles 14 and 21  of\t the
\nConstitution. In such a situation the power of this Court to
\npass  an appropriate order in exercise of  its\tjurisdiction
\nunder  Articles\t 32 and 142 of the  Constitution  cannot  be
\nseriously doubted particularly having regard to the  special
\nfacts and circumstances of this case. On the orders  direct-
\ning filing of complaints being held to be invalid the conse-
\nquential  complaints and the proceedings  thereon  including
\nthe orders of the Magistrate issuing summons cannot  survive
\nand it is in this view of the matter that by our order dated
\n18th  August,  1988  we have quashed them.  As\tregards\t the
\nsubmission  that  it  was not a fit  case  for\tinterference
\neither\tunder Article 32 or Article 136 of the\tConstitution
\ninasmuch  as it was still open to the petitioners  to  prove
\ntheir  innocence  before the Magistrate, suffice it  to\t say
\nthat in the instant case if the petitioners are compelled to
\nface  prosecution  in spite of the finding that\t the  orders
\ndirecting complaint to be filed against them were illegal it
\nwould  obviously cause prejudice to them.. Points (v),\t(vi)
\nand (vii) are decided accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
    These,  apart from those stated in our order dated\t18th
\nAugust, 1988 are our reasons for the said order.
\nN.P.V.\n<\/p>\n
57<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989 Equivalent citations: 1989 AIR 714, 1989 SCR (1) 20 Author: N Ojha Bench: Ojha, N.D. (J) PETITIONER: KIRAN BEDI & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT04\/01\/1989 BENCH: OJHA, N.D. (J) BENCH: OJHA, […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-163705","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nKiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1989-01-03T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-09-10T19:37:29+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"75 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989\",\"datePublished\":\"1989-01-03T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-09-10T19:37:29+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989\"},\"wordCount\":12121,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989\",\"name\":\"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1989-01-03T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-09-10T19:37:29+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1989-01-03T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2016-09-10T19:37:29+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"75 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989","datePublished":"1989-01-03T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-09-10T19:37:29+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989"},"wordCount":12121,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989","name":"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1989-01-03T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2016-09-10T19:37:29+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kiran-bedi-ors-vs-committee-of-inquiry-anr-on-4-january-1989#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Kiran Bedi & Ors vs Committee Of Inquiry & Anr on 4 January, 1989"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/163705","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=163705"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/163705\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=163705"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=163705"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=163705"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}