{"id":169809,"date":"1966-09-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1966-09-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966"},"modified":"2015-10-20T05:30:01","modified_gmt":"2015-10-20T00:00:01","slug":"p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966","title":{"rendered":"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1967 AIR 908, \t\t 1967 SCR (1) 434<\/div>\n
Author: Shelat<\/div>\n
Bench: Rao, K. Subba (Cj), Hidayatullah, M., Sikri, S.M., Shelat, J.M., Mitter, G.K.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nP.L. LAKHANPAL\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n21\/09\/1966\n\nBENCH:\nSHELAT, J.M.\nBENCH:\nSHELAT, J.M.\nRAO, K. SUBBA (CJ)\nHIDAYATULLAH, M.\nSIKRI, S.M.\nMITTER, G.K.\n\nCITATION:\n 1967 AIR  908\t\t  1967 SCR  (1) 434\n CITATOR INFO :\n C\t    1967 SC1507\t (3)\n RF\t    1973 SC1425\t (18)\n D\t    1988 SC1459\t (15)\n R\t    1990 SC 176\t (32)\n\n\nACT:\nDefence\t of India Rules 1962, rr. 30(1)(b) and\t3OA(9)-Scope\nof.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  petitioner\t who  was  the editor  of  a  newspaper\t was\ndetained  by  and order of the Central Government  under  r.\n30(1)(b)  of  the  Defence of India  Rules,  1962,  and\t the\ndetention  was\tcontinued by another order  of\tthe  Central\nGovernment  passed six months later, under r.  3OA(9).\t The\nfirst order directed the petitioner's detention with a\tview\nto  preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial  to\nthe  defence of India, civil defence, public safety and\t the\nmaintenance-of\tpublic order, but the order  continuing\t the\ndetention  set\tout  only the defence  of  India  and  civil\ndefence. The   petitioner challenged the second order of the\nfollowing  grounds:-(i)the  detention was punitive  and\t not\npreventive, because his writings in is\tpaper\t were\t the\ngrounds\t of  his original detention but that the  paper\t had\nsince become defunct; (ii) the two additional grounds  given\nin  the original order and omitted in the latter order\tmust\nbe  held  to  have  been non-existent at  the  time  of\t the\noriginal  order, and therefore, the original order based  on\nsuch  non-existent  grounds was illegal, and  could  not  be\nvalidly\t continued  under  r.  3OA(9);\t(iii)  even  if\t the\nGovernment  was\t competent to continue\tthe  detention,\t the\nvalidity  of the decision of the Government to continue\t the\ndetention   depended   upon  the   existence   of   relevant\ncircumstances which would necessitate the- continuation\t and\nsuch circumstances were demonstrable; and (iv) the  Minister\nwho  passed  the second order should have  filed  a  counter\naffidavit  showing that he applied his mind to the  material\nbefore he passed the order continuing the detention.\nHELD  :\t (i) Assuming that the petitioners writings  in\t his\npaper were relied on for the purpose of passing the original\norder,\tthey  were  not\t the only  materials  on  which\t the\noriginal  order and the order continuing the detention\twere\nbased.\t The  authorities had taken into  consideration\t the\nover-all  picture of all his anti-Indian  and  pro-Pakistani\nactivities.   Therefore, the fact that his paper  had  since\nbecome\t defunct  would\t make  no  difference  because\t the\njurisdiction  to  detain  is not in respect  of\t a  mischief\nalready\t committed  but\t in anticipation.  that\t the  person\nconcerned may in future act prejudicially. [436 H; 437\tA-B;\n439 C-D]\n(ii) The decision to continue the detention order was within\nthe scope of r. 30A and was therefore sustainable. [446 A-B]\nRule  30-A provides for a review of the order of  detention,\nthe    procedure   therefor,,\tthe   different\t   reviewing\nauthorities,  the period within which such review has to  be\nmade  and  the obligation to decide  whether  the  detention\nshould\tbe continued or cancelled after taking into  account\nall  the circumstances of the case.  Sub-rule  (9)  provides\nthat where a detention order is passed, by the Central or  a\nState  Government such order shall be reviewed at  intervals\nof  not\t more than six months by the Government\t which\tmade\nthe-order and upon such review decide whether to continue or\ncancel\tthe  order.  The object of the review is  to  decide\nwhether there is a necessity to continue the detention order\nor not in\n434\nthe  fight  of\tthe facts and  circumstances  including\t any\ndevelopment  that has taken place in the meantime.   If\t the\nreviewing authority finds that such a development has  taken\nplace in the sense that the reasons which led to the passing\nof the original order no longer subsist or that some of them\ndo not subsist that is not to say that those reasons did not\nexist at the time of passing the original order and that the\nsatisfaction was on grounds which did not then exist.  There\nis  no\tanalogy\t between the provisions\t of  review  in\t the\nDefence of India Rules and in the Preventive Detention\tAct,\n1950  and  therefore, the decisions on that  Act  cannot  be\navailed of by the petitioner. [438 H; 439 B; 445 F-H; 446 A-\nB]\n(iii)  The  words  used\t in r. 30(1)  (b)  and\tr.  30A\t are\nsatisfaction  in  one case, and decision after\ttaking\tinto\naccount\t all  the circumstances of the case  in\t the  other.\nUnlike\tr.  30(1)(b), the power to  continue  the  detention\nafter  review  is  not\tdependent on  the  solution  of\t the\nGovernment.  Under r. 30A the Government is enjoined upon to\ndecide\t whether  the  detention  should  be  continued\t  or\ncancelled.    The  substitution\t of  decision\tinstead\t  of\nsatisfaction  is  an  indication  that\tthe  criterion\t for\ncontinuing the detent on is the existence of those facts and\ncircumstances  which necessitate it. The existence  of\tsuch\nfacts which is the determinant for the exercise of the power\nis  demonstrable,  and if they are shown not  to  exist\t the\ndecision  would not be a decision within the meaning  of  r.\n30A and would be amenable on that ground to challenge.\t The\ncounter\t affidavit  of\tthe  Deputy  Secretary,\t on  record,\ndisclosed the anti-national activities of the petitioner and\nthat the decision under r. 30A that the petitioner had acted\nand was likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the defence\nof  India and civil defence was arrived at by  the  Minister\nafter  an examination of all the materials before  him.\t  So\nlong as the decision was arrived at on such materials, since\nthis  Court does not sit in appeal against such a  decision,\nit would not ordinarily examine the adequacy or the truth of\nthose materials and would not interfere with the decision on\nthe ground that if the Court had examined them it would have\ncome to a different conclusion. [440 C, 441 F-H; 446 F-G]\nSadhu  Singh  v. Delhi Administration,<\/a> [1966] 1\t S.C.R.\t 243\nreferred to.\n(iv) It was not a case of a mala fide exercise of power or a\ncase of non-application of mind by the authority  concerned.\nSince  no  allegation,-, of malice or dishonesty  have\tbeen\nmade  in the petition personally against the Minister.,\t his\nomission  to file a counter-affidavit, by itself, could\t not\nbe a ground to sustain the allegation of mala fides or\tnon-\napplication of mind. [446 D-E]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petition No. 137 of 1966.
\nPetition  under Art. 32 of the Constitution of India  for  a
\nwrit in the nature of habeas corpus.\n<\/p>\n
The petitioner appeared in person.\n<\/p>\n
S.  V. Gupte, Solicitor-General.  R. H. Dhebar and  B.R.G.K.
\nAchar, for the respondents.\n<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nShelat,\t J.  The petitioner was detained by an\torder  dated
\nDecember  10,  1965 under Rule 30(i)(b) of  the\t Defence  of
\nIndia Rules, 1962.  The order inter alia stated:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Whereas\tthe Central Government is  satisfied
\n\t      that  with  a view to preventing\tShri  P.  L.
\n\t      Lakhanpal …. from acting
\n435<\/span>
\n\t      in  any manner prejudicial to tile defence  of
\n\t      India,  and civil defence, public\t safety\t and
\n\t      the   maintenance\t of  public  order,  it\t  is
\n\t      necessary that he should be detained.”<\/p>\n
On December 24, 1965 he filed a writ petition under Art.  32
\nof  the\t Constitution  in this Court for a  writ  of  habeas
\ncorpus\tchallenging his detention inter alia on the  grounds
\nthat  Rule  30(i)(b) was ultra vires s. 3(2)(15)(i)  of\t the
\nDefence\t of India Act, 1962, that Rule 23 of the Defence  of
\nIndia (Delhi Detenues) Rules, 1964 gave him a right to\tmake
\na representation by providing a review of the said detention
\norder and also by providing that a detenu will be allowed to
\ninterview  a legal practitioner for the purpose of  drafting
\nhis  representation and that his said right was violated  by
\nhis being prevented from making such a representation,\tthat
\nthe  said order violated s. 44 inasmuch as though he was  an
\neditor\tof a newspaper action against him was not  taken  as
\nsuch  editor as provided by that section and  certain  other
\nprovisions  in\tthe Act resulting in the invalidity  of\t the
\nsaid  order  and that the said order was mala  fide  as\t the
\nUnion Home Minister had failed to file an affidavit swearing
\nas  to\this  satisfaction although  the\t petition  contained
\nspecific   allegations\tdenying\t such  satisfaction.\tThat
\npetition(1)  was heard and was dismissed on April  19,\t1966
\nrejecting  the aforesaid contentions.  On June 11, 1966\t the
\nCentral\t Government  passed  an order  continuing  the\tsaid
\ndetention  order under r. 3OA(9).  But whereas the order  of
\nDecember 10, 1965 directed the petitioner’s detention with a
\nview to preventing him from acting in any manner prejudicial
\nto the defence of India and civil defence, public safety and
\nthe  maintenance of public order the said  order  continuing
\nhis  detention set out only the defence of India  and  civil
\ndefence.  Likewise, though the original order described\t the
\npetitioner  as the son of the late Shri Diwan Chand  Sharma,
\neditor\tof the Evening View residing at etc., the  order  of
\nJune  11, 1966 simply described him as the son of  the\tlate
\nShri  Diwan Chand Sharma.  This difference probably was\t and
\nhad  to\t be  made as by reason of his detention\t he  was  no
\nlonger editing the said newspaper and was no longer residing
\nat the address set out in the original order.
\nIn  the present petition the petitioner challenges both\t the
\norders on the following grounds:-\n<\/p>\n
(i)  that there is no valid order of detention under any  of
\nthe provisions of the Act or the Rules made thereunder;\n<\/p>\n
(ii) that his continued detention under the order of June  1
\n1,  1966 was in contravention of Rule 23 of the\t Defence  of
\nIndia (Delhi Detenues) Rules, 1964 inasmuch as he was denied
\nthe  right  of\trepresentation by a  letter  of\t the  Deputy
\nSecretary  in the Ministry of’ Home Affairs  dated  December
\n27, 1965;\n<\/p>\n
(1) W.P. 47 of 1966 decided on April 19, 1966.\n<\/p>\n
436<\/span><\/p>\n
(iii) that the detention was punitive and not preventive  as
\nthe principal ground of his detention viz., his writings  in
\nhis  said paper had ceased to be the ground since  the\tsaid
\npaper  had  become  defunct, the  requisite  declaration  in
\nrespect thereof having lapsed;\n<\/p>\n
(iv) that the said detention order contravened section 44 of
\nthe Act;  and\n<\/p>\n
(v)  that  the\torders of detention  and  continuation\twere
\nillegal\t as  they  were\t mala, fide  and  made\twithout\t any
\napplication of mind by the Home Minister; consequently there
\nwas no satisfaction as required by s. 3 and r. 30(i)(b).
\nContentions 2, 4 and part of Contention 5 in so far as\tthey
\nconcern the original order of detention no longer survive as
\nthey  were disposed of by the decision in W.P. 47  of  1966.
\nThe  petitioner therefore cannot be permitted  to  reagitate
\nthe  same  questions,  it not being his case  that  any\t new
\ncircumstances  have  arisen  justifying\t their\treagitation.
\nContention  No.\t 3  also cannot\t be  sustained\tbecause\t the
\naffidavit  clearly shows that the detention was ordered\t not
\nonly because of his writings in the said newspaper but\tthat
\nthe   said   two  orders  were\tmade   after   taking\tinto
\nconsideration  the  over-all  picture  of  his\t activities.
\nAnnexure  D  to\t the  petition is the  affidavit  of  B.  S.
\nRaghavan, Deputy Secretary in the Ministry of Home  Affairs,
\nfiled  in the previous petition.  In that affidavit  it\t was
\nclearly\t stated\t that the activities of the  petitioner\t “do
\nconclusively  prove that the petitioner is  a  pro-Pakistani
\nand anti-Indian”; that “there was material before the  Union
\nHome  Minister\tabout  the  prejudicial\t activities  of\t the
\npetitioner  and\t he was satisfied that it was  necessary  to
\ndetail\tthe petitioner” and that “it was  the  anti-national
\nactivities  of the petitioner that was responsible  for\t his
\ndetention.”   That   affidavit\t also\tstated\t that\t“the
\npetitioner’s  activities  were sufficient in  themselves  to
\nenable the Central Government to come to the conclusion that
\nif the petitioner was not detained he was likely to act in a
\nmanner\tprejudicial to the defence of India, civil  defence,
\npublic\tsafety and the maintenance of public order.” In\t the
\nreturn\tfiled in the present petition also the same  officer
\nhas  once again stated that “he (the petitioner) is  a\tpro-
\nPakistani  agitator  acting against the\t integrity  and\t the
\nsolidarity  of India.  The history of the activities of\t the
\npetitioner shows that he is a pro-Pakistani propagandist and
\nseeks to undermine the unity and integrity of India and\t has
\nclose contacts and associations with elements which seek  to
\nencourage  force and violence in relation to  Kashmir.\t The
\npetitioner   has   been\t  in   constant\t  touch\t  with\t the
\nrepresentatives of foreign powers in India, inimical towards
\nIndia.” Para 4 of the return also states that he “is a\tpaid
\npro-Pakistani  and  anti-Indian”.   It\tis  true  that\t the
\ndeponent  in his counter-affidavit in the previous  petition
\nhad   relied  on  certain  extracts  culled  out  from\t the
\npetitioner’s  writings but those extracts as stated  by\t the
\ndeponent were in answer
\n437<\/span>
\nto  the petitioner’s claim that he was a journalist  and  an
\neditor.\t  But assuming that the petitioner’s  writings\twere
\nrelied on for the purpose of passing the original order,  it
\nis  manifest that they were not the only materials on  which
\nthe  order  was\t based and the authorities  had\t taken\tinto
\nconsideration  the over-all picture of all  his\t activities.
\nIf that be so the fact that his paper has now become defunct
\nwould make no difference and it cannot consequently be\theld
\nthat the order is punitive and not preventive.\tThis  leaves
\nthe   first   and   part  of  his   fifth   contention\t for
\nconsideration.\n<\/p>\n
The  petitioners argument on the first contention  was\tthat
\nthe order dated June 11, 1966 being based only on the ground
\nof  defence  of India and civil defence\t the  other  grounds
\ngiven in the original order- must be held to be non-existent
\nand that the validity of the original order being  dependent
\nupon  the  satisfaction.  of the Central  Government  it  is
\nimpossible to predicate whether the said order was not\tmade
\non  the\t basis of the non-existent  grounds.   Therefore  he
\nargued there was no valid satisfaction and the order founded
\non such invalid satisfaction could not be continued under r.
\n3OA(9);\t (2)  that  even  if  the  Central  Government\t was
\ncompetent   to\tcontinue  the  petitioner’s  detention\t the
\nvalidity  of  the  order of the 11th June,  1966  not  being
\ndeterminative  on  the subjective satisfaction\tbut  upon  a
\ndecision of the Government the grounds and the materials  on
\nwhich  such decision was made must exist and the  Government
\nwas  therefore bound to establish that there were  materials
\nbefore it upon which its said decision was based.
\nIn  order  to  appreciate  these  contentions  it  will\t  be
\nnecessary  to  ascertain the true scope of r.  30A  and\t the
\nscheme of the said Rules.  Section 3(1) of the Act  empowers
\nin  generality the Central Government to make such Rules  as
\nappear to be necessary or expedient for securing the defence
\nof India and civil defence etc.\t Sub-section 2 provides that
\nsuch Rules may provide for all or any of the matters therein
\nset out.  Clause (15)(i) empowers the Central Government  to
\nmake  rules providing for detention of any person  (a)\twhom
\nthe  authority empowered by the Rule to detain\tsuspects  on
\ngrounds\t appearing  to that authority to  be  reasonable  of
\nhaving\tacted, acting or being about to act or being  likely
\nto act in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and
\ncivil  defence\tetc.,  or  lb) with  respect  to  whom\tthat
\nauthority  is satisfied that his detention is necessary\t for
\nthe  purpose  of  preventing him from  acting  in  any\tsuch
\nprejudicial  manner.   Clause  15(i)  and  the\tother  Rules
\ncontemplate  and  empower, besides the\tCentral\t Government,
\nother  authority to detain, such authority being  not  below
\nthe rank of a District Magistrate.  The jurisdiction of such
\nauthority  is  conditioned  under  the\tfirst  part  on\t his
\nsuspicion and under the second part on his satisfaction that
\ndetention  is necessary for purposes therein set  out.\t The
\nsuspicion, of course has to be on grounds appearing to\tthat
\nauthority to be
\n438<\/span>
\nreasonable and the satisfaction under the second part is the
\nsatisfaction  of that authority that detention is  necessary
\nto prevent the person in question from acting in any  manner
\nprejudicial  to the matters set out therein.  Rule  30(1)(b)
\nprovides that the Central .or the State Government if it  is
\nsatisfied  with respect to any particular person that it  is
\nnecessary  so to do, may make an order directing that he  be
\ndetained.   In\tWrit  Petition\t47  of\t1966  filed  by\t the
\npetitioner earlier this Court made a distinction between the
\nfirst  and the second part of section 3(2)(15)(i)  and\theld
\nthat  Rule 30(1)(b) was made under the second part  of\tthat
\nsub-clause and that consequently the only thing required was
\nthat  the  authority must be satisfied\tthat  detention\t was
\nnecessary  for purposes mentioned therein. It  is  therefore
\nclear that the only condition precedent for the exercise  of
\npower  thereunder is the satisfaction of the Central or\t the
\nState  Government that it is necessary to detain the  person
\n,concerned   to\t prevent  him  from  acting  in\t  a   manner
\nprejudicial  to\t the several matters or any one or  more  of
\nthem therein set out.  Rule 30A was introduced in the  Rules
\nby  notification  G.S.R. 183 dated December  28,  1962.\t  It
\ndefines\t a  detention order as meaning one passed  under  r.
\n30(1)(b)  and provides for a review in accordance  with\t the
\nprovisions  therein  contained.\t Sub-rule  3  provides\tthat
\nwhere  a detention order is made by the Central or  a  State
\nGovernment or an Administrator a review is to be made by the
\nsame  authority.  Under sub-rule 4, if a detention order  is
\npassed\tby an officer authorised by a State  Government\t the
\nreviewing authority would consist of two officers  specified
\nby  that  Government.  If all order is made  by\t an  officer
\nauthorised  by the Administrator the reviewing authority  is
\nthe Administrator.  Under sub-rule 5, if ,a detention  order
\nis made by an authorised officer he has to forthwith  report
\nthe  fact to the reviewing authority.  Under sub-rule  6  on
\nsuch  report  the  reviewing  authority\t after\ttaking\tinto
\naccount all ‘the circumstances of the case has to  recommend
\nto  the\t State Government either to confirm  or\t cancel\t the
\norder  and thereupon that Government may confirm  or  cancel
\nthe order as it may deem fit.  Where the reviewing authority
\nis  the\t Administrator he may either confirm or\t cancel\t the
\norder after taking into account all the circumstances of the
\ncase.  Sub-rule 7 provides that every detention order passed
\nby  an\tauthorised  officer  and  confirmed  by\t the   State
\nGovernment  would be reviewed by the reviewing authority  at
\nintervals  of not more than six months and in the  light  of
\nthe  recommendation of that authority the  State  Government
\nshall  decide  whether\tthe  order  shall  be  continued  or
\ncancelled.   A\tsimilar\t provision in respect  of  an  order
\npassed\tby  an\tofficer authorised by  an  Administrator  is
\ncontained  in  sub-rule\t 8. Sub-rule 9\twith  which  we\t are
\nimmediately concerned provides that where a detention  order
\nis  passed by the Central or a State Government\t such  order
\nshall be reviewed at the aforesaid intervals by the  Govern-
\nment which made it and upon such review the Government shall
\n439<\/span>
\ndecide\t whether   the\t order\tshould\t be   continued\t  or
\ncancelled.Thus\twhere the detention is continued  after\t the
\nfirst  six months, a review by the prescribed  authority  is
\nobligatory  and\t a  decision of the  Central  or  the  State
\nGovernment  or the Administrator as the case may be  is\t the
\ncondition precedent for continued detention.  Rule 30A\tthus
\nprovides for a review, the procedure therefor, the different
\nreviewing  authorities, the period within which such  review
\nhas  to\t be made and the obligation to\tdecide\twhether\t the
\ndetention should be continued or cancelled after taking into
\naccount all the circumstances of the case.\n<\/p>\n
In  the present case we are concerned not with\ta  detention
\norder  passed  by an authorised officer but by\tthe  Central
\nGovernment.   In the case of such an order made\t under\trule
\n30(1)(b)  the  determinative factor is the  satisfaction  in
\nregard to a particular person that it is necessary to detain
\nhim with a view to prevent him from acting prejudicially  to
\nthe matters or any one or more of them therein set out.\t The
\njurisdiction  to  detain  is not in respect  of\t a  mischief
\nalready\t committed  but\t in  anticipation  that\t the  person
\nconcerned   may\t  in   future\tact   prejudicially.\tSuch
\nsatisfaction is exclusively that of the detaining  authority
\nand it is inherent in the power that it is and has to be the
\nsubjective  satisfaction.   Presumably an  emergency  having
\nbeen declared by the President the legislature granted\tsuch
\na  drastic and unique power enabling the Government  to\t act
\nquickly to prevent the person concerned from doing  anything
\ndeterimental  to the said matters.  In such a case  it\tmust
\nhave  been  presumed  by the  legislature  that\t a  judicial
\nprocess\t  under\t  normal  laws\tmay  be\t either\t  inept\t  or
\ninappropriate.\tThus the condition precedent to the exercise
\nof  jurisdiction  to detain under r. 30(1)(b)  is  only\t the
\nsubjective  satisfaction that it is necessary to detain\t the
\nperson\tconcerned.  (cf.  Rammanohar Lohia v. The  State  of
\nBihar).(1)
\nConsidering,   however,\t the  fact  that  the\tnotification
\ninducting  in the Rules rule 30A providing for a review\t was
\nissued\tin December 1962 it would appear that the  necessity
\nfor ensuring that a person is not improperly detained or  is
\nnot  unnecessarily continued in detention was felt and\tthat
\nmust  have  been the reason why a review  was  provided\t for
\nimmediately  after  the\t detention  in\tthe  case  where  an
\nauthorised  officer has passed the order and in the case  of
\nan  order passed by the Government, Central or State as\t the
\ncase  may  be, by that Government at every interval  of\t not
\nmore  than six months.\tIt may be recalled that in the\tcase
\nof  an\torder  by an officer it is  incumbent  upon  him  to
\nforthwith  report to the reviewing authority  whereupon\t the
\nreviewing authority has to recommend to the State Government
\nwhether to confirm or cancel the order.\t Thus a check on the
\nexercise  of power by an authorised officer  was  considered
\nnecessary.  Though there is no such immediate review in
\n(1) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 709.\n<\/p>\n
440<\/span><\/p>\n
the  case  of  an order passed by the  Central\tor  a  State
\nGovernment, ,sub-rules 7, 8 and 9 of Rule 30A provide for  a
\nreview\tat intervals of not more than six months (a) by\t the
\nreviewing  authority  in the case of an order passed  by  an
\nofficer\t and (b) by the Government in the case of  an  order
\npassed by the Government.  The provision for review is again
\na  check preventing a person being unnecessarily,  continued
\nin  detention,\tand whether the reviewing authority  is\t the
\nGovernment or the officers it is the Government which has to
\ndecide\t whether  the  detention  should  be  continued\t  or
\ncancelled. ,and such decision is the condition precedent for
\nan  order of continuation of detention.\t The  difference  in
\nthe  words  used  in  Rule  .30(1)(b)  and  Rule  30A  viz.,
\nsatisfaction  in  one case and decision\t after\ttaking\tinto
\naccount\t all  the  circumstances of the case  in  the  other
\ncannot be accidental but must be deliberate and\t purposeful.
\nThe phraseology used in Rule 30A is not “in its opinion”  or
\nis satisfied” or “has reason to believe” etc., as often used
\nin modern statutes and rules.\n<\/p>\n
The question then is: what precisely does the word  “decide”
\nin  Rule  30A  mean ? It is no doubt a\tpopular\t and  not  a
\ntechnical  word\t .According to its dictionary  -meaning\t “to
\ndecide”\t means “settle (question, issue, dispute) by  giving
\nvictory to one side; give judgment (between, for, in  favour
\nof,  against); bring, come, to a resolution” and  “decision”
\nmeans  “settlement, (of question etc).,\t conclusion,  formal
\njudgment,  making  up  one’s  mind,  resolve,  resoluteness,
\ndecided character.” As Fazl Ali J. in Province of Bombay  v.
\nAdvani<\/a>(1) observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “The word’decision’ in common parlance is more
\n\t      or  less\ta neutral expression and it  can  be
\n\t      used  with reference to purely executive\tacts
\n\t      as  well\tas judicial orders.  The  mere\tfact
\n\t\t\t    that an executive authority has to dec
\nide some-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      thing does not make the decision judicial.  It
\n\t      is the manner in which the decision has to  be
\n\t      arrived at which makes the difference and\t the
\n\t      real  test  is: Is there any  duty  to  decide
\n\t      judicially?”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
In  that case the question was whether the decision  of\t the
\nBombay Government under s. 3 of the Bombay Land\t Requisition
\nOrdinance,  5  of 1947 that a property was  required  for  a
\npublic\tpurpose\t was  a quasi judicial act  and\t a  writ  of
\ncertiorari would lie against such a decision.  The  majority
\nheld that it was an administrative act but it is  noteworthy
\nthat Mukherjea J. who differed along with Mahajan J. (as  he
\nthen was) was of the view that the question whether a public
\npurpose\t exists\t or  not had to\t be  determined\t under\tthat
\nsection by the Government of Bombay as there was a lis or  a
\ncontroversy  between the interest of the public on  the\t one
\nhand  and that of the individual who owned the\tproperty  on
\nthe other, and the deter-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
(1) [1950] S.C.R. 621 at 642.\n<\/p>\n
441<\/span><\/p>\n
initiation  of\tthe  Government\t was  a\t judicial  act\tsuch
\ndetermination  being  a\t collateral  matter  on\t which\t the
\njurisdiction  to requisition was founded and not a  part  of
\nthe  executive\tact of requisitioning.\tWe are\thowever\t not
\ncalled\tupon  in  the present case  to\tdecide\twhether\t the
\nfunction of review and the decision which may be made by the
\nGovernment  is\ta judicial or a quasi judicial\tfunction  or
\nnot.Indeed,the\tpetitioner has not raised any such  question
\nwhether the order of the 11th June 1966 was a judicial or  a
\nquasi-judicial one.  We do not therefore propose to  examine
\nthe  relevant  provisions of the Rules from  that  point  of
\nview.\tThe question raised by the petitioner before  us  is
\nwhether\t the  validity\tof the\tdecision  depends  upon\t the
\nexistence of relevant circumstances which would\t necessitate
\nthe continuation of detention and whether such circumstances
\non which it is founded are demonstrable.  As tersely put  by
\nLord  Atkin in his famous dissent in Liversidge v.  Anderson
\n(1) is the decision one of a case of thinking that a  person
\nhas  a\tbroken ankle and not a case of his really  having  a
\nbroken\tankle or- as Mahajan J. (as he then was) put  it  in
\nAdvani’s case(2 ) at p. 659 of the Report:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Similarly   can\t it  be\t said  that   s.   4
\n\t      contemplates  merely a vacancy in the mind  of
\n\t      the  Government,\tnot a vacancy in fact  as  a
\n\t      real thing.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
If  the\t decision  is to be founded  on\t a  mere  subjective
\nsatisfaction  or opinion it would be in the former  category
\nbut  if it is to be founded on a fact it has to fall in\t the
\nlatter\tcategory  and  in that event it\t would\thave  to  be
\nregarded as one based on an objective test.  It follows that
\nwhere  the  exercise of power is not conditioned on  a\tmere
\nopinion\t or  satisfaction but on the existence of a  set  of
\nfacts  or  circumstances that power can be  exercised  where
\nthey  exist.   The authority in such a case is\trequired  to
\nexercise  the  power  in the manner and\t within\t the  limits
\nauthorised by the legislature.\tThe existence of such  facts
\nwhich  is the determinant for the exercise of the  power  is
\ndemonstrable.\n<\/p>\n
Unlike\tRule  30(1)(b) the power to continue  the  detention
\nafter  review  is not dependent on the satisfaction  of\t the
\nGovernment.   Rule 30A postulates that ordinarily  detention
\nshould\tnot  be\t for  more  than  six  months  unless  found
\nnecessary.  It is for that reason that under the Rules\twhen
\nthe period of six months expires the Government is  enjoined
\nupon to decide whether it should be continued or  cancelled.
\nThough the legislature has made the Government the exclusive
\nforum for such a decision, its decision has to be founded on
\nfacts\tand  circumstances  which  make\t  the\tcontinuation
\nnecessary in order to prevent the detenu acting in a  manner
\nprejudicial to the matters set out therein.The\tsubstitution
\nof  decision instead of satisfaction is a  clear  indication
\nthat the criterion
\n(1) [1942] A.C. 206.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 621.\n<\/p>\n
442<\/span><\/p>\n
for continuing the detention is the existence of those facts
\nand   circumstances  which  necessitate\t it.   It   is\t not
\nunreasonable to think that the legislature decided to confer
\npower  the  exercise of which was made\tdependent  upon\t the
\nsubjective  satisfaction  at  the initial  stage  but  where
\ncontinuation  of detent ion was concerned, it  thought\tthat
\nthere  should  be different considerations.  At\t that  stage
\nthere would be ample time and opportunity for the Government
\nto scrutinise the case fully and ascertain whether facts and
\ncircumstances  exist  demanding continuation  and  therefore
\ndeliberately used the word “decide” instead of the words “is
\nsatisfied”.  Therefore where such circumstances do not exist
\nthere would be no necessity for continuation and yet if\t the
\nGovernment decides to continue the detention,such a decision
\nwould be beyond the scope of Rule 30A and would\t  not  be  a
\ndecision within the meaning of or under that rule.Cases\t may
\narise  where circumstances exist leading to the\t authority’s
\nsatisfaction that a particular person should be detained but
\nthose  circumstances  may  not exist at the  time  when\t the
\nreview is made.\t In the latter case it is impossible to\t say
\nthat  the  Government  can  still  decide  to  continue\t the
\ndetention  nor\tis  it\tpossible  to  say  that\t it  is\t the
\nGovernment’s  opinion  or satisfaction that such  facts\t and
\ncircumstances exist which is the criterion.  The decision on
\na  review  has\tto be arrived at from  the  facts  and\tcir-
\ncumstances  which  actually subsisted at the time  when\t the
\noriginal   order  was  made  in\t the  light  of\t  subsequent
\ndevelopments and not merely those existing at the time\twhen
\nthe  order  was made.  In such a case the  decision  can  be
\nchallenged as one not within the scope of or under the\trule
\nand therefore unauthorised or as one based on considerations
\nirrelevant to the power.\n<\/p>\n
Our  attention\twas however drawn to the decision  in  Sadhu
\nSingh  v.  Delhi  Administration<\/a>(1) where  Shah\t J.  sitting
\nsingly during vacation has held that the order of  detention
\npassed\tby the District Magistrate and its  confirmation  by
\nthe Delhi Administration were acts pre-eminently  executive,
\nsubject to subjective satisfaction and therefore not subject
\nto a judicial review.  He, however, added that even then the
\ncourt’s power is not excluded to investigate into compliance
\nwith  the  procedural safeguards imposed by the\t statute  or
\ninto the existence of prescribed conditions precedent to the
\nexercise  of  power or into a plea that the order  was\tmade
\nmala  fide or for a collateral purpose.\t The  learned  Judge
\nthen proceeded to consider the plea that the review under r.
\n30A(8) was a quasi judicial proceeding and that a review  of
\nthe facts in the light of subsequent developments, including
\nthe  change  of views, if any, of the detenu  since  he\t was
\ndetained  cannot effectively be made unless he was  afforded
\nan  opportunity to make his representation and convince\t the
\nreviewing  authority that the facts and circumstances  which
\nmay have justified the original
\n(1) [1966] 1 S.C.R. 243.\n<\/p>\n
443<\/span><\/p>\n
order did not continue to exist or in the context of changed
\ncircumstances  did  not\t justify  the  continuation  of\t the
\ndetention.   In\t ,repelling  this plea,\t the  learned  Judge
\nobserved:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Making of an order of detention proceeds upon
\n\t      the subjective satisfaction of the  prescribed
\n\t      authority in the light of circumstances placed
\n\t      before him or coming to his knowledge, that it
\n\t      is  necessary to detain the  person  concerned
\n\t      with   a\t view\tto   preventing\t  him\tfrom
\n\t      acting…… If that order is purely executive
\n\t      and not open to review by the Court, a  review
\n\t      of those very circumstances on which the order
\n\t      was  made in the light of circumstances  since
\n\t      the date of that order cannot but be  regarded
\n\t      as  an executive order.  Satisfaction  of\t the
\n\t      authority under r. 30(1) proceeding upon facts
\n\t      and  circumstances  which\t justifies  him\t  in
\n\t      making   an   order  of  detention   and\t the
\n\t      satisfaction  upon review of those very  facts
\n\t      and    circumstances   in\t  the\t light\t  of
\n\t      circumstances which came into existence  since
\n\t      the  order of detention are the result  of  an
\n\t      executive determination and are not subject to
\n\t      judicial review.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
On  this  view he held that the review was  not\t a  judicial
\nfunction  nor  did the statute require the  safeguard  of  a
\njudicial  approach  or the right of being  heard.   He\talso
\nnegatived the plea that the word “decide” in r. 3OA(8) meant
\nthat there was a lis observing as follows
\n\t      “That  only  imports that\t the  Administration
\n\t      after reviewing the material circumstances has
\n\t      to decide whether the detention of the  detenu
\n\t      should\tbe    continued\t   or\t  cancelled.\n<\/p>\n
\t      Undoubtedly,   in\t reviewing  the\t  order\t  of
\n\t      detention,  the Administrator would be  taking
\n\t      into  account all the  relevant  circumstances
\n\t      existing at the time when the order was  made,
\n\t      the  subsequent  developments  which  have   a
\n\t      bearing on the detention of the detenu and the
\n\t      representation,  if any, made by\tthe  detenu.
\n\t      But  the\trule  contemplates  review  of\t the
\n\t      detention order and in the exercise of a power
\n\t      to  review a condition of a judicial  approach
\n\t      is not implied.”\n<\/p>\n
Shah  J.  in this decision was primarily  dealing  with\t the
\nquestion  whether  the\tfunction of review  and\t a  decision
\nfollowing  it is a judicial function and whether there is  a
\nlis  between  the  power  of  the  Government  to   continue
\ndetention on the one hand and the right of the detenu to  be
\nreleased on the other  As already stated that question\tdoes
\nnot arise before us and we refrain from deciding, it. Though
\nhe  rejected  that plea the learned Judge has  yet  said  in
\nexplicit terms that the reviewing authority has to  consider
\n“the material circumstances ” and then has to decide whether
\nthe  detention\tshould\tbe continued or not.   He  has\talso
\nemphasised that M 15 sup.  CI\/66-15
\n444<\/span>
\nthe  Administrator while reviewing has to take into  account
\nthe  relevant circumstances” existing at the time  when\t the
\nOriginal  order\t was made and  the  subsequent\tdevelopments
\nhaving\t“a  bearing on the detention”.\t The  decision\tthus
\npresupposes that the Government or the Administrator, as the
\ncase may be, cannot decide to continue the detention without
\nconsidering all the relevant circumstances which existed  at
\nthe time of the original order and those which exist at\t the
\ntime  when the authority decides to continue the  detention.
\nWhile  making the plea that the use of the word ‘decide”  in
\nr. 30A meant that there is a lis, it does not appear to have
\nbeen  argued  that assuming that the power to  continue\t the
\ndetention  was\tministerial the condition precedent  to\t the
\nexercise  of that power is not the  subjective\tsatisfaction
\nbut  the decision from the facts and circumstances and\tthat
\nthe  validity of the exercise of that power is dependent  on
\nthe  existence\tof facts and circumstances relevant  to\t the
\npurpose\t set out in r. 30(1) and r. 30A.  If they are  shown
\nnot  to\t exist surely the decision would not be\t a  decision
\nwithin\tthe meaning of r. 30A and would be amenable on\tthat
\nground to a challenge.\n<\/p>\n
The question then is, is the decision to continue the  order
\nof detention one within the scope of r. 30A ? Relying on the
\nomission in the order of June 11, 1966 of the words  “public
\nsafety\tand the maintenance of public order” the  petitioner
\ncontended that it must be held that those two grounds  never
\nexisted\t and  that  since the exercise of  power  to  detain
\ndepended on the satisfaction of the Government it cannot  be
\npredicated  that  the  omitted grounds did  not\t affect\t the
\nGovernment  during  the\t process of  its  satisfaction.\t  He
\nrelied on two decisions of this Court, (1) Baradwaj v. State
\nof Delhi(1) and (2) Shibban Lal v. State of U.P.(2) Both the
\ncases  were under the Preventive Detention Act, IV of  1950.
\nIn  Baradwaj’s case(2) the question was not of a ground\t not
\nexisting but of a ground being found to be vague and it\t was
\nheld  that  even  though the rest of the  grounds  were\t not
\nvague,\tthe  detention\twas  not  in  accordance  with\t the
\nprocedure established by law and was therefore illegal.\t The
\ndecision therefore turned on the question whether under Art.
\n22(5) of the Constitution the detenu had an opportunity\t ,of
\neffectively   making  a\t representation.   In\tShibbanlal’s
\ncase(2)\t the  Court held that where  the  Government  itself
\nwhile  confirming  the detention in exercise  of  its  power
\nunder s. II admits that one of the two grounds mentioned  in
\nthe original order was unsubstantial or non-existent, to say
\nthat  the  other  ground  which\t still\tremained  was  quite
\nsufficient  to sustain the order would be to  substitute  an
\nobjective  judicial test for the subjective decision of\t the
\n,executive  authority  which  was  against  the\t legislative
\npolicy underlying the statute.\tIn such cases, the  position
\nwould  be  the\tsame  .,as if one of  the  two\tgrounds\t was
\nirrelevant for the purpose of the
\n(1) [1953] S.C.R.708\t   (2) A.I.R. 1964 S.C.179
\n445<\/span>
\nAct  or\t was  wholly illusory and  this\t would\tvitiate\t the
\ndetention order as a whole. These decisions cannot help\t the
\npetitioner.In  the first place the scheme of the  Preventive
\nDetention  Act\tis entirely different from the Act  and\t the
\nRules before us.  Section 3 of that Act confers the power of
\ndetention.   Section 7 requires the detaining  authority  to
\nfurnish\t grounds  of  detention\t to the\t detenu\t to  make  a
\nrepresentation.\t  Section  8  requires\tthe  setting  up  of
\nAdvisory Boards.  Section 9 requires reference of the  order
\npassed\tby  the- authority to such Advisory  Board  together
\nwith the representation, if any, made by the detenu.   Under
\nsection 10, the Board has to make a report to the Government
\nand  the report would be whether there is  sufficient  cause
\nfor  detention\tor  not.  Under s. 11,\tthe  Government\t may
\nconfirm the detention order and continue the detention where
\nthe report is that there is sufficient cause.  But where the
\nBoard  reports that there is no such sufficient\t cause,\t the
\nGovernment  has to revoke the detention order.\tIt is  clear
\nfrom s. 9 and the sections following it that the  Government
\nhas  to make the reference to the Board within 30 days\tfrom
\nthe  order  and\t the  Board has to  find  whether  there  is
\nsufficient  cause for detention or not.\t The review  by\t the
\nBoard  is  thus almost contemporaneous.\t  If  therefore\t the
\nBoard finds that certain grounds furnished to the detenu did
\nnot  in fact exist, it means that they did not exist at\t the
\ntime when the authority made up its mind to pass the  order.
\nIt  is for that reason that the courts have held that  since
\nthe  order  is based on subjective satisfaction, it  is\t not
\npossible to say whether or not the grounds found not to have
\nexisted\t affected the process of satisfaction of the  autho-
\nrity  or  not and to say that those only which\texisted\t had
\nmade up the satisfaction would be to substitute the  court’s
\nobjective  test in place of the subjective  satisfaction  of
\nthe detaining authority.  The scheme of rules 30(1) and\t 30A
\nis  totally different from that of the Preventive  Detention
\nAct.   Where an order is made under r. 30(1)(b), its  review
\nis at intervals of periods of not more than six months.\t The
\nobject\tof  the\t review\t is to decide  whether\tthere  is  a
\nnecessity  to  continue the detention order or\tnot  in\t the
\nlight\tof  the\t facts\tand  circumstances   including\t any
\ndevelopment  that has taken place in the meantime.   If\t the
\nreviewing authority finds that such a development has  taken
\nplace in the sense that the reasons which led to the passing
\nof the original order no longer subsist or that some of them
\ndo  not subsist, that is not to say that those\treasons\t did
\nnot  exist  at the time of passing the\toriginal  order\t and
\ntherefore the satisfaction was on grounds which did not then
\nexist.\t It is easy to visualise a case where the  authority
\nis  satisfied  that an order of detention  is  necessary  to
\nprevent a detenu from acting in a manner prejudicial to\t all
\nthe objects set out in r. 30 (1).  At the end of six  months
\nthe reviewing authority on the materials before it may\tcome
\nto  a decision that the detention is still necessary as\t the
\ndetenu is likely to act in a manner prejudicial
\n446<\/span>
\nto some but not all the matters.  Provided such decision  is
\narrived\t at within the scope of r. 30A the decision to\tcon-
\ntinue  the detention order would be sustainable.   There  is
\nthus no analogy between the provisions of review in the\t two
\nActs and therefore decisions on the Preventive Detention Act
\ncannot be availed of by the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
As  regards  the  contention as to mala\t fides\tit  will  be
\nobserved  that\tthe original order was passed by  the  Union
\nHome Minister while the order under r. 30A was passed by the
\nMinister  of State of Home Affairs.  The first part  of\t the
\ncontention  has already been rejected by this Court  in\t the
\npetitioner’s  earlier Writ Petition and therefore cannot  be
\nreagitated.  The contention in regard to the second part was
\nthat  since  the  State Minister himself has  not  filed  an
\naffidavit swearing to his decision and the affidavit on\t re-
\ncord  is  that of the Deputy Secretary there is\t nothing  to
\nshow that the Minister had arrived at a decision that  there
\nwere facts and circumstances necessitating the\tcontinuation
\nof  the\t petitioner’s detention.  The reasons given  by\t the
\npetitioner for this contention are in substance the same  as
\nthose urged in the earlier petition and which were  rejected
\nby  this  Court\t then.\tSince no  allegation  of  malice  or
\ndishonesty have been made in the petition personally against
\nthe Minister it is not possible to say that his omission  to
\nfile an affidavit in reply by itself would be any ground  to
\nsustain\t the allegation of mala fides or non-application  of
\nmind.  The affidavit by the Deputy Secretary discloses\tthat
\nthe  decision  under r. 30A was arrived at by  the  Minister
\nafter  an examination of all the materials before him.\t The
\naffidavit  also discloses the activities of  the  petitioner
\nand  the  conclusion  arrived at by the\t Minister  that\t the
\npetitioner  had\t acted\tand was likely to act  in  a  manner
\nprejudicial  to the defence of India and civil defence.\t  So
\nlong  as  that decision was arrived at on  materials,  since
\nthis Court does not sit in appeal against such a decision it
\nwould  not ordinarily examine the adequacy or the  truth  of
\nthose  materials and would not interfere with that  decision
\non  the ground that if the Court had examined them it  would
\nhave  come to a different conclusion.  It is  therefore\t not
\npossible to agree with the contention that this is a case of
\na  mala fide exercise of power or a case of  non-application
\nof mind by the authority concerned.\n<\/p>\n
For  the  reasons  aforesaid  the  petition  fails  and\t  is
\ndismissed.\n<\/p>\n
V.P.S.\t\t\t\t   Petition dismissed.\n447<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966 Equivalent citations: 1967 AIR 908, 1967 SCR (1) 434 Author: Shelat Bench: Rao, K. Subba (Cj), Hidayatullah, M., Sikri, S.M., Shelat, J.M., Mitter, G.K. PETITIONER: P.L. LAKHANPAL Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21\/09\/1966 BENCH: […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-169809","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nP.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1966-09-20T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-10-20T00:00:01+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"35 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966\",\"datePublished\":\"1966-09-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-10-20T00:00:01+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966\"},\"wordCount\":6055,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966\",\"name\":\"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1966-09-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-10-20T00:00:01+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1966-09-20T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2015-10-20T00:00:01+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"35 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966","datePublished":"1966-09-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-10-20T00:00:01+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966"},"wordCount":6055,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966","name":"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1966-09-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-10-20T00:00:01+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/p-l-lakhanpal-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-21-september-1966#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"P.L. Lakhanpal vs Union Of India & Ors on 21 September, 1966"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/169809","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=169809"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/169809\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=169809"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=169809"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=169809"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}