{"id":171625,"date":"1958-04-11T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1958-04-10T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-nagpur-electric-light-and-vs-k-shreepathirao-on-11-april-1958"},"modified":"2019-01-12T14:24:00","modified_gmt":"2019-01-12T08:54:00","slug":"the-nagpur-electric-light-and-vs-k-shreepathirao-on-11-april-1958","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-nagpur-electric-light-and-vs-k-shreepathirao-on-11-april-1958","title":{"rendered":"The Nagpur Electric Light And … vs K. Shreepathirao on 11 April, 1958"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
The Nagpur Electric Light And … vs K. Shreepathirao on 11 April, 1958<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1958 AIR 658, \t\t 1959 SCR 463<\/div>\n
Author: S Das<\/div>\n
Bench: Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama, Das, S.K., Gajendragadkar, P.B., Bose, Vivian<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nTHE NAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWERCO., LTD. & OTHERS\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nK.   SHREEPATHIRAO\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n11\/04\/1958\n\nBENCH:\nDAS, S.K.\nBENCH:\nDAS, S.K.\nBOSE, VIVIAN\nDAS, SUDHI RANJAN (CJ)\nAIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\n\nCITATION:\n 1958 AIR  658\t\t  1959 SCR  463\n\n\nACT:\nTermination  of\t Service-Company  Employee-Standing   Orders\n-Construction-Employees and workmen-Distinction.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe services of the respondent, an employee of the appellant\ncompany,  were\tterminated in accordance with  the  Standing\nOrders\t of  the  company,  approved  by   the\t appropriate\nauthorities   under   the  provisions  of   the\t  Industrial\nEmployment  (Standing  Orders) Act, 1946,  and\tthe  Central\nProvinces  and\tBerar Industrial  Disputes  Settlement\tAct,\n1947.\tStanding Order NO. 2(a) defined \" employees \"  as  \"\nall  persons ... employed in the Office or Mains  Department\nor  Stores  or\tPower  House or\t Receiving  Station  of\t the\nCompany\t ... whose names and ticket numbers are included  in\nthe departmental musters \". The Standing Orders also defined\nthe term \" workman \" and provided that every workman  should\nhave a ticket.\tNo ticket had been issued to the  respondent\nby  the company, and consequently his ticket number was\t not\nincluded   in  the  departmental  muster.   The\t  respondent\nchallenged  the\t validity  of  the  order  terminating\t his\nservices by an application made before the High Court  under\nArt.  226  of the Constitution on the grounds,\tinter  alia,\nthat the Standing Orders in question were confined to  those\nemployees  only to whom tickets were issued, and that as  no\nticket\twas issued to him he was not an employee within\t the\nmeaning of the Standing Orders which did not therefore apply\nto  him and, consequently, the termination of  his  services\nunder Standing Order No. 16(1) was illegal:\nHeld,  (1) that the words \" whose names and  ticket  numbers\nare  included  in the departmental musters  \"  occurring  in\nStanding Order NO. 2 (a) should be read as \" whose names and\nticket\tnumbers,  if any, are included in  the\tdepartmental\nmusters \";\nCortis v. The Kent Water Works Company (1827) 7 B. & C. 314;\n108 E. R. 741 and Perumal Goundan v. The  Thirumalarayapuram\njananukoola Dhanasekhara Sangha Nidhi, (1918) I.L.R. 4I Mad.\n624, applied.\n(2)that under the Standing Orders, in which a distinction is\nmade between 'employees' and 'workmen', while every  workman\nmust  have a ticket, there may be employees who may have  no\ntickets\t the  possession  of  which  is\t not  an   essential\ncharacteristic of an employee; and,\n(3)that\t the  Standing Orders apply to all  employees  for\nwhose benefit they have been made.\n464\nAccordingly,  the  Standing Orders were\t applicable  to\t the\nrespondent and the termination of his service in  accordance\nwith Standing Order No. 16(1) was valid and, therefore,\t the\napplication made by him to the High Court must fail.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIA, IL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.5 of 1958.
\nAppeal\tby special leave from the judgment and\torder  dated
\nSeptember  26,\t1956,  of the former Nagpur  High  Court  in
\nLetters\t Patent\t Appeal No. 66 of 1956, arising out  of\t the
\njudgment  and order dated April 14, 1956, of the  said\tHigh
\nCourt in Misc.\tPetition No. 6 of 1956.\n<\/p>\n
M.   C. Setalvad, Attorney-General of India, B. Sen, D.\t  B.
\nPadhya and I. N. Shroff, for the appellants.
\nR. V. S. Mani,<\/a> for the respondent.\n<\/p>\n
1958.  April II.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nS.K.  DAS  J.-This is an appeal by  special  leave.   The
\nappellants before us are the Nagpur Electric Light and Power
\nCo. Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the Company), a  public
\nlimited\t company having its registered office at  Nagpur  in
\nMadhya\tPradesh,  its Manager, and Assistant  Manager.\t The
\nrespondent,  Shreepathi\t Rao,  joined  the  service  of\t the
\nCompany as a typist on a salary of Rs. 30 per month in July,
\n1936.\tHe rose in rank from time to time and was  appointed
\nDeputy\tHead Clerk in 1947 in the grade of  Rs.\t 120-10-225.
\nSince  1952 he has been receiving a basic salary of Rs.\t 245
\nper month.  On November 28, 1955, an explanation was  called
\nfor  from him with regard to the issue of certain  bills  to
\nconsumers of electricity called “.high tension consumers  “,
\nwithout\t having\t certain  ” notes  for\tthe  information  of
\nconsumers  ”  printed  at  the\tback  of  the  bills.\t The
\nrespondent  submitted  his  explanation\t on  the  next\tday,
\nmarking\t a  copy  thereof to one of  the  directors  of\t the
\nCompany.  On December 2,1955, he was again asked to  explain
\nwhy  he\t marked\t a copy of his explanation  to\tone  of\t the
\ndirectors.   The  respondent  submitted\t an  explanation  in
\nrespect of this matter also.  On the same date, he
\nwas  again  asked  to explain as to how and  why  certain  ”
\ndouble\tadjustments ” had been made in the accounts of\t1954
\nrelating  to the consumers’ department of the  Company,\t the
\nallegation  being  that\t a sum\tof  Rs.\t 1,05,894-7-7  which
\nrepresented  the amount of bills of the Central Railway\t had
\nbeen  deducted\ttwice  in  the\taccounts.   The\t  respondent
\nsubmitted  an explanation on December 3, 1955, in  which  he
\nsaid that the charge was vague and that, after 1949, he\t was
\nnot  in any way concerned with the preparation of  summaries
\nand   annual  statements  of  accounts\tof   the   consumers
\ndepartment.  On December 5, 1955, an order of suspension was
\nmade against the respondent which stated that the order\t was
\nto  take  immediate  effect and to  remain  in\tforce  until
\nfurther\t orders,  pending  some\t investigation\tagainst\t the
\nrespondent.   Two  days\t later,\t on  December  7,  1955,   a
\nmemorandum  was\t served on the\trespondent  terminating\t his
\nservices with effect from January 31,1956.  The\t memorandum,
\nso far as it is relevant for our purpose, read-
\nWe  hereby give you notice under Standing Order\t 16(1)\tthat
\nyour  services will stand terminated as from  31st  January,
\n1956.\n<\/p>\n
The Company’s Managing Director is satisfied that it is\t not
\nin the interests of the business of the Company to  disclose
\nreasons’ for terminating your services.”
\nOn December 19, 1955, a notice was served on the Company  on
\nbehalf\tof  the respondent wherein it was  stated  that\t the
\norder of suspension dated December 5, 1955, and the order of
\ntermination  dated December 7, 1955, were illegal and  ultra
\nvires and a request was made to withdraw the said orders and
\nreinstate the respondent within 24 hours, failing which\t the
\nrespondent  said  that\the would take legal  action  in\t the
\nmatter.\t  On December 26, 1955, the Company sent a reply  to
\nthe notice denying the allegations, and the company  further
\nstated that it had no desire to enter into a discussion with
\nthe respondent as to the propriety of the orders passed.
\nOn  January 2, 1956, the respondent filed a  petition  under
\nArt. 226 of the Constitution in the High Court
\n466<\/span>
\nat  Nagpur in which he prayed for the issue  of\t appropriate
\nwrits  or directions quashing the orders of  suspension\t and
\ntermination  dated December 5, 1955, and December  7,  1955,
\nrespectively  and  asking for certain other  reliefs.\tThis
\npetition  was  heard by a learned single  Judge\t on  certain
\npreliminary  objections\t raised by the\tpresent\t appellants,
\nand,  by  an  order  dated April 14,  1956,  he\t upheld\t the
\npreliminary  objections\t and dismissed\tthe  petition.\t The
\npreliminary  objections taken were these: it was urged\tthat
\nthe  service of the respondent was terminated in  accordance
\nwith  the  Standing Orders of the Company, approved  by\t the
\nrelevant authorities under the provisions of the  Industrial
\nEmployment  (Standing  Orders)\tAct,  1946  (XX\t of   1946),
\nhereinafter  referred to as the central Act, and also  under
\nthe provisions of the Central Provinces and Berar Industrial
\nDisputes Settlement Act, 1947 (C.  P. and Berar Act XXlll of
\n1947),\thereinafter  called  the  local\t Act;  and  if\t the
\nrespondent  had\t any  grievance against\t the  said  Standing
\nOrders,\t his  only  remedy was to get  the  Standing  Orders
\namended\t as provided for in the relevant Act, but he had  no
\nright  to  move\t the  High  Court  under  Art.\t226  of\t the
\nConstitution  for quashing the orders passed against him  or
\nfor reinstatement, etc.\t Alternatively, it was urged that if
\nthe  Standing  Orders  did  not apply in  the  case  of\t the
\nrespondent  as was the respondent’s case, then the  Ordinary
\nlaw  of master and servant applied, and the only  remedy  of
\nthe  respondent\t was  to  sue the  Company  in\tdamages\t for
\nwrongful  dismissal.   On these preliminary  objections\t the
\nlearned\t Judge\theld  (1) that the  respondent\twas  not  an
\nemployee  within  the  meaning of the  Standing\t Orders\t and
\ntherefore his case was not governed by the Standing  Orders;
\n(2)  that  the relationship between the appellants  and\t the
\nrespondent was contractual and not statutory and the  remedy
\nof  the\t respondent was to sue the Company  in\tdamages\t for
\nwrongful dismissal; and (3) as for amendment of the Standing
\nOrders\tso as to include the respondent and persons  in\t his
\ncategory, the only remedy open to the respondent was to take
\naction\tunder the relevant Act by approaching  a  recognised
\nunion to move in the matter.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t     467<\/span><\/p>\n
On  the dismissal of his petition, the respondent  preferred
\nan  appeal under el. 10 of the Letters Patent.\tThis  appeal
\nwas  heard and allowed by a Division Bench on September\t 26,
\n1956,  on the findings that (1) the Standing Orders did\t not
\napply  to the respondent, though he was an  employee  within
\nthe meaning of that expression in s. 2 (1) of the local\t Act
\n;  (2)\tthe  conditions of  the\t respondent’s  service\twere
\ngoverned by the provisions of the local Act and on a  breach
\nthereof,  the respondent had a right to move the High  Court
\nfor  appropriate orders under Art. 226 of the  Constitution;
\nand (3) as the termination of the service of the  respondent
\nwas  without statutory authority, it must be  vacated.\t The
\nDivision  Bench accordingly allowed the appeal, quashed\t the
\norders of suspension and termination of service and declared
\nthat  the  respondent  continued to bean  employee   of\t the
\nCompany on terms which were applicable to him on the date of
\nhis suspension, namely, December 5, 1955.  There was also  a
\ndirection   to\tthe  Company  to  pay  back  wages  to\t the
\nrespondent.\n<\/p>\n
The  appellants\t herein then moved this Court  and  obtained
\nspecial\t leave\tto  appeal from the order  of  the  Division
\nBench,\tdated  September 26, 1956.  The present\t appeal\t has
\nbeen  brought  in pursuance of the  order  granting  special
\nleave to the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
The first and foremost question which arises for decision in
\nthis  appeal is whether the Standing Orders of\tthe  Company
\napply  to the respondent.  We have already stated-and it  is
\nnot  in dispute–that the Standing Orders were\tapproved  by
\nthe  certifying officer under the provisions of the  central
\nAct and by the Labour Commissioner under s. 30 of the  local
\nAct.  It is necessary to explain here the general scheme  of
\nthe  provisions\t of the two Acts under\twhich  the  Standing
\nOrders were approved.  Under the central Act, the expression
\n” Standing Orders ” means rules relating to matters set\t out
\nin  the Schedule, and s. 3 requires that within\t six  months
\nfrom the date on which the central Act becomes applicable to
\nan industrial establishment the employer shall submit to the
\ncertifying officer five copies of the draft Standing  Orders
\nproposed by him
\n468<\/span>
\nfor  adoption in his industrial establishment.\t Sub-section
\n(2)  of s. 3 lays down that provision shall be made in\tsuch
\ndraft for every matter set out in the Schedule which may  be
\napplicable  to the industrial establishment and where  model
\nStanding  Orders have been prescribed, the draft  shall\t  so
\nfar  as\t practicable, in conformity with  such\tmodel.\t The
\nSchedule  refers to the matters which are to he provided  by
\nStanding  Orders,  and item 8 of the Schedule relates  to  ”
\ntermination  of\t employment, and the notice  thereof  to  be
\ngiven  by  employer and workman We may state here  that\t the
\ncentral\t Act contains a definition of ” workman ” which,  at
\nthe material time in this case, meant any person employed in
\nany industrial establishment to do any skilled or unskilled,
\nmanual\tor clerical, labour for hire or reward, but did\t not
\ninclude any member of the armed forces.\t Sections 4 to 10 of
\nthe  central Act deal with (a) conditions for  certification
\nof  Standing Orders, (b) certification of  Standing  Orders,\n<\/p>\n
(e)  appeals, (d) date of operation of Standing Orders, (e)
\nregister of Standing Orders, (f) posting of Standing  Orders
\nand (g) duration and modification of Standing Orders.  There
\nare similar provisions in the local Act,Chapter IV of  which
\ndeals  with Standing Orders.Sub-section (1) of s. 30 of\t the
\nlocal Act lays down–\n<\/p>\n
Every employer, in respect of any industry to which this Act
\nhas been made applicable under subsection (3) of section  1,
\nshall, within two months of the (late of such  notification,
\nsubmit\tto  the Labour Commissioner for\t approval,  in\tsuch
\nmanner\tas may be prescribed, a copy of the Standing  Orders
\nconcerning the relations between him and his employees\twith
\nregard to all industrial matters mentioned in Schedule 1. ”
\nItem 8 of Schedule I of the local Act is again ” termination
\nof  employment, notice to be given by employer and  employee
\n“. The other sub-sections of s. 30 lay down the procedure to
\nbe  followed  for  the approval of Standing  Orders  by\t the
\nLabour\tCommissioner,  appeal by an aggrieved  person,\tetc.
\nSections  31 and 32 lay down the procedure for an  amendment
\nof  the\t Standing  Orders  either at  the  instance  of\t the
\nemployer or at the
\n469<\/span>
\ninstance of a representative of employees.  It is worthy  of
\nnote  that  sub-s. (1) of s. 30 requires every\temployer  to
\nsubmit\tto  the Labour Commissioner a copy of  the  Standing
\nOrders\t concerning  the  relations  between  him  and\t his
\nemployees with regard to all industrial matters mentioned in
\nSchedule 1. The local Act defines the expression ”  employee
\n” and, at the relevant time, it meant any person employed by
\nan  employer  to  do any skilled  or  unskilled,  manual  or
\nclerical  work\tfor  contract  or  hire\t or  reward  in\t any
\nindustry.   It\tis worthy of note that the definition  of  ”
\nemployee ” in the local Act corresponds more or less to\t the
\ndefinition of ” workman ” under the central Act.  There\t are
\nsome minor differences in the definition of the two  expres-
\nsions in the two Acts, but with those differences we are not
\nconcerned in the present case.\n<\/p>\n
The  Standing  Orders  with which we are  concerned  in\t the
\npresent case came into force on November 14, 1951, and it is
\nconvenient  at this stage to refer to the relevant  Standing
\nOrders.\t  Standing Order no. 2 defines\tcertain\t expressions
\nused in the Standing Orders.  It states-\n<\/p>\n
In  these Orders, unless there is anything repugnant in\t the
\nsubject or context\n<\/p>\n
(a)  ”\temployees  ”  means all\t persons,  male\t or  female,
\nemployed  in  the Office or Mains Department  or  Stores  or
\nPower  House or Receiving Station of the Company, either  at
\nNagpur\tor  at\tWardha whose names and\tticket\tnumbers\t are
\nincluded in the departmental  musters.\n<\/p>\n
(b)  ” The Manager ” means the person appointed as such and
\nincludes  the  Assistant Manager and in relation  to  Wardha
\nestablishment ” the Resident Engineer “.\n<\/p>\n
(c)  ” Ticket ” includes a Card, pass or token.\n<\/p>\n
(d)  ”\tWorkman ” means such categories of employees as\t may
\nfrom  time  to\ttime be declared to be ” Workman  ”  by\t the
\nManagement “.\n<\/p>\n
Standing  Order\t no.  3 classifies  employees  into  certain
\ncategories and Standing Order no. 4 deals with tickets.\t  In
\nsubstance, it says that every workman, permanent
\n6<\/span>
\n470<\/span>
\nor temporary, shall have a ticket or card, and an apprentice
\nshall  have an apprentice card; the tickets or cards  issued
\nshall  be  surrendered\twhen the workman  is  discharged  or
\nceases\tto belong to the class of employment for  which\t the
\ncard  or ticket is issued.  It is to be noticed\t that  under
\nthe  definition clause ” workman ” means such categories  of
\nemployees  as  may  from time to time  be  declared,  to  be
\nworkmen by the management and Standing Order no. 4 makes  it
\nclear that every workman, permanent or temporary, will\thave
\na  ticket.  Standing Order no. 16 deals with termination  of
\nemployment,  and cl. (1) thereof, relevant for our  purpose,
\nmust be quoted in full-\n<\/p>\n
” For terminating the employment of a permanent employee,  a
\nnotice\tin writing shall be given either by the employer  or
\nthe  employee,\tgiving\tone calendar  month’s  notice.\t The
\nreasons\t for  the  termination\tof  the\t services  will\t  be
\ncommunicated to the employee in writing, if he so desires at
\nthe  time of discharge, unless such a communication, in\t the
\nopinion\t of the Management, may directly or  indirectly\t lay
\nthe  company  and the Management or the person\tsigning\t the
\ncommunication  open to criminal or civil proceedings at\t the
\ninstance of the employee, or the Company’s Managing Director
\nis satisfied that it is not in the interests of the business
\nof  the\t Company to disclose the reasons and  so  orders  in
\nwriting.  ”\n<\/p>\n
Now, it is not in dispute that the respondent is a ‘workman’
\nwithin\tthe meaning of the Central Act and an ’employee’  as
\ndefined in the local Act.  The. controversy before us is  as
\nto  whether  he is an  employee’ within the meaning  of\t the
\nStanding  Orders.  Admittedly, no ticket has been issued  to
\nthe  respondent\t by the Company; his ticket  number  cannot,
\ntherefore,  be\tincluded in the\t departmental  muster.\t The
\nlearned Judges of the High Court held that the inclusion  of
\nthe name and ticket number in the departmental muster was an
\nessential  characteristic of an ‘ employee’ as\tdefined\t for
\nthe  purpose  of the Standing Orders, and the mere  fact  of
\nemployment  in the Office, Mains Department,  Stores,  Power
\nHouse or Receiving Station of the Company was not enough  to
\nmake a,
\n471<\/span>
\nperson\tso employed an ’employee’ within the meaning of\t the
\nStanding  Orders, and as the respondent did not\t fulfil\t the
\nnecessary  condition  of having his name and  ticket  number
\nincluded  in  the  departmental’  muster,  he  was  not\t  an
\n’employee’ as defined for the Standing Orders, which did not
\ntherefore apply to him.\t On behalf of the appellants, it  is
\ncontended  that\t regard\t being had to the  context  and\t the
\nentire\tbody of the Standing Orders, the aforesaid  view  of
\nthe High Court is not correct, and on a proper construction,
\ninclusion of the name and ticket number in the\tdepartmental
\nmuster\tis not an essential characteristic of an  ’employee’
\nas  defined for the Standing Orders.  It is rightly  pointed
\nout  that if the possession of a ticket and a ticket  number
\nis  taken as an essential characteristic of an ‘  employee’,
\nthen  there is hardly any difference between  an  ’employee’
\nand a ‘workman’ as defined in the Standing Orders; because a
\n‘workmen’  means  such categories of employees as  may\tfrom
\ntime  to time be declared to be workmen, and under  Standing
\nOrder no. 4 all workmen must have tickets.  If a person\t em-
\nployed by the company must have a ticket before he can be an
\nemployee, and if workmen are such categories of employees as
\nhave  tickets,\tthe distinction between the  two  disappears
\nand. it is difficult to understand why two definitions\twere
\nnecessary.\n<\/p>\n
On  a consideration, however, of’ the subject or context  of
\nthe  Standing Orders, read in their entirety and in  harmony
\nwith  one  another,  it\t becomes  at  once  clear  why\t two
\ndefinitions  are  necessary  and  what\tis  the\t distinction
\nbetween the two classes-, employees ‘ and ‘ workmen’-in\t the
\nlanding Orders.\t The expression ‘ employee’ denotes a larger
\ngroup-namely, all persons, male or females who are  employed
\nin  the\t Office, Mains Department, Stores, Power  House,  or
\nReceiving  Station  of\tthe Company,  either  at  Nagpur  or
\nWardha.\t  ‘Workmen’  denotes  a smaller\t group,\t viz.,\tsuch
\ncategories of employees as have been declared to be workmen,
\nand  who must have a ticket.  Such a distinction is  clearly
\nintelligible  in  an  industrial  establishment,  where\t for
\nsecurity and other reasons a system of tickets or passes  is
\nnecessary for those who
\n472<\/span>
\nwork in the Power House or Mains Department or other  places
\nwhere essential machinery is installed while others, such as
\nthe  clerical  staff, may work in an office  building  where
\nsecurity  demands  are\teither\tnonexistent  or\t much\tless
\ninsistent.   This distinction means that all  ‘workmen’\t are
\n’employees’, but all ` employees’ are not ‘workmen’ for\t the
\npurpose of the Standing Orders, and the inclusion of  ticket
\nnumbers\t in the departmental musters will be  applicable  to
\nthose  employees only to whom tickets have been issued;\t but
\nsuch  inclusion\t is not an essential  characteristic  of  an
\nemployee.\n<\/p>\n
Let us now see if such a distinction is consistent with\t the
\nStanding  Orders  as a whole.  Standing Order no.  3,  which
\nclassifies  employees, defines a probationer in cl. (c)\t and
\nsays  that a probationer means an employee who is  appointed
\nin  a clear vacancy on probation for a period not  exceeding
\ntwelve\tmonths, etc.  Standing Order no. 4 does not  require
\nthe issue of a ticket to a probationer; yet a probationer is
\nan employee.  It is thus obvious that the Standing Orders do
\nmake a distinction between `employees’ and  ` workmen’,\t and
\nthere  may also be employees who have no tickets.   Some  of
\nthe  Standing Orders apply to workmen only, e. g.,  Standing
\nOrders\t12, 13, 14 and 15.  Other Standing Orders  apply  to
\nall  employees, whether they are workmen or  not.   Standing
\nOrder  no. 16 falls in the latter category ; it\t applies  to
\nall employees.\n<\/p>\n
Standing Order no. 8 (b), we think, makes the position still
\nmore clear.  It says-\n<\/p>\n
”  Any\temployee,  who\tafter  marking\this  attendance\t  or
\npresenting  his ticket, card, or token, as the case may\t be,
\nis found absent from his proper place of work during working
\nhours  without permission or without any sufficient  reason,
\nshall  be liable to be treated as absent for the  period  of
\nhis absence.”\n<\/p>\n
If  every employee has to have a ticket, it is difficult  to
\nunderstand why this Standing Order should make a distinction
\nbetween an employee who marks his attendance and another who
\npresents  his ticket, card or token.  Such a distinction  is
\neasily\tunderstandable when some employees do not possess  a
\nticket, card or token,
\n473<\/span>
\nso  that they merely mark their attendance; while those\t who
\npossess a ticket, card or token present it.
\nIt  has\t been  suggested that Standing Order no.  4  is\t not
\nexhaustive in the matter of issue of tickets; it talks of an
\nissue  of  a ticket to every permanent workman,\t a  card  to
\nevery  badli workman, a temporary ticket to every  temporary
\nworkman,  and  an apprentice card to every  apprentice.\t  It
\ndoes not prescribe the issue of a pass or token, though\t the
\ndefinition  of\ta ‘ticket’ includes a pass  or\ttoken.\t The
\nsuggestion  further is that Standing Order no. 2 (a)  itself
\nauthorises the issue of tickets to other employees, so\tthat
\nthere  may  be one kind of tickets issued to  workmen  under
\nstanding  Order no. 4 and another kind of tickets  to  other
\nemployees under Standing Order no. 2 (a).  On this view, it,
\nis  suggested  that the alternatives mentioned\tin  Standing
\nOrder  no.  8  (b) really amount to an option  given  to  an
\nemployee  either  to  mark his\tattendance  or\tpresent\t his
\nticket.\t  It  is,  however,  difficult\tto  understand\t the
\nnecessity of an option of this kind when every employee must
\nhave  a\t ticket, particularly when the exercise of  such  an
\noption\tis  likely  to defeat the  very\t purpose  for  which
\ntickets\t are issued in an industrial establishment.   We  do
\nnot,  however, think that the case of the respondent  is  in
\nany  way strengthened by holding that Standing Order  no.  2\n<\/p>\n
(a)  itself  authorises the issue of  tickets  to  employees
\nother than workmen.  Even on that construction, the  failure
\nof  the Company to issue tickets under Standing Order no.  2\n<\/p>\n
(a)  will not deprive the employees of their real status  as
\nemployees  and of the benefit of the Standing  Orders.\t The
\ndirection for the issue of tickets will, in that view of the
\nStanding  Order,  be an enabling provision only and  not  an
\nessential characteristic of an employee.  Further,  Standing
\nOrder  no.  4 provides for the surrender of  tickets  issued
\nthereunder but Standing Order no. 2 (a), if it is  construed
\nas enabling the Company to issue tickets, makes no provision
\nfor the surrender of tickets when the employee ceases to  be
\nan  employee.  This absence of any provision  for  surrender
\napplicable to such tickets
\n474<\/span>
\nclearly implies that issue of tickets is not contemplated by
\nthe Standing Order no. 2 (a) itself.\n<\/p>\n
On behalf of the respondent, however, the main argument\t has
\nbeen  of  a different character.  It has  been\targued\tthat
\nthere  need  not  be  one set of  Standing  Orders  for\t all
\nemployees,  and\t the  Standing\tOrders\tin  question   being
\nconfined to those employees to whom tickets had been issued,
\nthe respondent who had no ticket was outside their  purview,
\nand  the result was that the Company had committed a  breach
\nof the statutory provision in s. 30 of the local Act in\t the
\nsense  that no Standing Orders had been made in\t respect  of
\nthe  respondent and employees like him to whom\ttickets\t had
\nnot  been  issued.  It hag been argued that,  therefore,  no
\naction\tcould be taken against the respondent  either  under
\nthe Standing Orders or even under the ordinary law of master
\nand  servant.\tWe  are unable to accept  this\targument  as
\ncorrect.   We  have  pointed out that  the  Standing  Orders
\nthemselves make a distinction between ’employees’ and `work-
\nmen’,  and there may also be employees who have no  tickets.
\nTo  hold that the Standing Orders apply to  those  employees
\nonly  to whom tickets have been issued will  make  employees
\nsynonymous  with workmen-a result negatived by two  separate
\ndefinitions  given in Standing Order no. 2. The central\t Act
\nas well as the local Act contemplate the making of  Standing
\nOrders\tfor  all employees in respect of matters  which\t are
\nrequired to be dealt with by Standing Orders.  The  Standing
\nOrders\tin question were not objected to as being  defective
\nor incomplete by workmen, and they have been approved by the
\nappropriate  authority\tand  they  must\t be  construed\twith
\nreference  to their subject or context.\t In the\t absence  of
\ncompelling  reasons to the contrary, it should be held\tthat
\nthey apply to all employees for whose benefit they have been
\nmade.\tWe  see no compelling reasons for holding  that\t the
\nStanding  Orders  do not apply to the  respondent.   In\t our
\nview,  and  having regard to the subject or context  of\t the
\nStanding  Orders, the words whose names and  ticket  numbers
\nare included in the departmental musters ” in Standing Order
\nno. 2 (a) do
\n475<\/span>
\nnot  lay down any essential characteristic of  employee\t and
\nare applicable only in cases where tickets have been  issued
\nto an employee.\t The essential content of the definition  of
\nan  employee is employment in the Office, Mains\t Department,
\neta., of the Company either at Nagpur or Wardha, and that of
\na  workman  the necessary declaration by the  Company  which
\nwould entitle him to a ticket under Standing Order no. 4.
\nThere  is also another relevant consideration which must  be
\nborne in mind in construing the Standing Orders in question.
\nSection\t 30 of the local Act imposes a statutory  obligation
\non  the employer to make, Standing Orders in respect of\t all
\nhis  employees\tand  a breach of  the  statutory  obligation
\ninvolves  a  criminal liability.  That being so,  the  court
\nwould be justified, if it can reasonably do so, to  construe
\nthe  Standing Orders so as to make them consistent with\t the
\ncompliance of the said statutory obligation.
\nWe  are not unmindful of the principle that in construing  a
\nstatutory  provision or rule, every word  occurring  therein
\nmust be given its proper meaning and weight.  The  necessity
\nof  such  an interpretation is all the more important  in  a
\ndefinition clause.  But even a definition clause must derive
\nits  meaning from the context or subject.  In Courts v.\t The
\nKent Waterworks Company (1), the question for  consideration
\nwas  the interpretation of the appeal clause in an  Act\t for
\nPaving, Cleansing, Lighting, etc., of the Town and Parish of
\nWoolwich  (47  Geo. III, Sess. 2, cap.\tCXI).  By  the\t16th
\nsection\t of  the statute, ” the commissioners  are  to\tmake
\nrates  upon  all and every the person or persons who  do  or
\nshall  hold,  occupy,  possess, etc., any  land\t within\t the
\nparish\t“.  The statute also gave a right of appeal  to\t any
\nperson\tor  persons aggrieved by any rate., but\t the  appeal
\nclause\trequired the person or persons appealing  against  a
\nrate to enter into a recognisance; the question was if\tthis
\nrequirement  was intended to exclude corporations  from\t the
\npurview\t of  the ap. peal clause, as  corporations,  it\t was
\nurged,\tcannot enter, into a recognisance.  In\tinterpreting
\nthe appeal clause, Bayley J. observed-\n<\/p>\n
(1) (1827) 7 B. & C. 314; 108 E. R, 741.\n<\/p>\n
476<\/span><\/p>\n
“But  assuming that they cannot enter into  a  recognizance,
\nyet  if they ire persons capable of being aggrieved  by\t and
\nappealing against a rate, I should say that that part of the
\nclause which gives the appeal applies to all persons capable
\nof  appealing, and that the other part of the  clause  which
\nrequires  a recognizance to be entered into applies only  to
\nthose\tpersons\t  who  are  capable  of\t entering   into   a
\nrecognizance, but is inapplicable to those who are not.”
\nThe same principle of interpretation was applied in  Perumal
\nGoundan\t v. The Thirumalarayapuram Jananukoola\tDhanasekhara
\nSangha\tNidhi  (1),  in construing  the\t Explanation  to  O.
\nXXXIII,\t r.  1, of the Code of Civil Procedure,\t which\tsays
\ninter  alia that ” a person is a pauper………… when  he
\nis  not entitled to property worth one hundred rupees  other
\nthan his necessary wearing apparel and the subject matter of
\nthe  suit  “. The question was if  the\taforesaid  provision
\napplied to companies.  It was held that it would be wrong to
\nconstrue the provision to mean that only persons who possess
\nwearing apparel can sue as paupers.  We are of the view that
\nthe  same rule of construction should apply in\tthe  present
\ncase,  and  the words ” whose names and ticket\tnumbers\t are
\nincluded  in  the  depart. mental  musters  ”  occurring  in
\nStanding Order no. 2(a) should be read as ” whose names\t and
\nticket\tnumbers,  if any, are included in  the\tdepartmental
\nmusters\t ” and should apply in the case of  those  employees
\nonly  who  possess  tickets and\t whose\tticket\tnumbers\t are
\ncapable\t of being entered in departmental musters; they\t are
\nnot intended to exclude employees who do not possess tickets
\nor  to\twhom tickets have not been issued  and\tconsequently
\nwhose names only are so entered.\n<\/p>\n
The learned Judges of the High Court were influenced by\t the
\ncircumstance that in an earlier- case D. C. Dungore v. S. S.
\nDandige\t Miscellaneous Petition No. 134 of 1954\t decided  by
\nthe same High Court on September 23, 1955) the Company\ttook
\ntip the stand that the Standing Orders applied to  employees
\nto  Whom tickets had been issued-a stand different from\t and
\ninconsistent with that taken in the present case,
\n(1)  (1917) I.L.R. 41 Mad. 624.\n<\/p>\n
477<\/span><\/p>\n
It may be pointed out, however, that 1).  C. Dungore of\t the
\nearlier\t case was not an employee within the meaning of\t the
\nrelevant  Act,\tand  there could be no\tStanding  Orders  in
\nrespect\t of  his conditions of service.\t  Moreover,  in\t the
\nmatter of construction of a statutory provision no  question
\nof  estoppel arises, and the learned Judges had pointed\t out
\nthat the respondent himself thought that the Standing Orders
\napplied to all employees.  We have rested our decision as to
\nthe  applicability  of the Standing Orders not on  what\t the
\nappellants or the respondent thought at one time or another,
\nbut   on  a  true  construction\t of  the   Standing   Orders
\nthemselves,  including\tthe definition\tclause\tin  Standing
\nOrder no. 2(a).\n<\/p>\n
We  take  the  view that the Standing Orders  apply  to\t the
\nrespondent.  This is really decisive of the appeal,  because
\nif  the\t Standing  Orders apply to the\trespondent  and\t his
\nservice\t has  been terminated in  accordance  with  Standing
\nOrder  no. 16(1), the writ application which the  respondent
\nmade to the High Court must fail.\n<\/p>\n
The  learned Attorney-General appearing for  the  appellants
\naddressed  us  on  the scope and ambit of Art.\t226  of\t the
\nConstitution,  and he contended that even if the  respondent
\nhad  been wrongfully dismissed by his private employer,\t the
\nproper\tremedy was by mean,,; of a suit and not by  invoking
\nthe  special  writ jurisdiction of the\tHigh  Court.   These
\ncontentions  raise important questions, but we do not  think
\nthat we are called upon to decide them in this case.
\nLastly, it has been urged oil behalf of the respondent\tthat
\neven  if  we  hold that the Standing  Orders  apply  to\t the
\nrespondent, we should remand the case to the High Court\t for
\na  decision  on\t merits\t of  other  points  raised  by\t the
\nrespondent, because the question whether the Standing Orders
\napply or not was treated as a preliminary issue by the\tHigh
\nCourt  and no decision was given on other points.  We  asked
\nlearned Advocate for the respondent what other points remain
\nfor decision oil his writ application, once it is held\tthat
\nthe Standing Orders apply to the respondent and
\n6<\/span>
\n478<\/span>
\nhis service has been terminated in accordance with  Standing
\nOrder  no.  16(1).   Learned Advocate then  referred  us  to
\nStanding  Order\t no. 18, which provides\t for  penalties\t for
\nmisconduct,  and submitted that the provisions thereof\thave
\nnot  been complied with by the appellants.  He\tparticularly
\nreferred  to cl. (e) of Standing Order no. 18 and  submitted
\nthat  the order of suspension passed against the  respondent
\nwas  in violation of the safeguards mentioned therein.\t The
\nshort  answer to this argument is that no penalty  for\tmis-
\nconduct\t has been imposed on the respondent  under  Standing
\nOrder no. 18.  The Company paid his salary to the respondent
\nfrom the date of suspension to January 31, 1956, which\talso
\nshowed\tthat  no order was passed by way of  punishment\t for
\nmisconduct.   The Company chose to terminate the service  of
\nthe respondent in accordance with Standing Order no. 16, and
\ndid not think fit to proceed against the respondent for\t any
\nalleged misconduct, and it was open to the Company to do so.
\nSo  far\t as  Standing Order no 16.  is\tconcerned,  all\t the
\nrequirements  thereof have been complied with.\t That  being
\nthe  position,\tno other point remains for decision  in\t the
\npresent case.\n<\/p>\n
The  result, therefore, is that the appeal succeeds  and  is
\nallowed.   The\tjudgment and order of the High\tCourt  dated
\nSeptember  26, 1956, are set aside and the writ petition  of
\nthe respondent is dismissed.  In view of the stand which the
\nappellants had taken in the earlier case with regard to\t the
\nStanding Orders, we think it proper to say in this case that
\nthe parties must bear their own costs throughout.\n<\/p>\n
\t       Appeal allowed.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t     479<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India The Nagpur Electric Light And … vs K. Shreepathirao on 11 April, 1958 Equivalent citations: 1958 AIR 658, 1959 SCR 463 Author: S Das Bench: Das, Sudhi Ranjan (Cj), Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama, Das, S.K., Gajendragadkar, P.B., Bose, Vivian PETITIONER: THE NAGPUR ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWERCO., LTD. & OTHERS Vs. RESPONDENT: K. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-171625","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Nagpur Electric Light And ... vs K. 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