{"id":174468,"date":"2010-10-08T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-10-07T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/omprakash-verma-ors-vs-state-of-a-p-ors-on-8-october-2010"},"modified":"2019-03-04T23:43:06","modified_gmt":"2019-03-04T18:13:06","slug":"omprakash-verma-ors-vs-state-of-a-p-ors-on-8-october-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/omprakash-verma-ors-vs-state-of-a-p-ors-on-8-october-2010","title":{"rendered":"Omprakash Verma & Ors vs State Of A.P. & Ors on 8 October, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Omprakash Verma & Ors vs State Of A.P. & Ors on 8 October, 2010<\/div>\n
Bench: P. Sathasivam, B.S. Chauhan<\/div>\n
                                                                         REPORTABLE\n\n                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\n\n                  CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n\n                     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 998 OF 2007\n\n\n\n\nOmprakash Verma & Ors.                                                 .... \n\nAppellant(s)\n\n\n\n            Versus\n\n\n\nState of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.                          . ... \n\nRespondent(s)\n\n\n                                  WITH\n\n\n                CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1024 OF 2007    \n\n\n                CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6115 OF 2008    \n\n\n                                  AND \n\n\n                     CIVIL APPEAL NO. 997 OF 2007\n\n\n                 \n\n\n                            J U D G M E N T \n<\/pre>\n
P. Sathasivam, J.\n<\/p>\n
1)     These   appeals   are   directed   against   a   common <\/p>\n
judgment and final order dated 17.01.2007 passed by the <\/p>\n
High   Court   of   Judicature,   Andhra   Pradesh   at   Hyderabad <\/p>\n
in Writ Petition Nos. 4121, 4141, 4144 and 5776 of 2006 <\/p>\n
                                                                                1<\/span><\/p>\n
whereby   the   High   Court   dismissed   all   the   writ   petitions <\/p>\n
preferred by the appellants herein challenging the validity <\/p>\n
of   G.O.Ms.No.   161,   Revenue   (UC-II)   Department,  dated <\/p>\n
13.02.2006   and   connected   proceedings   passed   by   the <\/p>\n
State of Andhra Pradesh.\n<\/p>\n
2)  Brief facts:-\n<\/p>\n
(a) One Mohd. Ruknuddin Ahmed and 10 others were the <\/p>\n
original   owners   of   land   admeasuring   526.07   acres   in <\/p>\n
Survey No. 83 situated at Village Raidurg (Panmaktha) of <\/p>\n
Ranga Reddy District in the State of Andhra Pradesh. Out <\/p>\n
of the said land, an extent of 252.33 acres is assessed to <\/p>\n
revenue as cultivable agricultural land and the remaining <\/p>\n
extent   of   273.14   acres   is   treated   as   pote-kharab(un-\n<\/p>\n
cultivable)   land.   On   07.07.1974,   the   owners   executed <\/p>\n
registered   General   Power   of   Attorney   (hereinafter   referred <\/p>\n
to as “GPA”) in favour of a partnership firm known as “Sri <\/p>\n
Venkateswara   Enterprises”   represented   by   its   Managing <\/p>\n
Partners   A.   Ramaswamy   and   A.   Satyanarayana.     On <\/p>\n
01.01.1975,   the   A.P.   Land   Reforms   Act,   1975   came   into <\/p>\n
                                                                     2<\/span><\/p>\n
force.  Since the land in Survey No.83 was an agricultural <\/p>\n
land,   the   said   owners   filed   eleven   declarations   under   the <\/p>\n
A.P.   Land  Reforms   (Ceiling   on   Agricultural  Holdings)   Act, <\/p>\n
1973   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   “the   Land   Reforms   Act”) <\/p>\n
and   the   Authority   under   the   Land   Reforms   Act   declared <\/p>\n
about   99   acres   as   surplus   in   the   hands   of   4   declarants <\/p>\n
and possession was also taken on 11.04.1975.  The Urban <\/p>\n
Land   (Ceiling   and   Regulation)   Act,   1976   (hereinafter <\/p>\n
referred   to   as   `the   ULC   Act’)   came   into   force   on <\/p>\n
17.02.1976.     The   owners,   through   their   GPA,   filed <\/p>\n
declarations   under   Section   6(1)   of   the   ULC   Act   under   a <\/p>\n
mistaken   impression   that   the   ULC   Act   was   applicable   to <\/p>\n
their   land,   though   the   same   was   inapplicable   for   the <\/p>\n
reason that the land in question was agricultural land and <\/p>\n
the   same   was   not   included   in   the   Master   Plan   as   on   the <\/p>\n
date   of   commencement   of   the   ULC   Act.   On   01.07.1977, <\/p>\n
draft   statements   under   Section   8(1)   of   the   ULC   Act <\/p>\n
together   with   notice   under   Section   8(3)   were   served <\/p>\n
inviting   objections   to   the   draft   statement   prepared   under <\/p>\n
                                                                          3<\/span><\/p>\n
Section 8(1) of the ULC Act but no orders were passed on <\/p>\n
any   of   the   declarations.   On   06.12.1979   &   25.01.1980, <\/p>\n
final statements under Section 9 were issued declaring the <\/p>\n
surplus area by each of the declarant.   On 16.09.1980 & <\/p>\n
30.01.1980,   the   Competent   Authority   issued   notification <\/p>\n
under Section 10(1) of the ULC Act.\n<\/p>\n
(b)    By   G.O.Ms.   No.   391   MA,   dated   23.06.1980,   the <\/p>\n
Master Plan as on 17.02.1976 was amended and the land <\/p>\n
in Survey No. 83 was included in the Second Master Plan <\/p>\n
which came into force w.e.f. 29.09.1980 vide Government <\/p>\n
Memo   No.  1439-UC.I\/80-2,   dated   10.12.1980   as  a   result <\/p>\n
of which re-computation of the land in the said Survey No. <\/p>\n
83 had to be carried out in accordance with the ULC Act.\n<\/p>\n
(c)    By   G.O.Ms.No.   5013   dated   19.12.1980,   the   State <\/p>\n
Government,   under   Section   23   of   the   ULC   Act,   allotted <\/p>\n
468   acres   out   of   the   said   land   to   Hyderabad   Urban <\/p>\n
Development   Authority   (hereinafter   referred   to   `HUDA’).\n<\/p>\n
The   Competent   Authority   vide   notification   dated <\/p>\n
24.01.1981,   under   Section   10(3)   of   the   ULC   Act,   vested <\/p>\n
                                                                    4<\/span><\/p>\n
the   land   in   Survey   No.   83   to   the   State   Government.     On <\/p>\n
26.12.1981,   the   Competent   Authority   issued   a   notice <\/p>\n
under Section 10(5) for surrendering possession, however, <\/p>\n
the possession was not surrendered.\n<\/p>\n
(d)    By   G.O.   Ms.No.   733   dated   31.10.1988   read   with <\/p>\n
G.O.Ms.No.   289   dated   01.06.1989   and   G.O.   Ms.   No.   217 <\/p>\n
dated 18.04.2000, the State Government in exercise of its <\/p>\n
power   under   Section   20(1)   of   the   ULC   Act   granted <\/p>\n
exemption   upto   an   extent   of   5   acres   after   excluding   40% <\/p>\n
of the area to be set apart for laying of roads as per lay out <\/p>\n
rules.     Thus,   by   virtue   of   this   exemption,   each   holder   of <\/p>\n
excess land is now entitled to hold 5 acres instead of 1000 <\/p>\n
sq meters.   A number of persons including the appellants <\/p>\n
herein   purchased   small   extents   of   land   in   Survey   No.   83 <\/p>\n
by   registered   sale   deeds   between   January   and   March <\/p>\n
1991. It is their case that these purchasers including the <\/p>\n
appellants herein have been in possession ever since their <\/p>\n
purchase.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                          5<\/span><\/p>\n
(e)    On   05.08.1992,   Inspector   General   of   Registration <\/p>\n
issued   a   memo   directing   the   District   Registrar   to   cancel <\/p>\n
the   sale   deeds.     The   District   Registrar,   on   03.09.1993, <\/p>\n
ordered cancellation of the sale deeds.  Being aggrieved by <\/p>\n
the abovesaid order, W.P. No. 18385 of 1993 and W.P. No. <\/p>\n
238   of   1994   were   filed   where   owners   were   impleaded   as <\/p>\n
parties.  By order dated 27.07.1994, learned Single Judge <\/p>\n
set aside the orders of the District Registrar nullifying the <\/p>\n
sale deeds regarding the land in question.  By order dated <\/p>\n
06.10.1994,   another   learned   Single   Judge   following   the <\/p>\n
above order allowed their petition whereas W.A. No. 1220 <\/p>\n
of   1994   arising   out   of   W.P.   No.   238   of   1994   filed   by   the <\/p>\n
State   was  dismissed   by  a   Division  Bench   on  28.10.1994.\n<\/p>\n
On   04.12.1996,   W.A.   No.   918   of   1994   filed   by   the   State <\/p>\n
against   the   order   of   the   learned   single   Judge   dated <\/p>\n
27.07.1994   was   dismissed   by   the   Division   Bench.   On <\/p>\n
28.08.1997,   the   State   filed   SLP(C)   No.   14868   of   1997 <\/p>\n
before this Court against the judgment dated 04.12.1996 <\/p>\n
in which this Court issued notice and ordered status quo <\/p>\n
                                                                             6<\/span><\/p>\n
regarding   possession   be   maintained.   On   06.11.2001,   a <\/p>\n
three   Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   disposed   of   all   the <\/p>\n
appeals, i.e. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others vs. N.\n<\/p>\n
Audikesava Reddy and Others reported in (2002) 1 SCC <\/p>\n
227.     In   view   of   the   law   declared   by   this   Court,   the <\/p>\n
Competent Authority is now statutorily bound to compute <\/p>\n
the   land   afresh,   in   accordance   with   the   provisions   of   the <\/p>\n
Act   and   in   the   light   of   the   law   declared   in  Audikesava  <\/p>\n
Reddy’s case (supra).\n<\/p>\n
(f) The State Government, in exercise of its powers under <\/p>\n
Section   23   of   the   ULC   Act,   issued   G.O.Ms.Nos.   455   and <\/p>\n
456 dated 29.07.2002 and decided to allot the excess land <\/p>\n
to   third   parties   who   were   in   occupation   of   such   excess <\/p>\n
land on payment of prescribed regularization charges and <\/p>\n
as   per   the   conditions   set   out   in   the   said   G.Os.     On <\/p>\n
28.11.2003,   by   way   of   a   representation,   the   owners <\/p>\n
requested   the   Competent   Authority   to   compute   the <\/p>\n
holdings afresh in terms of the law declared by this Court <\/p>\n
in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra).     The   owners   also <\/p>\n
                                                                         7<\/span><\/p>\n
stated in their representations that they themselves would <\/p>\n
like to retain the excess land in their occupation by paying <\/p>\n
the requisite compensation in terms of the aforesaid G.Os.\n<\/p>\n
(g)    On   02.07.2004,   the   owners   submitted   another <\/p>\n
representation  to the  Secretary  (Revenue),  Government  of <\/p>\n
Andhra Pradesh to re-compute the land afresh in the light <\/p>\n
of   the   decision   of   this   Court   and   also   to   compute   the <\/p>\n
compensation   amounts   to   be   paid   for   regularization   in <\/p>\n
terms   of   G.O.Ms.Nos.   455   and   456.     On   16.09.2005,   the <\/p>\n
owners   once   again   filed   their   representations   under <\/p>\n
Section  6(1) of  the  ULC  Act, as  there  was  no response  to <\/p>\n
the earlier representations.\n<\/p>\n
(h)   Without   taking   any   action   on   the   aforesaid   three <\/p>\n
representations,   the   State   Government,   in   exercise   of   its <\/p>\n
powers   under   Section   23   of   the   ULC   Act   issued <\/p>\n
G.O.Ms.No.   161   dated   13.02.2006   purporting   to   allot <\/p>\n
Ac.424.13 gts out of Ac.526.27 gts in Survey No. 83 to the <\/p>\n
Andhra   Pradesh   Industrial   Infrastructure   Corporation <\/p>\n
Limited   (in   short   `APIIC’),   Hyderabad,   the   4th  Respondent <\/p>\n
                                                                       8<\/span><\/p>\n
herein.     On   15.02.2006,   the   State   Government   issued <\/p>\n
G.O.Ms.No. 183, extending the time up to 31st March 2006 <\/p>\n
for   submitting   the   applications   accompanied   by   the <\/p>\n
amount   of   compensation   under   the   aforesaid   G.O.   Nos.\n<\/p>\n
455 and 456.\n<\/p>\n
(i)    Before   the   High   Court,   four   writ   petitions   were   filed <\/p>\n
by   the   purchasers,   owners   as   well   as   Chanakyapuri <\/p>\n
Cooperative Housing Society Limited, Secunderabad.\n<\/p>\n
(j) Writ Petition No. 4121 of 2006 has been filed by Smt. K.\n<\/p>\n
Anjana Devi and 45 others who claim to be the purchasers <\/p>\n
of a small extent of land forming part of Survey No. 83 of <\/p>\n
Village Raidurg, Ranga Reddy District. They claim to have <\/p>\n
purchased   the   said   lands   from   the   GPA   Holder   of   the <\/p>\n
original   land   owners.   Writ   Petition   No.   4144   of   2006   has <\/p>\n
been filed by Om Prakash Verma and 43 others who also <\/p>\n
claim to be purchasers of small extent of land forming part <\/p>\n
of   Survey   No.   83   Village   Raidurg,   Ranga   Reddy   District <\/p>\n
from   the   said   GPA.     Writ   Petition   No.   4141   of   2006   has <\/p>\n
been filed by Ahmed Abdul Aziz and 14 others who claim <\/p>\n
                                                                          9<\/span><\/p>\n
to be the owners of the land of an extent of acres 526.07 <\/p>\n
guntas in Survey No. 83.   Writ Petition No. 5776 of 2006 <\/p>\n
has   been   filed   by   Chanakyapuri   Cooperative   Housing <\/p>\n
Society   Limited,   Secunderabad,   which   claims   to   be   the <\/p>\n
holder   of   Agreement   to   Sell   dated   09.08.1974   allegedly <\/p>\n
executed   by   the   GPA   holder   of   the   owners   of   the   land   in <\/p>\n
Survey   No.   83   Village   Raidurg,   Ranga   Reddy   District.\n<\/p>\n
Before the High Court, all the petitioners have questioned <\/p>\n
the   validity   of   G.O.Ms.No.161   Revenue   (UC   II) <\/p>\n
Department, dated 13.02.2006 and other proceedings and <\/p>\n
prayed   for   quashing   of   the   same   with   a   direction   to   the <\/p>\n
official   respondents   to   consider   their   claim   for   grant   of <\/p>\n
exemption   under   various   Government   Orders,   namely, <\/p>\n
G.O.Ms.   No.   733   Revenue   (UC   II)   Department   dated <\/p>\n
31.10.1988   as   clarified   in   G.O.Ms.   No.   217   Revenue   (UC <\/p>\n
II)   Department   dated   18.04.2000,   G.O.Ms.   No.   455 <\/p>\n
Revenue   (UC   I)   Department   dated   29.07.2002   and <\/p>\n
G.O.Ms.   No.   456   Revenue   (UC   I)   Department,   dated <\/p>\n
29.07.2002.  The High Court, by a common judgment and <\/p>\n
                                                                           10<\/span><\/p>\n
final   order   dated   17.01.2007,   dismissed   all   the   writ <\/p>\n
petitions   filed   by   the   appellants   herein.     Against   the <\/p>\n
common   order,   the   appellants   have   preferred   these <\/p>\n
appeals by way of special leave petitions before this Court.\n<\/p>\n
3)    Heard   Mr.   K.   Rajendra   Chowdhary,   learned   senior <\/p>\n
counsel   for   the   appellants   in   all   the   appeals,   Mr. <\/p>\n
L. Nageshwar Rao, learned senior counsel for the State of <\/p>\n
Andhra   Pradesh,   Mr.   G.E.   Vahanvati,   learned   Attorney <\/p>\n
General   for   India,   Mr.   Rakesh   Dwivedi,   and   Mr.   Ranjit <\/p>\n
Kumar,   learned   senior   counsel   for   Andhra   Pradesh <\/p>\n
Industrial Infrastructure Corporation (APIIC) R-4 and Mr. <\/p>\n
A.K. Ganguly, Mr. P.S. Patwalia and Mr. Basavaprabhu S.\n<\/p>\n
Patil, learned senior counsel for the applicants.\n<\/p>\n
Issues:\n<\/p>\n
4)     The   main   question   in   these   appeals   is   whether   the <\/p>\n
proceedings of the Competent Authority under Sections 8, <\/p>\n
9 and 10 of the ULC Act in relation to the land in Survey <\/p>\n
No. 83 of Village Raidurg of Ranga Reddy District declared <\/p>\n
by the Division Benches by its judgment dated 28.10.1994 <\/p>\n
                                                                      11<\/span><\/p>\n
and 04.12.1996 in Writ Appeal Nos. 1220 and 918 of 1994 <\/p>\n
respectively, as void, stood restored by virtue of judgment <\/p>\n
of   this   Court   in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra)   as <\/p>\n
claimed in G.O. Ms. No. 161 dated 13.02.2006.   In other <\/p>\n
words,   what   actually   is   the   adjudication   contained   in <\/p>\n
Audikesava Reddy’s case (supra) is the question involved <\/p>\n
for   determination.     The   adjudication   contained   in   the <\/p>\n
Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra)   admittedly   was   in <\/p>\n
relation   to   the   same   land   in   Survey   No.   83   situated   in <\/p>\n
village   Raidurg   and   between   the   same   parties.     In   the <\/p>\n
earlier part of our judgment, we have already set out the <\/p>\n
facts which led to the filing of C.A. Nos. 3813 of 1996 and <\/p>\n
7239   of   2001   in   this   Court   by   the   respondent-State   in <\/p>\n
Audikesava Reddy’s case (supra).\n<\/p>\n
5)     In   order   to   go   into   the   factual   position   and   ultimate <\/p>\n
decision   in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra),   it   is <\/p>\n
necessary   to   bear   in   mind   the   meaning   of   expressions <\/p>\n
“Master   Plan”,   “Urban   Land”,   “Vacant   Land”   occurring   in <\/p>\n
Sections 2(h), 2(o), 2(q) respectively which reads as:-\n<\/p>\n
                                                                           12<\/span><\/p>\n
“Section   2(h)”master   plan”,   in  relation   to   an   area   within   an <\/p>\n
urban agglomeration or any part thereof, means the plan (by <\/p>\n
whatever  name called)  prepared  under any law  for the time <\/p>\n
being in force or in pursuance of an order made by the State <\/p>\n
Government for the development of such area or part thereof <\/p>\n
and   providing   for   the   stages   by   which   such   development <\/p>\n
shall be carried out;\n<\/p>\n
(o) “urban land” means,-\n<\/p>\n
          (i)   any   land   situated   within   the   limits   of   an   urban <\/p>\n
          agglomeration   and   referred   to   as   such   in   the   master <\/p>\n
          plan; or <\/p>\n
          (ii) in a case where there  is no master plan, or where <\/p>\n
          the   master   plan   does   not   refer   to   any   land   as   urban <\/p>\n
          land,   any   land   within   the   limits   of   an   urban <\/p>\n
          agglomeration   and   situated   in   any   area   included <\/p>\n
          within   the   local   limits   of   a   municipality   (by   whatever <\/p>\n
          name   called),   a   notified   area   committee,   a   town   area <\/p>\n
          committee,   a   city   and   town   committee,   a   small   town <\/p>\n
          committee, a cantonment board or a panchayat, <\/p>\n
but does not include any such land which is mainly used for <\/p>\n
the purpose of agriculture. <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Explanation.-For the purpose of this clause and clause <\/p>\n
(q),-\n<\/p>\n
          (A)   “agriculture”   includes   horticulture,   but   does   not <\/p>\n
include-\n<\/p>\n
          (i) raising of grass, <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
          (ii) dairy farming, <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
          (iii)poultry farming, <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
          (iv) breeding of live-stock, and <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
          (v)   such   cultivation,   or   the   growing   of   such   plant,   as <\/p>\n
          may be prescribed; <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (B) land shall not be deemed to be used mainly for the <\/p>\n
purpose   of   agriculture,   if   such   land   is   not   entered   in   the <\/p>\n
revenue or land records before the appointed day as for the <\/p>\n
purpose of agriculture:\n<\/p>\n
          Provided   that   where   on   any   land   which   is   entered   in <\/p>\n
the revenue or land records before the appointed day as for <\/p>\n
the purpose of agriculture, there is a building which is not in <\/p>\n
the  nature   of  a  farm-house,  then,  so  much   of  the  extent  of <\/p>\n
such land as is occupied by the building shall not be deemed <\/p>\n
to be used mainly for the purpose of agriculture:\n<\/p>\n
          Provided   further   that   if   any   question   arises   whether <\/p>\n
any building is in the nature of a farm-house, such question <\/p>\n
                                                                                       13<\/span><\/p>\n
      shall be referred to the State Government and the decision of <\/p>\n
      the State Government thereon shall be final;\n<\/p>\n
             (C) notwithstanding anything contained in clause (B) of <\/p>\n
      this   Explanation,   land   shall   not   be   deemed   to   be   mainly <\/p>\n
      used   for   the   purpose   of   agriculture   if   the   land   has   been <\/p>\n
      specified   in   the   master   plan   for   a   purpose   other   than <\/p>\n
      agriculture;\n<\/p>\n
      (q) “vacant land” means land, not being land mainly used for <\/p>\n
      the   purpose   of   agriculture,   in   an   urban   agglomeration,   but <\/p>\n
      does not include-\n<\/p>\n
             (i)   land   on   which   construction   of   a   building   is   not <\/p>\n
             permissible  under  the  building regulations  in force  in <\/p>\n
             the area in which such land is situated;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
             (ii) in an area where there are building regulations, the <\/p>\n
             land   occupied   by   any   building   which   has   been <\/p>\n
             constructed   before,   or   is   being   constructed   on,   the <\/p>\n
             appointed   day   with   the   approval   of   the   appropriate <\/p>\n
             authority  and the  land appurtenant  to such building; <\/p>\n
             and <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
             (iii) in an area where there are no building regulations, <\/p>\n
             the   land   occupied   by   any   building   which   has   been <\/p>\n
             constructed   before,   or   is   being   constructed   on,   the <\/p>\n
             appointed   day   and   the   land   appurtenant   to   such <\/p>\n
             building:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
             Provided   that   where   any   person   ordinarily   keeps   his <\/p>\n
             cattle,   other   than  for   the   purpose   of   dairy   farming   or <\/p>\n
             for  the  purpose of breeding  of live-stock,   on any  land <\/p>\n
             situated   in   a   village   within   an   urban   agglomeration <\/p>\n
             (described as a village in the revenue records), then, so <\/p>\n
             much   extent   of   the   land   as   has   been   ordinarily   used <\/p>\n
             for   the   keeping   of   such   cattle   immediately   before   the <\/p>\n
             appointed  day  shall   not  be   deemed   to  be  vacant   land <\/p>\n
             for the purposes of this clause.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
6)     On   behalf   of   the   appellants,   it   was   submitted   that   a <\/p>\n
combined   reading   of   the   definitions   of   the   above <\/p>\n
expressions   disclose   that   any   “land”   though   situated   in <\/p>\n
urban agglomeration is not a “Vacant Land” if the same is <\/p>\n
                                                                                         14<\/span><\/p>\n
used   mainly   for   the   purpose   of   agriculture   and   not <\/p>\n
referred to in the Master Plan existing as on 17.02.1976.\n<\/p>\n
In   other   words,   according   to   the   appellants,   the   land   in <\/p>\n
Survey  No.  83  is  not  a  “Vacant  Land”  though  situated  in <\/p>\n
urban   agglomeration   as   the   same   was   used   mainly   for <\/p>\n
agricultural purpose and not included or referred to in the <\/p>\n
Master   Plan   existing   as   on   17.02.1976   as   found   by   the <\/p>\n
High   Court   in   Writ   Appeal   No.   918   of   1994   which   led   to <\/p>\n
Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra).     It   is   the   appellants <\/p>\n
case that it was never the case of the respondent-State in <\/p>\n
Writ Petition Nos. 18385 of 1993 and 238 of 1994 (which <\/p>\n
culminated   into   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in <\/p>\n
Audikesava Reddy’s case) that the land in Survey No. 83 <\/p>\n
were   “grazing   lands”   as   shown   in   the   declaration.     The <\/p>\n
case   of   the   respondent-State   in   those   writ   petitions   was <\/p>\n
that   the   land   in  Survey   No.  83   was  not   agricultural  land <\/p>\n
since   the   same   was   within   the   urban   agglomeration,   the <\/p>\n
land has to be treated as “Vacant Land” and therefore the <\/p>\n
ULC Act is applicable with effect from 17.02.1976, even if <\/p>\n
                                                                          15<\/span><\/p>\n
the   said   land   is   not   included   in   the   Master   Plan   existing <\/p>\n
as on 17.02.1976.\n<\/p>\n
7)    The appellants in their earlier writ petitions, i.e. W.P.\n<\/p>\n
No.   18385   of   1993   and   238   of   1994   specifically   averred <\/p>\n
and   contended   that   the   land   in   the   said   Survey   No.   83 <\/p>\n
was   “mainly   used   for   the   purpose   of   agriculture”.     By <\/p>\n
order   dated   27.07.1994   and   06.10.1994   in   those   writ <\/p>\n
petitions,   learned   Single   Judge   recorded   that   the   land   in <\/p>\n
Survey   No.   83   was   “agricultural   land”.     The   Division <\/p>\n
Bench   in   Writ   Appeal   No.   918   of   1994   confirmed   the <\/p>\n
finding   of   the   learned   single   Judge   that   the   land   was <\/p>\n
mainly used for the purpose of agriculture.   After quoting <\/p>\n
conclusion of the Division Bench in W.A. No. 918 of 1994, <\/p>\n
it   was   contended   that   there   were   concurrent   findings   on <\/p>\n
the   question   whether   the   land   in   Survey   No.   83   was <\/p>\n
agricultural   land   as   the   same   was   “mainly   used   for <\/p>\n
agriculture”   and   the   owners   filed   declarations   under <\/p>\n
misconception.     Mr.   Rajendra   Chowdhary,   learned   senior <\/p>\n
counsel   for   the   appellants   heavily   contended   that   since <\/p>\n
                                                                          16<\/span><\/p>\n
the   land   in   Survey   No.   83   was   found   to   be   “mainly   used <\/p>\n
for   the   purpose   of   agriculture”   and   not   included   or <\/p>\n
referred to in the Master Plan existing as on 17.02.1976, <\/p>\n
the said land was neither “Urban Land” nor “Vacant Land”\n<\/p>\n
under   Sections   2(o),   2(q)   and   consequently   the   ULC   Act <\/p>\n
was   inapplicable.     Therefore,   according   to   him,   the <\/p>\n
Division   Bench,   by   judgments   dated   28.10.1994   and <\/p>\n
04.12.1996, upheld the orders of the learned single Judge <\/p>\n
declaring   the   proceedings   of   the   Competent   Authority <\/p>\n
treating   the   date   of   commencement   of   the   Act   as <\/p>\n
17.02.1976   as   void   and   quashed   the   same.     He   pointed <\/p>\n
out   that   the   Division   Bench   declined   to   look   into   the <\/p>\n
second Master Plan which came into force on 29.09.1980, <\/p>\n
in order to treat the land as “Vacant Land” in view of the <\/p>\n
law   declared   by   this   Court   in  Atia   Mohammadi   Begum <\/p>\n
vs.  State   of   U.P.   and   Ors.<\/a>   (1993)   2   SCC   546.     It   was <\/p>\n
against   these   judgments   dated   28.10.1994   and <\/p>\n
04.12.1996 in W.A. No. 1220 and 918 of 1994, the State <\/p>\n
preferred C.A. Nos. 3813 of 1996 and 7239 of 2001 before <\/p>\n
                                                                          17<\/span><\/p>\n
this   Court   which   is   referred   to   as  Audikesava   Reddy’s <\/p>\n
case.     Since   the   State   was   disabled   to   treat   the   land   in <\/p>\n
Survey No. 83 as “Vacant Land” even after its inclusion in <\/p>\n
the   second   Master   Plan   with   effect   from   29.09.1980,   on <\/p>\n
account of the above ruling in Atia Begum’s case, certain <\/p>\n
States   including   the   State   of   Andhra   Pradesh   sought <\/p>\n
reconsideration   of   the   decision   in  Atia   Begum’s  case.\n<\/p>\n
Accordingly,   this   Court,   by   its   orders   dated   23.02.1996, <\/p>\n
referred   the   question   of   correctness   of   ruling   in  Atia  <\/p>\n
Begum’s case to a larger Bench of three Hon’ble Judges.\n<\/p>\n
8)    Mr.   G.E.   Vahanvati,   learned   Attorney   General   for <\/p>\n
India and other senior counsel appearing for the State as <\/p>\n
well as Respondent No.4 submitted that as a consequence <\/p>\n
of   setting   aside   of   the   judgment   of   the   Division   Bench, <\/p>\n
which   had   approved   the   orders   passed   by   the   learned <\/p>\n
single   Judge,   the   proceedings   taken   under   the   ULC   Act <\/p>\n
starting   from   filing   of   statements   under   Section   6(1)   and <\/p>\n
culminating   in   subsequent   orders   of   the   Competent <\/p>\n
Authority   under   Sections   8   (4),   9,   10(1),   10(2),   10(5)   and <\/p>\n
                                                                           18<\/span><\/p>\n
10(6)   will   be   deemed   to   have   been   upheld   and   attained <\/p>\n
finality.  According to them, in view of the judgment of this <\/p>\n
Court in Audikesava Reddy’s case (supra), it is not open <\/p>\n
to   the   appellants   to   seek   re-opening   of   the   proceedings <\/p>\n
under the ULC Act.  In support of the above claim, learned <\/p>\n
Attorney   General   and   other   senior   counsel   relied   on <\/p>\n
various   judgments   to   show   that   once   the   decision   of   the <\/p>\n
High   Court   is   set   aside   by   this   Court,   it   is   not   open   to <\/p>\n
contend   that   a   particular   aspect   or   argument   was   not <\/p>\n
considered by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
Atia Begum’s case<\/p>\n
9)    Before   considering   the   ultimate   order   and   the   ratio <\/p>\n
laid   down   in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra),   we   will <\/p>\n
briefly notice the facts of  Atia Begum’s  case  (supra) and <\/p>\n
the   question   involved   therein.    In   that   case   the   question <\/p>\n
was   regarding   the   quantification   of   vacant   land.   The <\/p>\n
Competent Authority had declared that the appellant had <\/p>\n
19,813.83 sq m of vacant land in Aligarh in excess of the <\/p>\n
ceiling limit but the District Judge reduced the area of the <\/p>\n
                                                                             19<\/span><\/p>\n
excess   land   to   6738.23   sq   m.   The   order   of   the   District <\/p>\n
Judge was challenged by both i.e. the owner and the State <\/p>\n
by filing writ petitions in the High Court. The owner’s writ <\/p>\n
petition   was   dismissed   and   that   of   the   State   was   partly <\/p>\n
allowed.   In   appeal   before   this   Court,   the   owner   sought <\/p>\n
restoration   of   the   order   of   the   District   Judge   which   had <\/p>\n
been set aside by the High Court on the interpretation of <\/p>\n
the provisions of the ULC Act. The Act came into force in <\/p>\n
the   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   on   17-2-1976.   At   that   time, <\/p>\n
there   was   no   master   plan   for   the   area   of   Aligarh.   The <\/p>\n
master   plan   for   Aligarh   was   made   on   24-2-1980.   In   that <\/p>\n
master   plan,   the   land   in   dispute   was   shown.   The   High <\/p>\n
Court   took   the   view   that   by   virtue   of   Explanation   (c)   of <\/p>\n
Section   2(o)   defining   “urban   land”,   the   land   of   the <\/p>\n
appellant   could   not   be   treated   as   mainly   used   for   the <\/p>\n
purpose of agriculture because it was shown in the master <\/p>\n
plan made on 24-2-1980. The correctness of this view was <\/p>\n
in   issue   in  Atia   Begum’s   case.   The   decision,   though <\/p>\n
notices   that   determination   of   the   area   of   vacant   land   in <\/p>\n
                                                                          20<\/span><\/p>\n
excess   of   ceiling   limit   under   the   Act   is   to   be   made   with <\/p>\n
reference to the date of commencement of the Act, fails to <\/p>\n
notice   the   Explanation   to   Section   6   which   provides   the <\/p>\n
meaning   of   the   expression   “commencement   of   this   Act”.\n<\/p>\n
Section 6(1) and the Explanation read as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “6. Persons holding vacant land in excess of ceiling limit to file  <\/p>\n
      statement.–(1) Every person holding vacant land in excess of <\/p>\n
      the   ceiling   limit   at   the   commencement   of   this   Act   shall, <\/p>\n
      within   such   period   as   may   be   prescribed,   file   a   statement <\/p>\n
      before the competent authority having jurisdiction specifying <\/p>\n
      the location, extent, value and such other particulars as may <\/p>\n
      be   prescribed   of   all   vacant   lands   and   of   any   other   land   on <\/p>\n
      which   there   is   a   building,   whether   or   not   with   a   dwelling <\/p>\n
      unit therein,  held by him (including the nature of his right, <\/p>\n
      title or interest therein) and also specifying the vacant lands <\/p>\n
      within the ceiling limit which he desires to retain:<\/p>\n
      Provided   that   in   relation   to   any   State   to   which   this   Act <\/p>\n
      applies   in   the   first   instance,   the   provisions   of   this   sub-<\/p>\n
      section   shall   have   effect   as   if   for   the   words   `Every   person <\/p>\n
      holding   vacant   land   in   excess   of   the   ceiling   limit   at   the <\/p>\n
      commencement   of   this   Act’,   the   words,   figures   and   letters <\/p>\n
      `Every  person  who  held  vacant  land  in excess  of  the  ceiling <\/p>\n
      limit on or after the 17th day of February, 1975 and before <\/p>\n
      the   commencement   of   this   Act   and   every   person   holding <\/p>\n
      vacant   land   in   excess   of   the   ceiling   limit   at   such <\/p>\n
      commencement’ had been substituted.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
      Explanation.–In   this   section,   `commencement   of   this   Act’ <\/p>\n
      means,–\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (i) the date on which this Act comes into force in any State;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      (ii) where any land, not being vacant land, situated in a State <\/p>\n
      in which this Act is in force has become vacant land by any <\/p>\n
      reason   whatsoever,   the   date   on   which   such   land   becomes <\/p>\n
      vacant land;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (iii) where any notification has been issued under clause (n) <\/p>\n
      of  Section   2 in respect  of any  area  in a  State  in which  this <\/p>\n
      Act is in force, the date of publication of such notification.”<\/p>\n
                                                                                           21<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Audikesava Reddy’s case<\/p>\n
10)    Now,   we   have   to   see   the   entire   discussion   and <\/p>\n
ultimate   order   passed   in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case <\/p>\n
(supra).   A bench of three Hon’ble Judges in  Audikesava  <\/p>\n
Reddy’s  case after narrating the factual position in  Atia  <\/p>\n
Begum’s  case   (supra)   and   after   analyzing   the   issues, <\/p>\n
allowed   those   appeals.     Since   the   entire   argument   rests <\/p>\n
with the ultimate decision in Audikesava Reddy’s case, it <\/p>\n
is but proper to refer all the relevant paragraphs.\n<\/p>\n
       “11.  If   the   expression   “commencement   of   the   Act”   is   read <\/p>\n
       with   reference   to   the   aforesaid   Explanation,   the   area   of <\/p>\n
       doubt   about   the   correctness   of   the   decision   of  Atia   Begum  <\/p>\n
       case  becomes   very   narrow   e.g.   a   few   observations   therein <\/p>\n
       which are these: (SCC p.549, para 4)<\/p>\n
               “Just   as   the   holder   of   the   land   cannot   by   his <\/p>\n
               subsequent actions reduce the area of the vacant land <\/p>\n
               in excess of the ceiling limit, the authorities too cannot <\/p>\n
               by   any   subsequent   action   increase   the   area   of   the <\/p>\n
               excess vacant land by a similar action.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/blockquote>\n
       12.     The   observations   that   the   authorities   by   their <\/p>\n
       subsequent action after 17-2-1976 cannot alter or introduce <\/p>\n
       the master plan which has the effect of increasing the area of <\/p>\n
       excess vacant land do not represent the correct view of law. <\/p>\n
       The aforesaid Explanation to Section 6(1), inter alia, provides <\/p>\n
       that   where   any   land,   not   being   vacant   land,   situated   in   a <\/p>\n
       State in which this Act is in force has become vacant land by <\/p>\n
       any   reason   whatsoever,   the   date   on   which   such   land <\/p>\n
       becomes   vacant   land   would   be   the   date   of   the <\/p>\n
       commencement of the Act as regards such land.<\/p>\n
                                                                                         22<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
13.  Development   and   town   planning   are   ongoing   processes <\/p>\n
and they go on changing from time to time depending upon <\/p>\n
the local needs. That apart, the definition of “master plan” in <\/p>\n
Section 2(h) is very significant. It reads as under:\n<\/p>\n
        “2.   (h)   `master   plan’,   in   relation   to   an   area   within   an <\/p>\n
        urban   agglomeration   or   any   part   thereof,   means   the <\/p>\n
        plan   (by   whatever   name   called)   prepared   under   any <\/p>\n
        law   for   the   time   being  in   force   or   in  pursuance   of   an <\/p>\n
        order   made   by   the   State   Government   for   the <\/p>\n
        development of such area or part thereof and providing <\/p>\n
        for   the   stages   by   which   such   development   shall   be <\/p>\n
        carried out;”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
The above provision, inter alia, contemplates the master plan <\/p>\n
prepared   under   any   law   for   the   time   being   in   force   for <\/p>\n
development  of  an  area.   The  plan  shall  also  provide  for  the <\/p>\n
stages by which such development shall be carried out. It is <\/p>\n
evident   from   the   aforesaid   definition   of   master   plan   that   it <\/p>\n
takes   in   view   any   plan   prepared   even   subsequent   to   the <\/p>\n
coming   into   force   of   the   Act.   Further,   the   Explanation   to <\/p>\n
Section   6(1),   as   noticed   above,   very   significantly   provides <\/p>\n
that every person holding vacant land in excess of the ceiling <\/p>\n
limit at the commencement of the Act shall file a statement <\/p>\n
before   the   competent   authority   and   “the   commencement   of <\/p>\n
the   Act”   under   clause   (ii)   would   be   when   the   land   becomes <\/p>\n
vacant   for   any   reason   whatsoever.   Therefore,   the   date   of <\/p>\n
commencement   of   the   Act   in   a   case   where   the   land,   which <\/p>\n
was   not   vacant   earlier,   would   be   the   date   on   which   such <\/p>\n
land becomes vacant land. It, thus, contemplates a situation <\/p>\n
of   land,   not   being   vacant,   becoming   vacant   due   to <\/p>\n
preparation   of   a   master   plan   subsequent   to   17-2-1976.\n<\/p>\n
Further,   the   provisions   of   the   Act   require   filing   of   a <\/p>\n
statement under Sections 6, 7, 15 and 16 from time to time <\/p>\n
as   and   when   land   acquires   the   character   of   a   vacant   land.\n<\/p>\n
Obligation   to   file   statement   under   the   Act   arises   when   a <\/p>\n
person comes to hold any vacant land in excess of the ceiling <\/p>\n
limit, which date necessarily may not be 17-2-1976. It would <\/p>\n
all depend on the facts and circumstances of each case.\n<\/p>\n
14.  Accordingly,   we   hold   that   the   master   plan   prepared   as <\/p>\n
per law in force even subsequent to enforcement of the Act is <\/p>\n
to   be   taken   into   consideration   to   determine   whether   a <\/p>\n
particular   piece   of   land   is   vacant   land   or   not   and,   to   this <\/p>\n
extent, Atia Begum is not correctly decided.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                                        23<\/span><\/p>\n
       15.  In   these   matters,   however,   we   are   not   concerned   with <\/p>\n
       the question as to the consequences of filing of a statement <\/p>\n
       by a person under a wrong impression that the vacant land <\/p>\n
       held by him is in excess of ceiling limit if it was not so when <\/p>\n
       he filed a statement. This aspect is left open to be decided in <\/p>\n
       an appropriate case.\n<\/p>\n
       16.  Before concluding, we wish to place on record our deep <\/p>\n
       appreciation   for   the   able   assistance   rendered   by   Mr   Raju <\/p>\n
       Ramachandran,   Senior   Advocate,   who   on   our   request   very <\/p>\n
       readily agreed to assist the Court as amicus curiae.\n<\/p>\n
       17. For the aforesaid reasons, CAs Nos. 3813 of 1996, 7238 <\/p>\n
       and   7239   of   2001   are   allowed   and   CAs   Nos.   1149   of   1985 <\/p>\n
       and 10851 of 1996 are dismissed. The parties are left to bear <\/p>\n
       their own costs.”\n<\/p>\n
11)    It   is   the   claim   of   Mr.   Rajendra   Chowdhary,   learned <\/p>\n
senior   counsel   for   the   appellants   that   this   Court   in <\/p>\n
Audikesava Reddy’s  case was called upon to decide the <\/p>\n
only question relating to the correctness of the decision in <\/p>\n
Atia   Begum’s  case.     While   elaborating   the   same,   Mr. <\/p>\n
Chowdhari submitted that the State of Andhra Pradesh in <\/p>\n
C.A.   Nos.   3813   of   1996   and   7239   of   2001   neither <\/p>\n
canvassed   the   facts   nor   challenged   the   above   concurrent <\/p>\n
findings of facts before this Court in Audikesava Reddy’s <\/p>\n
case.     According   to   him,   all   the   State   Governments <\/p>\n
including the State of Andhra Pradesh were confined only <\/p>\n
with the reconsideration of the decision in  Atia Begum’s <\/p>\n
                                                                                        24<\/span><\/p>\n
case   as   the   States   were   disabled   from   looking   into   the <\/p>\n
second Master Plan, as a result of which any agricultural <\/p>\n
land, though situate in urban agglomeration not included <\/p>\n
in the existing Master Plan as on 17.02.1976 could never <\/p>\n
be treated as “Vacant Land” notwithstanding its inclusion <\/p>\n
in   any   other   subsequent   Master   Plan   for   bringing   such <\/p>\n
land within the purview of or the ambit of the ULC Act.  In <\/p>\n
those   circumstances,   according   to   Mr.   Chowdhary,   the <\/p>\n
State   cannot   now   be   permitted   to   reagitate   the   same <\/p>\n
question   once   again   in   these   appeals   arising   out   of   Writ <\/p>\n
Petition Nos. 4121, 4141, 4144 and 5776 of 2006 whether <\/p>\n
the land in Survey No. 83 was being mainly used for the <\/p>\n
purpose   of   agriculture   or   whether   the   declarations   were <\/p>\n
not filed in the year 1976 under a wrong impression.\n<\/p>\n
12)    In support of the above claim, learned senior counsel <\/p>\n
for the appellants relied on a Constitution Bench decision <\/p>\n
of   this   Court   in  Direct   Recruit   Class   II   Engineering  <\/p>\n
Officers’   Association  vs.  State   of   Mahrashtra   and  <\/p>\n
                                                                        25<\/span><\/p>\n
Others  (1990)   2   SCC   715.     The   following   principles <\/p>\n
enunciated in paragraph 35 were pressed into service.\n<\/p>\n
     “….In similar situation a Constitution Bench of this Court in <\/p>\n
     Daryao  v.  State   of   U.P.<\/a>  held   that   where   the   High   Court <\/p>\n
     dismisses   a   writ   petition   under   Article   226   of   the <\/p>\n
     Constitution   after   hearing   the   matter   on   the   merits,   a <\/p>\n
     subsequent  petition  in the  Supreme  Court  under Article  32 <\/p>\n
     on the same facts and for the same reliefs filed by the same <\/p>\n
     parties will be barred by the general principle of res judicata. <\/p>\n
     The   binding   character   of   judgments   of   courts   of   competent <\/p>\n
     jurisdiction is in essence a part of the rule of law on which <\/p>\n
     the   administration   of   justice,   so   much   emphasised   by   the <\/p>\n
     Constitution,   is  founded   and  a   judgment   of   the   High   Court <\/p>\n
     under Article 226 passed after a hearing on the merits must <\/p>\n
     bind   the   parties   till   set   aside   in   appeal   as   provided   by   the <\/p>\n
     Constitution and cannot be permitted to be circumvented by <\/p>\n
     a petition under Article 32. An attempted change in the form <\/p>\n
     of the petition or the grounds cannot be allowed to defeat the <\/p>\n
     plea   as   was   observed   at   SCR   p.   595   of   the   reported <\/p>\n
     judgment, thus : (SCR p. 595)<\/p>\n
             “We   are   satisfied   that   a   change   in   the   form   of   attack <\/p>\n
             against   the   impugned   statute   would   make   no <\/p>\n
             difference   to   the   true   legal   position   that   the   writ <\/p>\n
             petition in the High Court and the present writ petition <\/p>\n
             are directed against the same statute and the grounds <\/p>\n
             raised by the petitioner in that behalf are substantially <\/p>\n
             the same.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The decision in  Forward  Construction Co.  v.  Prabhat Mandal  <\/p>\n
     (Regd.), Andheri,<\/a> further clarified the position by holding that <\/p>\n
     an   adjudication   is   conclusive   and   final   not   only   as   to   the <\/p>\n
     actual matter determined but as to every other matter which <\/p>\n
     the parties  might and ought to have litigated and have had <\/p>\n
     decided as incidental to or essentially connected with subject <\/p>\n
     matter   of   the   litigation   and   every   matter   coming   into   the <\/p>\n
     legitimate   purview   of   the   original   action   both   in   respect   of <\/p>\n
     the   matters   of   claim   and   defence.  Thus,   the   principle   of <\/p>\n
     constructive   res   judicata   underlying   Explanation   IV   of <\/p>\n
     Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure was applied to writ <\/p>\n
     case…. ”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                                                             (Emphasis Supplied)<\/p>\n
                                                                                            26<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
13)  In Ishwar Dutt vs. Land Acquisition Collector and  <\/p>\n
Another<\/a>  (2005)   7   SCC   190,   this   Court,   once   again <\/p>\n
reiterated   that   the   principles   of   constructive  res   judicata <\/p>\n
enshrined   in   the   Explanation   IV   to   Section   11   of   Civil <\/p>\n
Procedure Code will apply to writ proceedings. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
14)   It   is   pointed   out   that   by   the   impugned   common <\/p>\n
judgment,   the   High   Court   held   that   by   reason   of   the <\/p>\n
expression  “appeals  are  allowed”,  occurring  in para  17 of <\/p>\n
Audikesava   Reddy’s  case,   the   judgments   in   W.A.   Nos.\n<\/p>\n
1220   and   918   of   1996   suffered   complete   reversal   as   a <\/p>\n
result   of   which   the   proceedings   of   the   Competent <\/p>\n
Authority   which   were   declared   void   and   quashed   stood <\/p>\n
restored   or   revived   and   consequently,   “vesting”   and <\/p>\n
“taking” of possession on 20.07.1993 of the land in Survey <\/p>\n
No. 83 under Sections 10(3), (5), (6) became final.  It is the <\/p>\n
case of the appellants that the above conclusion cannot be <\/p>\n
sustained   as   the   judgment   in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case <\/p>\n
cannot be read as having restored the proceedings of the <\/p>\n
Competent  Authority  under  Section  8(4),  9  and  10  of  the <\/p>\n
                                                                      27<\/span><\/p>\n
ULC   Act,   merely   because   the   use   of   the   expression <\/p>\n
“appeals   allowed”   in   para   17   of   the   said   judgment.     In <\/p>\n
other words, according to the appellants, the efficacy and <\/p>\n
binding nature of the adjudication and declaration of law <\/p>\n
in   relation   to   the   land   in   Survey   No.   83   contained   in <\/p>\n
Audikesava Reddy’s case cannot be either diminished or <\/p>\n
whittled   down   on   such   construction   of   the   expression <\/p>\n
“appeals allowed”.\n<\/p>\n
15)    As   regards   the   contention   of   the   appellants   that   in <\/p>\n
view of the ratio in Audikesava Reddy’s case (supra), the <\/p>\n
State is liable to re-compute the excess land holding of the <\/p>\n
appellants   under   the   provisions   of   the   ULC   Act   with <\/p>\n
reference to the date on which the Master Plan for the City <\/p>\n
of Hyderabad came to be extended to the appellants land <\/p>\n
that   is   as   on   29.09.1980   (G.O.Ms.   No.   23.06.1980).     Mr. <\/p>\n
Nageshwar   Rao,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the   State <\/p>\n
submitted   that   the   declaration   filed   by   the   appellants   in <\/p>\n
1976   under   the   provisions   of   the   ULC   Act   were   filed <\/p>\n
deliberately   and   consciously   hence,   binding   upon   them.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                        28<\/span><\/p>\n
He   also   submitted   that   the   judgment   of   the   Division <\/p>\n
Bench of the High Court in the earlier round of litigation <\/p>\n
being judgment dated 04.12.1996 delivered in Writ Appeal <\/p>\n
No.   918   of   1994   had   merged   into   the   judgment   of   this <\/p>\n
Court   in     Audikesava   Reddy’s           case   (supra)   hence, <\/p>\n
reliance   could   not   be   placed   by   the   appellants   herein   on <\/p>\n
any   observations   made   or   finding   returned   therein.     He <\/p>\n
also submitted that in view of the judgment of this Court <\/p>\n
in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra)   which   was   a <\/p>\n
judgment  inter   partes,   it   was   no   longer   open   to   the <\/p>\n
appellants   to   seek   re-computation   of   land   holdings   with <\/p>\n
reference to the date of extension of the Master Plan to the <\/p>\n
lands in issue.\n<\/p>\n
16)    The   submissions   made   by   the   appellants   about   the <\/p>\n
decision   of   this   Court   in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case <\/p>\n
(supra) are mis-conceived in law and were rightly rejected <\/p>\n
by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment.   It was <\/p>\n
highlighted   that   on   the   basis   of   the   declaration   made <\/p>\n
under   the   ULC   Act,   the   erstwhile   owners   of   the   land   in <\/p>\n
                                                                        29<\/span><\/p>\n
issue   had   got   released   from   the   authorities   an   area   of <\/p>\n
99.17 acres of land that had been declared as excess land <\/p>\n
under   the   Land   Reforms   Act.     Various   materials   with <\/p>\n
relevant   dates   and   particulars   furnished   on   behalf   of   the <\/p>\n
State   clearly   demonstrate   that   the   owners   of   the   land   in <\/p>\n
issue were actively and deliberately seeking to get release <\/p>\n
99.17 acres of land held to be excess land under the Land <\/p>\n
Reforms Act by relying on their declaration filed under the <\/p>\n
ULC Act.   Even as early as on 11.04.1975, GPA holder of <\/p>\n
owners   filed   declaration   under   Section   8(1)   of   the   Land <\/p>\n
Reforms   Act   in   respect   of   entire   extent   of   526.07   acres.\n<\/p>\n
On   02.06.1976\/16.06.1976,   the   declarants   held   to   be <\/p>\n
holding excess land to the extent of 99.17 acres.\n<\/p>\n
17)     On   02.09.1976,   the   GPA   holder   of   declarants   filed <\/p>\n
application in Land Reforms Tribunal contending that the <\/p>\n
provisions of the Land Reforms Act are not applicable and <\/p>\n
provisions   of   ULC   Act   are   applicable   since   the   land   is <\/p>\n
urban vacant land.  A prayer was made for release of land <\/p>\n
admeasuring   99.17   acres   declared   as   excess   land   under <\/p>\n
                                                                        30<\/span><\/p>\n
the   Land   Reforms   Act   to   be   returned   to   owners.     On <\/p>\n
16.09.1976\/27.07.1977,   the   very   same   GPA   holder   of <\/p>\n
owners filed declarations under Section 6 of the ULC Act.\n<\/p>\n
Draft   statement   under   Section   8(1)   and   notice   under <\/p>\n
Section   8(3)   of   the   ULC   Act   was   issued   on <\/p>\n
01.07.1977\/11.11.1977.  A perusal of the draft statement <\/p>\n
subsequently state that the land is a grazing land and is <\/p>\n
not mainly used for the purpose of agriculture.   By order <\/p>\n
dated   06.12.1979\/25.01.1980,   the   Competent   Authority <\/p>\n
under the ULC Act held the owners to be in possession of <\/p>\n
vacant   land   in   excess   of   ceiling   limit   and   issued   final <\/p>\n
statements   under   Section   9   of   the   ULC   Act   declaring   the <\/p>\n
surplus          area         of         each         declarant.              On <\/p>\n
16.01.1980\/30.01.1980,   a   notification   was   issued   under <\/p>\n
Section 10(1) of the ULC Act stating the extent of surplus <\/p>\n
land   held   by   the   declarants   and   affording   opportunity   of <\/p>\n
hearing   to   all   interested   persons.     On   23.06.1980,   the <\/p>\n
Master   Plan   came   to   be   extended   to   cover   the   land   in <\/p>\n
issue.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                               31<\/span><\/p>\n
18)     On   16.07.1980,   GPA   holder   of   declarants   filed <\/p>\n
another application in Land Reforms Tribunal contending <\/p>\n
that   the   provisions   of   the   Land   Reforms   Act   are   not <\/p>\n
applicable   and   provisions   of   the   ULC   Act   are   applicable <\/p>\n
since the land is urban vacant land.  As a matter of fact, a <\/p>\n
prayer   was   made   for   release   of   land   admeasuring   99.17 <\/p>\n
acres declared as excess land under the Land Reforms Act <\/p>\n
to   be   returned   to   the   owners.     Meanwhile,   surplus   lands <\/p>\n
were allotted to Hyderabad Urban Development Authority <\/p>\n
by   G.O.Ms.   No.   5013   dated   19.12.1980.     By   notification <\/p>\n
dated   24.01.1981   issued   under   Section   10(3)   of   the   ULC <\/p>\n
Act,   the   surplus   land   would   be   deemed   to   have   been <\/p>\n
acquired by the State Government and the same shall vest <\/p>\n
absolutely   in   the   State   Government   free   from   all <\/p>\n
encumbrances.     On   21.02.1981,   the   application   for <\/p>\n
exemption   was   filed   under   Section   20   of   the   ULC   Act   by <\/p>\n
GPA   holder   of   declarants   and   Chanakyapuri   Cooperative <\/p>\n
Housing   Society   which   was   rejected   by   the   State <\/p>\n
Government.     By   notice   dated   26.02.1981   issued   under <\/p>\n
                                                                        32<\/span><\/p>\n
Section   10(5)   of   the   ULC   Act,   the   Competent   Authority <\/p>\n
asked   the   declarants   to   vacate   and   deliver   possession   of <\/p>\n
the   land.     Application   for   release   of   land   admeasuring <\/p>\n
99.17   acres   declared   as   excess   land   under   the   Land <\/p>\n
Reforms Act was rejected by the Land Reforms Tribunal by <\/p>\n
order   dated   19.04.1982.     Against   the   said   rejection,   an <\/p>\n
appeal was filed in 1983 before the Land Reforms Tribunal <\/p>\n
being   L.R.A.   No.   6   of   1983.     By   order   dated   22.09.1984, <\/p>\n
the Land Reforms Appellate Tribunal allowed L.R.A. No. 6 <\/p>\n
of   1983   and   remanded   to   the   Land   Reforms   Tribunal   for <\/p>\n
fresh disposal.  On remand, application for release of land <\/p>\n
admeasuring   99.17   acres   declared   as   excess   land   under <\/p>\n
the   Land   Reforms   Act   was   allowed   on   10.11.1987   by   the <\/p>\n
Land   Reforms   Tribunal.     It   is   brought   to   our   notice   that <\/p>\n
possession   of   said   extent   of   land   delivered   to   the <\/p>\n
declarants   on   25.04.1990   was   through   their   GPA   under <\/p>\n
Panchnama.     On   19.07.1993,   notification   was   issued <\/p>\n
under   Section   10(6)   of   the   ULC   Act   directing   that <\/p>\n
possession be taken over all lands declared to be surplus <\/p>\n
                                                                         33<\/span><\/p>\n
under   the   ULC   Act.     In   fact,   possession   of   surplus   lands <\/p>\n
was taken over on 20.07.1993.   Those lands were allotted <\/p>\n
to   Respondent   No.4   (APIIC)   on   13.02.2006   and   physical <\/p>\n
possession was handed over to APIIC on 14.02.2006.  The <\/p>\n
above   factual   details   with   clear-cut   materials   cannot   be <\/p>\n
assailed.     All   those   dates   and   events   are   available   in   the <\/p>\n
various   documents   filed   by   all   the   parties.     Those <\/p>\n
particulars   also   show   that   only   when   possession   of   the <\/p>\n
said   99.17   acres   of   land   was   returned   to   the   owners   in <\/p>\n
1990, then the owners for the first time sought to take the <\/p>\n
plea that the declaration made by them under the ULC Act <\/p>\n
was a mistake and hence proceedings under the ULC Act <\/p>\n
were   void.     As   rightly   pointed   out,   the   owners   having <\/p>\n
taken   part,   all   the   declarations   filed   by   them   under <\/p>\n
Section   6   of   the   ULC   Act   to   recover   lands   admeasuring <\/p>\n
99.17 acres surrendered under the provisions of the Land <\/p>\n
Reforms   Act.     Either   the   appellants   or   anybody   claiming <\/p>\n
through   them   are   estopped   from   assailing   the   legality   or <\/p>\n
validity   of   the   declaration   made   by   the   owners   under <\/p>\n
                                                                          34<\/span><\/p>\n
Section   6   of   the   ULC   Act   on   the   principle   that   a   person <\/p>\n
cannot   aprobate   and   reprobate   in   respect   of   the   same <\/p>\n
transaction.\n<\/p>\n
19)    Mr.   Chowdhary,   learned   senior   counsel   for   the <\/p>\n
appellants,   by   drawing   our   attention   to   para   15   of <\/p>\n
Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra)   submitted   that   this <\/p>\n
Court has not gone into the factual conclusion arrived by <\/p>\n
the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   and   the   present <\/p>\n
decision is confined with only issue referred to by the two-\n<\/p>\n
Judge   Bench,   namely,   it   is   the   Master   Plan   that   was   in <\/p>\n
existence   when   the   ULC   Act   was   enforced   and   not   the <\/p>\n
plan   prepared   subsequently   that   has   to   be   taken   into <\/p>\n
consideration   to   determine   if   land   is   vacant   land   held   in <\/p>\n
excess of ceiling limit fixed under the Act.   As pointed out <\/p>\n
earlier,   this   submission   is   also   mis-placed.     A   close <\/p>\n
reading of para 15 makes it clear that in the said case it <\/p>\n
was   “not   concerned   with   the   question   as   to   the <\/p>\n
consequences of filing of a statement by a person under a <\/p>\n
wrong   impression   that   the   vacant   land   held   by   him   is   in <\/p>\n
                                                                           35<\/span><\/p>\n
excess   of  the   ceiling   limit.”     Inasmuch   as  the   case   of   the <\/p>\n
appellants   is   that   the   lands   regarding   which   declaration <\/p>\n
was filed by them was not vacant land at all, they would <\/p>\n
not be covered by the observations made by this Court in <\/p>\n
para 15 as aforesaid since the same is ex-facie intended to <\/p>\n
cover   only   such   cases   where   the   factum   of   the   land   in <\/p>\n
issue   being   vacant   land   is   admitted.     But   thereafter,   a <\/p>\n
submission was made that the vacant land declared to be <\/p>\n
excess land was in fact not excess land.\n<\/p>\n
20)    Equally,   reliance   placed   by   the   appellants   upon   the <\/p>\n
observations and findings reached in the judgment of the <\/p>\n
Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   in   the   earlier   round   of <\/p>\n
litigation which culminated in the judgment of this Court <\/p>\n
in  Audikesava   Reddy’s  case   (supra)   regarding   lands   in <\/p>\n
issue   having   been   agricultural   lands,   the   prayer   of <\/p>\n
extension of the Master Plan thereto is also mis-conceived <\/p>\n
and   unsustainable.     As   pointed   out   by   learned   senior <\/p>\n
counsel   for   the   respondents   by   virtue   of   special   leave <\/p>\n
petition   filed   against   the   judgment   dated   04.12.1996 <\/p>\n
                                                                           36<\/span><\/p>\n
delivered   in   Writ   Appeal   No.   918   of   1994   as   also   the <\/p>\n
judgment   dated   28.10.1994   delivered   in   Writ   Appeal   No. <\/p>\n
1220   of   1994,   finality   of   the   said   judgment   and   all <\/p>\n
findings contained therein stood destroyed.  It is useful to <\/p>\n
refer   the   decision   of   this   Court   in  Dharam   Dutt   and  <\/p>\n
Others  vs.  Union   of   India   and   Others,<\/a>   (2004)   1   SCC <\/p>\n
712.     This   Court   held   filing   of   an   appeal   destroys   the <\/p>\n
finality of the judgment under appeal (vide para 69).\n<\/p>\n
21)    In  M\/s   Gojer   Bros.   (Pvt.)   Ltd.  vs.  Shri   Ratan   Lal  <\/p>\n
Singh,<\/a>   (1974)   2   SCC   453,   the   following   conclusion   was <\/p>\n
pressed into service.\n<\/p>\n
       “11.  The juristic  justification of the doctrine of merger may <\/p>\n
       be sought in the principle that there cannot be, at one and <\/p>\n
       the same time, more than one operative order governing the <\/p>\n
       same   subject-matter.   Therefore   the   judgment   of   an   inferior <\/p>\n
       court, if subjected to an examination by the superior  court, <\/p>\n
       ceases to have existence in the eye of law and is treated as <\/p>\n
       being superseded  by the judgment of the superior  court. In <\/p>\n
       other   words,   the   judgment   of   the   inferior   court   loses   its <\/p>\n
       identity   by   its   merger   with   the   judgment   of   the   superior <\/p>\n
       court.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
22)    In  Kunhayammed and Others  vs.  State of Kerala  <\/p>\n
and Another,<\/a> (2000) 6 SCC 359, this Court held:\n<\/p>\n
                                                                                       37<\/span><\/p>\n
      “12. The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there <\/p>\n
      cannot   be   more   than   one   decree   or   operative   orders <\/p>\n
      governing  the same subject-matter  at a given  point of time. <\/p>\n
      When a decree or order passed by an inferior court, tribunal <\/p>\n
      or  authority  was  subjected  to a remedy  available under the <\/p>\n
      law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order <\/p>\n
      under   challenge   continues   to   be   effective   and   binding, <\/p>\n
      nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior <\/p>\n
      court has disposed of the lis before it either way — whether <\/p>\n
      the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or <\/p>\n
      simply   confirmed,   it   is   the   decree   or   order   of   the   superior <\/p>\n
      court,   tribunal   or   authority   which   is   the   final,   binding   and <\/p>\n
      operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order <\/p>\n
      passed by the court, tribunal or the authority below.” <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
However,   Mr.   Chowdhary   very   much   emphasized   the <\/p>\n
subsequent   passage   in   the   same   paragraph   which   reads <\/p>\n
thus:\n<\/p>\n
      “However,   the   doctrine   is   not   of   universal   or   unlimited <\/p>\n
      application.   The   nature   of   jurisdiction   exercised   by   the <\/p>\n
      superior   forum   and   the   content   or   subject-matter   of <\/p>\n
      challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be <\/p>\n
      kept in view.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
By   pointing   out,   Mr.   Chowdhary   submitted   that   the <\/p>\n
reliance   placed   on   the   doctrine   of   merger   and   the <\/p>\n
aforesaid   judgment   in                Kunhayammed   and   Others  <\/p>\n
(supra)  cannot be sustained.   He further pointed out that <\/p>\n
the   last   portion   in   the   said   paragraph   shows   that   what <\/p>\n
this   Court   laid   down   was   that   the   principle   contained   in <\/p>\n
the   doctrine   of   merger   is   not   of   universal   application.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                                          38<\/span><\/p>\n
Whatever   may   be,   it   is   clear   that   once   special   leave   has <\/p>\n
been   granted,   any   order   passed   by   this   Court   thereafter, <\/p>\n
would   be   an   appellate   order   and   would   attract   the <\/p>\n
applicability of the doctrine of merger.   The above view is <\/p>\n
supported  in the  very  same  Kunhayammed and  Others  <\/p>\n
(supra)  which reads:\n<\/p>\n
      “41.  Once   a   special   leave   petition   has   been   granted,   the <\/p>\n
      doors   for  the  exercise   of  appellate   jurisdiction   of  this  Court <\/p>\n
      have been let open. The order impugned before the Supreme <\/p>\n
      Court becomes an order appealed against. Any order passed <\/p>\n
      thereafter would be an appellate order and would attract the <\/p>\n
      applicability   of   doctrine   of   merger.   It   would   not   make   a <\/p>\n
      difference   whether   the   order   is   one   of   reversal   or   of <\/p>\n
      modification   or   of   dismissal   affirming   the   order   appealed <\/p>\n
      against. It would also not make any difference if the order is <\/p>\n
      a   speaking   or   non-speaking   one.   Whenever   this   Court   has <\/p>\n
      felt inclined to apply its mind to the merits of the order put <\/p>\n
      in   issue   before   it   though   it   may   be   inclined   to   affirm   the <\/p>\n
      same, it is customary with this Court to grant leave to appeal <\/p>\n
      and thereafter dismiss the appeal itself (and not merely the <\/p>\n
      petition for special leave) though at times the orders granting <\/p>\n
      leave   to   appeal   and   dismissing   the   appeal   are   contained   in <\/p>\n
      the   same   order   and   at   times   the   orders   are   quite   brief. <\/p>\n
      Nevertheless,   the   order   shows   the   exercise   of   appellate <\/p>\n
      jurisdiction   and   therein   the   merits   of   the   order   impugned <\/p>\n
      having been subjected to judicial scrutiny of this Court.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      42.  “To   merge”   means   to   sink   or   disappear   in   something <\/p>\n
      else; to become absorbed or extinguished; to be combined or <\/p>\n
      be swallowed up.  Merger in law is defined as the absorption <\/p>\n
      of   a   thing   of   lesser   importance   by   a   greater,   whereby   the <\/p>\n
      lesser   ceases   to   exist,   but   the   greater   is   not   increased;   an <\/p>\n
      absorption or swallowing up so as to involve a loss of identity <\/p>\n
      and   individuality.   (See  Corpus   Juris   Secundum,   Vol.   LVII, <\/p>\n
      pp. 1067-68.)”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
                                                                                           39<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
In   the   same   decision,   their   Lordships   have   summarized <\/p>\n
their conclusion as under:\n<\/p>\n
     “44. To sum up, our conclusions are:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed <\/p>\n
     by  a  court,  tribunal  or  any   other  authority  before  superior  forum <\/p>\n
     and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision <\/p>\n
     put   in   issue   before   it,   the   decision   by   the   subordinate   forum <\/p>\n
     merges   in   the   decision   by   the   superior   forum   and   it   is   the   latter <\/p>\n
     which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in <\/p>\n
     the eye of law.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      (ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is <\/p>\n
     divisible   into   two   stages.   The   first   stage   is   upto   the   disposal   of <\/p>\n
     prayer   for   special   leave   to   file   an   appeal.   The   second   stage <\/p>\n
     commences   if   and   when   the   leave   to   appeal   is   granted   and   the <\/p>\n
     special leave petition is converted into an appeal.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
     (iii)   The   doctrine   of   merger   is   not   a   doctrine   of   universal   or <\/p>\n
     unlimited   application.  It  will   depend   on the  nature   of  jurisdiction <\/p>\n
     exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter <\/p>\n
     of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of <\/p>\n
     the   applicability   of   merger.   The   superior   jurisdiction   should   be <\/p>\n
     capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue <\/p>\n
     before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court <\/p>\n
     may   reverse,   modify   or   affirm   the   judgment-decree   or   order <\/p>\n
     appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not <\/p>\n
     while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition <\/p>\n
     for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be <\/p>\n
     applied to the former and not to the latter.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
     (iv)   An   order   refusing   special   leave   to   appeal   may   be   a   non-<\/p>\n
     speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract <\/p>\n
     the   doctrine   of   merger.   An   order   refusing   special   leave   to   appeal <\/p>\n
     does not  stand substituted  in place  of the order under challenge. <\/p>\n
     All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its <\/p>\n
     discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
     (v)   If   the   order   refusing   leave   to   appeal   is   a   speaking   order,   i.e., <\/p>\n
     gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two <\/p>\n
     implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is <\/p>\n
     a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of <\/p>\n
     Article   141   of   the   Constitution.   Secondly,   other   than   the <\/p>\n
     declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings <\/p>\n
     recorded   by   the   Supreme   Court   which   would   bind   the   parties <\/p>\n
     thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings <\/p>\n
     subsequent   thereto   by   way   of   judicial   discipline,   the   Supreme <\/p>\n
                                                                                              40<\/span><\/p>\n
       Court   being   the   Apex   Court   of   the   country.   But,   this   does   not <\/p>\n
       amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority <\/p>\n
       below   has   stood   merged   in   the   order   of   the   Supreme   Court <\/p>\n
       rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme <\/p>\n
       Court   is   the   only   order   binding   as   res   judicata   in   subsequent <\/p>\n
       proceedings between the parties.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
       (vi)   Once   leave   to   appeal   has   been   granted   and   appellate <\/p>\n
       jurisdiction  of Supreme Court has been  invoked  the order passed <\/p>\n
       in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of <\/p>\n
       reversal, modification or merely affirmation.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
       (vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave <\/p>\n
       to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme <\/p>\n
       Court the jurisdiction of High Court to entertain a review petition <\/p>\n
       is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Rule 1 of Order 47 <\/p>\n
       CPC.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
23)    It is clear that once leave was granted by this Court <\/p>\n
in   the   special   leave   petitions   filed   against   the   Division <\/p>\n
Bench of the High Court in the earlier round of litigation <\/p>\n
and the consequent civil appeals arising therefrom filed by <\/p>\n
the   State   Government   is   allowed   by   this   Court,   the <\/p>\n
judgment   of   the   Division   Bench   lost   its   identity   and <\/p>\n
merged   with   the   judgment   of   this   Court.     The   said <\/p>\n
judgment   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court, <\/p>\n
therefore,   cannot   be   relied   upon   for   any   purpose <\/p>\n
whatsoever.     Even   on   merits,   it   is   relevant   to   point   out <\/p>\n
that   the   arguments   of   the   appellants   that   the   lands   in <\/p>\n
issue   became   amenable   to   the   ULC   Act   only   upon <\/p>\n
                                                                                       41<\/span><\/p>\n
extension  of  Master  Plan  thereto  on  23.06.1980  and  that <\/p>\n
the declaration made prior to such date is non  est  is not <\/p>\n
acceptable and sustainable.  As a matter of fact, the stand <\/p>\n
of   the   State   Government   has   through   out   been   that   the <\/p>\n
lands in issue were not agricultural lands but were vacant <\/p>\n
lands   under   the   ULC   Act   even   in   1976   when   the <\/p>\n
declaration   was   made   by   the   owners   under   Section   6   of <\/p>\n
the   ULC   Act,   hence   the   declaration   and   all   action   taken <\/p>\n
consequent   thereto   are   valid   in   law.     This   position   or <\/p>\n
stand   of   the   State   Government   is   clear   and   reiterated   in <\/p>\n
its writ appeal filed by way of counter affidavit before the <\/p>\n
Division Bench of the High Court and before this Court in <\/p>\n
the present proceedings.  It was brought to our notice that <\/p>\n
the   appellants   conceded   before   the   High   Court   that   the <\/p>\n
lands   in   issue   were   part   of   urban   agglomeration   even <\/p>\n
when the declaration under Section 6 of the ULC Act was <\/p>\n
enforced.   In addition to the same, it was also brought to <\/p>\n
our   notice   that   by   an   agreement   dated   09.08.1974,   the <\/p>\n
lands   in   issue   were   sold   by   the   owners   to   a   society, <\/p>\n
                                                                        42<\/span><\/p>\n
namely, Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing Society which <\/p>\n
got   a   layout   plan   sanctioned   on   20.10.1975   by   Raidurg <\/p>\n
Gram   Panchayat   for   construction   of   houses   on   the   said <\/p>\n
lands.     These   materials   clearly   show   that   the   lands   were <\/p>\n
not agricultural lands even prior to declaration filed under <\/p>\n
Section 6 of the ULC Act by the owners in 1976.  Any land <\/p>\n
not   being   agricultural   land   and   falling   within   an   urban <\/p>\n
agglomeration,   constitutes   vacant   land   as   defined   in <\/p>\n
Section 2(q) of the ULC Act.  The lands in issue, therefore, <\/p>\n
constitute vacant land on the date of filing of declaration <\/p>\n
under Section 6 of the ULC Act by the owners in 1976.  As <\/p>\n
per Section 6 of the ULC Act, declaration was required to <\/p>\n
be   filed   in   respect   of   vacant   land,   such   declaration   was <\/p>\n
correctly filed by the owners hence, subsequent extension <\/p>\n
of master plan to the lands in issue on 23.06.1980 has no <\/p>\n
relevance   to   the   validity   of   the   declaration   made   in   1976 <\/p>\n
or   to   the   proceedings   initiated   under   the   ULC   Act <\/p>\n
pursuant to such declaration.  It is not in dispute that the <\/p>\n
proceedings under the ULC Act were not challenged by the <\/p>\n
                                                                         43<\/span><\/p>\n
owners   at   any   stage   as   provided   by   the   statute.     The <\/p>\n
notification   under   Section   10(3)   of   the   ULC   Act   stating <\/p>\n
that   the   surplus   land   would   be   deemed   to   have   been <\/p>\n
acquired by the State Government and the same shall vest <\/p>\n
absolutely   in   the   State   Government   free   from   all <\/p>\n
encumbrances was issued even as early as on 24.01.1981 <\/p>\n
which  was allowed  to become  final in  the  absence  of any <\/p>\n
appeal being filed against such notification as provided by <\/p>\n
the statute.  Once vesting takes place under Section 10(3) <\/p>\n
of   the   Ceiling   Act,   the   State   has   absolute   title   and <\/p>\n
ownership   over   it.     The   owner   has   no   further   say   in <\/p>\n
respect   of   the   land   that   has   vested   in   the   State.     This <\/p>\n
position   has   been   explained   by   us   in  Smt.   Sulochana  <\/p>\n
Chandrakant   Galande  vs.  Pune   Municipal   Transport  <\/p>\n
& Ors.,<\/a> 2010 (7) Scale 571 as under:\n<\/p>\n
      “9.   The   meaning   of   the   word   `vesting’   has   been <\/p>\n
      considered by this Court time and again. In  The Fruit  <\/p>\n
      &   Vegetable   Merchants   Union                v.     The   Delhi  <\/p>\n
      Improvement Trust, AIR<\/a> 1957 SC 344, this Court held <\/p>\n
      that   the   meaning   of   word   `vesting’   varies   as   per   the <\/p>\n
      context of the Statute in which the property vests. While <\/p>\n
                                                                                 44<\/span><\/p>\n
considering   the   case   under   Sections  16  and  17  of   the <\/p>\n
Act 1894, the Court held as under:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/blockquote>\n
       …the   property   acquired   becomes   the   property   of  <\/p>\n
       Government  without   any   condition   or   limitations <\/p>\n
       either as to title or possession. The legislature has <\/p>\n
       made it clear that vesting of the property is not for <\/p>\n
       any limited purpose or limited duration.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                                                      (Emphasis <\/p>\n
       added).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n
10.   “Encumbrance”   actually   means   the   burden   caused <\/p>\n
by   an   act   or   omission   of   man   and   not   that   created   by <\/p>\n
nature. It means a burden or charge upon property or a <\/p>\n
claim   or   lien   on   the   land.   It   means   a   legal   liability   on <\/p>\n
property.   Thus,   it   constitutes   a   burden   on   the   title <\/p>\n
which   diminishes   the   value   of   the   land.   It   may   be   a <\/p>\n
mortgage or a deed of trust or a lien of an easement. An <\/p>\n
encumbrance, thus, must be a charge on the property. <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
It   must   run   with   the   property.   (Vide  Collector   of  <\/p>\n
Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri and Ors., AIR<\/a> <\/p>\n
1955  SC  298;  H.P.   State   Electricity   Board  and   Ors.\n<\/p>\n
v. Shiv K. Sharma and Ors., AIR 2005 SC 954; and AI  <\/p>\n
Champdany   Industries   Ltd.  v.  Official   Liquidator  <\/p>\n
and Anr.,<\/a>  (2009) 4 SCC 486).\n<\/p>\n
11.   In  State   of   Himachal   Pradesh  v.  Tarsem   Singh  <\/p>\n
and Ors., AIR<\/a> 2001 SC 3431, this Court held that the <\/p>\n
terminology   `free   from   all   encumbrances’   used   in <\/p>\n
Section  16  of   the   Act   1894,   is   wholly   unqualified   and <\/p>\n
would   en-compass   the   extinguishing   of   “all   rights,   title <\/p>\n
and   interests   including   easementary   rights”   when   the <\/p>\n
title vests in the State.\n<\/p>\n
       Thus, “free from encumbrances” means vesting of <\/p>\n
land   in   the   State   without   any   charge   or   burden   in   it.\n<\/p>\n
Thus, State has absolute title\/ownership over it.\n<\/p>\n
12.   In  Satendra   Prasad   Jain   and   Ors.  v.  State   of  <\/p>\n
U.P. and Ors., AIR<\/a> 1993 SC 2517, this Court held that <\/p>\n
once land vests in the State free from all encumbrances, <\/p>\n
it cannot be divested. The same view has been reiterated <\/p>\n
in  Awadh   Bihari   Yadav   and   Ors.  v.  State   of   Bihar  <\/p>\n
                                                                                   45<\/span><\/p>\n
and Ors.,  (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow  <\/p>\n
v.  M\/s   Kalra   Properties   (P)   Ltd.  Lucknow   and   Ors., <\/p>\n
AIR<\/a>   1996   SC   1170;            Pratap   and   Anr.   (Supra);\n<\/p>\n
Chandragauda Ramgonda Patil and Anr. v. State of  <\/p>\n
Maharashtra and Ors.,<\/a> (1996) 6 SCC 405; Allahabad  <\/p>\n
Development   Authority  v.  Nasiruzzaman   and   Ors.,<\/a> <\/p>\n
(1996)   6   SCC   424;  State   of   Kerala   and   Ors.  v.  M.\n<\/p>\n
Bhaskaran   Pillai   and   Anr.,   AIR   1997   SC   2703;  M.\n<\/p>\n
Ramalinga Thevar v. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors., <\/p>\n
(2000)   4   SCC   322;  Printers   (Mysore)   Ltd.  v.  M.A.\n<\/p>\n
Rasheed   and   Ors.,   (2004)   4   SCC   460;  Bangalore  <\/p>\n
Development   Authority   and   Ors.,   v.  R.   Hanumaiah  <\/p>\n
and   Ors,.<\/a>  (2005)   12   SCC   508;   and  Government   of  <\/p>\n
Andhra Pradesh and Anr.  v.  Syed Akbar,   AIR<\/a> 2005 <\/p>\n
SC 492.\n<\/p>\n
13.   So   far   as   the   change   of   user   is   concerned,   it   is   a <\/p>\n
settled   legal   proposition   that   once   land   vests   in   the <\/p>\n
State   free   from  all  encumbrances,  there   cannot  be  any <\/p>\n
rider   on   the   power   of   the   State   Government   to   change <\/p>\n
user of the land in the manner it chooses.\n<\/p>\n
       In   a   similar   situation,   in  Gulam   Mustafa   and  <\/p>\n
Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra and Ors., AIR<\/a> 1977 <\/p>\n
SC 448, this Court held as under:\n<\/p>\n
       “Once the original acquisition is valid and title has <\/p>\n
vested in the Municipality,  how it uses the excess land <\/p>\n
is   no   concern   of   the   original   owner   and   cannot   be   the <\/p>\n
basis   for   invalidating   the   acquisition.   There   is   no <\/p>\n
principle of law by which a valid compulsory acquisition <\/p>\n
stands voided because long later the requiring Authority <\/p>\n
diverts it to a public purpose other than the one stated <\/p>\n
in the….declaration.”\n<\/p>\n
14. Re-iterating a similar view in C. Padma and Ors. v.\n<\/p>\n
Deputy Secretary to the Government of Tamil Nadu  <\/p>\n
and Ors.,  (1997) 2 SCC 627, this Court held that if by <\/p>\n
virtue of a valid acquisition of land, land stands vested <\/p>\n
in   the   State,   thereafter,   claimants   are   not   entitled   to <\/p>\n
restoration of possession on the grounds that either the <\/p>\n
original   public   purpose   is   ceased   to   be   in   operation   or <\/p>\n
the land could not be used for any other purposes.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                                   46<\/span><\/p>\n
      15.   In  Bhagat   Singh   etc.  v.  State   of   U.P.   and   Ors., <\/p>\n
      AIR 1999 SC 436; Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja v.\n<\/p>\n
      State   of   West   Bengal,  AIR   2002   SC   2532;   and <\/p>\n
      Northern Indian Glass Industries  v.  Jaswant Singh  <\/p>\n
      and Ors.,<\/a>   (2003) 1 SCC 335, this Court held that, the <\/p>\n
      land   user   can   be   changed   by   the   Statutory   Authority <\/p>\n
      after   the   land   vests   in   the   State   free   from   all <\/p>\n
      encumbrances.\n<\/p>\n
      16.   In   view   of   the   above,   the   law   can   be   summarised <\/p>\n
      that once the land is acquired, it vests in the State free <\/p>\n
      from all encumbrances. It is not the concern of the land <\/p>\n
      owner   how   his   land   is   used   and   whether   the   land   is <\/p>\n
      being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or <\/p>\n
      for   any   other   purpose.   He   becomes   persona   non   grata <\/p>\n
      once   the  land   vests   in  the   State.   He   has  a  right  to  get <\/p>\n
      compensation only for the same. The person interested <\/p>\n
      cannot   claim   the   right   of   restoration   of   land   on   any <\/p>\n
      ground, whatsoever.”\n<\/p>\n
24)    With  regard  to  the  ultimate  decision  in  Audikesava  <\/p>\n
Reddy’s  case   (supra),   Mr.   Vahanvati,   learned   Attorney <\/p>\n
General  for  India,  by  drawing  our  attention  to  the  decree <\/p>\n
prepared by the Registry submitted that there is no doubt <\/p>\n
as   to   setting   side   the   entire   judgment   of   the   Division <\/p>\n
Bench of the High Court and the parties cannot claim that <\/p>\n
certain   issues   have   been   kept   open   or   untouched.     In <\/p>\n
support   of   the   above   claim,   learned   Attorney   General <\/p>\n
heavily  relied  on  the  decree  drafted  by  the  Registry.    The <\/p>\n
relevant portion of the decree is as follows:\n<\/p>\n
                                                                                    47<\/span><\/p>\n
      “….. while holding that the Master Plan prepared as per law <\/p>\n
      in force even subsequent to enforcement of the Urban Land <\/p>\n
      (Ceiling   &   Regulations)   Act,   1976   is   to   be   taken   into <\/p>\n
      consideration to determine whether a particular piece of land <\/p>\n
      is vacant land or not, and while leaving open the question as <\/p>\n
      to   the   consequences   of   filing   of   a   statement   by   a   person <\/p>\n
      under a wrong impression that the vacant land held by him <\/p>\n
      is   in   excess  of  ceiling   limit   if  it  was  not   so   when   he   filed   a <\/p>\n
      statement, to be decided in an appropriate case and for the <\/p>\n
      reasons   recorded   in   its   Judgment   DOTH   in   allowing   the <\/p>\n
      appeal and the resultant appeal ORDER:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
      1. THAT the Judgments and Orders dated 28th October, 1994 <\/p>\n
      and   the   4th  December,   1996   of   the   Division   Bench   of   the <\/p>\n
      High Court of Judicature of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in <\/p>\n
      Writ   Appeal   Nos.   1220   and   918   of   1994   respectively,   and <\/p>\n
      also Judgments and Orders dated 6th October, 1994 and 27th <\/p>\n
      July, 1994 of the Single Judge of the said High Court in Writ <\/p>\n
      Petition   Nos.   238   of   1994   and   18335   of   1993   be   and   are <\/p>\n
      hereby   set   aside   and   in   place   thereof   an   order   dismissing <\/p>\n
      Writ Petition Nos. 238 of 1994 and 18335 of 1993 on the file <\/p>\n
      of High Court be and is hereby substituted;<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
      2.      THAT  the  parties  herein  shall  bear  their  own  costs  of <\/p>\n
      these appeals in this Court;…”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
Mr. Chowdhary submitted that the terms of decree drawn <\/p>\n
by the Registry of this Court, cannot, in law, provide any <\/p>\n
guidance   of   the   interpretation   of   and   for   deducing   the <\/p>\n
adjudication   contained   in   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in <\/p>\n
Audikesava   Reddy’s   case                            having   regard   to   the <\/p>\n
definitions   of   the   expressions   “judgment   and   decree”\n<\/p>\n
contained   in   Section   2(9)   and   Section   2(2)   of   the   Code   of <\/p>\n
                                                                                                48<\/span><\/p>\n
Civil   Procedure,   1908   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   `CPC’) <\/p>\n
respectively, which reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
    “2(9) “judgment” means the statement given by the Judge on <\/p>\n
    the grounds of a decree or order;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
    2(2) “decree” means the formal expression of an adjudication <\/p>\n
    which, so far as regards the Court expressing it, conclusively <\/p>\n
    determines the rights of the parties with regard to all or any of <\/p>\n
    the   matters   in   controversy   in   the   suit   and   may   be   either <\/p>\n
    preliminary   or   final.     It   shall   be   deemed   to   include   the <\/p>\n
    rejection   of   a   plaint   and   the   determination   of   any   question <\/p>\n
    within section 144, but shall not include-<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
    (a)   any   adjudication   from   which   an   appeal   lies   as   an   appeal <\/p>\n
    from an order, or <\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
    (b) any order of dismissal for default.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
    Explanation.-   A   decree   is   preliminary   when   further <\/p>\n
    proceedings have to be taken before the suit can be completely <\/p>\n
    disposed   of.     It   is   final   when   such   adjudication   completely <\/p>\n
    disposes of the suit.   It may be partly preliminary  and partly <\/p>\n
    final;”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
According   to   him,   a   combined   reading   of   the   above   two <\/p>\n
definitions   show   that   the   judgment   must   furnish   the <\/p>\n
reasons or grounds for the adjudication of the controversy <\/p>\n
or controversies on the basis of which only a decree can be <\/p>\n
drawn.  He pointed out that that is the reason it is said in <\/p>\n
law that “a decree must follow the judgment” or “a decree <\/p>\n
must   agree   with   the   judgment”.                         Repeatedly,   Mr. <\/p>\n
                                                                                        49<\/span><\/p>\n
Chowdhuri   submitted   except   answering   the   question <\/p>\n
referred   to   by   a   two-Judge   Bench,   this   Court   has   not <\/p>\n
considered   or   concerned   with   the   consequences   of   filing <\/p>\n
declarations   under   a   wrong   impression   that   the   land   is <\/p>\n
“vacant”   when   the   land   is   not   a   “vacant   land”   and   the <\/p>\n
same be decided in an appropriate case, which necessarily <\/p>\n
means that this Court was not inclined to go into the three <\/p>\n
questions,   namely,   whether   the   land   in   Survey   No.   83, <\/p>\n
Raidurg   (Panmaqtha)   village   was   agricultural   or   not, <\/p>\n
whether such declarations were filed on 16.09.1976, on a <\/p>\n
wrong   impression   and   whether   the   proceedings   under <\/p>\n
Sections   8,   9   and   10   of   the   ULC   Act   are   valid,   having <\/p>\n
already   declared   in   Para   13   that   the   date   of <\/p>\n
commencement of the ULC Act qua the land in Survey No. <\/p>\n
83,   would   be   the   date   on   which   the   said   land   was <\/p>\n
included in the second Master Plan that is, on 29.09.1980 <\/p>\n
when the owners were obligated to file declarations under <\/p>\n
Section   6   of   their   holdings   and   as   such   the   statutory <\/p>\n
obligation   to   deal   with   such   declarations   also   would <\/p>\n
                                                                         50<\/span><\/p>\n
commence   only   from   the   date   of   filing   fresh   declarations <\/p>\n
after 29.09.1980 (date of commencement of the Act). While <\/p>\n
winding up his reservation about the decree, he submitted <\/p>\n
that   this   Court   in  Audikesava   Reddy’s   case  (supra) <\/p>\n
expressly   did   not   go   into   the   question   of   validity   of   the <\/p>\n
proceedings   taken   by   the   Competent   Authority   under <\/p>\n
Sections   8,   9   and   10   of   the   ULC   Act   on   the   earlier <\/p>\n
declarations   filed   in   September,   1976   under   a   mis-\n<\/p>\n
conception or a wrong impression when the land was not <\/p>\n
a   “vacant   land”.     As   a   matter   of   fact,   after   making   the <\/p>\n
above   submissions   as   to   the   decree,   Mr.   Chowdhury <\/p>\n
requested   this   Court   to   issue  suo   moto  direction   to   the <\/p>\n
Registry for making necessary correction.\n<\/p>\n
25)    About the decree prepared by the Registry, though as <\/p>\n
per the Rules, the parties are permitted to point out error <\/p>\n
or   defect,   if   the   same   is   not   in   accordance   with   the <\/p>\n
decision   before   the   official   concerned.     Till   date,   the <\/p>\n
appellants   have   not   questioned   the   correctness   of   the <\/p>\n
decree, even now, there is no application for its correction.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                          51<\/span><\/p>\n
On   the   other   hand,   we   are   of   the   view   that   the   decree <\/p>\n
which   we   have   extracted   in   the   earlier   part   of   our <\/p>\n
judgment   makes   it   clear   that   the   allowing   of   the   appeals <\/p>\n
filed   by   the   State   in  Audikesava   Reddy’s   case  clearly <\/p>\n
means that the High Court judgment is set aside and the <\/p>\n
writ petitions are dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
26)    The   appellants   also   contended   that   the   decree   must <\/p>\n
follow   the   judgment   and   if   it   does   not   conform   to   the <\/p>\n
judgment then the same can be corrected.  As a matter of <\/p>\n
fact, Mr. Chowdhary, learned senior counsel appearing for <\/p>\n
the   appellants,   made   a   plea   for  suo   moto  correction   and <\/p>\n
reliance   was   placed   on   the   judgment   of   this   Court   in <\/p>\n
Lakshmi Ram Bhuyan vs. Hari Prasad Bhuyan,<\/a> (2003) <\/p>\n
1 SCC 197.  In this case, the High Court had modified the <\/p>\n
order of the trial Court.  After the matter came back to the <\/p>\n
trial   Court,   a   decree   was   prepared.     During   execution <\/p>\n
proceedings,   an   objection   was   raised   to   the   execution   as <\/p>\n
the   decree   did   not   contain   the   relief   granted.     The   trial <\/p>\n
                                                                          52<\/span><\/p>\n
Court   stopped   execution   and   issued   direction   for <\/p>\n
correction of the decree.   The matter was taken up to the <\/p>\n
High   Court   and   finally   to   this   Court.     On   perusal   of   the <\/p>\n
entire   factual   details,   we   find   that   this   judgment   has   no <\/p>\n
application   to   the   case   on   hand   as   these   proceedings   do <\/p>\n
not   arise   out   of   the   proceedings   for   correction   of   decree.\n<\/p>\n
As observed earlier, till date, no application has been filed <\/p>\n
for   correction   of   decree.     On   the   other   hand,   we   have <\/p>\n
already   held   that   in   the   case   on   hand   the   decree   is <\/p>\n
consistent   with   the   judgment.     As   the   High   Court   had <\/p>\n
allowed   the   writ   petitions   only   on   one   ground   based   on <\/p>\n
Atia  Begum’s  case  and  as  this  Court  had  overruled   the <\/p>\n
said judgment, it was not inclined to go into the question <\/p>\n
relating   to   filing   of   declaration   by   owners   under   wrong <\/p>\n
impression.     The   direction   that   the   appeals   are   allowed <\/p>\n
can   have   only   one   meaning   and   the   meaning   is   that   the <\/p>\n
judgment   of   the   High   Court   is   set   aside   and   the   writ <\/p>\n
petitions are dismissed.   In view of the same, there is no <\/p>\n
occasion   for   making   any   correction   even  suo   moto  and <\/p>\n
                                                                           53<\/span><\/p>\n
that   too   after   a   lapse   of   nine   years   from   the   date   of   the <\/p>\n
judgment.\n<\/p>\n
27)    To   meet   the   above   contentions,   learned   Attorney <\/p>\n
General has made an elaborate argument by drawing our <\/p>\n
attention to the decree prepared by the Registry.   In fact, <\/p>\n
we   also   summoned   the   original   decree   drafted   by   the <\/p>\n
Registry.    A   judgment   comprises   three   segments   (i)   the <\/p>\n
facts   and   the   point   at   issue;   (ii)   the   reasons   for   the <\/p>\n
decision   and   (iii)   the   final   order   containing   the   decision.\n<\/p>\n
Order   XX   CPC   requires   a   judgment   to   contain   all   the <\/p>\n
issues   and   findings   or   decision   thereon   with   the   reasons <\/p>\n
therefor.  The judgment has to state the relief allowed to a <\/p>\n
party.     The   preparation   of   decree   follows   the   judgment.\n<\/p>\n
The   decree   shall   agree   with   the   judgment.     The   decree <\/p>\n
shall contain,  inter alia, particulars of the claim and shall <\/p>\n
specify clearly the relief granted or other determination of <\/p>\n
the   suit.   The   very   obligation   cast   by   the   Code   that   the <\/p>\n
decree   shall   agree   with   the   judgment   spells   out   an <\/p>\n
obligation   on   the   part   of   the   author   of   the   judgment   to <\/p>\n
                                                                              54<\/span><\/p>\n
clearly indicate the relief or reliefs to which a party, in his <\/p>\n
opinion,   has   been   found   entitled   to   enable   decree   being <\/p>\n
framed in such a manner that it agrees with the judgment <\/p>\n
and specifies clearly the relief granted.  The operative part <\/p>\n
of the judgment should be so clear and precise that in the <\/p>\n
event of an objection being laid, it should not be difficult <\/p>\n
to find out by a bare reading of the judgment and decree <\/p>\n
whether   the   latter   agrees   with   the   former   and   is   in <\/p>\n
conformity   therewith.     The   obligation   is   cast   not   only   on <\/p>\n
the trial court but also on the appellate court.   Order 41 <\/p>\n
Rule   31   CPC   casts   an   obligation   on   the   author   of   the <\/p>\n
appellate   judgment   to   state   the   points   for   determination, <\/p>\n
the   decision   thereon,   the   reasons   for   the   decision   and <\/p>\n
when   the   decree   appealed   from   is   reversed   or   varied,   the <\/p>\n
relief  to  which  the  appellant  is  entitled.    It  is  well  settled <\/p>\n
by a catena of decisions of this Court that once a decision <\/p>\n
of   the   High   Court   is   set   aside   by   this   Court,   it   ceases   to <\/p>\n
exist.   It falls on all four corners and not open to contend <\/p>\n
subsequently   that   a   particular   aspect   or   argument   was <\/p>\n
                                                                               55<\/span><\/p>\n
not considered by this Court or that it can be relied upon.\n<\/p>\n
28)    In  Kausalya   Devi   Bogra   (Smt.)   and   Others  vs. <\/p>\n
Land   Acquisition   Officer,   Aurangabad   and   Another,<\/a> <\/p>\n
(1984) 2 SCC 324, this Court held that once the Supreme <\/p>\n
Court   sets   aside   a   judgment   of   the   High   Court,   the   High <\/p>\n
Court judgment is a nullity and cannot be revived.\n<\/p>\n
29)    In Ballabhdas Mathurdas Lakhani and Others vs. <\/p>\n
Municipal   Committee,   Malkapur,<\/a>   (1970)   2   SCC   267, <\/p>\n
this Court observed that a decision of the Supreme Court <\/p>\n
was binding.\n<\/p>\n
       “… on the High Court and the High Court could not ignore it <\/p>\n
       because   they   thought   that   “relevant   provisions   were   not <\/p>\n
       brought to the notice of the Court…””\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
30)    In  M\/s   Kesho   Ram   and   Co.   and   Others   Etc.  vs. <\/p>\n
Union  of  India  and  Ors.,<\/a>  (1989)  3  SCC  151,  this  Court <\/p>\n
held that:\n<\/p>\n
       “Once   Petitioners   challenge   to   Section   3   and   the   impugned <\/p>\n
       Notification was considered by the Court and the validity of <\/p>\n
       the   same   upheld,   it   must   be   presumed   that   all   grounds <\/p>\n
       which could validly be raised were raised and considered by <\/p>\n
       the Court.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
                                                                                     56<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
31)    Similarly,   in  Director   of   Settlements,   A.P.   and  <\/p>\n
Others  vs.  M.R.   Apparao   and   Another,<\/a>   (2002)   4   SCC <\/p>\n
638, this Court held thus:\n<\/p>\n
       “a   judgment   of   the   High   court   which   refused   to   follow   the <\/p>\n
       decision   and   directions   of   the   Supreme   court   or   seeks   to <\/p>\n
       revive a decision of the High court which has been set aside <\/p>\n
       by the Supreme court is a nullity.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
In view of the peculiar controversy, we read the judgment <\/p>\n
in  Audikesava   Reddy’s   case  carefully,   particularly, <\/p>\n
paras   13   to   17   and   we   are   satisfied   that   the   decision   of <\/p>\n
this   Court   has   been   correctly   drafted   by   the   Registry   in <\/p>\n
the form of a decree and there is no ambiguity as claimed <\/p>\n
by learned senior counsel for the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
32)    Learned Attorney General submitted that a judgment <\/p>\n
rendered   by   this   Court   cannot   be   collaterally   challenged <\/p>\n
as is sought to be done by the appellants in these appeals.\n<\/p>\n
For the said proposition, he relied on the following:\n<\/p>\n
       In Hunter vs. Chief Constable [1982] 1 A.C, Diplock <\/p>\n
LJ delivering his speech in the House of Lords enunciated <\/p>\n
                                                                                         57<\/span><\/p>\n
the   doctrine   of   `Collateral   attack   on   a   judgment   and <\/p>\n
observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
       “The abuse of process which the instant case exemplifies  is <\/p>\n
       the   initiation   of   proceedings   in   a   court   of   justice   for   the <\/p>\n
       purpose of mounting a collateral attack upon a final decision <\/p>\n
       against   the   intending   plaintiff   which   has   been   made   by <\/p>\n
       another   court   of   competent   jurisdiction   in   previous <\/p>\n
       proceedings   in   which   the   intending   plaintiff   had   a   full <\/p>\n
       opportunity of contesting the decision in the court by which <\/p>\n
       it was made.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
Quoting Halsburys, the learned judge observed:\n<\/p>\n
       “I think it would be a scandal to the administration of justice <\/p>\n
       if the same question having been disposed by one case, the <\/p>\n
       litigant   were   to   be   permitted   by   changing   the   form   of   the <\/p>\n
       proceedings to set up the same case again.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
33)    This   Court   has   approved   this   well   settled   principle <\/p>\n
that   a   judgment   of   the   Supreme   Court   cannot   be <\/p>\n
collaterally   challenged   on   the   ground   that   certain   points <\/p>\n
had   not   been   considered.     This   Court   in  Anil   Kumar  <\/p>\n
Neotia   and   Others  vs.  Union   of   India   and   Others,<\/a> <\/p>\n
(1988) 2 SCC 587 held that it is not open to contend that <\/p>\n
certain   points   had   not   been   urged   or   argued   before   the <\/p>\n
Supreme Court and thereby seek to reopen the issue.  The <\/p>\n
relevant portion of the judgment is as follows:\n<\/p>\n
                                                                                           58<\/span><\/p>\n
       “…   This   Court   further   observed   that   to   contend   that   the <\/p>\n
       conclusion   therein   applied   only   to   the   parties   before   this <\/p>\n
       Court   was   to   destroy   the   efficacy   and   integrity   of   the <\/p>\n
       judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141 illusory….. <\/p>\n
       It is no longer open to the Petitioners to contend that certain <\/p>\n
       portions had not been  urged and the effect of the judgment <\/p>\n
       cannot be collaterally challenged.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
34)    In  Palitana   Sugar   Mills   (P)   Ltd.   and   Another  vs. <\/p>\n
State   of   Gujarat   and   Others,   (2004)   12   SCC   645,   this <\/p>\n
Court   reiterated   the   principle   that   a   judgment   of   this <\/p>\n
Court is binding on all and it is not open to contend that <\/p>\n
the full facts had not been placed before the Court.  In this <\/p>\n
regard, para 62 of the judgment reads as follows:\n<\/p>\n
       “62.  It   is   well   settled   that   the   judgments   of   this   Court   are
\n       binding   on   all   the   authorities   under   Article   142   of   the
\n       Constitution and it is not open to any authority to ignore a
\n       binding   judgment   of   this   Court   on   the   ground   that   the   full
\n       facts   had   not   been   placed   before   this   Court   and\/or   the
\n       judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   earlier   proceedings   had   only
\n       collaterally or incidentally decided the issues ……”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
35)    In  A.V.   Papayya   Sastry   and   Others  vs.  Govt.   of  <\/p>\n
A.P. and Others,<\/a> (2007) 4 SCC 221, this Court observed <\/p>\n
as under:\n<\/p>\n
       “38.  The  matter  can   be  looked  at   from   a  different   angle   as
\n       well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law
\n       after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of
\n       the   plaintiff   applicant   which   is   upheld   by   all   the   courts
\n       including  the  final   court.  Let   us  also  think   of  a  case   where
\n       this   Court   does   not   dismiss   special   leave   petition   but   after
\n       granting   leave   decides   the   appeal   finally   by   recording
\n       reasons.   Such   order   can   truly   be   said   to   be   a   judgment   to
\n       which   Article  141   of   the   Constitution   applies.   Likewise,   the
\n       doctrine   of   merger   also   gets   attracted.  All  orders   passed   by <\/p>\n
                                                                                             59<\/span><\/p>\n
       the   courts\/authorities   below,   therefore,   merge   in   the
\n       judgment   of   this   Court   and   after   such   judgment,   it   is   not
\n       open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or
\n       authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
36)    Regarding the doctrine of merger, once the appeal of <\/p>\n
the State was allowed in  Audikeshava Reddy’s case  the <\/p>\n
net   result   was   that   the   High   Court   judgment   which   held <\/p>\n
that   the   proceedings   under   the   ULC   Act   were   vitiated <\/p>\n
stood   merged   in   the   decision   of   this   Court   in <\/p>\n
Audikeshava Reddy.   The logical sequitor of this is that <\/p>\n
the writ petitions filed by the appellants are deemed to be <\/p>\n
dismissed.     In  Kunhayahmed  (supra),   a   three   Judge <\/p>\n
Bench   of   this   Court   while   elucidating   the   doctrine   of <\/p>\n
merger  held   that   once   `leave’   is   granted   while   exercising <\/p>\n
jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, <\/p>\n
the doors of the appellate jurisdiction are opened.  It does <\/p>\n
not matter whether reasons are given or not.  The doctrine <\/p>\n
of merger is attracted as soon as `leave’ has been granted <\/p>\n
in a special leave petition.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                                         60<\/span><\/p>\n
37)    As   pointed   out   by   learned   Attorney   General,   the <\/p>\n
matter   can   be   looked   at   from   another   angle.     The <\/p>\n
proceedings in the instant case are barred by the principle <\/p>\n
of   constructive  res   judicata.     The   validity   of   the   ULC   Act <\/p>\n
were   squarely   in   issue.     The   effect   of   allowing   the   State <\/p>\n
appeals   in  Audikeshava   Reddy’s   case  is   that   all <\/p>\n
contentions   which   parties   might   and   ought   to   have <\/p>\n
litigated   in   the   previous   litigation   cannot   be   permitted   to <\/p>\n
be raised in subsequent litigations.\n<\/p>\n
38)    In  Forward   Construction   Co.   &   Ors.  vs.  Prabhat  <\/p>\n
Mandal  & Ors., (1986)  1 SCC  100, this  Court held  that <\/p>\n
an   adjudication   is   conclusive   and   binding   not   only   as   to <\/p>\n
the actual matter determined but as to every other matter <\/p>\n
which   the   parties   might   and   ought   to   have   litigated   and <\/p>\n
have had it decided.  The following portion of the judgment <\/p>\n
is relevant which reads as under:\n<\/p>\n
       “20.  So far as the first reason is concerned, the High Court <\/p>\n
       in   our   opinion   was   not   right   in   holding   that   the   earlier <\/p>\n
       judgment   would   not   operate   as   res   judicata   as   one   of   the <\/p>\n
       grounds taken in the present petition was conspicuous by its <\/p>\n
       absence in the earlier petition. Explanation IV to Section 11 <\/p>\n
                                                                                        61<\/span><\/p>\n
       CPC   provides   that   any   matter   which   might   and   ought   to <\/p>\n
       have been made ground of defence or attack in such former <\/p>\n
       suit   shall   be   deemed   to   have   been   a   matter   directly   and <\/p>\n
       substantially   in   issue   in   such   suit.   An   adjudication   is <\/p>\n
       conclusive   and   final   not   only   as   to   the   actual   matter <\/p>\n
       determined   but   as   to   every   other   matter   which   the   parties <\/p>\n
       might and ought to have litigated and have had it decided as <\/p>\n
       incidental to or essentially connected with the subject-matter <\/p>\n
       of   the   litigation   and   every   matter   coming   within   the <\/p>\n
       legitimate   purview   of   the   original   action   both   in   respect   of <\/p>\n
       the   matters   of   claim   or   defence.   The   principle   underlying <\/p>\n
       Explanation   IV   is   that   where   the   parties   have   had   an <\/p>\n
       opportunity of controverting a matter that should be taken to <\/p>\n
       be   the   same   thing   as   if   the   matter   had   been   actually <\/p>\n
       controverted and decided. It is true that where a matter has <\/p>\n
       been   constructively   in  issue  it   cannot  be   said  to   have  been <\/p>\n
       actually heard and decided. It could only be deemed to have <\/p>\n
       been heard and decided. ”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
<\/blockquote>\n
39)    In  Hoystead  vs.  Commissioner   of   Taxation  (1926) <\/p>\n
1 Appeal Cases 155, the Privy Council observed:\n<\/p>\n
       “Parties  are  not   permitted   to  bring  fresh  litigations  because <\/p>\n
       of new views that they may entertain of the law of the case, <\/p>\n
       or new  versions which they present as to what should be a <\/p>\n
       proper apprehension by the Court of the legal result either of <\/p>\n
       the   construction   of   the   documents   or   the   weight   of   certain <\/p>\n
       circumstances.  If this were permitted, litigations would have <\/p>\n
       no   end   except   when   legal   ingenuity   is   exhausted.     It   is   a <\/p>\n
       principle   of   law   that   this   cannot   be   permitted   and   there   is <\/p>\n
       abundant authority reiterating that principle.”<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
As   rightly   observed   by   the   High   Court,   what   is   utmost <\/p>\n
relevant   is   the   final   judgment   of   the   superior   Court   and <\/p>\n
not   the   reasons   in   support   of   that   decision.     Apart   from <\/p>\n
the legal position and the effect of allowing of the appeals <\/p>\n
and   dismissing   the   writ   petitions   by   this   Court,   the <\/p>\n
                                                                                           62<\/span><\/p>\n
contention with regard to the land being agricultural land <\/p>\n
was   raised   in   the   writ   petitions   which   were   the   subject <\/p>\n
matter   of   the   appeals   filed   in   this   Court.     In   these <\/p>\n
proceedings,   the   State   categorically   took   the   stand   that <\/p>\n
the   lands   are   not   agricultural.     It   was   brought   to   our <\/p>\n
notice   that   the   present   appellants   as   respondents   in   the <\/p>\n
earlier round did not urge this plea before this Court and <\/p>\n
no   such   arguments   were   advanced   before   this   Court.     In <\/p>\n
view   of   the   same,   the   appellants   are   not   entitled   to   raise <\/p>\n
any such contention now.   The effect of allowing the said <\/p>\n
appeals is that W.P.Nos. 18385 of 1993 and 238 of 1994 <\/p>\n
stood   dismissed.     Inasmuch   as   the   writ   petitions   having <\/p>\n
been   dismissed,   the   orders   passed   under   the   ULC   Act <\/p>\n
have   attained   finality.     The   declarations   which   had   been <\/p>\n
made and statements filed on 06.09.1976 and 25.07.1977 <\/p>\n
stand till today and these declarations are not even sought <\/p>\n
to   be   withdrawn.     In   those   circumstances,   as   rightly <\/p>\n
contended by the learned senior counsel appearing for the <\/p>\n
respondents, the prayer on the part of the owners in W.P.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                           63<\/span><\/p>\n
No. 4141 of 2006 made for the first time in 2006 after 32 <\/p>\n
years of filing of the statements under Section 6 and after <\/p>\n
26   years   of   the   conclusion   of   ULC   proceedings   was <\/p>\n
completely misconceived and was rightly rejected.\n<\/p>\n
40)    Before the High Court, the purchasers had contended <\/p>\n
that   the   original   owners   had   filed   the   declarations   under <\/p>\n
misconception and confusion.  Even before this Court, the <\/p>\n
purchasers had raised a similar plea when they found that <\/p>\n
the   observations   in  Atia   Begum’s   case  was   overruled.\n<\/p>\n
The   observations   in   paragraph   15   of   the   judgment   in <\/p>\n
Audikesava Reddy’s case  are in the context of the plea <\/p>\n
of   the   purchasers.     It   was   not   the   case   of   the   State   that <\/p>\n
the   original   owners   filed   any   statement   or   declaration <\/p>\n
under   the   ULC   Act   under   a   wrong   impression.     On   the <\/p>\n
other   hand,   this   was   a   contention   of   the   purchasers.\n<\/p>\n
However, in paragraph 15 of Audikeshava Reddy’s case, <\/p>\n
this   Court  did   not  even   go  into   the   question   because   the <\/p>\n
owners   were   not   before   it   and   perhaps   the   purchasers <\/p>\n
                                                                             64<\/span><\/p>\n
could not raise that plea.   This Court said,  “this question  <\/p>\n
is   left   open   to   be   decided   in   an   appropriate   case.”    This <\/p>\n
means that this was not a fit case for going into this issue <\/p>\n
and when a proper case filed by owner comes with such a <\/p>\n
plea   then   the   Court   would   consider   the   same.     It   follows <\/p>\n
that   the   appeals   were   allowed   “for   the   aforesaid   reasons”\n<\/p>\n
and   this   means   on   account   of   two   reasons.     The   first <\/p>\n
reason   is   the   overruling   of  Atia   Begum’s  case   and   the <\/p>\n
second   reason   is   that   the   Court   was   not   prepared   to <\/p>\n
examine the declaration filed by the owners at the behest <\/p>\n
of the purchasers.   In those circumstances, there was no <\/p>\n
necessity to remand, hence there is no order for remand.\n<\/p>\n
Therefore, the expression “appeals are allowed”   can have <\/p>\n
only   one   meaning   and   that   is   the   judgment   of   the   High <\/p>\n
Court is set aside and writ petitions are dismissed and the <\/p>\n
determination of ceiling already made remains intact and <\/p>\n
undisturbed.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                           65<\/span><\/p>\n
41)    The   appellants   contended   that   the   High   Court   had <\/p>\n
recorded   a   finding   that   the   land   is   agricultural   and   the <\/p>\n
State had taken up a ground saying that the land was not <\/p>\n
agricultural   land   and   was   a   vacant   land   but   that   point <\/p>\n
was not pressed before this Court in Audikesava Reddy’s <\/p>\n
case, hence to that extent the High Court judgment would <\/p>\n
operate   with   binding   effect   in   view   of   principles   of <\/p>\n
constructive  res   judicata.  We   accept   that   principle   of  res  <\/p>\n
judicata\/constructive  res judicata  is applicable to the writ <\/p>\n
proceedings.     However,   in   the   present   case,   the   Division <\/p>\n
Bench   finding   with   respect   to   nature   of   land   in   a   writ <\/p>\n
petition filed by purchasers does not survive after appeals <\/p>\n
of   the   State   were   allowed   and   after   this   Court   refused   to <\/p>\n
go   into   the   question   of   filing   of   statements   by   owners <\/p>\n
under   a   wrong   impression.     If   this   Court   wanted   the <\/p>\n
nature   of   land   to   be   separately   considered   then   it   would <\/p>\n
have   done   so   or   remanded   the   matter.     However, <\/p>\n
paragraph 15 of Audikesava Reddy’s case shows a clear <\/p>\n
intent to leave the declaration of the owner filed under the <\/p>\n
                                                                          66<\/span><\/p>\n
ULC Act intact.   In the case on hand, as observed earlier, <\/p>\n
no   part  of   the   judgment   of  the   High  Court   would  survive <\/p>\n
after the appeal is allowed unless and until it is expressly <\/p>\n
and   specifically   preserved.     In   view   of   the   same,   the <\/p>\n
contrary   contention   of   the   appellants   in   this   context   is <\/p>\n
unacceptable and unsustainable.  In any case, the owners <\/p>\n
are   bound   by   the   determination   of   surplus   land   by   the <\/p>\n
Competent Authority on the basis of their own declaration <\/p>\n
and  the  various  orders  passed  under  the  ULC Act.   They <\/p>\n
cannot be permitted to re-open the chapter after about 25 <\/p>\n
years.\n<\/p>\n
42)    Mr.   Chowdhary,   learned   senior   counsel   contended <\/p>\n
that  when  a  doubt arises  about what  the  Court  intended <\/p>\n
then   the   same   must   be   resolved   by   construing   the <\/p>\n
expressions inconsistent with the law.   He placed reliance <\/p>\n
on the following judgment of this Court:\n<\/p>\n
1.  Gajraj Singh & Ors. vs. State of U.P. & Ors<\/a> (2001) 5  <\/p>\n
SCC 762<\/p>\n
                                                                      67<\/span><\/p>\n
2.   Sarat Chandra Mishra & Ors.  vs.  State of Orissa  <\/p>\n
& Ors.<\/a> (2006) 1 SCC 638, 643  and<\/p>\n
3.     State   of   Haryana   &   Ors.  vs.  M.P.   Mohla,<\/a>  (2007)   1  <\/p>\n
SCC 457, 464<\/p>\n
On going through those decisions, we have no quarrel over <\/p>\n
the ratio laid down, however, there is no scope of applying <\/p>\n
them   to   the   present   case.     As   pointed   out   earlier,   the <\/p>\n
expression   `civil   appeals   are   allowed’   carry   only   one <\/p>\n
meaning, i.e., the judgment of the High Court is set aside <\/p>\n
and   the   writ   petitions   are   dismissed.     Moreover,   the <\/p>\n
determination of surplus land based on the declaration of <\/p>\n
owners   has   become   final   long   back.     The   notifications <\/p>\n
issued   under   Section   10  of   the   Act   and  the   panchanama <\/p>\n
taken possession are also final.   On behalf of the State, it <\/p>\n
was   asserted   that   the   possession   of   surplus   land   was <\/p>\n
taken   on   20.07.1993   and   the   Panchanama   was   executed <\/p>\n
showing that the possession has been taken.   It is signed <\/p>\n
by   witnesses.     We   have   perused   the   details   which   are <\/p>\n
                                                                       68<\/span><\/p>\n
available   in   the   paper   book.     It   is   settled   law   that   where <\/p>\n
possession is to be taken of a large tract of land then it is <\/p>\n
permissible   to   take   possession   by   a   properly   executed <\/p>\n
Panchanama.     [vide   Sita   Ram   Bhandar   Society,   New  <\/p>\n
Delhi  vs.  Lieutenant   Governor,   Govt.   of   NCT,   Delhi,<\/a> <\/p>\n
(2009) 10 SCC 501].\n<\/p>\n
43)    It is not in dispute that the Panchnama has not been <\/p>\n
questioned   in   any   proceedings   by   any   of   the   appellants.\n<\/p>\n
Though it is stated that Chanakyapuri Cooperative Society <\/p>\n
is   in   possession   at   one   stage   and   Shri   Venkateshawar <\/p>\n
Enterprises   was   given   possession   by   the   owners   and <\/p>\n
possession   was   also   given   to   Golden   Hill   Construction <\/p>\n
Corporation and thereafter it was given to the purchasers, <\/p>\n
the fact remains that the owners are not in possession.  In <\/p>\n
view   of   the   same,   the   finding   of   the   High   Court   that   the <\/p>\n
possession   was   taken   by   the   State   legally   and   validly <\/p>\n
through   a   Panchnama   is   absolutely   correct   and   deserves <\/p>\n
to be upheld.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                            69<\/span><\/p>\n
44)    It   is   relevant   to   point   out   the   conduct   of   the <\/p>\n
appellants   in   the   previous   proceedings   which   were <\/p>\n
highlighted by learned senior counsel for the State as well <\/p>\n
as APIIC.  They are:\n<\/p>\n
       a)   The   appellants   themselves   described   the   land   in <\/p>\n
       Survey No. 83 as “grazing land” in their declarations <\/p>\n
       filed under Section 6(1);\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
       b)   The   appellants   filed   declarations   under   the   Land <\/p>\n
       Reforms Act subjecting the land to the jurisdiction of <\/p>\n
       the Tribunal;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
       c)   filing   declarations   under   the   ULC   Act   treating   the <\/p>\n
       land in Survey No. 83 as vacant land;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
       d)   the   transaction   of   agreement   of   sale   entered   into <\/p>\n
       between GPA and Chanakyapuri Cooperative Housing <\/p>\n
       Society;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
       e)   Owners   and   Society   filed   applications   for <\/p>\n
       exemptions which were rejected;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n
                                                                          70<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
       f) Chanakyapuri Society pursued its remedies against <\/p>\n
       such rejection of exemption up to this Court in which <\/p>\n
       the   owners   through   their   Power   of   Attorney   were <\/p>\n
       sailing with the Society.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
In   fact   these   instances   were   projected   in   their   counter <\/p>\n
affidavit  before  the  High  Court  by  the  State  and  APIIC to <\/p>\n
non-suit   the   appellants.     Though   learned   senior   counsel <\/p>\n
for the appellants pointed out that these aspects were not <\/p>\n
highlighted   before   the   High   Court,   the   conduct   of   the <\/p>\n
appellants   as   regards   the   above   aspects   cannot   be <\/p>\n
ignored.\n<\/p>\n
45)    It   is   pointed   out   that   the   owners   themselves   have <\/p>\n
described the land in Survey No. 83 as “grazing lands” and <\/p>\n
“vacant land” in the relevant columns of their declaration <\/p>\n
under   Section   6(1)   and,   therefore,   the   proceedings   of   the <\/p>\n
competent authority under Sections 8, 9 and 10 are valid.\n<\/p>\n
Though   the   said   aspect   had   not   been   disputed   by   the <\/p>\n
appellants, however, it is pointed out that the mentioning <\/p>\n
                                                                       71<\/span><\/p>\n
of “grazing lands” in the said declaration is not conclusive.\n<\/p>\n
However, as observed earlier, their statements in the form <\/p>\n
of declarations before the authorities concerned cannot be <\/p>\n
denied.     In   fact,   we   were   taken   through   those   entries <\/p>\n
which   are   available   in   the   paper-book   in   the   form   of <\/p>\n
annexures.\n<\/p>\n
46)    About   the   sales   under   G.O.Ms.   No.   733   dated <\/p>\n
31.10.1988   and   G.O.Ms.   No.   289   dated   01.06.1989,   it   is <\/p>\n
the stand of the appellants that those government orders <\/p>\n
were passed on the basis of a policy to encourage building <\/p>\n
activity and in public interest under Section 20(1)(a) of the <\/p>\n
ULC Act.  According to the appellants, they are entitled to <\/p>\n
the benefits of G.O.Ms.No. 733 dated 31.10.1988 and they <\/p>\n
are   entitled   to   the   same   benefits   as   any   other   holder   of <\/p>\n
excess   vacant   lands   is   entitled   to   as   they   are   in   actual <\/p>\n
physical   possession   even   as   on   date   irrespective   of <\/p>\n
whether   the   Act   became   applicable   on   17.02.1976   or <\/p>\n
29.09.1980.     It   is   brought   to   our   notice   that   the <\/p>\n
                                                                          72<\/span><\/p>\n
amendment   made   in   G.O.Ms.   No.   217   vide   G.O.Ms.   No. <\/p>\n
733   dated   31.10.1988   is   applicable   only   in   the   cases   in <\/p>\n
which the possession of land had been taken over by the <\/p>\n
Government under Section 10(5) and 10(6) and according <\/p>\n
to   the   State   Government,   in   this   case,   possession   was <\/p>\n
taken   after   31.10.1988   as   pointed   out   by   learned   senior <\/p>\n
counsel   for   the   respondents,   the   declarants   cannot   avail <\/p>\n
the said benefit since even, according to them, they were <\/p>\n
not   in   possession   as   on   31.10.1988.     The   benefit   of <\/p>\n
G.O.Ms. No. 733 may be available if the declarants were in <\/p>\n
possession   and   up   to   31.10.1988   and   possession   was <\/p>\n
taken   by   the   Government   subsequent   thereto.   As   rightly <\/p>\n
observed   by   the   High   Court,   G.O.Ms.   No.   217   cannot   be <\/p>\n
interpreted   as   entitling   the   declarants   to   claim   benefit   of <\/p>\n
exemption   even   in   cases   where   they   were   not   in <\/p>\n
possession as on 31.10.1988.  The same was handed over <\/p>\n
to   the   Mandal   Revenue   Officer,   Sherlingampally,   even <\/p>\n
prior   to   that,   the   said   land   was   allotted   to   Hyderabad <\/p>\n
Urban   Development   Authority   vide   G.O.Ms.   No.   5013 <\/p>\n
                                                                         73<\/span><\/p>\n
dated   19.12.1980.     Admittedly,   the   said   Government <\/p>\n
Order   was   not   challenged   by   the   appellants.     In   those <\/p>\n
circumstances,   the   appellants   cannot   be   allowed   to   take <\/p>\n
the  benefit  of  G.O.Ms.  No.  733  since  this  is  not  merely  a <\/p>\n
case   where   the   appellants   were   dispossessed   but   the <\/p>\n
property   was   transferred   initially   in   favour   of   Hyderabad <\/p>\n
Urban   Development   Authority   and   later   to   APIIC   for <\/p>\n
utilizing   the   same   to   set   up   IT   Park   Project.     We   are <\/p>\n
satisfied   that   the   appellants   are   not   entitled   to   claim <\/p>\n
benefits   under   G.O.Ms.   No.733.   It   is   also   clear   from <\/p>\n
G.O.Ms.   No.   455   and   456   dated   29.07.2002   that <\/p>\n
occupation\/possession is sine qua non for the allotment of <\/p>\n
surplus lands.\n<\/p>\n
47)    Various third parties have filed separate applications <\/p>\n
by way of I.As in these appeals praying for certain reliefs.\n<\/p>\n
In   view   of   the   disposal   of   the   appeals,   they   are   free   to <\/p>\n
approach   the   appropriate   authority\/court   to   vindicate <\/p>\n
their grievance if the same is permissible under law.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                           74<\/span><\/p>\n
48)    In   the   light   of   the   above   discussion,   we   do   not   find <\/p>\n
any   merit   in   the   appeals   filed   by   the   appellants.\n<\/p>\n
Consequently, they are dismissed.  No order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n
                                              …………………………………….J.\n<\/p>\n
                                           (P. SATHASIVAM)                <\/p>\n
                                              ……………………………………J.\n<\/p>\n
                                             (DR. B.S. CHAUHAN) <\/p>\n
NEW DELHI;\n<\/p>\n
OCTOBER 8, 2010.\n<\/p>\n
                                                                            75<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Omprakash Verma & Ors vs State Of A.P. & Ors on 8 October, 2010 Bench: P. Sathasivam, B.S. Chauhan REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 998 OF 2007 Omprakash Verma & Ors. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. . … Respondent(s) […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-174468","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nOmprakash Verma & Ors vs State Of A.P. & Ors on 8 October, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/omprakash-verma-ors-vs-state-of-a-p-ors-on-8-october-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Omprakash Verma & Ors vs State Of A.P. & Ors on 8 October, 2010 - 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