{"id":175155,"date":"1961-05-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1961-05-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ramlal-motilal-and-chhotelal-vs-rewa-coalfields-ltd-on-4-may-1961"},"modified":"2016-10-15T03:40:59","modified_gmt":"2016-10-14T22:10:59","slug":"ramlal-motilal-and-chhotelal-vs-rewa-coalfields-ltd-on-4-may-1961","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ramlal-motilal-and-chhotelal-vs-rewa-coalfields-ltd-on-4-may-1961","title":{"rendered":"Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_citations\">Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR  361, \t\t  1962 SCR  (3) 762<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B.<\/div>\n<pre>           PETITIONER:\nRAMLAL, MOTILAL AND CHHOTELAL\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nREWA COALFIELDS LTD.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n04\/05\/1961\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nWANCHOO, K.N.\n\nCITATION:\n 1962 AIR  361\t\t  1962 SCR  (3) 762\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1968 SC 222\t (4)\n R\t    1972 SC 749\t (29)\n R\t    1988 SC 897\t (7)\n\n\nACT:\nLimitation-Condonation of delay in filing appeal-Period\t for\nwhich delay to be explained Indian Limitation Act, 1908 (Act\nIX of 1908) s. 5.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nIn an application under s.5 of the Indian Limitation Act for\ncondonation  of\t one day's delay in filing  an\tappeal,\t the\nquestion arose whether the appellant had to explain his con-\nduct  during  the  whole period prescribed  for\t filing\t the\nappeal\tor he has to explain the delay between the last\t day\nfor  filing the appeal and the date on which the appeal\t was\nactually  filed.  Section 5 of the Limitation Act lays\tdown\nthat  an  appeal  may  be  admitted  after  the\t period\t  of\nlimitation  if the appellant shows sufficient cause for\t not\npreferring the appeal \"within such period\".\nHeld,  that  it\t would\tbe  irrelevant\tto  invoke   general\nconsiderations\tsuch  as  diligence  of\t the  appellant\t  in\nconstruing  the\t words of s.5. The expression  \"within\tsuch\nperiod\" does not mean during such period and the failure  of\nthe  appellant to account for his non-diligence\t during\t the\nwhole  period  of limitation does not  disqualify  him\tfrom\npraying\t for  condonation of delay.  In\t showing  sufficient\ncause  for condoning the delay the appellant has to  explain\nthe  whole  of the delay covered by the period\tbetween\t the\nlast day of limitation and the date on which the appeal\t was\nactually filed.\nKrishna\t v. Chattappan, (1890) I.L.R. 13 Mad. 267,  referred\nto.\nKaralicharan  Sarma v. Apurbakrishna Bajpeyi, (1931)  I.L.R.\n58 Cal. 549, approved.\nKedarnath v. Zumberlal A.I.R. 1916 Nag. 39 and Jahar Mal  v.\nG. M.  Pritchard A.I.R. 1919 Pat. 503, disapproved.\nRam Narain Joshi v. Parmeshwar Narain Mehta (1902)\nL.   R. 30 I.A. 20, not applicable.\nIndar  Singh  v.  Kanshi  Ram (1917) L. R.  44\tT.  A.\t218,\nreferred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 276 of 1958.<br \/>\nAppeal from the judgment and decree dated August 6, 1955, of<br \/>\nthe, Judicial Commissioner&#8217;s court, at Rewa, V. P. in  First<br \/>\nCivil Appeal No. 16 of 1955.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">763<\/span><\/p>\n<p>S.   N.\t Andley,  Rameshwar Nath and P. L.  Vohra,  for\t the<br \/>\nappellants.\n<\/p>\n<p>D.   N.\t Pathak,  R. Mahalingier and B. C. Mishra,  for\t the<br \/>\nrespondent.\n<\/p>\n<p>1961.  May 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by<br \/>\nGAJENDRAGADKAR,\t J.-The\t short question which  falls  to  be<br \/>\nconsidered in this appeal relates to the construction of  s.<br \/>\n5  of  the Indian Limitation Act IX of 1908.  It  arises  in<br \/>\nthis  way.   The  respondent Rewa Coalfields  Limited  is  a<br \/>\nregistered  company whose coal-mines are situated at  Burhar<br \/>\nand  Umaria.   Its registered office is\t at  Calcutta.\t The<br \/>\nappellant  is  a firm, Chaurasia Limestone  Company,  Satna,<br \/>\nVindhya;  Pradesh,  by name and the three  brothers  Ramlal,<br \/>\nMotilal\t and  Chhotelal\t are its  partners.   The  appellant<br \/>\nprepares and deals in limestone at Maihar and Satna and\t for<br \/>\nthe  use  in  their lime-kilns it purchased  coal  from\t the<br \/>\nrespondent&#8217;s coal-mines at Umaria by means of permits issued<br \/>\nto   it\t by  Coal  Commissioner\t Calcutta.    According\t  to<br \/>\nrespondent&#8217;s case the appellant purchased from it 3,307 tons<br \/>\nof  coal at the rate of Rs. 14-9-0 per ton  between  January<br \/>\n1952,  and  March  1953.  The price for this  coal  was\t Rs.<br \/>\n48,158-4-0.   Since the appellant did not pay the price\t due<br \/>\nfrom  it the respondent filed the present suit in-the  Court<br \/>\nof the District Judge, Umaria, and claimed a decree for\t Rs.<br \/>\n52,514-14-0  including\tinterest accrued due on\t the  amount<br \/>\nuntil the date of the suit.\n<\/p>\n<p>A  substantial part of, the respondent&#8217;s claim was  disputed<br \/>\nby  the\t appellant.  It was urged by the  appellant  in\t its<br \/>\nwritten statement that the amount claimed by the  respondent<br \/>\nhad  been arbitrarily calculated and that for a\t substantial<br \/>\npart  of  the  coal  purchased by  the\tappellant  from\t the<br \/>\nrespondent  due price had been paid.  The appellant  pleaded<br \/>\nthat for some time past it had stopped purchasing coal &#8216;from<br \/>\nthe respondent and it was<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">764<\/span><br \/>\nobtaining its supplies from Messrs Sood Brothers,  Calcutta,<br \/>\nto  whom  payments for the coal supply had been\t duly  made.<br \/>\nThe  appellant admitted its liability to  pay  Rs.7,496-11-0<br \/>\nand  it expressed its readiness and willingness to  pay\t the<br \/>\nsaid amount.\n<\/p>\n<p>On  these  pleadings the learned trial\tjudge  framed  seven<br \/>\nissues.\t It appears that on the date when the respondent led<br \/>\nits  evidence and the appellant&#8217;s turn to lead its  evidence<br \/>\narrived\t an  application  for adjournment was  made  on\t its<br \/>\nbehalf\tto produce additional evidence which was granted  on<br \/>\ncondition  that the appellant should pay to  the  respondent<br \/>\nRs.  200\/-  as costs.  On the subsequent  date\tof  hearing,<br \/>\nhowever,  the appellant did not appear nor did it pay  costs<br \/>\nto  the respondent as ordered.\tThat is why the trial  Court<br \/>\nproceeded  ex-parte  against the appellant.  On\t the  issues<br \/>\nframed trial Court made findings in favour of the respondent<br \/>\nin  the light of the evidence adduced by the respondent\t and<br \/>\nan  ex-parte decree was passed against the appellant to\t the<br \/>\ntune  of  Rs.  52,535-7-0  with\t proportionate\tcosts.\t The<br \/>\nappellant  was also ordered to pay interest at 6% per  annum<br \/>\nfrom  October 6,1953, which was the date of the\t suit  until<br \/>\nthe date of payment.  This decree was passed on November  9,<br \/>\n1954.\n<\/p>\n<p>Against\t this decree the&#8217; appellant preferred an  appeal  in<br \/>\nthe  Court  of the Judicial Commissioner,  Vindhya  Pradesh,<br \/>\nRewa,  on  February 17, 1955 (Appeal No. 16 of\t1955).\t The<br \/>\nmain  contention raised by the appellant in this appeal\t was<br \/>\nthat  the ex-parte decree should be set aside and  the\tcase<br \/>\nremanded  to  the trial Court with the\tdirection  that\t the<br \/>\nappellant  should be allowed to lead its evidence  and\tthe,<br \/>\ncase disposed of in accordance with law in the light of\t the<br \/>\nsaid  evidence.\t On February. 19, 1955, the appellant  filed<br \/>\nan  application under s. 5 of the Limitation Act and  prayed<br \/>\nthat one day&#8217;s<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">\t\t\t    765<\/span><br \/>\ndelay  committed  by  it  in filing  the  appeal  should  be<br \/>\ncondoned  because  Ramlal,  one\t of  the  partners  of\t the<br \/>\nappellant&#8217;s  firm,   who was in charge of  the\tlimitation.,<br \/>\nfell  ill on February 16, 1955, which was the last date\t for<br \/>\nfilling\t the appeal.  This application was supported  by  an<br \/>\naffidavit and a medical certificate showing that Ramlal\t was<br \/>\nill   on   February   16,  1955.    The\t  learned   Judicial<br \/>\nCommissioner,  who heard this application, appears  to\thave<br \/>\naccepted  the  appellant&#8217;s  case  that\tRamlal\twas  ill  on<br \/>\nFebruary  16  and  that if only one day&#8217;s delay\t bad  to  be<br \/>\nexplained satisfactorily by the appellant his illness  would<br \/>\nconstitute sufficient explanation; but it was urged.  before<br \/>\nhim by the respondent that the appellant bad not shown\tthat<br \/>\nits  partners were diligent during the major portion of\t the<br \/>\nperiod of limitation allowed for appeal, and since they\t put<br \/>\noff  the  filing  of the appeal till the last  date  of\t the<br \/>\nperiod of Limitation the illness of Ramlal cannot be said to<br \/>\nbe  sufficient cause  for condoning the delay though it\t was<br \/>\nonly  one  day&#8217;s delay.\t On the other  hand,  the  appellant<br \/>\nurged that it had a right to file the appeal on the last day<br \/>\nand  so\t the.  delay of one day which  it  was\trequired  to<br \/>\nexplain\t  by  sufficient  reason  had  been   satisfactorily<br \/>\nexplained.   The  learned-Judicial  Commissioner,   however,<br \/>\naccepted the plea raised by the respondent and in substance,<br \/>\nrefused\t to excuse delay on the ground that the\t appellant&#8217;s<br \/>\npartner\t had showed lack of diligence and negligence  during<br \/>\nthe  *hole  of\tthe period of  Limitation  allowed  for\t the<br \/>\nappeal.\t  It  is  on this ground that  the  application\t for<br \/>\ncondonation  of\t delay\twas  rejected  and  the\t appeal\t was<br \/>\ndismissed on August 6, 1955.\n<\/p>\n<p>The appellant then applied to the Judicial Commissioner\t for<br \/>\na certificate and urged that on the question of construction<br \/>\nof  s.\t5  of the Limitation Act there\twas  a\tconflict  of<br \/>\njudicial  opinion&#8217; and so the point decided by the  Judicial<br \/>\nCommissioner  was one of general importance.  This  argument<br \/>\nwas accepted by the- Judicial Commissioner<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">766<\/span><br \/>\nand so a certificate of fitness has been issued by him under<br \/>\nArt.  133 of the Constitution.\tIt is with this\t certificate<br \/>\nthat  the  appellant has come to this Court,  and  the\tonly<br \/>\npoint  which  has  been\t urged on its  behalf  is  that\t the<br \/>\nJudicial  Commissioner\twas  in error  in  holding  that  in<br \/>\ndetermining the question as to whether sufficient cause\t bad<br \/>\nbeen shown within the meaning of s. 5 of the Limitation\t Act<br \/>\nit  was necessary for the appellant to explain\this  conduct<br \/>\nduring the whole of the period prescribed for the appeal.<br \/>\nSection\t 5 of the Limitation Act provides for  extension  of<br \/>\nperiod in certain cases.  It lays down, inter alia, that any<br \/>\nappeal\tmay  be\t admitted after\t the  period  of  limitation<br \/>\nprescribed therefore when the appellant satisfies the  Court<br \/>\nthat  he had sufficient cause for not preferring the  appeal<br \/>\nwithin\tsuch period.&#8217; This section raises two questions\t for<br \/>\nconsideration.\tFirst is, what is sufficient cause; and\t the<br \/>\nsecond,\t what  is  the meaning of the  clause  &#8220;within\tsuch<br \/>\nperiod&#8221;?   With the first question we are not  concerned  in<br \/>\nthe  present  appeal.  It is the second question  which\t has<br \/>\nbeen  decided  by  the\tJudicial  Commissioner\tagainst\t the<br \/>\nappellant.   He\t has  held  that  &#8220;within  such\t period&#8221;  in<br \/>\nsubstance means during the period prescribed for making\t the<br \/>\nappeal.\t In other words, according to him, when an appellant<br \/>\nprefers an appeal beyond the period of limitation prescribed<br \/>\nhe  must  show that he acted diligently and that  there\t was<br \/>\nsome  reason which prevented him from preferring the  appeal<br \/>\nduring the period of limitation prescribed.  If the Judicial<br \/>\nCommissioner  had held that &#8220;within such period&#8221; means\t&#8220;the<br \/>\nperiod\tof  the delay between the last day  for\t filing\t the<br \/>\nappeal and the date on which the appeal was actually  filed&#8221;<br \/>\nhe  would undoubtedly have come to the conclusion  that\t the<br \/>\nillness\t of  Ramlal on February 16 was a  sufficient  cause.<br \/>\nThat clearly appears to be the effect of his judgment.\tThat<br \/>\nis why it is unnecessary for us to<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">\t\t\t    767<\/span><br \/>\nconsider what is &#8220;a sufficient cause&#8221; in the present appeal.<br \/>\nIt  has\t been  urged  before  us  by  Mr.  Andley,  for\t the<br \/>\nappellant,  that  the construction placed  by  the  Judicial<br \/>\nCommissioner on the words &#8220;within such period&#8221; is erroneous.<br \/>\n In  construing\t s.  5 it is relevant to bear  in  mind\t two<br \/>\nimportant  considerations.  The first consideration is\tthat<br \/>\nthe  expiration of the period of limitation  prescribed\t for<br \/>\nmaking\tan  appeal gives rise to a right in  favour  of\t the<br \/>\ndecree-holder  to  treat the decree as binding\tbetween\t the<br \/>\nparties. In other words, when the period of limitation pres-<br \/>\ncribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a  benefit<br \/>\nunder  the law of limitation to treat the decree  as  beyond<br \/>\nchallenge,  and\t this legal right which has accrued  to\t the<br \/>\ndecree-holder by lapse of time should not be  lightheartedly<br \/>\ndisturbed.  The other consideration which cannot be  ignored<br \/>\nis  that  if sufficient cause for excusing  delay  is  shown<br \/>\ndiscretion is given to the Court to condone delay and  admit<br \/>\nthe appeal.  This discretion has been deliberately conferred<br \/>\non the Court in order that judicial power and discretion  in<br \/>\nthat  behalf  should  be exercised  to\tadvance\t substantial<br \/>\njustice.   As has been observed by the Madras High Court  in<br \/>\nKrishna v. Chattapan (1) &#8220;s. 5 gives the Court a  discretion<br \/>\nwhich  in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in\t the<br \/>\nway  in\t which\tjudicial power and discretion  ought  to  be<br \/>\nexercised  upon\t principles which are well  understood;\t the<br \/>\nwords &#8220;sufficient cause&#8217; receiving a liberal construction so<br \/>\nas  to\tadvance substantial justice when no  negligence\t nor<br \/>\ninaction  nor  want  of\t bona  fide  is\t imputable  to\t the<br \/>\nappellant.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>Now,  what do the words &#8220;within such period&#8221; denote ? It  is<br \/>\npossible  that\tthe  expression &#8216;,within  such\tperiod&#8221;\t may<br \/>\nsometimes  mean\t during such period.  But the  question\t is:<br \/>\nDoes  the  context in which the expression occurs  in  s.  5<br \/>\njustify\t the said interpretation ? If the limitation Act  or<br \/>\nany other<br \/>\n(1)  (1890) J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">768<\/span><\/p>\n<p>appropriate   statute\tprescribes  different\tperiods\t  of<br \/>\nlimitation either for appeals or applications to which s.  5<br \/>\napplies\t that  normally means that liberty is given  to\t the<br \/>\nparty intending to make the appeal or to file an application<br \/>\nto  act\t within the period prescribed in  that\tbehalf.\t  It<br \/>\nwould  not  be reasonable to require a party  to  take\t&#8216;the<br \/>\nnecessary  action on the very first day after the  cause  of<br \/>\naction\taccrues.   In  view  of\t the  period  of  limitation<br \/>\nprescribed the party would be entitled to take its time\t and<br \/>\nto file the appeal on any day during the said period and  so<br \/>\nprime facie it appears unreasonable that when delay has been<br \/>\nmade  by the party in filing the appeal it should be  called<br \/>\nupon  to explain its conduct during the whole of the  period<br \/>\nof  limitation\tprescribed.   In our opinion,  it  would  be<br \/>\nimmaterial and even irrelevant to invoke general  considera-<br \/>\ntions of diligence of parties in construing the words of  s.\n<\/p>\n<p>5.  The context seems to suggest that &#8220;within  such  period&#8221;<br \/>\nmeans  within  the period which ends with the  last  day  of<br \/>\nlimitation prescribed.\tIn other words, in all cases falling<br \/>\nunder s. 5 what the party has to show is why he did not file<br \/>\nan  appeal on the last day of limitation  prescribed.\tThat<br \/>\nmay inevitably mean that the party will have to show  suffi-<br \/>\ncient  cause not only for-not filing the appeal on the\tlast<br \/>\nday but to explain the delay made thereafter day by day.  In<br \/>\nother  words, in showing sufficient cause for condoning\t the<br \/>\ndelay the party may be called upon to explain for the  whole<br \/>\nof  the\t delay covered by the period between  the  last\t day<br \/>\nprescribed  for filing the appeal and the day on  which\t the<br \/>\nappeal\tis filed.  To hold that the expression &#8220;within\tsuch<br \/>\nperiod&#8221;\t means during such period would in our\topinion\t  be<br \/>\nrepugnant  in the context.  We would accordingly  hold\tthat<br \/>\nthe  learned Judicial Commissioner was in error\t taking\t the<br \/>\nview  that the failure of the appellant to account  for\t its<br \/>\nnon-diligence  during the whole of the period of  limitation<br \/>\nprescribed for the appeal necessarily disqualified it<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">\t\t\t    769<\/span><br \/>\nfrom  praying for the condonation of delay, even though\t the<br \/>\ndelay  in  question was only for one day; and that  too\t was<br \/>\ncaused by the party&#8217;s illness.\n<\/p>\n<p>This question has been considered by some of the High Courts<br \/>\nand  their  decisions  show a conflict\ton  the\t point.\t  In<br \/>\nKaralicharan  Sarma v. Apurbakrishna Bajpeyi(2) it  appeared<br \/>\nthat the papers for appeal were handed over by the appellant<br \/>\nto  his advocate in the morning of the last day\t for  filing<br \/>\nthe  appeal.  Through pressure of urgent work  the  advocate<br \/>\ndid  not look into the papers till the evening of  that\t day<br \/>\nwhen he found that was the last day.  The appeal &#8220;,as  filed<br \/>\nthe  next  day.\t According to the majority decision  of\t the<br \/>\nCalcutta  High\tCourt, in the circumstances  just  indicated<br \/>\nthere  was  sufficient\tcause  to  grant  the  appellant  an<br \/>\nextension of a day under s. 5 of the Limitation Act  because<br \/>\nit  was held that it was enough if the\tappellant  satisfied<br \/>\nthe  Court that for sufficient cause he was  prevented\tfrom<br \/>\nfiling the appeal on the last day and his action during\t the<br \/>\nwhole of the period need not be explained.  This decision is<br \/>\nin  favour of the appellant and is in accord with  the\tview<br \/>\nwhich we are inclined to take.\n<\/p>\n<p>On the other hand, in Kedarnath v. Zumberlal(3) the Judicial<br \/>\nCommissioner  at  Nagpur  has expressed\t the  view  that  an<br \/>\nappellant   who\t  wailfully  leaves  the   preparation\t and<br \/>\npresentation of his appeal to the last day of the period  of<br \/>\nlimitation prescribed therefore is guilty of negligence\t and<br \/>\nis  not entitled to an extension of time if some  unexpected<br \/>\nor  unforeseen\tcontingency  prevents him  from\t filing\t the<br \/>\nappeal within time.  According to this decision, though\t the<br \/>\nperiod covered between the last day of filing and the day of<br \/>\nactual filing may be satisfactorily explained that would not<br \/>\nbe  enough  to\tcondone delay because  the  appellant  would<br \/>\nnevertheless have to how why he waited<br \/>\n(2)  (1931)I.R.L 58 Cal 549,<br \/>\n(3)  A.I.R. 1916 Nag, 39<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">770<\/span><br \/>\nuntil  the  last  day.\tIn coming  to  this  conclusion\t the<br \/>\nJudicial  Commissioner has relied substantially on  what  he<br \/>\nregarded as general considerations.  &#8220;This habit of  leaving<br \/>\nthings to the last moment&#8221;, says the learned judge, &#8220;has its<br \/>\norigin\tin laxity and negligence, and in my opinion,  having<br \/>\nregard\tto  the increasing pressure of business in  the\t law<br \/>\nCourts\tand  the   many facilities  now\t available  for\t the<br \/>\npunctual filing of suits, appeals and applications  therein,<br \/>\nit is high time that litigants and their legal advisers were<br \/>\nmade  to  realise the dangers of the  procrastination  which<br \/>\ndefers the presentation of a suit, appeal or application  to<br \/>\nthe last day of the limitation prescribed therefore&#8221;.  There<br \/>\ncan be no difference of opinion on the point that  litigants<br \/>\nshould act with due diligence and care; but we are  disposed<br \/>\nto  think  that\t such general consideration  can  have\tvery<br \/>\nlittle\trelevance in construing the provisions of s. 5.\t The<br \/>\ndecision  of the Judicial Commissioner shows that  be  based<br \/>\nhis conclusion&#8217; more on this a priori consideration and\t did<br \/>\nnot address himself as he should have to the construction of<br \/>\nthe   section  itself.\t Apparently  this  view\t  has\tbeen<br \/>\nconsistently followed in Nagpur.\n<\/p>\n<p>In Jahar Mal v. G. M. Pritchard (4) the Patna High Court has<br \/>\nadopted\t the same line.\t Dawson Miller, C.J., brushed  aside<br \/>\nthe  claim of the appellant for condonation of delay on\t the<br \/>\nground\tthat &#8216;,one is not entitled to put things off to\t the<br \/>\nlast  moment  and hope that nothing will  occur\t which\twill<br \/>\nprevent\t them  from  being in time.   There  is\t always\t the<br \/>\nchapter\t of accidents to be considered, and it seems  to  me<br \/>\nthat  one ought to consider that some accident or other\t may<br \/>\nhappen\twhich will delay them in carrying out that  part  of<br \/>\ntheir duties for which the Court prescribes a time limit and<br \/>\nif  they  choose to rely upon  everything  going  absolutely<br \/>\nsmoothly  and wait till the last moment.  I think they\thave<br \/>\nonly themselves to blame if they should find that some<br \/>\n(4)  A.I.R. 1919 Pat.503.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">\t\t\t    771<\/span><\/p>\n<p>thing has happened which was unexpected, but which ought  to<br \/>\nbe  reckoned and are not entitled in such  circumstances  to<br \/>\nthe indulgence of the court.&#8221; These observations are subject<br \/>\nto  the\t same  comment that we have made  about\t the  Nagpur<br \/>\ndecision(3).\n<\/p>\n<p>It  is,\t however,  necessary to emphasise  that\t even  after<br \/>\nsufficient  cause has been shown a party is not entitled  to<br \/>\nthe  condonation of delay in question as a matter of  right.<br \/>\nThe proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for<br \/>\nthe exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the<br \/>\nCourt  by  s. 5. If sufficient cause is not  proved  nothing<br \/>\nfurther has to be done; the application for condoning  delay<br \/>\nhas  to\t be dismissed on that ground alone.   If  sufficient<br \/>\ncause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in\t its<br \/>\ndiscretion it should condone the delay.\t This aspect of\t the<br \/>\nmatter\t naturally  introduces\tthe  consideration  of\t all<br \/>\nrelevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the<br \/>\nparty or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but\t the<br \/>\nscope  of  the enquiry while  exercising  the  discretionary<br \/>\npower  after  sufficient cause is shown would  naturally  be<br \/>\nlimited\t only  to  such facts as the  Court  may  regard  as<br \/>\nrelevant.  It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the  party<br \/>\nwas  sitting idle during all the time available to  it.\t  In<br \/>\nthis connection we may point out that considerations of bona<br \/>\nfides or due diligence are always material and relevant when<br \/>\nthe  Court is dealing with applications made under s. 14  of<br \/>\nthe  Limitation Act.  In dealing with such applications\t the<br \/>\nCourt is called upon to consider the effect of the  combined<br \/>\nprovisions  of\tss. 5 and 14.  Therefore,  in  our  opinion,<br \/>\nconsiderations\twhich have been expressly made material\t and<br \/>\nrelevant  by  the  provisions of s. 14 cannot  to  the\tsame<br \/>\nextent\tand  in the same manner be invoked in  dealing\twith<br \/>\napplications which fall to be decided only under s.    5<br \/>\nwithout reference to s. 14.  In the present case<br \/>\n(3) A.I.R. 1916 Nag. 39.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">772<\/span><\/p>\n<p>there is no difficulty in holding that the discretion should<br \/>\nbe exercised in favour of the appellant be cause apart\tfrom<br \/>\nthe  general criticism made against the appellant&#8217;s lack  or<br \/>\ndiligence during the period of limitation no. other fact had<br \/>\nbeen adduced against it.  Indeed, as we have already pointed<br \/>\nout,  the  learned Judicial Commissioner  rejected  the\t ap-<br \/>\npellant&#8217;s  application for condonation of delay only on\t the<br \/>\nground\tthat it was appellant&#8217;s duty to file the  appeal  as<br \/>\nsoon as possible within the period prescribed, and, that  in<br \/>\nour opinion, is not a valid ground.\n<\/p>\n<p>It  now remains to refer to two Privy Council  decisions  to<br \/>\nwhich  our  attention  was drawn.  In Ram  Narain  Joshi  v.<br \/>\nParmeshwar  Narain Mehta (5), the Privy Council was  dealing<br \/>\nwith a case where on August 9, 1895 the High Court bad\tmade<br \/>\nan  order that the appeal in question should be\t transferred<br \/>\nto  the\t High.\t Court\tunder s. 25 of\tthe  Code  of  Civil<br \/>\nProcedure  and\theard  along  with  another  appeal  already<br \/>\npending\t there.\t  In making this order the  High  Court\t had<br \/>\ngiven  liberty to the respondent to make his objections,  if<br \/>\nany, to the said transfer.  On September 16, 1895 a petition<br \/>\nwas  filed on behalf of the appellant objecting to the\tsaid<br \/>\ntransfer;  and the&#8217; question arose whether sufficient  cause<br \/>\nhad  been  shown for the delay made by\tthe  party,  between<br \/>\nAugust\t9,  1895 to September 16, 1895.\t  The  decree  under<br \/>\nappeal\thad  been  passed on June 25, 1894  and\t the  appeal<br \/>\nagainst\t the said decree had been presented to the  District<br \/>\nJudge  on  September 1894.  It would thus be seen  that\t the<br \/>\nquestion  which arose was very different from  the  question<br \/>\nwith  which  we are concerned; and it is in  regard  to\t the<br \/>\ndelay made between August 9, 1895 to September 16, 1895 that<br \/>\nthe  Privy  Council approved of the view taken by  the\tHigh<br \/>\nCourt  that  the  said delay  had  not\tbeen  satisfactorily<br \/>\nexplained.  We do not see how this decision can assist us in<br \/>\ninterpreting the provisions of s. 5.\n<\/p>\n<p>(5)  (1902) L.R. 30 I.A. 20.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">\t\t\t    773<\/span><\/p>\n<p>The  next  case\t on which reliance has been  placed  by\t the<br \/>\nrespondent  is\tBri  Indar Singh v. K  anshi  Ram  (6).\t The<br \/>\nPrincipal point decided in that had reference to 8. 14\tread<br \/>\nwith  8.  5 of the Limitation Act, 1908;  and  the  question<br \/>\nwhich it was whether the time occupied by an application  in<br \/>\n(food  faith for review, although made upon a mistaken\tview<br \/>\nof the law, should be deemed as added to the period  allowed<br \/>\nfor  presenting an appeal.  As we have already pointed\tout,<br \/>\nwhen the question of limitation has to be considered in\t the<br \/>\nlight  of  the\tcombined operation of ss. 14 and  5  of\t the<br \/>\nLimitation  Act\t the conditions expressly imposed by  s.  14<br \/>\nhave to be satisfied.  It would, however, be unreasonable to<br \/>\nsuggest that the said conditions must to the same extent and<br \/>\nin  the\t same manner be taken into account in  dealing\twith<br \/>\napplications falling under s. 5 of the Limitation Act.<br \/>\nIt  appears  that  the provisions of s.\t 5  in\tthe  present<br \/>\nLimitation  Act are substantially the same as those in s.  5\n<\/p>\n<p>(b) and s. 5, 1 paragraph 2, of the Limitation Acts of\t1871<br \/>\nand  1877 respectively.\t Section 5A which was added  to\t the<br \/>\nLimitation Act of 1877 by the amending Act VI of 1892  dealt<br \/>\nwith  the  topic covered by the explanation to s. 5  hi\t the<br \/>\npresent Act.  The explanation provides, inter alia, that the<br \/>\nfact that the appellant was misled by any order, practice or<br \/>\njudgment of the High Court in ascertaining or computing\t the<br \/>\nprescribed  period  of limitation &#8216;may be  sufficient  cause<br \/>\nwithin the meaning of s. 5. The effect of the explanation is<br \/>\nthat  if the party who has applied for extension  of  period<br \/>\nshows  that the delay was due to any of the facts  mentioned<br \/>\nin  the\t explanation  that would be  treated  as  sufficient<br \/>\ncause,\tand  after  it is treated as  sufficient  cause\t the<br \/>\nquestion  may  then  arise  whether  discretion\t should\t  be<br \/>\nexercised  in favour of the party or not.  In the  cases  to<br \/>\nwhich  the explanation applies it may be easy for the  Court<br \/>\nto decide, that the dis-\n<\/p>\n<p>(6)  (1917) L.R. 44 I.A. 218.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">774<\/span><\/p>\n<p>cretion should be exercised in favour of the party and delay<br \/>\nshould\tbe  condoned.  Even so, the matter is still  one  of<br \/>\ndiscretion.  Under s. 5A of the Act of 1877, however, if the<br \/>\ncorresponding  facts had been proved under the said  section<br \/>\nthere  a pears to have been no discretion left in the  Court<br \/>\ncause  the said section provided, inter alia, that  whenever<br \/>\nit was shown to the satisfaction of the Court that an appeal<br \/>\nwas  presented\tafter  an expiration of the  period  of\t the<br \/>\nlimitation  prescribed\towing to the appellant\thaving\tbeen<br \/>\nmisled by any order, Practice or judgment of the High  Court<br \/>\nof  the\t Presidency, Province or District,  such  appeal  or<br \/>\napplication, if otherwise in accordance with law, shall\t for<br \/>\nall  purposes  be deemed to have been presented\t within\t the<br \/>\nperiod\tof limitation prescribed therefore.  That,  however,<br \/>\nis  a  distinction  which is not  relevant  in\tthe  present<br \/>\nappeal.\n<\/p>\n<p>In  the result the appeal is allowed, the delay of  one\t day<br \/>\nmade  in  filing the appeal is condoned, and the  case\tsent<br \/>\nback to the Court of the Judicial Commissioner for  disposal<br \/>\non the merits in accordance with law.  In the  circumstances<br \/>\nof  this  case the appellant should pay the  respondent\t the<br \/>\ncosts  of this Court.  Costs incurred by the parties in\t the<br \/>\nCourt  of the Judicial Commissioner so far will be costs  in<br \/>\nthe appeal before him.\n<\/p>\n<p>Appeal allowed.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">775<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961 Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR 361, 1962 SCR (3) 762 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Gajendragadkar, P.B. PETITIONER: RAMLAL, MOTILAL AND CHHOTELAL Vs. RESPONDENT: REWA COALFIELDS LTD. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 04\/05\/1961 BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. BENCH: GAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B. WANCHOO, K.N. CITATION: 1962 [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-175155","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ramlal-motilal-and-chhotelal-vs-rewa-coalfields-ltd-on-4-may-1961\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Ramlal, Motilal And Chhotelal vs Rewa Coalfields Ltd on 4 May, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; 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