{"id":175266,"date":"2004-09-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2004-09-16T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/m-p-high-court-bar-association-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-17-september-2004"},"modified":"2015-10-09T04:43:16","modified_gmt":"2015-10-08T23:13:16","slug":"m-p-high-court-bar-association-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-17-september-2004","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/m-p-high-court-bar-association-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-17-september-2004","title":{"rendered":"M.P. High Court Bar Association vs Union Of India And Others on 17 September, 2004"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
M.P. High Court Bar Association vs Union Of India And Others on 17 September, 2004<\/div>\n
Author: Thakker<\/div>\n
Bench: Cji R.C. Lahoti, C.K. Thakker<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  5327 of 2002\n\nPETITIONER:\nM.P. HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 17\/09\/2004\n\nBENCH:\nCJI R.C. LAHOTI & C.K. THAKKER\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
J U D G M E N T<\/p>\n
WITH<\/p>\n
CIVIL APPEAL No. 5328 OF 2002, CIVIL APPEAL
\nNO.          OF 2004 @ S.L.P.(C) No. 22648 of 2002,
\nCIVIL APPEAL NOs.        OF 2004 @ S.L.P.(C)
\nNos. 23615-23616 of 2002, CIVIL APPEAL Nos.\n<\/p>\n
8292-8295 OF 2002, WRIT PETITION (C) Nos. 369 <\/span><\/p>\n
OF 2003 AND 374 OF 2003<\/p>\n
Thakker, J.\n<\/p>\n
\tLeave granted in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 22648 of
\n2002 and 23615-23616 of 2002.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn the present group of matters, common questions of fact and
\nlaw have been raised by the parties.  It is, therefore, appropriate to
\ndecide all the matters by a common judgment.\n<\/p>\n
To appreciate the controversy raised and questions agitated in
\nthese matters, few relevant facts in the first matter, i.e., Civil Appeal
\nNo. 5327 of 2002 may be stated.  The appeal arises out of a judgment
\nand order dated May 14, 2002 passed by the High Court of Madhya
\nPradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 3531 of 2001.\n<\/p>\n
The said petition was filed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court
\nBar Association and another against the Union of India, State of
\nMadhya Pradesh, State of Chhattisgarh and the Chief Ministers of
\nboth the States.  The case of the petitioners is that the petitioner No. 1
\nis an Association of Advocates practising at the High Court of
\nMadhya Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal at
\nJabalpur as also Central Administrative Tribunal (Jabalpur Bench).
\nThe Association was constituted to look after and protect the interests
\nof its members.  One of the prime duties of the Association, asserted
\nthe petitioners, is to ensure that legal system in the State is not
\nattacked by an outside agency.  Its aim is also to advance the cause of
\njustice by speedy trial.  It has, therefore, locus standi to file a petition.
\nPetitioner No.2 is the President of the Madhya Pradesh Bar
\nAssociation.  He is a practising lawyer at the High Court as well as at
\ntwo Tribunals.  He is a citizen of India.\n<\/p>\n
The petitioners have stated that Parliament amended the
\nConstitution by the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 by
\nwhich several changes had been made.  As a consequence thereof,
\nArticle 323A came to be inserted in the Constitution with effect from
\nJanuary 3, 1977.  The said Article provided for constitution and
\nestablishment of Administrative Tribunals.  Those Tribunals were
\nempowered to adjudicate and decide disputes and complaints relating
\nto recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public
\nservices and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of
\nany State or of any local or other authority within the territory of India
\nor under the control of the Government of India or of any corporation
\nowned or controlled by the Government.   It also declared that the
\nprovisions of the said Article would have effect notwithstanding
\nanything in any other provision of the Constitution or in any other law
\nfor the time being in force.  The Article further provided for exclusion
\nof jurisdiction of all courts, “except the jurisdiction of the Supreme
\nCourt under Article 136”, with respect to disputes or complaints to be
\ndealt with by such tribunals.  Article 323A, however, is not self-
\nexecutory inasmuch as it did not take away the jurisdiction of courts.
\nIt merely enabled Parliament or appropriate legislature to make laws,
\nto set up such tribunals and to exclude jurisdiction of all courts except
\nthe Supreme Court.\n<\/p>\n
In exercise of the power conferred by Article 323A of the
\nConstitution, Parliament enacted an Act, called the Administrative
\nTribunals Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).  In the
\nStatement of Objects and Reasons, it was stated that with a view to
\ngive effect to the constitutional provision by providing for the
\nestablishment of an Administrative Tribunal, the Act has been
\nenacted.  The Preamble of the Act also recites that with a view to
\nprovide for the adjudication or trials by Administrative Tribunals of
\ndisputes and complaints with respect to recruitment and conditions of
\nservice of persons appointed to public services and posts in
\nconnection with the affairs of the Union or of any State or of any local
\nor other authority, the Act has been enacted.  Whereas Section 4
\nprovides for establishment of Administrative Tribunals, Section 5
\ndeals with composition of Tribunals and Benches.  Provisions relating
\nto qualifications for appointment as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
\nother Members as also their terms of office, salaries and allowances,
\netc. have been made in Sections 6 to 13.  Sections 14 to 18 deal with
\njurisdiction, power and authority of Tribunals.  Sections 19 to 27 lay
\ndown the procedure to be followed by such Tribunals.  Section 28
\nexcludes jurisdiction of all courts except the Supreme Court.\n<\/p>\n
Sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the Act enabled the Central
\nGovernment, on receipt of a request from the State Government to
\nestablish by a notification an Administrative Tribunal for the State to
\nexercise the jurisdiction, powers and authority conferred on the
\nAdministrative Tribunal for the State.  According to the petitioners, a
\nrequest was made by the State of Madhya Pradesh for the
\nestablishment of an Administrative Tribunal for the State.  The
\nCentral Government, in exercise of power under sub-section (2) of
\nSection 4 of the Act, therefore, issued a notification on June 29, 1988
\nfor establishment of a Tribunal known as the Madhya Pradesh
\nAdministrative Tribunal with effect from August 2, 1988.  The
\npetitioner stated that in pursuance of the notification, the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal had been established.  It was having a
\nPrincipal seat at Jabalpur and four Benches at Gwalior, Indore, Bhopal
\nand Raipur.\n<\/p>\n
The petitioners further stated that Parliament enacted an Act
\ncalled the Madhya Pradesh Re-organisation Act, 2000, (Act 28 of
\n2000) (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 2000”).  The said Act has
\nbeen enacted with a view “to provide for the re-organisation of the
\nexisting State of Madhya Pradesh and for matters connected
\ntherewith”.  Part II deals with re-organisation of the State of Madhya
\nPradesh into two States to be known as the State of Madhya Pradesh
\nand the State of Chhattisgarh and their territorial divisions.  Part III
\nprovides for representation in the Legislatures.  Part IV relates to
\nadministration of justice.  Part VIII deals with services.  It provides
\nfor All-India services, services in Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh
\nand other services as also power of the Central Government to issue
\ndirections. Section 74 of the Act touches jurisdiction of Commissions,
\nAuthorities, Tribunals, Universities, Boards and other statutory
\nbodies, constitutional validity and vires whereof has been challenged.
\nIt is, therefore, appropriate to re-produce the said section in extenso.
\n\t“74. Jurisdiction of the Commissions,
\nAuthorities and Tribunals.(1) Notwithstanding
\nanything contained in any law for the time being in force,
\nevery Commission, Authority, Tribunal, University,
\nBoard or any other body constituted under a Central Act,
\nState Act or Provincial Act and having jurisdiction over
\nthe existing State of Madhya Pradesh shall on and from
\nthe appointed day continue to function in the successor
\nState of Madhya Pradesh and also exercise jurisdiction as
\nexisted before the appointed day over the State of
\nChhattisgarh for a maximum period of two years from
\nthe appointed day or till such period as is decided by
\nmutual agreement between the successor States:\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tto continue such body as a joint body for the
\nsuccessor State or\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\tto abolish it, on the expiry of that period, for either
\nof the successor States; or\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tto constitute a separate Commission, Authority,
\nTribunal, University, Board or any other body, as
\nthe case may be, for the State of Chhattisgarh.\n<\/p>\n
(2)\tNo suit or other legal proceeding shall be
\ninstituted, in case such body is abolished under clause (ii)
\nof sub-section (1), by any employee of such body against
\nthe termination of his appointment or for the enforcement
\nof any service conditions or for securing absorption in
\nalternative public employment against the Central
\nGovernment or any of the successor States.\n<\/p>\n
(3)\tNotwithstanding anything contained in any law for
\nthe time being in force or in any judgment, decree or
\norder of any court or Tribunal or contract or agreement,
\nany Chairman or member of any body abolished under
\nclause (ii) of sub-section (1) shall not be entitled to any
\ncompensation for the unexpired period of his tenure.\n<\/p>\n
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section or
\nany law for the time being in force, the Central
\nGovernment shall, in accordance with any mutual
\nagreement between the successor States or if there is no
\nsuch agreement, after consultation with the Government
\nof the successor States, issue directions for the resolution
\nof any matter relating to any body referred to in sub-
\nsection (1) and falling within the jurisdiction of any of
\nthe successor State within any period referred to in sub-
\nsection (1).\n<\/p>\n
 \tSection 85 declares that the provisions of the Act shall have
\noverriding effect “notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
\ncontained in any other law.”\n<\/p>\n
\tBare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 74 makes it clear that
\nit declares that all Commissions, Authorities, Tribunals, Universities,
\nBoards or other bodies constituted under an Act of Parliament will
\ncontinue to function in the State of Madhya Pradesh as also in the
\nState of Chhattisgarh.  It, however, states that they will continue to
\nfunction for a maximum period of two years or “till such period as is
\ndecided by mutual agreement between the successor States”.  Sub-
\nsections (2) and (3) enumerate circumstances pursuant to the abolition
\nof such Tribunal.  Sub-section (4) allows the Central Government to
\nissue directions.\n<\/p>\n
The petitioners stated in the petition that in purported exercise
\nof the powers under sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Act, a
\ndecision was taken by the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as the
\nState of Chhattisgarh to abolish State Administrative Tribunal.  A
\nnotification was issued on 25th July, 2001 by the State of Madhya
\nPradesh by which the Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal
\nhad been abolished.  By a circular of even date issued by the State, it
\nhad been ordered that existing Chairman, Vice-Chairman and
\nMembers of the Tribunal would cease to function with immediate
\neffect irrespective of unexpired period of their tenure, if any.  By an
\norder of even date, the State Government terminated the services of all
\nofficers and employees other than those on deputation with immediate
\neffect as their services were “no longer required”.\n<\/p>\n
\tBeing aggrieved by the said actions, the petitioner-Association
\napproached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh by invoking Articles
\n226 and 227 of the Constitution.  A writ of Mandamus was sought to
\ndeclare Section 74 of the Act of 2000 unconstitutional and ultra vires.
\nIn the alternative, a prayer was made to issue a writ of Mandamus to
\nhold that Section 74 would not apply to State Administrative Tribunal.
\nA further prayer was made to quash and set aside a notification, a
\ncircular and an order dated July 25, 2001 by which the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal was sought to be abolished and consequential
\nactions were taken.\n<\/p>\n
Similar petitions were filed being W.P. No.3529 of 2001 by
\nA.K. Shrivastava, a Member of the Administrative Tribunal, W.P.
\nNo.3525 of 2001 by Sanjay Kumar Misra, W.P. No. 3551 of 2001 by
\nKamal Joshi, W.P. No.3554 of 2001 by Nemi Chand, all employees of
\nthe State Administrative Tribunal, W.P. No. 3597 of 2001 and W.P.
\nNo.4129 of 2001 by Madhya Pradesh Class III Government
\nEmployees Association.\n<\/p>\n
Notices were issued to the State of Madhya Pradesh and other
\nrespondents.  The respondents appeared.  An affidavit-in-reply was
\nfiled by the State of Madhya Pradesh supporting the actions taken by
\nthe Government.  It was asserted in the counter that establishment of
\nState Administrative Tribunal was not obligatory.  The State
\nGovernment was not bound to constitute the Tribunal.  It was,
\ntherefore, open to the State Government to create, continue or abolish
\nsuch Tribunal.  Since the power exclusively vested in the State
\nGovernment to create, continue or abolish the Tribunal, the Central
\nGovernment had no voice in the matter.  It was also stated that the
\nCouncil of Ministers of the State of Madhya Pradesh took a decision
\non November 21, 1985 for the establishment of State Administrative
\nTribunal in the State of Madhya Pradesh.  A request was, therefore,
\nmade to the Central Government to constitute State Administrative
\nTribunal and, accordingly, a notification was issued on June 29, 1988
\nand the Tribunal was constituted on August 2, 1988.  Initially there
\nwas only a Principal seat at Jabalpur.  Later on, three Benches were
\nestablished at Gwalior, Indore and Bhopal.  In 1997, even the fourth
\nBench was established at Raipur.  The deponent stated that over and
\nabove State of Madhya Pradesh, seven other States had established
\nState Administrative Tribunals.  In the affidavit in reply, it was the
\ncase of the respondent-State that despite very laudable object behind
\nthe establishment of Administrative Tribunals, the performance of the
\nTribunals always remained “far from satisfactory and the Tribunals
\nfailed to achieve the objects and goals for which they were
\nestablished”.  Reference was made to the report of the Arrears
\nCommittee (1989-90), known as “Malimath Committee” which
\nelaborately dealt with the functioning of Tribunals in the country.
\nCiting extensively the working of the Tribunals in the report of
\nMalimath Committee, it was asserted by the State that the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal failed to fulfill the object for which it was
\nestablished.  Moreover, after the landmark decision of the Supreme
\nCourt in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India<\/a> (1997) 3 SCC 261 :
\nAIR 1997 SC 1125, wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that
\nthe decisions rendered by the Tribunals constituted under Articles
\n323A and 323B of the Constitution of India would be subject to the
\nwrit\/supervisory jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226\/227
\nof the Constitution within whose territorial jurisdiction the particular
\nTribunal is functioning, there was virtually no need to continue such
\nTribunal.  It was the case of the respondent-State that in the light of
\ndeclaration of law in L. Chandra Kumar, Administrative tribunals
\nbecame “intermediate\/additional adjudicatory stratum”, “leading to
\nsubstantial increase in number of pending cases at the level of High
\nCourt”.  Several matters decided by such Tribunals were challenged
\nbefore High Courts.\n<\/p>\n
Other problems had also been highlighted by the respondent-
\nState in the counter-affidavit which necessitated the State to take a
\ndecision to abolish it.  It included steep increase in pendency of cases,
\nconstruction of infrastructure, huge finance, maintenance of recurring
\nexpenses, etc.  The policy makers of the State had been continuously
\nmonitoring the Tribunal’s progress and performance as dispensation
\nof justice was an important priority of the State.\n<\/p>\n
Parliament meanwhile passed the Act of 2000 on 18th
\nSeptember, 2000 providing re-organisation of the erstwhile State of
\nMadhya Pradesh into two States.  Sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the
\nAct allowed both the States to continue functioning of the Tribunal in
\nthe successor States. It, however, authorized them to take a decision to
\nabolish State Administrative Tribunal by mutual agreement.  Thus, the
\npower had been conferred by Parliament on States of Madhya Pradesh
\nand Chhattisgarh to take an appropriate decision with regard to
\ncontinuation or abolition of State Administrative Tribunal.  Such
\naction, therefore, cannot be said to be illegal or contrary to law.  The
\nAct of 2000 has been enacted by Parliament in exercise of powers
\nunder Articles 2 to 4 of the Constitution of India.  The Act, therefore,
\ncannot be said to be unconstitutional or ultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
Respondent No.1 Government of India also filed a counter-
\naffidavit confirming that the State of Madhya Pradesh was “free to
\nrecommend abolition of the Madhya Pradesh Administrative
\nTribunal”.  It was stated that the Central Government would examine
\nthe proposal of the State Government to abolish State Administrative
\nTribunal keeping in view several factors, such as, alternative forum
\nproposed by the State Government for disposal of pending cases,
\ncompensation\/rehabilitation of various functionaries of the Tribunal,
\netc.  On interpretation of Section 74 of the Act of 2000, the Central
\nGovernment stated that the State of Madhya Pradesh cannot of its own
\nabolish State Administrative Tribunal which was set up by the Central
\nGovernment under Section 4(2) of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
\n1985.  According to the deponent, Section 74(1) of the Act of 2000
\nwas “only an enabling provision to facilitate the State Government to
\ntake a decision about the continuance or otherwise of the Madhya
\nPradesh Administrative Tribunal”.\n<\/p>\n
Further affidavit was also filed by the State of Madhya Pradesh
\nwherein a reference was made to an order of Council of Ministers
\ndated 8th March, 2001 to abolish the Madhya Pradesh Administrative
\nTribunal.\n<\/p>\n
The Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,
\nafter hearing the parties, held that the provisions of sub-section (1) of
\nSection 74 of the Act of 2000 are intra vires the Constitution and the
\nState of Madhya Pradesh possessed power to abolish the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal.  No direction from the Central Government
\nas envisaged by sub-section (4) of Section 74 was required.
\nAccording to the Court, Section 74(1) conferred unfettered power on
\nboth successor States to take a decision in regard to the abolition of
\nTribunal.  It was thus in the exclusive discretion of the successor
\nStates and no power or authority had been given to the Central
\nGovernment in the said process.  The Court also indicated that
\nParliament appeared to have granted “an opportunity of re-
\ndetermination to both the successor States in view of substantial
\nchanged circumstances necessitating review of all existing bodies
\nkeeping the experience of the old State”.\n<\/p>\n
Regarding sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 74 of the Act of
\n2000, however, after considering Articles 309 and 310 of the
\nConstitution of India and Sections 8, 9 and 10 of the Administrative
\nTribunals Act, 1985, the High Court held that the State could not have
\nignored statutory and constitutional provisions.  Sub-sections (2) and
\n(3) of Section 74 were thus ultra vires Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the
\nConstitution.  The High Court, however, recorded the statement of the
\nlearned Advocate General of the State of Madhya Pradesh that the
\nState Government shall abide by the decision of the court with regard
\nto officers and employees of the Government.\n<\/p>\n
The High Court  also held that after taking a decision to abolish
\nthe Madhya Pradesh State Administrative Tribunal, the State
\nGovernment had to request the Central Government for issuance of
\nnecessary notification for abolition of such Tribunal since it has been
\nestablished by the Central Government.  According to the Court,
\nhowever, the Central Government had no option but to accept the
\nrequest of the State Government.   In the light of the said decision,
\nnotification, circular and order dated 25th July, 2001 were quashed by
\nthe Court.\n<\/p>\n
In the operative part of the judgment, the High Court issued
\nfollowing directions:-\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tThe State Government of Madhya Pradesh is
\nempowered under Section 74(1) of the M.P. Re-\n<\/p>\n
organisation Act to abolish the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\tNo directions from the Central Government as
\nenvisaged under sub-section 4 of Section 74 of the
\nAct of 2000 are necessary to take the above
\ndecision to abolish the Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tAfter taking decision to abolish the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal, the State Government
\nwill have to make request to the Central
\nGovernment to issue notification for abolish of the
\nState Administrative Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n
(iv)\tThe Central Government has no option but to
\naccept the request received from the state
\nGovernment to abolish the State Administrative
\nTribunal and accordingly issue a notification
\nrescinding the earlier Notification establishing the
\nsame.\n<\/p>\n
(v)\tThe sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 74 of the
\nM.P. Reorganisation Act are declared ultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
(vi)\tSince the notification (Annexure P-1) abolishing
\nthe State Administrative Tribunal has been issued
\nby the State Government itself, and not by the
\nCentral Government, the notification (Annexure P-\n<\/p>\n
1) shall stand quashed.\n<\/p>\n
(vii)\tConsequent to quashment of the Notification
\n(Annexure P-1), the Circular Annexure P-2) and
\nthe Order (Annexure P-3) also stand quashed.\n<\/p>\n
(viii)\tSince the Madhya Pradesh Ordinance No. 3 of
\n2001 has lapsed, no order is necessary to quash the
\nsame.\n<\/p>\n
(ix)\tOn abolition of the Tribunal, the Chairman, Vice
\nChairman and Members shall be entitled to have
\ncompensation for unexpired term of their services
\nfrom the State Government.  The details shall be
\nworked out as per principles of natural justice.\n<\/p>\n
(x)\tOn abolition of the Tribunal, the officers and
\nemployees thereof shall be dealt with by the State
\nGovernment as per their service conditions,
\nincluding their absorption in other Departments of
\nthe State Government.\n<\/p>\n
Being aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court, the Bar
\nAssociation instituted Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.16108 of
\n2002 on July 11, 2002.  It may be stated that in other matters also,
\nleave was sought by the petitioners to approach this Court by filing
\nSpecial Leave Petitions.  In Special Leave Petition Nos.23615 and
\n23616 of 2002, the decision upholding constitutional validity of sub-
\nsection (1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000 is challenged.  We may
\nalso observe at this stage that Writ Petition No. 374 of 2003 was filed
\nby one Chhadami Lal and Writ Petition No. 369 of 2003 by the
\nGovernment Employees Class III Association.  Union of India has
\nalso challenged the decision of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in
\nCivil Appeal Nos.8292-95 of 2002 against certain directions of the
\nHigh Court.\n<\/p>\n
On August 26, 2002, leave was granted by this Court and
\nhearing was ordered to be expedited.  Other matters which were
\nsubsequently filed were also ordered to be heard along with Civil
\nAppeal No.5327 of 2002.\n<\/p>\n
We have heard the learned counsel for all the parties.
\nMr. Prashant Bhushan, learned counsel for the appellant
\ncontended that the action of abolishing Madhya Pradesh State
\nAdministrative Tribunal is illegal, improper and unlawful.  According
\nto him, the State Administrative Tribunal had been established under
\nthe Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 enacted by Parliament in
\nexercise of power under Article 323A of the Constitution.  Such
\nTribunal, therefore, cannot be abolished by a State.  It was further
\nsubmitted that Section 74 of the Act of 2000 by which Parliament
\nauthorized the State Government to discontinue or abolish State
\nAdministrative Tribunal is ultra vires the Constitution as no such
\npower could have been delegated to the State.  It was also urged that
\nthe delegation of power to abolish State Administrative Tribunal
\nconferred on the State Government by Parliament under the Act of
\n2000 is in the nature of “excessive delegation” and would be
\ninconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution as also contrary to
\nseveral decisions rendered by this Court wherein it has been observed
\nthat a competent legislature cannot delegate essential legislative
\nfunction or legislative policy.  The High Court, in the circumstances,
\nought to have declared sub-section (1) of Section 74 ultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
Alternatively, it was submitted that even if this Court holds that
\nParliament was competent to delegate its power to the State
\nGovernment to discontinue the State Administrative Tribunal, the
\nimpugned action of the State of Madhya Pradesh is illegal, unlawful
\nand mala fide.  It was contended that the Tribunal has been abolished
\nas, according to the Government, in many matters it had passed orders
\nagainst the Government and granted interim relief in “transfer”
\nmatters.  It was, therefore, contended that what weighed with the State
\nGovernment for abolishing the State Administrative Tribunal was
\n“judicial orders” passed by a competent Tribunal in exercise of its
\nundoubted jurisdiction thereby taking into account irrelevant
\nconsideration and such a decision cannot be said to be a decision in
\nthe eye of law and the action deserves to be set aside.\n<\/p>\n
It was also urged that from the affidavit in reply filed on behalf
\nof the State, it was clear that it had also considered the criticism
\nagainst working of Tribunals by Malimath Committee.  The report of
\nthe said Committee, however, has been commented upon by this
\nCourt in L. Chandra Kumar and the criticism by the said Committee
\nagainst the working of the Tribunals was not approved.  It was,
\ntherefore, submitted that if on the basis of such criticism an action is
\ntaken, the same deserves to be quashed.\n<\/p>\n
On merits, counsel contended that there was no need for
\nabolishing the Tribunal. No reasons for such abolition have been
\nmentioned anywhere.  No study was conducted regarding functioning
\nof the Tribunal.  Statistics had shown that several cases had been
\nadjudicated and decided by the Tribunal and even after the decision of
\nthis Court in L. Chandra Kumar, only few matters had reached the
\nHigh Court and in the rest of the matters, the decisions of the Tribunal
\nhad not been challenged.  Thus, it was not right, as stated by the State
\nof Madhya Pradesh, that after the decision in L. Chandra Kumar, the
\nTribunal remained as “additional tier” in the administration of justice.
\nIf that was the basis and foundation on which the State had taken a
\ndecision, the same being incorrect in fact and untenable at law, the
\norder of abolishing the Tribunal deserves to be set aside.  In this
\nconnection, the counsel submitted that ambit and scope of jurisdiction
\nof Administrative Tribunals exercising power under the Act and of the
\nHigh Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is totally
\ndifferent and distinct.  Even if the decision rendered by the Tribunal
\ncan be made subject matter of writ jurisdiction\/supervisory
\njurisdiction of a High Court under Article 226\/227 of the Constitution,
\nthe later exercises the power of “judicial review” and neither original
\nnor appellate power.  The sweep and extent of two jurisdictions
\ncannot be compared.  The learned counsel submitted that all these
\npoints have not been appreciated in their proper perspective by the
\nHigh Court and the decision of the High Court suffers from non-
\napplication of mind and non-consideration of relevant aspects and
\nneeds interference.\n<\/p>\n
Other counsel appearing in the remaining matters supported Mr.
\nPrashant Bhushan and adopted the arguments put forward by him.
\nThey also submitted that an attempt has been made by the State of
\nMadhya Pradesh to interfere with judicial functioning of the Tribunal
\nwhich is violative of the “basic feature of the Constitution” which
\nprotects and safeguards the independence of judiciary and such action
\ndeserves to be quashed and set aside by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. B. Datta, learned Additional Solicitor General for the
\nUnion of India has voiced grievance against some of the conclusions
\nreached by the High Court, particularly, that the State of Madhya
\nPradesh has the authority to abolish the State Administrative Tribunal
\nand if a request is made by the State Government to the Central
\nGovernment to abolish the Tribunal, the latter has no option but to
\naccept such request.\n<\/p>\n
The learned counsel appearing for the State of Madhya Pradesh,
\non the other hand, supported the order passed by the High Court.
\nAccording to him, the State Administrative Tribunal was constituted
\nand established in the State only at the request of the State of Madhya
\nPradesh.  It was, therefore, clear that the State of Madhya Pradesh
\nwanted establishment of such Tribunal.  Obviously, therefore, it was
\nopen to the State if it felt that continuance of such Tribunal would not
\nbe in the larger interest.  It was also urged by the counsel that the State
\nGovernment realised the need and necessity of such Tribunal in the
\nlight of the provisions of Article 323A of the Constitution as amended
\nby the Constitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976 and after 1985 Act
\nby Parliament.  The counsel also submitted that the validity of 1985
\nAct came up for consideration before this Court in S.P. Sampath
\nKumar v. Union of India<\/a> (1987) 1 SCC 124 : AIR 1987 SC 386 and
\nthe constitutional validity of the Act had been upheld.  Virtually
\ntherefore, after the decision in S.P. Sampath Kumar, the
\nAdministrative Tribunal was held “substitute” of the High Court.  The
\nState of Madhya Pradesh, therefore, thought it proper to have such
\nTribunal.  Accordingly, a request was made and the Tribunal was
\nestablished in 1988.  But the position was substantially altered after
\nthe decision in L.Chandra Kumar.  In the said case, this Court held
\nthat the power of “judicial review” conferred on all High Courts by
\nthe Constitution is a basic feature of the Constitution.  Such power
\ncannot be taken away even by an amendment in the Constitution.
\nClause (d) of Article 323A(2) and Clause (d) of Article 323B(3) of the
\nConstitution were, therefore, held ultra vires.  The consequence of the
\ndecision in L. Chandra Kumar was that after a decision by the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal, an aggrieved party can approach the High
\nCourt within the territorial jurisdiction of which a decision has been
\nrendered by such Tribunal and such decision could be made subject
\nmatter of judicial review before the High Court.  Considering the
\nabove fact, the Council of Ministers thought that it would not be
\nappropriate to have such Tribunal in view of the decision in L.
\nChandra Kumar.  According to the counsel, such a decision could
\nnever be termed as arbitrary, unreasonable or mala fide.  Therefore,
\neven if it is assumed that all the matters which had been decided by an
\nAdministrative Tribunal may not be taken to High Court, it cannot
\nprevent the Council of Ministers to take an appropriate decision as to
\ncontinuance or otherwise of the State Administrative Tribunal.  It was
\na policy decision.  The question is not of advisability or propriety of
\nsuch decision, but legality and constitutionality thereof.  If the
\ndecision is otherwise legal, valid and in accordance with law, it cannot
\nbe set aside.  A court of law can interfere with such decision only if it
\nis unconstitutional or without authority of law. It was submitted that
\neven Parliament considered the fact that the Tribunal was established
\nfor adjudication of service disputes in the State of Madhya Pradesh
\nand at the request of the State, such Tribunal was constituted.  Hence,
\na provision was made in Section 74 of the Act enabling the State
\nGovernments to continue or not to continue such Tribunal.  Such a
\nprovision cannot be termed arbitrary or unreasonable.  There is no
\ndelegation of legislative power by Parliament on the State. Since, the
\nState Government had requested the Central Government to constitute
\na Tribunal and a Tribunal had been constituted, Parliament thought it
\nappropriate to authorize the State Government to decide as to whether
\nsuch Tribunal should be continued or abolished.  There is, thus, no
\n“excessive delegation” in such matters and the High Court was fully
\njustified in repelling the contention of the petitioners-appellants and in
\ndismissing the petition.\n<\/p>\n
Regarding mala fide exercise of power, it was submitted that
\nthere was no material to show that the action was not bona fide or has
\nbeen taken in colourable exercise of power.  There is nothing to
\nsubstantiate such bald allegations.  Though it was asserted that the
\nTribunal has been abolished because it had passed certain “judicial
\norders”, it is merely ipse dixit and based on newspaper reports.  From
\nthe record, it is clear that the State considered the decision in L.
\nChandra Kumar and a satisfaction had been reached by the Council of
\nMinisters that there would be “one more tier” if Administrative
\nTribunal would be continued.  Accordingly, it was resolved to abolish
\nthe Tribunal.  Such a decision cannot be said malicious or mala fide.
\nIt was, therefore, submitted that the appeal deserves to be dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
So far as constitutional validity and vires of sub-section (1) of
\nSection 74 of the Act is concerned, in Mukesh Kumar Misra and
\nAnother v. Union of India and Others (W.P. No.2398 of<\/a> 2001 decided
\non 3rd July, 2001), the Division Bench of the High Court of Madhya
\nPradesh upheld the validity thereof.  Considering the provisions of the
\nConstitution including Article 323A and the relevant provisions of the
\nAct, the Court held that Parliament was competent to enact the Act of
\n2000 and it was open to Parliament to confer power on the States of
\nMadhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh to take an appropriate decision as
\nto continuance or otherwise of any Commission, Authority, Tribunal,
\nUniversity, Board or any other body constituted under the Central Act,
\nState Act or Provincial Act “having jurisdiction over the existing State
\nof Madhya Pradesh”.  The Court also held that discretion had been
\nconferred on both the State Governments to abolish the Tribunal if
\nthey wished to do so.  The Court noted that Article 323A of the
\nConstitution was merely an enabling provision and it was not
\nincumbent on State Governments to constitute a Tribunal under the
\nAct of 1985.  In the opinion of the Court, there was no inconsistency
\nor conflict between Section 74(1) of the Act of 2000 and Article 323A
\nof the Constitution or Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act,
\n1985.  It was also observed that sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the
\nAct of 2000 opens with non obstante clause (“Notwithstanding
\nanything contained in any other law for the time being in force”) and
\nallows the States of Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh to continue or
\nto abolish Tribunals in the respective States.  In this connection, it is
\nalso profitable to refer to Section 85 which declares that the
\nprovisions of “this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything
\ninconsistent therewith contained in any other law”.   Conjoint reading
\nof Article 323A of the Constitution, Section 4 of the Administrative
\nTribunals Act 1985 and Sections 74(1) and 85 of the Act of 2000, in
\nour considered opinion, leaves no room of doubt that Parliament
\nauthorized the State of Madhya Pradesh as well as the new State of
\nChhattisgarh to take an appropriate decision with regard to State
\nAdministrative Tribunals having jurisdiction over those States.
\nParliament empowered both the successor States to take an
\nappropriate decision to continue such Tribunals, to abolish them or to
\nconstitute  separate Tribunals.  It cannot be said that by enacting such
\na provision, Parliament had violated any mandate or the Act of 2000
\nis ultra vires Article 323A or any other part of the Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
It was then contended that once the power to constitute a
\nTribunal had been exercised, Parliament was denuded of any power to
\nmake any legislation providing for abolition of such Tribunal.  The
\nDivision Bench negatived the contention and observed :
\n“It is difficult to swallow that Parliament after
\nenacting law on a particular subject shall have no power
\nto amend, modify or repeal the same.  The power of the
\nParliament, in our opinion, does not exhaust by
\nenactment of any law and we are of the considered
\nopinion that Parliament can make law in relation to a
\nsubject for which it has the legislative competence,
\nnotwithstanding the fact that law on a particular subject
\nwas enacted by the Parliament earlier.  The theory of
\nexhaustation is unknown so far as the legislative powers
\nare concerned.  What Parliament has done, Parliament
\ncan undo.”\n<\/p>\n
The above observations, in our view, are in consonance with
\nlaw and lay down correct proposition of law.\n<\/p>\n
We are also not impressed by the argument of the learned
\ncounsel for the appellants that in the light of the ratio laid down by
\nthis Court in L. Chandra Kumar, an Administrative Tribunal
\nconstituted under the 1985 Act cannot be abolished.  What has been
\nheld by this Court in L. Chandra Kumar was that the jurisdiction
\nconferred on this Court under Articles 32 and 136 of the Constitution
\nas also of the High Courts under Articles 226 and 227 of the
\nConstitution is a part of the “basic structure” of our Constitution.
\nThat jurisdiction cannot be ousted by making any provision in the
\nConstitution also.  So far as Tribunals are concerned, they may
\nperform a “supplemental role” in the discharge of power conferred
\nupon the Supreme Court as well as upon High Courts.  From that,
\nhowever, it cannot be said that once a Tribunal is constituted, created
\nor established, there is no power either in the Central Government or
\nState Governments to abolish it.  There is no constitutional or
\nstatutory prohibition against exercise of such power.  To us, it is clear
\nthat Parliament which allowed the State Government to request the
\nCentral Government for establishment of an Administrative Tribunal
\nunder the 1985 Act has authority, power and jurisdiction to enable the
\nState Government to take an appropriate decision to continue or  not
\nto continue such Tribunal and a provision by Parliament authorizing
\nthe State Government to abolish such Tribunal, by no stretch of
\nimagination, can be held ultra vires the Constitution or inconsistent
\nwith the law laid down by this Court in L. Chandra Kumar.\n<\/p>\n
\tUnder the Constitution of India, the power to legislate is with
\nthe Legislature.  The said power of making laws, therefore, cannot be
\ndelegated by the Legislature to the Executive.  In other words, a
\nLegislature can neither create a parallel legislature nor destroy its
\nlegislative power.  The essential legislative function must be retained
\nby the Legislature itself.  Such function consists of the determination
\nof legislative policy and its formulation as a binding rule of conduct.
\nBut it is also equally well-settled that once the essential legislative
\nfunction is performed by the Legislature and the policy has been laid
\ndown, it is always open to the Legislature to delegate to the Executive
\nauthority ancillary and subordinate powers necessary for carrying out
\nthe policy and purposes of the Act as may be necessary to make the
\nlegislation complete, effective and useful.\n<\/p>\n
\tMr. Bhushan, learned counsel for the appellants invited our
\nattention to the leading case of In re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 (1951
\nSCR 747).  The question which arose before this Court in that case
\nwas of “great public importance” and was “first of its kind”.  The
\nCentral Government was authorized by Section 2 of Part C States
\n(Laws) Act, 1950 to extend to any Part C State with such
\nmodifications and restrictions as it thinks fit, any enactment in force in
\nPart A State.  While doing so, the Government was also authorized to
\nrepeal or amend any corresponding law (other than a Central Act)
\nwhich might be in force in Part C State.  While dealing with the
\nReference under Article 143 of the Constitution of India, this Court
\nopined that keeping the exigencies of the modern Government in
\nview, Parliament and State Legislatures in India needed to delegate
\nlegislative power, if they were to be able to face the multitudinous
\nproblems facing the country, as it was neither practicable nor feasible
\nto expect each of the legislative bodies to enact complete and
\ncomprehensive legislation on all subjects sought to be legislated upon.
\nIt was also observed that since the legislatures in India derive their
\npowers from written Constitution, they could not be allowed the same
\nfreedom as the British Parliament has in the matter of delegation.\n<\/p>\n
\tRelying on some of the observations, the learned counsel
\nsubmitted that the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the
\nAct of 2000 must be held ultra vires.  The counsel referred to the
\nfollowing observations of Kania, C.J.:\n<\/p>\n
\t“A fair and close reading and analysis of all these
\ndecisions of the Privy Council, the judgments of the
\nSupreme Courts of Canada and Australia without
\nstretching and straining the words and expressions used
\ntherein lead me to the conclusion that while a legislature,
\nas a part of its legislative functions, can confer powers to
\nmake rules and regulations for carrying the enactment
\ninto operation and effect, and while a legislature has
\npower to lay down the policy and principles providing
\nthe rule of conduct, and while it may further provide that
\non certain date or facts being found and ascertained by an
\nexecutive authority, the operation of the Act can be
\nextended to certain areas or may be brought into force on
\nsuch determination which is described as conditional
\nlegislation the power to delegate legislative functions
\ngenerally is not warranted under the Constitution of India
\nat any stage.  In cases of emergency, like war where a
\nlarge latitude has to be necessarily left in the matter of
\nenforcing regulations to the executive, the scope of the
\npower to make regulations is very wide, but even in those
\ncase the suggestion that there was delegation of
\n“legislative functions” has been repudiated.  Similarly,
\nvarying according to the necessities of the case and the
\nnature of the legislation, the doctrine of conditional
\nlegislation or subsidiary legislation or ancillary
\nlegislation is equally upheld under all the Constitutions.
\nIn my opinion, therefore, the contention urged by the
\nlearned Attorney General that legislative power carries
\nwith it a general power to delegate legislative functions,
\nso that the legislature may not define its policy at all and
\nmay lay down no rule of conduct but that whole thing
\nmay be left either to the executive authority or
\nadministrative or other body, is unsound and not
\nsupported by the authorities on which he relies.  I do not
\nthink that apart from the sovereign character of the
\nBritish Parliament which is established as a matter of
\nconvention and whose powers are also therefore absolute
\nand unlimited in any legislature of any other country
\nsuch general powers of delegation as claimed by the
\nAttorney-General for a legislature have been recognized
\nor permitted.” \t(emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
 \tKeeping in view the Parliamentary position in India in
\njuxtaposition of British system, His Lordship proceeded to state:
\n\t“Having regard to the position of the British
\nParliament, the question whether it can validly delegate
\nits legislative functions cannot be raised in the court of
\nlaw.  Therefore from the fact that the British Parliament
\nhas delegated legislative powers it does not follow that
\nthe power of delegation is recognized in law as
\nnecessarily include din the power of legislation.
\nAlthough in the Constitution of India there is no express
\nseparation of powers, it is clear that a legislature is
\ncreated by the Constitution and detailed provisions are
\nmade for making that legislature pass laws.  Is it then too
\nmuch to say that under the Constitution the duty to make
\nlaws, the duty to exercise its own wisdom, judgment and
\npatriotism in making laws is primarily cast on the
\nlegislatures?  Does it not imply that unless it can be
\ngathered from other provisions of the Constitution, other
\nbodies, executive or judicial, are not intended to
\ndischarge legislative functions?  I am unable to read the
\ndecisions to which our attention has been drawn as laying
\ndown that once a legislature observes the procedure
\nprescribed for passing a bill into an Act, it becomes a
\nvalid law, unless it is outside the Legislative Lists in the
\nSeventh Schedule prescribing its respective powers.  I do
\nnot read articles 245 and 246 as covering the question of
\ndelegation of legislative powers.  In my opinion, on a
\ntrue construction of articles 245 and 246 and the Lists in
\nthe Seventh Schedule, construed in the light of the
\njudicial decisions mentioned above, legislation
\ndelegating legislative powers on some other bodies is not
\na law on any of the subjects or entries mentioned in the
\nLegislative Lists.  It amounts to a law which states that
\ninstead of the legislature passing laws on any subject
\ncovered by the entries, it confers on the body mentioned
\nin the legislation the power to lay down the policy of the
\nlaw and make a rule of conduct binding on the persons
\ncovered by the law.”\n<\/p>\n
\tOur attention has also been invited to similar observations of
\nFazl Ali, J., who said:\n<\/p>\n
\t“There can be no doubt that if the legislature
\ncompletely abdicates its functions and sets up a parallel
\nlegislature transferring all its power to it, that would
\nundoubtedly be a real instance of delegation of its power.
\nIn other words, there will be delegation in the strict sense
\nif legislative power with all its attributes is transferred to
\nanother authority.  But the Privy Council have repeatedly
\npointed out that when the legislature retains its dominant
\npower intact and can whenever it pleases destroy the
\nagency it has created and set up another or take the
\nmatter directly into its own hands, it has not parted with
\nits own legislative power.  They have also pointed out
\nthat the act of the subordinate authority does not possess
\nthe true legislative attribute, if the efficacy of the act
\ndone by it is not derived from the subordinate authority
\nbut from the legislature by which the subordinate
\nauthority was entrusted with the power to do the act.  In
\nsome of the cases to which reference has been made, the
\nPrivy Council have referred to the nature and principles
\nof legislation and pointed out the conditional legislation
\nsimply amounts to entrusting a limited discretionary
\nauthority to others, and that to seek the aid of subordinate
\nagencies in carrying out the object of the legislation is
\nancillary to legislation and properly lies within the scope
\nof the powers which every legislature must possess to
\nfunction effectively.”        (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
 \tReference was also made to the following conclusions reached
\nby His Lordship:\n<\/p>\n
 \t“The conclusions at which I have arrived so far
\nmay now be summed up:<\/p>\n
(1)\tThe legislature must normally discharge its
\nprimary legislative function itself and not through
\nothers.\n<\/p>\n
(2)\tOnce it is established that it has sovereign powers
\nwithin a certain sphere, it must follow as a
\ncorollary that it is free to legislate within that
\nsphere in any way which appears to it to be the
\nbest way to give effect to its intention and policy in
\nmaking, a particular law, and that it may utilize
\nany outside agency to any extent it finds necessary
\nfor doing things which it is unable to do itself or
\nfinds it inconvenience to do.  In other words it can
\ndo everything which is ancillary to and necessary
\nfor the full and effective exercise of its power of
\nlegislation.\n<\/p>\n
(3)\tIt cannot abdicate its legislative functions, and
\ntherefore while entrusting power to an outside
\nagency it must see that such agency, acts as a
\nsubordinate authority and does not become a
\nparallel legislature.\n<\/p>\n
(4)\tThe doctrine of separation of powers and the
\njudicial interpretation it has received in America
\never since the American Constitution was framed,
\nenables the American courts to check undue and
\nexcessive delegation but the courts of this country
\nare not committed to that doctrine and cannot
\napply it in the same way as it has been applied in
\nAmerica.  Therefore, there are only two main
\nchecks in this country on the power of legislature
\nto delegate, these being its good sense and the
\nprincipal that it should not cross the line beyond
\nwhich delegation amounts to “abdication and self-
\neffacement.”\n<\/p>\n
\tOn the basis of the above observations, it was submitted by Mr.
\nPrashant Bhushan that by the impugned legislation, Parliament has
\ndelegated essential legislative functions in favour of the State
\nGovernment.  Such delegation is blanket and unchartered and is of
\nessential legislative function and legislative policy which could not
\nhave been done.  The High Court has committed an error of law in
\nupholding such delegation which was in substance and reality
\n“excessive delegation”.  The order passed by the High Court to that
\nextent suffers from legal infirmity and deserves to be interfered with
\nby holding sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000 ultra
\nvires.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe High Court, however, was not impressed by the argument.
\nIn the opinion of the High Court, sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the
\nAct of 2000 was not in the nature of “delegated legislation” but was
\n“conditional legislation”.  Taking note of distinction between
\ndelegated legislation and conditional legislation, the High Court held
\nthat the power conferred by Parliament on the State Government to
\nabolish Tribunal on fulfillment of conditions specified in sub-section
\n(1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000 could not be objected.\n<\/p>\n
\tWe find no infirmity in the approach of the High Court.  In
\nHamdard Dawakhana v. Union of India,<\/a> (1960) 2 SCR 671, speaking
\nfor the Constitution Bench, Kapur, J., said;\n<\/p>\n
“The distinction between conditional legislation
\nand delegated legislation is that in the former the
\ndelegate’s power is that of determining when a legislative
\ndeclared rule of conduct shall become effective;
\nHampton & Co. v. U.S., 276 US 394 : 72 L Ed 624
\n(1928) and the latter involves delegation of rule-making
\npower which constitutionally may be exercised by the
\nadministrative agent.  This means that the legislature
\nhaving laid down the broad principles of its policy in the
\nlegislation can then leave the details to be supplied by the
\nadministrative authority.  In other words by delegated
\nlegislation the delegate completes the legislation by
\nsupplying details within the limits prescribed by the
\nstatute and in the case of conditional legislation the
\npower of delegation is exercised by the legislature
\nconditionally leaving to the discretion of an external
\nauthority the time and manner of carrying its legislation
\ninto effect as also the determination of the area to which
\nit is to extend; (R. v. Burah [(1878) 3 AC 889, PC];
\nRussell v. R. [(1882) 7 AC 829 at p.835 : 51 LJPC 77,
\nPC]; King Emperor v. Benoari Lal Sarma [(1944) 72 IA
\n57 : AIR 1945 PC 48]; Sardar Inder Singh v. State of
\nRajasthan [AIR 1957 SC 510 : 1857 SCR 605].  Thus
\nwhen the delegate is given the power of making rules and
\nregulations in order to fill in the details to carry out and
\nsubserve the purposes of the legislation the manner in
\nwhich the requirements of the statute are to be met and
\nthe rights therein created to be enjoyed it is an exercise
\nof delegated legislation.  But when the legislation is
\ncomplete in itself and the legislature has itself made the
\nlaw and the only function left to the delegate is to apply
\nthe law to an area or to determine the time and manner
\nof carrying it into effect, it is conditional legislation.”
\n(emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
\tWe may also refer in this connection to a decision of this Court
\nin Sardar Inder Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1957 SCR 605).  There
\nthe Rajasthan Tenants’ Protection Ordinance was promulgated for two
\nyears.  By Section 3, the Rajpramukh was empowered to extend the
\nlife of the Ordinance by issuing a notification, if required.  The
\nduration of the Ordinance was extended by issuing a notification
\nwhich was challenged.  This Court, however, upheld the provision
\nobserving that it was a case of conditional legislation.
\n\tThe Court said;\n<\/p>\n
\t“In the present case, the preamble to the Ordinance
\nclearly recites the state of facts which necessitated the
\nenactment of the law in question, and s.3 fixed the
\nduration of the Act as two years, on an understanding of
\nthe situation as it then existed.  At the same time, it
\nconferred a power on the Rajpramukh to extend the life
\nof the Ordinance beyond that period, if the state of affairs
\nthen should require it.  When such extension is decided
\nby the Rajpramukh and notified, the law that will operate
\nis the law which was enacted by the legislative authority
\nin respect of “place, person, laws, powers”, and it is
\nclearly conditional and not delegated legislation as laid
\ndown in The Queen v. Burah [(1878)) 5 I.A. 178], and
\nmust, in consequence, be held to be valid.”\n<\/p>\n
\tReferring to Sardar Inder Singh and reiterating the principle
\nlaid down therein, this Court in State of T.N. represented by Secretary,
\nHousing Department, Madras v. K. Sabanayagam & Anr.,<\/a> (1998) 1
\nSCC 318, speaking through S.B. Majmudar, J., stated;
\n\t“It is thus obvious that in the case of conditional
\nlegislation, the legislation is complete in itself but its
\noperation is made to depend on fulfillment of certain
\nconditions and what is delegated to an outside authority,
\nis the power to determine according to its own judgment
\nwhether or not those conditions are fulfilled.  In case of
\ndelegated legislation proper, some portion of the
\nlegislative power of the legislature is delegated to the
\noutside  authority in that, the legislature, though
\ncompetent to perform both the essential and ancillary
\nlegislative functions, performs only the former and parts
\nwith the latter, i.e., the ancillary function of laying down
\ndetails in favour of another for executing the policy of
\nthe statute enacted.  The distinction between the two
\nexists in this that whereas conditional legislation contains
\nno element of delegation of legislative power and is,
\ntherefore, not open to attack on the ground of excessive
\ndelegation, delegated legislation does confer some
\nlegislative power on some outside authority and is
\ntherefore open to attack on the ground of   excessive
\ndelegation.”\n<\/p>\n
\tIn the case on hand also, the Act of 2000 as enacted by
\nParliament was full and complete when it left legislative chamber.
\nThere was, therefore, no question of delegation of legislative power
\nby the legislature in favour of the executive.  What was left to the
\nexecutive was merely to decide whether to continue the
\nAdministrative Tribunal or to abolish it.  The State Government, after
\nconsidering the facts and circumstances decided not to continue the
\nTribunal which was within the power of the State Government and,
\nhence, no objection can be raised against exercise of such power.  The
\ncontention of the appellants, therefore, cannot be upheld.\n<\/p>\n
The matter can be looked at from another angle also.  As
\nalready indicated in the earlier part of the judgment, Article 323A is
\nnot self-executory.  The said provision did not create or establish
\nAdministrative Tribunals.  It was merely a permissive or an enabling
\nprovision allowing Parliament to make law to establish Administrative
\nTribunal if it wished to do so. Thus, there was no binding requirement
\non the part of the Parliament (or State Legislature) to create such a
\nforum as contemplated by Article 323A of the Constitution of India.
\nIt also cannot be overlooked that the Administrative Tribunal in
\nquestion was to be created for a particular State, i.e. State of Madhya
\nPradesh.  Neither under Article 323A of the Constitution nor under the
\nAdministrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the Central Government could
\nhave created such Tribunal except in accordance with the provisions
\nof sub-section (2) of Section 4 of the said Act.  As already noted, the
\nCentral Government could exercise the jurisdiction, power and
\nauthority conferred on the Administrative Tribunal for the State by or
\nunder the said Act only “on receipt of a request in this behalf from any
\nState Government”.  Essentially therefore, it was on the request made
\nby the State of Madhya Pradesh to the Central Government that the
\npower to create and establish Administrative Tribunal in the State of
\nMadhya Pradesh was exercised by the Central Government and the
\nTribunal was established.  We, therefore, see no objection in
\nconferring the power on the State Government to continue or to
\nabolish such Tribunal.  In our considered opinion, there is no
\nexcessive delegation by Parliament to the State Government which
\nwould be hit either by the provisions of the Constitution or the law
\nlaid down in In re: The Delhi Laws Act, 1912 or other decisions of
\nthis Court.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe learned counsel for the appellants contended that for
\nabolishing State Administrative Tribunal, the State of Madhya
\nPradesh took into account the report of the Arrears Committee
\n(Malimath Committee).  Even in the affidavit in reply, reliance was
\nplaced on the report of the said Committee.  It was urged that this
\nCourt in L. Chandra Kumar did not fully endorse the views expressed
\nby the Malimath Committee.  Quoting certain recommendations on
\n“functioning of Tribunals”, the Malimath Committee specifically
\nrecommended that the theory of alternative institutional mechanisms
\nshould be abandoned.  It also suggested that institutional changes
\nshould be carried out within the High Courts dividing them into
\nseparate divisions for different branches of law as has been done in
\nEngland.  According to the Committee, appointment of more Judges
\nwould be a better way of remedying the problem of pendency in High
\nCourts.\n<\/p>\n
\tThis Court, while dealing with the constitutional validity of
\nArticle 323A of the Constitution and ouster of jurisdiction of High
\nCourts considered the report of the Committee and observed that “its
\nrecommendation is not suited to our present context”.  The Court,
\nhowever, conceded that various Tribunals have not performed up to
\nthe expectation was “self-evident and widely acknowledged truth”.
\nBut, the Court proceeded to state that “to draw an inference that their
\nunsatisfactory performance points to their being founded on a
\nfundamentally unsound principle would not be correct”.  According to
\nthe Court, “the reasons for which the Tribunals were constituted still
\npersist; indeed those reasons have become even more pronounced in
\nour times”.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe endeavor of the learned counsel is to impress upon the
\nCourt that the reasons which weighed with the State Government in
\ntaking a decision to abolish the State Administrative Tribunal were
\nillegal, non-existent, irrelevant and ill-founded.  Once this Court has
\nheld that existence of such Tribunals is a “need for the day” and the
\nobservations of the Arrears Committee could not be said to be well-
\nfounded, no action of abolishing the State Administrative Tribunal
\ncould be taken by the State Government.\n<\/p>\n
The contention of the learned counsel cannot be upheld.  It is
\ntrue that the State of Madhya Pradesh had considered the report of the
\nArrears Committee and the functioning of State Administrative
\nTribunal in the State of Madhya Pradesh, but it is equally true that
\nwhen a request was made by the State of Madhya Pradesh to the
\nCentral Government for establishment of State Administrative
\nTribunal and the decision was taken by the Central Government to
\ncreate such Tribunal and a notification was issued in 1988 and the
\nTribunal was established, the law governing the field was as laid
\ndown in S.P. Sampath Kumar.  L. Chandra Kumar had not seen the
\nlight of the day.  It was after the order of Reference in R.K. Jain v.
\nUnion of India<\/a> (1993) 4 SCC 119 that a Division Bench of this Court
\nin L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India<\/a> (1995) 1 SCC 400 referred the
\nmatter to a Bench of seven Judges concluding that “the decision
\nrendered by five-Judge Constitution Bench in S.P. Sampath Kumar
\nneeds to be comprehensively reconsidered”.  It is also pertinent to
\nnote that seven-Judge Bench overruled S.P. Sampath Kumar and
\nunanimously held that power, authority and jurisdiction of High
\nCourts under Articles 226 and 227 cannot be taken away even by an
\namendment in the Constitution.  Clause (d) of Article 323A (2) and
\nClause (d) of Article 323B (3) of the Constitution, therefore, were
\nheld ultra vires.  The resultant effect of L. Chandra Kumar was that
\nafter an order is passed by State Administrative Tribunal, an
\naggrieved party could approach the High Court by invoking
\nwrit\/supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226\/227 of the Constitution
\nof India.  So much so that after the decision by the Administrative
\nTribunal, the aggrieved party was required to approach the High Court
\nbefore approaching this Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.
\n  In this connection, it may be necessary to bear in mind the
\nfollowing observations in L. Chandra Kumar:–
\n\t“We may add here that under the existing system,
\ndirect appeals have been provided from the decisions of
\nall Tribunals to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of
\nthe Constitution.  In view of our above-mentioned
\nobservations, this situation will also stand modified.  In
\nthe view that we have taken, no appeal from the decision
\nof a Tribunal will directly lie before the Supreme Court
\nunder Article 136 of the Constitution; but instead, the
\naggrieved party will be entitled to move the High Court
\nunder Articles 226\/227 of the Constitution and from the
\ndecision of the Division Bench of the High Court the
\naggrieved party could move this Court under Article 136
\nof the Constitution.”\n<\/p>\n
  \tFrom the discussion hereinabove, it is clear that after the
\nConstitution (42nd Amendment) Act, 1976, the Administrative
\nTribunals Act, 1985 came to be enacted by Parliament.  The position
\nprevailed at that time was  the law laid down by the Constitution
\nBench of this Court in S.P. Sampath Kumar.  Invoking sub-section (2)
\nof Section 4 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, the State of
\nMadhya Pradesh requested the Central Government to constitute a
\nTribunal for civil servants in the State.  It was also on the basis of
\npronouncement of law in S.P. Sampath Kumar.  The notification was
\nissued by the Central Government in 1988 and the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal was established for the State of Madhya
\nPradesh.  At that time, as per well-settled legal position, decisions
\nrendered by the Administrative Tribunals constituted under the Act of
\n1985 were “final” subject to jurisdiction of this Court under Article
\n136 of the Constitution.  No person aggrieved by a decision of State
\nAdministrative Tribunal could approach the High Court of Madhya
\nPradesh in view of Clause (d) of Article 323A (2) of the Constitution
\nread with Section 28 of the Act of 1985 and the declaration of law in
\nS.P. Sampath Kumar.  If, in view of subsequent development of law in
\nL. Chandra Kumar, the State of Madhya Pradesh felt that continuation
\nof State Administrative Tribunal would be “one more tier” in the
\nadministration of justice inasmuch as after a decision is rendered by
\nthe State Administrative Tribunal, an aggrieved party could approach
\nthe High Court under Article 226\/227 of the Constitution of India and,
\nhence, it felt that such tribunal should not be continued further, in our
\nopinion, it cannot be said that such a decision is arbitrary, irrational or
\nunreasonable. From the correspondence between the State of Madhya
\nPradesh and Central Government as well as from the affidavit in
\nreply, it is clear that the decision of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar
\nhad been considered by the State of Madhya Pradesh in arriving at a
\ndecision to abolish State Administrative Tribunal.  Such a
\nconsideration, in our opinion, was relevant, germane and valid.  It,
\ntherefore cannot be said that the decision was illegal, invalid or
\nimproper.\n<\/p>\n
It was also contended that there is interference with judicial
\nfunctioning of the Tribunal by the Executive and such interference
\nwould be violative of “basic structure of the Constitution” and would
\nresult in death knell of Rule of Law.  The counsel in this connection,
\nplaced reliance on a decision of this Court in P. Sambamurthy &
\nOthers  v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Another (1987) 1 SCC 362.
\nIn that case, vires of Clause (5) of Article 371D of the Constitution
\nwas challenged before this Court.  Article 371D was inserted in the
\nConstitution by the Constitution (32nd Amendment) Act, 1983.
\n The said clause read as under:-\n<\/p>\n
\t“371D.  Special provisions with respect to the
\nState of Andhra Pradesh<\/p>\n
(5)\tThe order of Administrative Tribunal finally
\ndisposing of any case shall become effective upon
\nits confirmation by the State Government or on the
\nexpiry of three months from the date on which the
\norder is made, whichever is earlier.\n<\/p>\n
Provided that the State Government may, by
\nspecial order made in writing and for reasons to be
\nspecified therein, modify or annul any order of the
\nAdministrative Tribunal before it becomes
\neffective and in such a case, the order of the
\nAdministrative Tribunal shall have effect only in
\nsuch modified form or be of no effect, as the case
\nmay be.” \t\t\t(emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
\tThe reading of above clause makes it clear that it empowered
\nthe State Government to decide whether it would confirm the order, to
\nmodify it or even to annul it.  Taking judicial notice of the fact that
\n“almost invariably in every service dispute before the Administrative
\nTribunal” the State Government was a party, this Court noted with
\nconcern that the said party was granted ultimate authority to uphold or
\nreject the determination of Administrative Tribunal.  This Court, in
\nthe circumstances, held the provision unconstitutional and ultra vires.\n<\/p>\n
Speaking for the Court, Bhagwati, C.J. observed:
\n\t“It would be open to the State Government, after it
\nhas lost before the Administrative Tribunal, to set at
\nnaught the decision given by the Administrative Tribunal
\nagainst it.  Such a provision is, to say the least, shocking
\nand is clearly subversive of the principles of justice.
\nHow can a party to litigation be given the power to
\noverride the decision given by the Tribunal in the
\nlitigation, without violating the basic concept of justice?
\nIt would make a mockery of the entire adjudicative
\nprocess.  Not only is the power conferred on the State
\nGovernment to modify or annul the decision of the
\nAdministrative Tribunal starling and wholly repugnant to
\nour notion of justice but it is also a power which can be
\nabused misused.”    (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
\tPutting the problem on a high pedestal, the Court added;\n<\/p>\n
“This power of modifying or annulling an order of
\nthe Administrative Tribunal conferred on the State
\nGovernment under the proviso to clause (5) is violative
\nof the rule of law which is clearly a basic and essential
\nfeature of the Constitution.  It is a basic principle of the
\nrule of law that the exercise of power by the executive or
\nany other authority must not only be conditioned by the
\nConstitution but must also be in accordance with law and
\nthe power of judicial review is conferred by the
\nConstitution with a view to ensuring that the law is
\nobserved and there is compliance with the requirement of
\nlaw on the part of the executive and other authorities.  It
\nis through the power of judicial review conferred on an
\nindependent institutional authority such as the High
\nCourt that the rule of law is maintained and every organ
\nof the State is kept within the limits of the law.  Now if
\nthe exercise of the power of judicial review can be set at
\nnaught by the State Government by overriding the
\ndecision given against it, it would sound the death-knell
\nof the rule of law.  The rule of law would cease to have
\nany meaning, because then it would be open to the State
\nGovernment to defy the law and yet to get away with it.
\nThe proviso to clause (5) of Article 371-D is therefore
\nclearly violative of the basic structure doctrine”.
\n(emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
\tIn our considered opinion, P. Sambamurthy has no application
\nto the facts of the case.  In that case, the Executive (Government), a
\nparty to the proceeding  was authorized to interfere with a decision
\nrendered by a quasi-judicial authority (Tribunal).  Such a course
\ncannot be allowed in a democratic country and in a judicial system
\ngoverned by Rule of Law.  It would totally destroy the independence
\nof judiciary.  It was in the light of the said fact that the provision was
\nheld ultra vires and unconstitutional.\n<\/p>\n
In the instant case, there is no interference with a “judicial
\norder” passed by a competent court or a Tribunal, but a “policy
\ndecision” has been taken by the State Government to abolish State
\nAdministrative Tribunal allowing aggrieved litigants to approach
\nappropriate authority\/court for ventilating their grievances.  The ratio
\nlaid down in P. Sambamurthy, therefore, does not apply and the
\ncontention cannot be upheld.\n<\/p>\n
It was also contended that it is the Central Government which
\ncan issue a notification under sub-section (4) of Section 74 of the Act
\nof 2000.  Hence, even if it is assumed that the Tribunal can be
\nabolished, the power has been vested in the Central Government.  It is
\nthe Central Government which is required to issue directions for
\nresolution of any matter relating to any body referred to in sub-section
\n(1) of Section 74.  Since no action has been taken by the Central
\nGovernment, abolition of the Tribunal is illegal and unlawful.\n<\/p>\n
On behalf of the State of Madhya Pradesh, however, it was
\nsubmitted that the interpretation put forward by the appellants was not
\ncorrect and reliance on sub-section (4) of Section 74 was
\nmisconceived and ill-founded.  Sub-section (4) of Section 74 of the
\nAct of 2000 has limited application and could be invoked in case there
\nis dispute between the successor States, but not otherwise.  “When
\nboth the States mutually agreed for a decision, the Central
\nGovernment has neither any discretion nor any role has been given to
\nthe Central Government”.  The contention, therefore, has no force.\n<\/p>\n
Considering the provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 74, the
\nHigh Court stated;\n<\/p>\n
“A fair reading of the above sub-section (4) of
\nSection 74 of the Act of 2000 makes it clear that the
\nabove contention raised by the learned counsel appearing
\nfor the petitioners is not based on proper and correct
\ninterpretation of sub-section (4) of Section 74 of the Act
\nof 2000.  If both the successor States decide by mutual
\nagreement to abolish the Tribunal, as envisaged in sub-
\nsection (1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000, it is not
\nobligatory for the Central Government to issue directions
\nas envisaged in above sub-section (4) of Section 74.  This
\nsub-section does not contain any provision about the
\nissuance of notification by the Central Government for
\nthe abolition of the Tribunal.  An issuance of notification
\nis a mandatory requirement as the Tribunal was
\nestablished by a notification issued by the Central
\nGovernment.  The sub-section (4) of Section 74 of the
\nAct of 2000 begins with a non-obstante clause which
\nindicates that the provisions of this sub-section are
\nindependent.  The provisions of sub-section (1) of
\nSection 74 of the Act of 2000 are not subservient to the
\nprovisions of sub-section (4) of Section 74 of the Act of
\n2000.  If it had been so, the words “subject to the
\nprovisions of sub-section (4)” would have been used in
\nsub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000.
\nMoreover, above sub-section (4) provides that the
\nCentral Government shall issue directions for the
\nresolution of any matter relating to any body referred to
\nin sub-section (1) within any period referred to in sub-
\nsection (1) in accordance with any mutual agreement
\nbetween the successor States or if there is no such
\nagreement (emphasis supplied) after consultation with
\nthe Governments of successor States.  Obviously if on
\nany matter relating to any body referred to in sub-section
\n(1), there is no mutual agreement then the directions
\ncould also be issued by the Central Government after
\nconsultation with the Governments of both the successor
\nStates.  A fair reading of sub-section (1) of Section 74 of
\nthe Act of 2000, however, makes it clear that the decision
\nto abolish any of the bodies referred to in that clause can
\nbe taken only by mutual agreement between the
\nsuccessor States, therefore the issuance of “directions” by
\nthe Central Government under sub-section (4) does not
\ninclude the issuance of “notification” for the abolition of
\nany of the body referred to in sub-section (1).  The
\nabolition of the Tribunal does not require any “direction”
\nfrom the Central Government under sub-section (4) of
\nSection 74 of the Act of 2000.  Such direction can only
\nbe issued for the “resolution” of any matter and the
\ndecision to abolish the Tribunal taken by the successor
\nStates by mutual agreement does not amount to a
\n“resolution” of any matter relating to the Tribunal.  The
\nprovisions of sub-section (4) is only in the nature of
\nfurther supplemental ancillary, or consequential
\nprovisions to further the aims, objects and stopgap
\narrangement envisaged under sub-section (1) of Section
\n74 of the Act of 2000.  The word “direction for
\nresolution” means direction regarding some defect or
\ndeadlock persists requiring intervention of the Central
\nGovernment in relation to the functioning of that body
\nwithin a period referred to in sub-section (1).”\n<\/p>\n
We   fully  agree   with    the   interpretation   of  the High
\nCourt.  In our judgment, the High Court was right in
\nobserving that Section 74(1) is not subservient to Section 74(4)
\nof the Act and once the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 74 of
\nthe Act are attracted and invoked, the provisions of sub-section (4) of
\nSection 74 has no application.  The contention of the appellants,
\ntherefore, has no force and has to be rejected.\n<\/p>\n
It was also argued that even if this Court comes to the
\nconclusion that sub-section (1) of Section 74 of the Act of 2000 is
\nintra-vires and constitutional confirming the view taken by the High
\nCourt, the impugned action of abolishing State Administrative
\nTribunal is mala fide and malicious.  For this, learned counsel referred
\nto certain press reports wherein it had been alleged that a decision had
\nbeen taken at the Cabinet Meeting of the State Government to abolish
\nState Administrative Tribunal as the Chief Minister and all the
\nMinisters were of the view that State Administrative Tribunal had
\ngranted stay in many transfer matters.  The attempt on the part of the
\nlearned counsel for the appellants was that the action has been taken
\nby the State of Madhya Pradesh because of adverse verdicts by the
\nState Administrative Tribunal.  In other words, according to the
\nappellants, action of abolishing State Administrative Tribunal was
\ntaken because of “judicial orders” passed by the Tribunal which was
\nnot liked by the State Government.   Such an action, submitted the
\nlearned counsel, cannot be sustained in law.\n<\/p>\n
Now, it may be stated that there is no concrete material on
\nrecord to show that the decision to abolish State Administrative
\nTribunal was taken because of orders passed by the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal.  Except bald assertions by the appellants and
\nPress cuttings, there is nothing to substantiate such allegations.  On
\nthe contrary, sufficient material is available on record to show what
\nweighed with the respondent-State in taking a decision to abolish the
\nTribunal.  So far as allegations by the appellants are concerned, they
\nwere emphatically denied by the State of Madhya Pradesh by filing a
\ncounter-affidavit.  Moreover, the Advocate General, appearing for the
\nState of Madhya Pradesh placed chronological events in detail before
\nthe High Court which were as under;\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tOn 8.3.2001 Cabinet took decision to abolish the
\nTribunal.  The decision was communicated to
\nPress as usual.  To communicate the decision of
\nthe Cabinet to the Press is no crime.\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\tOn 18.3.2001 a letter was sent to the Government
\nof Chhattisgarh informing about the decision taken
\nby the Government of M.P. to abolish Tribunal
\nw.e.f. 30.4.2001.\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\tOn 27.3.2001 a reply from the Government of
\nChhattisgarh was received seeking further
\ninformation etc. as the Chhattisgarh Government
\nhad no power.\n<\/p>\n
(iv)\tOn 3.4.2001 second letter from the Government of
\nChhattisgarh was received reminding that they
\nwere waiting fro reply of the Government of
\nMadhya Pradesh.\n<\/p>\n
(v)\tOn 3.4.2001 i.e. the same day the reply was sent
\nby the Government of Madhya Pradesh to the
\nGovernment of Chhattisgarh giving reasons for
\nabolition of the Tribunal and also suggesting to
\nconstitute own Tribunal, if so desired.\n<\/p>\n
(vi)\tOn 26.4.2001 both the State Government agreed to
\nabolish the Tribunal for both the States.\n<\/p>\n
(vii)\tOn 5.5.2001 a letter was written by the
\nGovernment of Madhya Pradesh to Central
\nGovernment to abolish the Tribunal w.e.f.\n<\/p>\n
1.6.2001.\n<\/p>\n
(viii)\tOn 17.7.2001 order was passed by the Tribunal
\nwhich is alleged to be the ground for abolition of
\nthe Tribunal.\n<\/p>\n
(ix)\tOn 23.7.2001 a letter was received by the
\nGovernment of Madhya Pradesh from the
\nGovernment of Chhattisgarh again reiterating to
\nabolish the Tribunal.”\n<\/p>\n
Thus, from the correspondence between the State of Madhya
\nPradesh and the Central Government and from various letters and
\ncommunications and also from the decision which has been taken by
\nthe Cabinet, it is clear that the State Government took into account a
\nvital consideration that after the decision of this Court in L. Chandra
\nKumar, an aggrieved party could approach the High Court, the object
\nfor establishment of the Tribunal was defeated.  In our opinion, in the
\nlight of the facts before the Court, it cannot be said that the decision to
\nabolish State Administrative Tribunal taken by the State of Madhya
\nPradesh can be quashed and set aside as mala fide.\n<\/p>\n
It was finally submitted that even on merits, the action of
\nabolition of State Administrative Tribunal was unwarranted and
\nuncalled for.  For that, the counsel invited our attention to facts and
\nfigures and stated that it is not that all the cases decided by the State
\nAdministrative Tribunal reached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh.
\nIn most of the cases dealt with by the State Administrative Tribunal,
\nthe parties accepted the orders of the Tribunal. It is only in few cases
\nthat the aggrieved party  public servant or government  approached
\nthe High Court.  It was also stated that no survey has been made by
\nthe State.  No reasons have been recorded why continuance of
\nTribunal was not necessary.  There was non-application of mind to
\nthis very important aspect and on that ground also, the action deserves
\nto be set aside at least with a limited direction to the State to
\nreconsider the matter and take an appropriate decision afresh keeping
\nin mind all relevant factors.\n<\/p>\n
We are unable to uphold even this argument.  In our judgment,
\nif a decision is illegal, unconstitutional or ultra vires, it has to be set
\naside irrespective of laudable object behind it.  But once we hold that
\nit was within the power of the State Government to continue or not to
\ncontinue State Administrative Tribunal and it was open to the State
\nGovernment to take such a decision, it cannot be set aside merely on
\nthe ground that such a decision was not advisable in the facts of the
\ncase or that other decision could have been taken.  While exercising
\npower of judicial review, this Court cannot substitute its own decision
\nfor the decision of the Government.  The Court, no doubt, can quash
\nand set aside the decision, if it is illegal, ultra vires, unreasonable or
\notherwise objectionable.  But that is not the situation here.   To repeat,
\nfrom the record of the case, it is amply clear that relevant, germane,
\nvalid and proper considerations weighed with the State Government
\nand keeping in view development of law and the decision of the larger
\nBench of this Court in L. Chandra Kumar, a policy decision has been
\ntaken by the State Government to abolish State Administrative
\nTribunal.  Parliament also empowered the State Government to take
\nan appropriate decision by enacting sub-section (1) of Section 74 of
\nthe Act of 2000 and in exercise of such power, the State Government
\nhad taken a decision.  The decision, in our opinion, cannot be
\nregarded as illegal, unlawful or otherwise objectionable.  The
\ncontention, therefore, has no force and has to be negatived.\n<\/p>\n
For the foregoing reasons, Civil Appeal No. 5327 of 2000
\ndeserves to be dismissed and is, accordingly, dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
In view of the above, Civil Appeal Nos. 8292-8295 of 2002 and
\nCivil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition No.22648 of 2002
\nfiled by the Union of India stand disposed of and Civil Appeal No.
\n5328 of 2002, Civil Appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition Nos.
\n23615-23616 of 2002, Writ Petition No. 369 of 2003, Writ Petition
\nNo. 374 of 2003 stand dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
In the facts and circumstances of the case, however, there shall
\nbe no order as to costs in all these matters.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India M.P. High Court Bar Association vs Union Of India And Others on 17 September, 2004 Author: Thakker Bench: Cji R.C. Lahoti, C.K. Thakker CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5327 of 2002 PETITIONER: M.P. HIGH COURT BAR ASSOCIATION RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 17\/09\/2004 BENCH: CJI R.C. LAHOTI & […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-175266","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nM.P. 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