{"id":177205,"date":"1964-05-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1964-05-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964"},"modified":"2017-05-29T10:19:31","modified_gmt":"2017-05-29T04:49:31","slug":"waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964","title":{"rendered":"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private … on 4 May, 1964"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private … on 4 May, 1964<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 90, \t\t 1962 SCR (3) 209<\/div>\n
Author: T V Aiyyar<\/div>\n
Bench: Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nWAVERLY JUTE MILLS CO. LTD.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nRAYMON & CO. (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD.(And connected appeals)\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n04\/05\/1964\n\nBENCH:\nAIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA\nBENCH:\nAIYYAR, T.L. VENKATARAMA\nSINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)\nSUBBARAO, K.\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\nMUDHOLKAR, J.R.\n\nCITATION:\n 1963 AIR   90\t\t  1962 SCR  (3) 209\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF\t    1969 SC 504\t (6)\n R\t    1973 SC2479\t (13)\n R\t    1974 SC1579\t (6)\n D\t    1985 SC1156\t (24,49,53)\n R\t    1989 SC 839\t (15)\n F\t    1990 SC  85\t (24)\n RF\t    1990 SC 781\t (13)\n\n\nACT:\nForward\t  Contract--Legislative\t validity   of\t enactment--\nConstitutional\tvalidity--Notification\tprohibiting  forward\ncontracts  other  than\tnon-transferable  specific  delivery\ncontract--Contract   for  sale\tof   goods--Validity--Clause\nproviding   for\t  arbitration--Parties\t appearing    before\narbitration--Effect--Forward  Contracts\t (Regulation)\tAct,\n1952  (74 of 1952), ss.2(f), 17, 18--Constitution of  India,\nArt. 14, Sch. 7, List I, Entry 48, List II, Entries 26,\t 27,\nList III, Entry 7.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  appellant\tcompany\t entered into a\t contract  with\t the\nrespondents  on\t September  7, 1955,  for  the\tpurchase  of\ncertain\t bales\tof  jute cuttings to  be  delivered  by\t the\nrespondents  ill equal instalments every month\tin  October,\nNovember,  and\tDecember, 1955.\t Under cl. 14  all  disputes\narising out of or concerning the contract should be referred\nto  the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of  Commerce.\t  As\nthe  respondents failed to deliver the goods its agreed,  an\napplication was made by the appellant for the arbitration as\nprovided  in  cl. 14.  The respondents appeared\t before\t the\narbitrators  and contested the claim, but an award was\tmade\nin favour of the appellant.  Thereupon the respondents filed\nan application in the High Court of Calcutta under s. 33  of\nthe Arbitration Act challenging the validity of the award on\nthe  ground that the contract dated September 7,  1955,\t was\nillegal\t as it was in contravention of the  notification  of\nthe Central Government dated October 29, 1953, issued  under\ns.  17 of the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act,  1952,  by\nwhich no person \"shall enter into any forward contract other\nthan  a non-transferable specific delivery contract for\t the\nsale  or  purchase  of\traw  jute  in  any  form.....\".\t The\nappellant   pleaded   (1)  that\t  the\tForward\t  Contracts,\n(Regulation) Act, 1952, was invalid and ultra vires  because\n(a)  Parliament had no competence to enact it, and  (b)\t the\nprovisions  of\tthe  Act were repugnant to  Art\t 14  of\t the\nConstitution  of  India, and,  therefore,  the\tnotification\ndated  October 29, 1953, was null and void; (2) that on\t the\nterms  of  the arbitration clause the question\twhether\t the\ncontract dated\n210\nSeptember  7, 1955, was illegal was one for the\t arbitrators\nto  decide  and that it was not open to the  respondents  to\nraise  the  same  in  an application  under  s.\t 33  of\t the\nArbitration;  (3)  that\t the respondents  submitted  to\t the\njurisdiction of the arbitrators and that amounted to a fresh\nagreement for arbitration and therefore, the award was valid\nand   binding\ton  them;  and\t(4)  that,  in\t any   case,\nthe contract dated September 7, 1955, was a non-transferable\nspecific  delivery contract and, therefore, was not  hit  by\nthe notification dated October 29, 1953.\nHeld, that: (1) a legislation on Forward Contracts would  be\na legislation on Futures Markets and, therefore, the Forward\nContracts (Regulation) Act, 1952, fell within the  exclusive\ncompetence of Parliament under entry 28 List I of Sch. 7  of\nthe Constitution of India, accordingly, the Act could not be\nchallenged on the ground of legislative incompetence.\nDuni  Chand  Rateria  v. Dhuwalka Brothers  Ltd.,<\/a>  [1955]  1\nS.C.R. 1071, followed.\n(2)  the Act did not infringe Art. 14 of the Constitution.\nM\/s.   Baghubar\t Dyal  Jai Prakash v. The  Union  of  India.<\/a>\n[1962] 3 S. C. R. 547, followed,\n(3)  if\t a  contract was illegal and  void,  an\t arbitration\nclause which was one of the terms thereof must perish  along\nwith  it,  and\ta  dispute relating to\tthe  validity  of  a\ncontract  was,\tin  such cases, for the court  and  not\t the\narbitrators to decide.\nKhardah\t Company Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India) Private  Ltd.,<\/a>\n[1963] 3 S.C.R. 183, followed.\n(4)  the  respondents  were not precluded by what  they\t did\nbefore\tthe arbitrators from agitating the question  of\t the\nvalidity  of the contract in the present proceedings  before\nthe High Court.\nShiva Jute Baling Ltd. v. Hindley and Company Ltd.'<\/a> [1960] 1\nS.C.R. 569 and East India Trading Co. v. Badat and Co., I. L\nR. [1959] Bom. 1004, considered.\n(5)  the  contract  dated  September 7,\t 1955,\twas  a\tnon-\ntransferable   specific\t delivery  contract  as\t defined  in\ns.2(f)\tof  the\t Act  and, therefore, was  not\thit  by\t the\nnotification dated October 29, 1953.\nKhardah\t Company Ltd. v. Raymon & Co. (India)<\/a> private  Ltd.,\n[1963] 3 S.C.R. 183, followed.\n211\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION\t: Civil Appeal\tNos.  389 to
\n392 of 1960.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals by special leave from the judgment and orders  dated
\nJuly  15,  16, 1958. of the Calcutta High Court\t in  Appeals
\nfrom  Original\tOrders and Decrees Nos. 140 to 143  of\t1957
\nrespectively.\n<\/p>\n
B.   Das and Ghosh, for the appellant (in C. A. Nos. 389 and
\n390 of 1960).\n<\/p>\n
B.   Sen,  Shankar Ghosh and B. N. Ghosh, for the  appellant
\n(in C. A. Nos. 391 and 392 of 1960).\n<\/p>\n
C. B. Aggarwala and S. N. Mukherjee, for the respondents.
\nC. K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, Daulat Ram\tPrem
\nand  P.\t  D.  Menon,  for  the\tAttorney-General  of  India,
\n(Intervener).\n<\/p>\n
1962.  May 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nVENKATARAMA  AIYAR,  J.-These are appeals by  special  leave
\nagainst\t judgments of High Court of Calcutta  setting  aside
\nawards which directed the respondents to pay compensation to
\nthe  appellants for Breach of contracts, on the ground\tthat
\nthey were in contravention of a notification of the  Central
\nGovernment dated October 29, 1.953, and were in\t consequence
\nillegal and void.  These appeals were heard along with Civil
\nAppeals Nos. 98 & 99 of 1960 as there were common  questions
\nof law to be decided in all.\n<\/p>\n
In  Civil Appeals Nos. 389 & 390 of 1960 the facts are\tthat
\non  September  7,  1955, the appellants who  are  a  company
\nowning\ta  Jute Mill at Calcutta entered into  an  agreement
\nwith  the respondents who are also a Company doing  business
\nas  dealers in jute, for the purchase of 2,250 bales of\t the
\njute
\n212<\/span>
\ncuttings at Rs. 80 per bale of 400 lbs. to be delivered\t 750
\nbales  every month in October, November and December,  1955.
\nClause\t14  of\tthe agreement  provides\t that  all  disputes
\narising out of or concerning the contract should be referred
\nto  the arbitration of the Bengal Chamber of Commerce.\t The
\nrespondents delivered, pursuant to the contract, in all 2000
\nbales and made default in the delivery of the balance.\t The
\nappellants  then applied to the Bengal Chamber\tof  Commerce
\nfor arbitration in accordance with cl. 14 of the  agreement.
\nThe   respondents  appeared  before  the   arbitrators\t and
\ncontested the claims on the merits.  The arbitrators made an
\naward  in favour of the appellants for Rs. 10,525, and\tthat
\nwas  filed under s. 14(2) of the Indian arbitration  Act  in
\nthe  High Court of Calcutta on its original side and  notice
\nwas  issued  to the respondents.  Thereupon  they  filed  an
\napplication  presumably under s. 33 of the  Arbitration\t Act
\nfor a declaration that the contract dated September 7, 1955,
\nwas  illegal as it was in contravention of the\tnotification
\nof  the Central Government dated October 29, 1953, and\tthat
\nthe award based thereon was a nullity.\tThe learned Judge on
\nthe  original side before whom the application came  up\t for
\nhearing\t dismissed it, and passed a decree in terms  of\t the
\naward.\t Against  both\tthe  judgment  and  the\t order,\t the
\nrespondents  preferred\tappeals to a Division Bench  of\t the
\nHigh Court, appeals Nos. 148 & 141 of 1957.  They were heard
\nby  Chakravartti, C. J., and Lahiri, J., who held  that\t the
\ncontract  dated September 7, 1955, was illegal, as  it\tfell
\nwithin\tthe prohibition contained in a notification  of\t the
\nCentral\t Government dated October 29, 1953, and\t accordingly
\nallowed the appeals and set aside the award.  The appellants
\nthen  applied  for a certificate under Art.  133(3)  of\t the
\nConstitution  but  the same was\t refused.   Thereafter\tthey
\napplied to this Court for leave under
\n 213<\/span>
\nArt.  136 of the Constitution and that was granted. This  is
\nhow these appeals come before us.\n<\/p>\n
In  Civil  Appeals Nos. 391 and 392 of 1960  the  facts\t are
\nsimilar.   The\tappellants  who are a  company\tcarrying  on
\nbusiness in the manufacture of jute entered into a  contract
\nwith  the respondents on October 17, 1955, for the  purchase
\nof 500 bales of into cuttings at Rs. 87-8-0 per bale of\t 400
\nlbs.,  to be delivered in equal instalment of 250  bales  in
\nNovember  and in December 1955.\t Clause 14 of the  agreement
\nprovides  that all differences arising out of or  concerning
\nthe  contract  should be referred to the Bengal\t Chamber  of
\nCommerce for arbitration. The respondent made default in the
\ndelivery  of the, goods and thereupon the  appellants  moved
\nthe Chamber of Commerce for arbitration under cl. 14 of\t the
\nagreement.  The respondents appeared before the\t arbitrators
\nand contested the claim on the merits.\tThe arbitrators made
\nan  award in favour of the appellants for Rs.  17,500,\tand
\nthat was filed in the High Court of Calcutta on it  original
\nside  and notice under s. 14(2) of the Arbitration  Act\t was
\nserved\t on  the  respondents.\t Thereupon  they  filed\t  an
\napplication in the High Court of Calcutta, presumably  under
\ns. 33 of the Arbitration Act for a declaration that the con-
\ntract  dated October 17, 1955, was in contravention  of\t the
\nnotification  of  the Central Government dated\tOctober\t 29,
\n1953,  and  was therefore illegal and that  the\t arbitration
\nproceedings  pursuant thereto and the award  passed  therein
\nwere  all  void.  The learned single Judge on  the  original
\nside  before whom the application came up for  hearing\tdis-
\nmissed\tit  and\t passed\t a decree in  terms  of\t the  award.
\nAgainst\t the  above  judgment  and  order  the\t respondents
\npreferred  appeals  to a Division Bench of the\tHigh  Court,
\nAppeals Nos. 142 and 143 of They were heard by\tChakravarti,
\nC.J., and Lahiri, J.,
\n214<\/span>
\nwho  hold  that\t the contract dated October  17,  1955,\t was
\nillegal, as it fell within the prohibition contained in\t the
\nnotification  of  the Central Government dated\tOctober\t 29,
\n1953, and accordingly allowed the appeals and set aside\t the
\nawards.\t   The\tappellant  thereafter  applied\tunder\tArt.
\n133(1)(c)  for\ta certificate and that having  been  refused
\nthey  obtained from this Court leave under Art. 136  of\t the
\nConstitution  and that is how these appeals come before\t us.
\nThe  points for decision in all these appeals are  the\tsame
\nand this Judgment will govern all of them.\n<\/p>\n
The  following\tcontentions have been urged  in\t support  of
\nthese appeals:\n<\/p>\n
\t      (1)  The Forward Contracts  (Regulation)\tAct,
\n\t\t\t    1952, is ultra vires and the notification date
\nd
\n\t      October  29, 1953, is in consequence Bull\t and
\n\t      void.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (2)On the terms of the arbitration clause\t the
\n\t      question whether the contracts dated September
\n\t      7, 1955, and October 17, 1955, are illegal  is
\n\t      one for the     arbitrators to decide and that
\n\t      it  was not open to respondents to  raise\t the
\n\t      same  in\tapplications  under  s.\t 33  of\t the
\n\t      Arbitration Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (3)   The\t  respondents\tsubmitted   to\t the
\n\t      jurisdiction  of\tthe  arbitrators  and\tthat
\n\t      amounts to fresh agreement for arbitration and
\n\t      the award is accordingly valid and binding  on
\n\t      them.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (4) The contracts dated September 7, 1955, and
\n\t      October,\t 17,   1955   are   non-transferable
\n\t      specific\tdelivery contracts and they are\t not
\n\t      hit  by  the notification\t dated\tOctober\t 29,
\n\t      1953,
\n 215<\/span>
\n(1)The\tfirst  question\t relates to  the  vires\t of  Forward
\nContracts   (Regulation)  Act,\t1952  (Act  74\t of   1952),
\nhereinafter  referred  to  as the Act’.\t  This\tstatute\t was
\nenacted\t by  Parliament\t and  received\tthe  assent  of\t the
\nPresident on December 26, 1952.\t Its validity is attacked on
\ntwo grounds; that Parliament had no competence to enact\t it,
\nand that the provisions of the Act are repugnant to Art.  14
\nand  Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution and  therefore  void.
\nIf  this contention is well founded, then  the\tnotification
\ndated  October\t29, 1953, which was issued  by\tthe  Central
\nGovernment  in exercise of the powers conferred by s. 17  of
\nthe Act would be null and void.\n<\/p>\n
Dealing\t first\twith the question as to\t the  competence  of
\nParliament to enact the impugned law, it will be  convenient
\nto  set out the entries in the Legislative Lists in  Seventh
\nSchedule of the Constitution bearing on this question.\n<\/p>\n
\t      List  I-Entry 48-Stock Exchanges\tand  Futures
\n\t      Markets.\n<\/p>\n
\t      List  II-Entry 26–Trade and  commerce  within
\n\t      the  State subject to the provisions of  entry
\n\t      33 of List III.\n<\/p>\n
\t      Entry  27-Production, supply and\tdistribution
\n\t      of goods subject to the provisions of entry 33
\n\t      of List III.\n<\/p>\n
\t      List    III-Entry\t   7-Contracts,\t   including
\n\t      partnership,  agency, contracts  of  carriage,
\n\t      and other special forms of contracts, but\t not
\n\t      including\t contracts relating to\tagricultural
\n\t      land.\n<\/p>\n
Now  the contention of the appellants is that  the  subject-
\nmatter\tof  the\t impugned legislation is  either  Trade\t and
\nCommerce  or Production, supply and distribution  of  goods,
\nwithin\tentries 6 or 27 in List II of the Seventh  Schedule,
\nand  that  it is within the exclusive domain  of  the  State
\nLegislature.\n<\/p>\n
216<\/span><\/p>\n
The  contention of the respondents, and of the\tUnion  which
\nhas  intervened, is that the impugned Act is legislation  on
\n‘Futures Markets’ falling under entry 48 in List I and\tthat
\nit is Parliament which has the exclusive competence over it,
\nand  in the alternative it is one on contracts, and that  is
\ncovered\t by entry 7 in List III in the Seventh Schedule\t and
\nis intra vires.\t To decide this question, it is necessary to
\nascertain the true nature and scope of the legislation,\t its
\npith and substance.  The object of the Act as stated in\t the
\npreamble  is  “to  provide for\tthe  regulation\t of  certain
\nmatters\t relating to forward contracts, the  prohibition  of
\noptions\t in goods and for the matters connected\t therewith”.
\nThe  statute  make,; a distinction between  “ready  delivery
\ncontracts” and “forward contracts.” When a contract provides
\nfor  the  delivery of goods and payment\t of  price  therefor
\neither\timmediately or within a period not exceeding  eleven
\ndays  it is a ready delivery contract.\tAll other  contracts
\nare forward contracts.\tForward contracts are again  divided
\ninto two categories ‘specific delivery contracts’ and  ‘non-
\ntransferable   specific\t  delivery   contracts’,   ‘Specific
\ndelivery contracts’ mean forward contracts which provide for
\nactual delivery of specific goods at the price fixed  during
\nspecified future , period.  ‘Non-transferable specific deli-
\nvery  contracts’ are specific delivery contracts the  rights
\nor liabilities under which are not transferable.  Section 15
\nconfers\t power\ton  the Government  to\tissue  notifications
\ndeclaring  illegal forward contracts with reference to\tsuch
\ngoods  or  class  of  goods and in  such  areas\t as  may  be
\nspecified.  Section 17 authorises the Government to prohibit
\nby  notification  any  forward\tcontract  for  the  sale  or
\npurchase  of  any  goods  or class of  goods  to  which\t the
\nprovisions  of s.15 have not been made applicable.   Section
\n18 exempts non-transferable specific delivery contracts from
\nthe operation of these
\n217<\/span>
\nsections.   Thus  the law is what it purports to be,  a\t law
\nregulating Forward Contracts.\n<\/p>\n
That  being  the scope of the enactment, the  point  debated
\nbefore\tus is whether it is a law on Trade and\tCommerce  or
\nProduction, supply and’ distribution of goods within entries
\n26 or 27 in List II or on Futures Markets within entry 48 in
\nList I. ,It would be noticed that both the entries 26 and 27
\nin List II are subject to entry 33 in List Ill.\t Entry 33 as
\nit   now  stands  is:  “Trade  and  commerce  in,  and\t the
\nProduction, supply distribution of…… (e) raw jute”.\t The
\nimpugned Act in so far as it relates to raw jute-and that is
\nwhat we are concerned with, in these appeals-will clearly be
\nintra  vires if it fell under this entry.  But it should  be
\nmentioned  that\t el.  (e) in entry 33 was  inserted  by\t the
\nConstitution.\tThird  Amendment)  Act, 1954  an  d  as\t the
\nimpugned  Act  was  passed in 1952,  its  validity  must  be
\ndetermined  on\tthe provisions of the Constitution  as\tthey
\nstood  prior  to the Amendment Act in 1954 and entry  33  in
\nList III therefore must be excluded from consideration.
\nNow  turning  to the question whether the  impugned  Act  is
\nlegislation on Futures Markets or on Trade and commerce, the
\ncontention  of the appellants is that a law with respect  to
\nForward\t Contracts,  is not a law with\trespect\t to  Futures
\nMarkets,  because  the\tordinary  and  accepted\t meaning  of
\n‘Market’  is that it is a place where business in  the\tsale
\nand  purchase  of goods is carried on, In  support  of\tthis
\ncontention we are referred to the Dictionary meaning of\t the
\nword  ‘Market’\tand the decisions of the Madras\t High  Court
\nreported  in  Public  Prosecutor  v.  Cheru  Kutti  (1)\t and
\nCommissioner, Coimbatore Municipality v. Chettimar Vinayagar
\nTemple\tCommittee(2).\tAccording  to  the  Concise   Oxford
\nDictionary the word ‘market’ mean,; gathering of people\t for
\npurchase & sale of provisions. livestock, etc.-, open  space
\nor covered building in
\n(1) A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1095.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1956] 2 M.L.J. 563.\n<\/p>\n
218<\/span><\/p>\n
which  cattle  etc.  are  exposed  for\tsale”.\t In   Public
\nProsecutor  v.\tCheru  Kutti (1) the  facts  were  that\t the
\naccused was charged under s. 170 of the Madras Local  Boards
\nAct,  1920 for keeping open a new private market  without  a
\nlicence.   His\tdefence was that the place where  the  sales
\nwere held was not truly a market, and that was accepted.  In
\nthat  context, discussing the meaning of the  word  market’,
\nthe Court observed that it meant “a place set apart for\t the
\nmeeting of the general public of buyers and sellers,  freely
\nopen to any such to assemble together, where any seller\t may
\nexpose\this goods for sale and any buyer may purchase”.\t  In
\nCommissioner, Coimbatore Municipality v. Chettimar Vinayagar
\nTemple\tCommittee  (1), the question arose  this  time\twith
\nreference to the provision in Madras District Municipalities
\nAct,  1920, requiring a place used as an open market  under
\nthe  Act to be licensed.  The Court held that  the  ordinary
\nmeaning of market was place where the public could go during
\nparticular times for purpose of buying and selling and\tthat
\non  the\t facts\tthe place in question  was  market.   It  is
\ncontended  on the strength of the above rulings that as\t the
\nimpugned  Act  is not one with reference to  building  where
\nbusiness is being transacted it is not a law with  reference
\nto markets.\n<\/p>\n
We  are\t unable to agree with this  contention.\t  Market  no
\ndoubt  ordinarily  means  a place where\t business  is  being
\ntransacted.   That was probably all that it meant at a\ttime
\nwhen  trade  was not developed and  when  transactions\ttook
\nplace at specified places.  But with the development of com-
\nmerce,\tbargains  came to be concluded more often  than\t not
\nthrough\t correspondence\t and  the connotation  of  the\tword
\n‘market’  underwent  a corresponding expansion.\t  In  modern
\nparlance the word ‘market’ has come to mean business as well
\nas  the place where business is carried on.   Labour  Market
\nfor  example, is not a place where labourers  are  recruited
\nbut the conditions of the business of
\n(1)  [1956] 2 M.L.J. 563.\n<\/p>\n
 219<\/span><\/p>\n
labour.\t The word ,market’ being thus capable of  signifying
\nboth  business and the place where the business\t is  carried
\non,  the question in what sense it is used in  a  particular
\nstatute must be decided on a consideration of the context of
\nthat statute.  Thus in Public Prosecutor v. Cheru Kutti\t (1)
\nand   Commissioner,  Coimbator\tMunicipality  v.   Chettimar
\nVinayagar  Temple  Committee (2), the  question\t arose\twith
\nreference   to\t provisions  as\t to   licensing\t  by   local
\nauthorities, and for that purpose market was interpreted  as
\nmeaning\t a place.  So we must examine what the\tword  market
\nmeans  ‘in  entry 48 ,Futures Markets” in List I.  The\tword
\n‘Futures’  is  thus  defined  in  Encyclopaedia\t  Britannioa
\n“contracts  which consist of a promise to deliver  specified
\nqualities of some commodity at a specified future time.\t The
\nobligation  is for a single quantity in a given\t month……
\nFutures are thus a form of security, analogous to a bond  or
\npromissory note”.  In this sense a market can have reference
\nonly to business and not to any location.  In our opinion  a
\nlegislation  on Forward Contracts would be a legislation  on
\nFutures Markets.\n<\/p>\n
It  is next argued for the appellants that even if a law  on
\nForward\t Contracts  can\t be said to be a  law  on.   Futures
\nMarkets,  it  must be held to be legislation  falling  under
\nentry  26  in List IT, and not entry 48 in list\t 1,  because
\nForward\t Contracts form a major sector of modern trade,\t and
\nconstitute its very core, and to exclude them from the ambit
\nof  entry 26 in List II, would be to rob it of much  of\t its
\ncontents.    Reliance\twas  placed  in\t support   of\tthis
\ncontention, on the rule of construction that the entries  in
\nthe Lists should be construed liberally and on the  decision
\nin  Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd. v. Dunichand Rateria (3),  which,
\non  this  point\t was affirmed by this Court  in\t Duni  Chand
\nRateria\t v. Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd.<\/a> (4).\t The rule  of  cons-
\ntruction is undoubtedly well established that the
\n(1) A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 1095.  (2) [1956] 2 M.L.J. 563.
\n(3) A.I.R. 1952 cal. 740.   (4) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1071.\n<\/p>\n
220<\/span><\/p>\n
entries in the Lists should be construed broadly and not  in
\na  narrow or pedantic sense.  But there is no need  for\t the
\nappellants to call this rule in aid of their contention,  as
\ntrade  and  commerce would, in their ordinary  and  accepted
\nsense.\tinclude forward contracts, That was the\t view  which
\nwas  adopted  in Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd.\t case(1)  and  which
\ncommended itself to this Court in Duni Chand Rateria’s\tcase
\n(2).   Therefore, if the question were simply whether a\t law
\non  Forward Contracts would be a law with respect  to  Trade
\nand commerce, there should be no difficulty in answering  it
\nin  the\t affirmative,  But the point which we  have  got  to
\ndecide is as to the scope of the entry ‘Trade and  commerce’
\nread  in juxtaposition with entry 48 of List I. As  the\t two
\nentries\t relate\t to  the powers mutually  exclusive  of\t two
\ndifferent legislatures, the question is how these two are to
\nbe  reconciled.\t  Now it is a rule of construction  as\twell
\nestablished  as that on which the appellants rely, that\t the
\nentries\t in  the  Lists should be so construed\tas  to\tgive
\neffect\tto  all of them and that a construction\t which\twill
\nresult\tin any of them being rendered futile or otiose\tmust
\n,be avoided.  It follows from this that where there are\t two
\nentries,  one  general\tin  its\t character  and\t the   other
\nspecific,  the\tformer must be construed  as  excluding\t the
\nlatter.\t  This is only an application of the  general  maxim
\nthat Generalia specialibus non derogant.  It is obvious that
\nif  entry  26 is to be construed  as  comprehending  Forward
\nContracts,  then  “Futures  Markets” in\t entry\t48  will  be
\nrendered useless.  We are therefore of opinion that legisla-
\ntion  on Forward Contracts must be held to fall\t within\t the
\nexclusive competence of the Union under entry 48 in List I.
\nIt  now\t remains  to deal with the decisions  on  which\t the
\nappellants  rely  in support of their  contention  that\t the
\nlegislation is really one on Trade
\n(1) A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 740.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1071
\n 221<\/span>
\nand commerce falling within entry 26.  In Bhuwalka  Brothers
\nLtd.  case  (1)\t the question was  with\t reference’  to\t the
\nvalidity  of the West Bengal Jute Goods\t Futures  Ordinance,
\n1949.\tThat Ordinance had been promulgated by the  Governor
\nwithout\t obtaining the consent of the  Governor-General\t and
\nthe contention was that the legislation fell within entry  7
\n‘Contracts’ in List III and as the consent of the  Governor-
\nGeneral\t had not been obtained it was invalid.\t As  against
\nthis it was contended that the legislation was with  respect
\nto  Trade  and commerce which fell within List II  and\tthat
\ntherefore  the\tconsent\t of  the  Governor-General  was\t not
\nnecessary.   ID\t accepting the latter contention  the  Court
\nobserved : “In pith and substance the legislation was one on
\ntrade  and commerce and not on contracts and that  therefore
\nit  was\t within the powers of the  provincial  legislature”.
\nThere  was  an appeal taken against this  decision  to\tthis
\nCourt  and there the correctness of this view was  accepted.
\nVide  Duni  Chand  Rateria’s case(2).\tNow  the  contention
\nbefore\tus is that on this authority it should be held\tthat
\nthe legislation was one on Trade and commerce falling within
\nentry 26.\n<\/p>\n
We  are unable to accept this contention.  The\tvalidity  of
\nthe  West Bengal Jute Goods Futures Ordinance, 1949, has  to
\nbe   judged  in\t accordance  with  the\tprovisions  of\t the
\nGovernment  of India Act, 1935, which was  the\tConstitution
\nAct then in force.  In that Act there was no specific  entry
\nrelating  to  ‘Futures\tMarkets’.  Such\t an  entry  was\t in.
\ntroduced  for the first time in the present Constitution  in
\n1952.\tThe  contest  in  Bhuwalka  Brothers  Ltd.   case(1)
\ntherefore  was\tnot  between a general entry  on  trade\t and
\ncommerce and a specific entry on the futures markets, as  in
\nthe present case, but between Trade and commerce in List  II
\nand Contracts in List
\n(1) A.I.R.1952 Cal. 740.  (2) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 1071.\n<\/p>\n
222<\/span><\/p>\n
Ill.   In  the\tabsence of a specific  entry  like  the\t one
\ncontained  in entry 48 in List I, the decision\tin  Bhuwalka
\nBrothers Ltd. case (1) would be correct but it is no  longer
\nlaw in view of the change in the Constitution.
\nIn the present case the question was also raised whether the
\nimpugned  legislation would fall under entry 7 of List\tIll.
\nWhile  the respondents insisted that it fell under entry  48
\nin List I, they were also prepared, in case that  contention
\nfailed, to fall back on entry 7 in List III as a second line
\nof  defence.   Entry 7 is general in its  terms\t and  cannot
\nprevail as against specific entry such as entry 48 in List I
\nor  26 in List II.  On this point, we are in agreement\twith
\nthe  decision  in Bhuwalka Brothers Ltd.  case(1).   In\t the
\nresult\twe must hold that the attack on the impugned Act  on
\nthe ground of legislative incompetence must fail.
\nThe second ground of attack on the vires of the Act is\tthat
\nit  is\trepugnant  to Art. 14 and to Art.  19(1)(g)  of\t the
\nConstitution and is, therefore, void.  So far as Art. 14  is
\nconcerned, the question is now concluded by the decision  of
\nthis Court in M\/s.  Raghubar Dayal Jai Prakash v. The  Union
\nof  India<\/a> (2) where it has been held that the  impugned\t Act
\ndoes not infringe that Article and is valid.  This point  is
\ntherefore no longer open to debate and indeed the appellants
\naddressed no arguments on it.\n<\/p>\n
Then  as  regards  the attack based  on\t Art.  19(1)(g)\t the
\nposition   is  that  though  the  appellants   raised\tthis
\ncontention in the pleadings they did not press it before the
\nlearned\t Judges\t in  the Court below  because  there  was  a
\ndecision  of the Bench of the Calcutta High Court which\t had
\ndecided\t the  point  against  the  appellants.\t The  point,
\nhowever was taken in the grounds of appeal to this Court,
\n(1) A.I.R. 1952 Cal. 740.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1962] 3 S.C.R. 547.\n<\/p>\n
223<\/span><\/p>\n
and   has  been\t sought\t to  be\t pressed  before  us.\t The
\nrespondents  complain  and rightly that a  point  like\tthis
\nshould\tnot  be\t allowed  to be taken at  this\tstage  as  a
\ndecision  thereon will turn on investigation of facts  which
\nhas not been made.  It is also contended that there being  a
\nstrong\tpresumption in favour of the constitutionality of  a
\nlegislation the appellants must fail as they have not placed
\nany  materials before the Court to rebut  that\tpresumption.
\nThe  answer of the appellants to this contention is that  as
\nthe  Act is on the face of it violative of  the\t fundamental
\nrights\tunder  Art. 19(1)(g), it was for the other  side  to
\nplace materials for showing that it was protected by Art. 19
\n(6) as one which is reasonable and made in the interests  of
\nthe general public, and not for them to show negatively that
\nit  was not and reliance was placed on the  observations  of
\nthis Court in Saghir Ahmed v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and
\nOthers (1). We are of opinion that those observations cannot
\nbe   read   as\tnegativing  the\t presumption   as   to\t the
\nconstitutionality  of a statute.  But it is  unnecessary  to
\nsay  more about it, as the appellants abandoned\t this  point
\nafter some argument.  This contention also must therefore be
\nfound against the appellants.\n<\/p>\n
(2)  It\t is  next  contended for  the  appellants  that\t the
\nquestion  as  to the validity of the contracts\tbetween\t the
\nparties\t was one for the arbitrators to decide and  that  in
\nconsequence  it was not open to the respondents to raise  it
\nin an independent application under a. 33 of the Arbitration
\nAct.   This  question has been considered by us\t in  Khardah
\nCompany\t Ltd. v. Raymon & Company (India) (P) Ltd.<\/a> (2)\twith
\nwhich these appeals were heard and therein we have held that
\nit  a  contract is illegal and void, an\t arbitration  clause
\nwhich is one of the terms thereof, must also perish along
\n(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 707, 726.\n<\/p>\n
(2) (1963) 3 S.C.R. 183.\n<\/p>\n
224<\/span><\/p>\n
with  it  and that a dispute relating to the validity  of  a
\ncontract  is  in such case, for the Court and  not  for\t the
\narbitrators  to\t decide.  Following that  decision  we\tmust
\noverrule this contention.\n<\/p>\n
(3) The appellants next contend that even if the arbitration
\nclause in the original agreement between the parties  should
\nbe  held to be inoperative by reason of the validity of\t the
\ncontract  itself  being in question,  when  the\t respondents
\nsubsequently  appeared\tbefore\tthe  arbitrators  and  filed
\nstatements in support of their defence, that must be held to
\namount to a new agreement by them for arbitration, on  which
\nthe  arbitrators  would\t be  entitled to  act  and  that  in
\nconsequence the award could not be attacked on the ground of
\nwant  of jurisdiction.\tThis the respondents dispute.\tThey
\ncontend\t  that\t mere  participation  in   the\t arbitration
\nproceedings  cannot  be\t held  to be  a\t new  agreement\t for
\narbitration,  and that the jurisdiction of  the\t arbitrators
\nmust  be  decided  solely with reference to cl.\t 14  of\t the
\nagreement.  The point for decision is as to the true  effect
\nof   what   happened  before  the   arbitrators\t  on   their
\njurisdiction to hear the dispute.  The principles applicable
\nin  the determination of this question are well settled.   A
\ndispute\t as  to\t the validity of a  contract  could  be\t the
\nsubjectmatter  of  an agreement of arbitration in  the\tsame
\nmanner\tas  a  dispute relating to a claim  made  under\t the
\ncoatract.   But\t such an agreement would  be  effective\t and
\noperative  only when it is separate from and independent  of
\nthe contract which is impugned as illegal.  Where,  however,
\nit  is\ta  term of the very contract whose  validity  is  in
\nquestion,  it  has, as hold by us in Khardah Co.  Ltd.\tcase
\n(1), no existence apart from the impugned contract and\tmust
\nperish with it.\n<\/p>\n
(1) (1963) 3 S.C.R.183
\n225<\/span>
\nWe shall now refer to the decisions cited before us, bearing
\non   this   distinction\t between  the  two   categories\t  of
\nagreements.   In  Shiva\t Jute Baling  Ltd.  v.\tHindley\t and
\nCompany\t Ltd.,<\/a> (1) the difference between these two  classes
\nof  agreements was noticed, though in a\t somewhat  different
\ncontext.  A decision directly bearing on this distinction is
\nthe one in East India Trading Company v. Badat and Co.\t(2).
\nThere  the  facts were that there was a\t .general  agreement
\nbetween the parties as to the terms on which they should  do
\nbusiness  and  it  was provided therein\t that  all  disputes
\narising\t  out\tof  the\t contract  should  be\tsettled\t  by
\norbitration.   Subsequent thereto the parties  entered\tinto
\nseveral contracts and then a dispute arose with reference to
\none  of them.  One of the parties denied the  contracts\t and
\nthe question was whether an award passed by the\t arbitrators
\nwith reference to that dispute was without jurisdiction.  In
\nholding that the arbitrators had jurisdiction to decide\t the
\nmatter by virtue of the agreement antecedent to the disputed
\none, the Court observed : “Now, the principle of the  matter
\nis this that when a party denies the arbitration  agreement,
\nthe  very  basis  on  which  the  arbitrator  can  acts\t  is
\nchallenged and therefore the Courts have taken the view that
\nin such a case the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to  decide
\nwhether\t he himself has jurisdiction to adjudicate upon\t the
\ndispute…………………… If the arbitration agreement
\nis  part and parcel of the contract itself, by\tdenying\t the
\nfactum\tof the contract the party is denying the  submission
\nclause and denying the jurisdiction of the arbitrators.\t But
\nin  this  case\tthe  position  is  different.\tWe  have  an
\nindependent  agreement by which the parties agreed to  refer
\nthe  disputes to arbitration.  Pursuant to  this  agreement,
\ncontracts  were entered into and when the plaintiffs made  a
\nclaim  against the defendants, the defendants  denied  their
\nliability.\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1960] 1 S.C.R. 569.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1959] I.L.R. Bom. 1004 1018,1019.\n<\/p>\n
226<\/span><\/p>\n
Therefore,  what was denied was not the jurisdiction of\t the
\narbitrators,  not the submission clause, but  business\tdone
\npursuant   to  the  submission\tclause\tand  to\t which\t the
\nsubmission  clause  applied”.\tThat in our  judgment  is  a
\ncorrect statement of the true legal position.
\nThe point then for decision is whether there is in this case
\nan agreement for reference to arbitration apart from el.  14
\nof  the\t contract.  It is not contended for  the  appellants
\nthat there was any express agreement between the parties for
\nreferring the disputes under the contract dated September 7,
\n1955,  to  arbitrators.\t  All  that  is\t said  is  that\t the
\nrespondent  filed statements before the arbitrators  setting
\nout their defence on the merits, and that must be  construed
\nas  an\tindependent  agreement\tfor  arbitration.  and\t the
\ndecisions in National Fire and General Insurance Co. Ltd. v.
\nUnion  of India (1) and Pratabmull Rameswar v. K. C.  Sethia
\nLtd.  (2)  are\tcited  as authorities  in  support  of\tthis
\ncontention.\n<\/p>\n
Now  an agreement for arbitration is the very foundation  on
\nwhich the jurisdiction of the arbitrators to act rests,\t and
\nwhere that is not in existence, at the time when they  enter
\non  their duties, the proceedings must be held to be  wholly
\nwithout\t jurisdiction.\tAnd this defect is not cured by\t the
\nappearance of the parties in those proceedings, even if that
\nis without protest, because it is well settled that  consent
\ncannot\tconfer\tjurisdiction.  But in such a case  there  is
\nnothing\t to prevent the parties from entering into  a  fresh
\nagreement  to refer the dispute to arbitration while  it  is
\npending\t adjudication before the arbitrators, ,and  in\tthat
\nevent the proceedings thereafter before them might be upheld
\nas  referrable to that agreement, and the award will not  be
\nopen  to attack as without jurisdiction.  But it  will\tmake
\nall the
\n(1) A.I.R. 156 Cal. I,
\n(2) (1959) 64 C.W.N. 616.\n<\/p>\n
227<\/span><\/p>\n
difference  in the result whether the parties  have  entered
\ninto  an arbitration agreement as defined in W. a,  2(a)  of
\nthe  Arbitration  Act  or have merely  taken  steps  in\t the
\nconduct of proceedings assumed or believed to be valid.\t  In
\nthe  former  case the award will be valid;  in\tthe  latter,
\n;nullity.\n<\/p>\n
Now  what are the facts in the present case 1  We have\tgone
\nthrough\t the statements filed by the respondents before\t the
\narbitrators,  and  we do not find any thing therein  out  of
\nwhich  a new agreement to refer the dispute  to\t arbitration
\ncould be spelt.\t The respondents merely contested the  claim
\non  the\t merits, and then added : “The sellers\tsubmit\tthat
\nthis  reference\t is  improper,\tunwarranted,  frivolous\t and
\nvaxatious  and\tshould\tbe  dismissed  with  cost.”  It\t  is
\nimpossible to read this statement as meaning an agreement to
\nrefer to arbitration.\n<\/p>\n
The  decisions\tin National Fire and General  Insurauce\t Co.
\nLtd’s. case (1) and Pratabmull Rameswar’s case (2) relied on
\nfor the appellants are not really in point,.  In both  these
\ncases there was a valid submission on which the\t arbitrators
\nproceeded to act.  Before them the parties filed  statements
\nand therein they put forward a claim which was not  actually
\ncovered\t by  the reference, and invited them to\t give  their
\ndecision thereon.  The party against whom the award had gone
\ncontended   that   the\t arbitrators   had   acted   without
\njurisdiction  in  deciding that claim.\tIn  overruling\tthis
\ncontention the Court held that it was open to the  parties
\nto enlarge the scope of a reference by inclusion of a  fresh
\ndispute. that they must be held to have done that when\tthey
\nfiled their statements putting forward claims not covered by
\nthe original agreement, that these statements satisfied\t the
\nrequirements of s. 2(a) of the Arbitration Act, and that  it
\nwas
\n(1) A I.R. 1956 Col. II.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1959] 64 C.W.N. 616.\n<\/p>\n
228<\/span><\/p>\n
competent  to  the arbitrators to decide the  dispute.\t The
\npoint to be noticed is that in both these cases there was no
\nwant  of  initial jurisdiction, but a  feeding\tof  existing
\njurisdiction by an enlargement of the scope of the reference
\nThat  this does not involve any question of jurisdiction  of
\nthe  arbitrators will be clear from the scheme of  the\tAct.
\nIf an award deals with a matter not covered by the agreement
\nit could either be modified under s. 15(a) or remitted under
\ns.  16(1)(a)..\tAnd where such matter is dealt with  on\t the
\ninvitation of the parties contained in the statements, there
\ncan be no difficulty in holding that the arbitrators  actual
\nwithin\tjurisdiction.  In the present case  the\t arbitrators
\nhad  no jurisdiction when they entered on their duties,\t nor
\nis  it established that there was any  subsequent  agreement
\nwhich could be held to be a submission of the question as to
\nthe  validity of the contracts.\t We are accordingly  of\t the
\nopinion that the respondents are not precluded by what\tthey
\ndid  before the arbitrators from agitating the\tquestion  of
\nthe validity of the contracts in the present proceedings.
\n(4)  The  last\tcontention of the  appellants  is  that\t the
\ncontracts dated September 7, 1955, and October 17, 1955, are
\nnon-transferable specific delivery contracts, as defined  in
\ns. 2(f) of the Act and under s. 18 they are exempt from\t the
\noperation  of s. 17, and that they are therefore not hit  by
\nthe  notification  dated October 29, 1953.   The  facts\t are
\nsimilar to those considered by this Court in Khardah Company
\nLtd. case(1)with which these appeals were heard, and for the
\nreasons\t given\tby  us\tin our\tJudgment  in  those  appeals
\ndelivered   to-day,   we  accept  the  contention   of\t the
\nappellants, and hold that the contracts in question are\t not
\nhit by the notification dated October 29, 1953.
\n(1) (1963) 3 S.C.R. 183.\n<\/p>\n
 229<\/span><\/p>\n
In   the  result  the  appeals\tare  allowed,\twith   costs
\nthroughout,  one  set in Civil Appeals Nos. 389 and  390  of
\n1960  and one in Appeals Nos.. 391 and 392 of 1960, and\t one
\nhearing fee.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t      Appeal allowed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private … on 4 May, 1964 Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 90, 1962 SCR (3) 209 Author: T V Aiyyar Bench: Aiyyar, T.L. Venkatarama PETITIONER: WAVERLY JUTE MILLS CO. LTD. Vs. RESPONDENT: RAYMON & CO. (INDIA) PRIVATE LTD.(And connected appeals) DATE OF […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-177205","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nWaverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private ... on 4 May, 1964 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private ... on 4 May, 1964 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1964-05-03T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2017-05-29T04:49:31+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"31 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private … on 4 May, 1964\",\"datePublished\":\"1964-05-03T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-05-29T04:49:31+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964\"},\"wordCount\":5520,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964\",\"name\":\"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private ... on 4 May, 1964 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1964-05-03T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2017-05-29T04:49:31+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private … on 4 May, 1964\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private ... on 4 May, 1964 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private ... on 4 May, 1964 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1964-05-03T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2017-05-29T04:49:31+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"31 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private … on 4 May, 1964","datePublished":"1964-05-03T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-05-29T04:49:31+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964"},"wordCount":5520,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964","name":"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private ... on 4 May, 1964 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1964-05-03T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2017-05-29T04:49:31+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/waverly-jute-mills-co-ltd-vs-raymon-co-india-private-on-4-may-1964#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Waverly Jute Mills Co. Ltd vs Raymon & Co. (India) Private … on 4 May, 1964"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/177205","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=177205"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/177205\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=177205"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=177205"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=177205"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}