{"id":177595,"date":"1962-10-18T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1962-10-17T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-engineering-mazdoor-sabha-vs-the-hind-cycles-ltd-bombayand-on-18-october-1962"},"modified":"2015-03-08T03:44:10","modified_gmt":"2015-03-07T22:14:10","slug":"the-engineering-mazdoor-sabha-vs-the-hind-cycles-ltd-bombayand-on-18-october-1962","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-engineering-mazdoor-sabha-vs-the-hind-cycles-ltd-bombayand-on-18-october-1962","title":{"rendered":"The Engineering Mazdoor Sabha … vs The Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay(And … on 18 October, 1962"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
The Engineering Mazdoor Sabha … vs The Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay(And … on 18 October, 1962<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 874, \t\t 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 625<\/div>\n
Author: P Gajendragadkar<\/div>\n
Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Gajendragadkar, P.B., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Shah, J.C.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nTHE ENGINEERING MAZDOOR SABHA REPRESENTING WORKMEN  EMPLOYED\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nTHE HIND CYCLES LTD., BOMBAY(And Connected Appeal)\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n18\/10\/1962\n\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nBENCH:\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nSINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)\nWANCHOO, K.N.\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\nSHAH, J.C.\n\nCITATION:\n 1963 AIR  874\t\t  1963 SCR  Supl. (1) 625\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF\t    1964 SC1140\t (13)\n R\t    1965 SC1595\t (23,42)\n R\t    1968 SC 384\t (8)\n F\t    1976 SC 425\t (10)\n RF\t    1977 SC2155\t (24)\n RF\t    1980 SC1896\t (80)\n D\t    1987 SC1629\t (17)\n\n\nACT:\nIndustrial Dispute-Reference to arbitration by agreement  of\nparties-Arbitration  award-Appeal  by  special\tleave-Compe-\ntence-Industrial   Disputes  Act,  1947(14  of\t1947).\t ss.\n10,10A,18-Constitution of India, Art. 136.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  dispute between the respondent company and its  workmen\nwas  voluntarily referred to arbitration by their  agreement\ndated  December\t 3,  1959, under s. 10A\t of  the  Industrial\nDisputes  Act, 1947.  Section 10A(2) prescribed the form  of\nagreement which required that the parties should state\tthat\nthey  had agreed to refer the subsisting industrial  dispute\nto  the arbitration of the persons to be named in the  form.\nSection\t 18(2) provided that the arbitration award shall  be\nbinding\t on  the parties to the agreement.   The  arbitrator\nnamed by the parties entered. upon the reference on December\n14,  1959, and pronounced his award on April 8,\t 1960.\t The\nappellants  seeking to challenge the validity of  the  award\napplied\t for  and obtained special leave to  appeal  to\t the\nSupreme\t Court against the decision of the arbitrator.\t The\nrespondent pleaded that the appeal was not competent because\nthe  arbitrator\t was not a tribunal under Art.\t136  of\t the\nConstitution of India.\nHeld, that the decision of an arbitrator to whom  industrial\ndisputes are voluntarily referred under s. 10A of the Indus-\ntrial Disputes Act, 1947, is quasi-judicial in character and\namounts to a determination or order under Art. 136(1) of the\nConstitution of India, but the arbitrator is not a  tribunal\nwithin the meaning of that Article because the State has not\ninvested him with its inherent judicial power and the  power\nof  adjudication which he exercises is derived by  him\tfrom\nthe  agreement\tof  the parties.   Consequently,  an  appeal\nagainst\t the decision of an arbitrator under s. 10A  of\t the\nAct does not lie under Art. 136 of the Constitution.\n626\nBharat\tBank  Ltd., Delhi v. Employees of  the\tBharat\tBank\nLtd.,  Delhi,<\/a>  [1950]  S.C.R. 459,  Province  of  Bombay  v.\nKusaldas S. Advani & Others,<\/a> [ 1 950] S. C. R. 621 and Durga\nShankar\t Mehta v. Thakur Raghuraj Singh,<\/a> [1955] 1 S.  C.  R.\n267, relied on.\nSemble, Art. 226 of the Constitution of India under which  a\nwrit  of certiorari can be issued in an appropriate case  is\nwider than Art. 136 because the power conferred on the\tHigh\nCourt to issue, certain writs is not conditioned or  limited\nby  the requirement that the said writs can be\tissued\tonly\nagainst the orders of courts or tribunals.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL  APPELLANTS JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals Nos. 182\t and
\n183 of 1962.\n<\/p>\n
Appeal by special leave from the Award dated April 8,  1960,
\nof the Arbitrator, Bombay.\n<\/p>\n
Civil Appeal No. 204 of 1962.\n<\/p>\n
Appeal\tby  special leave from the Award  dated\t August\t 27,
\n1961, of the Arbitrator, Coimbatore.\n<\/p>\n
K.   T.\t Sule and K. R. Choudhri, for the appellants (in  C.
\nA. Nos. 182 and 1 83 of 1962).\n<\/p>\n
C.   K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, S.  K.\tBose
\nand  Sardar Bahadur, for the respondent (in C. A.  Nos.\t 182
\nand 183 of 1962).\n<\/p>\n
G.   B.\t Pai,  J.B. Dadachanji, O. C.  Mathur  and  Ravinder
\nNarain, for the appellant (in C.A. No. 204 of 1962).
\nA.   S. R. Chari, M. K. Ramamurthi, R. K. Garg,\t  D.\t  P.
\nSingh and S. C. Agarwala, for the respondents (in C. A.\t No.
\n204 of 1962).\n<\/p>\n
1962.  October 1. 8. The judgment of the Court was delivered
\nby
\nGAJENDRAGADIKAR, J.-These three appeals have been placed for
\nhearing\t together because the respective respondents in\t the
\nsaid  appeals  have raised the\tsame  preliminary  objection
\nagainst\t their\tcompetence.   Civil  Appeals  Nos.  182\t and
\n183\/1962 have
\n\t\t\t    627<\/span>
\nbeen filed against the award pronounced by Mr. D.V. Vyas  on
\nApril  8,  1960, in a dispute between  the  appellants,\t the
\nEngineering Mazdoor Sabha & another, and the respondent\t The
\nHind  Cycles Limited, Bombay.  This dispute was\t voluntarily
\nreferred to Mr. Vyas under s. 10A of the Industrial Disputes
\nAct, 1947 (No. 14 of 1947) (hereinafter called the Act),  by
\nthe  parties  by their agreement of December 3,\t 1959.\t The
\nArbitrator entered upon the reference on December 14,  1959,
\nand  pronounced\t his  award  on April  8,  1960.   By  their
\nappeals, the appellants have challenged the validity and the
\npropriety  of  the  said award on several  grounds  and\t the
\nappeals\t have been brought to this Court by  special  leave.
\nThe  respondent contends that the arbitrator whose award  is
\nchallenged  was\t not  a\t Tribunal  under  Art.\t136  of\t the
\nConstitution  and  so,\tan appeal by special  leave  is\t not
\ncompetent.\n<\/p>\n
Civil  Appeal No. 204\/1962 has been filed by the  appellant,
\nthe Anglo-American Direct Tea Trading Co. Ltd., against\t the
\nrespondents,  its workmen, and by its appeal, the  appellant
\nseeks  to challenge the validity and the correctness of\t the
\naward pronounced by Dr. T. V. Sivanandam to whom the dispute
\nbetween the parties was voluntarily referred under s. 10A of
\nthe  Act.  The award was pronounced on August 27, 1961,\t and
\nby special leave the appellant has come to this Court.\t The
\nrespondents urge that the appeal is incompetent because\t the
\narbitrator  is\tnot  a\tTribunal  under\t Art.  136  of\t the
\nConstitution.  That is how the question which arises for our
\ndecision  on  these  preliminary objections  is\t whether  an
\narbitrator  to whom parties have voluntarily referred  their
\ndisputes for arbitration is a Tribunal under Art. 136.
\nArticle\t 136(1)\t provides that notwithstanding\tanything  in
\nthis  Chapter,\tthe Supreme Court may., in  its\t discretion,
\ngrant  special leave to appeal from ,any  judgment,  decree,
\ndetermination, sentence or
\n628<\/span>
\norder in any cause or matter passed or made by any court  or
\ntribunal  in  the  territory  of  India.   Sub-article\t (2)
\nexcludes  from\tthe  scope of  sub-Art.\t (1)  any  judgment,
\ndetermination, sentence or order passed or made by any court
\nor tribunal constituted by or under any law relating to\t the
\nArmed  Forces.\t It is clear that Art. 136(1)  confers\tvery
\nwide  powers on this Court and as such, its provisions\thave
\nto be liberally construed.  The constitution-makers  thought
\nit  necessary to clothe this Court with very wide powers  to
\ndeal  with all orders and adjudications made by\t Courts\t and
\nTribunals in the territory of India in order to ensure\tfair
\nadministration\t of   justice  in  this\t country.    It\t  is
\nsignificant  that whereas Arts. 133(1) and 134\t(1)  provide
\nfor  appeals  to this Court against  judgments,\t decrees  or
\nfinal  orders passed by the High Courts, no such  limitation
\nis prescribed by Art. 136(1).  All Courts and all  Tribunals
\nin  the\t territory  of India except those  in  cl.  (2)\t are
\nsubject\t to the appellate jurisdiction of this\tCourt  under
\nArt.  136(1)  It is also clear that  whereas  the  appellate
\njurisdiction of this Court under Arts. 133(1) and 134(1) can
\nbe invoked only against final orders, no such limitation  is
\nimposed\t by  Art.  136(1).  In other  words,  the  appellate
\njurisdiction  of this Court under this latter provision\t can
\nbe   exercised\teven  against  an  interlocutory  order\t  or
\ndecision.  Causes or matters covered by Art. 136(1) are\t all
\ncauses and matters that are brought for adjudication  before
\nCourts\tor Tribunals.  The sweep of this provision  is\tthus
\nvery  wide.  It is true that in exercising its powers  under
\nthis  Article,\tthis  Court in\tits  discretion\t refuses  to
\nentertain applications for special leave where it appears to
\nthe  Court  that interference with the orders sought  to  be
\nappealed  against  may not be necessary in the\tinterest  of
\njustice.  But the limitations thus introduced, in  practice,
\nare  the  limitations  imposed by the Court  itself  in\t its
\ndiscretion.  They are not prescribed by Art. 136(1).
\nFor  invoking Art. 136(1), two condition must be  satisfied.
\nThe proposed appeal must be from any
\n 629<\/span>
\njudgment, decree, determination, sentence or order, that  is
\nto  say,  it  must  not be against  a  purely  executive  or
\nadministrative order.  If the determination or order  giving
\nrise   to  the\tappeal\tis  a  judicial\t or   quasi-judicial
\ndetermination  or order, the first condition  is  satisfied.
\nThe second condition imposed by the Article is that the said
\ndetermination or order must have been made or passed by\t any
\nCourt  or  Tribunal  in\t the  territory\t of  India.    These
\nconditions,  therefore,\t require  that\tthe  act  complained
\nagainst must have the character of a judicial or quasi-judi-
\ncial  act and the authority whose act is complained  against
\nmust  be a Court or a Tribunal.\t Unless both the  conditions
\nare satisfied, Art. 136 (1) cannot be invoked.
\nThe  distinction between purely administrative or  executive
\nacts and judicial or quasi-judicial acts has been considered
\nby this Court on several occasions.  In the case of Province
\nof  Bombay v. Kusaldas<\/a> s. Advani, (1) Mahajan, J.,  observed
\nthat  the question whether an act is a judicial or a  quasi-
\njudicial one or a purely executive act depends on the  terms
\nof  the particular rule and the nature, scope and effect  of
\nthe  particular\t power in exercise of which the act  may  be
\ndone   and  would,  therefore,\tdepend\ton  the\t facts\t and
\ncircumstances  of each case.  Courts of law  established  by
\nthe  State decide cases brought before them  judicially\t and
\nthe decisions thus recorded by them fall obviously under the
\ncategory of judicial decisions.\t Administrative or executive
\nbodies,\t on the other hand, are often called upon  to  reach
\ndecisions  in several matters in a purely administrative  or
\nexecutive mariner and these decisions fall clearly under the
\ncategory of administrative or executive orders.\t Even judges
\nhave,  in  certain matters, to act  administratively,  while
\nadministrative\tor  executive authorities may  have  to\t act
\nquasi-judicially  in dealing with some matters entrusted  to
\ntheir  jurisdiction.  Where an authority is required to\t act
\njudicially either
\n(1)  [1950] S. C. R. 621.\n<\/p>\n
630<\/span><\/p>\n
by  an express provision of the statute under which it\tacts
\nor  by\tnecessary  implication\tof  the\t said  statute,\t the
\ndecisions  of such an authority generally amount  to  quasi-
\njudicial  decisions.   Where,  however,\t the  executive\t  or
\nadministrative bodies are not required to act judicially and
\nare   competent\t to  deal  with\t issues\t referred  to\tthem
\nadministratively,  their  conclusions cannot be\t treated  as
\nquasi-judicial\tconclusions.   No doubt, even  while  acting
\nadministratively,  the\tauthorities must act  bonafide;\t but
\nthat is different from saying that they must act judicially.
\nBearing\t in  mind  this broad distinction  between  acts  or
\norders which are judicial or quasi-judicial on the one\thand
\nand administrative or executive acts on the other, there  is
\nno   difficulty\t in  holding  that  the\t decisions  of\t the
\narbitrators  to\t whom industrial  disputes  are\t voluntarily
\nreferred  under\t s.  10A  of  the  Act\tare  quasi  judicial
\ndecisions and they amount to a determination or order  under
\nArt.  136  (1).\t  This position is  not\t seriously  disputed
\nbefore\tus.  What is in dispute between the parties  is\t not
\nthe  character\tof the decisions against which\tthe  appeals
\nhave  been filed, but it is the character of  the  authority
\nwhich  decided the disputes.  The respondents  contend\tthat
\nthe  arbitrators  whose\t awards\t are  challenged,  are\t not
\nTribunals, whereas the appellants contend that they are.
\nArticle 136(1) refers to a Tribunal in contradistinction  to
\na Court.  The expression “a Court” in the technical sense is
\na  Tribunal constituted by the State as a part\tof  ordinary
\nhierarchy  of  courts which are invested  with\tthe  State’s
\ninherent  judicial  powers.  The Tribunal  as  distinguished
\nfrom  the  Court,  exercises  judicial\tpowers\tand  decides
\nmatters\t brought before it judicially or  quasi\t judicially,
\nbut  it does not constitute a court in the technical  sense.
\nThe Tribunal, according to the dictionary meaning, is a seat
\nof justice; and in the discharge of its functions, it shares
\nsome  of  the  characteristics of  the\tcourt.\t A  domestic
\nTribunal appointed in departmental proceedings, for
\n\t\t\t    631<\/span>
\ninstance,  or  instituted by an industrial  employer  cannot
\nclaim\tto  be\ta  Tribunal  under  Art.   136(1).    Purely
\nadministrative\tTribunals are also outside the scope of\t the
\nsaid Article.  The Tribunals which are contemplated by Art.
\n136(1)\tare clothed with some of the powers of\tthe  courts.
\nThey  can  compel witnesses to appear, they  can  administer
\noath,\tthey  are  required  to\t follow\t certain  rules\t  of
\nprocedure;  the\t proceedings  before them  are\trequired  to
\ncomply with rules of natural justice, they may not be  bound
\nby  the\t strict\t and  technical\t rules\tof  evidence,\tbut,
\nnevertheless,  they must decide on evidence  adduced  before
\nthem; they may not be bound by other technical rules of law,
\nbut  their decisions must, nevertheless, be consistent\twith
\nthe general principles of law.\tIn other words, they have to
\nact  judicially\t and reach their decisions in  an  objective
\nmanner\tand they cannot proceed purely\tadministratively  or
\nbase their conclusions on subjective tests or  inclinations.
\nThe  procedural rules which regulate the proceedings  before
\nthe  Tribunals and the powers conferred on them\t in  dealing
\nwith matters brought before them, are sometimes described as
\nthe  “trappings of a court’ and in determining the  question
\nas  to whether a particular body or authority is a  Tribunal
\nor  not,  sometimes  a rough and ready test  is\t applied  by
\nenquiring whether the said body or authority is clothed with
\nthe trappings of a court.\n<\/p>\n
In Shell Company of Australia, Ltd. v. Federal\tCOMMissioner
\nof  Taxation (1), the Privy Council had to consider  whether
\nthe Board of Review created by s. 41 of the (Federal) Income
\nTax Assessment Act, 1922-25, to review the decisions of\t the
\nCommissioner  of  Taxation,  was  a  court  exercising\t the
\njudicial power of the Commonwealth within. the meaning of s.
\n71 of the Constitution of Australia; and it was held that it
\nwas  not a court but was an administrative  tribunal.\tLord
\nSankey,\t L.  C.,  examined the relevant\t provisions  of\t the
\nstatute\t which\tcreated\t the  said Board  and  came  to\t the
\nconclusion that the Board appeared to be in
\n(1)  [1931] A. C. 275.\n<\/p>\n
the nature of administrative machinery to which the taxpayer
\ncan  resort at his option in order to have  his\t contentions
\nreconsidered.  He then added that an administrative tribunal
\nmay  Act  judicially,  but still  remain  an  administrative
\ntribunal as distinguished from a Court, strictly  so-called.
\nMere externals do not make a direction to an  administrative
\nofficer\t by  an ad hoc tribunal an exercise by\ta  court  of
\njudicial power (pp. 297-298).  It is in this connection that
\nLord Sankey observed that the authorities are clear to\tshow
\nthat  there  are tribunals with many of the trappings  of  a
\nCourt  which,  nevertheless, are not Courts  in\t the  strict
\nsense of exercising judicial power.  In that connection, His
\nLordship enumerated some negative propositions.\t He observed
\nthat  a Tribunal does not become a Court because it gives  a
\nfinal  decision, or because it hears witnesses on  oath,  or
\nbecause\t two  or more contending parties  appear  before  it
\nbetween\t whom  it  has\tto  decide,.  or  because  it  gives
\ndecisions  which affect the rights of subjects,\t or  because
\nthere  is an appeal to a Court, or because it is a  body  to
\nwhich  a matter is referred by another body  (pp.  296-297).
\nThese  negative propositions indicate that the\tfeatures  to
\nwhich  they refer may constitute the trappings of  a  Court;
\nbut the presence of the said trappings does not\t necessarily
\nmake  the Tribunal a Court.  It is in this context that\t the
\npicturesque  phrase  ‘the trappings of a Court’ came  to  be
\nused by the Privy Council.\n<\/p>\n
This  question\twas considered by this Court in\t The  Bharat
\nBank  Ltd.,  Delhi  v. Employees of the\t Bharat\t Bank  Ltd.,
\nDelhi.<\/a> (1) This decision is apposite for our purpose because
\nthe  question which came to be determined was in  regard  to
\nthe character of the Industrial Tribunals constituted  under
\nthe  Act.  The majority decision of this Court was that\t the
\nfunctions  and\tduties of the Industrial Tribunal  are\tvery
\nmuch like those of a body discharging judicial functions and
\nso, though the Tribunal is not a Court,
\n(1)  [1950] S. C. R. 459,
\n 633<\/span>
\nit is nevertheless a Tribunal for the purposes of Art.\t136.
\nIn other words, the majority decision which, in a sense, was
\nepoch  making, held that the appellate jurisdiction of\tthis
\nCourt under Art. 136 can be invoked in proper cases  against
\nawards\tand other orders made by Industrial Tribunals  under
\nthe Act.  In discussing the question as to character of\t the
\nIndustrial Tribunal functioning under the Act, Mahajan, J.,
\nobserved  that\tthe  condition\tprecedent  for\tbringing   a
\ntribunal within the ambit of Art. 136, is that it should  be
\nconstituted by the State; and he added that a Tribunal would
\nbe outside the ambit of Art. 136 if it is not invested\twith
\nany  part  of  the  judicial  functions\t of  the  State\t but
\ndischarges  purely administrative or executive\tduties.\t  In
\nthe opinion of the learned judge, Tribunals which are  found
\ninvested  with certain functions of a Court of\tjustice\t and
\nhave some of its trappings also would fall within the  ambit
\nof Art. 136 and would be Subject to the appellate control of
\nthis  Court whenever it is found necessary to exercise\tthat
\ncontrol\t in  the  interests of justice.\t It  would  thus  be
\nnoticed that apart from the importance of the trappings of a
\nCourt,\tthe  basic and essential condition  which  makes  an
\nauthority  or a body a tribunal under Art. 136, is  that  it
\nshould\tbe constituted by the State and should\tbe  invested
\nwith  the State’s inherent judicial power.  Since this\ttest
\nwas  satisfied\tby the Industrial Tribunals under  the\tAct,
\naccording  to  the majority decision, it was held  that\t the
\nawards\tmade by the Industrial Tribunals are subject to\t the
\nappellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 136.
\n  In  Durga  Shankar  Mehta v. Thakur  Raghuraj\t Singh<\/a>\t(1),
\nMukherjea,  J., who delivered the unanimous opinion  of\t the
\nCourt  observed\t that it was well settled  by  the  majority
\ndecision  of this Court in the case of Bharat Bank Ltd.\t (2)
\nthat the expression “Tribunal” as used in Art. 136 does\t not
\nmean  the  same thing as “Court” but  includes,\t within\t its
\nambit, all adjudicating bodies,
\n(1)  [1955] 1 S.C.R. 267.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1950] S.C.R. 459.\n<\/p>\n
634<\/span><\/p>\n
provided they are constituted by the State and are  invested
\nwith judicial as distinguished from purely administrative or
\nexecutive  functions.  Thus, there can be no doubt that\t the
\ntest which has to be applied in determining the character of
\nan  adjudicating  body\tis whether the said  body  has\tbeen
\ninvested  by  the State with its inherent  judicial  power’.
\nThis  test  implies that the ad indicating  body  should  be
\nconstituted  by\t the State and should be invested  with\t the
\nState’s\t judicial power which it is authorised to  exercise.
\nThe  same principle has been reiterated in  Harinagar  Sugar
\nMills Ltd. v. Shyam Sunder Jhunjhunwala<\/a> (1).
\nIt  is now necessary to examine the scheme of  the  relevant
\nprovisions of the Act bearing on the voluntary reference  to
\nthe  arbitrator, the powers of the said arbitrator  and\t the
\nprocedure which he is required to follow.  Section 16A under
\nwhich  voluntary reference has been made in both  the  cases
\nwas  added to the Act by Act 36 of 1956.  It reads as  under
\n:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “10A. (1) Where any industrial dispute  exists
\n\t      or  is  apprehended and the employer  and\t the
\n\t      workmen\tagree  to  refer  the\tdispute\t  to
\n\t      arbitration, they may, at any time before\t the
\n\t      dispute has been referred under section 10  to
\n\t      a\t  Labour  Court\t or  Tribunal  or   National
\n\t      Tribunal,\t by a written agreement,  refer\t the
\n\t      dispute to arbitration and the reference shall
\n\t      be  to such person or persons  (including\t the
\n\t      presiding\t  officer  of  a  Labour  Court\t  or
\n\t      Tribunal\t or   National\t Tribunal)   as\t  an
\n\t      arbitrator or Arbitrators as may be  specified
\n\t      in the arbitration agreement.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (2)   An arbitration agreement referred to  in
\n\t      sub-section  (1)\tshall be in  such  form\t and
\n\t      shall be signed by the parties thereto in such
\n\t      manner as may be prescribed,
\n(1)  [1962] 2 S.C.R. 339
\n 635<\/span>
\n\t      (3)   A  copy  of\t the  arbitration  agreement
\n\t      shall   be   forwarded  to   the\t appropriate
\n\t      Government  and the conciliation\tofficer\t and
\n\t      the   appropriate\t Government  shall,   within
\n\t      fourteen days from the date of the receipt  of
\n\t      such  copy, publish the same in  the  official
\n\t      Gazette.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (4)   The\t arbitrator  or\t arbitrators   shall
\n\t      investigate  the\tdispute and  submit  to\t the
\n\t      appropriate  Government the arbitration  award
\n\t      signed   by   the\t arbitrator   or   all\t the
\n\t      arbitrators, as the case may be.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (5)   Nothing  in\t the arbitration  Act,\t1940
\n\t      shall   apply  to\t arbitrations\tunder\tthis
\n\t      section.”\n<\/p>\n
Consequent  upon  the  addition\t of  this  section,  several
\nchanges\t were  made  in the other  provisions  of  the\tAct.
\nSection\t 2  (b) which defines an award was  amended  by\t the
\naddition of the words “it includes an arbitration award made
\nunder  section\t10A”.  In other words, as a  result  of\t the
\namendment  of  the  definition\tof  the\t word  “award”,\t  an
\narbitration  award has now become an award for the  purposes
\nof  the Act.  The inclusion of the arbitration award  within
\nthe  meaning  of  s. 2 (b) has led  to\tthe  application  of
\nsections 17, 17A, 18(2), 19 (3), 21, 29, 30, 33C and 36A  to
\nthe  arbitration  award.  Under s. 17  (2),  an\t arbitration
\naward  when  published under s. 17 (1), shall be  final\t and
\nshall  not be called in question by any Court in any  manner
\nwhatsoever.   Section  17A  provides  that  the\t arbitration
\nagreement  shall become enforceable on the expiry of  thirty
\ndays  from  the date of its publication 1 under s.  17,\t and
\nunder  s.  18(2),  it  is binding  on  the  parties  to\t the
\nagreement who referred the dispute to arbitration; under  s.
\n19(3), it shall. subject to the provisions of s, 19,  remain
\nin  operation  for a period of one year\t provided  that\t the
\nappropriate  Government may reduce the said period and-\t fix
\nsuch
\n636<\/span>
\nother  period  as it thinks fit; provided further  that\t the
\nsaid  period  may also be extended as prescribed  under\t the
\nsaid  proviso.\tThe other sub-sections of s. 19\t would\talso
\napply  to the arbitration award.  Section 21 which  requires
\ncertain matters to be kept confidential is applicable and so
\nsection\t  30   which  provides\tfor  a\t penalty   for\t the
\ncontravention  of  s. 21, also applies.\t  Section  29  which
\nprovides for penalty for breach of an award can ‘be  invoked
\nin  respect  of\t an arbitration award.\t Section  33C  which
\nprovides for a speedy remedy for the recovery of money\tfrom
\nan  employer is applicable; and s. 36A can also\t be  invoked
\nfor  the interpretation of any provision of the\t arbitration
\naward.\tIn other words, since an arbitration award has\tbeen
\nincluded  in  the  definition  of  the\tword  ‘Award’  these
\nconsequential changes have made the respective provisions of
\nthe Act applicable to an arbitration award.
\nOn the other hand, there are certain provisions which do not
\napply  to  an  arbitration award.  Sections 23\t&  24  which
\nprohibit  strikes  and lock-outs, are  inapplicable  to\t the
\nproceedings  before  the arbitrator to whom a  reference  is
\nmade  under s. 10A, and that shows that the Act has  treated
\nthe arbitration award and the prior proceedings in  relation
\nto it as standing on a different basis from an award and the
\nprior proceedings before the Industrial Tribunals or  Labour
\nCourts.\t  Section 20, which deals with the commencement\t and
\nconclusion of proceedings,, provides, inter alia, by  sub-s.
\n(3) that proceedings before an arbitrator under s. 10A shall
\nbe deemed to have commenced on the date of the reference  of
\nthe  dispute for arbitration and such proceedings  shall  be
\ndeemed to have concluded on the date on which the award\t be-
\ncomes  enforceable under s. 17A.  It would be  noticed\tthat
\njust  as  in the case of proceedings before  the  Industrial
\nTribunal  commencement of the Proceedings is marked  by\t the
\nreference   under  s.  10,  so\tthe  commencement   of\t the
\nproceedings before the arbitrator
\n 637<\/span>
\nis  marked by the reference made by the parties\t themselves,
\nand  that  means the commencement of the  proceedings  takes
\nplace even before the appropriate Government has entered  on
\nthe  scene  and\t has taken any action in  pursuance  of\t the
\nprovisions of s. 10A.\n<\/p>\n
Rules have been framed by the Central Government and some of
\nthe State Governments under s. 38(2)\t(aa).\tand    These
\nrules make provisions for the form of arbitration agreement,
\nthe place and time of hearing,\t   the\t  power\t   of\t the
\narbitrator to take evidence, the manner in which the summons
\nshould be served, the powers of the arbitrator to proceed ex
\nparte,\tif necessary, and the power to correct\tmistakes  in
\nthe  award and such other matters.  Some of these Rules\t (as
\nfor  instance,\tCentral Rules 7, 8, 13, 15, 16 & IS  to\t 28)
\nseem  to make a distinction between an arbitrator  and\tthe-
\nother authorities under the Act, whereas the Rules framed by
\nsome  of the States (for instance the rules, framed  by\t the
\nMadras State 31; 37, 38, 39,  40, 41 & 42) seem to treat the
\narbitrator  on\tthe  same basis\t as  the  other\t appropriate
\nauthorities  under  the Act.  That, shortly stated,  is\t the
\nposition  of the relevant provisions of the statute and\t the
\nRules  framed  thereunder.   It is in  the  light  of  these
\nprovisions  that we must now consider the character  of\t the
\narbitrator  who enters upon arbitration proceedings  as-,  a
\nresult of the reference made to him under s. 10A.
\nThe   learned  Solicitor-General  contents  that   such\t  an
\narbitrator  is\tno  more  and  no  better  than\t a   private
\narbitrator,  to whom a reference can be made by the  parties
\nunder\tan   arbitration  agreement  as\t defined by   the
\nArbitration Act, 1940 (No.  X of 1940).\t He argues that such
\nan  arbitrator has to act judicially, has to follow a,\tfair
\nprocedure,  take evidence, hear the parties and come to\t his
\nconclusion in the light of the evidence adduced before\thim;
\nand  that  is all that the arbitrator to whom  reference  is
\nmade  under s. 10A does. i ‘It may be that  the\t arbitration
\naward is treated as an award for certain purposes
\n638<\/span>
\nunder the Act; but the position, in law, still remains\tthat
\nit  is\tan  award made by an  arbitrator  appointed  by\t the
\nparties.   Just\t as an award made by  a\t private  arbitrator
\nbecomes a decree subject to the provisions of ss. 15, 16, 17
\nand  30 of the Arbitration Act, and thus binds the  parties,
\nso  does  an  award of the arbitrator under  s.\t 10A  become
\nbinding on the parties by virtue of the relevant  provisions
\nof the Act.  Against an award made by a private\t arbitrator,
\nno  writ can issue under Art. 226; much less can  an  appeal
\nlie  under Art. 136.  The position with regard to the  award
\nmade  by  an arbitrator under s. 10A is\t no  different.\t  In
\nsupport\t of this argument, he has relied on the decision  in
\nR.  V. Disputes Committee of the National Joint Council\t for
\nthe  Craft Dental Technicians(1).  On a motion for an  order
\nof  certiorari to quash an order made by the  Disputes\tCom-
\nmittee,\t Lord  Goddard, C. J., held that the  Court  has  no
\npower  to  direct the issue of orders of  certiorari  or  of
\nProhibition  addressed\tto an arbitrator  directing  that  a
\ndecision  by him should be quashed or that he be  prohibited
\nfrom proceeding in an arbitration, unless he is acting under
\npowers conferred by statute.  “There is no instance of which
\nI  know\t in  the  books”,  observed  Lord  Goddard,  “‘where
\ncertiorari or prohibition has gone to any arbitrator, except
\na  statutory  arbitrator, and a statutory  arbitrator  is  a
\nperson\tto whom, by statute, the parties must  resort.”\t The
\nSolicitor-General suggests that though some powers have been
\nconferred  on  the  arbitrator appointed under\ts.  10A,  he
\ncannot\tbe  treated as a statutory arbitrator,\tbecause\t the
\nparties are not compelled to go to any person named as\tsuch
\nby  the\t statute.  The arbitrator is an\t arbitrator  of\t the
\nparties’ choice and so, he cannot be treated as a  statutory
\narbitrator.\n<\/p>\n
On  the\t other\thand, Mr. Pai has urged\t that  it  would  be
\nunreasonable  to treat the present arbitrator as  a  private
\narbitrator,  because s. 10A gives statutory  recognition  to
\nthe appointment of the arbitrator and
\n(1)  [1953] 1 All.  E. R. 327.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    639<\/span><\/p>\n
the consequential changes made in the Act and the  statutory
\nrules  framed  thereunder  clearly show\t that  he  has\tbeen
\nclothed\t with quasi-judicial powers and his proceedings\t are
\nregulated  by  rules of procedure.  Therefore, it  would  be
\nappropriate  to treat him as a statutory arbitrator  and  as
\nsuch,  a writ of certiorari would lie against  his  decision
\nunder  Art.  226.  In support of this argument,\t Mr.Pai\t has
\nreferred  us to the decision of the court of Appeal  in\t The
\nKing v. Electricity Commissioners Ex-parte London  Electri-
\ncity  Joint Committee Co. (1920) Ltd.(1) In that, case,\t the
\nscheme\tframed by the Electricity Commissioners\t established
\nby  s.\t1   of\tthe  Electricity  (Supply)  Act,  1919,\t was
\nchallenged  and\t it was held that the  impugned\t scheme\t was
\nultra  vires,  and  so, a writ\tof  prohibition\t was  issued
\nprohibiting  the  Commissioners\t from  proceeding  with\t the
\nfurther\t consideration\tof  the scheme.\t  Dealing  with\t the
\nquestion as to whether a writ can issue against a body\tlike
\nthe  Electricity  Commissioners constituted under  the\tAct,
\nLord  Atkin referred to the genesis and the history  of\t the
\nwrits  of  prohibition\tand certiorari and  held  ‘that\t the
\noperation of the writs has extended to control the  proceed-
\nings  of bodies which do not claim to be, and would  not  be
\nrecognised  as,\t Courts of justice.  Wherever  any  body  of
\npersons\t having\t legal\tauthority  to  determine   questions
\naffecting the rights of subjects, and having the duty to act
\njudicially, act in excess of their legal authority they\t are
\nsubject to the controlling jurisdiction of the King’s  Bench
\nDivision exercised in these writs (p. 205).  Then Lord Atkin
\nreferred  to a large number of previous decisions  in  which
\nwrits\thad  been  issued  against   different\t authorities
\nstatutorily  entrusted\twith  the  discharge  of   different
\nduties.\t  To the same effect is the decision in the case  of
\nR. V. Northumberland Compensation ‘Appeal Tribunal  Ex-parte
\nShaw,  (2)  “de also Halsbury’s Laws of\t England  3rd  Edn.,
\nVol.. 2, p.,62, and Vol.  II, p. 122.\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1924] 1 K.B.D. 171,  (2) [1951] 1 All.  E.R. 268.
\nThe argument, therefore, is that against an award Pronounced
\nby  an\tarbitrator  appointed  under  s.  10A,\ta  writ\t  of
\ncertiorari would lie under Art. 226, and so, the  arbitrator
\nshould\tbe deemed to be a Tribunal even for the purposes  of
\nArt.  136.   In\t our opinion, this  argument  is  not  well-
\nfounded.   Art. 226 under which a writ of certiorari can  be
\nissued\tin an appropriate case, is, in a sense,\t wider\tthan
\nArt  . 1336, because the power conferred on the High  Courts
\nto issue certain writs is not conditioned or limited by\t the
\nrequirement  that the said writs can be issued only  against
\nthe  orders of Courts or Tribunals.  Under Art.\t 226(1),  an
\nappropriate writ can be issued to any person or\t authority,.
\nincluding  in appropriate cases any Government,\t within\t the
\nterritories  prescribed.  Therefore even if  the  arbitrator
\nappointed under section 10A is not a Tribunal under Art. 136
\nin  a  proper case, a writ may lie against his\taward  under
\nArt.  226.   That is why the argument that a  writ  may\t lie
\nagainst\t an  award  made  by such  an  arbitrator  does\t not
\nmaterially  assist the appellants’ case that the  arbitrator
\nin question is a tribunal under Art. 136.\n<\/p>\n
It may be conceded that having regard to several  provisions
\ncontained  in  the Act and the rules framed  thereunder,  an
\narbitrator  appointed under s. 10A cannot be treated  to  be
\nexactly\t similar to a private arbitrator to whom  a  dispute
\nhas  been referred under an arbitration agreement under\t the
\nArbitration Act, The arbitrator under s. 10A is clothed with
\ncertain powers, his procedure is regulated by certain  rules
\nand  the  award\t pronounced by him  is\tgiven  by  statutory
\nprovisions a certain validity and a binding character for  a
\nspecified period.  Having regard to these provisions, it may
\nperhaps be, possible to describe such an arbitrator, as in a
\nloose sense, a statutory arbitrator and to that extent,\t the
\nargument  of the learned Solicitor-General may be  rejected.
\nBut  fact that the arbitrator under s. 10A is not exactly
\n641<\/span>
\nin  the same position as a private arbitrator does not\tmean
\nthat  he is a tribunal under Art. 136.\tEven if some of\t the
\ntrappings  of a Court are present in his case, he lacks\t the
\nbasic,\tthe essential and the fundamental requisite in\tthat
\nbehalf because he is not invested with the State’s  inherent
\njudicial  power.   As  we will presently point\tout,  he  is
\nappointed by the parties and the power to decide the dispute
\nbetween\t the parties who appoint him is derived by him\tfrom
\nthe agreement of the, parties and from no other source.\t The
\nfact  that  his\t appointment once  made\t by-the\t parties  is
\nrecognised by s. 10A and after his appointment he is clothed
\nwith  certain  powers and has thus, no doubt,  some  of\t the
\ntrappings  of  a  court, does not mean\tthat  the  power  of
\nadjudication  which  he is exercising is  derived  from\t the
\nState and so, the main test which this Court has evolved  in
\ndetermining   the  question  about  the\t character   of\t  an
\nadjudicating  body is not satisfied.  He is not\t a  Tribunal
\nbecause\t the State has not invested him’ with  its  inherent
\njudicial  power\t and  the power\t of  adjudication  which  he
\nexercises  is  derived\tby him from  the  agreement  of\t the
\nparties.  His position, thus, may be said to be higher\tthan
\nthat  of  a  private arbitrator and lower  than\t that  of  a
\ntribunal.   A  statutory  Tribunal is  appointed  under\t the
\nrelevant  provisions of a statute which.  also\tcompulsorily
\nrefers\tto its adjudication certain classified\tclasses\t of
\ndisputes.  That is the essential feature of what is properly
\ncalled\tstatutory adjudication or arbitration.\tThat is\t why
\nwe think the argument strenuously urged before us by Mr. Pai
\nthat a writ of certiorari can lie against his award is of no
\nassistance to the appellants when they contend that such  an
\narbitrator is a Tribunal under Art. 136.\n<\/p>\n
Realising  this\t difficulty, Mr. Sule  concentrated  on\t the
\nconstruction  of s. 10A itself and urged that on a fair\t and
\nreasonable  construction of s. 10A, it should be  held\tthat
\nthe  arbitrator cannot be distinguished from  an  Industrial
\nTribunal and is therefore, a
\n642<\/span>
\nTribunal under Art. 136.  In the Bharat Bank Ltd.(1) case it
\nhas  been  held that an Industrial Tribunal  is\t a  tribunal
\nunder  Art.  136 and the arbitrator is no more and  no\tless
\nthan an Industrial Tribunal; and so, the present appeals are
\ncompetent, says Mr. Sule.\n<\/p>\n
That  takes us to the construction of s. 10A.\tSection\t 10A
\nenables the employer and the workmen to refer their dispute
\nto arbitration by a written agreement before such a  dispute
\nhas  been  referred  to\t the Labour  Court  or\tTribunal  or
\nNational  Tribunal  under s. 10.  If an\t industrial  dispute
\nexists\tor  is apprehended, the appropriate  Government\t may
\nrefer  it  for adjudication under s. 10; but before  such  a
\nreference  is  made, it is open to the parties to  agree  to
\nrefer their dispute to the arbitration of a person of  their
\nchoice and if they decide to adopt that course, they have to
\nreduce their agreement to writing.  When the parties  reduce
\ntheir  agreement to writing, the reference shall be to\tsuch
\nperson\tas  may be specified in the  arbitration  agreement.
\nThe  section is not very happily worded; but  the  essential
\nfeatures  of its, scheme are not in doubt.  If\ta  reference
\nhas  not  been made under s. 10, the parties  can  agree  to
\nrefer  their dispute to the arbitrator of their choice,\t the
\nagreement is followed by writing, the writing specifies\t the
\narbitrator  or\tarbitrators to whom the reference is  to  be
\nmade  and  the reference shall be made accordingly  to\tsuch
\narbitrator  or arbitrators.  Mr. Sule contend sand it is  no
\ndoubt  an ingenious argument-that the last clause of s.\t 10A
\nmeans  that after the written agreement is entered  into  by
\nthe parties, the reference shall be made to the person named
\nby  the\t agreement but it shall be made by  the\t appropriate
\nGovernment.   In  other words, the argument is that  if\t the
\nparties enter into a written agreement as to the person\t who
\nshould adjudicate.Upon their disputes, it is the  Government
\nthat steps in and makes the reference to such named  person.
\nThe arbitrator or arbitrators are
\n(1)[1950] S.C.R. 459.\n<\/p>\n
 643<\/span><\/p>\n
initially named by the parties by consent; but it is when  a
\nreference  is  made  to\t him  or  them\tby  the\t appropriate
\nGovernment  that  the arbitrator or arbitrators\t is  or\t are
\nclothed\t with  the authority to adjudicate, and\t so,  it  is
\nurged  that  the act of reference which is the\tact  of\t the
\nappropriate  Government makes the arbitrator  an  Industrial
\nTribunal  and  he  is  thereby\tinvested  with\tthe  State’s
\ninherent judicial power.\n<\/p>\n
We  do\tnot  think  that the  section  is  capable  of\tthis
\nconstruction.  The last clause which says that the reference
\nshall be to such person or persons, grammatically must\tmean
\nthat after the written agreement is entered into  specifying
\nthe person or persons, the reference shall be to such person
\nor  persons.   We  do not think that on the  words  as\tthey
\nstand,\tit  is possible to introduce the Government  at\t any
\nstage  of the operation of s. 10A (1).\tThe  said  provision
\ndeals with what the parties can do and provides that if\t the
\nparties\t agree\tand  reduce their agreement  to\t writing,  a
\nreference  shall be to the person or persons named  by\tsuch
\nwriting.  The fact that the parties can agree to refer their
\ndispute\t to the Labour Court, Tribunal or National  Tribunal
\nmakes  no difference to the construction of  the  provision.
\nSub-section  (2) prescribes the form of agreement  and\tthis
\nform  also  supports  the  same\t construction.\t This\tform
\nrequires that the parties should state that they have agreed
\nto  refer the subsisting industrial dispute to the  arbitra-
\ntion  of  the persons to be named in the form.\tThen  it  is
\nrequired that the matters in dispute should be specified and
\nseveral\t other\tdetails indicated.  The form ends  with\t the
\nstatement that the parties agree that the majority  decision
\nof  the arbitrators shall be binding on them.  This form  is
\nto be signed by the respective parties and to be attested by
\ntwo  witnesses.\t In other words, there is no doubt that\t the
\nform  prescribed  by s. 10A (2) is exactly  similar  to\t the
\narbitration  agreement; it refers to the dispute,  it  names
\nthe arbitrator and it binds the parties to
\n644<\/span>
\nabide by the majority decision of the arbitrators.  Thus, it
\nis  clear  that what s. 10A contemplates is carried  out  by
\nprescribing an appropriate form under s. 10A (2).
\nAfter the prescribed form is thus duly signed by the parties
\nand  attested,\tunder  sub-s. (3) a copy of  it\t has  to  be
\nforwarded to the appropriate Government and the conciliation
\nofficer and the appropriate Government has, within  fourteen
\ndays  from the date of the receipt of such copy, to  publish
\nthe  same in the official Gazette.  The publication  of\t the
\ncopy  is, in a sense, a ministerial act and the\t appropriate
\nGovernment has no discretion in the matter.  Subsection\t (4)
\nprovides  that the arbitrator shall investigate the  dispute
\nand submit his award to the appropriate Government; and sub-
\ns.  (5) excludes the application of the Arbitration  Act  to
\nthe  arbitrations provided for by s. 10A.  It is thus  clear
\nthat  when  s.\t10A(4) provides that  the  arbitrator  shall
\ninvestigate  the dispute; it merely asks the  arbitrator  to
\nexercise  the  powers which have been conferred\t on  him  by
\nagreement of the parties under s. 10A(1).  There is no doubt
\nthat  the  appropriate Government plays some part  in  these
\narbitration  proceeding–it  publishes\tthe  agreement;\t  it
\nrequires  the arbitration award to be submitted to it;\tthen
\nit  publishes  the  award; and in that sense,  some  of\t the
\nfeatures  which\t characterise  the  proceedings\t before\t the
\nIndustrial Tribunal before an award is pronounced and  which
\ncharacterise the subsequent steps to be taken in respect  of
\nsuch  an  award, are common to the  proceedings\t before\t the
\narbitrator  and\t the  award  that  he  may  make.   But\t the
\nsimilarity  of these features cannot disguise the fact\tthat
\nthe  initial and the inherent power to adjudicate  upon\t the
\ndispute\t is  derived  by the arbitrator\t from  the  parties,
\nagreement, whereas it is derived by the Industrial  Tribunal
\nfrom   the   statutory\tprovisions  themselves.\t   In\tthis
\nconnection,  the  provisions of s. 10(2) may be\t taken\tinto
\nconsideration
\n 645<\/span>
\nThis  clause  deals  with a case where\tthe  parties  to  an
\nindustrial  dispute  apply in the prescribed  manner  for  a
\nreference of their dispute to an appropriate authority,\t and
\nit  provides that the appropriate Government,  if  satisfied
\nthat  the  persons applying represent the majority  of\teach
\nparty,\tshall  make  the reference  accordingly.   In  other
\nwords,\tif the parties agree that a dispute pending  between
\nthem  should  be referred for adjudication,  they  move\t the
\nappropriate  Government, and the appropriate  Government  is
\nbound  to  make\t the reference\taccordingly.   Unlike  cases
\nfalling under s. 10 (1) where in the absence of an agreement
\nbetween\t the  parties  it  is  in  the\tdiscretion  of\t the
\nappropriate  Government\t to  refer  or\tnot  to\t refer\t any
\nindustrial dispute for adjudication, under s. 10(2) if there
\nis  an\tagreement  between  the\t parties,  the\t appropriate
\nGovernment  has to refer the dispute for adjudication.\t But
\nthe significant fact is that the reference has to be made by
\nthe  appropriate Government and not by the parties,  whereas
\nunder  s.  10A\tthe  reference is  by  the  parties  to\t the
\narbitrator  named by them and it is after the  parties\thave
\nnamed the arbitrator and entered into a written agreement in
\nthat  behalf  that the appropriate Government  steps  in  to
\nassist the further proceedings before the named arbitrator.
\nSection 18 (2) is also helpful in this matter.\tIt  provides
\nthat an arbitration award which has become enforceable shall
\nbe binding on the parties to the agreement who referred\t the
\ndispute\t to  arbitration.   It would be\t noticed  that\tthis
\nprovision  mentions  the  parties to the  agreement  as\t the
\nparties\t who  have referred the dispute to  arbitration\t and
\nthat  indicates that the act of reference is not the act  of
\nthe appropriate Government, but the act of the parties them-
\nselves.\n<\/p>\n
Section\t 10A (5) may also be considered in this\t connection.
\nIf’ the reference to arbitration under s.    10A   (1)\t had
\nbeen made by the appropriate
\n646<\/span>
\nGovernment  then  the  Legislature could  have\teasily\tused
\nappropriate   language\tin  that  behalf  assimilating\t the
\narbitrator to the position of an Industrial Tribunal and  in
\nthat case, it would not have been necessary to provide\tthat
\nthe  Arbitration  Act will not apply to\t arbitrations  under
\nthis section.  The provisions of s. 10A (5)  suggest\tthat
\nthe proceedings contemplated by s. 10A\t  are\t arbitration
\nproceedings  to which, but for sub-s. (5),  the\t Arbitration
\nAct would have applied.\n<\/p>\n
On  behalf of the appellants, reliance has been placed on  a
\nrecent decision of the Bombay High Court in the case of\t the
\nAir  Corporation Employees’ Union v. D.<\/a> 17.  Vyas  (1).\t  In
\nthat case, the Bombay High Court has held that an arbitrator
\nfunctioning  under  s.\t10A  is\t subject  to  the   judicial
\nsuperintendence\t of  the High Court under Art.\t227  of\t the
\nConstitution  and., therefore, the High Court can  entertain
\nan  application for a writ of certiorari in respect  of\t the
\norders\tpassed\tby the arbitrator.  It was  no\tdoubt  urged
\nbefore\tthe High Court that the arbitrator in  question\t was
\nnot  amenable  to the jurisdiction of the High\tCourt  under
\nArt.  227  because  he was a private  and  not\ta  statutory
\narbitrator;  but the Court rejected the said contention\t and
\nheld  that the proceedings before the  arbitrator  appointed
\nunder s. 10A had all the essential attributes of a statutory
\narbitration  under s. 10 of the Act.  From the judgment,  it
\ndoes not appear that the question about the construction  of
\ns. 10A was argued before the High Court or its attention was
\ndrawn  to the obvious differences between the provisions  of
\ns. 10A and s. 10.  Besides, the attention of the High  Court
\nwas  apparently\t not drawn to the tests laid  down  by\tthis
\nCourt\tin  dealing  with  the\tquestion  as  to   when\t  an
\nadjudicating  body  or\tauthority  can be  deemed  to  be  a
\nTribunal  under\t Art.  136.  Like Art. 136,  Art.  227\talso
\nrefers\tto courts and Tribunals and what we have said  about
\nthe  character of the arbitrator appointed under s.  10A  by
\nreference to the requirements of Art. 136, may prima facie
\n(1) (1961)64 Bom. L. R. 1
\n 647<\/span>
\napply to the requirements of Art. 227.\tThat, however, is  a
\nmatter\twith  which  we are not directly  concerned  in\t the
\npresent appeals.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. Sule made a strong plea before us that if the arbitrator
\nappointed  under  s. 10A was not treated as a  Tribunal,  it
\nwould lead to unreasonable consequences.  He emphasised that
\nthe policy of the legislature in enacting section 10A was to
\nencourage  industrial  employers  and  employees  to   avoid
\nbitterness  by referring their disputes voluntarily  to\t the
\narbitrators  of their own choice, but this  laudable  object
\nwould be defeated if it is realised by the parties that once
\nreference  is made under s. 10A the proceedings\t before\t the
\narbitrator  are\t not subject to the scrutiny of\t this  Court
\nunder  Art. 136.  It is extremely anomalous, says Mr.  Sule,
\nthat  parties  aggrieved  by  an  award\t made  by  such\t  an
\narbitrator  should be denied the protection of the  relevant
\nprovisions of the Arbitration Act as well as the  protection
\nof the appellate jurisdiction of this Court under Art.\t136. There is some
\n force in this connection., It appears that in
\nenacting  section  10A\tthe  Legislature  probably  did\t not
\nrealise\t that  the position of\tan  arbitrator\tcontemplated
\ntherein\t would become anomalous in view of the fact that  he
\nwas not assimilated to the status of an Industrial  Tribunal
\nand   was  taken  out  of  the\tprovisions  of\tthe   Indian
\nArbitration  Act.   That,  however,  is\t a  matter  for\t the
\nLegislature to consider.\n<\/p>\n
In  the\t result,  the preliminary objection  raised  by\t the
\nrespondents in the appeals before us must be upheld and\t the
\nappeals\t dismissed on the ground that they  are\t incompetent
\nunder  Article 136.  The appellants to pay the costs of\t the
\nrespondents  in C A. No. 204 of 1962.  No order as to  costs
\nin C. A. Nos. 182 & 183 of 1962.\n<\/p>\n
Appeal dismissed,
\n648<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India The Engineering Mazdoor Sabha … vs The Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay(And … on 18 October, 1962 Equivalent citations: 1963 AIR 874, 1963 SCR Supl. (1) 625 Author: P Gajendragadkar Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Gajendragadkar, P.B., Wanchoo, K.N., Gupta, K.C. Das, Shah, J.C. PETITIONER: THE ENGINEERING MAZDOOR SABHA REPRESENTING WORKMEN EMPLOYED Vs. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-177595","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Engineering Mazdoor Sabha ... vs The Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay(And ... on 18 October, 1962 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-engineering-mazdoor-sabha-vs-the-hind-cycles-ltd-bombayand-on-18-october-1962\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Engineering Mazdoor Sabha ... vs The Hind Cycles Ltd., Bombay(And ... on 18 October, 1962 - 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