{"id":177981,"date":"2001-10-19T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2001-10-18T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/v-purushotham-rao-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-19-october-2001"},"modified":"2016-03-15T22:31:27","modified_gmt":"2016-03-15T17:01:27","slug":"v-purushotham-rao-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-19-october-2001","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/v-purushotham-rao-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-19-october-2001","title":{"rendered":"V. Purushotham Rao vs Union Of India &amp; Ors on 19 October, 2001"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">V. Purushotham Rao vs Union Of India &amp; Ors on 19 October, 2001<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: Pattanaik<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: G.B. Pattanaik, Ruma Pal<\/div>\n<pre>           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil) 3100  of  2000\n\n\n\nPETITIONER:\nV. PURUSHOTHAM RAO\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA &amp; ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\t19\/10\/2001\n\nBENCH:\nG.B. Pattanaik &amp; Ruma Pal\n\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>With<br \/>\nCivil Appeal Nos. 3104-3105, 3089, 3090, 3117, 3097, 3102,<br \/>\n3086, 3106, 3085, 3094, 3099, 3103, 3092 &amp; 3101\t of 2000.\n<\/p>\n<p>JUDGMENT<\/p>\n<p>PATTANAIK, J.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tIn this batch of appeals the judgment of Delhi High<br \/>\nCourt, canceling the allotment made by the concerned<br \/>\nminister from out of his so- called discretionary quota on<br \/>\npetroleum dealership  as well as LPG dealership is under<br \/>\nchallenge.    Prior to 1995, the Minister of Petroleum in<br \/>\nexercise of his discretion  had been allotting retail outlets for<br \/>\npetroleum products, LPG dealership and SKO dealership,<br \/>\nwithout having any prescribed norms.  A Public Interest<br \/>\nLitigation had been filed in this Court by Centre for Public<br \/>\nInterest Litigation under Article 32 of the Constitution,<br \/>\npraying that guidelines to regulate the exercise of discretion<br \/>\nin the matter of such allotment, which results in exercise of<br \/>\nthe discretion arbitrarily be fixed.  It may be stated that<br \/>\ninitially a prayer had also been made in that application to<br \/>\ncancel the dealership in favour of respondent\tNo. 4,\t but<br \/>\nthat prayer stood deleted and an amended petition was filed<br \/>\nas the said respondent did not accept the dealership in<br \/>\nquestion.  This Court after hearing the counsel for the<br \/>\npetitioner, and the learned Attorney General, issued a set of<br \/>\nguidelines for discretionary allotment of petroleum products<br \/>\nagencies to ensure that the exercise of discretion in making<br \/>\nsuch allotments are in conformity with the rule of law and by<br \/>\nexcluding the likelihood of arbitrariness and minimising the<br \/>\narea of discretion.  The said decision of this Court has  since<br \/>\nbeen reported in the case of Centre for <a href=\"\/doc\/164698616\/\">Public Interest<br \/>\nLitigation vs. Union of India and Ors.,<\/a> 1995 Supp.(3)<br \/>\nS.C.C. 382.\tIn para (4) of the aforesaid Judgment, the<br \/>\nCourt had directed as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>\tWe hereby direct that the above-quoted<br \/>\nnorms\/guidelines etc. shall be followed by the<br \/>\nCentral Government in making all such<br \/>\ndiscretionary allotments of retail outlets for<br \/>\npetroleum products, LPG Dealership and SKO<br \/>\nDealership, hereafter.\n<\/p>\n<p>The Common Cause had filed a petition under Article 32 on<br \/>\nthe basis of a news item which appeared in a national<br \/>\nnewspaper that the Minister of Petroleum was personally<br \/>\ninterested in making allotment of petrol pumps in favour of<br \/>\n15 persons, who\t were either the relations of his personal<br \/>\nstaff or sons of the Ministers, or sons\/relations of the<br \/>\nChairman and Members of the Oil Selection Boards,  praying<br \/>\nfor cancellation of allotments made inter alia on the ground<br \/>\nthat the allotments had been made by the concerned minister,<br \/>\nmala fide and the decision is arbitrary and motivated by<br \/>\nextraneous considerations.  The Court ultimately cancelled<br \/>\nthe allotments made in favour of the 15 persons mentioned in<br \/>\nthe petition, on a conclusion that the allotments are arbitrary,<br \/>\ndiscriminatory, mala fide and wholly illegal.  The Court also<br \/>\nissued certain other directions in relation to the allottees and<br \/>\ncalled upon the concerned minister to show cause as to why a<br \/>\ndirection be not issued to the appropriate police authority to<br \/>\nregister a case and initiate prosecution against him for<br \/>\ncriminal breach of trust or any other offence under law and in<br \/>\naddition, why he should not be liable to pay damages for his<br \/>\nmala fide action in allotting petrol pumps to 15 persons<br \/>\nmentioned therein.  This judgment of the Court is reported in<br \/>\n1996(6) SCC 530.      While the Common Cause case was<br \/>\npending in this Court, Civil Writ Petition Nos. 4003 and 4430<br \/>\nof 1995 had been filed in Delhi High Court by the Centre for<br \/>\nPublic Interest Litigation,   as public interest litigation, which<br \/>\nwere pending in Delhi High Court.  In those two petitions,<br \/>\nallotment of petrol pumps\/gas agencies to various persons<br \/>\nduring the period 1992-93, 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1995-96<br \/>\nhad been challenged.  A Transfer Petition had been filed in<br \/>\nthis Court, which was registered as Transfer Petition No.<br \/>\n127\/96 and this Court had issued notice in the transfer<br \/>\npetition and stayed further proceedings before the High<br \/>\nCourt.\tIn an affidavit filed by the Ministry of Petroleum in<br \/>\nthe aforesaid transfer petition, the then Joint Secretary had<br \/>\nstated that in 1995-96 under the discretionary power of the<br \/>\nGovernment, allotment had been made to 99 persons and<br \/>\nfurther orders had already been made in favour of 61 more<br \/>\npersons, allotting petrol pumps\/gas agencies.\t One Mr.<br \/>\nSrinivasan, Advocate had filed an affidavit giving a long list<br \/>\nof persons who are related to the then Prime<br \/>\nMinister\/Ministers and other V.I.Ps and who had been<br \/>\nallotted petrol pumps and gas agencies.\t On behalf of<br \/>\npetroleum ministry, an affidavit had been filed, stating that<br \/>\ndue inquiry had been made through the oil companies and<br \/>\nafter due inquiry, the concerned minister had made the<br \/>\nallotment.  This Court ultimately held that since the two writ<br \/>\npetitions are pending before the High Court, wherein the<br \/>\nallotment made to all these persons have been challenged, it<br \/>\nwould not  be necessary for this Court to get the writ<br \/>\npetitions transferred and decide the matter.  The Court,<br \/>\ntherefore, vacated the stay order granted and directed the<br \/>\nRegistry of the Court to send all affidavits filed by the parties<br \/>\nin the transfer petition along with the annexures to the High<br \/>\nCourt.\tThe Court observed:\n<\/p>\n<p>We have no doubt that the High Court shall<br \/>\nexamine the issues involved in the writ petitions<br \/>\nand shall also go into the validity of the allotment<br \/>\nof petrol pumps\/gas agencies to various persons,<br \/>\nafter hearing them, in accordance with law.  We<br \/>\nrequest the High Court to expedite the hearing of<br \/>\nthe petitions.\n<\/p>\n<p>Pursuant to the directions contained in the judgment of this<br \/>\nCourt in <a href=\"\/doc\/1449517\/\">Common Cause vs. Union of India,<\/a> 1996(6) SCC<br \/>\n530,  show cause notice having been issued to the then<br \/>\nMinister Captain Satish Sharma,\t  said Shri Sharma had filed<br \/>\nan affidavit in reply to the show cause notice.\t The Court<br \/>\nultimately perused the show cause notice filed and after<br \/>\nhearing the counsel appearing for the Minster, directed the<br \/>\nCBI to hold  an investigation, after registering a case against<br \/>\nthe concerned minister in respect of the allegations dealt with<br \/>\nand findings made by the Court earlier in the Common Cause<br \/>\ncase. On the question of liability of the minister to pay<br \/>\nexemplary or compensatory damages, the Court considered<br \/>\nthe matter and came to the conclusion  that Captain Satish<br \/>\nSharma, the then minister would be liable to pay exemplary<br \/>\ndamages and quantified the same at Rs. 50 lacs.\t This<br \/>\nJudgment of the Court has been reported in 1996(6) S.C.C.\n<\/p>\n<p>593.<\/p>\n<p>\tPursuant to the directions of this Court in Common<br \/>\nCause case, 1996(6) S.C.C. 530, the Delhi High Court took<br \/>\nup the writ petitions which had been filed as Public Interest<br \/>\nLitigation by the Centre for Public Interest Litigation.  On<br \/>\nexamination of the relevant files dealing with the allotment<br \/>\nof retail outlets of petrol, LPG distributorship and SKO\/LDO<br \/>\ndealership under the discretionary quota made by the<br \/>\nminister concerned, it was revealed that between January<br \/>\n1993 till 1996, 179 retail outlets (petrol pumps), 155 LPG<br \/>\ndistributorships and 45 SKO\/DLO dealerships had been<br \/>\nallotted by the concerned minister under the discretionary<br \/>\nquota.\tIn its order dated 29th of August, 1997, the Division<br \/>\nBench of  Delhi High Court came to the conclusion that the<br \/>\nexamination of files clearly shows that these are not the cases<br \/>\nof aberrations here or there but are cases which show a<br \/>\npattern of favouritism.\t From the judgment of Delhi High<br \/>\nCourt in C.W. 4003\/95 dated 29.8.1997, it transpires that<br \/>\neven before the Supreme Court stayed the  proceedings by<br \/>\norder dated 6th December, 1995 , the High Court had called<br \/>\nupon the respondents by order dated 2nd November, 1995 to<br \/>\nproduce the list of allotments made under the discretionary<br \/>\nquota of the petroleum minister for allotment of petrol retail<br \/>\noutlets, LPG distributorship and Kerosene distributorship<br \/>\nfrom the date of the tenure of the minister which was 18th of<br \/>\nJanuary, 1993.\t Before the  Delhi High Court, it had been<br \/>\ncontended by the allottees as well as by the Government that<br \/>\nthe judgment dated 31st March, 1995 of the Supreme Court<br \/>\nlaying down the guidelines, since reported in 1995 Supp.(3)<br \/>\nS.C.C. 382 would indicate that the Supreme Court had<br \/>\nimplidely regularised the allotments made prior to 31st<br \/>\nMarch, 1995 and consequently the validity of the said<br \/>\nallotments need not be gone into. The High Court however<br \/>\nwas not persuaded to agree with the submissions and in our<br \/>\nview rightly,  particularly, when in the Common Cause case<br \/>\n[1996(6) SCC 530] this Court has positively directed the<br \/>\nHigh Court to examine the issues involved and dispose of the<br \/>\ntwo pending writ petitions in accordance with law. Since the<br \/>\nallottees were required to be noticed before any decision is<br \/>\ntaken, the High Court by its order dated 11th December,<br \/>\n1996, constituted a Committee of three advocates and<br \/>\ndirected them to examine all the files and submit a report in a<br \/>\nProforma which had been prepared by the Court itself, after<br \/>\ndiscussion with the counsel appearing for the parties.\tThe<br \/>\nsaid Committee submitted its report,  on the basis of which<br \/>\nthe Court issued notices to various persons by its order dated<br \/>\n27th of February, 1997 and 20th of March, 1997 and the Court<br \/>\nwas to deal with the cases of about 400 allottees.  Pursuant to<br \/>\nthe notices issued, the allottees filed their respective show<br \/>\ncauses and then the Court heard the respective counsel for<br \/>\nthe allottees as well as examined the report of the Committee<br \/>\nand scrutinized the same by perusing the original file and<br \/>\nfinally disposed of the cases of about 100 allottees by its<br \/>\njudgment dated 29th of August, 1997.  The Court on<br \/>\nexamination of the materials before it and on perusal of the<br \/>\noriginal files, appears to have taken the view in several cases<br \/>\nthat  the discretion had been exercised on sufficient materials<br \/>\nand  after inquiry and held those allotments to have been<br \/>\nproper exercise of the discretion and  accordingly discharged<br \/>\nthe notices of cancellation.  But in those cases, where the<br \/>\nCourt found either there were no materials before the<br \/>\nconcerned minister in support of the applications filed to<br \/>\njustify the exercise of power for allotment under the<br \/>\ndiscretionary quota or such allotments had been made on<br \/>\naccount of political patronage or some other extraneous<br \/>\nconsiderations, the Court cancelled  the allotment made with<br \/>\ncertain directions therein.  It would be appropriate at this<br \/>\nstage to notice the observations of the High Court:\n<\/p>\n<p>It is unfortunate that perusal of the files show that<br \/>\na large number of persons to whom allotments<br \/>\nwere made under the discretionary quota belong to<br \/>\nan affluent class of society and not to the class<br \/>\nwhich may deserve compassion, resulting in<br \/>\nexercise of discretion in their favour.\t Whether this<br \/>\nlarge number of persons got allotment on account<br \/>\nof their affluence or on account of their close<br \/>\nproximity with the powers that be, it may be<br \/>\ndifficult to say definitely, one way or the other but<br \/>\nthat makes no difference since both affluence<br \/>\nand\/or proximity, are irrelevant and extraneous<br \/>\nconsiderations for exercise of discretion.\n<\/p>\n<p>The Court also came to the further conclusion that there had<br \/>\nbeen no verification of the statements made in the<br \/>\napplications by the allottees and hardly any application<br \/>\ncontains details of annual income or bio-data  and hardly any<br \/>\nperson had filed any affidavit in support of his claim, seeking<br \/>\ngrant of discretionary allotment and in several cases the<br \/>\napplications even did not bear any data and a number of<br \/>\nallottees belonged  to one Parliamentary Constituency and<br \/>\nwere active members and supporters of the party in power at<br \/>\nthe relevant time.  The Court having cancelled the allotments<br \/>\nmade in favour of the appellants, who are before us, the<br \/>\npresent appeals have been filed by grant of special leave.<br \/>\nAfter the disposal of first batch of cases by the High Court by<br \/>\nits judgment dated 29.8.1997, the High Court issued notices<br \/>\nto some other allottees and disposed of the second batch of<br \/>\ncases by its order dated 11.10.99 and both these orders of<br \/>\nDelhi High Court are under challenge, so far as it relates to<br \/>\nthe cancellation of allotments made under the discretionary<br \/>\nquota.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tCaptain Satish Sharma, who was the concerned<br \/>\nminister and against whom the Court had directed<br \/>\nregistration of a criminal case by the C.B.I., and also levied<br \/>\npenalty of Rs. 50 lacs, filed a review petition against the<br \/>\naforesaid two directions of the Court, which was entertained<br \/>\nand  that review petition was allowed by a three Judge Bench<br \/>\nof this Court, since reported in 1999(6) S.C.C. 667.  In the<br \/>\naforesaid case, this Court came to the conclusion that the<br \/>\nfactors relevant to the award of exemplary damages had not<br \/>\nbeen taken by this Court and consequently the levy of<br \/>\npenalty of Rs.50 lacs was not in accordance with law.  The<br \/>\nCourt also held\t that no case could be said to have been made<br \/>\nout against the concerned minister for directing  registering a<br \/>\ncase under Section 409 and such a direction could not have<br \/>\nbeen given  under Article 32 or under Article 142 and further,<br \/>\nsuch a direction would be contrary to the concept of right to<br \/>\nlife under Article 21.\tThe Court, therefore, set aside the two<br \/>\ndirections earlier made in relation to registering a criminal<br \/>\ncase and levy of penalty against the minister.\tCertain<br \/>\nobservations had been made in the  aforesaid three Judge<br \/>\nBench Judgment, which form the sheet anchor of one of the<br \/>\ncontentions of the appellants in the present batch of appeals<br \/>\nand we will refer to those observations and deal with the<br \/>\nsame at appropriate stage.  The aforesaid judgment of the<br \/>\nCourt has since been reported in 1999(6) SCC 667.<br \/>\nBetween 1997 and 1999, against the order of cancellation of<br \/>\nallotments made under discretionary quota,  about 79 special<br \/>\nleave petitions had been filed in this Court, which had been<br \/>\ndismissed or dismissed as withdrawn.  Notwithstanding the<br \/>\ndismissal of the aforesaid special leave petitions, after the<br \/>\nthree Judge Bench Judgment of this Court dated 3rd August,<br \/>\n1999 since reported in 1999 (6) S.C.C. 667, special leave<br \/>\npetitions having been filed, this batch of cases were listed<br \/>\nbefore the Bench presided over by the very learned Judge,<br \/>\nwho was presiding over the Bench which reviewed the earlier<br \/>\njudgment and absolved the concerned minister from the<br \/>\ndirection of levy of penalty as well as from the criminal<br \/>\nprosecution.  The Bench, therefore, having granted leave, the<br \/>\npresent appeals were placed for hearing.  At this stage, it<br \/>\nwould be appropriate for us to notice that the review petitions<br \/>\nfiled by Captain Satish Sharma, the concerned Minister was<br \/>\nin relation to the order dated 4.11.96 in the case of <a href=\"\/doc\/1449517\/\">Common<br \/>\nCause vs. Union of India,<\/a> 1996(6) S.C.C. 593 and was not<br \/>\nin relation to the judgment dated 25.9.96 in the case of<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/1449517\/\">Common Cause vs. Union of India<\/a> reported in 1996(6)<br \/>\nS.C.C. 530.  The three Judge Bench however committed an<br \/>\nerror in paragraph (7) by noticing that the review petition<br \/>\nrelates to both the judgments viz. the Judgment dated 25.9.96<br \/>\nand 4.11.1996.\t   Mr. P.P. Rao, the learned counsel,<br \/>\nappearing in four of these appeals viz. Civil Appeal Nos.<br \/>\n3085, 3094, 3099 and 3092, seriously contended that the<br \/>\njudgment of this Court in the Centre for <a href=\"\/doc\/164698616\/\">Public Interest<br \/>\nLitigation vs. Union of India,<\/a> 1995 Supp.(3) S.C.C. 382<br \/>\nin no uncertain terms, stipulates that the norms and<br \/>\nguidelines should be followed by the Central Government in<br \/>\nmaking discretionary allotment of retail outlets of petroleum<br \/>\nproducts, LPG distributorship and SKO dealership,<br \/>\nsubsequent to the said judgment which necessarily and<br \/>\nimpliedly indicates that the Court has approved the earlier<br \/>\nlapses in the matter of such allotment\tunder discretionary<br \/>\nquota and, therefore, it was not open to the High Court to re-<br \/>\nexamine all the cases and decide the legality of the allotments<br \/>\nmade under the discretionary quota.  He further contended<br \/>\nthat in view of the observations of this Court\tin the three<br \/>\nJudge Bench Judgment [1999(6) S.C.C. 667],   in paragraph<br \/>\n115 of the said judgment, the plea  of constructive res-<br \/>\njudicata should have been applied by the High Court and the<br \/>\nHigh Court committed error in rejecting the said contention.<br \/>\nAccording to Mr. Rao, on a plain reading of the judgment of<br \/>\nthis Court in Centre for Public Interest Litigation case [1995<br \/>\nSupp.(3) S.C.C. 382], the conclusion is irresistible that the<br \/>\nCourt in that case had given its stamp of judicial approval to<br \/>\nthe discretionary allotments had  already been made by that<br \/>\ndate and it is for that reason, the Court had indicated that the<br \/>\nguidelines therein would be followed hereafter.\t That being<br \/>\nthe position, not only that the principle  of  constructive res-<br \/>\njudicata would apply, but also it was not open for the High<br \/>\nCourt to re-open and examine the legality of the discretionary<br \/>\nallotments made prior to 1995.\tAccording to Mr. Rao, during<br \/>\nthe period when the allotments had been made in favour of<br \/>\nhis clients,  which is prior to the guidelines indicated by this<br \/>\nCourt in the Centre for Public Interest Litigation case, under<br \/>\nthe pre-existing practice and norms, the concerned minister<br \/>\nhaving exercised the discretion, the High Court committed<br \/>\nserious error in interfering with those discretionary orders of<br \/>\nallotment. Mr. Rao further urged that the impugned judgment<br \/>\nwould indicate that there has been no due consideration of<br \/>\nthe show-cause filed by the allottees and the materials<br \/>\nreferred to in the show-cause have not been considered by the<br \/>\nHigh Court and, therefore, it would be a fit case where matter<br \/>\nshould be remitted back to the High Court for re-<br \/>\nconsideration.\tAccording to Mr. Rao , the discretion having<br \/>\nbeen exercised in favour of his clients, who happened  to be<br \/>\npolitical sufferers and a  political sufferer having been<br \/>\nrecognised as a class\/category by themselves in the case of<br \/>\n<a href=\"\/doc\/1276295\/\">D.N. Chanchala vs. State of Mysore and Ors.<\/a> etc., 1971<br \/>\nSupp.S.C.R. 608 at 629,\t the High Court committed serious<br \/>\nerror of law in interfering with the allotments made in favour<br \/>\nof his clients and as such the impugned orders cannot be<br \/>\nsustained.    Mr. Rao also urged that allotments having been<br \/>\nmade in individual cases of extreme hardship by the minister<br \/>\nconcerned and that being one of the norms which this Court<br \/>\nformulated in its guidelines in the case of Centre for Public<br \/>\nInterest Litigation and the appellants having invested huge<br \/>\nmoney and this being the only source of livelihood since<br \/>\n1993, the same ought not to have been cancelled, particularly<br \/>\nwhen no public interest will be served by such cancellation.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tMr. P.S. Narasimha, the learned\t counsel, appearing for<br \/>\nthe appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3100\/2000, while<br \/>\nsupporting the arguments of Mr. Rao, further urged that all<br \/>\nthe necessary information was available with the High Court<br \/>\nbut the Court never considered those materials nor did the<br \/>\nCourt inquire into the correctness of those materials, as it<br \/>\nwould be apparent from the affidavit of the appellant, filed<br \/>\npursuant to the notice of show-cause and also the impugned<br \/>\norder of the High Court dealing with the appellants case.<br \/>\nThis being the position, Mr. Narsimhan urged that the order<br \/>\nof cancellation should be set aside and the matter should be<br \/>\nremitted back to the High Court for re-consideration.\n<\/p>\n<p>Appearing for the appellants in Civil Appeal Nos.<br \/>\n3104-3105 of 2000,  Mr. Narsimha, the learned counsel<br \/>\nurged that in these two cases, the concerned authority having<br \/>\nexercised the discretion in favour of a young educated<br \/>\nunemployed youth belonging to a back-ward community<br \/>\nand his family being under financial constraint, the<br \/>\nconclusion of the High Court that it was a case of arbitrary<br \/>\nallotment, is unsustainable in law.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. V.A. Mohta, the learned senior counsel appearing<br \/>\nfor the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3089\/2000, urged that<br \/>\nthe allotment in favour of his client had been made under<br \/>\ndiscretionary quota as the family of the applicant had been<br \/>\nput to severe financial hardship on account of natural<br \/>\ncalamity on one hand and the Naxailite activities on the other<br \/>\nhand.  According to the learned counsel, this must be held to<br \/>\nbe a germane consideration which weighed with the<br \/>\nconcerned authority for exercise of his discretionary power<br \/>\nand, therefore, the High Court ought not to have cancelled<br \/>\nthe allotment made in favour of the appellant.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. Dushyant A. Dave, the learned senior counsel<br \/>\nappearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3090 of 2000<br \/>\nurged that the only ground on which the High Court has set<br \/>\naside the allotment made in favour of the appellant is that<br \/>\nthere had been no verification whatsoever regarding other<br \/>\nmembers of his family and their sources of income before<br \/>\nexercising discretion, and therefore, since the minister<br \/>\napproved the allotment without any verification, the<br \/>\nallotment is liable to be cancelled.  According to   Mr. Dave,<br \/>\nthe fact that the order of allotment itself indicated that the<br \/>\nI.O.C.Ltd. would conduct requisite verification before<br \/>\nissuance of Letter of Intent, it cannot be said that the order in<br \/>\nquestion was without any inquiry.  Mr. Dave urged that it is<br \/>\nnobodys case that the I.O.C., on an inquiry came to the<br \/>\nconclusion that the grant of distributorship in favour of the<br \/>\nappellant on compassionate grounds was unjustified.  That<br \/>\napart, the appellant himself had filed an affidavit before the<br \/>\nHigh Court, indicating his family conditions and the fact that<br \/>\nhe had no resources and he had gathered the resources from<br \/>\nfriends, but the High Court unfortunately over-looked these<br \/>\nmaterials and directed cancellation of the allotment made in<br \/>\nfavour of the appellant.  The learned counsel also urged that<br \/>\nthe order of the High Court would indicate that in case of<br \/>\nseveral other noticees, the High Court discharged the notice<br \/>\nof cancellation without ascribing any reason and therefore,<br \/>\nthere was no reason why the High Court should have<br \/>\ncancelled the allotment made in favour of the appellant.  The<br \/>\nlearned counsel further urged that even if the High Court<br \/>\nfound that there had been no verification, then it would have<br \/>\nbeen appropriate for the High Court to direct for a fresh<br \/>\nverification, rather than canceling the distributorship and the<br \/>\napproach of the High Court is wholly uncalled for.<br \/>\nAccording to the learned counsel, the appellants case being<br \/>\ncovered under the existing discretionary scheme, as was<br \/>\nprevalent, and further even under the guidelines issued by<br \/>\nthis Court in the judgment reported in 1995 Supp.(3) S.C.C.<br \/>\n382, individual cases of extreme hardship which in the<br \/>\nopinion of the Government are extremely compassionate and<br \/>\ndeserve sympathetic consideration being one of the criteria,<br \/>\nthere was absolutely no rhyme or reason on the part of the<br \/>\nHigh Court to set aside the discretionary allotment made in<br \/>\nfavour of the appellant.  He also reiterated the arguments<br \/>\nadvanced on behalf of Mr. Rao that the judgment of this<br \/>\nCourt  in 1995 Supp.(3) S.C.C. 382 must be so  construed,<br \/>\nthat allotments made under the discretionary quota prior to<br \/>\nthe date of the said judgment were not intended to be<br \/>\ninterfered with and as such, the High Court had no<br \/>\njurisdiction to examine the allotment made in favour of the<br \/>\nappellant, which was in the year 1993.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. Sushil Kumar Jain, the learned  counsel, appearing<br \/>\nfor the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3117 of 2000,<br \/>\ncontended in addition to what had been urged by Mr. P.P.<br \/>\nRao that the impugned judgment of the High Court  is earlier<br \/>\nto the three Judge Bench Judgment of this Court in 1999(6)<br \/>\nS.C.C. 667  and the observations made in the three Judge<br \/>\nBench Judgment more particularly, in paragraph 115 thereof,<br \/>\nunequivocally supports the contention of the appellant that<br \/>\nthe Court approved all allotments made prior to the Judgment<br \/>\nin 1995 Supp.(3) S.C.C. 382 and therefore, the matter<br \/>\nshould be remitted back to the High Court for re-<br \/>\nconsideration in the light of the aforesaid three Judge Bench<br \/>\ndecision of this Court.\t  Mr. Jain also appearing for the<br \/>\nappellant in Civil Appeal No. 3114 of 2000 reiterated his<br \/>\nsubmissions made in the earlier case and contended that there<br \/>\nhas been gross injustice by the High Court in canceling the<br \/>\nallotment made and the equitable considerations require that<br \/>\nthis Court should interfere with the order of cancellation and<br \/>\nin the alternative, the matter should be remitted back to the<br \/>\nHigh Court  for reconsideration after due inquiry.\n<\/p>\n<p>In the written submission given by Mr. Bhachawat,<br \/>\nlearned senior counsel, in this case it was urged that prior to<br \/>\n31st March, 1995 there being no fixed guidelines for<br \/>\nallotment under discretionary quota, the High Court was not<br \/>\njustified in canceling the allotment which are not tainted by<br \/>\nany favoritism\tor nepotism merely because there is no proof<br \/>\nto support the allotment on compassionate ground, or that the<br \/>\napplication is undated, or there is no receipt entry on the<br \/>\napplication or even that there is no bio-data of the applicant.<br \/>\nAccording to Mr. Bhachawat even judicial notice can be<br \/>\ntaken of the fact that Ministers hold open Darbar in which<br \/>\nthey meet people, hear their grievances and also solve their<br \/>\nproblems on the spot, therefore, the possibility of<br \/>\napplications for allotment from discretionary quota having<br \/>\nbeen received during such Darbars cannot be denied.  Mr.<br \/>\nBhachawat also urged in his written submission that the<br \/>\nconcerned Minister, who is the author of the alleged wrong<br \/>\nallotment having been given a clean chit by the three Judge<br \/>\nBench of this Court, since reported in 1999 (6) SCC 667<br \/>\nand the main culprit thus being exonerated, it would not be<br \/>\nfair deal to punish the allottees, particularly when they have<br \/>\nmade investments and are earning their livelihood by<br \/>\noperating the allotments made in their favour.\tHe also<br \/>\nreiterated on the question of applicability of the principle res<br \/>\njudicata by stating that if the parties were the same and the<br \/>\nrelief sought for is identical then Explanation 6 to Section 11<br \/>\nshould apply.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. M.C. Bhandari, the learned senior counsel,<br \/>\nappearing for the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3101 of<br \/>\n2000, seriously contended that the appellant does not belong<br \/>\nto any of the three categories of persons mentioned in the<br \/>\njudgment of this Court in 1996(6) S.C.C. 530 inasmuch as<br \/>\nthe High Court never found that the allotment in favour of<br \/>\nthe appellant had been made as he happened to be relation of<br \/>\nany personal staff of the minister or that the allotment had<br \/>\nbeen made on extraneous considerations nor the appellant<br \/>\ncan be said to be belonging to the category of sons of<br \/>\nministers or related to any member of the Oil Selection<br \/>\nBoard.\tThat being so and no mala fide, favouritism or<br \/>\nnepotism having been established, the allotment could not<br \/>\nhave been nullified by the High Court.\tAccording to Mr.<br \/>\nBhandari, the father of the appellant, Karibasavaraj,  being a<br \/>\nwell known talented stage artist in the State of Karnataka,<br \/>\nwho through his performance, had been able to convey the<br \/>\nmessages of freedom fighters and religious tolerance, having<br \/>\nfaced with acute financial stringency and said Karibasavaraj<br \/>\nhaving died, the responsibility to maintain a large family fell<br \/>\non the appellant, who though a graduate, had no job or<br \/>\nemployment.  It is on this consideration, the then Chief<br \/>\nMinister of Karnataka and the then Vice President of India<br \/>\nhad recommended the case of the appellant for being<br \/>\nfavourably considered for getting allotment under<br \/>\ndiscretionary quota and ultimately the Minister, Petroleum<br \/>\nhad made the grant in favour of the appellant.\tThe said<br \/>\nallotment is neither arbitrary nor motivated nor vitiated by<br \/>\nmala fides and as such the High Court was wholly in error in<br \/>\ncanceling the  allotment without proper examination of the<br \/>\naforesaid materials.  According to Mr. Bhandari, the finding<br \/>\nof the High Court that the minister has exercised his<br \/>\ndiscretion without any verification, is on the face of it<br \/>\nerroneous inasmuch as the order of allotment itself specified<br \/>\nthat the Letter of Intent could be issued only after requisite<br \/>\nverification.  In fact such verification can be effectively done<br \/>\nonly by the Oil Company at site and not by the Minister,<br \/>\nsitting in Delhi and to hold that the minister must verify the<br \/>\ncontents of the application, would be unreasonable and<br \/>\nimpracticable. Mr. Bhandari further urged that the so-called<br \/>\nquestionnaire which was formulated was behind the back of<br \/>\nthe appellant and the records indicating that the appellant is<br \/>\nrelated\/connected to Mr. Veerapa Moily, the then Chief<br \/>\nMinister of Karnataka is untrue.  Mere recommendation by<br \/>\nthe Chief Minister would not constitute any relationship and<br \/>\nthe conclusion therefore,  is without any materials.<br \/>\nAccording to the learned counsel, the procedure adopted by<br \/>\nthe High Court, so far as the appellant is concerned,<br \/>\ntantamounts to denial of a fair hearing and justice to the<br \/>\nappellant inasmuch as even before serving the notice on the<br \/>\nappellant on 15.4.1999, the High Court itself heard the first<br \/>\nbatch of cases and delivered its judgment on 29.8.97,<br \/>\nanswering all the questions of\tlaw, including the question of<br \/>\nconstructive res judicata.  Mr. Bhandari urged that in a public<br \/>\ninterest litigation like the one, the High Court was duty<br \/>\nbound to issue notice under Order 1 Rule 8 CPC so that<br \/>\npersons likely to be affected, could have appeared before the<br \/>\nHigh Court and made their submissions before the High<br \/>\nCourt prior to its first order on 29.8.1997.  Since the Court<br \/>\nitself has come to a definite conclusion on several issues<br \/>\narising in the matter by its order dated 29.8.97, the issuance<br \/>\nof notice to the appellant was a mere formality to comply<br \/>\nwith the principles of natural justice and the ultimate disposal<br \/>\nof the appellants case by the High Court must be held to be<br \/>\na disposal by the learned Judges who had already made up<br \/>\ntheir mind and this resulted in patent injustice.  In support of<br \/>\nthis contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on the<br \/>\ndecision of this Court in 1989(3) S.C.C. Page 202 at 208-<br \/>\n210 (para 13).\tMr. Bhandari also urged that even in the case<br \/>\nof a public interest litigation, the basic principle of law to<br \/>\navoid multiplicity of proceedings should be implemented.<br \/>\nNecessarily, therefore, when the Centre for Public Interest<br \/>\nLitigation filed a petition in this Court, which was disposed<br \/>\nof by the Judgment since reported in 1995 Supp.(3) SCC<br \/>\n382 and that application also related to the allotment of retail<br \/>\ndealership in petroleum, under discretionary quota and did<br \/>\nnot assail the allotments already made, then  a second<br \/>\npetition before the Delhi High Court was not entertainable.<br \/>\nHe also reiterated the argument that explanation 4 to Section<br \/>\n11 CPC should apply to the case in hand and in support of<br \/>\nthe same he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court<br \/>\nreported in  AIR 1986 SC 391 at Page 397, para 20.  The<br \/>\nlearned\t counsel with emphasis urged that it is no doubt true<br \/>\nthat discretion in public matters should be least but it cannot<br \/>\nbe totally denuded of,\tnor can any Court strike down the<br \/>\npower exercised by an authority having discretion even in<br \/>\ndeserving cases.  The exercise of discretion by an authority<br \/>\ndepends upon the independence and integrity of the<br \/>\nindividual exercising such discretion.\tAdjudged from any<br \/>\nstand point, the allotment made in favour of the appellant in<br \/>\nhis case would not be a case of allotment on the ground of<br \/>\nfavouritism, nepotism and\/or abuse of power and, therefore,<br \/>\nthe High Court committed serious error in canceling the<br \/>\nallotment made.\t According to Mr. Bhandari,  compassion or<br \/>\na case of extreme hardship has all along been recognised as a<br \/>\ngermane factor for exercise of a discretion.  Even this has<br \/>\nbeen recognised in the guidelines issued by this Court in<br \/>\n1995 Supp (3) S.C.C. 382.    The allotment made in favour<br \/>\nof the appellant being covered by the guidelines (6) and (7)<br \/>\nof the Judgment of this Court in 1995 Supp.(3) S.C.C. 382,<br \/>\nit must be held that the discretion has been exercised in a<br \/>\nfair, reasonable and legal manner and, therefore, the same<br \/>\nought not to have been interfered with by the High Court.<br \/>\nMr. Bhandari lastly urged that such a discretionary allotment<br \/>\nhaving existed for a long time, as has been noticed by the<br \/>\nthree Judge Bench decision of this Court in 1999(6) S.C.C.<br \/>\n667 and the appellant having been allowed to run the agency<br \/>\nfor about eight years and having invested about Rs. 30 lacs<br \/>\nand the entire family being dependent on the income derived<br \/>\nfrom the agency, this Court should set aside the order of<br \/>\ncancellation made by the Delhi High Court and follow the<br \/>\njudgment of this Court dated 28th of September, 2001 in<br \/>\nCivil Appeal No. 6840\/2001 and batch, relating to allotment<br \/>\nof land from the discretionary quota in the State of Haryana.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. Jaideep Gupta, the learned counsel, appearing for<br \/>\nthe appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3103 of 2000 contended<br \/>\nthat in his case, an eminent Member of Parliament, highly<br \/>\nrespected in the political sphere Smt. Gita Mukherjee, since<br \/>\ndeceased,  had\therself filed an affidavit before the Delhi<br \/>\nHigh Court, explaining the circumstances that led her to<br \/>\nrecommend the case of the appellant and the High Court<br \/>\neven did not bother to notice the said affidavit filed by Late<br \/>\nSmt. Gita Mukherjee and came to the conclusion that the<br \/>\nMinister before exercising the discretion, did not himself<br \/>\nverify about the source of income of the applicant and his<br \/>\nfamily members.\t According to Mr. Gupta, if  a Member of<br \/>\nParliament recommends the case of a citizen belonging to<br \/>\nhis\/her constituency and if the Minister acts upon such<br \/>\nrecommendations, it cannot be said that the Minister did not<br \/>\nverify himself before exercising his discretion.  Mr. Gupta<br \/>\nalso urged that even before entering into the dealership<br \/>\nagreement, the appellant had been extensively interviewed<br \/>\nby the Chief Regional Manager and the Legal Officer of the<br \/>\ncompany regarding his income and on being fully satisfied<br \/>\nwith the same and the aforesaid state of affairs having been<br \/>\nmade by the appellant on oath, which was not denied by<br \/>\nanyone concerned, on the un-controverted statement of the<br \/>\nappellant, the High Court was not justified in canceling the<br \/>\nallotment made on the ground as already stated.\t Mr. Gupta<br \/>\nfurther urged that the agreement entered into between the<br \/>\nappellant and the Oil Company itself contains power to<br \/>\nterminate the dealership if it is found that the applicant had<br \/>\nmade any incorrect statement at the time of allotment of<br \/>\ndealership.  That being the position, it would be always open<br \/>\nfor the Oil company to annul the dealership if it is found that<br \/>\nthe appellant had furnished any incorrect information.\tIn the<br \/>\npremises, it would be more appropriate to direct the oil<br \/>\ncompany to investigate into the matter, rather than to cancel<br \/>\nthe allotment made.  According to Mr. Gupta, the principles<br \/>\nto be followed in a case of cancellation of a grant should be<br \/>\ndifferent from the principles for determining the legality of a<br \/>\ngrant and, therefore, the High Court was wholly unjustified<br \/>\nin canceling the allotment made on the sole ground that the<br \/>\nconcerned minister had not made any inquiry before<br \/>\nexercising his discretion.  The learned counsel also urged<br \/>\nthat the appellant has invested a huge amount of money and<br \/>\ncancellation of the dealership at this point would cause<br \/>\nuntold hardship.  To deprive of the appellant and his family<br \/>\nof earning his livelihood at this length of time would not be<br \/>\nin the interest of justice and, therefore, this Court should set<br \/>\naside the order of cancellation passed by the Delhi High<br \/>\nCourt.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. Subba Rao, the learned counsel appearing for the<br \/>\nappellant in Civil Appeal No. 3097 of 2000 urged that the<br \/>\nappellant, a widow was a destitute, having no source of<br \/>\nincome and the allotment made in her favour cannot but be<br \/>\nheld to be an allotment on germane consideration and,<br \/>\ntherefore, the High Court was wholly in error in canceling<br \/>\nthe allotment solely on the ground that the minister accepted<br \/>\nthe statement made in the application as a gospel truth.<br \/>\nAccording to Mr. Subba Rao, it is nobodys contention nor<br \/>\nhas the High Court found as a fact that the statements made<br \/>\nin the application for allotment are untrue and in such a case<br \/>\nthe discretion exercised ought not to have been interfered<br \/>\nwith on an hypothesis that the\tMinister committed an error<br \/>\nin accepting the statement made in the application for<br \/>\nallotment.  In this case the source of livelihood from out of<br \/>\nthe agency is a source for the entire family.  According to<br \/>\nMr. Rao, this source ought not to be closed down, which<br \/>\nwould make the entire family  destitute.  Mr. Subba Rao in<br \/>\nsupport of his contention placed reliance on a judgment of<br \/>\nthis Court in the case of Ram and Shyam Company vs.<br \/>\nState of Haryana and Ors. 1985 Supp.(1) S.C.R.541,<br \/>\nwhereunder this court noticed that there exists a clear<br \/>\ndistinction between the use and disposal of  private property<br \/>\nand social property.  While the Court observed in the<br \/>\naforesaid case that disposal of public property partakes the<br \/>\ncharacter of a trust in that in its disposal their should be<br \/>\nnothing dubious,  but this is subject to one important<br \/>\nlimitation namely that the socialist property may be disposed<br \/>\nat a price lower than the market price or even for a token<br \/>\nprice to achieve some defined constitutionally recognised<br \/>\npublic purpose, one such being to achieve that goals set out<br \/>\nin Part IV of the Constitution.\t In this view of the matter,<br \/>\naccording to Mr. Subba Rao the discretion used by the<br \/>\nconcerned minister in favour of his client cannot be held to<br \/>\nbe illegal or invalid.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. P. N. Misra, the learned senior counsel appearing<br \/>\nfor the appellant in Civil Appeal Nos. 3102\/2000 and<br \/>\n3086\/2000, strenuously urged that in the first appeal, the<br \/>\napplicant had lost her husband in a road accident while she<br \/>\nwas of a young age of 32.  She had two small school going<br \/>\nchildren and to establish her in life for the maintenance of the<br \/>\nyoung children it is her father-in-law who had made the<br \/>\napplication to allot her a retail outlet.  The concerned<br \/>\nMinister had approved the case of allotment in favour of the<br \/>\napplicant.  In the other case, on an application being made,<br \/>\nan inquiry had been made from the ministry to furnish the<br \/>\nbio-data which the applicant had furnished and on being<br \/>\nsatisfied with the materials furnished, the allotment had been<br \/>\nmade in favour of the applicant.  According to Mr. Misra,<br \/>\nthese are two genuine cases and a case of pure compassion<br \/>\nand as such the order of allotment ought not to have been<br \/>\ninterfered with.  Be it be stated that the father-in-law, who<br \/>\nhad made the application for getting an allotment in favour<br \/>\nof the applicant was none else than a Member of Parliament.<br \/>\nAccording to Mr. Misra, the allotment letter clearly having<br \/>\nstipulated that the allotment would be subject to verification<br \/>\nto be made by the concerned oil company and the company<br \/>\nitself having made the necessary verification, the High Court<br \/>\nwas not justified in interfering with the allotment made.<br \/>\nAccording to Mr. Misra, the applicant was asked to furnish<br \/>\nthe bio-data, which the applicant did comply with and<br \/>\ntherefore, the conclusion that there were no material before<br \/>\nthe minister was incorrect.  According to Mr. Misra, it is no<br \/>\ndoubt  true that the father-in-law  of the applicant was an<br \/>\nM.P. since 1991 but the application was made only in 1994,<br \/>\nafter the unfortunate death of his son which is indicative of<br \/>\nthe fact that the father-in-law never misused his position.<br \/>\nMr. P. N. Misra also placed before us the counter affidavit<br \/>\nfiled on behalf of the Union Government in the Delhi High<br \/>\nCourt in some other allied matters and also the noting dated<br \/>\n5.5.93, which indicates as to how the application of the<br \/>\nallottee is sent to the company concerned for verification of<br \/>\nfacts therein like income, residence, social status etc., and<br \/>\ncontends that the conclusion of the High Court that there had<br \/>\nbeen no verification is unsustainable.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. O.P. Sharma, the learned senior counsel, appearing<br \/>\nfor the appellant in Civil Appeal No. 3106\/2000 reiterated<br \/>\nthe submissions made by all the counsel appearing before<br \/>\nhim and argued at  considerable length by placing all the<br \/>\ndecisions afresh and urged that the three Judge Bench<br \/>\nJudgment having over-ruled the earlier two Judge Bench<br \/>\ndecision, the High Court could not have set aside the<br \/>\nallotment made, relying upon the judgment of this Court in<br \/>\nthe two Judge Bench decision.  The learned counsel also<br \/>\nurged that the three Judge Bench Judgment has categorically<br \/>\ncome to a finding that allotment has been made in<br \/>\naccordance with the prescribed guidelines.  That being the<br \/>\nposition, the High Court was not competent to over-ride\t the<br \/>\naforesaid conclusion of the three Judge Bench Judgment of<br \/>\nthis Court and arrive at a conclusion contrary to the same.<br \/>\nMr. Sharma also urged that the plea of constructive res<br \/>\njudicata should apply to the case in hand inasmuch as the<br \/>\naforesaid plea is applied as a matter of public policy to avoid<br \/>\nmultiplicity of litigation and not to allow re-opening of a<br \/>\nmatter already adjudicated upon.  In this view of the matter,<br \/>\nthe High Court was not\tentitled to re-examine the matter<br \/>\nafter the judgment of this Court in 1995 Supp.(3) SCC 382.<br \/>\nIn support of this contention, reliance had been placed on the<br \/>\ndecision of this Court in AIR 1997 SC 1680.  Mr. Sharma<br \/>\nalso relied upon the recent judgment of this Court in Haryana<br \/>\nLand Allotment case and contended that the theory of<br \/>\nprospective over-ruling should apply to prospective<br \/>\ncancellation of the grant made and that would subserve larger<br \/>\npublic interest and in this view of the matter this Court<br \/>\nshould set aside the order of cancellation made by the High<br \/>\nCourt.\tRelying upon the observations made in the reviewed<br \/>\njudgment of three learned Judges of this Court, Mr. Sharma<br \/>\ncontended that this decision approves the fact that allotments<br \/>\nmade earlier to the guidelines issued by this Court in 1995<br \/>\nmust not be interfered with and the said observation being<br \/>\nbinding on this Bench,\tthis Bench should allow this appeal<br \/>\nor refer the matter to a three Judge Bench.  Mr. Sharma<br \/>\nurged that right to life engrafted in Article 21 of the<br \/>\nconstitution also equally applies to the case in hand and as<br \/>\nsuch  the entire family will be ruined if the dealership is<br \/>\ncancelled.  He lastly urged  that pursuant to the notice issued<br \/>\nto the appellant, the appellant having filed an affidavit before<br \/>\nthe High Court, giving all material particulars, the High<br \/>\nCourt could not have set aside the allotment made in favour<br \/>\nof the appellant without even consideration of those<br \/>\nmaterials.   The disposal made by the High Court on such<br \/>\nnon-consideration of such germane materials must be held to<br \/>\nbe vitiated and therefore, the matter should be remitted back<br \/>\nto the High Court.  So far as the ground on which the High<br \/>\nCourt set aside the allotment made viz. the minister had not<br \/>\nverified the particulars, Mr. Sharma urged that the minister is<br \/>\nnot required to make any check or verification and can make<br \/>\nthe allotment under the discretionary quota, relying upon the<br \/>\nstatements made by an applicant, since the so-called grant is<br \/>\nsubject to the verification to be made by the oil company.  It<br \/>\nis always open for the oil company on verification, not to<br \/>\ngrant the dealership notwithstanding the order of the minister<br \/>\ninasmuch as order itself stipulates that the grant should be<br \/>\nsubject to the verification by the oil company.\t According to<br \/>\nMr. Sharma, the touch-stone for\t exercise of discretionary<br \/>\npower being that it should not suffer from the virus  of<br \/>\nnepotism and favouritism and should be devoid of any<br \/>\npersonal interest and should not be for extraneous<br \/>\nconsiderations and none of these grounds having been found<br \/>\nby the High Court, the order of cancellation on the face of it<br \/>\nis wholly unsustainable.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. Sanjeev K. Kapoor, the learned counsel appearing<br \/>\nfor the Centre for Public Interest Litigation repels the<br \/>\nsubmissions made by the counsel for the appellants.<br \/>\nAccording to the learned counsel, the contention that the<br \/>\njudgment of this Court in the Centre for Public Interest<br \/>\nLitigation[1995 Supp.(3) S.C.C 382] amounts to a tacit<br \/>\napproval of the Court to the allotments made, any  illegal<br \/>\nexercise of discretionary power is nothing but a misreading<br \/>\nof the judgment.   He further urged that in public interest<br \/>\nlitigation, when there is no adversarial adjudication, the<br \/>\nprinciples of constructive res judicata ought not to apply, as<br \/>\nwas held by this Court in the case of <a href=\"\/doc\/584837\/\">Rural Litigation and<br \/>\nEntitlement Kentra vs. State of U.P.<\/a> 1989 Supp.(1) S.C.C.\n<\/p>\n<p>504.  At any rate the earlier litigation filed at the behest of<br \/>\nthe Centre for Public Interest Litigation was only for laying<br \/>\ndown the guidelines for exercise of the discretionary power,<br \/>\nas is apparent from the amended petition, the amended<br \/>\npetition was considered and disposed of and as such there<br \/>\nhas been no adjudication by this Court with regard to the<br \/>\nlegality or illegality of the allotments made by the concerned<br \/>\nminister from the discretionary quota.\tThe learned counsel<br \/>\nalso vehemently submitted that in the Common Cause case,<br \/>\nwhere subsequent to the judgment in Centre for Public<br \/>\nInterest Litigation case, legality of allotments made in favour<br \/>\nof 15 allottees from the discretionary quota was the subject<br \/>\nmatter for adjudication, this Court in no uncertain terms,<br \/>\ncancelled the allotments made  and in the very same<br \/>\njudgment, directed the Delhi High Court where the writ<br \/>\npetitions were pending to dispose of the matter in accordance<br \/>\nwith law. In fact the High Court proceeded to dispose of the<br \/>\nmatter pursuant to the aforesaid judgment\/observations of<br \/>\nthis Court in the Common Cause case.  In this view of the<br \/>\nmatter, the contention that the High Court should have<br \/>\napplied the principle of constructive res judicata, is wholly<br \/>\nmisconceived.  So far as the observations made by the three<br \/>\nJudge Bench Judgment of this Court in the review petition<br \/>\narising out of Common Cause case judgment, Mr. Kapoor<br \/>\ncontends that the review petition merely related to the<br \/>\nsubsequent order, wherein this Court directed institution of a<br \/>\ncriminal case and levied exemplary damages to the tune of<br \/>\nRs.50 lacs on the concerned  minister Capt. Satish Sharma.<br \/>\nIn the aforesaid premise, any observations made by the said<br \/>\nthree Judge Bench in relation to the legality of the allotments<br \/>\nmade by the minister from discretionary quota, cannot be<br \/>\ntreated to be of any binding precedent.\t According to Mr.<br \/>\nKapoor, the High Court was examining the legality of the<br \/>\nexercise of discretion by the concerned minister on the<br \/>\nmaterials available to find out whether it was in fact an<br \/>\nexercise of discretion on germane materials or the discretion<br \/>\nhas been exercised arbitrarily and for extraneous<br \/>\nconsiderations in which event the order emanated out of such<br \/>\ndiscretion was required to be nullified.  The High Court has<br \/>\napplied its mind to each and individual case of allotment<br \/>\nunder the discretionary quota and wherever some materials<br \/>\nwere there, the High Court has discharged the notice of<br \/>\ncancellation and it is only when there existed no materials for<br \/>\nthe minister concerned for exercise of his discretion and the<br \/>\nminister passed the order of allotment without any inquiry<br \/>\ninto the assertions made in the application, the Court has set<br \/>\naside the same.\t According to Mr. Kapoor, the notoriety by<br \/>\nwhich such discretionary allotment by a Minister has<br \/>\nreached, it would be unwise to interfere with well reasoned<br \/>\norder of the High Court, particularly when the High Court<br \/>\nhad the opportunity of examining the file from the Ministry,<br \/>\nin relation to each and every case of allotment under the<br \/>\ndiscretionary quota.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr. T.L.V. Iyer, the learned senior counsel, appearing<br \/>\nfor the Union of India, submitted that the Union Government<br \/>\nhas no role to play and it merely complied with the directions<br \/>\nof the Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tIn view of the rival submissions at the Bar, the<br \/>\nfollowing questions arise for our consideration:\n<\/p>\n<p>(a) Is the Judgment of this Court in the case of Centre for<br \/>\nPublic Interest Litigation [1995 Supp.(3) S.C.C. 382]<br \/>\nsusceptible of a construction that the Court indicated<br \/>\nthe guidelines for future guidance and\thad it given its<br \/>\nstamp of judicial approval to the discretionary<br \/>\nallotments already made by the date of the judgment?\n<\/p>\n<p>(b) Would  the principle of constructive res judicata as<br \/>\nprovided under Section 11 explanation 4 of the Code of<br \/>\nCivil Procedure or Order 2 Rule 2 CPC  apply to a<br \/>\npublic interest litigation and if so, in the case in hand,<br \/>\ncan it be said that the writ petitions filed by the Centre<br \/>\nfor Public Interest Litigation in Delhi High Court from<br \/>\nout of the judgment of which the present appeals have<br \/>\nbeen preferred, are barred by the aforesaid principles on<br \/>\nthe ground that in the petition filed under Article 32 by<br \/>\nthe said Centre, no prayer for cancellation of illegal<br \/>\nallotments had been made, though could have been<br \/>\nmade?\tand what is the impact of the observations<br \/>\nmade by the three Judge Bench in the review petition<br \/>\nfiled by Captain Satish Sharma, which stood disposed<br \/>\nof by the judgment reported in 1999(6) S.C.C. 667?\n<\/p>\n<p>(c) Does the expression over ruled in the three Judge<br \/>\nBench Judgment,\t refer to over-ruling the judgment in<br \/>\nthe Common Cause case wholly or does  it refer to only<br \/>\nthe subsequent order in the Common Cause case,<br \/>\ndirecting registration of the criminal case and its<br \/>\ninvestigation and levy of penalty\/exemplary damages<br \/>\nagainst Captain Sharma?\n<\/p>\n<p>(d) The judgment of the High Court being earlier to the<br \/>\nthree Judge Bench judgment of this Court in the review<br \/>\npetition filed by Captain Satish Sharma since reported<br \/>\nin 1999(6) SCC 530,   is there any necessity for<br \/>\nremitting these appeals to the High Court for<br \/>\nreconsideration, in the light of the subsequent three<br \/>\nJudge Bench judgment of this Court?\n<\/p>\n<p>(e) Are the appellants entitled to any equitable<br \/>\nconsiderations on the ground that they have spent a<br \/>\nsubstantial amount and have also operated the petrol<br \/>\noutlets\/gas agencies for about eight years? and<\/p>\n<p>(f) Can the impugned judgment of the High Court in any of<br \/>\nthese appeals be said to be vitiated on account of non-<br \/>\nconsideration of any germane materials?\n<\/p>\n<p>(g) Whether in a Public Interest Litigation, where large<br \/>\nnumber of persons are going to be affected, the Court is<br \/>\nbound to issue notice under Order I Rule 8 and does<br \/>\nnon-issuance of such notice vitiate the entire<br \/>\nproceedings?\n<\/p>\n<p>(h) Whether the verification supposed to have been made<br \/>\nby the Oil Company pursuant to the order of allotment<br \/>\nmade by the Minister, can be held to be the proper<br \/>\nverification for exercise of discretion by the Minister<br \/>\nhimself and in such event whether the order of<br \/>\ncancellation by the High Court is valid?\n<\/p>\n<p>(i) Whether the principle decided in the judgment of this<br \/>\nCourt in Civil Appeal No. 6840 of 2001, in relation to<br \/>\nsuch discretionary allotment of land in the State of<br \/>\nHaryana, can be made applicable to the case in hand, so<br \/>\nthat the judgment would be made applicable<br \/>\nprospectively and consequently,\t the orders of<br \/>\ncancellation will have to be set aside?\n<\/p>\n<p>So far as the first question is concerned, the entire<br \/>\nemphasis is  on the directions given by the Court in<br \/>\nparagraph (4) of the Judgment, which is quoted hereunder:\n<\/p>\n<p>\tWe hereby direct that the above-quoted<br \/>\nnorms\/guidelines etc. shall be followed by the<br \/>\nCentral Government in making all such<br \/>\ndiscretionary allotments of retail outlets for<br \/>\npetroleum products, LPG Dealership and SKO<br \/>\nDealership, hereafter.\n<\/p>\n<p>The appellants contention is that while the writ petition was<br \/>\nfiled in public interest, the exercise of discretion in allotment<br \/>\nof retail outlets for petroleum products, LPG Dealership and<br \/>\nSKO Dealership had been challenged and a prayer for laying<br \/>\ndown the guidelines to regulate the exercise of discretion<br \/>\nhad been made,\tthe Court only laid down the guidelines and<br \/>\nfurther observed that the norms and guidelines would be<br \/>\nfollowed hereafter  and necessarily, therefore, there has been<br \/>\na tacit approval to the earlier allotments made under the<br \/>\ndiscretionary quota inasmuch as the Court never cancelled<br \/>\nthe allotments made nor had issued any direction in that<br \/>\nrespect.  This contention in our considered opinion, cannot<br \/>\nbe sustained for two reasons.  Firstly, the amended petition<br \/>\nwhich the Centre for Public Interest Litigation has filed,<br \/>\nmerely prayed for laying down the guidelines to regulate<br \/>\nexercise of discretion in the matter of such allotments.<br \/>\nSecondly, which is rather more important is that this<br \/>\njudgment was delivered by the Court on 31st of March, 1995.<br \/>\nThe Common Cause had filed another petition under Article<br \/>\n32, alleging arbitrary exercise of discretion in favour of 15<br \/>\nallottees and that petition was entertained by this Court and<br \/>\ndisposed of by Judgment dated 25th September, 1996 and the<br \/>\nCourt cancelled all such allotments on a finding that the<br \/>\nMinister without keeping in view any guidelines,  allotted  in<br \/>\nexercise of his discretion in a cluster manner\tand the public<br \/>\nproperty have been doled out in wholly arbitrary  and<br \/>\ndiscriminatory manner. If the earlier Judgment is susceptible<br \/>\nof the construction, as contended by the appellants, then it<br \/>\nwould not have been possible in the Common Cause case to<br \/>\nexamine the legality of such allotments which had been<br \/>\nmade in favour of 15 persons. Instead of construing the<br \/>\njudgment in the Centre for Public Interest Litigation to the<br \/>\neffect that it accords a tacit approval of the allotments made<br \/>\nprior to the judgment in the Common Cause case, the Court<br \/>\nrelied upon the earlier judgment in 1995 Supp.(1) S.C.C.<br \/>\n382, and ultimately cancelled the orders of allotment, having<br \/>\nfound that the allotments were made arbitrarily and for<br \/>\nextraneous considerations.  In this view of the matter, it is<br \/>\ndifficult for us to sustain the contention of the learned<br \/>\ncounsel, appearing for the appellants.\tWe, therefore,\thold<br \/>\nthat the judgment of this Court in Centre for Public<br \/>\nInterest Litigation, 1995 Supp.(3) S.C.C. 382,\t cannot be<br \/>\nconstrued by any stretch of the\t imagination to be a tacit<br \/>\napproval of the discretionary allotments made prior to that<br \/>\njudgment.  We, therefore, do not find any substance in this<br \/>\nsubmission of the learned counsel for the appellants.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tComing to the second question, Explanation (IV) to<br \/>\nSection 11 of the Civil Procedure Code postulates that any<br \/>\nmatter which might and ought to have been made ground of<br \/>\ndefence or attack  in such former suit shall be deemed to<br \/>\nhave been a matter directly and substantially in issue in such<br \/>\nsuit.  Order II Rule (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure<br \/>\nprovides that every suit shall include the whole of the claim<br \/>\nwhich the plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause<br \/>\nof action and if he omits to sue in respect of, or intentionally<br \/>\nrelinquishes, any portion of his claim, then he shall not<br \/>\nafterwards sue in respect of the portion, so omitted or<br \/>\nrelinquished.\tBy virtue of explanation to Section 141 of the<br \/>\nCode of Civil Procedure, since proceedings under Article<br \/>\n226 of the Constitution is excluded from the expression<br \/>\nproceedings,   therefore, the Civil Procedure Code is not<br \/>\nrequired to be followed in a proceeding\t under Article 226<br \/>\nunless the High Court itself has made the provisions of Civil<br \/>\nProcedure Code applicable to a proceeding under Article\n<\/p>\n<p>226.  Then again, the principles of Section 11 as well as<br \/>\nOrder II Rule 2, undoubtedly contemplate an adversarial<br \/>\nsystem of litigation, where the Court adjudicates the rights<br \/>\nof the parties and determines the issues arising in a given<br \/>\ncase.  The Public Interest Litigation or a petition filed for<br \/>\npublic interest cannot be held to be an adversarial system of<br \/>\nadjudication and the petitioner in such case, merely brings it<br \/>\nto the notice of the Court, as to how and in what manner the<br \/>\npublic interest is being jeopardised by arbitrary and<br \/>\ncapricious action of the authorities.  In the case of <a href=\"\/doc\/818484\/\">Rural<br \/>\nLitigation and Entitlement Kendra vs. State of U.P.<\/a> 1989<br \/>\nSupp.(1) S.C.C. 504, which is commonly known as the<br \/>\nDoon Valley case, such a contention had been  raised, as is<br \/>\napparent from paragraph (14) of the judgment viz. the<br \/>\ndecision of the Court dated 12th March, 1985 was final in<br \/>\ncertain aspects, including the release of A category mines<br \/>\noutside the city limits of Mussoorie from the proceedings<br \/>\nand in view of such finality it was not open to this Court in<br \/>\nthe same proceedings at a later stage to direct differently in<br \/>\nregard to what had been decided earlier.  The Court repelled<br \/>\nthe same by holding that the writ petitions are not inter-<br \/>\nparties disputes and have been raised by way of public<br \/>\ninterest litigation and the controversy before the Court is as<br \/>\nto whether for social safety and for creating a hazardless<br \/>\nenvironment for the people to live in, mining in the area<br \/>\nshould be permitted or stopped.\t The Court hastened to add:\n<\/p>\n<p>We may not be taken to have said that for public<br \/>\ninterest litigations, procedural laws do not apply.<br \/>\nAt the same time it has to be remembered that<br \/>\nevery technicality in the procedural law is not<br \/>\navailable as a defence when a matter of grave<br \/>\npublic importance is for consideration before the<br \/>\nCourt.\tEven if it is said that there was a final<br \/>\norder, in a dispute of this type it would be difficult<br \/>\nto entertain the plea of res judicata.\n<\/p>\n<p>Thus even in the self-same proceeding, the earlier order<br \/>\nthough final, was treated not to create a bar inasmuch as the<br \/>\ncontroversy  before the Court was of grave public interest.<br \/>\nThe learned counsel appearing for the appellants drew our<br \/>\nattention to the decision of this Court in the case of Forward<br \/>\nConstruction Co. and Ors. vs. Prabhat Mandal, AIR 1986<br \/>\nSC 391, whereunder the Court  did record a conclusion that<br \/>\nSection 11 of the Civil Procedure Code applied to Public<br \/>\nInterest Litigation.  In our considered opinion, therefore, the<br \/>\nprinciple of constructive res judicata cannot be made<br \/>\napplicable in each and every public interest litigation,<br \/>\nirrespective of the nature of litigation itself and its impact on<br \/>\nthe society and the larger public interest which is being<br \/>\nserved.\t There cannot be any dispute that in  competing rights<br \/>\nbetween the public interest and individual interest, the public<br \/>\ninterest would over-ride.   In the Centre for Public Interest<br \/>\nLitigation case, which had been filed in this Court, the prayer<br \/>\nthat had been made was to lay down the guidelines for the<br \/>\ndiscretion being exercised in the matter of allotment of  Gas<br \/>\nagencies, petroleum dealership and others.  It is no doubt true<br \/>\nthat the applicant therein could have made a prayer for<br \/>\nexamining the legality of the allotments already made but as<br \/>\nthe applicant states in the writ petition filed in Delhi High<br \/>\nCourt that he had no knowledge about the persons to whom<br \/>\nsuch allotments had been made and in fact the Delhi High<br \/>\nCourt itself on a petition being filed, called upon the<br \/>\nrespondents to submit the list of such allottees, whereafter<br \/>\nnotices could be issued to the allottees.  That apart, when this<br \/>\nCourt entertained another public interest litigation, filed by<br \/>\nthe Common Cause in respect of 15 discretionary allotments<br \/>\nmade in favour of 15 persons, the Court did entertain the<br \/>\nsame and instead of treating the earlier decision to be a bar<br \/>\nand applying the principle of constructive res judicata, the<br \/>\nCourt relied upon the same and cancelled the allotments<br \/>\nmade in favour of those 15 persons who had been arrayed as<br \/>\nparties to the said petition filed under Article 32.  That apart,<br \/>\nthe writ petitions in which the judgment of which are the<br \/>\nsubject matter of challenge in these appeals, had been filed in<br \/>\nDelhi High Court and which were pending when the<br \/>\nCommon Cause case was taken up by this Court.  This Court<br \/>\ninitially stayed the proceedings and issued notice in the<br \/>\nTransfer Petitions but ultimately, vacated the stay order and<br \/>\ninstead of bringing the writ petitions to this Court on transfer,<br \/>\ndirected the Registry of the Court to send the petitions along<br \/>\nwith the annexures to the High Court and required the High<br \/>\nCourt to examine the issues involved in the writ petitions and<br \/>\ngo into the validity of the allotments of petrol pumps\/Gas<br \/>\nagencies to various persons.  In view of the aforesaid positive<br \/>\ndirection in para 31 of the judgment of this Court in Common<br \/>\nCause case, 1996(6) S.C.C. 530, it is difficult for us to<br \/>\nsustain the plea of bar of constructive res judicata, as urged<br \/>\nby the counsel, appearing for the appellants.  In this<br \/>\nconnection, the counsel also brought to our notice,<br \/>\nobservation made in the review petition judgment in the<br \/>\nCommon Cause Case 1999(6) S.C.C. 667 in paragraph 115,<br \/>\nwhich is quoted herein below in extenso:\n<\/p>\n<p>\tIt is contended that since the allotments<br \/>\nmade by the petitioner till the filing of the writ<br \/>\npetition in this Court, in spite of a challenge<br \/>\nhaving been raised therein, were not set aside and<br \/>\nonly guidelines were settled for future exercise of<br \/>\ndiscretionary quota, tacit stamp of judicial<br \/>\napproval shall be deemed to have been placed on<br \/>\nthe allotments made by the petitioner and<br \/>\nconsequently those allotments could not have<br \/>\nbeen reopened on the principle of constructive res<br \/>\njudicata.  Normally, we would have accepted this<br \/>\nargument, but in this case we cannot go to that<br \/>\nextent.\n<\/p>\n<p>According to the learned counsel, the three Judge Bench<br \/>\naccepted the contention of the applicability of principle of<br \/>\nconstructive res judicata and, therefore, this Bench being a<br \/>\ntwo Judge Bench must be bound by the said observations or<br \/>\nin the alternative, may refer the matter to a larger Bench.  We<br \/>\nare not in a position to accept either of these submissions.  It<br \/>\nmay be stated at the outset that the three Judge Bench was<br \/>\nconcerned with the review petition that had been filed in<br \/>\nrelation to the order dated 4.11.96 since reported in 1996(6)<br \/>\nS.C.C. 593.   The learned Judges committed an error in the<br \/>\nbeginning in thinking that the review petition filed by Capt.<br \/>\nSatish Sharma was in relation to both the judgments viz.<br \/>\n1996(6) S.C.C. 530   as well as 1996(6) S.C.C. 593.  In the<br \/>\nreview petition, the Court was concerned with the correctness<br \/>\nof the directions contained in the order dated 4.11.96 to<br \/>\ninstitute criminal prosecution against the concerned Minister<br \/>\nand levy of penalty as exemplary damages to the tune of Rs.<br \/>\n50 lacs.  It is in that context the Court made the aforesaid<br \/>\nobservations not noticing the fact that in 1996(6) S.C.C.530,<br \/>\nthe Court had earlier directed the High Court to dispose of<br \/>\nthe two writ petitions pending in the High Court and decide<br \/>\nthe legality of the order of discretionary allotment made by<br \/>\nthe concerned minister.\t  It is indeed interesting to notice that<br \/>\nin paragraph 125 of the judgment of the three Judge Bench,<br \/>\nthe Court itself had indicated that the conduct of the<br \/>\nconcerned minister in making allotments of petrol outlets was<br \/>\natrocious and reflects a  wanton exercise of power by the<br \/>\nMinister.   But what the Court wanted to examine and<br \/>\nultimately held was that the said action fell  short of<br \/>\nmisfeasance in public office  which is a specific tort and the<br \/>\ningredients  of that tort were\tnot wholly met in the case, so<br \/>\nthat there was no occasion to award exemplary damages.\tIt<br \/>\nwould be indeed a travesty of justice to accept the submission<br \/>\nof the counsel for the appellants that the three Judge Bench<br \/>\nexpressed opinion that the principle of constructive res<br \/>\njudicata would apply to the case in hand, so as to debar the<br \/>\nHigh Court from entertaining the writ petitions and disposing<br \/>\nthem of on merits.  As we have already noted,  prior to the<br \/>\nthree Judge Bench Judgment of this Court , the self-same<br \/>\norder of the Delhi High Court had been assailed in as many<br \/>\nas 79 cases by\tapproaching this Court by way of  special<br \/>\nleave petitions and  all those petitions had been dismissed.\n<\/p>\n<p>  The extent to which corruption in the governing<br \/>\nstructure has corroded the very core of our democracy,\tthe<br \/>\nnotoriety which the discretionary allotment of petroleum<br \/>\ndealership and LPG gas agencies had acquired, the earlier<br \/>\npetition under Article 32  entertained by this Court at the<br \/>\nbehest of the Common Cause, the\t cancellation of 15  of<br \/>\nsuch allotments and finally, the express direction therein to<br \/>\nthe High Court to dispose of the pending writ petitions after<br \/>\nexamining the individual cases, it is difficult for us to accept<br \/>\nthe bar of principle of constructive res judicata on the ground<br \/>\nthat the earlier judgment in the case of Centre for Public<br \/>\nInterest Litigation has accorded any tacit approval or the<br \/>\nsubsequent so-called observation made in the three Judge<br \/>\nBench decision of this Court in the review petition.  We,<br \/>\ntherefore, unhesitatingly hold that the aforesaid contention is<br \/>\ndevoid of any substance.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe third contention was seriously argued by Mr.<br \/>\nSharma, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant in<br \/>\nCivil Appeal No. 3106 of 2000.\tThe learned counsel very<br \/>\nmuch emphasised that <a href=\"\/doc\/1449517\/\">Common Cause vs. Union of India<\/a><br \/>\n1996(6) S.C.C. 530,  has been over-ruled and, therefore,<br \/>\nnothing survived for Delhi High Court to examine the<br \/>\nlegality of the allotments made under discretionary quota.<br \/>\nThis argument appears to have been made on the basis of the<br \/>\nHead Note at page 671 of the reported judgment with<br \/>\nreference to paragraph 123 of the judgment.  But when we<br \/>\nexamine paragraph 123 of the judgment, we do not find<br \/>\nanywhere that the three Judge Bench had in fact\t over-ruled<br \/>\nthe judgment in Common Cause case, 1996(6) S.C.C.530.<br \/>\nOn the other hand, in paragraph 125 it affirms the earlier<br \/>\nconclusion that the conduct of the Minister was wholly<br \/>\nunjustified.  Then again, the review petition itself, as already<br \/>\nstated had been filed by Capt. Satish Sharma, the then<br \/>\nMinister only in relation to the order and direction dated<br \/>\n4.11.96 since reported in 1996(6) S.C.C.593.   In this view of<br \/>\nthe matter, we find no\tsubstance in the aforesaid contention<br \/>\nraised by Mr. Sharma, appearing for the appellant in Civil<br \/>\nAppeal No. 3106 of 2000.  We have therefore no hesitation in<br \/>\nrejecting the same.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tSo far as the fourth question is concerned, it\tis no<br \/>\ndoubt true that the three Judge Bench decision of this Court,<br \/>\nreviewing the direction in the Common Cause Case, so far as<br \/>\norder dated 4.11.96 is concerned, is subsequent to the<br \/>\ndisposal of the writ petition by the Delhi High Court, but we<br \/>\ndo not\tfind any justification for requiring the Delhi High<br \/>\nCourt to re-consider the appeals in the light of the<br \/>\nobservations made by the three Judge Bench judgment of this<br \/>\nCourt inasmuch as  in the said judgment this Court was<br \/>\nmerely concerned with the directions to register  a criminal<br \/>\ncase and prosecute the concerned minister, if he is found to<br \/>\nhave committed any criminal offence and levy of exemplary<br \/>\ndamages to the tune of Rs. 50 lacs.  Consequently, any<br \/>\nobservation made in that regard will have no bearing on the<br \/>\nmerits of the individual allotments, which were the subject<br \/>\nmatter of consideration in the two writ petitions before the<br \/>\nDelhi High Court.  We, therefore, do not find any substance<br \/>\nin the aforesaid submission made on behalf of the appellants.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tSo far as the fifth question is concerned, it is no doubt<br \/>\ntrue that the appellants have invested considerable amount in<br \/>\nthe business and have operated for about eight years but even<br \/>\non equitable considerations, we do not\tfind any equity in<br \/>\nfavour of the appellants.   The conduct of the Minister in<br \/>\nmaking the discretionary allotments has been found to be<br \/>\natrocious, in the very three Judge Bench decision of this<br \/>\nCourt and in relation to similar allotments made by the said<br \/>\nminister in favour of 15 persons, who were respondents in the<br \/>\nCommon Cause case. This Court came to hold that the<br \/>\nallotments of the public property has been doled out in<br \/>\narbitrary and discriminatory manner and the appellants had<br \/>\nbeen held to be beneficiaries of such arbitrary orders of<br \/>\nallotments.  The question of granting the allottees relief on an<br \/>\nequitable consideration did not arise at all, for the same<br \/>\nreasons in a case like this, a sympathetic consideration on the<br \/>\nground of equity would be a case of misplaced sympathy and<br \/>\nwe refrain from granting any relief on any equitable<br \/>\nconsideration.\tIn our view, the appellants do not deserve any<br \/>\nequitable consideration.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tSo far as the sixth question is concerned, we have<br \/>\nexamined the judgment of Delhi High Court in the case of<br \/>\neach individual appellant. We have also considered the<br \/>\nquestionnaire that had been evolved and also the replies  to<br \/>\nthe show-cause notices that had been filed by the allottees.<br \/>\nWe have also considered the original applications that had<br \/>\nbeen filed by these appellants and the orders of allotment<br \/>\nmade by the concerned minister, wherever they are available<br \/>\non record as well as the recommendations and circumstances<br \/>\nleading to the exercise of discretion.\tThe impugned<br \/>\njudgment also indicates\t that in each and every case, the High<br \/>\nCourt had considered the original file, dealing with the<br \/>\nallotments in question and it cancelled only  those allotments<br \/>\nwhere there was not an iota of material in support of the<br \/>\nclaim made by the applicant, whereas it sustained several<br \/>\nother cases of discretionary allotments made during that<br \/>\nperiod, wherever materials were available in the original file.<br \/>\nIt is difficult for us to come to a conclusion that the<br \/>\nconclusion of the High Court in the cases in hand can be said<br \/>\nto be vitiated on account of non-consideration of any<br \/>\ngermane materials.  Factually, we do not have any basis to<br \/>\ncome to the aforesaid finding.\tOn the other hand, we are<br \/>\nsatisfied that the High Court has applied its mind to each and<br \/>\nevery individual case of discretionary allotment and<br \/>\ncancelled only those, which it came to hold to have been<br \/>\narbitrarily granted without any inquiry and only on being<br \/>\npersuaded by certain recommendations of high dignitaries<br \/>\nand without verification of any materials.  We, therefore, see<br \/>\nno infirmity with the ultimate conclusion of the High Court,<br \/>\ncanceling the allotments in favour of the appellants, so as to<br \/>\nbe interfered with by this Court.\n<\/p>\n<p>So far as the seventh question is concerned, it is Mr.<br \/>\nBhandari, who argued with vehemence that non-issuance of<br \/>\nnotice under Order I Rule 8 CPC by the High Court before<br \/>\ndeciding the legal issues by its order dated 22.8.97, has<br \/>\nvitiated the entire proceedings and  consequently, the order of<br \/>\ncancellation must be set aside by this Court. According to<br \/>\nMr. Bhandari, in a matter like the present one, unless the<br \/>\nCourt directs issuance of notice by  publication in a<br \/>\nnewspaper, following the procedure under Order I Rule 8<br \/>\nCPC and all the affected persons get an opportunity to appear<br \/>\nand made their submissions, before the Court formulates the<br \/>\nlegal position and answers them, the subsequent notice to<br \/>\ndifferent persons like the appellants is nothing but a<br \/>\ncompliance of paper formality and such procedure adopted<br \/>\nhas grossly prejudiced the appellants.\tWe, however, are not<br \/>\npersuaded to accept this submission.  The provisions of Order<br \/>\nI Rule 8 C.P.C. get attracted when there are numerous<br \/>\npersons having the same interest, are sued or sue and the<br \/>\nCourt can permit such a suit to be defended by adopting the<br \/>\nprocedure under Order I Rule 8 CPC.  In the case in hand, the<br \/>\nwrit petition that had been filed was in fact a petition in<br \/>\nPublic Interest, where\tthe allegations were that the<br \/>\nconcerned authority had been involved in large-scale<br \/>\nallotments of retail outlets in petrol, gas and kerosene,<br \/>\narbitrarily and for extraneous considerations without having<br \/>\nany guidelines for such allotments and as such it<br \/>\ntantamounted   to  disposal of public  property in a manner<br \/>\nwhich is shocking to conscience.  By the time when the High<br \/>\nCourt went into those allegations in the two petitions filed,<br \/>\nthis Court had taken the view that such allotments had in fact<br \/>\nbeen made arbitrarily and contrary to the public interest and<br \/>\nthis Court directed the High Court to dispose of the pending<br \/>\nproceedings in accordance with law.  The High Court, on<br \/>\nreceipt of the names of the allottees during a specified period<br \/>\nfrom the Union Government, issued notice to each and every<br \/>\nsuch allottee, who had been allotted out of the discretionary<br \/>\nquota of the concerned Minister and granted opportunity to<br \/>\neach of such allottee to inspect the relevant file dealing with<br \/>\nthe allotment in his\/her favour and then heard the said<br \/>\nallottee before passing the final order, either discharging<br \/>\nnotice of cancellation or canceling the allotment made.\t In<br \/>\nthis view of the matter, we hardly find any justification in the<br \/>\nsubmission of Mr. Bhandari that the entire proceedings are<br \/>\nvitiated as notice under Order I Rule 8 CPC had not been<br \/>\ngiven.\tIf the allottee like the appellant whose allotment has<br \/>\nbeen cancelled by the impugned order, had the opportunity of<br \/>\nexamining the materials on the file of the Government,<br \/>\nwherein his case of allotment has been dealt with and had the<br \/>\nopportunity of filing his show-cause, pursuant to the notice of<br \/>\ncancellation that had been issued and the allotment in his<br \/>\ncase having been cancelled on the ground that the concerned<br \/>\nminister did not make any verification with regard to the<br \/>\nnecessary criteria indicated in the application for<br \/>\ndiscretionary allotment, we fail to understand how a<br \/>\ncontention could be raised that the whole procedure adopted<br \/>\nis vitiated for non-compliance of the procedure under Order I<br \/>\nRule 8 CPC.  The object of order 1 Rule 8 CPC is to give<br \/>\nnotice to persons likely to be affected by litigation, so that<br \/>\nthey may be heard.     If the Court would have directed<br \/>\nissuance of notice under Order I Rule 8 CPC without giving<br \/>\nindividual notice to the allottees to show-cause why the<br \/>\nallotment will not be cancelled, then  that perhaps would<br \/>\nhave been an infraction and violation of  the principle of<br \/>\nnatural justice.  But in this case,  each and every allottee had<br \/>\nbeen duly noticed, they have filed their replies to the notices,<br \/>\nthey have availed of the opportunity of examining the<br \/>\noriginal file, wherein the case of discretionary allotment had<br \/>\nbeen dealt with and it was only\t after hearing them that  the<br \/>\norders of cancellation had been passed.\t We have, therefore,<br \/>\nno hesitation in answering this question that there was no<br \/>\nrequirement of following the procedure under Order I Rule 8<br \/>\nnor can it be said that the entire exercise is vitiated.\n<\/p>\n<p>So far as the eighth question is concerned, it was<br \/>\nrepeatedly argued before us by several counsel that the<br \/>\nconcerned minister was not required to verify and since the<br \/>\norder of allotment stipulates that the Oil company would<br \/>\nverify before granting the agency in question that itself is a<br \/>\ngood verification and consequently, the High Court was in<br \/>\nerror in canceling the allotment on the ground that there had<br \/>\nbeen no proper verification.  It is no doubt true that the<br \/>\nMinister having exercised his discretion and allotting a<br \/>\nparticular agency in favour of the applicant, has required the<br \/>\nOil company to make necessary verification before entering<br \/>\ninto an agreement with the allottee,  but that verification<br \/>\nsupposed to have been done by the oil company has nothing<br \/>\nto do with the materials on which the subjective satisfaction<br \/>\nof the Minister was arrived at for exercise of his discretion in<br \/>\nfavour of  any individual for any justifiable reason.\tWhen a<br \/>\nState property as distinct from a private property is being<br \/>\ndealt with by a Minister then it is of paramount importance<br \/>\nthat such public property must be dealt with for public<br \/>\npurpose and in the  public interest.  The disposal of a public<br \/>\nproperty undoubtedly partakes the character of a trust and<br \/>\ntherefore, in the matter of such disposal, there should not be<br \/>\nany suspicion of a lack of principle.\tThe exercise of<br \/>\ndiscretion must not be arbitrary or capricious or for any<br \/>\nextraneous considerations.  It is in that context when the<br \/>\nCourt was examining each and every individual case of<br \/>\ndiscretionary allotment, the Court was trying to find out<br \/>\nwhether there existed  some materials, on the basis of which<br \/>\nthe Minister could be said to have arrived at his subjective<br \/>\nsatisfaction for exercise of  his discretion in favour of the<br \/>\napplicant.  It is the so-called satisfaction of the Minister for<br \/>\nexercise of his discretionary power and making the grant that<br \/>\nwas being examined and scrutinized by the Court and only<br \/>\nwhen the Court found that there had been absolutely no<br \/>\nmaterials or that Minister had made the grant without making<br \/>\nany inquiry or verification,  that the Court had interfered with<br \/>\nthe allotments in question, obviously on a conclusion that<br \/>\nsuch allotments had been arbitrarily  made.  The subsequent<br \/>\ninquiry supposed to have been conducted by the Oil company<br \/>\ncannot replace\tthe pre-conditions for exercise of discretion<br \/>\nby the Minister.  If the initial order of allotment by exercise<br \/>\nof discretion is vitiated on the ground of absence of any<br \/>\nmaterials or verification by the concerned authority  who has<br \/>\nexercised the discretion,  then the so-called subsequent<br \/>\ninquiry by the Oil company which operates in different fields<br \/>\ncannot make the so-called arbitrary order of the Minister a<br \/>\nlegal  or just order.  This being the position, we see no force<br \/>\nin the submission made by the counsel appearing for the<br \/>\nappellants on this score.  The same accordingly stands<br \/>\nrejected.\n<\/p>\n<p>The next question which arises for consideration is<br \/>\nwhether the judgment of this Court  in Civil Appeal No. 6840<br \/>\nof 2001 and principles evolved therein can be applied to the<br \/>\ncase in hand, so as to protect the allotments already made<br \/>\nunder the discretionary quota.\tThe aforesaid case no doubt<br \/>\nwas a case of allotment of land by the Chief Minister of a<br \/>\nState in the State of Haryana.\tThe High Court of Punjab and<br \/>\nHaryana by its order dated 20th January, 1988 disposed of the<br \/>\ncase of S.R. Dass vs. State of Haryana, 1988 Punjab Law<br \/>\nJournal page 123,\tunder which it formulated certain<br \/>\nprinciples on which the discretionary allotments could be<br \/>\nmade with certain conditions.  The so-called discretionary<br \/>\nallotments made by the Government and HUDA, pursuant to<br \/>\nthe earlier judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court were<br \/>\nsought to be assailed as  being contrary to certain stricter<br \/>\nprinciples, which were evolved in the case of Anil<br \/>\nSabharwal which stood disposed of on 5.12.97.  This Court<br \/>\nin the appeal in question held that the stricter scrutiny<br \/>\nrequired to be made as per the guidelines evolved in Anil<br \/>\nSabharwals case, must be made applicable to the period<br \/>\nsubsequent to the judgment viz. 5.12.97 and allotments made<br \/>\nbetween 1988 and 1997 in accordance with the principles and<br \/>\nguidelines indicated in S.R. Dass case, were protected\tby<br \/>\napplying the principle of prospective application, so far as the<br \/>\njudgment in Anil Sabharwals case.  We fail to understand<br \/>\nhow the aforesaid principle can apply to the case in hand<br \/>\nwhere the allotments made prior to the judgment of this<br \/>\nCourt in Centre for Public Interest Litigation, 1995(3)<br \/>\nSupp.(3) S.C.C. 382,  are the subject matter of scrutiny and<br \/>\nhad been made indiscriminately,\t as there had been no<br \/>\nguiding principle for making such allotments.  Consequently,<br \/>\nthe principles evolved in Civil Appeal No. 6840 of 2001, will<br \/>\nhave no application at all to the present appeals.  The said<br \/>\ncontention, therefore, must fail.\n<\/p>\n<p>In view of our conclusions on the nine issues,\tas<br \/>\nmentioned above, these appeals fail and are dismissed.\tThere<br \/>\nhowever will be no order as to costs.\n<\/p>\n<p>While, we are dismissing the appeals, we are also aware<br \/>\nof the fact that these appellants are operating the allotments<br \/>\nmade in their favour since 1993-94 and even after the<br \/>\njudgment of the High Court, they are continuing by virtue of<br \/>\nan interim order of this Court.\t  In these circumstances, we<br \/>\ndirect that they shall be allowed to wind-up their respective<br \/>\nbusinesses  by 31st of December, 2001.\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..J<br \/>\n\t  (G.B.\t PATTANAIK)<\/p>\n<p>&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;..J.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t\t(RUMA PAL)<\/p>\n<p>October\t 19, 2001.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India V. Purushotham Rao vs Union Of India &amp; Ors on 19 October, 2001 Author: Pattanaik Bench: G.B. Pattanaik, Ruma Pal CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 3100 of 2000 PETITIONER: V. PURUSHOTHAM RAO Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA &amp; ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19\/10\/2001 BENCH: G.B. Pattanaik &amp; Ruma Pal JUDGMENT: With Civil [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-177981","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>V. 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