{"id":180650,"date":"1961-02-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1961-02-09T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-chief-inspector-of-mines-and-vs-lala-karam-chand-thapar-etc-on-10-february-1961"},"modified":"2016-05-24T23:30:54","modified_gmt":"2016-05-24T18:00:54","slug":"the-chief-inspector-of-mines-and-vs-lala-karam-chand-thapar-etc-on-10-february-1961","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-chief-inspector-of-mines-and-vs-lala-karam-chand-thapar-etc-on-10-february-1961","title":{"rendered":"The Chief Inspector Of Mines And … vs Lala Karam Chand Thapar Etc on 10 February, 1961"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
The Chief Inspector Of Mines And … vs Lala Karam Chand Thapar Etc on 10 February, 1961<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1961 AIR 838, \t\t 1962 SCR (1)\t 9<\/div>\n
Author: K D Gupta<\/div>\n
Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Das, S.K., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala, Mudholkar, J.R.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nTHE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MINES AND ANOTHER\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nLALA KARAM CHAND THAPAR ETC.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n10\/02\/1961\n\nBENCH:\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\nBENCH:\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\nSINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P.(CJ)\nDAS, S.K.\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\nMUDHOLKAR, J.R.\n\nCITATION:\n 1961 AIR  838\t\t  1962 SCR  (1)\t  9\n CITATOR INFO :\n F\t    1961 SC 849\t (3)\n F\t    1961 SC1543\t (3)\n RF\t    1972 SC2066\t (10)\n F\t    1976 SC1031\t (35)\n D\t    1980 SC1858\t (19,20)\n R\t    1982 SC1413\t (18)\n F\t    1989 SC1612\t (12)\n\n\nACT:\nColliery   Company-Violation  of  Coal\t Mines\t Regulations\nProsecution of all directors of company, the managing agents\nand  the  manager  of  company-Legality-Mines  Act  Of\t1923\nrepealed  and  reenacted  Regulations  made  thereunder,  if\ncontinue  in force 'Anyone of directors' meaning  of  Indian\nCoal Mines Regulations, 1926-Mines Act, 1923 (4 of 1923), S.\n31(4)-Mines  Act, 1952, (35 of 1952), SS.  2(1),  76-General\nClauses\t Act,  1897  (10 of 1897), S.  24  -constitution  of\nIndia, Art. 20(1).\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  directors\tof  a  company, which was  the\towner  of  a\ncolliery,  the\tdirectors  of the  managing  agents  of\t the\ncompany,  and  the manager and the agent  of  colliery\twere\nprosecuted  for\t offenses under ss. 73 and 74 Of  the  Mines\nAct, 1932, for violation\n10\nof  several  regulations  out  of  the\tIndian\tCoal   Mines\nRegulations,  1926.   They challenged the  validity  of\t the\nprosecution  on the of grounds, inter alia (1) that  as\t the\nIndian\tCoal  Mines  Regulations,  1926,  framed  under\t the\nprovisions  of the Mines Act, 1923, had, under s.  31(4)  of\nthat  Act, effect as if enacted in the Act, and as that\t Act\nhad  been  repealed  by\t the  Mines  Act,  1952,  the\tsaid\nRegulations  had  ceased to have any  legal  existence\tlong\nbefore\tthe date of the alleged violation, and (2) that\t the\nRegulations of 1926 were only deemed to be regulations under\nthe Mines Act, 1952, and hence were not laws in force on the\ndate  of  the  alleged contravention,  and,  therefore,\t the\nprosecution  in\t the present case was a\t violation  of\tArt.\n20(1) Of the Constitution of India.  Two of the directors of\nthe company also raised an objection that the prosecution of\nall the directors was not. permitted by the Mines Act, 1952,\nin view of s. 76 of the Act, which provided that any one  of\nthe  directors\tmay  be prosecuted.  The  directors  of\t the\nmanaging  agents  contended  that,  in\tany  event,  as\t the\nmanaging  agents were not the owners of the  colliery,\tthey\ncould not be prosecuted.\nHeld:\t  (1)  that in view Of S. 24 Of the General  Clauses\nAct,  1897, by which when an Act is repealed and  reenacted,\nrules  and regulations framed under the repealed  Act  shall\ncontinue in force and be deemed to have been made under\t the\nprovisions  so reenacted, s. 31(4) of the Mines\t Act,  1923,\nwhich  had  been repealed, must be construed in such  a\t way\nthat  for  the purpose of the continuity of  existence,\t the\nRegulations  framed  under that Act will not  be  considered\npart  of  the  Act.   Accordingly,  the\t Indian\t Coal  Mines\nRegulations, 1926, continued to be in force at the  relevant\ndate  and  must be deemed to be regulations made  under\t the\nMines Act, 1952.\nInstitute   of\t Patent\t  Agents  and\tothers\t v.   Joseph\nLockwood,[1894] A. C. 347 and State v. K. B. Chandra, (r914)\nI.L.R. 33 Pat. 507, distinguished.\n(2)  that  the Indian Coal Mines Regulations,  1926,  though\nthey became Regulations under the Mines Act, 1952, in conse-\nquence\tof a deeming provision, nonetheless, were  \"laws  in\nforce\" within the meaning of Art. 20(1) of the Constitution.\nRao  Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. The State of  Vindhya\nPradesh, [1953] S.C.R. 1188, distinguished.\n(3)  that the expression \"any one of the directors\" in S.   76\nof the Mines Act, 1952, means \"every one of the directors\".\nIsle  of Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin, (1883) 25  Ch.\t  D.\n320, relied on.\n(4)  that  the managing agents or the colliery company\twere\nneither\t the owner of the mine nor the occupier\t within\t the\nmeaning\t Of S. 2(1) of the Mines Act, 1952, and,  therefore,\nthe prosecution of the directors of the managing agents\t was\nnot maintainable.\n11\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CRIMINAL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeals Nos.  98
\nto 106 of 1959.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals\t by special leave from the judgment and order  dated
\nMarch 3, 1958, of the Patna High Court in M. J. C. Nos. 475,
\n476,  479  and 480 of 1956, 180 of 1957 and 475\t to  478  of
\n1956.\n<\/p>\n
N.   S.\t Bindra and B. H. Dhebar, for the appellants in\t Cr.
\nAs.  Nos. 98 and 101 of 1959.\n<\/p>\n
G.   S. Pathak, S. 0. Banerjee and P. K. Chatterjee, for the
\nappellants  in\tCr.   As.   Nos. 102  to  106  of  1959\t and
\nrespondents in Cr.  As.\t Nos. 98 to 100 of 1959.
\nB.   Ganapathy Iyer and R. H. Dhebar, for the respondents in
\nCr.  As.  Nos. 102 to 106 of 1959 and appellants in Cr.\t As.
\nNos. 99 and 100 of 1959.\n<\/p>\n
1961.  February 10.  The Judgment of the Court was delivered
\nby
\nDAs  GUPTA,  J.-On  February  5,1955,  there  was  a  tragic
\naccident  in the Amlabad Colliery, in Manbhum  District,  in
\nthe  State  of Bihar, as a result of which 52  persons\tlost
\ntheir  lives  and one escaped with injuries.  The  court  of
\nenquiry\t which\twas appointed to hold an  inquiry  into\t the
\ncauses\tof the accident and the circumstances attending\t the
\naccident submitted its report on September 26, 1955, holding
\nthat  the accident was due to negligence and  non-observance
\nof  some  of  the  regulations\tof  the\t Indian\t Coal  Mines
\nRegulations, 1926.  This report was duly published under  s.
\n27  of the Mines Act, 1952.  Thereafter, on March  3,  1956,
\nthe  Government of India informed the manager and the  agent
\nof   the  colliery  that  a  court  of\tenquiry\t was   being
\nconstituted  under cl. (a) of the Regulation 48 to  hold  an
\ninquiry into their conduct.  Criminal proceedings were\talso
\ninstituted against 14 persons including the manager and\t the
\nagent  of  the colliery, all the directors  of\tthe  company
\nwhich was the owner of the colliery and the directors of the
\nmanaging  agents  of that company.  The\t complaints  alleged
\nviolation  by the 14 accused of several regulations  out  of
\nthe  Indian  Coal Mines Regulations, 1926.  There  were\t two
\nseparate complaints in respect of the violation of different
\n12<\/span>
\nregulations.   It was alleged in one of the complaints\tthat
\nthe accused persons had by the violation of the\t regulations
\nmentioned  therein  committed offenses under s.\t 73  of\t the
\nMines  Act,  1952; the other complaint alleged that  by\t the
\nviolation  of the regulations mentioned therein the  accused
\npersons\t had committed offenses under as. 73 and 74  of\t the
\nMines\tAct,  1952.   The  Sub-Divisional  Magistrate\ttook
\ncognizance of the offenses, and issued processes against all
\nthe 14 persons on May 23, 1956.\t Six of the accused persons,
\nLala  Karam  Chand Thaper, H. P. Poddar, Jagat\tRam  Sharma,
\nKumud\tRanjan\tDutt,  H.  V.  Varma  and  U.  Mehta   filed
\napplications before the High Court of Patna for the issue of
\nappropriate  writs  or\torders\tfor  quashing  the  criminal
\nproceedings.   The  main  ground on  which  these  different
\napplications  were  based was that the regulations  for\t the
\nalleged\t violation of which the complaints were\t lodged\t had
\nceased\tto have any legal existence long before the date  of
\nthe alleged violation by the repeal of the Mines Act,  1923,
\nunder  which they had admittedly been made.  Another  ground
\ntaken by all the applicants was that the prosecution was  in
\nviolation  of  Art.  20(1)  of\tthe  Constitution.   In\t the
\napplication by two directors of the company owning the mine,
\nLala Karam Chand Thaper and H. P. Poddar a further point was
\ntaken  that  the prosecution of all the\t directors  was\t not
\npermitted  by  the Mines Act, 1952.  The  directors  of\t the
\nmanaging agents raised in their applications the point\tthat
\nthe  managing  agents not being owners of the  colliery\t the
\ndirectors of the managing agents should not be prosecuted.
\nThe High Court rejected the applicants’ contention that\t the
\nRegulations  framed  under  a. 29 of the  Mines\t Act,  1923,
\nceased to have legal existence after the repeal of that Act.
\nIt  however accepted the contention of the managing  agents’
\ndirectors  that\t they were not liable to  prosecution.\t The
\nHigh Court also held on a consideration of the provision  of
\ns. 76 of the 1952 Act that all the directors of the  company
\nwhich  owned the colliery could not be prosecuted  and\tonly
\none to be chosen by the complainant out of all the directors
\n13<\/span>
\ncould  be  proceeded against.  On these\t findings  the\tHigh
\nCourt  dismissed  the applications of the manager,  and\t the
\nagent, and allowed the applications of the directors of\t the
\nmanaging  agents.   In\tthe  two  applications\tby  the\t two
\ndirectors  of the colliery company (Lals Karam Chand  Thaper
\nand  H.\t P.  Poddar)  it  gave\ta  direction  requiring\t the
\nrespondents 2 and 3 before it, that is, the Chief  Inspector
\nof Mines, and the Regional Inspector of Mines, Dhanbad,\t “to
\nchoose\tone  of\t the  directors of  the\t company  for  being
\nprosecuted  against  and  to remove the name  of  the  other
\ndirectors from the category of the accused persons”.  In the
\ntwo criminal cases the two directors of the company obtained
\nspecial\t leave\tto appeal against this direction  and  have,
\npursuant thereto, filed the two appeals which are now before
\nus  as\tCriminal  Appeals Nos. 103 and\t104  of\t 1959.\t The
\nmanager\t and the agent have also filed appeals\tagainst\t the
\norder  rejecting  their applications after  having  obtained
\nspecial\t leave from this Court.\t These two appeals  are\t now
\nnumbered  as  Cr.  Appeals Nos. 105 and 106  of\t 1959.\t The
\nChief Inspector of Mines and others who are made respondents
\nin the application under Art. 226 have also filed appeals on
\nspecial leave granted by this Court against the High Court’s
\norder  in the applications of the directors of the  managing
\nagents\tallowing the same and also against the High  Court’s
\norders\tin  the\t application of the  two  directors  of\t the
\ncompany asking the Chief Inspector of Mines and the Regional
\nInspector  of Mines to choose one only of the directors\t for
\nprosecution;  their  appeals  in  the  application  of\t the
\ndirectors  of  the  managing  agents  before  us  have\tbeen
\nnumbered  as  Criminal\tAppeals Nos.  100  and\t101.   Their
\nappeals in the applications of the directors of the colliery
\ncompany are numbered 98 and 99 of 1957.\n<\/p>\n
It  will be convenient to refer to the appellants  in  these
\nfour appeals as government-appellants.\n<\/p>\n
At about the same time these several applications were\tmade
\nbefore\tthe  High Court, the agent and the  manager  of\t the
\ncolliery company also made applications to the High Court of
\nPatna for the issue of
\n14<\/span>
\nappropriate writs or orders restraining the Commissioner  of
\nChotanagpur  who  had been appointed to\t  hold\tthe  inquiry
\nunder  Regulation 48, from holding that inquiry.   The\tHigh
\nCourt  held  that no inquiry could be  ordered\tagainst\t the
\nagents.\t  The  manager’s application was  however  rejected.
\nAgainst\t that  order  the manager Shri\tKumud  Ranjan  Dutt.
\nobtained  special  leave  from\tthis  Court  to\t appeal\t and
\npursuant thereto has filed the appeal which is now before us
\nas Appeal No. 102 of 1959.\n<\/p>\n
The  Appeals Nos. 100 and 101 need not detain us long.\t For
\nwhatever  be the controversy on other questions\t as  regards
\nthe  Regulations of 1926 being in force after the repeal  of
\nthe  Mines Act of 1923 and as regards the alleged  violation
\nof  Art.  20(1) of the Constitution, there is no  manner  of
\ndoubt  that  the  High Court is right in  holding  that\t the
\nmanaging  agents  of the colliery company  are\tneither\t the
\n“owner”\t of  the coal mines nor the  “manager”\tnor  “agent”
\nthereof.   It  was  not even suggested before  us  that\t the
\nmanaging agents are either managers or agents.\t“Agent”\t has
\nbeen defined in the Act, as the representative of the  owner
\nin  respect of the management, control and direction of\t the
\nmines  and managing agent of the company in no\tsense  falls
\nwithin this definition.\t “Manager” is not defined, but s. 17
\nof  the\t Act  provides that every mine 3hall  be  under\t one
\nmanager\t who  shall have the prescribed\t qualifications\t and
\nshall\tbe   responsible  for\tthe   control,\t management,
\nsupervision  and directions of the mines, and the owner\t and
\nagent  of  every mine shall appoint himself  or\t some  other
\nperson\thaving such qualifications to be such  manager.\t  In
\nthe  Amlabad Colliery Mr. Kumud Ranjan Dutt  was  admittedly
\nappointed  the\tmanager\t and  it  was  on  that\t basis\tthat
\nproceedings were commenced against him.\t The managing  agent
\nof  the company was not and could not be the manager of\t the
\nAmlabad\t Colliery.  It was urged however that  the  managing
\nagents\tof  the colliery company are in\t occupation  of\t the
\nmines  and  thus  fall within the  definition  of  the\tword
\n“owner” in s. 2(1) of the Act.\tThe relevant portion of\t the
\ndefinition of owner in s. 2(1) runs thus: ” “Owner” when
\n15<\/span>
\nused  in  relation to a mine, means any person\twho  is\t the
\nimmediate proprietor or lessee or occupier of the(,, mine or
\nof  any\t part thereof”.\t The argument is that  the  managing
\nagents exercise, by reason of their being managing agents of
\nthe  colliery  company,\t possession over the  mine;  and  so
\n“occupy”  the  mine.   Though the  word\t “occupier”  is\t not
\ndefined in the Act it is patently absurd to suppose that any
\nand every person exercising possession over the mine, is  an
\n“occupier” and thus an owner of the mine, for the purpose of
\nthe  Mines  Act.   From the very collocation  of  the  words
\n“immediate  proprietor, or lessee or occupier of the  mine”,
\nit  is abundantly clear that only a person whose  occupation
\nis  of\tthe  same  character,  that  is,  occupation  by   a
\nproprietor  or a lessee-by way of possession on\t his  behalf
\nand  not  on behalf of somebody else is meant  by  the\tword
\n“occupier”  in\tthe  definition.   Thus,  a  trespasser\t  in
\nwrongful  possession to the exclusion of the rightful  owner
\nwould  be an occupier of the mine, and so be an “owner”\t for
\nthe purposes of the Act.  When however a servant or agent of
\nthe  proprietor\t or lessee of a mine is in possession  of  a
\nmine,  he  is in possession on behalf of his master  or\t his
\nprincipal,  and\t not  on  his  own  behalf.   It  would\t  be
\nunreasonable  to  think that the legislature  intended\tsuch
\nservants or agents liable and responsible as “owner” of\t the
\nmine. possession on behalf of another was sufficient to make
\na  person  “occupier” within the meaning of s.\t2(1),  every
\nmanager\t would\tbe  an\toccupier  and  thus  have  all\t the
\nresponsibilities  of  an  “owner”.   Many  “agents”  of\t the
\nproprietors  or\t lessee\t of  the  mine\twould  similarly  be
\n“occupier”  and\t therefore “owner”.  If that  had  been\t the
\nintention of the legislature it would have been\t unnecessary
\nand  indeed meaningless to mention “agent” and “manager”  in
\naddition  to the word “owner” in s. 18 of the  Act,.,in\t the
\nimportant  provision as to who will be responsible  for\t the
\nproper\tcarrying on of operations in the mine in  regard  to
\nthe  provisions of the Act and Regulations and bye-laws\t and
\norders made thereunder.\n<\/p>\n
It would have been similarly unnecessary to mention  “agent”
\nand “manager” in addition to the word
\n16<\/span>
\n‘Inspector power to give special directions for the  removal
\nof certain defects or in s. 61 providing for the framing  of
\nbye-laws.   The\t very fact that in ss. 18,22 and  61  owner,
\nagent  and  manager have been  separately  made\t responsible
\nclearly shows that the legislature did not think that  agent
\nor manager would come within the definition of “owner” in s.
\n2(1).  That must be because possession on behalf of somebody
\nelse was not in the contemplation of the legislature such  ”
\noccupation”   as  to  make  the\t person\t in  possession\t  an
\n“occupier”   within  the  meaning  of  s.  2(1).    Whatever
\npossession,  the  managing  agents  of\ta  colliery  company
\nexercise  in and over a mine is exercised on behalf  of\t the
\ncolliery  company  and not on their own behalf and  so\tsuch
\nmanaging  agents  are not occupier of the  mine\t within\t the
\nmeaning of s. 2(k).\n<\/p>\n
The  managing  agent  company, not  being  either  agent  or
\nmanager, or owner of the mine, no question of  contravention
\nby  that company or any of its directors of the\t Coal  Mines
\nRegulations can arise.\tThe High Court has therefore rightly
\nquashed\t the criminal proceedings against the  directors  of
\nthe  managing agent company.  Appeals Nos. 100 and  101\t are
\naccordingly dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
The  main controversy common to the other seven\t appeals  is
\nwhether\t the  Mines Regulations, 1926, framed as  they\twere
\nunder  a. 29 of the Mines Act, 1923, survived the repeal  of
\nthe  Mines Act, 1923, by the Mines Act, 1952.  For a  proper
\nappreciation  of  the question involved it is  necessary  to
\nhave  regard on the one hand to the provisions of s.  31  of
\nthe  Mines Act, 1923, and on the other to the provisions  of
\na. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897.\t The first  sub-sec-
\ntion  of a. 31 provides that the power to  make\t regulations
\nand rules conferred by ss. 29, 30 and 30A is subject to\t the
\ncondition  of  the  regulation and rules  being\t made  after
\nprevious  publication.\t The  fourth  sub-section  of\tthat
\nsection\t lays  down  that regulations  and  rules  shall  be
\npublished  in the official gazette and on  such\t publication
\nshall  have  effect  “as  if  enacted  in  this\t Act”.\t The
\nregulations, which are alleged to have
\n17<\/span>
\nbeen contravened were all made under s. 29 of the 1923\tAct,
\nand  admittedly\t they were duly published  in  the  official
\ngazette.  As a result of such publication, these regulations
\nfrom  the date of the publication, commenced having  “effect
\nas if enacted” in the Mines Act, 1923.\tThe question we have
\nto  answer is: Did the regulations stand repealed, when\t the
\nMines Act, 1923, was repealed?\tBefore endeavoring to answer
\nthe  question, we have to take note of s. 24 of the  General
\nClauses\t Act.\tThe relevant portion of this  clause  is  in
\nthese words:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “When  any Central Act is after the  commence-
\n\t      ment  of this Act repealed and reenacted\twith
\n\t      or  without modification, then, unless  it  is
\n\t      otherwise expressly provided, any rule made or
\n\t      issued under the repealed Act shall so far  as
\n\t      it is not inconsistent with the provisions re-
\n\t      enacted,\tcontinue in force, and be deemed  to
\n\t      have been made or issued under the  provisions
\n\t      so reenacted unless and until it is superseded
\n\t      by   any\trule  made  or\tissued\t under\t the
\n\t      provisions so reenacted”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It is convenient at this stage to state that a regulation is
\nindisputably a rule within the meaning of these provisions.
\nThe  present  is  a case, where the  Mines  Act,  1923,\t was
\nrepealed, and was reenacted with modifications as the  Mines
\nAct, 1952: Section 29 of the 1923 Act empowering the Central
\nGovernment  to make regulations consistent with the Act\t for
\nspecified  purposes was reenacted in the 1952 Act as s.\t 57:
\nregulations  were made in 1926 under s. 29 of the 1923\tAct,
\nbut  at the relevant date, in 1955, no regulations had\tbeen
\nmade under S. 57 of the 1952 Act, so that in 1955 the  Mines
\nRegulations,   1926,   had  not\t been  superseded   by\t any
\nregulations made under there enacted provisions of s. 57  of
\nthe 1952 Act: Therefore if s. 24 of the General Clauses\t Act
\nis  operative the Mines Regulations, 1926, were in force  at
\nthe relevant date in-1955, and shall be deemed to have\tbeen
\nmade  under s. 57 of the 1952 Act, as there is no  provision
\nexpress or otherwise, in the later Act to the contrary,\t and
\nthe  regulations  are not inconsistent\twith  the  reenacted
\nprovisions.\n<\/p>\n
18<\/span><\/p>\n
For  the management-appellant, Mr. Pathak  contends  however
\nthat s. 24 of the General Clauses Act can have no  operation
\nin  respect  of these regulations, as  they  stood  repealed
\nalong with the repeal of the Mines Act, 1923.  His  argument
\nis  simple.   Section  31(4) of the  1923  Act\tsays,  these
\nregulations  shall  have effect as if enacted in  that\tAct.
\nThe  consequence of this provision is that  the\t regulations
\nbecame part of the Act: the entire Act was repealed by s. 88
\nof  the\t 1952 Act: the 1926 Regulations as part of  the\t Act
\nthus stood repealed.  So, on the very day the 1952 Act\tcame
\ninto  force,  the Regulations of 1926 ceased to\t have  legal
\nexistence.  So, a. 24 of the General Clauses Act had nothing
\nto operate upon.\n<\/p>\n
The whole foundation of the argument is the assumption\tthat
\nthe  necessary\tconsequence of s. 31(4) of the 1923  Act  is
\nthat  the regulations, on publication, shall have effect  as
\nif  enacted in the Act is that the Regulations\tbecame\tpart
\nand parcel of the Act.\tIs that assumption justified?
\nIn attempting to answer this question, it will be profitable
\nto  remember that the purpose of the General Clauses Act  is
\nto  place  in  one single statute  different  provisions  as
\nregards interpretations of words and legal principles  which
\nwould  otherwise  have\tto be specified\t separately  a\tmany
\ndifferent  acts\t and  regulations.   Whatever  the   General
\nClauses\t Act says, whether as regards the meanings of  words
\nor  as regards legal principles, has to be read\t into  every
\nstatute\t to which it applies.  The Mines Act, 1923, being  a
\nCentral Act, s. 24 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, applies
\nto  it, so that we have to read in the Mines Act,  1923,  an
\nadditional  provision  embodying the words of s. 24  of\t the
\nGeneral\t Clauses  Act.\tThe result is that we have  in\tthis
\nMines  Act  of 1923 on the one hand the provision  that\t the
\nregulations made under s. 29 of the Act will have effect  as
\nif  enacted  in\t the  Act and  on  the\tother,\tthe  further
\nprovision, that regulations made under s. 29 shall  continue
\nto  remain in force when this Act is repealed and  reenacted
\nand  be\t deemed to have been made under the  reenacted\tpro-
\nvisions, it is otherwise expressly provided, unless and
\n19<\/span>
\nuntil  superseded  by regulations made under  the  reenacted
\nprovisions.\n<\/p>\n
If  the\t words of s. 31(4) are construed to mean  that’\t the
\nregulations  became part of the Act to the extent that\twhen
\nthe Act is repealed, the regulations also stand repealed,  a
\nconflict at once arises between s. 31 (4) and the provisions
\nof  s. 24 of the General Clauses Act.  In other\t words,\t the
\nMines Act, 1923, while saying in s. 31(4) that the repeal of
\nthe  Act will result in the repeal of the regulations,\twill
\nbe saying, in the provisions of s. 24 of the General Clauses
\nAct as read into it, that on the repeal of the Act, when the
\nAct  is\t repealed and reenacted, the  regulations  will\t not
\nstand repeated but will continue in force till superseded by
\nregulations  made  under the reenacted Act.  To\t solve\tthis
\nconflict  the  courts  must apply  the\trule  of  harmonious
\nconstruction.\tAccording  to  Mr. Pathak  we  have  perfect
\nharmony\t if it is held that the provisions of s. 24  of\t the
\nGeneral Clauses Act will have effect only if the regulations
\nare such as survive the repeal of the parent Act and at\t the
\nsame  time, construe s. 31(4) to mean that  the\t regulations
\nbecame\tfor  all purposes part and parcel of  the  Act.\t  To
\nharmonise is not however to destroy.  The so-called  harmony
\non the learned counsel’s argument is achieved by making\t the
\nprovisions of a. 24 of the General Clauses Act nugatory\t and
\nin  effect  destroying them in relation to  the\t Mines\tAct,
\n1923.\tWe  have  to  seek therefore  some  other  means  of
\nharmonising  the  two  provisions.  The\t reasonable  way  of
\nharmonising that obviously suggests itself is to construe s.
\n31(4) to mean that the regulations on publication shall have
\nfor some purposes, say, for example, the purpose of deciding
\nthe validity of the regulations, the same effect as if\tthey
\nwere part of the Act, but for the purpose of the  continuity
\nof  existence, they will not be considered part of the\tAct,
\nso  that  even though the Act is repealed,  the\t regulations
\nwill continue to exist, in accordance with the provisions of
\ns.  24 of the General Clauses Act.  This  construction\twill
\ngive  reasonable effect to S. 31(4) of the Mines; Act,\t1923
\nand at the same time not frustrate the very salutary  object
\nof
\n20<\/span>
\nFs.  24 of the General Clauses Act.  One may pause here\t to-
\nremember  that\tregulations framed under an Act are  of\t the
\nvery  greatest importance.  Such regulations are framed\t for
\nthe  successful\t operation  of\tthe  Act.   Without   proper
\nregulations,  a\t statute will often be worse  than  useless.
\nWhen  an  Act  is  repealed, but  reenacted,  it  is  almost
\ninevitable that there will be some time lag between the\t re-
\nenacted\t statute  coming into force, and  regulations  being
\nframed\tunder the reenacted statute.  However efficient\t the
\nrule making authority may be it is impossible to avoid\tsome
\nhiatus\tbetween\t the  coming into  force  of  the  reenacted
\nstatute\t and the simultaneous repeal of the old Act and\t the
\nmaking\tof  regulations.   Often,  the\ttime  lag  would  be
\nconsiderable.\tIs it conceivable that any  legislature,  in
\nproviding that regulations made under its statute will\thave
\neffect\tas  if enacted in the Act, could  have\tintended  by
\nthose words to say that if ever the Act is repealed and\t re-
\nenacted, (as is more than likely to happen sooner or later),
\nthe  regulations will have no existence for the\t purpose  of
\nthe  reenacted statute, and thus the reenacted statute,\t for
\nsome time at least, will be in many respects, a dead letter.
\nThe answer must be in the negative.  Whatever the purpose be
\nwhich induced the, draftsmen to adopt this legislative\tform
\nas  regards  the rules and regulations that they  will\thave
\neffect\t“case  if enacted in the Act”, it  will\t be  strange
\nindeed if the result of the language used, be that by becom-
\ning part of the Act, they would stand repealed, when the Act
\nis  repealed.  One can be certain that\tcould not have\tbeen
\nthe  intention of the legislature.  It is satisfactory\tthat
\nthe words used do not produce that result,, For, if we apply
\nthe rule of harmonious construction, as has been pointed out
\nabove,, s. 31(4) does not stand in the way of the  operation
\nof s. 24 of the General Clauses Act.\n<\/p>\n
The  proper  construction  of  a  legislative  provision  as
\nregards rules or regulations made under an Act having effect
\nas  if enacted in the Act, fell to be considered in  several
\nEnglish\t and  Indian  decisions and from  one  of  these-the
\nearliest.. case in which the
\n21<\/span>
\nquestion appears to have been considered Mr.  Pathak  sought
\nassistance.  That is the case of Institute of Patent  Agents
\nand others v. Joseph Lockwood (1).  There, a declaration was
\nsought\tagainst\t Lockwood that he was not  registered  as  a
\npatent\tagent in pursuance of the Patents, Design and  Trade
\nMarks Act, 1888 and was not entitled to describe himself  as
\na  patent  agent; and consequential relief  was\t asked\tfor.
\nWhile  the  first  section  of\tthe  Act  required  such   a
\nregistration, the Act itself did not provide “for the manner
\nin  which  the register is to be formed, who is\t to  be\t the
\nRegistrar,  the formalities requisite for the  registration,
\nor any particulars in relation to it”.\tThe Act left to\t the
\nBoard  of Trade to make such general rules as were  required
\nfor  giving  effect to the first section.  Among  the  rules
\nmade by the Board, was one requiring certain fee to be\tpaid
\non  first registration, and also an annual fee, non  payment
\nof  which shall be a ground for canceling the  registration.
\nThe question arose whether the rules with reference to\tfees
\nwere  intra vires or ultra vires.  The House of\t Lords\theld
\nthat  the  rules  were intra vires; but dealt  also  with  a
\ncontention  raised on behalf of the appellants that in\tview
\nof the provisions in the Act that the rules “shall be of the
\nsame  effect  as  if they were contained in  this  Act”\t the
\nquestion  whether the rules were intra vires or ultra  vires
\ncould not at all be canvassed in the courts.  Speaking about
\nthe  effect of the above provisions, Lord Herschell, L.\t C.,
\nsaid:-“I own I feel very great difficulty in giving to\tthis
\nprovision  that\t they ‘shall have of the same effect  as  if
\nthey were contained in the Act’ any other meaning than this,
\nthat  you  shall  for  all  purposes  of  construction,\t  or
\nobligation or otherwise, treat them, as if. they were in the
\nAct”.  Mr. Pathak fastens on the phrase “for all purposes of
\nconstruction,  or obligation or otherwise” and submits\tthat
\nthis is a good authority for holding that for the purpose of
\ndeciding  whether the rules were part of the Act, so  as  to
\nattract the consequence of repeal, along with the repeal  of
\nthe Act, the rules should be treated “as if they were in the
\nAct” and so stood
\n(1)  [1894] A-C- 347.\n<\/p>\n
22<\/span><\/p>\n
repealed.  We are bound however to take notice of the  .fact
\nthat  the question whether the rules were to be\t treated  as
\npart  of  the  Act to ascertain the effect on  them  of\t the
\nrepeal of the Act was not even remotely. before the House of
\nLords.\t The  sole question before them was how far,  if  at
\nall,  the courts could consider the question of validity  of
\n‘the rules, in view of the above provisions as regards their
\nhaving\t“the  same effect as if they were contained  in\t the
\nAct”.\tThat the Lord Chancellor was not concerning  himself
\nwith  the  effect  of this provision  in  other\t aspects  is
\nfurther\t clear\tfrom  what he  said  immediately  after\t the
\nobservations quoted above:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “No doubt”, said he, “there might be some con-<\/p>\n
\t      flict  between a rule and a  provision-of\t the
\n\t      Act.   Well  there  is  a\t conflict  sometimes
\n\t      between  two sections to be found in the\tsame
\n\t      Act.   You have to try and reconcile  them  as
\n\t      best  as you may.\t If you cannot, you have  to
\n\t      determine\t which is the leading provision\t and
\n\t      which is the subordinate provision, and  which
\n\t\t\t    must  give way to the other.  That would be\t s
\no
\n\t      with  regard to enactments and with regard  to
\n\t      rules which are to be treated as if within the
\n\t      enactment.    In\t that  case   probably\t the
\n\t      enactment\t itself\t would\tbe  treated  as\t the
\n\t      governing consideration and the rule
\n\t      as subordinate to it”.\n<\/p>\n
Not only was the question now before us not for decision  in
\nLockwood’s Case (1), but it is quite clear that the  learned
\nLord  Chancellor had no intention of dealing with  questions
\nlike  this, when he used the words on which Mr.\t Pathak\t has
\ntried to rely.\n<\/p>\n
In  our\t opinion,  Lockwood’8 Case (1) is  no  authority  in
\nfavour of the construction urged by the learned counsel\t for
\nacceptance.\n<\/p>\n
In  a later case of Ministry of Health v. The King (on\tthe,
\nprosecution of Yaffe,) (2) the House of Lords considered the
\nquestion how far the principle laid down in Lockwood’s\tCase
\nwent.\tBut  there  also, the question was  as\tregards\t the
\nsoundness of a plea that the validity of a scheme which,  on
\nconfirmation, had effect as if it was contained in the\tAct,
\ncould not be
\n(1) [1894] A.C. 347.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1931] A.C. 494.\n<\/p>\n
23<\/span><\/p>\n
questioned in the courts and the question now before us\t did
\nnot even remotely come up for consideration.
\nThe question which was considered by the Patna High Court in
\nState  v. K.B. Chandra(1) was also entirely  different\tfrom
\nthe  question now before us.  The contention there was\tthat
\nthe  Mines Creche Rules and Coal Mines Pithead\tBath  Rules,
\n1946-which  the\t respondent  Chandra  had  been\t accused  of
\nviolating  should be deemed as part of the Mines Act,  1923,
\nand any question as to their validity could not be canvassed
\nin the courts.\tThe contention was rejected, and it was held
\nthat whether the rules were consistent with the Act can be a
\nmatter\t of   judicial\t consideration.\t   In\tthat\tcase
\ncontravention of the rules took place before the Act of 1952
\nhad come into force, and so the Court was not called upon to
\nconsider  the  question of the continued  existence  of\t the
\nrules after the 1923 Act was repealed.\n<\/p>\n
None  of  the  cases cited at the bar is  therefore  of\t any
\nassistance for the decision of our present question.
\nThe  true  position  appears  to  be  that  the\t Rules\t and
\nregulations  do\t not  lose  their  character  as  rules\t and
\nregulations,  even though they are to be of the same  effect
\nas  if\tcontained  in the Act.\tThey continue  to  be  rules
\nsubordinate  to\t the Act, and though for  certain  purposes,
\nincluding  the\tpurpose\t of construction,  they\t are  to  be
\ntreated\t as  if contained in the Act, their true  nature  as
\nsubordinate rule is not lost.  Therefore, with regard to the
\neffect\tof a repeal of the Act, they continue to be  subject
\nto the operation of s. 24 of the General Clauses Act.
\nFor  the  reasons  given above, we  have  no  hesitation  in
\nholding that the provisions of s. 31, sub-s. 4, of the Mines
\nAct, 1923, do not stand in the way of the full operation  of
\ns.  24\tof  the\t General Clauses  Act,\t1897,  and  that  in
\nconsequence of these provisions the Coal Mines\tRegulations,
\n1926, continued to be in force at the relevant date and have
\nto  be deemed to be regulations; made under the\t Mines\tAct,
\n1952.\n<\/p>\n
Mention has to be made here of an argument rather
\n(1)  (1954) I.L.R. 33 Patna ‘507.\n<\/p>\n
24<\/span><\/p>\n
faintly made by Mr. Pathak that even if the regulations\t are
\ndeemed\tto be regulations made under the Mines Act of  1952,
\ns.  73\tor s. 74 of that Act can have  no  application.\t  He
\npointed\t out that what these sections made punishable  is  a
\ncontravention\tof  a  provision  of  the  Act\tor  of\t any
\nregulations,  rules  or\t bye laws or any  other\t order\tmade
\nthereunder.   They  do\tnot, he\t contends,  make  punishable
\ncontravention  of  regulations deemed to be made  under\t the
\n1952 Act; and so assuming that his clients have\t contravened
\nthe Mines Regulations, 1926, as alleged no offence under  s.
\n73  or s. 74 has been committed.  Learned Counsel has  drawn
\nour  attention\tin  this connection  to\t the  definition  of
\n“regulations” in a. 2(o) of the 1952 Act according to  which
\nregulations  mean “regulations made under this Act”.  If  it
\nwas intended, the argument is, that any contravention of the
\nregulations  deemed to be made under the Act should also  be
\npunishable,  the legislature would have defined\t regulations
\nto  include  not  only regulations made under  the  Act\t but
\nregulations  deemed to have been made under the\t Act.\tThis
\nargument  is  not even plausible.  The effect of  a  deeming
\nprovision,  it need hardly be pointed out, is to attract  to
\nwhat is deemed to be something all the legal consequences of
\nthat  something.  In other words, when A is deemed to be  B,
\ncompliance with A is in law compliance with B, contravention
\nof  A is in law contravention of B. As soon as we reach\t the
\nconclusion  that  in  consequence of s. 24  of\tthe  General
\nClauses\t Act, the Coal Mines Regulations, 1926, had  at\t the
\nalleged\t  date\tof  contravention,  to\tbe  deemed   to\t  be
\nregulations  made under the Mines Act, 1952, the  conclusion
\nis  inevitable that contravention of the Mines\tRegulations,
\n1926, amounted to con. travention of regulations made  under
\nthe  1952  Act,\t so that the contravener was  guilty  of  an
\noffence under s.73, or 74, as the case might be.
\nEqually\t untenable is Mr. Pathak’s next contention that\t the
\ncontravention  of the Indian Coal Mines\t Regulations,  1926,
\nwhich  were  at\t the date of contravention  “deemed”  to  be
\nregulations under the 1952 Act, was not a violation of a law
\nin force on such date, so that
\n25,
\nArt.  20(1) is a bar to the conviction of his clients.\t The
\nrelevant  portion  of Art. 20(1) lays down  that  no  person
\nshall be convicted of any offence except for violation of  a
\nlaw  in\t force\tat the-time of the  commission\tof  the\t act
\ncharged as an offence.\tThe result of this is that if at the
\ndate  of the commission of an act, such commission  was\t not
\nprohibited  by\ta law then in force, no\t future\t legislation
\nprohibiting that act with retrospective effect will  justify
\na conviction for such commission.  In other words, if an act
\nis  not an offence at the date of commission, no future\t law
\ncan make it an offence.\t But how, on the facts of this\tcase
\nthe accused can claim benefit of this principle embodied  in
\nArt.  20(1) it is difficult to see.  They are being  charged
\nunder  s.  73  and s. 74 of the Mines  Act,  1952,  for\t the
\ncontravention  of some regulations.  Were these\t regulations
\nin  force on the alleged date of contravention?\t  Certainly,
\nthey  were in consequence of the provisions of S. 24 of\t the
\nGeneral\t Clauses Act.  The fact that these regulations\twere
\ndeemed to be regulations made under the 1952 Act does not in
\nany way affect the position that they were laws in force  on
\nthe  alleged  date of contravention.  The argument  that  as
\nthey were “regulations” under the 1952 Act in consequence of
\na  deeming  provision, they were not laws in  force  on\t the
\nalleged date of contravention is entirely misconceived.
\nEqually\t misconceived  is the submission that  this  Court’s
\ndecision  in  Shiv  Bahadur Singh’s Case  (1)  supports\t the
\nargument.   In that case, dealing with a suggestion that  as
\nthe  Vindhya Pradesh Ordinance 48 of 1949 though enacted  on
\nSeptember  11, 1947, i.e., after the alleged  offenses\twere
\ncommitted,  was\t in terms made retrospective by a.  2  which
\nsays  that  the Ordinance shall be deemed to  have  been  in
\nforce  in Vindhya Pradesh from August 9,1949, the  Ordinance
\nwas  a\tlaw in force on or from August 9, 1949,\t this  Court
\nsaid:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “This  however would be, to import a  somewhat
\n\t      technical meaning into the phrase law in force
\n\t      used
\n\t      (1)   [1953] S.C.R. 1188.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      26<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      in Art. 20.  Law in force referred to  therein
\n\t      must  be taken to relate not to a law  “deemed
\n\t      to be in force”, and thus brought into  force,
\n\t      but the law factually in operation at the time
\n\t      or  what\tmay  be\t called\t the  then  existing
\n\t      law………………  It cannot therefore  be
\n\t      doubted that the phrase “law in force” as used
\n\t      in  Art. 20 must be understood in its  natural
\n\t      sense  as being the law in fact  in  existence
\n\t      and in operation at the time of the commission
\n\t      of  the  offence\tas  distinct  from  the\t law
\n\t      “deemed” to have become operative by virtue of
\n\t      power  of\t legislature to\t pass  retrospective
\n\t      laws.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
As  the Court clearly pointed out, it was  considering\tonly
\nthe  question whether a law made after the alleged act,\t can
\nby  providing for its retrospective operation,\tmake  itself
\nthe “law in force”, for the purpose of Art. 20; and it\theld
\nthat  this  could  not be done.\t The  words  “law  in  force
\nreferred  to  therein must be taken to relate not to  a\t law
\n‘deemed\t to  be in force”‘, in this judgment should  not  be
\ntaken apart from its context.  In the words that-immediately
\nfollow the Court was saying that “law in force relates to  a
\nlaw  factually\tin  operation at the time, or  what  may  be
\ncalled the then existing law”.\tThe question to be asked is:
\nWas  the-law said to have been violated in operation at\t the
\nalleged date of violation?  The answer, in the cases  before
\nus,  must  be  that it was.  Art.  20(1)  has  therefore  no
\napplication.\n<\/p>\n
No  other point has been raised before us in the appeals  by
\nthe Manager and the Agent.  These appeals (Appeals Nos. 102,
\n105 and 106) are therefore dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
The other four appeals raise a difficult question about\t the
\ninterpretation of the word “any one of the directors” in  s.
\n76 Section 76 is in these words:-\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Determination  of  owner in  certain  cases:-
\n\t      Where  the owner of a mine is a firm or  other
\n\t      association  of  individuals, any one  of\t the
\n\t      partners or members thereof or where the owner
\n\t      of a mine is a public company, any one of\t the
\n\t      directors\t thereof,  or where the owner  of  a
\n\t      mine  is\ta private company, any\tone  of\t the
\n\t      shareholders thereof, may be prosecuted and
\n\t      27<\/span>
\n\t      punished\tunder this Act for any\toffence\t for
\n\t      which the owner of a mine is punishable:-
\n\t      Provided\tthat  where a firm,  association  or
\n\t      company  has  given notice in writing  to\t the
\n\t      Chief Inspector that it has nominated,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a)   in\tthe  case  of a\t firm,\tany  of\t its
\n\t      partners,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b)   in\tthe case of an association,  any  of
\n\t      its members,\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (c)   in the case of a public company, any  of
\n\t      its directors, or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (d)   in\tthe case of a, private company,\t any
\n\t      of its shareholders,
\n\t      who  is resident in each case in any place  to
\n\t      which   this   Act  extends  to\tassume\t the
\n\t      responsibilities of the owner of the mine\t for
\n\t      the  purposes  of\t this  Act,  such   partner,
\n\t      member,  director or shareholder as  the\tcase
\n\t      may  be, shall so long as he continues  to  be
\n\t      the owner of the mine for the purpose of\tthis
\n\t      Act,  unless notice in writing  canceling\t his
\n\t      nomination or stating that he has ceased to be
\n\t      a partner, member, director or shareholder, as
\n\t      the  case\t may be, is received  by  the  Chief
\n\t      Inspector”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  is\ton the basis of this section, that  prosecution\t has
\nbeen  launched against all the directors.  If “any  one”  in
\nthe  section  is  interpreted to mean  “every  one”  as\t was
\nunsuccessfully\tcontended  on  behalf  of  the\t Government-
\nappellant  in  the  High  Court-the  section  justifies\t the
\nprosecution  of all the directors.  If however, “any one  of
\nthe directors” must be interpreted to mean “one only of\t the
\ndirectors, it does not matter which one” as was contended by
\nthe  appellants\t in  Appeals  Nos.  103\t and  104,  the\t two
\ndirectors-and  as  held\t by  the High  Court,  it  would  be
\nnecessary  to  consider their further  contention  that\t the
\nsection\t contravenes  Art. 14 of the  Constitution,  and  is
\ntherefore void, so that the High Court’s order directing the
\nInspector  of Mines to select one of the directors  for\t the
\nprosecution cannot be sustained.  For, on the interpretation
\nthat  “any  one of the directors”, means “only\tone  of\t the
\ndirectors”  the\t authorities have got the right\t to  proceed
\nagainst\t one  of the directors, out of the  several  and  it
\nmight be argued that the exercise of
\n28<\/span>
\nthis discretion is wholly unfettered and unguided and Of the
\nHigh Court could not in law, ask the authorities to exercise
\nthis   discriminatory  provision  of  law.   The   important
\nquestion that arises for decision therefore is how the words
\n“any one of the directors” should be interpreted.
\nIt  is\tquite  clear and indeed not disputed  that  in\tsome
\ncontexts,  “any\t one” means “one only it matters  not  which
\none”;  the phrase “any of the directors” is therefore  quite
\ncapable\t of meaning “one only of the directors, it does\t not
\nmatter\twhich  one”.  Is the phrase however  capable  of  no
\nother  meaning?\t  If  it  is not,  the\tcourts\tcannot\tlook
\nfurther,  and  must interpret these words  in  that  meaning
\nonly, irrespective of what the intention of the\t legislature
\nmight  be believed to have been.  If however the  phrase  is
\ncapable\t of another meaning, as suggested, viz., “every\t one
\nof  the directors” it will be necessary to decide  which  of
\nthe two meanings was intended by the legislature.
\nIf  one\t examines the use of the words “any one”  in  common
\nconversation or literature, there can be no doubt that\tthey
\nare not infrequently used to. mean “every one”-not one,\t but
\nall.   Thus we say “any one can see that this is wrong”,  to
\nmean  “everyone can see that this is wrong”.  “Any  one\t may
\nenter”\tdoes not mean that “only one person may enter”,\t but
\nthat all may enter.  It is permissible and indeed profitable
\nto turn in this connection to the Oxford English Dictionary,
\nat p. 378 of which, we find the meaning of “any” given thus:
\n“In affirmative sentences, it asserts, concerning a being or
\nthing of the sort named, without limitation as to which, and
\nthus  collectively  of\tevery  one of  them”.\tOne  of\t the
\nillustration  given is”I challenge anyone to  contradict  my
\nassertions.” Certainly, this does not mean that one only  is
\nchallenged;  but that all are challenged.  It is  abundantly
\nclear  therefore that “any one” is not infrequently used  to
\nmean “every one”.\n<\/p>\n
But, argues Mr. Pathak, granting that this is so, it must be
\nheld  that  when  the  phrase “any one”\t is  used  with\t the
\npreposition  “of”, followed by a word denoting a  number  of
\npersons, it never means “every one”.\n<\/p>\n
29<\/span><\/p>\n
The extract from the Oxford Dictionary, it is interesting to
\nnotice, speaks of an assertion “concerning a being or  thing
\nof the sort named”; it is not unreasonable to say that,\t the
\nword “of” followed by a word denoting a number of persons or
\nthings is just such ” naming of a sort” as mentioned  there.
\nSuppose, the illustration “I challenge any one to contradict
\nmy  assertions”\t was changed to “I challenge any one  of  my
\nopponents  to  contradict  my assertion.”  “Any\t one  of  my
\nopponents”  here would mean “all my opponents”-not one\tonly
\nof the opponents.\n<\/p>\n
While  the  phrase “any one of them” or any  similar  phrase
\nconsisting  of “any one”, followed by “of which is  followed
\nin its turn by words denoting a number of persons or things,
\ndoes not appear to have fallen for judicial construction, in
\nour  courts  or in England-the phrase “any  of\tthe  present
\ndirectors”  had\t to be interpreted in an old  English  case,
\nIsle  of  Wight Railway Co. v. Tahourdin (1).  A  number  of
\nshareholders required the directors to call a meeting of the
\ncompany\t for two objects.  One of the objects was  mentioned
\nas  “To remove, if deemed necessary or expedient any of\t the
\npresent\t directors,  and  to elect directors,  to  fill\t any
\nvacancy\t on  the Board”.  The directors issued a  notice  to
\nconvene a meeting for the other object and held the meeting.
\nThen  the  shareholders, under the  Companies  Clauses\tAct,
\n1845,  issued a notice of their own convening a meeting\t for
\nboth the objects in the original requisition.  In an  action
\nby  the\t directors  to restrain\t the  requisitionists,\tfrom
\nholding the meeting, the Court of Appeal held that a  notice
\nto.  remove “any of the present directors” would  justify  a
\nresolution for removing all who are directors at the present
\ntime.\t“Any”,\tCotton, L. J., pointed\tout,  would  involve
\n“all”.\n<\/p>\n
 It is true that the language there was “any of the  present
\ndirectors” and not “any one of the present directors” and it
\nis urged that the word “one”, in the latter phrase makes all
\nthe  difference.  We think it will be wrong to put too\tmuch
\nemphasis  on the word “one” here.  It may be pointed out  in
\nthis connection
\n (1) (1883) 25 Ch.  D. 320.\n<\/p>\n
30<\/span><\/p>\n
that  the  Permanent Edition of the Words and  Phrases\t(1),
\nmentions an American case Front & Hintingdon Building & Loan
\nAssociation v. Berzinski, where the words “any of them” were
\nheld to be the equivalent of “any one of them”.
\nAfter  giving the matter full and anxious consideration,  we
\nhave  come to the conclusion that the words “any one of\t the
\ndirectors”  is ambiguous; in some contexts, it\tmeans  “only
\none  of\t the directors, does not matter which one”,  but  in
\nother  contexts, it is capable of meaning “every one of\t the
\ndirectors”.  Which of these two meanings was intended by the
\nlegislature  in\t any particular statutory phrase has  to  be
\ndecided\t by the courts on a consideration of the context  in
\nwhich  the words appear, and in particular, the\t scheme\t and
\nobject of the legislation.\n<\/p>\n
The plain object of s. 76 of the Mines Act is to ensure that
\nno  lacuna remains in the application of the  provisions  in
\nthe  Act to owners of mines, in the cases where the mine  is
\nowned  not  by\tan  individual,\t but  by  a  firm  or  other
\nassociation of individuals, or a public company or a private
\ncompany.  It provides that where the owner of the mine is  a
\nfirm  or  other association of individuals, any one  of\t the
\npartners or members thereof may be punished; where the owner
\nis  a  private company, any one of the shareholders  may  be
\nprosecuted  and\t punished and where the owner  is  a  public
\ncompany not “any one of the shareholders” but any one of the
\ndirectors  may\tbe  prosecuted and  punished.\tThere  is  a
\nproviso\t under which on notice being given of nomination  of
\n“any”  of  the\tpartners of the firm, or  in’  the  case  of
\nassociation  any of the members; in the case of\t the  public
\ncompany\t any of its directors, and in the case of a  private
\ncompany\t any of its shareholders, the ownership of the\tmine
\nshall be determined only in accordance with the\t nomination.
\nThere  can be no question that where a mine is owned by\t one
\nindividual  A-the one and complete owner-would be liable  to
\nall penalties which ownership entails.\tWhen the legislature
\nthought\t it  desirable to make special provision  where\t the
\nmine
\n(1) Vol. 3A.\n<\/p>\n
31<\/span><\/p>\n
is  owned by a firm, or an association of individuals, or  a
\ncompany,  it  does  not stand to reason\t that  it  of  would
\nordinarily  permit  all\t the partners except  one,  all\t the
\nmembers of the association except one, all the\tshareholders
\nof  the private company except one and all the directors  of
\nthe public company except one to escape the penalties.\t The
\npurpose of the Act is to secure safety and proper conditions
\nof  work for labour.  To enforce the provisions of  the\t Act
\nand  the rules, regulations and bye-laws under it,  designed
\nto achieve this purpose, the legislature, makes in its\t18th
\nsection’ the manager, the agent, and the owner,\t responsible
\nfor   their  proper  observance.   Contravention   is\tmade
\npunishable  by\tfine  or imprisonment.\tIn  this  scheme  of
\nthings,\t it  is reasonable to expect that  the\tlegislature,
\nwould take particular care to see that everybody  performing
\nthe  function  which  an individual  owner  is\texpected  to
\nperform,  would be treated in the same way as an  individual
\nowner.\tIn the case of a firm this position is filled by all
\nthe   partners;\t in  the  case\tof  other   association\t  of
\nindividuals  this position is filled by all the members;  in
\nthe case of a private company this position is filled by all
\nthe  shareholders  thereof  while in the case  of  a  public
\ncompany\t the  position\tis  filled  by\tall  the   directors
\ntogether.   It\tis  to be expected therefore  that  all\t the
\npartners in the case of a firm, all the shareholders in\t the
\ncase of a private company and all the directors in the\tcase
\nof  a public company should be subjected to prosecution\t and
\npunishment in the same way as an individual owner of a mine.
\nWhen  we find in this background the legislature  using\t the
\nwords  “any one of the directors, any one of  the  partners,
\nany    one    of    the\t  members,   any    one\t   of\t the
\nshareholders………………\t may   be   prosecuted\t and
\npunished”,  ‘words  which are capable of  meaning  “all\t the
\ndirectors, all the members, all the shareholders and all the
\npartners,  as  also  the  other meaning\t “only\tone  of\t the
\ndirectors,  only  one  of the partners”,  only\tone  of\t the
\nmembers, only one of the shareholders,” we have no doubt  at
\nall  that the legislature used the words in the\t former\t and
\nnot in the latter sense.\n<\/p>\n
32<\/span><\/p>\n
But,  argues Mr. Pathak, you must not forget the Of  special
\nrule  of  interpretation  for “penal statute”  that  if\t the
\nlanguage  is ambiguous, the interpretation in favour of\t the
\naccused should ordinarily be adopted.  If you interpret “any
\none”  in  the  sense suggested by him,\tthe  legislation  he
\nsuggests is void and so the accused escapes.  One of the two
\npossible constructions, thus being in favour of the accused,
\nshould\ttherefore be adopted.  In our opinion, there  is  no
\nsub.  stance  in  this\tcontention.   The  rule\t of   strict
\ninterpretation of penal statutes in favour of the accused is
\nnot  of universal application, and must be considered  along
\nwith  other  will established rules of\tinterpretation.\t  We
\nhave already seen that the scheme and object of the  statute
\nmakes  it reasonable to think that the legislature  intended
\nto subject all the directors of a company owning coal  mines
\nto  prosecution\t and  penalties, and not  one  only  of\t the
\ndirectors.  In the face of these considerations there is  no
\nscope  here  of\t the  application of  the  rule\t for  strict
\ninterpretation of penal statutes in favour of the accused.
\nThe High Court appears to have been greatly impressed by the
\nfact that in other statutes where the legislature wanted  to
\nmake  every one out of a group or a class of persons  liable
\nit  used clear language expressing the intention;  and\tthat
\nthe phrase “any one” has not been used in any other  statute
\nin  this  country  to  express\t“every\tone”.\tIt  will  be
\nunreasonable,  in our opinion, to attach too much weight  to
\nthis  circumstance; and as for the reasons mentioned  above,
\nwe think the phrase “any one of the directors” is capable of
\nmeaning “every one of the directors”, the fact that in other
\nstatutes,  different  words were used to express  a  similar
\nmeaning is not of any significance.\n<\/p>\n
We have, on all these considerations come to the  conclusion
\nthat  the words “any one of the directors” has been used  in
\ns.  76\tto mean “every one of the directors”, and  that\t the
\ncontrary  interpretation  given\t by the High  Court  is\t not
\ncorrect.\n<\/p>\n
On the interpretation that “any one of the directors”  means
\n“every\tone of the director,%”, no question of violation  of
\nArt. 14 of the Constitution arises.\n<\/p>\n
33<\/span><\/p>\n
We,  therefore, allow the Appeals Nos. 98 and 99, set  aside
\nthe orders of the High Court in Writ Petitions Nos. 475\t and
\n476 of 1956 and order that these writ petitions be rejected.
\nAppeals Nos. 103 and 104 are dismissed.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals Nos. 98 and 99 allowed.\n<\/p>\n
Appeals Nos. 100 to 106 dismissed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India The Chief Inspector Of Mines And … vs Lala Karam Chand Thapar Etc on 10 February, 1961 Equivalent citations: 1961 AIR 838, 1962 SCR (1) 9 Author: K D Gupta Bench: Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P.(Cj), Das, S.K., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala, Mudholkar, J.R. PETITIONER: THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF MINES AND […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-180650","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nThe Chief Inspector Of Mines And ... vs Lala Karam Chand Thapar Etc on 10 February, 1961 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/the-chief-inspector-of-mines-and-vs-lala-karam-chand-thapar-etc-on-10-february-1961\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"The Chief Inspector Of Mines And ... vs Lala Karam Chand Thapar Etc on 10 February, 1961 - 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