{"id":183759,"date":"2009-11-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2009-11-08T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dabwali-fire-tragedy-victims-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-9-november-2009"},"modified":"2017-02-17T13:29:22","modified_gmt":"2017-02-17T07:59:22","slug":"dabwali-fire-tragedy-victims-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-9-november-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dabwali-fire-tragedy-victims-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-9-november-2009","title":{"rendered":"Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims … vs Union Of India And Others on 9 November, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"
Punjab-Haryana High Court<\/div>\n
Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims … vs Union Of India And Others on 9 November, 2009<\/div>\n
Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                            1\n\n\n\n\n     In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh.\n\n                                 ****\n<\/pre>\n
                 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996<\/p>\n
                    Date of Decision:    9.11.2009<\/p>\n
Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims Association<\/p>\n
                                                           …Petitioner<\/p>\n
                               Versus<\/p>\n
Union of India and Others<\/p>\n
                                                     …Respondents<\/p>\n
CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE T.S.THAKUR, CHIEF JUSTICE.\n<\/p>\n
       HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE KANWALJIT SINGH AHLUWALIA.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
1.       Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the
\n         judgment?\n<\/p>\n
2.       Whether to be referred to the reporters or not?\n<\/p>\n
3.       Whether the judgment should be reported in the Digest?<\/p>\n
Present: Mrs. Anju Arora, Advocate and
\n         Ms.Aditi Girdhar, Advocate,
\n         for the petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
         Mr. Onkar Singh Batalvi, Advocate
\n         Central Government Standing Counsel
\n         for respondent No.1.\n<\/p>\n
         Mr. H.S. Hooda, Advocate General, Haryana
\n         with Mr. Randhir Singh, Addl. AG Haryana,
\n         for respondents No.2 and 3.\n<\/p>\n
         Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, Senior Advocate
\n         with Mr. Sunish Bindlish and Mr. Subhash Gupta,
\n         Advocates, for respondents No.4 and 5.\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             2<\/span><\/p>\n
         Mr. Girish Agnihotri, Senior Advocate
\n         with Mr. Arvind Seth, Advocate
\n         for respondent No.6.\n<\/p>\n
         Mr. Mahavir Sandhu, Advocate
\n         for respondent No.7.\n<\/p>\n
         None for respondent No.8.\n<\/p>\n
         Mr. Gaurav Mohunta, Advocate
\n         for respondent No.9.\n<\/p>\n
\nT.S. Thakur, Chief Justice<\/p>\n
         Four hundred and forty six precious lives, mostly children and<\/p>\n
women, were lost in what turned out to be the worst fire tragedy ever in<\/p>\n
this part of the Country. Besides those who died, nearly 200 suffered<\/p>\n
burn injuries, disfiguring some of them beyond recognition. Payment of<\/p>\n
compensation to those, who survived or the next of kin of those, who did<\/p>\n
not, may never heal their wounds completely nor make any material<\/p>\n
difference in the ground realities unless all those concerned do some<\/p>\n
introspection to identify the causes for such tragedies and take<\/p>\n
corrective steps to prevent their recurrence in future. That is because<\/p>\n
human tragedies of such magnitude are more often than not caused as<\/p>\n
much by lack of care and caution as by the all round failure of public<\/p>\n
authorities statutory or otherwise in the due and proper discharge of<\/p>\n
their functions and duties especially those concerning enforcement of<\/p>\n
safety measures.\n<\/p>\n
         D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali was known to<\/p>\n
be a Premier Educational Institute in District Sirsa in the State of<\/p>\n
Haryana. The school was amongst six hundred and fifty other colleges<\/p>\n
and institutions under the management of DAV College Managing
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                3<\/span><\/p>\n
Committee, Chitragupta Road, New Delhi. For an Annual Prize<\/p>\n
Distribution Function, the school appears to have chosen what was<\/p>\n
known as Rajiv Marriage Palace situated at Chautala Chowk, Mandi,<\/p>\n
Dabwali, as the venue to which the children on the rolls of the school,<\/p>\n
their parents and teachers were invited. An invitation card sent to the<\/p>\n
invitees by the Principal of the School and the Regional Director of the<\/p>\n
DAV Managing Committee announced that Shri M.P.Bidlan, IAS, Deputy<\/p>\n
Commissioner, Sirsa would be the Chief Guest and Shri S.N.Kamboj,<\/p>\n
SDM Dabwali as the Guest of Honour. The function was to start at 11.00<\/p>\n
A.M. on the 23rd of December 1995. At about 1.40 P.M. or so, the pandal<\/p>\n
under which a very large number of invitees were sitting, appears to<\/p>\n
have caught fire. To the misfortune of those attending the function the<\/p>\n
fire spread much too fast to let them escape. The blaze claimed 446<\/p>\n
lives apart from causing burn injuries to 200 others. The cause of death<\/p>\n
was fire and a resultant stampede inside the pandal for want of escape<\/p>\n
routes the single exit point proving to be too small to let everyone under<\/p>\n
the pandal run to safety.\n<\/p>\n
          Nearly nine months after the incident when the funeral pyres<\/p>\n
and the ill fated venue had cooled, CWP No.13214 of 1996 was filed by<\/p>\n
the petitioner-association in the interest of those affected by the tragedy<\/p>\n
claiming a number of reliefs including adequate compensation to those<\/p>\n
who had lost their near and dear ones. Several directions were issued in<\/p>\n
the said writ petition from time to time which was finally disposed of by<\/p>\n
an order dated 28\/29.01.2003, whereby Justice T P Garg, a former<\/p>\n
Judge of High Court of Allahabad was appointed as a one man<\/p>\n
Commission for determining the negligence of those connected with the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                4<\/span><\/p>\n
incident and the amount of compensation payable to the victims or their<\/p>\n
next of kin.\n<\/p>\n
          The one man Commission, pursuant to the above directions,<\/p>\n
published notices inviting claim petitions from the general public, in<\/p>\n
response whereto the victims association filed a total of 493 petitions,<\/p>\n
out of which 405 cases related to compensation in death cases while the<\/p>\n
remaining 88 cases pertained to burn injuries suffered by the claimants.<\/p>\n
Notices were also sent to nine respondents including Union of India,<\/p>\n
State of Haryana, DAV Managing Committee, Haryana State Electricity<\/p>\n
Board, Municipal Council, Mandi Dabwali and Rajiv Marriage Palace.<\/p>\n
          In their claim petitions, the claimants alleged that the DAV<\/p>\n
Managing Committee and the school authorities had organized the ill<\/p>\n
fated function at a Marriage Palace without taking reasonable care and<\/p>\n
caution expected of a prudent person regarding the safety of all those<\/p>\n
attending the function. The School Authorities had thereby committed an<\/p>\n
act of negligence especially when the Marriage Palace and the Pandal<\/p>\n
under which the function was held were constructed in defiance of the<\/p>\n
building plan sanctioned by the Municipal Committee and had more than<\/p>\n
double the sanctioned electric load with loose wires crisscrossing the<\/p>\n
Pandal. Absence of fire fighting equipment and proper exits made the<\/p>\n
peace vulnerable to any mishap which mishap did occur claiming<\/p>\n
valuable human lives. The claim petitions prayed for several reliefs apart<\/p>\n
from payment of compensation.\n<\/p>\n
          In the reply filed by the respondents to the claim petitions, the<\/p>\n
allegation that there was any negligence on their part or that any legal<\/p>\n
liability accrued against them were both denied. Reply filed by
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              5<\/span><\/p>\n
respondents No.1 to 3 inter-alia pointed out that the State Government<\/p>\n
was shocked over the tragic incident and that apart from remedial<\/p>\n
measures and providing relief to the affected instituted a fact finding<\/p>\n
enquiry into the incident. FIR No.397 of 1995 under Section 304-A of the<\/p>\n
Indian Penal Code registered at Police Station, Dabwali was<\/p>\n
subsequently transferred to the Central Bureau of Investigation.<\/p>\n
Respondents No.1 to 3 further pleaded that the Government had<\/p>\n
announced an ex-gratia payment of Rs.1,00,000\/- for every death and<\/p>\n
Rs.50,000\/- for every injury case which amount had been disbursed to<\/p>\n
the persons concerned. Reimbursement of medical bills to the injured<\/p>\n
was also one of the reliefs, which the State Government had conceded<\/p>\n
to the victims before the High Court. Respondents 1 to 3 alleged that the<\/p>\n
incident had taken place on account of the negligence of respondents<\/p>\n
No.4, 5 and 9, who had organized the function and on account of their<\/p>\n
short sighted, careless and greedy approach meant to cut corners and<\/p>\n
save money in total disregard of the safety of the students, the parents<\/p>\n
and guests invited to the function. It was also alleged that the incident<\/p>\n
had taken place on account of highly inflammable material used to erect<\/p>\n
the pandal and the inadequate number of exit points from the same. The<\/p>\n
charge sheet filed by the CBI, had, according to the respondents,<\/p>\n
culminated in the conviction of Kewal Krishan, Rajinder Kumar and Devi<\/p>\n
Dayal by Special Judicial Magistrate, CBI, Ambala.<\/p>\n
         Respondents No.4 & 5 had also similarly denied the<\/p>\n
averments made in the claim petitions and asserted that the fault leading<\/p>\n
to the tragedy lay with respondent No.9, who had failed to make proper<\/p>\n
arrangements and      take all such steps as were essential in the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                6<\/span><\/p>\n
circumstances. It was also asserted that no claim was maintainable<\/p>\n
against respondent No.4 as the said respondent was not a juristic<\/p>\n
person. It was also alleged that the function was not organized by the<\/p>\n
DAV Managing Committee, as such no negligence or blame for the<\/p>\n
tragedy could be attributed to the said Committee. It was further alleged<\/p>\n
that the DAV organization had treated the tragedy as a natural calamity<\/p>\n
and taken several steps in the matter such as helping the victims in<\/p>\n
getting free education, medicines and even financial assistance.<\/p>\n
According to respondents No. 4 and 5, the responsibility for the safety of<\/p>\n
the students, staff and parents was that of respondent No.9, engaged to<\/p>\n
organize the function and not the School Authorities or DAV Managing<\/p>\n
Committee. Respondent No.9 was, according to the school, expected to<\/p>\n
make arrangements for the safety of the students, staff, parents and<\/p>\n
guests invited to the function.\n<\/p>\n
          Respondents No. 6 and 7, HSEB and Municipal Committee,<\/p>\n
Dabwali respectively also disputed their liabilities and denied that they<\/p>\n
were guilty of any negligence whatsoever. Similarly respondent No.8,<\/p>\n
Sh. M.P. Bidlan, the then D.C. Sirsa denied his liability and pleaded<\/p>\n
complete innocence in the matter.\n<\/p>\n
          Respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace too filed a reply inter-<\/p>\n
alia stating that the venue had not been formally inaugurated till the time<\/p>\n
the incident occurred and it was only because the school was serving a<\/p>\n
social cause that the venue was offered to them without charging a<\/p>\n
single penny in consideration thereof. It was also alleged that the<\/p>\n
responsibility for making the necessary arrangements for seating of the<\/p>\n
guests and provisions for electricity and water etc. was that of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               7<\/span><\/p>\n
respondents No. 4 & 5. The allegation that they had been using more<\/p>\n
then the sanctioned load of electricity with loose wires hanging all<\/p>\n
around was also denied by them. The Pandal was, according to<\/p>\n
respondent No.9 made of pure cotton fabric purchased from M\/s Sukh<\/p>\n
Chain Singh Makhan Singh and Co. Gandhi Chowk, Abohar. All other<\/p>\n
arrangements towards electricity, water, security, eatables according to<\/p>\n
respondent No.9 and seating etc. were to be made by the school itself.<\/p>\n
          The Commission afforded the fullest opportunity to the parties<\/p>\n
to lead evidence in support of their respective cases. Consequently, as<\/p>\n
many as 1084 witnesses including 393 doctors were examined on behalf<\/p>\n
of the claimants over a period of four years. In rebuttal, the respondents<\/p>\n
examined 29 witnesses on their behalf, while the Commission examined<\/p>\n
as many as 30 witnesses on its own. It is noteworthy that as many as<\/p>\n
2800 documents were produced, marked and exhibited during the<\/p>\n
course of inquiry proceedings. The hearing of the claim petitions filed<\/p>\n
before the Commission commenced on 29.8.2006 and was completed<\/p>\n
on 24.12.2007. The Commission submitted the first part of the report on<\/p>\n
19.8.2008 in which it determined the amount of compensation payable<\/p>\n
to the claimants in death cases. The second part of the report submitted<\/p>\n
by the Commission on 10.12.2008 dealt with the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation payable to the victims in injury cases. The third and final<\/p>\n
part of the report submitted on 16.3.2009 determined the negligence of<\/p>\n
the respondents and the apportionment of the liability to pay<\/p>\n
compensation among them.\n<\/p>\n
          Dealing with the question of negligence of the respondents,<\/p>\n
the Commission recorded a clear finding to the effect that while the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  8<\/span><\/p>\n
accommodation in the School building was admittedly insufficient for<\/p>\n
holding of a function like the one which the School was organizing, the<\/p>\n
same did not absolve the School of the responsibility to look for a<\/p>\n
suitable alternative.    The Commission took the view that it was the<\/p>\n
responsibility of respondents No.4 and 5 to see that the Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
where they were holding their Annual Function was safe and had the<\/p>\n
capacity to accommodate the large number of invitees attending the<\/p>\n
same. It was also the responsibility of the said respondents to ensure<\/p>\n
that adequate arrangements for fire fighting in the case of an<\/p>\n
emergency existed and that there were sufficient number of exits for<\/p>\n
escape in any such eventuality. The School was also expected to<\/p>\n
ensure that the Marriage Palace owner had the necessary certificates<\/p>\n
and permissions from the Municipal Committee, Dabwali, for holding of<\/p>\n
a function like the one being organized by the School. The Commission<\/p>\n
took the view that respondents No.4 and 5 had, in their anxiety and over<\/p>\n
enthusiasm, failed to      take care and look into all these aspects of<\/p>\n
security even when the function was to be attended by a very large<\/p>\n
number of persons comprising men, women and children. The<\/p>\n
Commission observed:-\n<\/p>\n
                        “Under the above circumstances, it is clear that<\/p>\n
                    respondents No.4 & 5, who were expected to see<\/p>\n
                    that the Marriage Palace where they were holding<\/p>\n
                    their annual function was safe and sound and it had<\/p>\n
                    the     capacity    to    accommodate     about    1500<\/p>\n
                    persons\/invitees;        that   there   were   sufficient<\/p>\n
                    arrangements for fire fighting equipment and water
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   9<\/span><\/p>\n
                   in case of    emergency and there were sufficient<\/p>\n
                   number of exits and openings for escape and going<\/p>\n
                   out in case of emergency and also that the owners<\/p>\n
                   of the Marriage Palace had with them the<\/p>\n
                   completion certificate from the Municipal Committee,<\/p>\n
                   Dabwali, before holding any such function but in<\/p>\n
                   their anxiety and over-enthusiasm they did not care<\/p>\n
                   to look into any such thing”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         The    Commission      rejected   the     contention   urged       by<\/p>\n
respondents No.4 and 5 that the responsibility for making arrangements<\/p>\n
for the function lay entirely with respondent No.9, the owner of the<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace, or that safety and security of the guests including the<\/p>\n
children who were participating in the function was a matter that rested<\/p>\n
with Marriage Palace or its owners. The Commission observed:<\/p>\n
                    “Although respondents No.4 & 5 have throughout<\/p>\n
                   alleged that the Banquet Hall owners had to make<\/p>\n
                   all arrangements including sitting, electricity, lighting<\/p>\n
                   and tent etc. but then they have not led any<\/p>\n
                   evidence in support of their allegations. Their own<\/p>\n
                   witnesses: Smt. Neelam Wadhwa, a teacher of the<\/p>\n
                   school, and Shri V.K. Mittal, Principal of the School,<\/p>\n
                   have categorically stated that there was only one<\/p>\n
                   gate of entrance and exit in Rajiv Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
                   and the width of that gate as per their estimate was<\/p>\n
                   about 10 X 12 feet. Respondents No.4 & 5 have not
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                     10<\/span><\/p>\n
                   led any iota of evidence in support of their plea that<\/p>\n
                   their ‘agent’ respondent No.9 was negligent in so far<\/p>\n
                   as    the   sitting,   lighting,   electricity   and   tent<\/p>\n
                   arrangements were concerned.               None of their<\/p>\n
                   witnesses has stated as to what steps were taken<\/p>\n
                   and    what   arrangements         were   made    by    the<\/p>\n
                   organizers of the function i.e. Respondents No.4 & 5<\/p>\n
                   to meet any emergency, or unforeseen event like<\/p>\n
                   the present one. Admittedly, the size of the only<\/p>\n
                   gate of entrance and exit to the Banquet Hall was<\/p>\n
                   only 10 X 12 feet. Thus, when the fire engulfed the<\/p>\n
                   entire Pandal, it was humanly impossible for the<\/p>\n
                   children, ladies and gents to come out speedily from<\/p>\n
                   out of the single gate of exit”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Repelling the contentions urged on behalf of respondents<\/p>\n
No.4 and 5 that they had paid a sum of Rs.6,000\/- towards hire charges<\/p>\n
of the Marriage Palace and, therefore, had no responsibility for the<\/p>\n
safety and security of the children and other guests, the Commission<\/p>\n
observed:-\n<\/p>\n
                   “Even if it be admitted for the sake of argument that<\/p>\n
                   the respondent No.9 had to make all these<\/p>\n
                   arrangements for a consideration of Rs.6,000\/-,<\/p>\n
                   although as per the statement of Kewal Krishan, one<\/p>\n
                   of the owners of respondent No. 9 (RW19\/1-DFT),<\/p>\n
                   they offered the Marriage Palace to the School
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 11<\/span><\/p>\n
                    Authorities for their publicity free of charge; that the<\/p>\n
                    entire arrangement with regard to the chairs,<\/p>\n
                    curtains and other installations were all made by the<\/p>\n
                    School Authorities with which they had no concern<\/p>\n
                    whatsoever. He has also stated that as many as two<\/p>\n
                    generators were provided by the School Authorities<\/p>\n
                    and which were placed outside the Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
                    in the street. It can thus safely be concluded that<\/p>\n
                    even if the Rajiv Marriage Palace was hired for an<\/p>\n
                    amount of Rs.6,000\/-, but as per statement of Kewal<\/p>\n
                    Krishan, they had only offered the Banquet Hall<\/p>\n
                    while all other arrangements were to be made by<\/p>\n
                    the School Authorities. It is also a matter of common<\/p>\n
                    observation that in such functions, the sitting,<\/p>\n
                    lighting and such type of other arrangements are<\/p>\n
                    always made by the organizers themselves as per<\/p>\n
                    their requirement. To say now that all these<\/p>\n
                    arrangements like sitting, lighting, tent etc. were to<\/p>\n
                    be made by respondent No.9, does not, therefore,<\/p>\n
                    appeal to reason. The respondent No.9 was only an<\/p>\n
                    ‘agent’ of respondents No.4 & 5 and whatever he<\/p>\n
                    did, was done during the course of his agency”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          While examining the liability of respondent No.9, the owner of<\/p>\n
the Marriage Palace, the Commission recorded a finding that the owners<\/p>\n
had not applied for a completion certificate after the construction of the<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace was completed nor had they obtained any licence from
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             12<\/span><\/p>\n
the Municipal Committee for running the        Marriage Palace. The<\/p>\n
Commission further recorded a finding that respondent No.9 had not<\/p>\n
made any arrangement for a Fire-brigade and\/or Ambulance in the<\/p>\n
event of an emergency arising during the function. The Commission<\/p>\n
accepted the assertion made by respondent No.9, the owner of<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace, that the Marriage Palace was offered to respondents<\/p>\n
No.4 and 5 free of any charge only with a view to promoting the<\/p>\n
commercial interest of the establishment. Analysing the deposition of<\/p>\n
Mr. V.K. Mittal, Principal of the School and Mr. Jagdish Deol, Upper<\/p>\n
Division Clerk,   produced by respondents No.4 and 5 as defence<\/p>\n
witnesses, the Commission came to the conclusion that payment of<\/p>\n
Rs.6,000\/- to the Marriage Palace was not established as the receipt<\/p>\n
showing the said payment had not been produced. The Commission<\/p>\n
observed:-\n<\/p>\n
                   “From the evidence of Shri V.K. Mittal, it is rather<\/p>\n
                   made out that there did not exist any such receipt<\/p>\n
                   showing the alleged payment of Rs.6000\/- to<\/p>\n
                   respondent No.9. In case there would have been<\/p>\n
                   any such receipt, Shri V.K. Mittal or Shri Jagdish<\/p>\n
                   Deol, Upper Division Clerk of the Head Office of the<\/p>\n
                   D.A.V. College Managing Committee must have<\/p>\n
                   produced it but the same has been withheld from<\/p>\n
                   the Commission for the     reasons best known to<\/p>\n
                   them. Shri Jagdish Deol has nowhere stated about<\/p>\n
                   his having received any such receipt of Rs.6-000\/-<\/p>\n
                   from the D.A.V. School, Dabwali alongwith other
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                13<\/span><\/p>\n
                    record as alleged by Shri V.K. Mittal. Moreover,<\/p>\n
                    even if there was any such receipt as has been<\/p>\n
                    categorically stated by Shri V.K. Mittal, there are no<\/p>\n
                    reasons as to why respondents No.4 & 5 would<\/p>\n
                    withhold the same from the Commission”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Having, thus, found the owners of Marriage Palace guilty of<\/p>\n
negligence leading to the fire incident, the Commission went on to hold<\/p>\n
that the relationship between respondents No.4 and 5, on the one hand,<\/p>\n
and respondent No.9, on the other, was that of Principal and Agent<\/p>\n
thereby rendering the former vicariously liable for the acts of negligence,<\/p>\n
omission and commission of the latter. Relying upon the decisions of the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi and Others v.<\/p>\n
Ranjit Ginning and Pressing Co. Pvt. Ltd. And Another AIR<\/a> 1977<\/p>\n
Supreme Court 1735 and Minu B. Mehta and Another v. Balkrishana<\/p>\n
Ramchandra Nayan and Another AIR<\/a> 1977 Supreme Court 1248 and<\/p>\n
a Full Bench of this Court in Pirthi Singh v. Binda Ram and Others<\/p>\n
AIR<\/a> 1987 Punjab & Haryana 56, the Commission held that regardless<\/p>\n
whether or not payment of Rs.6,000\/- was proved to have been made<\/p>\n
towards user charges by respondents No.4 and 5 to respondent No.9<\/p>\n
the former were vicariously liable for any act of negligence, omission<\/p>\n
and\/or commission of the latter. The Commission took the view that<\/p>\n
since the function in question had been arranged by respondents No.4<\/p>\n
and 5 in the premises of respondent No.9 the inference was that<\/p>\n
negligence of respondent No.9 was in the course of Agency thereby<\/p>\n
making the Principal vicariously liable for such negligence. Reliance was<\/p>\n
also placed by the Commission upon the decision in M.S. Grewal &
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  14<\/span><\/p>\n
Another v. Deep Chand Sood & Others 2001 Supreme Court Cases<\/p>\n
(Criminal) 1426 and Kooragang Investments Pvt. Ltd. v. Richardson<\/p>\n
& Wrench Ltd. (1981) 3 AII ER 65 to hold that the liability of<\/p>\n
respondents No.4 and 5 could not be different from that of respondent<\/p>\n
No.9.\n<\/p>\n
          The Commission examined the question of negligence on the<\/p>\n
part of the Haryana Electricity Board also and on the basis of the<\/p>\n
evidence on the record, returned a specific finding to the effect that the<\/p>\n
officers of the Board were totally negligent in the discharge of their<\/p>\n
duties. The Commission held that there were two electric connections<\/p>\n
for the Marriage Palace and that although the sanctioned load was<\/p>\n
limited to 5.980 KW only, the owners of the Marriage Palace were found<\/p>\n
to be consuming 11.15 KW load, a fact that was established even in the<\/p>\n
investigation conducted by the Central Bureau of Investigation.        The<\/p>\n
Commission found that the terminal plate of the three-phase meter was<\/p>\n
intentionally left unsealed by the Junior Engineer, who had released the<\/p>\n
connection in favour of the owner of the Marriage Palace. This was<\/p>\n
done to facilitate illegal abstraction of electricity by the owners without<\/p>\n
making any payment to the Board.         It also recorded a finding that<\/p>\n
welding-set lying at the spot appeared to have been utilized by the<\/p>\n
owners for the construction of steel structures of the main hall and that<\/p>\n
no meter reading was recorded in regard to both the electric<\/p>\n
connections. The bills issued by the Board Authorities were also for very<\/p>\n
petty   amounts.   In   the   opinion   of   the   commission,   had    the<\/p>\n
officers\/officials of the Board been vigilant and had they checked the<\/p>\n
premises, things would have been entirely different and the incident in
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                15<\/span><\/p>\n
question may not have occurred. The Commission observed:<\/p>\n
                   “From the above, the negligence of the officials of<\/p>\n
                   the Board respondent No.6 is proved.         It is also<\/p>\n
                   proved that there were two electric connections<\/p>\n
                   installed in the Marriage Palace. One of the<\/p>\n
                   connections was Single-Phase while the other was<\/p>\n
                   a    Three-Phase       connection.     Although     the<\/p>\n
                   sanctioned load of Three-Phase connection was<\/p>\n
                   5.980 KW but the owners were found consuming<\/p>\n
                   11.10 KW load which was almost double the<\/p>\n
                   sanctioned load, which has clearly been established<\/p>\n
                   from the investigation of the C.B.I. as per their report<\/p>\n
                   Ex.P.1347\/1-DFT. It has also come in the C.B.I.<\/p>\n
                   Report that the meter terminal plate of the Three-<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   Phase meter was intentionally not sealed by the<\/p>\n
                   J.E., who had released the connection in favour of<\/p>\n
                   Kewal Krishan. This was done to facilitate undue<\/p>\n
                   consumption of the electricity by the owners without<\/p>\n
                   making any payment to the Board. It has also come<\/p>\n
                   in the evidence that the owners had taken the<\/p>\n
                   electric connection in the Pandal by unauthorisedly<\/p>\n
                   extending it from Three-Phase connection.          The<\/p>\n
                   welding-set lying there appears to have been<\/p>\n
                   utilized by the owners for the construction of steel<\/p>\n
                   structures of the main Hall. As stated above, no<\/p>\n
                   meter reading was taken and the bills for both the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              16<\/span><\/p>\n
                   electric connections were issued for very petty<\/p>\n
                   amount and even then no payment of the bills was<\/p>\n
                   ever made by the consumers. This further shows<\/p>\n
                   that the whole staff of the Board was in connivance<\/p>\n
                   with the owners. It has also been proved that four<\/p>\n
                   core of cable of the length of 66 meters was used by<\/p>\n
                   the J.E. against the instructions of the Board for the<\/p>\n
                   use of 30 meters cable only. The Meter Reader,<\/p>\n
                   Lineman, J.E. and other supporting staff of the<\/p>\n
                   Board were all highly negligent and not performing<\/p>\n
                   their duties   intentionally in connivance with the<\/p>\n
                   owners of the premises, where connection was<\/p>\n
                   released and even the higher officers also cannot<\/p>\n
                   escape the liability, because they (higher officers)<\/p>\n
                   also failed in the performance of their duties as they<\/p>\n
                   never cared to inspect the site and get matters<\/p>\n
                   straight particularly when the consumer was not<\/p>\n
                   making payment of any bill for a considerable long<\/p>\n
                   time. Had they been vigilant and checked the<\/p>\n
                   premises and other record of the Board with regard<\/p>\n
                   to the payment qua the bills, the things would have<\/p>\n
                   been entirely different and the incident would not<\/p>\n
                   have perhaps occurred. In this view of the matter,<\/p>\n
                   the respondent No.6 and its officials were extremely<\/p>\n
                   negligent in the performance of their duties and for<\/p>\n
                   which they are certainly liable. Since the negligence
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             17<\/span><\/p>\n
                   of the officials of the Board was in their public<\/p>\n
                   capacity as also in the discharge of their     public<\/p>\n
                   duties during the course of employment and they<\/p>\n
                   being employees of the Board, the respondent No.6<\/p>\n
                   i.e. The Board is vicariously liable for their<\/p>\n
                   negligence”. (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
         The Commission, on the above reasoning, found the officials<\/p>\n
of the Board to be negligent in the discharge of their duties and the<\/p>\n
Board to be vicariously liable for such negligence. Since the Board,<\/p>\n
during the intervening period, was converted into Dakshin Haryana Bijli<\/p>\n
Vitran Nigam, the Nigam was held liable for payment of compensation to<\/p>\n
the claimants. But keeping in view the fact that the Nigam was entirely<\/p>\n
controlled by the State Government, the Commission held the State of<\/p>\n
Haryana to be liable to pay the amount in the first instance and recover<\/p>\n
the same from the Nigam subsequently.\n<\/p>\n
         Dealing with the liability of the Municipal Committee, Dabwali,<\/p>\n
the Commission came to the conclusion that Rajiv Marriage Palace was<\/p>\n
constructed in complete violation of the sanctioned plans. No<\/p>\n
Completion Certificate was obtained by the owners and the building<\/p>\n
occupied without clearance from the Municipal Authorities. There were<\/p>\n
no fire fighting equipments nor any exit    gate except one that was<\/p>\n
barely 10X12 feet wide. The owners of the Marriage Palace had never<\/p>\n
obtained “No Objection Certificate” from the Fire Officer nor made any<\/p>\n
arrangement for fire fighting equipment and other such essential<\/p>\n
services before putting the Marriage Palace to use. The Commission<\/p>\n
observed:-\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                18<\/span><\/p>\n
                   “As stated by Shri Ramesh Chander, Assistant<\/p>\n
                   Engineer of the Municipal committee, he did not<\/p>\n
                   care to the inspect the site after the sanction of the<\/p>\n
                   building plan. He did not care to see as to whether<\/p>\n
                   the construction is being done according to the site<\/p>\n
                   plan and all the constructions made by the owners<\/p>\n
                   are according to the sanctioned site plan and that<\/p>\n
                   after completion of the construction, a completion<\/p>\n
                   certificate has been obtained or not and whether a<\/p>\n
                   ‘no objection certificate’ from the Fire Officer has<\/p>\n
                   been procured or not. In this view of the matter, the<\/p>\n
                   Municipal    Committee     (respondent    No.7)    was<\/p>\n
                   certainly negligent and so also respondents No.4 &<\/p>\n
                   5 alongwith them”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   XXX         XXX      XXX       XXX        XXX       XX<\/p>\n
                   “This further shows that the Municipal Committee<\/p>\n
                   was also negligent in so far as the maintenance and<\/p>\n
                   upkeep of its fire station and the presence of the<\/p>\n
                   officials at the Fire Station is concerned. It appears<\/p>\n
                   that the Municipal Committee perhaps had no<\/p>\n
                   control or supervision on the staff of its Fire Station,<\/p>\n
                   so much so, that even the Fire Station Officer was<\/p>\n
                   found to be on “furlough” at the time        when his<\/p>\n
                   presence was of utmost importance at the time of<\/p>\n
                   such an emergency”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         The Commission then summed up its findings regarding the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 19<\/span><\/p>\n
negligence of the Municipal Committee and its officials, in the following<\/p>\n
words:\n<\/p>\n
                    “It has also been held in this report that the officials<\/p>\n
                    of the Municipal Committee, who were duty bound<\/p>\n
                    to check the unauthorized construction in the town<\/p>\n
                    and the construction of the Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
                    according to the sanctioned plan, miserably failed in<\/p>\n
                    the discharge of their duties. Had the officials of the<\/p>\n
                    Municipal Committee taken due and timely care, the<\/p>\n
                    tragedy might have been minimized. It has been<\/p>\n
                    held above that the building of respondent No.9 was<\/p>\n
                    constructed in violation of the sanctioned plan; that<\/p>\n
                    no completion certificate was obtained by the<\/p>\n
                    owners of the building before occupying the same<\/p>\n
                    nor any fire fighting equipment was installed and<\/p>\n
                    there was only one gate of entry and exit of the size<\/p>\n
                    of 10′ x 12′. The Fire Officer of the Municipal<\/p>\n
                    Committee took no pains to see that the owners of<\/p>\n
                    the Marriage Palace had never obtained ‘No<\/p>\n
                    Objection Certificate’ from him nor made any<\/p>\n
                    arrangement for keeping fire-fighting equipment in<\/p>\n
                    the case of emergency. Under the circumstances<\/p>\n
                    and as held above the Municipal Committee<\/p>\n
                    (respondent No.7) and its officials were certainly<\/p>\n
                    negligent in the discharge of their duties”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Having regard to the gravity of the culpable negligence as also
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              20<\/span><\/p>\n
the involvement of the officials of the Municipal Committee in the non-<\/p>\n
observance of statutory requirements, the Commission held the<\/p>\n
Municipal Committee to be liable to pay compensation to the extent of<\/p>\n
5% of the whole amount and directed the said amount to be paid by the<\/p>\n
State Government on the ground that the latter was vicariously liable for<\/p>\n
the negligence of the former.\n<\/p>\n
         The Commission then examined whether the State of Haryana<\/p>\n
was liable to share the responsibility for the tragedy that occurred at<\/p>\n
Dabwali. Answering the question in the affirmative, the Commission held<\/p>\n
that Mr. M.P. Bidlan who happened to be the Head of the District<\/p>\n
Administration and was the Chief Guest for the function organized by<\/p>\n
the School did not take any care to see that proper arrangements for<\/p>\n
security, fire fighting equipment, ambulance and other public utility<\/p>\n
services were made for those who were invited to the function. The<\/p>\n
Commission rejected the explanation offered by Mr. Bidlan that such<\/p>\n
arrangements were not necessary to be made because the function was<\/p>\n
a private function. Relying upon the deposition of Mr.Norang Dass,<\/p>\n
Tehsildar, Dabwali, who was examined as a witness by respondents<\/p>\n
No.1 to 3, the Commission held that District Administration was duty<\/p>\n
bound to enforce and secure the enforcement of laws          relevant to<\/p>\n
various departments. It also held that the District Administration had to<\/p>\n
look after the security, safety and welfare of its citizens and that the<\/p>\n
Deputy Commissioner had agreed to be the Chief Guest at the function<\/p>\n
in discharge of a public duty and not in his private capacity, which fact<\/p>\n
was admitted even by Mr. Bidlan in his own deposition. The Commission<\/p>\n
relied upon the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer against Mr.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             21<\/span><\/p>\n
Bidlan, according to which the charge of dereliction of duty framed<\/p>\n
against Mr. Bidlan was proved. On the basis of the material on record<\/p>\n
comprising oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties, the<\/p>\n
Commission further held that Mr. Bidlan had left the place of incident<\/p>\n
hastily only to go to the security of a Police Station at Odhan some 28<\/p>\n
Kms. from Dabwali and had in the process, failed to discharge        his<\/p>\n
duties as the Head of the District Administration in which capacity he<\/p>\n
ought to have supervised the relief and rescue measures especially<\/p>\n
when people were crying for the same. The Commission also held that<\/p>\n
the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer regarding the charge of<\/p>\n
dereliction of duties by Mr. Bidlan and the imposition of penalty upon<\/p>\n
him were perfectly justified. The Commission noted that the Central<\/p>\n
Administrative Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, before whom the order of<\/p>\n
punishment imposed upon      Mr.Bidlan was assailed, had upheld the<\/p>\n
order of punishment. After discussing the deposition of eight witnesses<\/p>\n
examined by Mr. Bidlan in his defence, the Commission concluded as<\/p>\n
under:-\n<\/p>\n
                   “From the evidence of above witnesses examined<\/p>\n
                   by Shri M.P. Bidlan, he has tried to prove that he<\/p>\n
                   remained at the scene of occurrence for quite some<\/p>\n
                   time after the incident, tried to break the wall with<\/p>\n
                   the help of a tractor-trolley, sent for Haryana<\/p>\n
                   Roadways buses and also tried to use the telephone<\/p>\n
                   facility at Police Station Sadar, Dabwali and only<\/p>\n
                   thereafter, he went to Police Post, Odhan. But then<\/p>\n
                   it will be seen that no such plea has been taken by
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              22<\/span><\/p>\n
                   him anywhere in his written statement. Obviously,<\/p>\n
                   therefore, the entire evidence led by him in support<\/p>\n
                   of his contention is certainly beyond the pleadings<\/p>\n
                   and cannot be looked into . Moreover, it appears<\/p>\n
                   that all this evidence has been led by Shri M.P.<\/p>\n
                   Bidlan in order perhaps to build up some sort of<\/p>\n
                   defence in his departmental enquiry or for any other<\/p>\n
                   reason best known to him. In any case, this<\/p>\n
                   evidence does not help him in any manner in view<\/p>\n
                   of the findings of the Enquiry Officer Shri Dharam<\/p>\n
                   Vir and the punishment awarded to him by the<\/p>\n
                   Government of India and his challenge against the<\/p>\n
                   same    before the Central Administrative Tribunal,<\/p>\n
                   Chandigarh, also met with no success. A perusal of<\/p>\n
                   written statement filed by Shri M.P. Bidlan shows<\/p>\n
                   that he has throughout accused respondents No.4,<\/p>\n
                   5 and 9 for the tragedy and has asserted that the<\/p>\n
                   only   liability   for   compensation   falls   upon<\/p>\n
                   respondents No.1, 2, 3 i.e. the Union of India, the<\/p>\n
                   State of Haryana and the Secretary Health and<\/p>\n
                   respondent No.9 besides respondents No.4 & 5.<\/p>\n
                   The only plea taken by him in the prayer clause of<\/p>\n
                   his written statement is that he never fled away from<\/p>\n
                   the place of incident and there is absolutely nothing<\/p>\n
                   against him as alleged by the claimants. It is thus<\/p>\n
                   evident that no such plea has been raised by him in
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                       23<\/span><\/p>\n
                   his written statement that he stayed at the scene of<\/p>\n
                   occurrence for quite some time, asked a driver of<\/p>\n
                   tractor-trolley to demolish the wall, sent directions to<\/p>\n
                   the Haryana Roadways Workshop for sending<\/p>\n
                   buses, went to Police Station Sadar, Dabwali and<\/p>\n
                   when all these efforts failed, he went to Police Post<\/p>\n
                   Odhan to do the needful. The evidence led by Shri<\/p>\n
                   M.P. Bidlan cannot, therefore, be looked into and is<\/p>\n
                   of no assistance to him in the absence of any plea in<\/p>\n
                   any of his written statements. As per his own<\/p>\n
                   statement, Shri M.P. Bidlan had already put in 21<\/p>\n
                   years of service at that time, firstly as a Haryana<\/p>\n
                   Civil Service Officer for 13 years and thereafter, an<\/p>\n
                   Officer of the I.A.S. For the last about 8 years. Being<\/p>\n
                   an   officer        having    21    years     administrative<\/p>\n
                   experience, it is indeed extremely sad to see that<\/p>\n
                   Shri Bidlan did not rise to the occasion and instead<\/p>\n
                   of taking control of the entire situation created by the<\/p>\n
                   unfortunate fire incident, chose to run away from the<\/p>\n
                   site only to take breath at a distance of 28 Kms.<\/p>\n
                   from Dabwali at Odhan. The conduct of Shri M.P.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   Bidlan was indeed most reprehensible and certainly<\/p>\n
                   deserves censure and for which he has been rightly<\/p>\n
                   penalized      by    the     Appropriate    Authority.   The<\/p>\n
                   evidence led by him does not, in any manner,<\/p>\n
                   absolve him of the responsibility that fell upon him
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 24<\/span><\/p>\n
                    on account of the fire incident. An officer of such a<\/p>\n
                    long   administrative    experience     should    have<\/p>\n
                    remained at the spot and organized the rescue<\/p>\n
                    operations, particularly when his Sub Divisional<\/p>\n
                    Officer had died in the fire incident while the Deputy<\/p>\n
                    Superintendent of Police had received        extensive<\/p>\n
                    burns and there was no Senior Officer except him<\/p>\n
                    on the spot at that time”. (emphasis is ours)<\/p>\n
          The Commission further held that the version given by Mr.<\/p>\n
Bidlan that a large mob had gathered in front of Police Station Sadar<\/p>\n
Dabwali did not lend any support to the plea of innocence set up by him.<\/p>\n
It was, according to the Commission, all the more necessary for the<\/p>\n
Deputy Commissioner, who had long administrative experience, to stay<\/p>\n
put at Dabwali having regard to the extremely grave situation that had<\/p>\n
arisen out of the incident. The Commission held that when Mr. Bidlan<\/p>\n
left the place of occurrence, there was no responsible civil or police<\/p>\n
officer to take charge of the situation that had been created by the<\/p>\n
incident. He did not contact the local officers nor left any instructions<\/p>\n
before leaving the site although the Tehsildar, Dabwali was very much<\/p>\n
there, whose services could have been utilized by him. The Commission<\/p>\n
finally concluded as under:-\n<\/p>\n
                    “From the entire material on the record, it is clearly<\/p>\n
                    established that Shri M.P. Bidlan was certainly<\/p>\n
                    negligent in the discharge of his duties as Head of<\/p>\n
                    the District Administration and he is, therefore,<\/p>\n
                    liable for the negligence on his part and for his act of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                      25<\/span><\/p>\n
                     omission to perform his duties as Head of the<\/p>\n
                     District   Administration       being       the   Deputy<\/p>\n
                     Commissioner of the District. Since Shri Bidlan was<\/p>\n
                     present as Chief Guest at the function in his public<\/p>\n
                     capacity as also in the discharge of his public duties<\/p>\n
                     during the course of employment and was an<\/p>\n
                     employee of the State Government, only the<\/p>\n
                     Haryana State Government respondent No.2 is<\/p>\n
                     ‘vicariously’ liable for his negligence”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          The vicarious liability of the State Government was, on<\/p>\n
account of the neglect on the part of its officer Mr. Bidlan           in the<\/p>\n
discharge of his duties properly, fixed at 10% of the amount awarded to<\/p>\n
the victims and their legal representatives. The Commission observed:-<\/p>\n
                     “Having regard to the degree of negligence on the<\/p>\n
                     part of Shri Bidlan in the discharge of his public<\/p>\n
                     duties as public servant during the course of<\/p>\n
                     employment and being an employee of the State<\/p>\n
                     Government, it is held that the Haryana State<\/p>\n
                     Government (respondent No.2) shall be vicariously<\/p>\n
                     liable for his negligence and as such it is held that it<\/p>\n
                     shall be liable to pay compensation to the extent of<\/p>\n
                     Ten Percent of the whole”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          For the purpose of award of compensation, the Commission<\/p>\n
categorized the claim petitions into following six distinct categories:-<\/p>\n
          1)         Death cases involving children between the age<\/p>\n
                     group of one month to ten years;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                26<\/span><\/p>\n
\n<\/blockquote>\n
          2)        Death cases involving        children between the age<\/p>\n
                    group of ten to fifteen years;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          3)        Death cases involving        children between the age<\/p>\n
                    group of sixteen to twenty two years;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          4)        Death   cases    involving       housewives   including<\/p>\n
                    working women;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          5)        Death cases involving working men; And\n\n          6)        Claims based on injuries sustained by the victims\n\n                    men, women and children.\n\nCategory 1 Cases\n\n<\/pre>\n
          In so far as death cases involving children between the age<\/p>\n
group of one month to ten years, the Commission relying upon the<\/p>\n
decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in C.K.Subramonia Iyer &<\/p>\n
Others v. T.Kunhikuttan Nair & Others AIR<\/a> 1970 Supreme Court<\/p>\n
376, New India Assurance Company Limited v. Satender & Others<\/a><\/p>\n
2007 (1) Civil Court Cases 255 (SC), Lata Wadhwa & Others v.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
State of Bihar & Others (2001) 8 Supreme Court Cases 197, M.S.<\/p>\n
Grewal & Another v. Deep Chand Sood & Others<\/a> 2001 Supreme<\/p>\n
Court Cases (Criminal) 1426, awarded to the parents\/next of kin of<\/p>\n
each child killed in the incident, a lump sum amount of Rs.2,00,000\/-<\/p>\n
towards compensation. It is noteworthy that majority of the victims fell in<\/p>\n
this category, as out of a total of four hundred and forty six dead, 172<\/p>\n
happened to be children in the age group of one month to ten years.<\/p>\n
Category 2 Cases<\/p>\n
          In the case of children in the age group of 10 to 15 years,
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                27<\/span><\/p>\n
numbering in all 38, the Commission relying upon the decisions referred<\/p>\n
to earlier, awarded a sum of Rs.4,10,000\/- per child killed in the incident<\/p>\n
and apportioned the same between the parents\/legal representatives of<\/p>\n
the deceased.\n<\/p>\n
Category 3 Cases<\/p>\n
          In the case of 20 children who lost their lives and fell in the<\/p>\n
age group of 16 to 22 years, the Commission awarded a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.5,00,000\/- for each child killed in the unfortunate incident and<\/p>\n
apportioned the amount of compensation suitably among those<\/p>\n
claiming the same.\n<\/p>\n
Category 4 Cases<\/p>\n
          As regards 136 house wives that included 47 working women<\/p>\n
killed in the fire incident, the Commission awarded compensation that<\/p>\n
ranged between Rs.44,000\/- to Rs.10,82,000\/- depending upon the<\/p>\n
facts and circumstances of each case which facts have been discussed<\/p>\n
by the Commission at considerable length. The amount of award has<\/p>\n
also been apportioned by the Commission              suitably among the<\/p>\n
claimants. It is noteworthy that out of 47 working women nine victims<\/p>\n
who were killed in the incident were unmarried and were working with<\/p>\n
the DAV School on meager salaries offered to them. It is ironical that<\/p>\n
while in the case of children in the age group of 16 to 22 years, the<\/p>\n
Commission awarded Rs.5,00,000\/- per child killed, in the case of nine<\/p>\n
young unmarried girls, who were working in the School, the<\/p>\n
compensation awarded ranges between Rs.44,000\/- to Rs.2,30,000\/-<\/p>\n
only. The petitioners\/claimants have made a grievance against this<\/p>\n
anamolous situation and claimed enhancement of the compensation
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               28<\/span><\/p>\n
awarded to the parents\/next of kin of these nine victims by treating the<\/p>\n
victims as children in age group of 16-22 years. We shall presently<\/p>\n
examine that aspect when we come to the question of enhancement of<\/p>\n
the amount of compensation.\n<\/p>\n
Category 5 Cases<\/p>\n
          In so far as working men are concerned, the Commission<\/p>\n
determined compensation payable to the legal representatives of the<\/p>\n
victims ranging between Rs.61,200\/- to Rs.16,11,000\/- depending upon<\/p>\n
the income which the deceased was earning and the multiplier that was<\/p>\n
applicable to the case at hand.\n<\/p>\n
Category 6 Cases<\/p>\n
          In 88 cases of injured men, women and children, the<\/p>\n
Commission has adopted a method of awarding compensation based<\/p>\n
on the extent of disability that was suffered by the victims. For a better<\/p>\n
understanding of the method adopted by the Commission, we may<\/p>\n
present the picture emerging from the recommendations of the<\/p>\n
Commission in the following tabular form:-<\/p>\n
\n\nS.No. No.       of   victims Extent of Disability Amount               of\n      comprising       men,                       compensation\n      women and children                          ranging from\n      who suffered disability\n      on account of burn\n      injuries.\n   1               29                1% to 10%       Rs.2,00,000\/-\n                                                     except in case of\n                                                     one        person\n                                                     namely Surinder\n                                                     Pal Kaur alias\n                                                     Chhinder Pal Kaur\n                                                     who has been\n                                                     awarded\n                                                     Rs.1,00,000\/-.\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  29<\/span>\n\n\n\n\nS.No. No.       of   victims Extent of Disability Amount                of\n      comprising       men,                       compensation\n      women and children                          ranging from\n      who suffered disability\n      on account of burn\n      injuries.\n     2               8                 11% to 20%      Rs.2,50,000\/-    to\n                                                       Rs.6,00,000\/-\n     3               9                 21% to 30%      Rs.3,50,000\/-    to\n                                                       Rs.6,00,000\/-\n     4               12                31% to 40%      Rs.3,00,000\/-    to\n                                                       Rs.6,50,000\/-\n     5               7                 41% to 50%      Rs.3,25,000\/-    to\n                                                       Rs.6,50,000\/-\n     6               4                 51% to 60%      Rs.5,00,000\/-    to\n                                                       Rs.5,50,000\/-\n     7               3                 61% to 70%      Rs.4,00,000\/-    to\n                                                       Rs.6,50,000\/-\n     8               3                 71% to 80%      Rs.7,00,000\/-    to\n                                                       Rs.8,00,000\/-\n     9               3                 81% to 90%      Rs.8,00,000\/-\n                                                       each\n     10              1                 91% to 99%      Rs.15,00,000\/-\n     11              9                  100.00%        Rs.10,00,000\/-   to\n                                                       Rs.16,00,000\/-\n\n<\/pre>\n
          Learned counsel for the parties have filed their objections to<\/p>\n
the report and recommendations made by the Commission. We may<\/p>\n
briefly refer to the said objections before proceeding further.<\/p>\n
          The Association and the victims have inter-alia raised the<\/p>\n
following objections to the report:-\n<\/p>\n
I)        The Commission committed an error in determining the<\/p>\n
          amount of compensation payable in death cases involving<\/p>\n
          children by following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme<\/p>\n
          Court in       Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) stricto senso. The<\/p>\n
          Commission        overlooked the   fact that the amount of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                30<\/span><\/p>\n
           compensation awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) for<\/p>\n
           the children was determined on the basis of the price index<\/p>\n
           then prevailing. The incident in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)<\/p>\n
           having taken place on 3.3.1989 could not possibly provide a<\/p>\n
           sound basis for awarding compensation in a claim arising out<\/p>\n
           of an accident that took place seven years later on 23.12.1995<\/p>\n
           without adding to the amount awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s<\/p>\n
           case (supra) the component of price escalation based on the<\/p>\n
           National Price Index. In support of its claim for higher amount<\/p>\n
           of compensation, the petitioner-Association has filed a<\/p>\n
           separate calculation chart indicating the amount which the<\/p>\n
           claimants would be entitled to after taking into consideration<\/p>\n
           the Price Index. According to this chart, the compensation<\/p>\n
           payable to the claimants for children of different age groups<\/p>\n
           would be as under:\n<\/p>\n
S. No. Age Group Amount awarded by Amount claimed by the
\n       of Children the Commission on Petitioner-Association
\n                   the basis of Lata
\n                   Wadhwa’s case
\n      1   One month        Rs.2,00,000\/-             Rs.3,57,000\/-\n<\/p>\n
          to ten years
\n      2   Ten to    15     Rs.4,10,000\/-             Rs.7,33,684\/-\n<\/p>\n
          years
\n      3   15 to     22     Rs.5,00,000\/-             Rs.8,94,736\/-\n<\/p>\n
          years<\/p>\n
II)        The petitioner-Association has also found fault with the award<\/p>\n
           of compensation by the Commission in the case of<\/p>\n
           housewives. According to it, the Commission committed a<\/p>\n
           mistake in ignoring the very essence of the decision in Lata
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              31<\/span><\/p>\n
         Wadhwa’s case (supra), where the contribution of a<\/p>\n
         housewife was assessed by their Lordships at Rs.3,000\/- per<\/p>\n
         month.    The   Commission     has,   while   accepting   that<\/p>\n
         contribution in the form of services rendered by the<\/p>\n
         housewives to their families wrongly deducted 1\/3rd towards<\/p>\n
         expenses of the victim on herself. This was not, according to<\/p>\n
         the petitioner-Association, permissible having regard to the<\/p>\n
         fact that the Supreme Court had determined Rs.3,000\/- per<\/p>\n
         month to be the value of the contribution of the housewives to<\/p>\n
         their families. No deduction towards personal expenses was<\/p>\n
         permissible out of the said contribution nor was any made by<\/p>\n
         their Lordships. The Commission, thus, fell in error in taking<\/p>\n
         the multiplicand at Rs.24,000\/- per annum instead of<\/p>\n
         Rs.36,000\/- per year. The petitioner-Association has further<\/p>\n
         asserted that the value of the contribution made by the<\/p>\n
         deceased housewives ought to be proportionately raised to a<\/p>\n
         higher figure having regard to the increase in the price index<\/p>\n
         for the period between 1989 and 1995. According to the<\/p>\n
         petitioner-Association, the multiplicand, after taking into<\/p>\n
         consideration the escalation in the Price Index, could be<\/p>\n
         determined at Rs.64,424\/- for all housewives except the<\/p>\n
         elderly ones between the age group of 62 to 72 years, qua<\/p>\n
         whom the multiplicand would come to Rs.35,789\/- as for that<\/p>\n
         category of cases the Supreme Court had determined the<\/p>\n
         contribution towards family to be Rs.20,000\/- per annum only<\/p>\n
         which could, on the basis of price index, be taken as
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                32<\/span><\/p>\n
         Rs.35,789\/-. It is noteworthy that in both these cases namely<\/p>\n
         housewives and the elderly women, the petitioner-Association<\/p>\n
         or the claimants have not found any fault with the multiplier<\/p>\n
         chosen by the Commission while determining the amount of<\/p>\n
         compensation.\n<\/p>\n
III)     The conventional figure of Rs.50,000\/- awarded by the<\/p>\n
         Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra),<\/p>\n
         ought to be enhanced.       According to the claimants, after<\/p>\n
         taking into consideration the Price Index, the said amount<\/p>\n
         could be fixed at Rs.89,473\/- per person killed in the incident.<\/p>\n
IV)      The petitioner-Association has also questioned the amount of<\/p>\n
         compensation determined by the Commission qua nine young<\/p>\n
         working girls in regard to whom the Commission has<\/p>\n
         recommended different amounts of compensation ranging<\/p>\n
         between Rs.44,000\/- to Rs.2,88,000\/- depending upon the<\/p>\n
         evidence that was adduced to prove their monthly income.<\/p>\n
         According to the petitioner-Association and the claimants, the<\/p>\n
         award of compensation for such young victims of the tragedy<\/p>\n
         could be more logically determined and awarded as in the<\/p>\n
         case of children in the age group of 15-22 years. The<\/p>\n
         approach adopted by the Commission in fixing a lower amount<\/p>\n
         of compensation for working young girls has brought about an<\/p>\n
         anomaly as those who were working at the time of tragedy<\/p>\n
         would leave behind lesser amount for payment to their legal<\/p>\n
         representatives than those who were not. The fact that young<\/p>\n
         girls were working on the date of the incident could not, it is
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                    33<\/span><\/p>\n
         asserted,    become     a   disadvantage     in   the    matter      of<\/p>\n
         determination of compensation. The amount in DFT Nos. 6,<\/p>\n
         55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63 and 342 would, thus, require to be<\/p>\n
         enhanced suitably so as to be equivalent to the amount paid<\/p>\n
         for non-working girls in the age group of 15 to 22 years.<\/p>\n
V)       The petitioner-Association has also found fault with the<\/p>\n
         amount of compensation determined in favour of legal<\/p>\n
         representatives of deceased working        women, 38 of whom<\/p>\n
         had fallen victim to the tragedy. Most of them were, according<\/p>\n
         to the Association, working as Teachers in the DAV School.<\/p>\n
         Some of them were working even in Government Schools as<\/p>\n
         Teachers. The salaries received by these working women<\/p>\n
         ranged between Rs.1,800\/- per annum to Rs.81,600\/- per<\/p>\n
         annum.      The   petitioner-Association    states      that    while<\/p>\n
         determining the compensation             payable to the legal<\/p>\n
         representatives of these victims, the Commission has not<\/p>\n
         taken into consideration their future prospects and proceeded<\/p>\n
         to   determine the amount of compensation entirely on the<\/p>\n
         basis of the amount they were receiving as salaries on the<\/p>\n
         date of the incident. Relying upon the decision of the<\/p>\n
         Supreme Court in Kerala State Transport Corporation v.<\/p>\n
         Susama Thomas<\/a> 1994(2) PLR 1, the Association asserts that<\/p>\n
         the Commission ought to have taken into consideration future<\/p>\n
         prospects    of   the   victims   also   while    determining     the<\/p>\n
         multiplicand. Notably learned counsel did not question the<\/p>\n
         correctness of the multiplier chosen by the Commission qua
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                34<\/span><\/p>\n
         these claims also.         The Association asserts that the<\/p>\n
         conventional figure of Rs.50,000\/- has not been awarded in<\/p>\n
         the above cases which ought to be awarded taking into<\/p>\n
         consideration the escalation in the price index.<\/p>\n
                     It is also asserted by the petitioner-Association that<\/p>\n
         apart from the amount quantified on the basis of multiplier<\/p>\n
         method evolved in Susama Thomas’s case (supra) the<\/p>\n
         claimants     were   entitled   to   an   additional   amount    of<\/p>\n
         compensation on account of the loss of contribution which<\/p>\n
         such working women made in terms of services rendered by<\/p>\n
         them to the family. The Association argues that while in the<\/p>\n
         case of housewives, the Supreme Court has quantified the<\/p>\n
         said amount at Rs.36,000\/- per annum in the case of working<\/p>\n
         women the said amount could be awarded over and above<\/p>\n
         the amount quantified on the basis of the multiplier method as<\/p>\n
         it was not disputed that working women were apart from<\/p>\n
         supplementing the family income contributing in terms of<\/p>\n
         services rendered to their families which could also be<\/p>\n
         quantified.\n<\/p>\n
VI)      The same line of reasoning is urged by the petitioner-<\/p>\n
         Association in cases arising out of death of working men. The<\/p>\n
         Association finds fault with the failure of the Commission in not<\/p>\n
         taking the future prospects into consideration in the said<\/p>\n
         cases.   No conventional amount has been awarded to the<\/p>\n
         claimants in cases involving death of working men.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
VII)     In injury cases also, the claimants have found fault with the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              35<\/span><\/p>\n
         amount awarded in their favour and prayed for enhancement<\/p>\n
         of the said amounts on several grounds.\n<\/p>\n
         The respondents have also filed their objections to the report<\/p>\n
submitted by the One Man Commission and questioned the findings as<\/p>\n
also the extent of liability fastened upon them. The objections filed by<\/p>\n
respondents No.4 and 5 upon whom the liability to pay has been fixed to<\/p>\n
the extent   of 80% of the amount awarded by          the Commission,<\/p>\n
challenge the final report of the Commission not only regarding the<\/p>\n
entitlement of some of the claimants to claim compensation but even the<\/p>\n
determination of the negligence of the parties and the apportionment of<\/p>\n
the liability arising out of the same among them. The objections assail<\/p>\n
even the quantum of compensation awarded to the claimants by the<\/p>\n
Commission. The case of these respondents is that they were not<\/p>\n
negligent in any manner and that no responsibility for the incident can<\/p>\n
be fixed upon them. According to these respondents, there was no<\/p>\n
statutory duty cast on them to take any preventive measures towards<\/p>\n
safety etc. nor was there any duty cast on them to take any other<\/p>\n
measures which, if taken, would have prevented the fire tragedy. The<\/p>\n
respondents allege that the statutory duty to provide measures, enforce<\/p>\n
compliance with the said measures regarding        safety of the victims<\/p>\n
including compliance with the building bye-laws by the owners of the<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace, regulation of electric supply etc.    was that of the<\/p>\n
Municipal Committee, Dabwali, and\/or Haryana State Electricity Board.<\/p>\n
It was also the duty of the Marriage Palace Owners to ensure<\/p>\n
compliance with safety measures required for safety of any visitor\/guest<\/p>\n
entering such a public place.     Relying upon the provisions of the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   36<\/span><\/p>\n
Haryana Municipal Act, 1973, Haryana Municipal Building Bye-laws,<\/p>\n
1982, Haryana Municipal (Dangerous and Offensive Trades) Bye-laws,<\/p>\n
1982,   Haryana Municipal (Formation and Working of Fire Brigade)<\/p>\n
Rules, 1985, Indian Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 and Indian Electricity<\/p>\n
Rules, 1956, the respondents have tried to absolve themselves of their<\/p>\n
responsibility for the tragedy while accusing the statutory and public<\/p>\n
authorities of negligence in the performance of what, according to these<\/p>\n
respondents, were statutory duties cast upon them.<\/p>\n
          In the reply to the claim for enhancement of compensation<\/p>\n
payable to the victims, respondents No.4 and 5 have inter-alia alleged<\/p>\n
that the award of compensation in the case of children was on the basis<\/p>\n
of   consensus arrived at between learned counsel for the parties<\/p>\n
appearing before the Commission. Compensation in the case of children<\/p>\n
was, on that basis, awarded at the rate of Rs.2,00,000\/-, Rs.4,10,000\/-<\/p>\n
and Rs.5,00,000\/- in the three age groups of children between one<\/p>\n
month to ten years, ten to 15 years, and 16 to 22 years, respectively.<\/p>\n
The respondents argued that since the award of compensation was<\/p>\n
consensual qua the claims arising out of death of children, neither the<\/p>\n
petitioner-Association nor the claimants could seek any enhancement of<\/p>\n
the same.\n<\/p>\n
          The   respondents     further   assert   that   the   claim    for<\/p>\n
enhancement in death cases involving housewives was also not justified<\/p>\n
and that deduction of 1\/3rd of the amount in terms of the second<\/p>\n
Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act by application of a suitable multiplier<\/p>\n
was legally correct. It is also alleged that compensation awarded was<\/p>\n
excessive. The decision in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) is even
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 37<\/span><\/p>\n
otherwise not applicable as the same is, according to the respondents,<\/p>\n
based on a concession made before the Apex Court. It is also<\/p>\n
contended that the One Man Commission could award compensation<\/p>\n
taking the income of housewives to be Rs.15,000\/- per annum keeping<\/p>\n
in view the second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and not<\/p>\n
on the assumption that the income of the deceased housewives was<\/p>\n
Rs.3,000\/- per month.\n<\/p>\n
          The claim for enhancement made in the case of working men,<\/p>\n
killed in the incident, has also been disputed by the respondents as the<\/p>\n
amount already awarded is, according to them, just and reasonable<\/p>\n
having regard to the evidence adduced on behalf of the claimants. The<\/p>\n
claim regarding future prospects is disputed by the respondents on the<\/p>\n
ground that there was no evidence to support any such claim. In the<\/p>\n
claims arising out of injury cases, the respondents have questioned the<\/p>\n
award of compensation by the Commission on the ground that the same<\/p>\n
is highly excessive and unsustainable. It is alleged that the question of<\/p>\n
taking future prospects into consideration in cases where the<\/p>\n
compensation is awarded on the basis of multiplier method does not<\/p>\n
arise.\n<\/p>\n
          Objections to the Commission’s report have been filed even by<\/p>\n
the Haryana Electricity Board, now known as Dakshin Haryana Bijli<\/p>\n
Vitran Nigam Limited. It is inter-alia alleged that the incident in question<\/p>\n
had occurred during a period when there was a regular power cut from<\/p>\n
11.20 A.M. To 12.20 P.M. and that the power supply by the Board was<\/p>\n
in no way responsible for the unfortunate incident. The findings recorded<\/p>\n
by the Commission suggesting negligence on the part of the officers of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   38<\/span><\/p>\n
the Board have also been assailed by the Nigam.\n<\/p>\n
          The Municipal Committee, Dabwali, has also similarly filed<\/p>\n
objections and assailed the findings recorded by the commission that<\/p>\n
the Committee and its employees were also to an extent responsible for<\/p>\n
the occurrence leading to a large scale human tragedy, hence liable to<\/p>\n
pay compensation to the claimants.\n<\/p>\n
          State of Haryana has not filed any objections to the findings<\/p>\n
recorded by the Commission. Objections, however, have been filed to<\/p>\n
the prayer for enhancement of compensation made by the petitioner and<\/p>\n
the claimants in which it is alleged that the prayer for enhancement is<\/p>\n
not justified as the Commission          has determined the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation payable to the victims in a fair and reasonable manner.<\/p>\n
          We have heard learned counsel for the parties at considerable<\/p>\n
length. We have also been taken through the material on record<\/p>\n
including the depositions recorded before the Commission. The<\/p>\n
following questions, in our opinion, fall for determination:<\/p>\n
          1)         Whether the findings of fact recorded by the One<\/p>\n
                     Man Commission of Inquiry regarding the genesis of<\/p>\n
                     the fire incident and the concomitant       negligence<\/p>\n
                     leading to 446 deaths and injuries to 200 suffer from<\/p>\n
                     any error of law or perversity to warrant interference<\/p>\n
                     from this Court?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          2)         If answer to Question No.1 above is in the negative,<\/p>\n
                     was the Commission of Inquiry legally correct in<\/p>\n
                     holding that respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
                     was    an   Agent    of   the   D.A.V.    School   and
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   39<\/span><\/p>\n
                    Management Committee, respondents No.4 and 5,<\/p>\n
                    so as to render the later vicariously liable for the<\/p>\n
                    acts of negligence committed by the former?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
         3)         Is the apportionment of the responsibility and<\/p>\n
                    negligence for the fire tragedy in question and the<\/p>\n
                    liability flowing from the same fair and reasonable<\/p>\n
                    having regard to the acts         of omission and<\/p>\n
                    commission and the role played by each one of<\/p>\n
                    those held responsible for the incident?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
         4)         Are the claimants entitled to seek enhancement in<\/p>\n
                    the payment of compensation in the light of the<\/p>\n
                    consensus allegedly arrived at before the One Man<\/p>\n
                    Commission?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         5)         In case, answer to question No.3 is in the<\/p>\n
                    affirmative, what is the extent of enhancement to<\/p>\n
                    which the petitioner and claimants are entitled in<\/p>\n
                    each category and\/or claim petition filed by them<\/p>\n
                    before the Commission and on what basis?<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
         6)         To what other reliefs are the claimants entitled?<\/p>\n
         We shall deal with the above questions ad seriatim.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
Re: Question No.1<\/p>\n
         Before we examine whether the findings of fact recorded by<\/p>\n
the Commission suffer from any error or perversity, we may briefly<\/p>\n
discuss the legal purport of what in law constitutes negligence in the<\/p>\n
realm of actionable tort. The term negligence has not been given a<\/p>\n
statutory definition. Black’s Law Dictionary, however, describes
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                      40<\/span><\/p>\n
negligence to mean:-\n<\/p>\n
                   “The failure to exercise the standard of care that a<\/p>\n
                   reasonably prudent person would have exercised in<\/p>\n
                   a similar situation; any conduct that falls below the<\/p>\n
                   legal standard established to protect others against<\/p>\n
                   unreasonable risk of harm, except for conduct that is<\/p>\n
                   intentionally, wantonly, or willfully disregardful of<\/p>\n
                   others’ rights”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Judicial pronouncements have similarly described negligence<\/p>\n
to mean the breach of a duty caused by the omission to do something<\/p>\n
which a reasonable man guided by those considerations which ordinarily<\/p>\n
regulate the conduct of a person would do or not do. One of the earliest<\/p>\n
pronouncements as to the meaning of negligence came from the House<\/p>\n
of Lords in Donoghue Vs. Stevenson (1932) AC 562 (HL) where Lord<\/p>\n
MACMILLAN summed up the legal purport of negligence in the following<\/p>\n
words:-\n<\/p>\n
                       “The law takes no cognizance of carelessness in<\/p>\n
                       the abstract. It concerns itself with carelessness<\/p>\n
                       only where there is a duty to take care and where<\/p>\n
                       failure in that duty has caused damage. In such<\/p>\n
                       circumstances carelessness assumes the legal<\/p>\n
                       quality   of    negligence     and        entails    the<\/p>\n
                       consequences in law of negligence.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                       XXX        XXX        XXX       XXX            XXX<\/p>\n
                       The cardinal principle of liability is that the party<\/p>\n
                       complained     of   should   owe     to     the     party
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               41<\/span><\/p>\n
                      complaining a duty to take care, and that the party<\/p>\n
                      complaining should be able to prove that he has<\/p>\n
                      suffered damage in consequence of a breach of<\/p>\n
                      that duty”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Lord ATKIN who delivered a separate opinion in the above<\/p>\n
case summarized the legal approach to be adopted in the case of<\/p>\n
negligence thus:-\n<\/p>\n
                      “You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or<\/p>\n
                      omission which you can reasonably foresee<\/p>\n
                      would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who,<\/p>\n
                      then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems<\/p>\n
                      to be , persons who are so closely and directly<\/p>\n
                      affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have<\/p>\n
                      them in contemplations as being so affected when<\/p>\n
                      I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions<\/p>\n
                      which are called in question.”<\/p>\n
         The above view was affirmed by the House of Lords in Home<\/p>\n
Office Vs. Dorset Yacht Co. Limited (1970) 2 All England Reports<\/p>\n
294 (HL). Later decisions that were delivered by English Courts and the<\/p>\n
Courts in this Country limit the “proximity principle” to persons to whom<\/p>\n
the defendant owes a duty referred to by Lord ATKIN as neighbours. At<\/p>\n
the bottom of the principle of proximity, thus, lies a relationship the<\/p>\n
nature whereof makes it reasonable to impose a liability in negligence.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
The relationship ought to be such as would in justice and fairness make<\/p>\n
it reasonable for the defendant to keep the plaintiff in contemplation<\/p>\n
while doing the act giving rise to the claim. The Principle of Proximity
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  42<\/span><\/p>\n
does not have anything to do with physical proximity, as for instance in<\/p>\n
Donoghue’s case (supra) the manufacturer had no proximity with the<\/p>\n
consumer of the product and yet it was held that the manufacturer owed<\/p>\n
a duty to the consumer.\n<\/p>\n
          Clerk and Lindsell on Torts (The Common Law Library<\/p>\n
No.3) (16th Edition) London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1989 while dealing<\/p>\n
with “Duty of Care Situation” states that no action lies in negligence<\/p>\n
unless there is damage. In cases of personal injuries, damage used to<\/p>\n
be understood to have been inflicted when injury was sustained by the<\/p>\n
plaintiff. The duty in negligence, therefore, is not simply a duty not to act<\/p>\n
carelessly, it is a duty not to inflict damage carelessly. Since damage is<\/p>\n
the gist of the action, what is meant by “duty of care situation” is that it<\/p>\n
has to be shown that the Courts recognize as actionable the careless<\/p>\n
infliction of the kind of damage of which the plaintiff complains, on the<\/p>\n
type of person to which he belongs and by the type of person to which<\/p>\n
the defendant belongs.\n<\/p>\n
          Reference may also be made to a Division Bench decision of<\/p>\n
High Court of Karnataka in M.N. Rajan and Others v. Konnali Khalid<\/p>\n
Haji and Another, III (2004) Accident & Compensation Cases 272, in<\/p>\n
which the Court held that in a case based on tort by negligence, it was<\/p>\n
imperative for the Court first to determine whether the defendant was<\/p>\n
under a legal duty to take care and whether there was sufficient reason<\/p>\n
of proximity between the defendant and plaintiff. In answering that<\/p>\n
question, the Court has to apply the test of foresight of a reasonable<\/p>\n
person to examine whether the injury to the plaintiff was reasonably<\/p>\n
foreseeable as a consequence of the defendant’s acts of omission or
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  43<\/span><\/p>\n
commission. In Southern Portland Cement Limited              Vs. Cooper<\/p>\n
(1974) 1 ALL     ER 87, the court declared that in cases of tort by<\/p>\n
negligence the test applicable is the foresight of a reasonable man and<\/p>\n
not the hindsight of the Court for it is easy to become wiser after the<\/p>\n
event.\n<\/p>\n
          There is sufficient authority for the proposition that a public<\/p>\n
school educator’s relationship to his\/her student is one of those<\/p>\n
relationships in which one party (the educator) owes a duty to the other<\/p>\n
party (the student). In the context of “principle of proximity”, the Courts<\/p>\n
have had several occasions to pronounce whether the School owes any<\/p>\n
duty towards its students in terms of the care that need be taken for their<\/p>\n
safety. In Virna Mirand et al. v. City of New York and Board of<\/p>\n
Education of the City of New York 92 Ed. Law Rep. 957, it was held:-<\/p>\n
                    “A teacher owes it to his or her charges to exercise<\/p>\n
                    such care of them as a parent of ordinary prudence<\/p>\n
                    would observe in comparable circumstances; duty<\/p>\n
                    owed derives from simple fact that school, in<\/p>\n
                    assuming      physical   custody   and   control   over<\/p>\n
                    students, effectively takes place of parents and<\/p>\n
                    guardians”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          In M.S. Grewal’s case (supra), one of the questions that fell<\/p>\n
for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether the School<\/p>\n
owed any duty of care towards its students on the principle of proximity<\/p>\n
of relationship. Answering the question in the affirmative, their Lordships<\/p>\n
observed:-\n<\/p>\n
                    “Duty of care varies from situation to situation-
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 44<\/span><\/p>\n
                   whereas it would be the duty of the teacher to<\/p>\n
                   supervise the children in the playground but the<\/p>\n
                   supervision, as the children leave the school, may<\/p>\n
                   not be required in the same degree as is in the play<\/p>\n
                   field. While it is true that if the students are taken to<\/p>\n
                   another school building for participation in certain<\/p>\n
                   games, it is sufficient exercise of diligence to know<\/p>\n
                   that the premises are otherwise safe and secure but<\/p>\n
                   undoubtedly if the students are taken out to<\/p>\n
                   playground near a river for fun and swim, the degree<\/p>\n
                   of care required stands at a much higher degree and<\/p>\n
                   no deviation therefrom can be had on any count<\/p>\n
                   whatsoever. Mere satisfaction that the river is<\/p>\n
                   otherwise safe for swim by reason of popular<\/p>\n
                   sayings will not be a sufficient compliance. As a<\/p>\n
                   matter of fact the degree of care required to be<\/p>\n
                   taken specially against the minor children stands at<\/p>\n
                   a much higher level than adults: children need much<\/p>\n
                   stricter care”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         In Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman<\/p>\n
Iyer and Another, III<\/a> (2003) Accident & Compensation Cases 551<\/p>\n
(SC): 2003 (4) Recent Civil Reports 764, the Supreme Court held:<\/p>\n
                   “Negligence is omission of duty caused either by an<\/p>\n
                   omission to do something which a reasonable man<\/p>\n
                   guided upon those considerations who ordinarily by<\/p>\n
                   reason of conduct of human affairs would do or
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               45<\/span><\/p>\n
                   obligated to, or by doing something which a prudent<\/p>\n
                   or reasonable man would not do. Negligence does<\/p>\n
                   not always mean absolute carelessness, but want of<\/p>\n
                   such a degree of care as is required in particular<\/p>\n
                   circumstances. Negligence is failure to observe, for<\/p>\n
                   the protection of the interests of another person, the<\/p>\n
                   degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the<\/p>\n
                   circumstances justly demand whereby such other<\/p>\n
                   person suffers injury. The idea of negligence and<\/p>\n
                   duty are strictly correlative. Negligence means either<\/p>\n
                   subjectively a careless state of mind, or objectively<\/p>\n
                   careless conduct. Negligence is not an absolute<\/p>\n
                   term, but is a relative one; it is rather a comparative<\/p>\n
                   term. No absolute standard can be fixed and no<\/p>\n
                   matheatically exact formula can be laid down by<\/p>\n
                   which negligence or lack of it can be infallibly<\/p>\n
                   measured in a given case. What constitutes<\/p>\n
                   negligence varies under different conditions and in<\/p>\n
                   determining whether negligence exists in a particular<\/p>\n
                   case, or whether a mere act or course of conduct<\/p>\n
                   amounts to negligence, all the attending and<\/p>\n
                   surrounding facts and circumstances have to be<\/p>\n
                   taken into account. It is absence of care according to<\/p>\n
                   circumstances. To determine whether an act would<\/p>\n
                   be or would not be negligent, it is relevant to<\/p>\n
                   determine if any reasonable man would foresee that
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 46<\/span><\/p>\n
                   the act would cause damage or not. The omission to<\/p>\n
                   do what the law obligates or even the failure to do<\/p>\n
                   anything in a manner, mode or method envisaged by<\/p>\n
                   law would equally and per se constitute negligence<\/p>\n
                   on the part of such person. If the answer is in the<\/p>\n
                   affirmative, it is a negligent act”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Let us now examine in the light of the above          principles<\/p>\n
whether the Commission of Inquiry had correctly held that the School<\/p>\n
had committed a breach of the duty qua the students, their parents and<\/p>\n
other invitees to participate in the function. The foremost aspect that<\/p>\n
would require examination is whether the Commission had properly<\/p>\n
appreciated the evidence adduced before it and correctly applied the<\/p>\n
legal tests to which we have referred in the foregoing paragraphs.<\/p>\n
          Appearing for respondents No.4 and 5, Mr. Rajive Atma Ram,<\/p>\n
strenuously argued that the One Man Commission had not properly<\/p>\n
appreciated the evidence before it while recording its findings on the<\/p>\n
question of the nature and extent of negligence of each one of the<\/p>\n
respondents, their employees and agents. He made a valiant attempt to<\/p>\n
persuade us to hold that the findings were unsupported by any material<\/p>\n
and at any rate a contrary view was equally plausible on a proper re-<\/p>\n
appraisal of the material assembled before the Commission.           He, in<\/p>\n
particular, laid considerable emphasis on certain aspects which,<\/p>\n
according to him, established that the School was in no way negligent in<\/p>\n
the discharge of its duty towards the children, their parents and<\/p>\n
members of the staff invited to attend the ill fated annual function; that<\/p>\n
the School premises was not big enough to permit the holding of such a
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 47<\/span><\/p>\n
function which forced the School Authorities to take a reasonable and<\/p>\n
prudent decision to shift the function to another place; that Rajiv<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace was the only public place in Dabwali where the fateful<\/p>\n
function could be organized by the School; that the Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
comprised a steel structure used for making a permanent Pandal inside<\/p>\n
the premises thereby ensuring safety of the premises for any public<\/p>\n
function conducted in the same; that the wiring and fittings within the<\/p>\n
Pandal were permanent and had been got done by the Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
owner through a reputed Electrician; that several functions had already<\/p>\n
been held in the Marriage Palace over a period of three-four months<\/p>\n
before the incident; that nearly 1200 people were present at the venue<\/p>\n
none out of whom could foresee the possibility of fire breaking out and<\/p>\n
engulfing the entire area; that functionaries of the District Administration<\/p>\n
like the Deputy Commissioner, Tehsildar and Police Officers were also<\/p>\n
present at the spot which created a reasonable impression in the mind<\/p>\n
of everybody that the place was safe and nothing untoward could<\/p>\n
happen; that although the School had hired the Marriage Palace on<\/p>\n
payment of a sum of Rs.6,000\/-, yet even if the premises had been<\/p>\n
offered by the Marriage Palace owner free to the School for the sake of<\/p>\n
commercial publicity, there was an element of quid pro quo in the<\/p>\n
arrangement which brought about a commercial relationship between<\/p>\n
the parties distinctly different from the jural relationship of a Principal<\/p>\n
and Agent.     All these circumstances, argued the learned counsel,<\/p>\n
proved that respondents No.4 and 5 were in no way negligent in the<\/p>\n
discharge of the duty which they owed towards their invitiees, guests,<\/p>\n
students and staff attending the function.\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   48<\/span><\/p>\n
          Relying heavily upon the decision of the Supreme Court in<\/p>\n
Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Manjulaben Jayantilal Nakum and<\/p>\n
Others<\/a> (1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 552, Mr. Atma Ram argued<\/p>\n
that the fact situation of the instant case did not satisfy the dual test of<\/p>\n
proximity of relationship between the School and the victims or the<\/p>\n
foreseeability of the incident in question. The Commission had,<\/p>\n
therefore, fallen in error in holding the School guilty of tort arising out of<\/p>\n
negligence.\n<\/p>\n
          On behalf of the petitioner\/claimants, it was per contra argued<\/p>\n
that the findings recorded by the One Man Commission were based on a<\/p>\n
thorough appraisal of the evidence adduced before it and that it had<\/p>\n
given cogent reasons in support of its findings. There was, according to<\/p>\n
Mrs. Arora, nothing perverse about the said findings to call for<\/p>\n
interference of this Court in exercise of its extraordinary writ jurisdiction.<\/p>\n
This Court cannot, it was contended, assume the role of a Court of<\/p>\n
appeal and sit in judgment over the correctness of the findings of fact<\/p>\n
recorded by the Commission presided over by none other than a former<\/p>\n
Judge of this Court.\n<\/p>\n
          On behalf of the State of Haryana, it was contended by Mr.<\/p>\n
H.S. Hooda, learned Advocate General, Haryana, and Mr. Randhir<\/p>\n
Singh, learned Additional Advocate General, Haryana, that the findings<\/p>\n
recorded by the One Man Commission regarding negligence on the part<\/p>\n
of the respondents leading to the fire incident had been accepted by the<\/p>\n
State of Haryana and that the State had challenged neither the said<\/p>\n
findings nor the apportionment of the liability arising out of the<\/p>\n
negligence established against them.         Even otherwise, the findings
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  49<\/span><\/p>\n
recorded by the Commission, argued the learned counsel, were justified<\/p>\n
on the material placed before it and any attempt by the School to shift its<\/p>\n
responsibility or accuse the statutory and other public authorities         of<\/p>\n
negligence while underplaying its own fault was unwarranted and indeed<\/p>\n
unfortunate having regard to the magnitude of the tragedy that occurred<\/p>\n
only because the School was cutting corners without caring for the<\/p>\n
safety and security of a very large number of people whom it had invited<\/p>\n
to a place wholly unsuitable for a function that was to be attended by<\/p>\n
such a large number of people.\n<\/p>\n
          We have given our careful consideration to the submissions<\/p>\n
made by learned counsel for the parties.\n<\/p>\n
          Claims arising out of Tort ordinarily go for trial and adjudication<\/p>\n
before the competent Civil Courts except in cases where statutory fora<\/p>\n
are created for such adjudication as is the position in claim cases arising<\/p>\n
before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal under the Motor Vehicles Act,<\/p>\n
1988, or the Railway Claims Tribunal established under the Railway<\/p>\n
Claims Tribunal Act, 1987. Even so, the High Courts and indeed the<\/p>\n
Apex    Court   exercising    writ   jurisdiction   have,   in   exceptional<\/p>\n
circumstances, intervened with a view to providing immediate succour to<\/p>\n
those affected by tragedies involving heavy loss of human lives. That is<\/p>\n
precisely what happened in M.S. Grewal’s case, in which 14 students<\/p>\n
studying in fourth, fifth and sixth standards in Dalhousie Public School,<\/p>\n
Badhani, Pathankot, were drowned in river Beas while out on a picnic. In<\/p>\n
a writ petition filed before it, the High Court of Himachal Pradesh held<\/p>\n
the School Management liable to pay compensation at the rate of<\/p>\n
Rs.5,00,000\/- each to the parents of 14 students who died in the incident
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 50<\/span><\/p>\n
with the interest at the rate of 12% per annum. In an appeal arising out<\/p>\n
of that decision, the Apex Court noted the shift in the judicial attitude<\/p>\n
from the old to new concept of providing expeditious relief in cases<\/p>\n
where the citizens’ right to life and\/or liberty has been affected. Making a<\/p>\n
departure from the conservative approach that damages must be left to<\/p>\n
the Civil Courts to determine, their Lordships observed:<\/p>\n
                    “Currently judicial attitude has taken a shift from the<\/p>\n
                    old    draconian      concept   and    the   traditional<\/p>\n
                    jurisprudential system – affectation of the people<\/p>\n
                    has been taken note of rather seriously and the<\/p>\n
                    judicial concern thus stands on a footing to provide<\/p>\n
                    expeditious relief to an individual when needed<\/p>\n
                    rather than taking recourse to the old conservative<\/p>\n
                    doctrine of civil courts obligation to award damages.<\/p>\n
                    As a matter of fact the decision in D.K. Basu, (1997)<\/p>\n
                    1 SCC 416, has not only dealt with the issue in a<\/p>\n
                    manner apposite to the social need of the country<\/p>\n
                    but the learned Judge with his usual felicity of<\/p>\n
                    expression firmly established the current trend of<\/p>\n
                    ‘justice oriented approach’. Law courts will lose its<\/p>\n
                    efficacy if it cannot possibly respond to the need of<\/p>\n
                    the society – technicalities there might be many but<\/p>\n
                    the justice oriented approach ought not to be<\/p>\n
                    thwarted on the basis of such technicality since<\/p>\n
                    technicality cannot and ought not to out-weigh the<\/p>\n
                    course of justice”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  51<\/span><\/p>\n
           That is also what happened in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)<\/p>\n
in which as many as 60 persons including 26 children, 25 women and<\/p>\n
nine men died in a fire incident in a function held to celebrate the 150th<\/p>\n
birth anniversary of Sir Jamshedji Tata at Jamshedpur. Lata Wadhwa,<\/p>\n
who had lost both her children in the said incident, filed a writ petition in<\/p>\n
the Supreme Court alleging inaction on the part of State in initiating<\/p>\n
proceedings against the officers because of whose negligence the<\/p>\n
tragedy had taken place. It was in that petition that the Supreme Court<\/p>\n
requested Mr. Y.V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India, to look<\/p>\n
into the matter and determine the compensation payable to the legal<\/p>\n
heirs of the deceased as well as compensation payable to the injured.<\/p>\n
Upon receipt of the report from Justice Chandrachud the Court directed<\/p>\n
payment of the amount of compensation to those affected by the<\/p>\n
tragedy.\n<\/p>\n
           Even in Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy and<\/p>\n
Others v. Union of India and Others 104 (2003) Delhi Law Times 234<\/p>\n
(DB), the High Court of Delhi was dealing with a case for payment of<\/p>\n
compensation to victims of what was commonly known as Uphar Fire<\/p>\n
Tragedy. The determination of the negligence and the apportionment of<\/p>\n
liability was undertaken on the basis of broad principles applicable in<\/p>\n
such situations and the reports and material that was placed before the<\/p>\n
Court. The enquiry into the fire incident was in that case ordered by the<\/p>\n
Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and conducted by Mr.<\/p>\n
Naresh Kumar, Deputy Commissioner (South). It was meant to identify<\/p>\n
the causes and circumstances leading to the fire and examine whether<\/p>\n
the Cinema had taken the necessary safety measures. The petitioner
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                52<\/span><\/p>\n
had, upon conclusion of the said enquiry, filed a writ petition seeking<\/p>\n
adequate compensation for the victims and punitive damages against<\/p>\n
the respondents for showing callous disregard towards their obligations<\/p>\n
to protect the fundamental and indefeasible rights of the citizens under<\/p>\n
Article 21 of the Constitution by failing to provide a premises that was<\/p>\n
safe and free from hazards, that could be reasonably foreseen. The<\/p>\n
approach adopted by the Court in that case if we may say with respect<\/p>\n
was in consonance with the law declared by the Supreme Court in D.K.<\/p>\n
Basu v. State of W.B.<\/a> (1997)1 Supreme Court Cases 416 where their<\/p>\n
Lordships made a distinction between a claim in public law for an<\/p>\n
unconstitutional deprivation of the fundamental right to life and liberty<\/p>\n
which proceeds on the doctrine of strict liability and a claim for damages<\/p>\n
for tortious act of public servants. The Court observed:<\/p>\n
                    “The claim in public law for compensation for<\/p>\n
                    unconstitutional deprivation of fundamental right to<\/p>\n
                    life and liberty, the protection of which is guaranteed<\/p>\n
                    under the Constitution, is a claim based on strict<\/p>\n
                    liability and is in addition to the claim available in<\/p>\n
                    private law for damages for tortious acts of       the<\/p>\n
                    public servants. Public law proceedings serve a<\/p>\n
                    different purpose than the private law proceedings.<\/p>\n
                    Award of compensation for established infringement<\/p>\n
                    of the indefeasible rights guaranteed under Article<\/p>\n
                    21 is a remedy available in public law since the<\/p>\n
                    purpose of public law is not only to civilize public<\/p>\n
                    power but also to assure the citizens that they live
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               53<\/span><\/p>\n
                   under a legal system wherein their rights and<\/p>\n
                   interests shall be protected and preserved. Grant of<\/p>\n
                   compensation in proceedings under Article 32 or<\/p>\n
                   Article 226 of the Constitution of India for the<\/p>\n
                   established violation of the fundamental rights<\/p>\n
                   guaranteed under Article 21, is an exercise of the<\/p>\n
                   courts under the public law jurisdiction for penalising<\/p>\n
                   the wrongdoer and fixing the liability for the public<\/p>\n
                   wrong on the State which failed in the discharge of<\/p>\n
                   its public duty to protect the fundamental rights of<\/p>\n
                   the citizen.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                             The old    doctrine of only relegating the<\/p>\n
                   aggrieved to the remedies available in civil law limits<\/p>\n
                   the role of the courts too much, as the protector and<\/p>\n
                   custodian of the indefeasible rights of the citizens.<\/p>\n
                   The courts have the obligation to satisfy the social<\/p>\n
                   aspirations of the citizens because the courts and<\/p>\n
                   the law are for the people and expected to respond<\/p>\n
                   to their aspirations. A court of law cannot close its<\/p>\n
                   consciousness and aliveness to stark realities. Mere<\/p>\n
                   punishment of the offender cannot give much solace<\/p>\n
                   to the family of the victim – civil action for damages<\/p>\n
                   is a long drawn and a cumbersome judicial process.<\/p>\n
                   Monetary compensation for redressal by the court<\/p>\n
                   finding the infringement of the indefeasible right to<\/p>\n
                   life of the citizen is, therefore, useful and at time
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                54<\/span><\/p>\n
                    perhaps the only effective remedy to apply balm to<\/p>\n
                    the wounds of the family members of the deceased<\/p>\n
                    victim, who may have been the breadwinner of the<\/p>\n
                    family”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Having said that, we need to keep in mind is that the setting<\/p>\n
up of the One Man Commission of Inquiry for determination of the nature<\/p>\n
and the extent of negligence of the School or the public functionaries<\/p>\n
and for award of compensation to the victims does not constitute the<\/p>\n
Commission as a Civil Court nor does it constitute the High Court under<\/p>\n
whose order the Commission was set up as an Appellate Forum for the<\/p>\n
latter to sit in judgment over the findings of fact recorded by the<\/p>\n
Commission. The choice of the person who was to preside over the<\/p>\n
Commission was evidently guided by the solitary consideration that he is<\/p>\n
a trained and vastly experienced judicial mind familiar with the principles<\/p>\n
of   law and procedure that need to be followed for any such<\/p>\n
determination.   The report submitted by a Commission of Inquiry so<\/p>\n
chosen and appointed shall, therefore, have to be respected unless<\/p>\n
there is apparent on the face of the record an error of law or perversity<\/p>\n
of the kind that cannot be countenanced. Suffice it to say that this Court<\/p>\n
cannot sit in appeal over the findings of fact recorded by the<\/p>\n
Commission or undertake an exercise in re-appraisal of evidence and<\/p>\n
substitute its own finding for that of the Commission simply because a<\/p>\n
contrary or alternative view seems equally plausible. Keeping the above<\/p>\n
broad parameters in view, let us briefly refer to the material that was<\/p>\n
placed before the Commission for its appreciation and findings recorded<\/p>\n
on the basis thereof, not because we propose to re-appraise the entire
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 55<\/span><\/p>\n
material adduced before the Commission to record our own findings but<\/p>\n
only to see whether the findings of fact recorded by the Commission are<\/p>\n
perverse in that they are unsupported by any evidence whatsoever.<\/p>\n
          The incident in question took place on 23.12.1995. On the<\/p>\n
very following day i.e. 24.12.1995, the then Secretary to Government of<\/p>\n
Haryana directed the Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar to<\/p>\n
hold a Magisterial enquiry into the facts relating to the fire incident. The<\/p>\n
first of the enquiries   into the incident was, thus, conducted by the<\/p>\n
Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division, Hisar, the report whereof was<\/p>\n
marked before the One Man Commission. In the course of the enquiry,<\/p>\n
the Divisional Commissioner had examined as many as 40 witnesses<\/p>\n
including Magistrates, Police Officials, Advocates, Doctors and the<\/p>\n
owners and employees of Rajiv Marriage Palace. Relations of the<\/p>\n
deceased persons present on the occurrence, a large number of the<\/p>\n
injured including Teachers of the D.A.V. Centenary Public School,<\/p>\n
technical experts of the Forensic Science Laboratory, Madhuban,<\/p>\n
Haryana State Electricity Board, Public Works Department, Municipal<\/p>\n
Committee and Chief Electrical Officer, Haryana, were also examined.<\/p>\n
          On the basis of statements made by the experts and eye<\/p>\n
witnesses including the police officials and public men, the Divisional<\/p>\n
Commissioner recorded a clear finding to the effect that the fire incident<\/p>\n
had not occurred on account        of any sabotage or the use of any<\/p>\n
explosive substance whatsoever, as the physical or chemical clues<\/p>\n
available from the evidence and the opinion of the experts did not<\/p>\n
support any such possibility. The Commissioner then examined whether<\/p>\n
the fire could have been caused by leakage of gas cylinder or bursting of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                56<\/span><\/p>\n
gas stove or burning of cigarettes etc. and ruled out the same also as a<\/p>\n
possible cause of the incident. He then turned to the possibility of fire<\/p>\n
having been caused because of electric wirings on account of the heat<\/p>\n
generated by the use of focus lights, mingling of supply of two generator<\/p>\n
sets at a common point and electrocution of the entire area through<\/p>\n
which PVC tubes covered wires passed in the Pandal and concluded<\/p>\n
that the available material, both documentary and oral, lent support to<\/p>\n
the possibility that the fire started from a height of 12 feet on the right<\/p>\n
side of the main entrance to the Pandal on account of use of crude<\/p>\n
material in the focus light fixed at that place. The wires passing through<\/p>\n
the welding machine was found as a second possibility from which the<\/p>\n
fire could have started. The Divisional Commissioner was also of the<\/p>\n
view that the fire had started while the two generating sets placed near<\/p>\n
the Pandal were in operation. The following passage from the report<\/p>\n
submitted by the Divisional Commissioner is, in this regard, relevant:-<\/p>\n
                    In addition to the fire breaking out from the heating<\/p>\n
                    of the focus light which had crude material in it,<\/p>\n
                    according to Dr. M.B. Rao, the other possibility of<\/p>\n
                    quick burning of whole of the pandal along with<\/p>\n
                    factors like false roofing PVC material, the synthetic<\/p>\n
                    curtains and the like, could arise from the fact that<\/p>\n
                    even while the power of one generating set might<\/p>\n
                    have stopped on the breaking out of fire in the focus<\/p>\n
                    light, the other generating set was still in operation<\/p>\n
                    (as admitted in the statement of Rajinder Kumar)<\/p>\n
                    and thus heating caused by the live wires multiplied
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               57<\/span><\/p>\n
                    with the burning of PVC covering with the outbreak<\/p>\n
                    of fire from one side which spread through the<\/p>\n
                    synthetic material available in the roof, and all this<\/p>\n
                    could have accelerated the speed of fire as<\/p>\n
                    witnessed by all”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          The Divisional Commissioner also recorded the finding that<\/p>\n
the owners of the Marriage Palace had illegally taken a three-phase<\/p>\n
connection from the Electricity Board and the officers of the Board had<\/p>\n
made no effort to issue and recover any bill from the owners in regard<\/p>\n
to the three phase connection granted to them. The Commissioner also<\/p>\n
found fault with the construction of an unauthorized building in violation<\/p>\n
of the building plans sanctioned by the Municipal Committee and the<\/p>\n
casual manner in which the plans were sanctioned. He also found fault<\/p>\n
with the loose terminals of the wires drawn from the three phase meter<\/p>\n
which, according to him, showed the real motive behind the criminal<\/p>\n
intention of the owners of the Marriage Palace. Strictest criminal action<\/p>\n
against the owners and disciplinary proceedings against the employees<\/p>\n
was, therefore, recommended.\n<\/p>\n
          The enquiry by the Divisional Commissioner was followed by a<\/p>\n
charge sheet presented against the owners of the Marriage Palace by<\/p>\n
the Central Bureau of Investigation. The investigation conducted by the<\/p>\n
Central Bureau of Investigation established that Rajiv Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
at Mandi, Dabwali was a partnership firm comprising three real brothers,<\/p>\n
named Kewal Krishan Dhameeja, Om Parkash Dhameeja and Chander<\/p>\n
Bhan Dhameeja. The place was named after Rajiv Dhameeja, eldest<\/p>\n
son of Kewal Krishan Dhameeja. A rectangular Pandal was constructed
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               58<\/span><\/p>\n
in the Rajiv Marriage Palace covering an area measuring 100′ X 90′.<\/p>\n
The Pandal comprising steel super structure of GI Sheets on the top and<\/p>\n
partially covered on the three sides with a false ceiling supported with<\/p>\n
bamboo sticks. The lowest false ceiling wall inside the Pandal was at a<\/p>\n
height of 12 feet from the ground. The entire ceiling was made of cotton<\/p>\n
clothes in colourful designs and in chunri style. All the three sides of<\/p>\n
the Pandal were covered with thick cotton curtains tightly fitted with the<\/p>\n
bamboo support from the ground level to the height of first ceiling. The<\/p>\n
upper portions of the three sides of the Pandal were covered with PV<\/p>\n
Sheets. The front portion of the Pandal was covered with PV Sheets<\/p>\n
from inside upto the height of 12 feet. Thick cotton curtains on both<\/p>\n
sides of the gate were also fixed right from the ground level upto the<\/p>\n
height of 12 feet leaving a vacant space of 12′ X 12′ as entrance\/exit<\/p>\n
gate. Both inner and upper curtains in the front portion were tightly tied<\/p>\n
with bamboos placed in between the angle frames and steel poles. The<\/p>\n
curtains of D-China cloth were fixed in hanging order on both sides of<\/p>\n
the entrance\/exit gate of the Pandal. The lighting arrangements in the<\/p>\n
Pandal were described in the charge sheet submitted by the Central<\/p>\n
Bureau of Investigation in the following words:\n<\/p>\n
                    “The pandal was provided with 12 electrical circuits<\/p>\n
                    through the switch board installed in the switch room<\/p>\n
                    towards eastern side of the pandal. There were 25<\/p>\n
                    jhumar lights with electric bulbs of 100 watts each<\/p>\n
                    hanging from the false ceiling of the pandal. Beside,<\/p>\n
                    two halogen lights over the stage and other two<\/p>\n
                    halogen lights near the entry\/exit gate of the pandal
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                59<\/span><\/p>\n
                    were also fixed. Due to frequent power tripping in<\/p>\n
                    Dabwali, the owners of the Rajiv Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
                    (Pandal) had arranged two generator sets to ensure<\/p>\n
                    uninterrupted power supply at the function on<\/p>\n
                    23.12.1995 in the Pandal. The switch board fitted in<\/p>\n
                    the switch room of the premises had been provided<\/p>\n
                    with the arrangements of power supply from HSEB<\/p>\n
                    as well as from the generators.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                              In addition, the lighting arrangements<\/p>\n
                    inside the pandal also include an arc light in crude<\/p>\n
                    form fitted with two carbon electrodes and a reflector<\/p>\n
                    fitted above the first ceiling near the central portion<\/p>\n
                    of entrance gate facing the dias. Accused Rajender<\/p>\n
                    Kumar and Devi Lal of M\/s Chacha Bhatija Light<\/p>\n
                    Service were deployed for manning the electrical<\/p>\n
                    arrangements, operating generators etc. on the day<\/p>\n
                    of function i.e. on 23.12.1995. Besides, a number of<\/p>\n
                    temporary\/loose connections were also provided in<\/p>\n
                    the pandal on the date of function by Rajendra<\/p>\n
                    Kumar and Devi Lal by tampering with the electrical<\/p>\n
                    fittings inside the pandal”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          The Charge sheet also referred to the seating arrangements<\/p>\n
inside the Pandal and suggested that as many as 725 chairs made of<\/p>\n
plastic were laid out on both sides of the central passage. The first three<\/p>\n
rows from the stage had blocked the central passage. In the front row<\/p>\n
there were sofa sets with extra chairs on both sides        for VIPS and
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                     60<\/span><\/p>\n
special guests. There was a narrow passage in the southern, eastern<\/p>\n
and western side of the Pandal. The placement of chairs was at the end<\/p>\n
of the Pandal from the entrance, in diagonal shape because of provision<\/p>\n
of counter for serving tea and cold drinks to the invitees.<\/p>\n
          The Charge sheet further indicated that the organizers of the<\/p>\n
D.A.V. Public School, Dabwali, had hired Rajiv Marriage Palace for<\/p>\n
holding its annual function for a sum of Rs.6,000\/- only. A huge crowd<\/p>\n
of around 1000 invitees including children and parents had gathered at<\/p>\n
the venue. The function started around 1200 hours on 23.12.1995 in<\/p>\n
which Mr. M.P.Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, was the Chief<\/p>\n
Guest. While the function was going on, around 1.45 to 1.50 P.M., a fire<\/p>\n
was noticed at the entrance\/exit gate. The fire spread so fast that it<\/p>\n
engulfed the whole Pandal within no time. Consequently, more than 441<\/p>\n
persons majority of which were innocent children died due to burn<\/p>\n
injuries. Besides more than 145 persons sustained burn injuries. Among<\/p>\n
the dead were, Mr.Som Nath Kamboj, Sub Divisional Magistrate,<\/p>\n
Dabwali, daughter of Mr. Anil Yadav, Deputy Superintendent of Police,<\/p>\n
Dabwali, and Mrs.Priti Kamra, Principal of D.A.V. School. The charge<\/p>\n
sheet placed reliance upon the report submitted by the Forensic<\/p>\n
Experts from Forensic Science Laboratory Madhuban, Haryana, the<\/p>\n
relevant portion dealing with the cause of incident may be extracted at<\/p>\n
this stage:-\n<\/p>\n
                  “In the middle portion leading to stage a focus         light<\/p>\n
                  connected by copper wire was connected          temporarily<\/p>\n
                  by the two terminals of a welding           machine.    The<\/p>\n
                  welding machine      in turn   was   connected     to    the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              61<\/span><\/p>\n
                mains through switch change over box. In one of the<\/p>\n
                terminals of the welding machine, the copper wires<\/p>\n
                were found melted leading to bead formation.        This<\/p>\n
                clearly indicates that there was high voltage due to<\/p>\n
                which there could have been heavy sparking at the<\/p>\n
                loose terminals. Because of this even the two fuse<\/p>\n
                grips through which the focus light has been connected<\/p>\n
                also had blackening resulting in the burning of copper<\/p>\n
                wire.   In the focus light two carbon electrodes are<\/p>\n
                placed at a distance to produce spark which is<\/p>\n
                transmitted on to reflector to give bright light. This<\/p>\n
                process produces tremendous amount of heat which<\/p>\n
                has burnt the bamboo poles as well as decorative cloth<\/p>\n
                which was synthetic. The synthetic cloth caught fire<\/p>\n
                instantaneously and fell down as fused mass with<\/p>\n
                flames. The remaining plastic sheets and synthetic<\/p>\n
                cloth caught fire and engulfed the entire area leading to<\/p>\n
                death of several people”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         The Charge sheet also relied upon the report submitted by Mr.<\/p>\n
V.B. Gupta, Superintending Engineer, North Regional Electricity Board,<\/p>\n
New Delhi, in which the cause of fire was summed up as under:-<\/p>\n
                   “Based on the results of experiments conducted at<\/p>\n
                   site and discussions the most probable cause of fire<\/p>\n
                   appears to be the flash\/spark created at the T-Joint<\/p>\n
                   above the main entrance to the pandal where a<\/p>\n
                   large number of loose electrical connections were
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               62<\/span><\/p>\n
                    made by the electrical operators for fitting the<\/p>\n
                    lighting equipments. The T-Joint was very close<\/p>\n
                    almost touching the curtains spread horizontally at<\/p>\n
                    12′ height above the main entrance. The spark from<\/p>\n
                    this T-Joint could have caused the fire in the curtain<\/p>\n
                    clothes. Once the cloth caught fire, the fire spread<\/p>\n
                    all around within few minutes bringing the whole of<\/p>\n
                    pandal into burning simultaneously”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Relying upon the opinions given by the Central Forensic<\/p>\n
Science Laboratory Experts in the field of Ballistics, Physics and<\/p>\n
Chemistry the Central Bureau of Investigation concluded that the<\/p>\n
incident was not caused by any sabotage as no explosive substance<\/p>\n
had been detected in the residue. The fire, according to the Central<\/p>\n
Bureau of Investigation, was caused due to short circuiting. The charge<\/p>\n
sheet also concluded that Kewal Krishan Dhameeja and Chander Bhan<\/p>\n
Dhameeja, partners of M\/s Rajiv Marriage Palace, were personally<\/p>\n
supervising the   arrangements at the venue including the electrical<\/p>\n
fittings etc. and that the accused\/owners had hurriedly provided several<\/p>\n
temporary electric connections in the Pandal employing untrained and<\/p>\n
unqualified Electricians in total disregard of the safety of human lives.<\/p>\n
The charge sheet stated:-\n<\/p>\n
                    “During the course of investigation, it has been<\/p>\n
                    established that accused Kewal Krishan Dhameeja<\/p>\n
                    and Chander Bhan Dhameeja, Partners of M\/s Rajiv<\/p>\n
                    Marriage Palace, were personally supervising the<\/p>\n
                    arrangements at the site of the function which
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                    63<\/span><\/p>\n
                   included electrical fittings etc. The electrical fittings<\/p>\n
                   etc. were made by accused Rajendra Kumar and<\/p>\n
                   Devi Lal who had no training. Accused Rajendra<\/p>\n
                   Kumar     and    Devi    Lal     also   provided   several<\/p>\n
                   temporary electrical connections at the Pandal.<\/p>\n
                   Temporary       electrical     connections    were    also<\/p>\n
                   provided by them for the arc light and also for the<\/p>\n
                   Halwai’s Oven. These connections were made by<\/p>\n
                   these untrained and unqualified accused persons in<\/p>\n
                   a haste and hurry in total disregard to the safety of<\/p>\n
                   the human lives. Investigation has established that<\/p>\n
                   accused       ‘Kewal         Krishan    Dhameeja      and<\/p>\n
                   Chanderbhan Dhameeja, apart from personally<\/p>\n
                   supervising     these    operations     had   taken    the<\/p>\n
                   electrical connection in the Pandal in an illegal and<\/p>\n
                   unauthorised manner and, therefore, they are also<\/p>\n
                   liable to be prosecuted for their acts of omission and<\/p>\n
                   commission which resulted in loss of 441 lives and<\/p>\n
                   injuries to 145 others”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         The Commission of Inquiry has referred to and partly relied<\/p>\n
upon the enquiry report submitted by the Divisional Commissioner and<\/p>\n
the conclusions drawn by the Central Bureau of investigation in its<\/p>\n
charge sheet. But apart from what was gathered by the Divisional<\/p>\n
Commissioner and the Central Bureau of Investigation in their respective<\/p>\n
enquiries\/investigations, the One Man Commission had before it, the<\/p>\n
depositions   of a very large number of witnesses           examined in the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   64<\/span><\/p>\n
course of enquiry proceedings. The Commission, among others, relied<\/p>\n
upon the statement of Vinod Bansal, one of the claimants, according to<\/p>\n
whom, the banquet hall had around 500 to 600 chairs for guests and<\/p>\n
visitors but about 1500 persons including men, women and children had<\/p>\n
gathered at the venue on the fateful day. The witness further stated that<\/p>\n
since the number of visitors was more than the capacity of the Marriage<\/p>\n
Palace and the Pandal, the main gate was closed from inside. The<\/p>\n
witness further stated that Pandal was made of curtains, synthetic cloth,<\/p>\n
polythene sheets and coconut ropes used for tying the curtains with<\/p>\n
bamboo sticks. The electrical fittings were all temporary and the joints of<\/p>\n
electrical wires were loose and naked. There were inside the Pandal<\/p>\n
nearly 15\/16 Chandeliers fixed to the ceiling besides a large number of<\/p>\n
other lights. The witness goes on to state that the fire broke out at<\/p>\n
about 1.45 PM but an announcement was made from the stage that the<\/p>\n
fire had been brought under control and the visitors should remain calm,<\/p>\n
quiet and sitting. The fire all the same spread all around and could not<\/p>\n
be controlled and engulfed the entire Pandal within no time. According<\/p>\n
to the witness, the fire had broken out on account of short circuit of the<\/p>\n
electricity.   Neither   the   District   Administration   nor   the   D.A.V.<\/p>\n
Management nor the Municipal Committee, the Electricity Board or the<\/p>\n
Management of Rajiv Marriage Palace had made any arrangement for<\/p>\n
fire fighting in the event of an emergency.\n<\/p>\n
           The witness further stated that as many as 442 persons had<\/p>\n
died and 200 persons suffered injuries on account of fire including the<\/p>\n
witness himself. That his wife and two children died in the incident. He<\/p>\n
also referred to the small exit gate in the dark room behind the stage out
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                65<\/span><\/p>\n
of which Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, had made good his<\/p>\n
escape immediately on seeing the fire. The S.D.O. (Civil) and his wife<\/p>\n
had, however, died in the incident.\n<\/p>\n
           In the cross-examination, the witness inter-alia stated that the<\/p>\n
size of the Pandal was about 50′ X 70′, whereas the height of Pandal<\/p>\n
was nearly 15\/16 feet. All the chairs in the Pandal were occupied by the<\/p>\n
visitors and the persons who could not get chairs were standing on all<\/p>\n
the three sides of the Pandal. The size of the banquet hall was 100′ X<\/p>\n
70′ and there were walls all around the banquet hall with one gate<\/p>\n
about 10\/11 feet wide for entrance to the banquet hall. There was<\/p>\n
another small gate with the size of 2 feet behind the stage. The witness<\/p>\n
further stated that there was only one gate to the Pandal whereas all the<\/p>\n
sides had been covered by curtains tied with bamboo and coir ropes.<\/p>\n
The bamboos were fixed at a distance of half a foot of each other. The<\/p>\n
fire started from the exit gate of the Pandal from where he was standing<\/p>\n
at a distance of 15\/20 feet. He further stated that if there was no Pandal,<\/p>\n
the total capacity of banquet hall would have been around 1000<\/p>\n
persons.\n<\/p>\n
           The Commission has similarly relied upon the statements of<\/p>\n
Satpal Chawla, Secretary, Municipal Committee, Dabwali, examined to<\/p>\n
prove the site plan and the documents pertaining to the Municipal<\/p>\n
Committee. So also the statement of M.R. Sachdeva, Assistant<\/p>\n
Engineer of the Haryana State Electricity Board has been relied upon<\/p>\n
to prove grant of electric connection to the Marriage Palace. The witness<\/p>\n
has stated that a three phase commercial supply connection had also<\/p>\n
been granted to the Marriage Palace owners with a sanctioned load of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              66<\/span><\/p>\n
5.980 KW. Details of the consumption with regard to single phase<\/p>\n
electric connection were also given by the witness. The witness also<\/p>\n
tried to suggest that the incident took place at 13.45 P.M. during which<\/p>\n
time there was a power cut for about five minutes i.e. from 13.40 P.M.<\/p>\n
to 13.45 P.M. on account of some technical fault.\n<\/p>\n
         The Commission has similarly taken note of the depositions of<\/p>\n
Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of the Financial Commissioner<\/p>\n
and Principle Secretary to Government Haryana, Ram Parkash,<\/p>\n
Superintendent in the office of Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa, Bahadur<\/p>\n
Singh, Deputy Superintendent in the office of the Sub Divisional Officer<\/p>\n
(Civil), Dabwali, examined by the claimants in support of their cases<\/p>\n
apart from proving a very large number of documents relevant for the<\/p>\n
issues that fell for consideration. Also noticed by the Commission are<\/p>\n
the documents that were proved in the course of the enquiry and relied<\/p>\n
upon by the Commission for recording its findings.<\/p>\n
         The Commission has also taken note of the depositions of the<\/p>\n
witnesses examined by the respondents. These include Norang Dass,<\/p>\n
Tehsildar, Dabwali, Om Parkash, Superintendent in the office of Civil<\/p>\n
Surgeon, Sirsa, and     Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of<\/p>\n
Financial Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government of<\/p>\n
Haryana, examined on behalf of respondents No.1 to 3. Out of these<\/p>\n
witnesses, Subhash Chander, Assistant in the office of Financial<\/p>\n
Commissioner and Principal Secretary to Government of Haryana,<\/p>\n
produced before the Commission statements of 39 witnesses who were<\/p>\n
examined by Mr. K.C. Sharma, Divisional Commissioner, Hisar Division,<\/p>\n
Hisar, the then Commission of Inquiry.\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             67<\/span><\/p>\n
         The statements of Chander Parkash Jain, Assistant, New<\/p>\n
India Assurance Company Limited, Lachhman Dass, Private Architect,<\/p>\n
Mrs. Neelam Wadhwa, Teacher of D.A.V. School, Mandi Dabwali,<\/p>\n
Jagdish Deol, Upper Division Clerk, D.A.V. Managing Committee,<\/p>\n
Chitragupta Road, New Delhi and V.K.Mittal, Principal of D.A.V. School,<\/p>\n
Mandi Dabwali, examined by respondents No.4 and 5, have also been<\/p>\n
noticed and discussed at great length by the Commission.<\/p>\n
         While discussing the statement of V.K. Mittal, Principal of<\/p>\n
D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali, the Commission has<\/p>\n
noticed that no receipt regarding payment of Rs.6,000\/- to the Marriage<\/p>\n
Palace owners had been produced by the witness or any other official of<\/p>\n
the School nor was there any recital anywhere in the written statement<\/p>\n
about the alleged payment of Rs.6,000\/- as hire charges to the owners<\/p>\n
of the Marriage Palace. The Commission has observed:-<\/p>\n
                   “From the evidence of this witness, it is made out<\/p>\n
                   that although there is no recital in the written<\/p>\n
                   statement about the alleged settlement or payment<\/p>\n
                   of Rs.6000\/- as hire charges to the owners of the<\/p>\n
                   Rajiv Marriage Palace but he has introduced the<\/p>\n
                   payment of Rs.6000\/- to them by the School<\/p>\n
                   Authorities although he could not produce any such<\/p>\n
                   receipt and has stated that there is no such receipt<\/p>\n
                   in the School record as it was sent to the Head<\/p>\n
                   Office. Shri Jagdish Deol RW6\/1-DFT is an Upper<\/p>\n
                   Division Clerk in the Head Office of the D.A.V.<\/p>\n
                   College Managing Committee. He has nowhere
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 68<\/span><\/p>\n
                    stated about any such alleged receipt of Rs.6000\/-<\/p>\n
                    having been sent by the D.A.V. School, Mandi<\/p>\n
                    Dabwali, to the Head Office nor has he produced<\/p>\n
                    any such receipt. It appears that this witness has<\/p>\n
                    introduced the factum of the alleged receipt on his<\/p>\n
                    own and the same does not find support from any<\/p>\n
                    documentary evidence. This witness has also<\/p>\n
                    introduced that the hiring charges of Rs.6000\/- also<\/p>\n
                    included charges for making sitting arrangements,<\/p>\n
                    electricity, water, security, eatables and tent etc. but<\/p>\n
                    then he has added that there was an oral agreement<\/p>\n
                    in this respect and there was no written agreement”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          The Commission has also noted and discussed the deposition<\/p>\n
or R.K. Sodha, Executive Engineer of the Electricity Board examined as<\/p>\n
RW9\/1-DFT by respondent No. 6 and the documents marked in his<\/p>\n
deposition. The Commission has, upon a careful analysis of the<\/p>\n
deposition, observed that the witness was not able to satisfactorily<\/p>\n
explain the over-writing made in the log sheet in support of the case<\/p>\n
sought to be set up that the electric supply had tripped during the period<\/p>\n
the incident took place. The Commission observed:-<\/p>\n
                    “The over-writing over the digits 42 into digits 50 to<\/p>\n
                    give the time as 13.50 PM has not only been<\/p>\n
                    admitted by this witness but it is also clear on the<\/p>\n
                    Log sheet even to the naked eye. This assumes<\/p>\n
                    significance in view of the fact that the fire broke out<\/p>\n
                    at 13.45 PM., and the plea of the Board is that there
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             69<\/span><\/p>\n
                   was no electric supply at that time. But then in case<\/p>\n
                   the electric supply was restored at 13.42 PM., the<\/p>\n
                   plea of the Board pales into insignificance. However,<\/p>\n
                   in case the supply was not restored at 13.42 PM.,<\/p>\n
                   what necessitated the Board officials to manipulate<\/p>\n
                   the entry of the time 13.42 PM by over-writing the<\/p>\n
                   digits 42 and making it into 50. This was done in<\/p>\n
                   order perhaps to give the impression to the Enquiry<\/p>\n
                   Officers concerned and the public at large that there<\/p>\n
                   was no electric supply at 13.45 PM. when the fire<\/p>\n
                   broke out. But in their over enthusiasm and anxiety<\/p>\n
                   to do so, they forgot that the digits 50 which they<\/p>\n
                   were manipulating by over-writing on the digits 42<\/p>\n
                   may be detected at sometime and the factum of the<\/p>\n
                   electric supply having been restored at 13.42 PM.<\/p>\n
                   may be established”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         The oral and documentary evidence adduced by the Municipal<\/p>\n
Committee, Dabwali, has been similarly examined by the Commission<\/p>\n
and the depositions of Ramesh Chander Kamboj, Assistant Engineer of<\/p>\n
the Improvement Trust, Mandi Dabwali, Balwant Singh, Assistant Fire<\/p>\n
Officer, Mandi Dabwali and Satpal Chawla, Secretary, Municipal<\/p>\n
Committee, Mandi Dabwali, discussed.      The Commission has, on a<\/p>\n
careful analysis of their depositions, recorded a specific finding that<\/p>\n
Kartar Singh Chawla, Fire Station Officer, Mandi Dabwali, was absent<\/p>\n
from duty on 23.12.1995 when the occurrence took place. Although,<\/p>\n
attendance register produced showed him to be present the entry was
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                70<\/span><\/p>\n
belied by the statement of his own Assistant Fire Officer Balwant Singh.<\/p>\n
The evidence adduced by Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa,<\/p>\n
comprising eight witnesses besides himself has also been discussed<\/p>\n
and evaluated by the Commission apart from four witnesses examined<\/p>\n
by Rajiv Marriage Palace in support of its defence.<\/p>\n
          On a careful and thorough appraisal of the evidence referred<\/p>\n
to above the Commission held that D.A.V. School Authorities held its<\/p>\n
Annual Prize Distribution Function at Rajiv Marriage Palace on<\/p>\n
23.12.1995; that invitation Card marked P74\/248-DFT was jointly issued<\/p>\n
by the Management, Staff and Students of D.A.V. Centenary Public<\/p>\n
School which is under the direct control of D.A.V. Managing Committee,<\/p>\n
New Delhi; that the invitation card so far as the same pertains to D.A.V.<\/p>\n
Centenary Public School was issued through its Principal Mrs. Naresh<\/p>\n
Kamra. In so far as      D.A.V. Managing Committee, New Delhi was<\/p>\n
concerned, the same was issued by its Regional Director Mr. S.P.<\/p>\n
Rajput. The card was, thus, a joint invitation card issued by both the<\/p>\n
respondents; that D.A.V. Centenary Public School, Mandi Dabwali, was<\/p>\n
under the overall control of the Managing Committee, respondent No.4,<\/p>\n
and its affairs are run as per the directions of the said respondent<\/p>\n
including recruitment of the staff as well as the grant of funds etc.; that<\/p>\n
the venue of ill-fated function was Rajiv Marriage Palace, Mandi<\/p>\n
Dabwali, with Mr. M.P. Bidlan, Deputy Commissioner, as the Chief<\/p>\n
Guest; that the function was an open public function and persons other<\/p>\n
than invitees could also attend the same; that the School had collected<\/p>\n
annual insurance premium from the students along with the annual fee;<\/p>\n
that respondents No.4 and 5 had nowhere claimed in the written
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                71<\/span><\/p>\n
statement that the Marriage Palace was hired for the day for a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.6,000\/-; that even payment of Rs.6,000\/- towards the hiring charges<\/p>\n
of the venue was not proved to have been made; that there was only<\/p>\n
one gate for entrance and exit to Rajiv Marriage Palace and the width of<\/p>\n
the gate was no more than 10′ X 12′; that there was only one gate for<\/p>\n
entry and exit to the Pandal; that there were nearly 700 to 800 chairs<\/p>\n
placed inside the Pandal and the central passage inside the Pandal was<\/p>\n
blocked by the front rows of chairs and sofas; that no safety measures<\/p>\n
were taken by the School to prevent any untoward incident like fire or<\/p>\n
stampede in the course of the function; that when the entire Pandal was<\/p>\n
engulfed in fire, it was impossible for the children and the ladies to move<\/p>\n
out of a single exit gate provided for that purpose; that the respondents<\/p>\n
had not made any alternative arrangement for exit of visitors trapped<\/p>\n
inside the Pandal in case of emergency; and that no Fire Brigade or<\/p>\n
Ambulance or any other arrangement with regard to safety and security<\/p>\n
of the visitors especially ladies and children were made.<\/p>\n
          The Commission has on the above findings of fact held that<\/p>\n
the School had failed to exercise due care expected of a reasonable and<\/p>\n
prudent person in disregard of the safety of those who were invited to<\/p>\n
attend the function including students, parents and the staff. Relying<\/p>\n
upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.S. Grewal’s case<\/p>\n
(supra), the Commission declared that the School was duty bound to<\/p>\n
take proper care for the safety of the children under its charge, which<\/p>\n
care the School had failed to take in the instant case. The School was,<\/p>\n
thus, negligent in the discharge of its legal obligations. The legal injury<\/p>\n
caused thereby was an actionable tort, observed the Commission.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 72<\/span><\/p>\n
          There is, in our opinion, no infirmity leave alone, any perversity<\/p>\n
in the findings of fact recorded by the Commission. The material on<\/p>\n
record was more than sufficient for the Commission to support the<\/p>\n
findings recorded by it and the legal inferences that inexorably flow from<\/p>\n
such findings. The very fact that the School did not have enough space<\/p>\n
in its own premises to organize the Annual Function, did not absolve it<\/p>\n
of the legal obligation to act prudently and to ensure that the children,<\/p>\n
staff and the parents invited to such a function are safe wherever the<\/p>\n
same may be held. That there was no other suitable place in Dabwali<\/p>\n
where the function could be held also did not mean that the School<\/p>\n
could hold the function in a Marriage Palace which admittedly had no<\/p>\n
safety measures whatsoever to take care of any emergency.<\/p>\n
          The argument that the place chosen by the School was<\/p>\n
functional and the School had no reason to believe that it would not<\/p>\n
have sufficient safety measures as required under law has not<\/p>\n
impressed us. The standard of care that may be required would vary<\/p>\n
from case to case and situation to situation. In the case of children of<\/p>\n
tender age, the care that the School Authorities were expected to take<\/p>\n
regarding their safety was much higher in comparison to the care which<\/p>\n
may be required qua adults. Children are under a disability. They need<\/p>\n
care and protection more than the grown ups. Parents who leave their<\/p>\n
children to the care of the School are entitled to rest assured that the<\/p>\n
School would act prudently while dealing with their wards and would do<\/p>\n
nothing that may in the slightest expose them to danger or compromise<\/p>\n
their safety and security. The choice of the venue for the function was,<\/p>\n
therefore, an onerous decision which the School ought to have taken
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              73<\/span><\/p>\n
having regard to all the attendant risks, hazards and imponderables that<\/p>\n
could be reasonably foreseen in a public function attended not only by<\/p>\n
the children, parents and teachers but even the general public. The<\/p>\n
School ought to have realized that holding of a function in a Marriage<\/p>\n
Palace may not be the best option especially when the Marriage Palace,<\/p>\n
did not have the statutory completion certificate and was promoting its<\/p>\n
commercial interests by offering the place gratis to the School. The<\/p>\n
School ought to have known that in a function which is open to general<\/p>\n
public, a Pandal with a capacity of 500 to 600 persons spread over no<\/p>\n
more than an area measuring 100′ X 70′, a gathering of 1200 to 1500<\/p>\n
persons could result in a stampede and expose to harm everyone<\/p>\n
participating in the function especially the children who were otherwise<\/p>\n
incapable of taking care of their safety. The school ought to have known<\/p>\n
that the availability of only one exit gate from the Marriage Palace and<\/p>\n
one from the Pandal would       prove insufficient in the event of any<\/p>\n
untoward incident taking place in the course of function. The School<\/p>\n
ought to have taken care to restrict the number of invitees to what could<\/p>\n
be reasonably accommodated instead of allowing all and sundry to<\/p>\n
attend and in the process increase the chances of a stampede. The<\/p>\n
School ought to have seen that sufficient circulation space in and around<\/p>\n
the seating area was provided so that the people could quickly move out<\/p>\n
of the place in case the need so arose. Suffice it to say that a<\/p>\n
reasonably prudent School Management organizing an annual function<\/p>\n
could and indeed was duty bound to take care and ensure that no harm<\/p>\n
came to anyone who attended the function whether as an invitee or<\/p>\n
otherwise, by taking appropriate steps to provide for safety measures
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                74<\/span><\/p>\n
like fire fighting arrangements, exit points , space for circulation, crowd<\/p>\n
control   and the like.     And that obligation remained unmitigated<\/p>\n
regardless whether the function was held within the School premises or<\/p>\n
at another place chosen by the Management of the School, because the<\/p>\n
children continued to be under the care of the School and so did the<\/p>\n
obligation of the School to prevent any harm coming to them.          The<\/p>\n
principle of proximity creating an obligation for     the School qua its<\/p>\n
students and invitees to the function would make the School liable for<\/p>\n
any negligence in either the choice of the venue of the function or the<\/p>\n
degree of care that ought to have been taken to prevent any harm<\/p>\n
coming to those who had come to watch and\/or participate in the event.<\/p>\n
Even the test of foreseeability of the harm must be held to have been<\/p>\n
satisfied from the point of view of an ordinary and reasonably prudent<\/p>\n
person. That is because a reasonably prudent person could foresee<\/p>\n
danger to those attending a function in a place big enough to<\/p>\n
accommodate only 500 to 600 people but stretched beyond its capacity<\/p>\n
to accommodate double that number. It could also be foreseen that<\/p>\n
there was hardly any space for circulation within the Pandal. In the event<\/p>\n
of any mishap, a stampede was inevitable in which women and children<\/p>\n
who were attending in large number would be worst sufferers as indeed<\/p>\n
they turned out to be. Loose electric connections, crude lighting<\/p>\n
arrangements and an electric load heavier than what the entire system<\/p>\n
was   geared to take was a recipe for a human tragedy to occur.<\/p>\n
Absence of any fire extinguishing arrangements within the Pandal and a<\/p>\n
single exit from the Pandal hardly enough for the people to run out in the<\/p>\n
event of fire could have put any prudent person handling such an event
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               75<\/span><\/p>\n
to serious thought about the safety of those attending the function<\/p>\n
especially the small children who had been brought to the venue in<\/p>\n
large numbers. Applying the foresight of a reasonable person to the fact<\/p>\n
situation which the evidence established before the Commission, we<\/p>\n
have no hesitation     in holding that the Commission was justified in<\/p>\n
declaring that the School was negligent in the matter of arranging the<\/p>\n
function and providing security qua those whom it owed the duty to take<\/p>\n
care.\n<\/p>\n
          The decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajkot<\/p>\n
Municipal Corporation v. Manjulaben Jayantilal Nakum and Others<\/a><\/p>\n
(1997) 9 Supreme Court Cases 552 heavy reliance upon which was<\/p>\n
placed by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel for the School,<\/p>\n
does not, in our opinion, lend any assistance to the School or its<\/p>\n
Management. On a comprehensive review of the case law on the<\/p>\n
subject, the Court in that case observed:-\n<\/p>\n
                     “The degree of carelessness in breach of duty<\/p>\n
                     would, therefore, vary from case to case and it<\/p>\n
                     should not unduly be extended or confined or limited<\/p>\n
                     or circumscribed to all situations.    The attending<\/p>\n
                     circumstances require evaluation and application to<\/p>\n
                     a given set of facts in the case on hand”.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                     XXX       XXX       XXX       XXX       XXX      XX<\/p>\n
                     “The negligence lies in failure to take such steps as<\/p>\n
                     a reasonable, prudent man would have taken in the<\/p>\n
                     given circumstances. What constitutes carelessness<\/p>\n
                     is the conduct and not the result of inadvertence.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                76<\/span><\/p>\n
                    Thus, negligence in this sense is a ground for<\/p>\n
                    liability in tort”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         What is noteworthy is that the Court was, in that case, dealing<\/p>\n
with a claim arising out of the sudden fall of a tree causing death of a<\/p>\n
road user. The question was whether there was proximity of relationship<\/p>\n
between the parties, and foreseeability of danger and duty of care to be<\/p>\n
performed by the defendant to avoid the accident or to prevent danger<\/p>\n
to the person of the deceased. The Court answered all the three in<\/p>\n
negative and held that there was no proximity of relationship between<\/p>\n
the Corporation and a road user nor any foreseeability of danger where<\/p>\n
a healthy tree suddenly falls and injures a road user. Consequently,<\/p>\n
there was no failure to take care. The Court observed:<\/p>\n
                    “If the duty of maintaining constant vigil or verifying<\/p>\n
                    or testing the healthy condition of trees at public<\/p>\n
                    places with so many other functions to be<\/p>\n
                    performed, is cast on it, the effect would be that the<\/p>\n
                    authority would omit to perform statutory duty. Duty<\/p>\n
                    of care, therefore, must be carefully examined and<\/p>\n
                    the foreseeability of damage or danger to the person<\/p>\n
                    or property must be corelated to the public duty of<\/p>\n
                    care to infer that the omission\/non-feasance gives<\/p>\n
                    rise to actionable claim for damages against the<\/p>\n
                    defendant”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         In the light of what we have stated above, we have no<\/p>\n
hesitation in answering question No.1 in the negative.<\/p>\n
Re: Question No.2
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                77<\/span><\/p>\n
          The Commission of Inquiry has recorded a clear finding that<\/p>\n
the School had failed to adduce any evidence to establish that Rajiv<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace was hired for use on payment of a sum of Rs.6,000\/-<\/p>\n
as alleged by the School. It noted the denial of that allegation by one of<\/p>\n
the owners of the Marriage Palace, according to whom use of Marriage<\/p>\n
Palace was given gratis to gain commercial publicity for the place. The<\/p>\n
Commission has held that regardless whether the place had been hired<\/p>\n
for consideration or had been taken for use gratis, the Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
was, for purposes of the function organized by the School, its agent. The<\/p>\n
Commission has, relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court in<\/p>\n
Pushpabai Parshottam Udeshi’s case (supra), Minu B. Mehta’s case<\/p>\n
(supra), and M.S. Grewal’s case (supra) and a few English decisions,<\/p>\n
taken the view that the Principal is vicariously liable for the acts of his<\/p>\n
Agent performed during the course of the agency. The Commission<\/p>\n
observed that the vicarious liability of the Master does not depend upon<\/p>\n
whether the act is lawful or unlawful and that the Principal would be<\/p>\n
liable for the acts of his Agent committed in the course of the contract<\/p>\n
even though the Agent may have acted in contravention of some of the<\/p>\n
provisions of the statute or the rules thereunder.<\/p>\n
          Finding fault with the conclusion arrived at by the Commission,<\/p>\n
Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel appearing for respondents<\/p>\n
No.4 and 5, strenuously argued that the School had only a commercial<\/p>\n
relation with the Marriage Palace and that the commission was in error<\/p>\n
in holding that the relationship of Master and Servant or Principal and<\/p>\n
Agent came about between the two. It was argued by Mr. Atma Ram<\/p>\n
that the School was like any other person in that position to be taken as
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                78<\/span><\/p>\n
a client\/customer of the Marriage Palace who was for all intents and<\/p>\n
purposes an independent Contractor engaged to render services in<\/p>\n
connection with the function in question. In the event of any mishap<\/p>\n
taking place in the course of function resulting in any damage or loss of<\/p>\n
lives, the School was in no way responsible for any such negligence. It<\/p>\n
was contended that the School had no reason to believe that the<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace was unauthorizedly built, did not have a completion<\/p>\n
certificate or that the arrangements made by it whether for lighting or<\/p>\n
other purposes were unsafe or unsatisfactory thereby jeopardizing the<\/p>\n
safety and security of the invitees. The School was, according to Mr.<\/p>\n
Rajive Atma Ram, supremely confident that once the Management of<\/p>\n
the event was placed in professional hands, the safety and security of<\/p>\n
the guests\/participants would be taken care of by them.<\/p>\n
          On behalf of petitioner, it was per contra argued that the<\/p>\n
School had shifted the function from out of its premises for want of<\/p>\n
sufficient space and that according to the evidence on record all<\/p>\n
arrangements including the arrangements for fixing of chairs, lighting,<\/p>\n
standby generators, safety and security were that of the organizers of<\/p>\n
the function. The school was the sole organizer of the function who had<\/p>\n
cut corners to save expense and arranged an unsatisfactory and wholly<\/p>\n
insecure place for holding the function in total disregard of its legal<\/p>\n
obligations of taking care especially when children and women formed a<\/p>\n
major part of the audience qua whom special care had to be taken by<\/p>\n
the organizers. In the alternative, it was submitted that if the School had<\/p>\n
entered into any arrangement for holding the function with any other<\/p>\n
agency like the Marriage Palace on whatever terms that may have been
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                79<\/span><\/p>\n
settled between the two, it would be liable for the consequences flowing<\/p>\n
from any act of negligence on its own part as much as it would be liable<\/p>\n
for the negligence of its Contractor for that function who would, in the<\/p>\n
eyes of law, be an Agent of the School. The Commission was, therefore,<\/p>\n
justified in holding the School liable for its own negligence and also the<\/p>\n
negligence of the Marriage Palace owners.\n<\/p>\n
          M\/s H.S. Hooda, Advocate General, Haryana and Randhir<\/p>\n
Singh, Additional Advocate General, Haryana, also supported the same<\/p>\n
line of reasoning and contended that not only was the School itself<\/p>\n
negligent but even if it had engaged the services of any agent for<\/p>\n
holding that function and providing support needed for the same,<\/p>\n
negligence of any such person brought into the scheme of things had<\/p>\n
also to be treated as negligence of the School itself in the event of<\/p>\n
something going wrong. Learned counsel appearing for the Municipal<\/p>\n
Committee, Dabwali and Electricity Board pursued a similar line of<\/p>\n
reasoning.\n<\/p>\n
          On behalf of the Marriage Palace owners, respondent No.9, it<\/p>\n
was contended by Mr. Mohunta that the School was the occupier of the<\/p>\n
premises at the time of the unfortunate incident and since the control<\/p>\n
over everything relevant to the holding of the function lay in the hands of<\/p>\n
the School, it could not shift its responsibility to the Marriage Palace.<\/p>\n
Relying upon certain     English decisions, Mr. Mohunta argued that<\/p>\n
although there was no comparable legislation in this Country to what in<\/p>\n
United Kingdom is called the Occupiers’ Liability Act, 1957, the<\/p>\n
principles underlying the said legislation were well recognized in<\/p>\n
common law and could be attracted to analogous situations.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               80<\/span><\/p>\n
          The fateful function was organized by the School and the<\/p>\n
Management at the helm of its affairs. Any such School function, would<\/p>\n
in the ordinary course, have been conducted within the School premises<\/p>\n
because it is the School that organizes and controls the function not only<\/p>\n
as to the content of the programme but also the manner in which the<\/p>\n
same may be performed and completed. So also the School had the<\/p>\n
complete freedom not only to decide about the venue for the function but<\/p>\n
also the manner and the conditions subject to which the same shall be<\/p>\n
conducted. That the School did not have sufficient space for holding of<\/p>\n
such a big function was admitted before us. This only meant that the<\/p>\n
function had to be organized outside the School premises, but the fact<\/p>\n
remained that the function continued to be a School function regardless<\/p>\n
of the venue at which it was held. It cannot be disputed that for holding<\/p>\n
of any such function, the School would have to make necessary<\/p>\n
arrangements not only for a tent\/shamiana and the like but also arrange<\/p>\n
electricity, refreshment, tea, water etc. The School could make these<\/p>\n
arrangements of its own or employ an agency for doing so.          In the<\/p>\n
present case, according to the School, it had engaged Rajiv Marriage<\/p>\n
Palace for providing the necessary support in terms of accommodation<\/p>\n
etc. required for holding of the function. The School alleges that the<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace had agreed to do the needful for a consideration of<\/p>\n
Rs.6,000\/- only which fact has been disputed by the Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
Owners. But even assuming that the arrangements were for a payment,<\/p>\n
the legal relationship that arose between the School on the one hand<\/p>\n
and the Marriage Palace Owners on the other hand, was that of a<\/p>\n
Principal and Agent, the purpose underlying the agency being a
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                81<\/span><\/p>\n
satisfactory conduct and conclusion of the entire programme.           The<\/p>\n
function was for all intents and purposes a school function, controlled<\/p>\n
entirely by the School. The kind of sitting arrangement that was required<\/p>\n
to be made for the guests invited to the function, the kind of lighting<\/p>\n
arrangement that was required to be made in and around the Pandal,<\/p>\n
the size of the stage that was required to be prepared for the function<\/p>\n
and the kind of decoration that was required to be made were all matters<\/p>\n
that lay entirely in the discretion of the School Authorities. It is common<\/p>\n
knowledge that not only for marriage ceremonies but also other similar<\/p>\n
functions where venues are hired, the hiring clients of the premises have<\/p>\n
a free hand in deciding as to how the available space within the<\/p>\n
premises can be utilized and what facilities, safeguards, precautions<\/p>\n
and comforts need to be provided to those attending or invited to the<\/p>\n
function. The fateful function held on 23.12.1995 was not for that matter<\/p>\n
different from any other function in which the School remained in<\/p>\n
complete control of what it wanted to be arranged and the manner in<\/p>\n
which the same had to be arranged. The participation or presence of<\/p>\n
the owners of the Marriage Palace only suggests that they were carrying<\/p>\n
out the instructions given to them by the School Authorities. At any rate<\/p>\n
even if the School had given a free hand to the Marriage Palace to<\/p>\n
organize the function, the relationship between the School and the<\/p>\n
Marriage Palace did not undergo any change and continued to be that of<\/p>\n
a Principal and Agent.\n<\/p>\n
          The legal relationship between the School and the Marriage<\/p>\n
Palace as Principal and Agent apart, both were on the principles of<\/p>\n
common law liable to third parties as occupier of the premises which
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              82<\/span><\/p>\n
went up in flames because of their negligence to take care. In Salmond<\/p>\n
on the Law of Torts (Tenth Edition), the Law on the point is<\/p>\n
stated\/summarised as below:-\n<\/p>\n
                    “In dealing with dangerous premises it is necessary<\/p>\n
                    to distinguish between the responsibilities of the<\/p>\n
                    owner and those of the occupier or possessor.<\/p>\n
                    Generally speaking, liability in such cases is based<\/p>\n
                    on occupancy or control, not on ownership. The<\/p>\n
                    person responsible for the condition of the premises<\/p>\n
                    is he who is in actual possession of them for the<\/p>\n
                    time being, whether he is the owner or not, for it is<\/p>\n
                    he who has the immediate supervision and control<\/p>\n
                    and the power of permitting or prohibiting the entry<\/p>\n
                    of other persons”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          In Wheat v. E. Lacon & Co. (1966)1 All England Reports<\/p>\n
582 (HL), Lord Denning       declared that anyone exercising sufficient<\/p>\n
degree of control over the premises would as an occupier be under a<\/p>\n
duty of care towards those who came lawfully on the premises. The<\/p>\n
following passage is, in this connection, apposite:<\/p>\n
                    “It was simply a convenient word to denote a person<\/p>\n
                    who had a sufficient degree of control over premises<\/p>\n
                    to put him under a duty of care towards those who<\/p>\n
                    came lawfully on to the premises. In order to be an<\/p>\n
                    ‘occupier’ it is not necessary for a person to have<\/p>\n
                    entire control over the premises. He need not have<\/p>\n
                    exclusive occupation. Suffice it that he has some
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   83<\/span><\/p>\n
                    degree of control. He may share the control with<\/p>\n
                    others. Two or more may be occupiers. And<\/p>\n
                    whenever this happens, each is under a duty to use<\/p>\n
                    care towards persons coming lawfully on to the<\/p>\n
                    premises, dependent on his degree of control. If<\/p>\n
                    each fails in his duty, each is liable to a visitor who is<\/p>\n
                    injured in consequence of his failure but each may<\/p>\n
                    have a claim to contribution from the other”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          In the instant case while the School had the absolute right to<\/p>\n
restrict the entry to the venue of the function being organized by it and<\/p>\n
everything that would make the function go as per its requirements, the<\/p>\n
owners had not completely given up their control over the premises, and<\/p>\n
were indeed present at the time the incident occurred. The facts and<\/p>\n
circumstances brought on record in the course of the enquiry establish<\/p>\n
that the School and the Marriage Palace owners were both occupying<\/p>\n
the premises and were, therefore, under an obligation to take care for<\/p>\n
the safety of not only the students, but everyone who entered the<\/p>\n
premises on their invitation or with their permission specific or implied.<\/p>\n
As to the obligation of an occupier to take care qua his invitees a long<\/p>\n
line of English decisions have settled the legal position. We may, at this<\/p>\n
stage, briefly refer to some of those decisions:\n<\/p>\n
          In Thomson v. Cremin and Others (1953)2 All England<\/p>\n
Reports 1185, it was observed:\n<\/p>\n
                    “The duty of the invitor towards the invitee is,in my<\/p>\n
                    opinion, a duty personal to the former, in the sense<\/p>\n
                    that he does not get rid of the obligation by
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   84<\/span><\/p>\n
                   entrusting     its   performance       to    independent<\/p>\n
                   contractors. It is true that the invitor is not an insurer:<\/p>\n
                   he warrants however, that due care and skill to<\/p>\n
                   make the premises reasonably safe for the invitee<\/p>\n
                   have been exercised, whether by himself, his<\/p>\n
                   servants, or agents or by independent contractors<\/p>\n
                   whom he employs to perform his duty. He does not<\/p>\n
                   fulfill the warranty merely by leaving the work to<\/p>\n
                   contractors,     however,    reputable      or   generally<\/p>\n
                   competent. His warranty is broken if they fail to<\/p>\n
                   exercise the proper care and skill. This is only an<\/p>\n
                   instance of the general rule which was stated by<\/p>\n
                   LORD BLACKBURN in another connection in Dalton v.<\/p>\n
                   Angus (6) (6 App. Cas. 829), where he distinguished<\/p>\n
                   the case of what has been called the collateral<\/p>\n
                   negligence of sub-contractor from their negligence in<\/p>\n
                   failing to perform a duty resting on the principal<\/p>\n
                   himself”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         In Hartwell v. Grayson Rollo and Clover Docks Limited<\/p>\n
and Others (1947) 1 King’s Bench Division 901, similarly it was<\/p>\n
observed:\n<\/p>\n
                   “In my opinion the true view is that when a person<\/p>\n
                   invites another to a place where they both have<\/p>\n
                   business, the invitation creates a duty on the part of<\/p>\n
                   the invitor to take reasonable care that the place<\/p>\n
                   does not       contain or to give warning of hidden
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               85<\/span><\/p>\n
                   dangers, no matter whether the place belongs to the<\/p>\n
                   invitor or is in his exclusive occupation. Although the<\/p>\n
                   rule has generally been stated with reference to<\/p>\n
                   owners or occupiers of premises, it is indicated by<\/p>\n
                   Lord Wright in the case of Glasgow Corporation v.<\/p>\n
                   Muir and others (I) that the occupation need not be<\/p>\n
                   exclusive. He said there: “Before dealing with the<\/p>\n
                   facts, I may observe that in cases of ‘invitation’ the<\/p>\n
                   duty has most commonly reference to the structural<\/p>\n
                   condition of the premises, but it may clearly apply to<\/p>\n
                   the use which the occupier (or whoever has control<\/p>\n
                   so far as material) of the premises permits a third<\/p>\n
                   party to make of the premises”. Invitors, of course,<\/p>\n
                   do not as a rule invite others on       business      to<\/p>\n
                   premises in which the invitors have no business<\/p>\n
                   interest or control, but they may have an interest and<\/p>\n
                   control which falls short of exclusive occupation, and<\/p>\n
                   where they have such an interest and control and<\/p>\n
                   invite others to come to the spot on business they<\/p>\n
                   are bound, in my opinion, to warn the invitee against<\/p>\n
                   concealed dangers of which they know, or ought to<\/p>\n
                   know, even if such dangers are not created by their<\/p>\n
                   own positive acts”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         In H & N Emanuel Ltd. v. Greater London Council and<\/p>\n
Another (1971) 2 All England Reports 835, the Court of appeal was<\/p>\n
dealing with a case where an independent contractor was negligent
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              86<\/span><\/p>\n
resulting in the escape of fire and damage to the neighbouring building.<\/p>\n
The Court held the occupier liable and observed:\n<\/p>\n
                   “An occupier was liable for the escape of fire caused<\/p>\n
                   by the negligence not only of his servant, but also of<\/p>\n
                   his independent contractor and anyone else who<\/p>\n
                   was on his land with his leave and licence; the only<\/p>\n
                   occasion when the occupier would not be liable for<\/p>\n
                   negligence was when the negligence was the<\/p>\n
                   negligence of a stranger, although (per Lord<\/p>\n
                   Denning MR) for this purpose a ‘stranger’ would<\/p>\n
                   include a person on the land with the occupier’s<\/p>\n
                   permission who, in lighting a fire or allowing it to<\/p>\n
                   escape, acted contrary to anything which the<\/p>\n
                   occupier could anticipate that he would do; in the<\/p>\n
                   present case the council were ‘occupiers’ of the<\/p>\n
                   premises because they had a sufficient degree of<\/p>\n
                   control over the activities of persons thereon and K’s<\/p>\n
                   men were not ‘strangers’ because, although they<\/p>\n
                   were forbidden to burn rubbish, it was their regular<\/p>\n
                   practice to do so; the council could reasonably have<\/p>\n
                   anticipated that the men would light a fire and ought<\/p>\n
                   to have taken more effective steps to prevent them”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         In the light of the above, we have no hesitation in holding that<\/p>\n
the One Man Commission of Inquiry was perfectly justified in holding the<\/p>\n
School and the Marriage Palace liable for the act of tort arising out of<\/p>\n
their negligence and duty to take care about the safety of all those
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  87<\/span><\/p>\n
invited to the function at Dabwali. Question No.2 is answered<\/p>\n
accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
Re: Question No.3<\/p>\n
          On behalf of School, it was argued by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram,<\/p>\n
learned senior counsel, that the Commission of Inquiry had not fairly<\/p>\n
apportioned the liability among the School and other tort-feasors. It was<\/p>\n
urged that the Commission was influenced only by the income of the<\/p>\n
School while fixing its liability at 80% of the total.      The economic<\/p>\n
capacity of the School or the Managing Committee under whose control<\/p>\n
the School functions was not, according to learned senior counsel,<\/p>\n
determinative of the extent of the liability that could and ought to be<\/p>\n
fastened on the School. The liability fixed upon the Municipal Committee<\/p>\n
and the Electricity Board was unreasonably low even when the<\/p>\n
Commission has recorded a clear finding that the incident could have<\/p>\n
been avoided only if the employees of the Municipal Committee and the<\/p>\n
Electricity Board had performed      their   duties properly. So also the<\/p>\n
liability of the State had not been properly fixed having regard to the<\/p>\n
magnitude of the default on the part of its officers and employees. The<\/p>\n
present was, according to learned senior counsel, a fit case where the<\/p>\n
liability could be apportioned    afresh having regard to the extent of<\/p>\n
negligence attributable to each one of the tort-feasors.<\/p>\n
          On behalf of the State, Municipal Committee, Dabwali, and the<\/p>\n
Electricity Board, it was argued that the major part of the liability arising<\/p>\n
out of the tragedy must fall on the School and its Agent, the Marriage<\/p>\n
Palace, and had been rightly placed by the Commission on them jointly<\/p>\n
and severally. There was, according to the learned counsel, no
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                88<\/span><\/p>\n
comparison between an actual tort-feasor and tort-feasor who was being<\/p>\n
held responsible only because of its omission to take steps which could<\/p>\n
have prevented the tragedy.\n<\/p>\n
          The Commission of Inquiry has, no doubt, fixed the liability of<\/p>\n
the School at 80% of the total amount payable to the claimants but it is<\/p>\n
wrong to say that the     higher percentage    of liability fixed upon the<\/p>\n
School was only because it was in a position to pay the amount<\/p>\n
recoverable from it. Apportionment of liability arising out of act of tort<\/p>\n
would vary from case to case and situation to situation. There is no cut<\/p>\n
and dried formula that can be applied while fixing liability among several<\/p>\n
tort-feasors. Broadly speaking, the liability ought to be apportioned<\/p>\n
depending upon the nature and extent of the role played by the tort-<\/p>\n
feasor in the commission of the tort and the resultant loss to the<\/p>\n
claimants. In the opinion of the Commission, the School being the major<\/p>\n
player in the tort arising out of its negligence ought to shoulder the<\/p>\n
responsibility to the extent of 80%, while the State, the Municipal<\/p>\n
Committee and the Electricity Board would take only 10%, 5% and 5%,<\/p>\n
respectively. That ratio, in our opinion, is open to a slight correction in<\/p>\n
order to balance the equities and also to make the apportionment as<\/p>\n
nearly as possible proportionate to the extent of negligence and its<\/p>\n
effect. In the case of Association of Victims of Uphaar Tragedy’s<\/p>\n
case (supra), the fire incident had claimed as many as 59 lives and<\/p>\n
caused injuries to 203 men, women and children who had            gone to<\/p>\n
Uphar Cinema to watch a Hindi Movie. In a petition under Article 226 of<\/p>\n
the Constitution filed by the Association of Victims of the Tragedy, the<\/p>\n
Court had not only held the owners of the Cinema, Delhi Vidyut Board,
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                89<\/span><\/p>\n
Municipal Corporation of Delhi and Licensing Authority guilty of<\/p>\n
negligence but awarded compensation against them to the claimants.<\/p>\n
The Court had, while fixing the liability to the extent of 55% of the total<\/p>\n
upon the owners of the Cinema, held Delhi Vidyut Board, the Licensing<\/p>\n
Authority and the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, liable to the extent of<\/p>\n
15% each. It is evident from a reading of the decision rendered by the<\/p>\n
Court that a distinction was made between the tort-feasors inter-se. A<\/p>\n
heavier liability was fastened on the person whose primary duty it was to<\/p>\n
take care about the safety of the Cinema goers. In the absence of any<\/p>\n
reason to the contrary we are inclined to adopt the same approach for<\/p>\n
apportionment of liability in the present case also. Consequently, while<\/p>\n
the School and its Agent namely respondent No.9-Rajiv Marriage Palace<\/p>\n
would be jointly and severally liable to pay 55% of the total amount of<\/p>\n
compensation payable to the claimants, the remaining tort-feasors,<\/p>\n
namely the State of Haryana, Haryana State Electricity Board (now<\/p>\n
named as “Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam) and the Municipal<\/p>\n
Committee, Dabwali, shall be liable to pay 15% each of the total amount.<\/p>\n
We make it clear that the State Government shall, as recommended by<\/p>\n
the Commission of Inquiry, pay the amount on its own behalf and on<\/p>\n
behalf of respondents Electricity Board and Municipal Committee,<\/p>\n
Dabwali, in the first instance but shall be free to recover the same from<\/p>\n
them to the extent of the liability that we have fixed for the said two<\/p>\n
respondents.\n<\/p>\n
          Question No.3 is answered accordingly.\n<\/p>\n
Re: Question No.4<\/p>\n
          It was contended by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   90<\/span><\/p>\n
counsel, appearing on behalf of respondents No.4 and 5, that the<\/p>\n
claimants were not entitled to make any claim for enhancement of<\/p>\n
amounts of compensation awarded in their favour. He argued that the<\/p>\n
amounts awarded by the Commission in favour of the claimants were<\/p>\n
based on a consensus arrived at before the Commission by not only the<\/p>\n
claimants but by the respondents also, which could not at this stage be<\/p>\n
displaced by the claimants. He drew our attention in this regard to the<\/p>\n
following passages appearing in         the report submitted by the<\/p>\n
Commission while dealing with the claims arising out of death of minor<\/p>\n
children:-\n<\/p>\n
                   “In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all<\/p>\n
                   unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar that<\/p>\n
                   there is a consensus between them that in view of<\/p>\n
                   the overwhelming case law on the subject and the<\/p>\n
                   principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case, an<\/p>\n
                   amount of Rupees two lacs may be held to be ‘just’<\/p>\n
                   compensation to be paid to the claimants in each of<\/p>\n
                   these   76    cases.    Accordingly,   accepting     their<\/p>\n
                   submissions and also finding the same to be just<\/p>\n
                   and reasonable as also keeping in view the principle<\/p>\n
                   laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra),               an<\/p>\n
                   amount of Rupees two lacs is hereby fixed to be<\/p>\n
                   payable      by   way    of   compensation      to    the<\/p>\n
                   claimant\/claimants in each of these 76 cases”.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                   XXX       XXX          XXX     XXX        XXX         XX<\/p>\n
                   “In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   91<\/span><\/p>\n
                   unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar that<\/p>\n
                   there is a consensus between them that in view of<\/p>\n
                   the overwhelming case law on the subject and the<\/p>\n
                   principle laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case, an<\/p>\n
                   amount of Rupees 4.10 lacs may be held to be ‘just’<\/p>\n
                   compensation to be paid to the claimants in each of<\/p>\n
                   these   38    cases.    Accordingly,   accepting     their<\/p>\n
                   submissions and also finding the same to be just<\/p>\n
                   and reasonable as also keeping in view the principle<\/p>\n
                   laid down in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra), an<\/p>\n
                   amount of Rupees 4.10 lacs is hereby fixed to be<\/p>\n
                   payable      by   way    of   compensation      to    the<\/p>\n
                   claimant\/claimants in each of these 38 cases”.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                   XXX       XXX          XXX     XXX        XXX         XX<\/p>\n
                   “In fact, the learned counsel for the parties have all<\/p>\n
                   unanimously agreed and submitted at the Bar<\/p>\n
                   stating that there is a consensus between them that<\/p>\n
                   in view of the overwhelming case law on the subject<\/p>\n
                   and the principle laid down both in M.S. Grewal’s<\/p>\n
                   case and Lata Wadhwa’s case, an amount of<\/p>\n
                   Rupees 5 lacs may be held to be the ‘just’<\/p>\n
                   compensation to be paid to the heirs of all the 20<\/p>\n
                   deceased children in the age group of 16 to 22<\/p>\n
                   years. Accordingly, accepting their submissions and<\/p>\n
                   also finding the same to be just and reasonable, the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 92<\/span><\/p>\n
                    amount of Rupees 5 lacs is hereby fixed to be<\/p>\n
                    payable    by   way    of   compensation     to    the<\/p>\n
                    claimant\/claimants in each of these 20 cases”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Per contra, Mrs. Anju Arora, learned counsel appearing for the<\/p>\n
petitioner-Association argued that the claimants gave no consent like the<\/p>\n
one referred to in the report. All that was agreed before the Commission<\/p>\n
was that the principles of payment of compensation as set out in Lata<\/p>\n
Wadhwa’s case (supra) could be adopted while determining the<\/p>\n
amounts payable to the claimants where children of different age groups<\/p>\n
had been killed in the tragedy. The question as to what would be the<\/p>\n
amount of compensation on the said principles was a matter which had<\/p>\n
to be determined by the Commission and on which the claimants had<\/p>\n
made no concession. In support of that submission she placed on record<\/p>\n
affidavits sworn by her and by M\/s Harpal Singh, President of Dabwali<\/p>\n
Fire Tragedy Victim Association, Sukhcharan Singh Sran, Dewan Chand<\/p>\n
Garg, Ravinder Kumar Tayal, Radhey Shyam Challana, Advocates, who<\/p>\n
appeared for the claimants before the Commission of Inquiry. All these<\/p>\n
affidavits emphatically deny making of any statement or concession on<\/p>\n
behalf of the claimants that        a sum of Rs.2,00,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
compensation in each one of the 172 cases arising out of death of<\/p>\n
children would suffice or was just and fair compensation. It was<\/p>\n
submitted that the alleged consensus was not evidenced by any<\/p>\n
statement recorded at any stage of the proceedings nor was the making<\/p>\n
of any such concession mentioned in the interim orders passed by the<\/p>\n
Commission. The concession attributed to the petitioners in the final<\/p>\n
report has, according to learned counsel, come as a surprise to the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 93<\/span><\/p>\n
petitioner-Association and deserved to be eschewed from consideration.<\/p>\n
          Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, learned senior counsel, argued that in<\/p>\n
case the parties were to be relieved of the concessions made by them<\/p>\n
even the respondents ought to have the freedom of arguing that no such<\/p>\n
concession was made on their behalf either. No affidavit on behalf of<\/p>\n
the School has, however, been filed either by any School functionary or<\/p>\n
by the Advocates appearing on its behalf before the Commission<\/p>\n
repudiating or denying the concession attributed to the School. In the<\/p>\n
totality of these circumstances, therefore, and in the absence of any<\/p>\n
material to suggest that a concession       was indeed made before the<\/p>\n
Commission, we are of the opinion that no such concession was made<\/p>\n
or can stand in their way in praying for a reasonable enhancement in the<\/p>\n
amount of compensation payable to them. What holds true about the<\/p>\n
concession attributed to the petitioner-Association must, however, be<\/p>\n
equally true about the concession attributed to the School also although<\/p>\n
there is no specific denial on its part. Consequently, all that, the parties<\/p>\n
shall be deemed to have agreed to, was that the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation payable to the petitioners shall be determined on the<\/p>\n
principles stated in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra). As to what amount<\/p>\n
would become payable on the application of those principles was not,<\/p>\n
however, covered by any concession and would, therefore, remain open<\/p>\n
to be determined on a proper appreciation of the matter by this Court.<\/p>\n
          Question No.4 is accordingly answered in the affirmative.<\/p>\n
Re:Question No.5<\/p>\n
          The One Man Commission of Inquiry has dealt with the claims<\/p>\n
in different categories and awarded compensation accordingly. We also
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                94<\/span><\/p>\n
propose to similarly deal with the claims by reference to each category<\/p>\n
of cases.\n<\/p>\n
Category 1 Cases<\/p>\n
            In Category 1 fall cases involving children in the age group of<\/p>\n
one month to ten years.        The Commission has, as noticed earlier,<\/p>\n
awarded to the parents\/next of kin of each child killed in the incident a<\/p>\n
sum of Rs.2,00,000\/- by way of compensation. The Commission has,<\/p>\n
while doing so, taken support from the decisions of the Supreme Court<\/p>\n
including those delivered in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) and M.S.<\/p>\n
Grewal’s case (supra). Before us, while the claimants          prayed for<\/p>\n
enhancement of the amounts awarded by the Commission, respondent-<\/p>\n
School has sought reduction of the amount already awarded. The plea<\/p>\n
for enhancement was made by the claimants primarily on the basis that<\/p>\n
the amount of Rs.2,00,000\/- awarded on the analogy of Lata Wadhwa’s<\/p>\n
case (supra) ignored the escalation in the price index between 1989<\/p>\n
when the incident in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) occurred and 1995<\/p>\n
when the incident relevant to these cases took place. In the intervening<\/p>\n
period, the consumer price index having risen considerably, any amount<\/p>\n
of compensation based on the decision in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)<\/p>\n
can be accurate, fair and reasonable only if the amount is<\/p>\n
proportionately enhanced to take care of the escalation in the price<\/p>\n
index during the intervening period. Relying upon a Single Bench<\/p>\n
decision of High Court of Delhi in Ashok Sharma and Others v. Union<\/p>\n
of India and Others II<\/a>(2008) Accident and Compensation Cases 644,<\/p>\n
it was contended that the amount of compensation awarded to claimants
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             95<\/span><\/p>\n
in Category 1 ought to be raised to Rs.3,57,000\/-.<\/p>\n
         On behalf of respondent-School, it was, on the other hand,<\/p>\n
contended that the amount of compensation awarded by the<\/p>\n
Commission for children falling in the age group of one month to ten<\/p>\n
years was on the higher side and ought to be suitably reduced. In<\/p>\n
support of that submission, Mr. Rajive Atma Ram placed reliance upon<\/p>\n
the decision of the Supreme Court in New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v.<\/p>\n
Satender and Others AIR<\/a> 2007 Supreme Court 324, where the Court<\/p>\n
had awarded a sum of Rs.1,80,000\/- towards compensation for the<\/p>\n
death of a nine year child killed in a motor accident on 7.5.2002.<\/p>\n
Reliance was also placed by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram upon the decision of<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Kaushlya Devi v. Karan Arora and Others AIR<\/a><\/p>\n
2007 Supreme Court 1912 where a sum of Rs.1,00,000\/- was awarded<\/p>\n
towards compensation for a 14 years old boy killed in a road accident.<\/p>\n
In Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Syed Ibrahim and Others AIR<\/a> 2008<\/p>\n
Supreme Court 103 relied upon by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram, the amount<\/p>\n
of compensation awarded was limited to a sum of Rs.51,500\/- only for<\/p>\n
the death of a seven year old child in a road accident that occurred in<\/p>\n
the year 1994. It was submitted by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram that the<\/p>\n
amount of Rs.2,00,000\/- awarded by the Commission of Inquiry on the<\/p>\n
analogy of the decision of the Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa’s case<\/p>\n
(supra) was already on the higher side and did not call for any further<\/p>\n
enhancement.\n<\/p>\n
         In State of Haryana and Another v. Jasbir Kaur and Others<\/a><\/p>\n
(2003) 7 Supreme Court Cases 484, their Lordships of Supreme Court<\/p>\n
were dealing with a case involving determination of compensation for
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                96<\/span><\/p>\n
loss of life. The Court observed that compensation for loss of limbs or<\/p>\n
life   can hardly be weighed in golden scales and that while<\/p>\n
compensation need not be a windfall for the victim or the dependents<\/p>\n
left behind the same cannot be a pittance also. The Courts and<\/p>\n
Tribunals have a duty to weigh various factors in quantifying the amount<\/p>\n
of compensation which appears to be just. No mathematical precision<\/p>\n
can, however, be expected in such calculations. Compensation would<\/p>\n
depend upon the facts and circumstances and special features of each<\/p>\n
individual case. What is to be remembered is that compensation is just<\/p>\n
implying thereby that it can neither be whimsical nor arbitrary. It must be<\/p>\n
equitable, fair and reasonable.\n<\/p>\n
          In   New India Assurance Co. Ltd.’s case (supra), Arijit<\/p>\n
Pasayat, J., while dealing with the question of determination of<\/p>\n
compensation in cases where children are killed, observed:<\/p>\n
                    “There are some aspects of human life which are<\/p>\n
                    capable of monetary measurement, but the totality of<\/p>\n
                    human life is like the beauty of sunrise or the<\/p>\n
                    splendour of the stars, beyond the reach of<\/p>\n
                    monetary tape-measure.         The determination of<\/p>\n
                    damages for loss of human life is an extremely<\/p>\n
                    difficult task and it becomes all the more baffling<\/p>\n
                    when the deceased is a child and\/or a non-earning<\/p>\n
                    person. The future of a child is uncertain. Where the<\/p>\n
                    deceased was a child, he was earning nothing but<\/p>\n
                    had a prospect to earn. The question of assessment<\/p>\n
                    of compensation, therefore, becomes stiffer. The
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               97<\/span><\/p>\n
                    figure of compensation in such cases involves a<\/p>\n
                    good deal of guesswork. In cases, where parents<\/p>\n
                    are claimants, relevant factor would be age of<\/p>\n
                    parents”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           The Court further held that in the case of children of tender<\/p>\n
age, uncertainties abound making it difficult to quantify the prospects of<\/p>\n
the future increase in their income or the chances of advancement of<\/p>\n
their career. Uncertainties in regard to their academic pursuits,<\/p>\n
achievements in career and advancement in life are         so many that<\/p>\n
nothing can be assumed with reasonable certainty.<\/p>\n
          Reference may also be made           to the decision in Lata<\/p>\n
Wadhwa’s case (supra) in which the Supreme Court was dealing with<\/p>\n
claims arising out of a similar fire incident in which a large number of<\/p>\n
children had lost their lives. The Commission of Inquiry comprising<\/p>\n
Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, former Chief Justice of India, had, in that<\/p>\n
case, awarded a sum of Rs.50,000\/- towards compensation for the<\/p>\n
death of children in the age group of five to ten years. This amount was<\/p>\n
enhanced by the Supreme Court to Rs.1,50,000\/- to which was added a<\/p>\n
conventional figure of Rs.50,000\/- taking the total compensation to<\/p>\n
Rs.2,00,000\/-. While doing so, the Court observed:<\/p>\n
                    “Mr. Nariman, appearing for the TISCO on his own<\/p>\n
                    submitted that   the compensation     determined for<\/p>\n
                    the children of all age groups could be doubled, as<\/p>\n
                    in his view also, the determination made is grossly<\/p>\n
                    inadequate. Loss of a child to the parents is<\/p>\n
                    irrecoupable and no amount of money could
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 98<\/span><\/p>\n
                   compensate the parents. Having regard to the<\/p>\n
                   environment    from    which    these   children   were<\/p>\n
                   brought, their parents being reasonably well placed<\/p>\n
                   officials of the Tata Iron and Steel Company and on<\/p>\n
                   considering    the submission of Mr. Nariman, we<\/p>\n
                   would direct that the compensation amount for the<\/p>\n
                   children between the age group of 5 and 10 years<\/p>\n
                   should be three times. In other words, it should be<\/p>\n
                   Rs.1,50,000 to which the conventional figure of<\/p>\n
                   Rs.50,000 should be added and thus the total<\/p>\n
                   amount in each case would be Rs.2,00,000\/-“.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         It was argued on behalf of School by Mr. Rajive Atma Ram<\/p>\n
that the enhancement of compensation in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)<\/p>\n
was based on a concession made before the Apex Court and could not,<\/p>\n
therefore, be taken as a benchmark for adoption in other cases of similar<\/p>\n
nature. This may not be wholly correct, inasmuch as a reading of the<\/p>\n
passage extracted above would show that the concession made before<\/p>\n
the Court was to the extent of awarding double the amount<\/p>\n
recommended by the One Man Commission. The Court had, however,<\/p>\n
awarded three times the said amount taking the compensation from<\/p>\n
Rs.50,000\/- to Rs.1,50,000\/-. The conventional amount was also<\/p>\n
enhanced by the Apex Court from Rs.25,000\/- to Rs.50,000\/-. In that<\/p>\n
view, therefore, the decision in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) cannot be<\/p>\n
said to be based on consent alone.\n<\/p>\n
         Even so      what would     be   the     reasonable   amount      of<\/p>\n
compensation for claimants in Category 1 needs to be examined.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 99<\/span><\/p>\n
According to the claimants, the amount cannot be less than<\/p>\n
Rs.3,57,000\/- per child killed in the incident. In our opinion, even if the<\/p>\n
amount of compensation is not calculated with mathematical precision<\/p>\n
based on the consumer price index as was done in case decided by the<\/p>\n
Delhi High Court, the fact that there was a considerable time gap<\/p>\n
between the incident referred to in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) and<\/p>\n
that with which we are concerned in these cases cannot be overlooked.<\/p>\n
We are also of the opinion that the amount awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s<\/p>\n
case (supra) could only be a guiding factor and not a benchmark for all<\/p>\n
times to come especially with an ever increasing price index and falling<\/p>\n
value of the rupee. That apart determination of compensation in cases<\/p>\n
involving loss of life always involves some amount of guess work and<\/p>\n
speculation. What is important is that any such guess work is moderate,<\/p>\n
and tempered by realism, prudence and experience in life. Taking into<\/p>\n
consideration the totality of these factors we are of the opinion that while<\/p>\n
the amount of compensation            of Rs.1,50,000\/- awarded in Lata<\/p>\n
Wadhwa’s case (supra) for an incident that took place six years before<\/p>\n
the incident in question could be enhanced to Rs.2,75,000\/-, the<\/p>\n
conventional figure of Rs.50,000\/- awarded in the said case could also<\/p>\n
be revised to Rs.75,000\/- in each one of the cases that fall in Category 1<\/p>\n
to serve the ends of justice. The amount awarded by the One Man<\/p>\n
Commission     of   Inquiry   would    accordingly   stand   enhanced      to<\/p>\n
Rs.3,50,000\/- in 172 claim petitions of children in the age group of one<\/p>\n
month to ten     years.   The apportionment of the enhanced amount<\/p>\n
among the claimants shall be in the ratio recommended by the<\/p>\n
Commission.\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              100<\/span><\/p>\n
Category 2 Cases<\/p>\n
          The cases falling in this category comprised claims arising out<\/p>\n
of death of children in the age group of ten to 15 years. The One Man<\/p>\n
Commission had, relying upon the decisions referred to above, awarded<\/p>\n
a sum of Rs.4,10,000\/- in each one of these cases. The claimants,<\/p>\n
however, seek enhancement of the same based on consumer price<\/p>\n
index to Rs.7,33,684\/-.\n<\/p>\n
          The Commission has, while awarding the amount mentioned<\/p>\n
above, taken support from the decision in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra)<\/p>\n
where the Court had awarded a sum of Rs.4,10,000\/- for each claimant<\/p>\n
in said category. The basis of said calculation has been set out in the<\/p>\n
following passage appearing in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra):<\/p>\n
                    “So far as the children between the age group of 10<\/p>\n
                    and 15 years, they are all students of Class VI to<\/p>\n
                    Class X and are children of employees of TISCO.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
                    The TISCO itself has a tradition         that every<\/p>\n
                    employee can get one of his child employed in the<\/p>\n
                    company.    Having regard to these facts, in their<\/p>\n
                    case, the contribution of Rs.12,000\/- per annum<\/p>\n
                    appears to us to be on the lower side and in our<\/p>\n
                    considered opinion, the annual contribution should<\/p>\n
                    be Rs.24,000\/- and instead of multiplier of 11, the<\/p>\n
                    appropriate multiplier would be 15. Therefore, the<\/p>\n
                    compensation, so calculated on the aforesaid basis<\/p>\n
                    should be worked out to Rs.3,60,000 to which an<\/p>\n
                    additional sum of Rs.50,000 has to be added, thus,
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                     101<\/span><\/p>\n
                      making   the   total      compensation     payable      at<\/p>\n
                      Rs.4,10,000 for each of the claimants of the<\/p>\n
                      aforesaid deceased children”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          It is evident from a careful reading of above that their<\/p>\n
Lordships of Supreme Court had adopted the multiplier method for<\/p>\n
calculating the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. The<\/p>\n
Court had taken the contribution of the deceased children as<\/p>\n
Rs.24,000\/- per annum and adopted a multiplier of 15 to work out a sum<\/p>\n
of Rs.3,60,000\/- towards compensation. To that amount is added<\/p>\n
Rs.50,000\/-   towards     conventional       figure,   taking   the   total   to<\/p>\n
Rs.4,10,000\/-. What is significant is that one of the factors that the<\/p>\n
Court considered while awarding the compensation in this category was<\/p>\n
the fact that the TISCO had a tradition of providing employment to<\/p>\n
atleast one child of each one of its employees. There is, in the case in<\/p>\n
hand, no such assured employment to the children of the employees of<\/p>\n
respondent-School. The process of determination of compensation,<\/p>\n
therefore, remains a difficult task with all the uncertainties and other<\/p>\n
imponderables a galore. Even so while the multiplier chosen by the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court can be adopted for application in the present case also<\/p>\n
the question is whether the amount of contribution which the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court had adopted for purposes of calculation can be enhanced and, if<\/p>\n
so, to what extent.\n<\/p>\n
          In Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra), the contribution of the victims<\/p>\n
was on a notional basis taken at Rs.24,000\/-. That figure cannot remain<\/p>\n
static forever. Some escalation is inevitable having regard to all the<\/p>\n
relevant considerations, especially the time gap between the two
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   102<\/span><\/p>\n
incidents.     In our opinion, an annual increase of Rs.1,000\/- in the<\/p>\n
contribution ought to be reasonable. This would mean that the annual<\/p>\n
contribution of the victims in this category could be taken at Rs.30,000\/-.<\/p>\n
The amount of compensation would, accordingly, go to Rs.4,50,000\/- by<\/p>\n
applying a multiplier of 15. To that figure should be added Rs.75,000\/-<\/p>\n
towards conventional amount to take the total to Rs.5,25,000\/- in each<\/p>\n
case falling in this category which amount we hereby award.<\/p>\n
Category 3 Cases<\/p>\n
             The Commission had, taking support from the decision in M.S.<\/p>\n
Grewal’s case (supra), awarded Rs.5,00,000\/- as compensation to<\/p>\n
elderly children in the age group of 16 to 22 years. The claimants have,<\/p>\n
before us, claimed a sum of Rs.8,94,736\/- in each one of the cases<\/p>\n
falling in this category. The enhancement of claim rests entirely on the<\/p>\n
consumer price index escalation during the period          of six years that<\/p>\n
separates the two incidents. On the analogy of what we have said in<\/p>\n
Category 2 cases, we are inclined to take the contribution of the children<\/p>\n
falling in this category at Rs.35,000\/- and adopt a higher multiplier of 16<\/p>\n
for determining the compensation payable in these cases. The total<\/p>\n
amount payable by that method comes to Rs.5,60,000\/- to which we add<\/p>\n
Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure taking the total to Rs.6,35,000\/-.<\/p>\n
The award made by the Commission shall, to the above extent, stand<\/p>\n
modified. The enhanced amount shall also be apportioned among the<\/p>\n
claimants in the ratio indicated by the Commission.<\/p>\n
Category 4 cases:-\n<\/p>\n
             In this category fall cases of 136 women, who lost their lives in<\/p>\n
the fire incident. While 93 out of the victims in this category were simple
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               103<\/span><\/p>\n
housewives, 4 were elderly ladies and 9 others were unmarried working<\/p>\n
girls. Another 9 were employed in Government service, while 12 were<\/p>\n
employed in Non-Government service. Remaining 9 were working<\/p>\n
women doing miscellaneous work. Since each one of these groups<\/p>\n
would stand on a different footing for purposes of payment of<\/p>\n
compensation due in their cases, it would be appropriate to deal with<\/p>\n
them separately, under the following sub-categories:-<\/p>\n
          i)        Housewives;\n          ii)       Elderly ladies;\n          iii)      Unmarried working girls;\n          iv)       Working women in Government service;\n          v)        Working women in Non-Government service; and\n          vi)       Working women (miscellaneous).\n\ni)        Housewives\n\n<\/pre>\n
          A total of 93 victims fall in this sub-category. The one man<\/p>\n
Commission has dealt with 85 of these cases by treating their<\/p>\n
contribution to the family to be Rs.36,000\/-, deducted 1\/3 out of the<\/p>\n
same towards personal expenses, applied a multiplier appropriate in<\/p>\n
each one of the cases and awarded compensation accordingly. What is<\/p>\n
noteworthy is that the one man Commission has in 8 out of a total of 93<\/p>\n
cases awarded a higher amount of compensation in comparison to other<\/p>\n
similar cases on the premise that the women in these 8 cases held high<\/p>\n
family status. Their contribution, in terms of services to the family, was<\/p>\n
on that basis assessed at a higher figure. We have not been able to<\/p>\n
persuade ourselves to accept that line of reasoning. So long as the<\/p>\n
deceased victims were housewives, the services rendered by them to<\/p>\n
the family ought to be assessed on an equal footing common to all. The
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 104<\/span><\/p>\n
social status of the victim notwithstanding, the value of the services<\/p>\n
rendered by her may not make any difference vis-a-vis any other<\/p>\n
housewife, who was less qualified or held a relatively modest position in<\/p>\n
the social milieu. The proper course, therefore, would be to deal with<\/p>\n
the claims relating to all 93 housewives on a common basis and to<\/p>\n
award compensation       payable to them depending on the multiplier<\/p>\n
applicable in each one of these cases.\n<\/p>\n
           As noticed in the earlier part of this order the claimants have<\/p>\n
found fault with not only the deduction made by the Commission but also<\/p>\n
claimed that a higher multiplicand ought to be chosen having regard to<\/p>\n
the rise in the consumer price index between the year 1989 and 1995.<\/p>\n
           Both these submissions have considerable merit in them. In<\/p>\n
Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra), relied upon by the claimants, the<\/p>\n
contribution which a housewife makes to the family in the nature of<\/p>\n
services   rendered    by   her   was    assessed   at   Rs.36000\/-   and<\/p>\n
compensation awarded on that bases by applying a suitable multiplier.<\/p>\n
No deduction towards the personal expenses was made nor was there<\/p>\n
any occasion to do so. That is because deduction towards personal<\/p>\n
expenses would be called for only when the deceased was earning and<\/p>\n
the Court is examining as to what would eventually accrue to the benefit<\/p>\n
of the family, out of the said earning. It has no application to a case<\/p>\n
where the value of the services rendered by the housewife was itself<\/p>\n
assessed at Rs.36000\/- per annum. The Commission was, therefore, in<\/p>\n
error in deducting 1\/3rd of the said amount while determining the amount<\/p>\n
of compensation payable to the claimants. A Single Bench decision of<\/p>\n
the High Court of Gujarat has in United India Insurance Co.Ltd. Vs.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               105<\/span><\/p>\n
Virambhai Ranchhodbhai Patel and others, 2007 (4) RCR (Civil)<\/p>\n
436, taken a similar view and observed:-\n<\/p>\n
                   “6. In Lata Wadhwa V. State of Bihar,<\/a> 2001(4)<\/p>\n
                   RCR (Civil) 673: 2001 ACJ 1735: (AIR 2001 SC<\/p>\n
                   3218), the Apex Court awarded compensation to the<\/p>\n
                   family members of the deceased-housewives by<\/p>\n
                   assessing the value of their services at Rs.3,000\/-<\/p>\n
                   per month, albeit on a concession from the TISCO.<\/p>\n
                   The Tribunal has valued the services rendered by<\/p>\n
                   the deceased to the family at only Rs.1500\/- per<\/p>\n
                   month and with fall in the value of money, such<\/p>\n
                   income could certainly be valued at Rs.2250\/- per<\/p>\n
                   month. In fact, when such services are being valued<\/p>\n
                   in terms of money, the question of deducting one-<\/p>\n
                   third amount therefrom may not arise. Hence, even<\/p>\n
                   if only Rs.1500\/- per month is taken as the value of<\/p>\n
                   such services, which were being rendered by the<\/p>\n
                   deceased, the same can certainly be adopted as the<\/p>\n
                   datum    figure   for   determining   the   amount   of<\/p>\n
                   compensation payable under the head”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         The second aspect relates to the choice of the multiplicand in<\/p>\n
as much as according to the claimants the amount of Rs.36000\/- was in<\/p>\n
Lata Wadhawa’s case (supra) assessed as the contribution of a<\/p>\n
housewife in connection with an incident of the year 1989. The incident<\/p>\n
in the present case had occurred six years later. This time gap ought to<\/p>\n
be suitably provided for in terms of a suitable increase argued Mrs.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              106<\/span><\/p>\n
Arora, appearing for the claimants.\n<\/p>\n
         That assessment of the contribution made by a housewife in<\/p>\n
Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) must be taken with reference to the<\/p>\n
incident in that case was not and cannot be disputed. It is not as<\/p>\n
though regard less of the rise in the consumer price index, inflation and<\/p>\n
the ever decreasing purchasing power of the rupee, the value of the<\/p>\n
contribution made by a housewife would forever remain static at<\/p>\n
Rs.36000\/- per annum. The value must of necessity go up with passage<\/p>\n
of time on the common sense principle that what could be purchased for<\/p>\n
Rs.36000\/- in the year 1989, was no longer purchasable at the same<\/p>\n
price in the year 1995. As to what ought to be the escalation over the<\/p>\n
base figure of Rs.36000\/- per annum is the real question.<\/p>\n
         According to the claimants, the inflation corrected value of<\/p>\n
Rs.36000\/- in the year 1989 would rise to Rs.64,424\/- in the year 1995.<\/p>\n
In the case of elderly ladies in the age group of 62 to 72 years the<\/p>\n
amount of contribution assessed by the apex Court of Rs.20,000\/- would<\/p>\n
rise to Rs.35,789\/-. This means a rise of over 75% of the base amount.<\/p>\n
which in our view may be on the higher side. The rise can in our opinion<\/p>\n
be on a uniform basis applicable to all the claimants taken at 25% of the<\/p>\n
base figure which would add to the amount of Rs.36000\/- an amount of<\/p>\n
Rs.9000\/- taking the total to 45000\/- per annum. In the case of elderly<\/p>\n
ladies in the age group of 62 years to 72 years the amount of<\/p>\n
contribution would stand enhanced from Rs.20,000\/- to Rs.25000\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. We have already noticed in the beginning of this order that the<\/p>\n
parties have not assailed before us the choice of the multiplier applied<\/p>\n
by the Commission in each one of these cases. In the result in the
\n     Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                           107<\/span><\/p>\n
    cases of 93 housewives who died in the fire incident the amount of<\/p>\n
    compensation awarded shall stand enhanced to the extent indicated<\/p>\n
    below.     The conventional amount of Rs.50,000\/- shall also stand<\/p>\n
    enhanced to Rs.75,000\/- as determined by us in category 2 cases<\/p>\n
    above. The final picture that would thus emerge shall be as under:-<\/p>\n
\n\nSr. Case   Name & Age of Amount     Multiplier Value ofRevised          Conventional Total\nNo. No.    the Deceased awarded by Applied services amount           of Figure    (InAmount\n                         the                   rendered compensation Rs.)            {7+8}\n                         Commission            to     theheld payable                (In Rs.)\n                         (In Rs.)              family (In{Rs.45000\/-X\n                                               Rs.)      multiplier\n                                                         applicable}\n                                                         (In Rs.)\n1     2           3             4          5         6          7             8             9<\/span>\n 1 65-DFT Mrs. Meera         312000        13     45000      585000         75000         660000\n          Kumari 28 years\n 2 67-DFT Mrs. Rameshwari    408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          30years\n 3 77-DFT Mrs. Amarjit       384000        16     45000      720000         75000         795000\n          Kaur 37 years\n 4 79-DFT Mrs. Kanta         360000        15     45000      675000         75000         750000\n          Bathla 43 years\n 5 82-DFT Mrs. Kaushalya     408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          Devi 20 years\n 6 83-DFT Mrs. Narinder      408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          Kaur 21 years\n 7 84-DFT Mrs. Rekha         432000        18     45000      810000         75000         885000\n          Rani 22 years\n 8 85-DFT Mrs. Vandna        120000        5      45000      225000         75000         300000\n          Rani 22 years\n 9 86-DFT Mrs. Jasbir Kaur   408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          22 years\n10 87-DFT Mrs. Saroj Devi    408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          25 years\n11 89-DFT Mrs. Dimple 24     120000        5      45000      225000         75000         300000\n          years\n12 90-DFT Mrs. Mishu Bala    408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          24 years\n13 91-DFT Mrs. Lata Rani     408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          30 years\n14 92-DFT Mrs. Neelam        408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          Rani 25 years\n15 93-DFT Mrs. Kailash       408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          Rani 26 years\n16 94-DFT Mrs. Champa        408000        17     45000      765000         75000         840000\n          Rani 33 years\n17 95-DFT Mrs. Madhu         384000        16     45000      720000         75000         795000\n          Rani 26 years\n     Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                            108<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n18 96-DFT Mrs. Vanita alias   432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n          Pooja Rani 27\n          years\n19 97-DFT Mrs. Harinder       360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n          Kaur 27 years\n20 98-DFT Mrs. Madhu          432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n          Bala alias\n          Neena 27 years\n21 99-DFT Mrs. Paramjit       432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n          Kaur 27 years\n22 100-DFT Mrs. Sunita Rani   432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n           27 years\n23 101-DFT Mrs. Seema         384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Rani 27 years\n24 102-DFT Mrs. Surinder      432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n           Kaur 28 years\n25 103-DFT Mrs. Raj Rani      432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n           28 years\n26 104-DFT Mrs. Anjna         384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Kumari 28 years\n27 105-DFT Mrs. Sushma        384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Chugh 28 years\n28 106-DFT Mrs. Sunita 25     360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           years\n29 107-DFT Mrs. Shalu 19      384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           years\n30 108-DFT Mrs. Harinder      432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n           Kaur 27 years\n31 110-DFT Mrs. Saroj Rani    384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           29 years\n32 111-DFT Mrs. Suman         408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Jain 30 years\n33 112-DFT Mrs. Santosh       38400    16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Kumari 30 years\n34 113-DFT Mrs. Usha Rani     36000    15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           30 years\n35 114-DFT Mrs. Shashi        432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n           Bala 30 years\n36 115-DFT Mrs. Rajinder      408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Kaur 30 years\n37 116-DFT Mrs. Anita Rani    384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           30 years\n38 117-DFT Mrs. Kiran         360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           Gupta 30 years\n39 118-DFT Mrs. Kulvinder     408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Kaur 30 years\n40 119-DFT Mrs. Neelam 31     408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           years\n41 120-DFT Mrs. Neelam        360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           Rani 30 years\n42 121-DFT Mrs. Nirmla        408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Devi 31 years\n43 122-DFT Mrs. Suman 31      360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           years\n     Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                            109<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n44 123-DFT Mrs. Nina 31       384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           years\n45 125-DFT Mrs. Satbir Kaur   408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           31 years\n46 128-DFT Mrs. Sunita Rani   408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           32 years\n47 129-DFT Mrs. Sarita Rani   408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           alias Prem lata\n           32 years\n48 130-DFT Mrs. Jaswinder     408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Kaur 32 years\n49 132-DFT Mrs. Bhupinder     360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           Kaur 33 years\n50 133-DFT Mrs. Sangeeta      408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Bhateja 33\n           years\n51 134-DFT Mrs. Veena         312000   13   45000   585000   75000         660000\n           Kumari 32 years\n52 136-DFT Mrs. Arun Bala     408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           34 years\n53 137-DFT Mrs. Shardha       408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Rani, 33 years\n54 139-DFT Mrs. Ranjit Kaur   312000   13   45000   585000   75000         660000\n           35 years\n55 140-DFT Mrs. Basant        384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Kaur alias Sant\n           Kaur 35 years\n56 141-DFT Mrs. Krishna       384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Devi 35 years\n57 142-DFT Mrs. Anita alias   360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           Krishna 35\n           years\n58 144-DFT Mrs. Amarjeet      384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Kaur 38 years\n59 145-DFT Mrs. Sudarshan     384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           alias\n           Sukhdarshan 36\n           years\n60 146-DFT Mrs. Charanjit     384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Kaur 37 years\n61 148-DFT Mrs. Harbans       384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Kaur 38 years\n62 149-DFT Mrs. Manju         384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Grover 37 years\n63 150-DFT Mrs. Neeta 40      384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           years\n64 151-DFT Mrs. Raj Rani      264000   11   45000   495000   75000         570000\n           41 years\n65 153-DFT Mrs. Nirmal 43     312000   13   45000   585000   75000         660000\n           years\n66 154-DFT Mrs.               312000   13   45000   585000   75000         660000\n           Rameshwari 49\n           years\n67 155-DFT Mrs. Roopan        264000   11   45000   495000   75000         570000\n           Devi 50 years\n     Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                            110<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n68 156-DFT Mrs. Veena         192000   8    45000   360000   75000         435000\n           alias Veera 57\n           years\n69 157-DFT Mrs. Satya Devi    264000   11   45000   495000   75000         570000\n           50 years\n70 161-DFT Mrs. Kuldeep       192000   8    45000   360000   75000         435000\n           Kaur 25 years\n71 347-DFT Mrs. Parmjit       384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Kaur 28 years\n72 349-DFT Mrs. Sunita        384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Sachdeva 32\n           years\n73 350-DFT Mrs. Shikha        408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Midha 20 years\n74 352-DFT Mrs. Jasvinder     432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n           Kaur 28 years\n75 354-DFT Mrs. Anju Sethi    120000   5    45000   225000   75000         300000\n           28 years\n76 357-DFT Mrs. Asha Rani     384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           32 years\n77 359-DFT Mrs. Sanjana       408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           alias Suman\n           Lata 24 years\n78 360-DFT Mrs. Gitika Rani   408000   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           25 years\n79 367-DFT Mrs. Parveen       384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           Rani widow of\n           Ravi Kumar, 32\n           years\n80 370-DFT Mrs. Suraksha      384000   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n           40 years\n81 468-DFT Mrs. Preetpal      120000   5    45000   225000   75000         300000\n           Kaur (widow) 42\n           years\n82 469-DFT Mrs. Neena         312000   13   45000   585000   75000         660000\n           Rani 36 years\n83 470-DFT Mrs. Santosh 40    360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           years\n84 473-DFT Mrs. Chanchal      360000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           44 years\n85 481-DFT Mrs. Sunita 28     432000   18   45000   810000   75000         885000\n           years\n86 88-DFT Mrs. Rama           652800   16   45000   720000   75000         795000\n          Chaudhary 23\n          years\n87 126-DFT Mrs. Meena         693600   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Kumari 32 years\n88 127-DFT Mrs. Priti Midha   693600   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           32 years\n89 131-DFT Mrs. Sanjivan      693600   17   45000   765000   75000         840000\n           Lata 33 years\n90 143-DFT Mrs. Sonia Rani    612000   15   45000   675000   75000         750000\n           26 years\n91 147-DFT Mrs. Som Lata      450000   11   45000   495000   75000         570000\n           37 years\n     Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                111<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n92 348-DFT Mrs. Anupam 38   653000      16   45000   720000      75000         795000\n           years\n93 493-DFT Mrs. Kamlesh     816000      17   45000   765000      75000         840000\n           Rani 33 years\n                                     TOTAL                                 71280000\n\n\n\n\n    ii)        Elderly Ladies\n\n    Case No.21-DFT\n\n<\/pre>\n
               In Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) the value of services<\/p>\n
    rendered to the family by elderly ladies was assessed at Rs.20,000\/- per<\/p>\n
    annum. That amount can and ought to be revised to Rs.25,000\/- in<\/p>\n
    respect of an incident that took place six years later.     Applying a<\/p>\n
    multiplier of 5, which the one-man Commission has chosen in the<\/p>\n
    present case the amount payable to the claimants would come to<\/p>\n
    Rs.1,25,000\/-. To that amount we need to add Rs.82,000\/-, which the<\/p>\n
    Commission has determined as the loss of dependency on account of<\/p>\n
    pension drawn by the deceased at the time of death. Adding to these<\/p>\n
    two figures the conventional amount Rs.75,000\/-, the total amount of<\/p>\n
    compensation payable to the claimant in this case would come to<\/p>\n
    Rs.2,82,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
    Cases No.158-DFT, 159-DFT and 353-DFT<\/p>\n
               The deceased in Claim Petitions No.158-DFT, 159-DFT and<\/p>\n
    353-DFT, namely Mrs. Lakshmi Devi aged 70 years, Mrs. Reshma Devi,<\/p>\n
    aged 67 years and Mrs. Sumitra Devi aged 62 years, were simple<\/p>\n
    housewives, whose contribution has been taken by the Commission to<\/p>\n
    be Rs.36,000\/- per annum as against Rs.20,000\/- awarded in Lata<\/p>\n
    Wadhwa’s case (supra). Deducting 1\/3rd towards their personal<\/p>\n
    expenses and applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded a
\n       Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                           112<\/span><\/p>\n
      sum of Rs.1,20,000\/- to the claimants in each one of these cases. That<\/p>\n
      figure would stand enhanced even after a correct application of the<\/p>\n
      norms fixed in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra). Taking the contribution of<\/p>\n
      the deceased elderly ladies, mentioned above, to be Rs.25,000\/- per<\/p>\n
      annum and applying a multiplier of 5, the claimants in each one of these<\/p>\n
      cases would be entitled to Rs.1,25,000\/-. To that shall be added a sum<\/p>\n
      of Rs.75,000\/- each towards conventional amount, taking the total<\/p>\n
      amount of compensation payable to the claimants in each one of these<\/p>\n
      cases to Rs.2,00,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
                   The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this<\/p>\n
      category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-<\/p>\n
\n\n\nSr. Case     Name & AgeAmount       Multiplier   Value of Loss of Revised       Conventional Total\nNo. No.      of       theawarded by applied      Services Depen- amount       ofFigure       Amount\n             Deceased    the                     rendered dency compensation (In Rs.)        {8+9}\n                         Commission              to    the (In Rs.) held payable             (In Rs.)\n                         (In Rs.)                family (In         {5x6+7}  (In\n                                                 Rs.)               Rs.)\n 1    2           3           4          5          6        7          8             9         10\n 1 21-DFT Mrs. Shanta       82000        5        25000    82000     207000        75000     282000\n          Relan 73\n          years\n 2 158-DFT Mrs. Lakshmi     120000       5        25000      0       125000        75000     200000\n           Devi 70 years\n 3 159-DFT Mrs. Reshma      120000       5                   0       125000        75000     200000\n           Devi 67 years                          25000\n 4 353-DFT Mrs. Sumitra     120000       5        25000      0       125000        75000     200000\n           Devi 62 years\n                                         TOTAL                                               882000\n\n\n\n      iii)         Unmarried Working Girls\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n
                  Apart from the housewives and elderly ladies dealt with in the<\/p>\n
      foregoing paragraphs, the deceased included 9 unmarried working girls,<\/p>\n
      most of whom were at that point of time, employed in the DAV School at
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                    113<\/span><\/p>\n
meager salaries. The Commission of Inquiry has, based on the salaries<\/p>\n
received by the girls, assessed and awarded compensation that varies<\/p>\n
between Rs.44,000 to Rs.2,88,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
          It was contended on behalf of the claimants that the approach<\/p>\n
adopted by the Commission has brought about an anomalous situation<\/p>\n
in as much as in cases involving children in the same age group the<\/p>\n
Commission has awarded a higher amount of compensation than what<\/p>\n
is awarded in cases where the victims were in some employment or the<\/p>\n
other. Mrs. Arora, Learned Counsel for the Association argued that the<\/p>\n
anomaly could be removed by awarding to the working girls the same<\/p>\n
amount of compensation as is awarded to children in the comparable<\/p>\n
age group. There is in our opinion merit in that contention. That young<\/p>\n
and un-married girls had taken up jobs at meager salaries need not put<\/p>\n
the victims or the claimants at a disadvantage which would be obvious if<\/p>\n
the mere fact that the young girl was working results in the assessment<\/p>\n
of a lower amount of compensation than that payable for a non-working<\/p>\n
one. The fact that the girls had taken up small time and temporary jobs<\/p>\n
in the school or elsewhere was even otherwise not a sound reason why<\/p>\n
the compensation should be determined on the basis of the income they<\/p>\n
derived from such engagements. The nature of the employment and<\/p>\n
remuneration paid for the same sufficiently indicates that the same were<\/p>\n
more in the nature of pastime for spending the time available with them<\/p>\n
usefully than an estimate or indication of their true potential in life. In the<\/p>\n
circumstances, we deem it fit to award in each one of the following<\/p>\n
cases the same amount as is determined for payment in category 3
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                             114<\/span><\/p>\n
cases.\n<\/p>\n
             The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this<\/p>\n
category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-<\/p>\n
\n\n\n\nSr. No. Case No. Name &        Age      of   theAmount awarded by Revised amount of\n                 Deceased                       the Commission (In compensation held\n                                                Rs.)               payable    (In Rs.)\n  1          2                 3                         4                  5<\/span>\n      1   6-DFT    Ms. Maninder Kaur 19               230400             635000\n                   years\n      2   56-DFT   Ms. Manju Bala 19 years             88000             635000\n      3   57-DFT   Ms. Meera 21 years                 288000             635000\n      4   58-DFT   Ms. Anju Rani 22 years              72000             635000\n      5   59-DFT   Ms. Sunita Mehta 27 years           44000             635000\n      6   60-DFT   Ms. Rita 22 years                   60000             635000\n          61-DFT   Ms. Babita Wadhera 23              150000             635000\n  7                years\n      8   63-DFT   Ms. Sandeep kaur 25 years          105600             635000\n      9   342-DFT Ms. Rekha Rani 21 years              60000             635000\n                              TOTAL                                     5715000\n\n\n\niv)          Working Women in Government Service\n\n<\/pre>\n
             As already noticed above, nine out of the female victims were<\/p>\n
working women employed in Government service.                        The one man<\/p>\n
Commission has based on the salary drawn by these victims,<\/p>\n
determined the contribution towards their families and, awarded<\/p>\n
compensation by adopting the multiplier method. The claimants have<\/p>\n
found fault with the end result for two precise reasons.                  Firstly it is<\/p>\n
contended that even when the women were working on a full time basis,<\/p>\n
they also rendered services to their respective families as is normally<\/p>\n
done by a housewife.             Determination of any          compensation must,<\/p>\n
therefore, take note of the said contribution also, argued the learned<\/p>\n
counsel for the claimants.\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              115<\/span><\/p>\n
          The second reason advanced by the claimants for an upward<\/p>\n
revision is that the Commission had not taken into consideration the<\/p>\n
future prospects while determining the amount of compensation in these<\/p>\n
cases and other cases where women are not working in Government<\/p>\n
Departments.    Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in<\/p>\n
Susamma Thomas’s case (supra) and Smt. Sarla Dixit v. Balwant<\/p>\n
Yadav<\/a> 1996(2) The Punjab Law Reporter 656, it was argued that<\/p>\n
future prospects must be one of the inputs for determining the<\/p>\n
multiplicand. Any award which ignores that input would not be fair and<\/p>\n
reasonable contended the learned counsel for the claimants.<\/p>\n
          On behalf of the respondent-school it was per contra argued<\/p>\n
by Mr. Atma Ram, that future prospects could not be taken into<\/p>\n
consideration except in cases and situations which the Apex Court has<\/p>\n
identified in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Others v. Delhi Transport<\/p>\n
Corporation and Another<\/a> (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121. The<\/p>\n
cases at hand do not, according to the learned counsel, fall in anyone of<\/p>\n
the situations in which future prospects could be taken into<\/p>\n
consideration. It was also argued that once compensation was awarded<\/p>\n
by applying the multiplier method there was no room for adoption of any<\/p>\n
other method nor could two methods be applied to produce results<\/p>\n
favourable to the claimants.\n<\/p>\n
          In Sarla Verma’s case (Supra), relied upon by Mr. Rajive<\/p>\n
Atma Ram, the Supreme Court has on a review of its pronouncements<\/p>\n
dealing with the relevance and the necessity of adding the future<\/p>\n
prospects for determination of compensation payable in Motor Accident<\/p>\n
Claim cases declared that as a rule of thumb, an addition of 50% of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                116<\/span><\/p>\n
actual salary income of the deceased could be added towards future<\/p>\n
prospects, in cases where the deceased had a permanent job and was<\/p>\n
below 40 years of age. The addition should however be only 30% of the<\/p>\n
actual salary income in cases where the age of the deceased was<\/p>\n
between 40 to 50 years. In cases where the age of the deceased was<\/p>\n
more than 50 years no addition towards future prospects could be made.<\/p>\n
It was further held that where the deceased was self-employed or was<\/p>\n
on a fixed salary without provision for annual increments etc. the Courts<\/p>\n
will usually take only the actual income at the time of death, a departure<\/p>\n
being permissible only in rare and exceptional cases involving special<\/p>\n
circumstances. The following passage from the decision is apposite in<\/p>\n
this connection: –\n<\/p>\n
                     “24:      In Susamma Thomas this Court increased<\/p>\n
                     the income by nearly 100%, in Sarla Dixit the income<\/p>\n
                     was increased only by 50% and in Abati Bezbaruah<\/p>\n
                     the income was increased by a mere 7%. In view of<\/p>\n
                     the imponderables and uncertainties, we are in<\/p>\n
                     favour of adopting as a rule of thumb, an addition of<\/p>\n
                     50% of actual salary to the actual salary income of<\/p>\n
                     the deceased towards future prospects, where the<\/p>\n
                     deceased had a permanent job and was below 40<\/p>\n
                     years. (Where the annual income is in the taxable<\/p>\n
                     range, the words “actual salary” should be read as<\/p>\n
                     “actual salary less tax”). The addition should be only<\/p>\n
                     30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50 years.\n<\/p>\n
                     There should be no addition, where the age of the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 117<\/span><\/p>\n
                    deceased is more than 50 years.           Though the<\/p>\n
                    evidence may indicate a different percentage of<\/p>\n
                    increase, it is necessary to standardise the addition<\/p>\n
                    to avoid different yardsticks being applied or different<\/p>\n
                    methods of calculation being adopted. Where the<\/p>\n
                    deceased was self-employed or was on a fixed<\/p>\n
                    salary (without provision for annual increments etc.)<\/p>\n
                    the courts will usually take only the actual income at<\/p>\n
                    the time of death. A departure therefrom should be<\/p>\n
                    made only in rare and exceptional cases involving<\/p>\n
                    special circumstances.”\n<\/p>\n
           It is in the light of the above pronouncements clear that the<\/p>\n
addition to the salary income of the deceased victims would depend on<\/p>\n
whether the victims held a permanent job. The extent of addition would<\/p>\n
also depend upon the age of the victims. In the case of working women<\/p>\n
in Government Service, an addition towards future prospects would be<\/p>\n
perfectly justified, on the principles laid down in Sarla Verma’s case<\/p>\n
(Supra).\n<\/p>\n
           That brings us to the question whether working women were<\/p>\n
also rendering services to the family that could be evaluated in terms of<\/p>\n
money and, if so, what is the monetary value of such services. Our<\/p>\n
answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative. Working<\/p>\n
women not only support the income of the family but are at times the<\/p>\n
main bread winners of the family. That does not, however, mean that<\/p>\n
they neglect duties towards the family that are otherwise enjoined upon<\/p>\n
them as ladies of the house. In the social and cultural milieu that we
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              118<\/span><\/p>\n
have in this Country, the very fact that a woman is employed does not<\/p>\n
necessarily mean that she does not perform any other duty towards her<\/p>\n
family. The only difference between a housewife simpliciter and a<\/p>\n
working woman is that while a housewife may be working and rendering<\/p>\n
services to the family for a greater part of the time available to her, a<\/p>\n
working woman by reason of her commitment to the job is not able to<\/p>\n
spare that much time. On an average, if we take the contribution of a<\/p>\n
housewife, in terms of services rendered to the family stretched over a<\/p>\n
period of 15 hours a day, the services rendered by a working woman<\/p>\n
may be limited to only five hours, for she would be at her work place for<\/p>\n
atleast 8 hours and travelling to and fro for atleast two hours everyday.<\/p>\n
On a rough basis one can safely assume that the value of services<\/p>\n
rendered for 5 hours would be proportionately less than the value of the<\/p>\n
services rendered by a whole time housewife. Proportionate to the time<\/p>\n
spent by the working woman the value of her services may be only 1\/3rd<\/p>\n
of the value at which the services of a housewife have been assessed<\/p>\n
i.e. 45,000X1\/3= Rs.15,000\/- per annum. Consequently, with the death<\/p>\n
of a working female, the family not only looses in terms of the monetary<\/p>\n
supplement which she was providing but also in terms of loss of services<\/p>\n
that the family was enjoying on account of her presence. The One Man<\/p>\n
Commission has not taken this into consideration except in 64-DFT<\/p>\n
arising out of the death of Mrs. Neelam Kumari, where the Commission<\/p>\n
has taken into account not only the income being earned by her at the<\/p>\n
time of death but also added the value of services to the family at<\/p>\n
Rs.36,000\/- less 1\/3rd deducted by the Commission towards personal<\/p>\n
expenses. Suffice it to say that the correct approach appears to us to
\n             Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                       119<\/span><\/p>\n
            determine the net loss of dependency on the basis of the income of the<\/p>\n
            deceased from her employment after taking into consideration the future<\/p>\n
            prospects in terms of Sarla Verma’s case (supra) and add to the same<\/p>\n
            a sum of Rs.15,000\/- per annum towards the value of services which<\/p>\n
            she was rendering to the family. This could provide the true multiplicand<\/p>\n
            applicable in each one of these cases and provide a uniform and non-<\/p>\n
            discriminatory basis for determination of compensation payable to the<\/p>\n
            claimants. The position that would, on that basis, emerge in each one<\/p>\n
            of the nine cases of the working women in Government service, would<\/p>\n
            be as under:-\n<\/p>\n
Sr. Case    Name & Age ofSalary at Future   Annual loss Value of Revised         Conventional Total
\nNo. No.     the Deceased the time prospects of          services amount        offigure    @ amount
\n                         of death (In Rs.) dependency rendered compensation Rs.75,000\/- {8+9}
\n                         (In Rs.)           {4+5-1\/3rd  to     the held   payablep.a.         (In Rs.)
\n                                            towards     family @ {6+7x multiplier
\n                                            personal    Rs.15,000 applied}    (In
\n                                            expenses} p.a.         Rs.)
\n 1      2          3           4       5             6       7           8             9          10<\/span>
\n 1   64-DFT Mrs. Neelam       3661   1831       43936      15000      766168         75000      841168
\n            Kumari 34
\n            years
\n 2   71-DFT Mrs. Krishna      3159    1580      37912      15000      264560         75000      339560
\n            Kamboj 34
\n            years
\n 3   72-DFT Mrs. Karamjit     5500    2750      66000      15000      1296000        75000     1371000
\n            Kaur 35 years
\n 4   74-DFT Mrs. Lakhvinder   4811    2406      57736      15000      945568         75000     1020568
\n            34 years
\n 5   75-DFT Mrs. Sneh Lata    3845    1923      46144      15000      794872         75000      869872
\n            32 years
\n 6   78-DFT Mrs. Neelam       6800    3400      81600      15000      1545600        75000     1620600
\n            Kumari 39
\n            years
\n 7   80-DFT Mrs. Sushil       3337    1001      34704      15000      646152         75000      721152
\n            Jattana 45
\n            years
\n 8   81-DFT Mrs. Geeta        5100    1530      53040      15000      1020600        75000     1095600
\n            Devi 44 years
\n 9 471-DFT Mrs. Sunita        2843     0        22744      15000      301952         75000      376952
\n           Devi 57 years
\n                                             TOTAL                                             8256472
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              120<\/span><\/p>\n
v)       Working Women in Non-Government Service<\/p>\n
         Out of 12 working women in Non-Government service, all the<\/p>\n
victims except four viz. Mrs. Naresh alias Preeti Kamra, deceased, in<\/p>\n
case No. 17-DFT, Mrs. Santosh, deceased, in case No. 76-DFT, Mrs.<\/p>\n
Sarita Bansal, deceased, in case No. 135-DFT and Mrs. Nirmal Sharma,<\/p>\n
deceased, in case No. 374-DFT were employed as Teachers in DAV<\/p>\n
School on payment of salary ranging from Rs.900\/- to Rs.1,500\/- per<\/p>\n
month. The Commission has while awarding compensation in these<\/p>\n
cases taken the     contribution of the deceased as a housewife for<\/p>\n
services rendered to her family to be Rs.3,000\/- per month and added to<\/p>\n
the same the salary, which the deceased was drawing from the school.<\/p>\n
From the figure thus available the Commission has deducted 1\/3rd<\/p>\n
towards personal expenses, applied an appropriate multiplier and made<\/p>\n
its award accordingly. In principle we do not see any error in the method<\/p>\n
adopted by the Commission except that there should have been no<\/p>\n
deduction towards personal expenses, from out of the value of services<\/p>\n
rendered by the deceased to her family. Even though the deceased<\/p>\n
employee victims were working with the DAV School there is nothing on<\/p>\n
record to suggest that they had any security of tenure or any other<\/p>\n
benefits like Assured Career Progression or increments so as to call for<\/p>\n
award of compensation on the basis of their salary income alone. In<\/p>\n
reality, they were not only rendering services to their family but were<\/p>\n
working in the school to supplement the family income, the former being<\/p>\n
the dominant of the two engagements. In the process of determination of<\/p>\n
compensation payable for their death the proper course would be to<\/p>\n
treat them primarily as housewives and add to the value of the services
\n        Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                       121<\/span><\/p>\n
       rendered by them the additional amount which they were earning from<\/p>\n
       the school out of their employment. We have in the foregoing part of<\/p>\n
       this judgment valued the services rendered by the housewives to the<\/p>\n
       family at Rs.45,000\/-.      To that amount we need to add the annual<\/p>\n
       income of the victims from the salary drawn from the school less 1\/3rd<\/p>\n
       deducted towards personal expenses, which would then be the<\/p>\n
       multiplicand for purposes of applying a suitable multiplier to arrive at a<\/p>\n
       correct figure, to which we need to add a sum of Rs.75,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
       conventional figure. The position that would emerge by adoption of this<\/p>\n
       process would be as under: –<\/p>\n
\n\nSr. Case   Name & AgeAmount      Annual     Value of Multiplier Revised       ConventionalTotal\nNo. No.    of      theawarded byloss      ofServices Applied amount        of figure   (InAmount\n           Deceased   the        dependen rendered              compensation Rs.)         {8+9} (In\n                      Commission cy    afterto     the          held payable              Rs.)\n                      (In Rs.)   deducting family @             {5+6x7}   (In\n                                 1\/3rd      Rs.45000\/-          Rs.)\n                                 thereof (Inp.a.\n                                 Rs.)\n1      2         3          4          5             6      7         8            9         10\n 1 62-DFT Mrs. Manju     544000      8000           45000   17     901000        75000     976000\n          Bala 24\n          years\n 2 66-DFT Mrs. Mamta     609000      9840           45000   18     987120        75000    1062120\n          Midha 26\n          years\n 3 68-DFT Mrs. Upma      544000      8000           45000   17     901000        75000     976000\n          30 years\n 4 69-DFT Mrs. Renu      468000      7200           45000   15     783000        75000     858000\n          Bala 32\n          years\n 5 70-DFT Mrs. Bimla     512000      8000           45000   16     848000        75000     923000\n          Devi 37\n          years\n 6 324-DFT Mrs. Anita    524800      8800           45000   16     860800        75000     935800\n           Sharma 33\n           years\n 7 478-DFT Mrs. Sunita   590000      8800           45000   18     968400        75000    1043400\n           Rani 28\n           years\n 8 482-DFT Mrs. Maya     576000      12000          45000   16     912000        75000     987000\n           Devi 35\n           years\n                                            Total                                         7761320\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              122<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n
         In 76-DFT the deceased, Mrs. Santosh aged about 38 years,<\/p>\n
was working as a teacher in Arya School, Dabwali at a salary of<\/p>\n
Rs.5716\/- per month. So also in 17-DFT the deceased, Mrs. Naresh<\/p>\n
alias Preeti Kamra, was working as Principal in DAV School, Dabwali at<\/p>\n
a salary of Rs.4,400\/- per month. Mrs Nirmal Sharma, deceased in 374-<\/p>\n
DFT, was working as Principal in Satluj School, Dabwali at a salary of<\/p>\n
Rs.3,000\/- per month.     Mrs. Sarita Bansal, aged about 34 years,<\/p>\n
deceased in 135-DFT, was also working as Lecturer in M.P. College,<\/p>\n
Dabwali at a salary of Rs.5,000\/- per month. These four cases appear<\/p>\n
to be distinguishable from other employees referred to above inasmuch<\/p>\n
as they were holding regular and permanent jobs and drawing the salary<\/p>\n
attached to the same and were, therefore, more comparable to those<\/p>\n
holding permanent jobs in the Government. They were at the same time<\/p>\n
rendering services to their respective families, the value whereof cannot<\/p>\n
be less than Rs.15,000\/- per annum as held by us while dealing with the<\/p>\n
cases of Government employees.          Award of compensation would,<\/p>\n
therefore, be more rational, if these regular employees holding<\/p>\n
permanent jobs in their respective establishments are placed at par with<\/p>\n
the Government employees in the matter of award of compensation. In<\/p>\n
the case of Mrs. Nirmal alias Preeti Kamra, the Commission has also<\/p>\n
found that she was drawing an income of Rs.6,393\/- per annum from the<\/p>\n
LIC agency work that she was doing. The said amount can, therefore,<\/p>\n
be added to her income from salary while determining the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation payable to claimants in her case. The final picture, that<\/p>\n
would emerge, can be summarised in a tabular form as under: –<\/p>\n
\n        Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                          123<\/span>\n\n\n\n\nSr. Case     Name & AgeAmount      Annual      Value of Multiplier Revised       ConventionalTotal\nNo. No.      of      theawarded byloss      ofServices Applied amount         of figure   (InAmount\n             Deceased   the        dependen rendered               compensation Rs.)         {8+9} (In\n                        Commission cy (In Rs.) to     the          held payable              Rs.)\n                        (In Rs.)               family @            {5+6x7}   (In\n                                               Rs.15000\/-          Rs.)\n                                               p.a.\n1      2          3           4          5            6      7          8             9         10\n 1 17-DFT Mrs. Naresh       632416     57158         15000   16      1154528       75000     1229528\n          @ Preeti\n          Kamra, 39\n          years\n 2 76-DFT Mrs.              731650     68592         15000   16      1337472       75000     1412472\n          Santosh, 38\n          years\n 3 135-DFT Mrs. Sarita     1088000     60000         15000   17      1275000       75000     1350000\n           Bansal, 34\n           years\n 4 374-DFT Mrs. Nirmal      816000     36000         15000   17       867000       75000      942000\n           Sharma\n                                             Total                                           4934000\n\n\n\n       vi)            Working women (Miscellaneous)\n\n<\/pre>\n
                      In this category fall nine cases in which the deceased were<\/p>\n
       said to be working women doing miscellaneous work. Having regard to<\/p>\n
       the nature of employment and the amount earned from the same, the<\/p>\n
       Commission has treated them as housewives but added the income<\/p>\n
       derived by them from their respective vocations to the multiplicand for<\/p>\n
       determining the amount of compensation payable to the claimants. We<\/p>\n
       shall briefly deal with each one of these cases and re-assess the<\/p>\n
       amount of compensation by reference to the findings recorded by the<\/p>\n
       Commission.\n<\/p>\n
       Case No. 14-DFT<\/p>\n
                      This case arose out of the death of Mrs. Asha Rani, an<\/p>\n
       Anganwari Worker who was drawing a salary of Rs.450\/- per month.<\/p>\n
       Deducting 1\/3rd out of the said amount towards personal expenses, the<\/p>\n
       net contribution to the family can be taken to be Rs.3,600\/- per annum.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 124<\/span><\/p>\n
To that amount shall be added Rs.45,000\/- towards value of the<\/p>\n
services rendered to the family taking the total loss of dependency to<\/p>\n
Rs.48,600\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the claimants would<\/p>\n
be entitled to a compensation of Rs.8,26,200\/-. Adding to that figure the<\/p>\n
conventional amount of Rs.75,000\/-, the total amount of compensation<\/p>\n
payable to the claimants would come to Rs.9,01,200\/-.<\/p>\n
Case No. 109-DFT<\/p>\n
          This case arose out of the death of Mrs. Rekha Rani, who<\/p>\n
was, according to the findings recorded by the Commission, doing<\/p>\n
tuition work and earning Rs.36,260\/- per annum from the same.<\/p>\n
Deducting 1\/3rd out of the said amount towards her personal expenses,<\/p>\n
her net contribution to the family would come to Rs.24,174\/- per annum.<\/p>\n
Adding to that amount the value of the services to the family amounting<\/p>\n
to Rs.45,000\/-, the multiplicand would rise to Rs.69,174\/-. It is<\/p>\n
noteworthy that before the Commission, the claimants had produced<\/p>\n
the Income-tax return filed by the deceased for the financial year 1994-<\/p>\n
95 which supported the claim made by them that the deceased was<\/p>\n
doing tuition work during her life time. Applying a multiplier of 18 to that<\/p>\n
amount, the claimants would be entitled to Rs.12,45,132\/-. To that figure<\/p>\n
we add the conventional amount of Rs.75,000\/- taking the total amount<\/p>\n
of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.13,20,132\/-.<\/p>\n
Case No. 124-DFT<\/p>\n
          Mrs. Renu Bala, deceased, in this case was said to be a<\/p>\n
Social Worker. The Commission has taken her income from social work<\/p>\n
at Rs.2,100\/- per month. We, however, see no reason to assume that a<\/p>\n
Social Worker does such work for any monetary gain. Addition of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  125<\/span><\/p>\n
Rs.2,100\/- per month to the monthly income of the deceased was,<\/p>\n
therefore, not justified. All the same, if the value of the services rendered<\/p>\n
by the deceased, who was a young lady of 31 years, is taken at<\/p>\n
Rs.45,000\/- per annum and a multiplier of 17 applied to the same, the<\/p>\n
amount payable to the claimant would work out to Rs.7,65,000\/-. To that<\/p>\n
figure is added Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount taking the total<\/p>\n
amount payable to the claimants to be Rs.8,40,000\/-, which amount we<\/p>\n
hereby award to the claimants in this case.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 138-DFT<\/p>\n
          Mrs.Sushma Gupta, deceased, in this case, was aged 34<\/p>\n
years. The Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.6,12,000\/- by taking<\/p>\n
her income to be Rs.1,500\/- per month from tuition\/coaching work in<\/p>\n
addition to Rs.3,000\/- per month towards services rendered to the<\/p>\n
family. Taking the value of services rendered to the family at Rs.45,000\/-<\/p>\n
and adding the net income of Rs.12000\/- per annum after deducting<\/p>\n
1\/3rd towards her personal expenses earned by her from tuition\/coaching<\/p>\n
work, the multiplicand would come to Rs.57,000\/- per annum. Applying<\/p>\n
a multiplier of 17, the amount of compensation payable to the claimants<\/p>\n
in this case would come to Rs.9,69,000\/-. Addition of a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount would take the total amount of<\/p>\n
compensation payable to the        claimants to Rs.10,44,000\/-, which is<\/p>\n
hereby awarded.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 152-DFT<\/p>\n
          Mrs. Kiran Pal Grover, deceased in this case was, according<\/p>\n
to the evidence adduced before the Commission, engaged in tailoring<\/p>\n
work and earned Rs.100\/- to Rs.200\/- per month. The Commission has
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                126<\/span><\/p>\n
taken her earning to Rs.150\/- per month or Rs.1,800\/- per annum and<\/p>\n
added a sum of Rs.36,000\/- per annum towards the value of the<\/p>\n
services rendered by her to the family, deducted 1\/3rd towards her<\/p>\n
personal expenses and determined the multiplicand at Rs.25,200\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the Commission has awarded a sum<\/p>\n
of Rs.3,78,000\/- to the claimants who happen to be the husband and<\/p>\n
minor daughter of the deceased. We see no reason to interfere with the<\/p>\n
determination made by the Commission towards the income of the<\/p>\n
deceased from tailoring work. The value of the services rendered to the<\/p>\n
family shall, however, stand enhanced to Rs.45,000\/- without any<\/p>\n
deduction as has been the position in all such cases. The total loss of<\/p>\n
dependency would, therefore, come to Rs.46,200\/- per annum. Applying<\/p>\n
a multiplier of 15 to that figure, the claimants would be entitled to a sum<\/p>\n
of Rs.6,93,000\/-. Adding conventional amount of Rs.75,000\/- to the<\/p>\n
same the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants would<\/p>\n
come to Rs.7,68,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 160-DFT<\/p>\n
          Mrs. Manju Bala, deceased, in this case was also a 31 years<\/p>\n
old housewife who was engaged in Life Insurance Corporation Agency<\/p>\n
work. The Commission has, on the basis of the material placed before<\/p>\n
it, taken her income from the Agency’s work to be Rs.2,000\/- per month<\/p>\n
or Rs.24,000\/- per annum and added to the same the value of services<\/p>\n
rendered to the family. Deducting 1\/3rd of the said amount towards<\/p>\n
personal expenses, the Commission has taken the loss of dependency<\/p>\n
to be Rs.40,000\/- per annum. The Commission has, accordingly,<\/p>\n
awarded Rs.6,40,000\/- to the claimants. While we see no reason to
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             127<\/span><\/p>\n
interfere with the amount determined by the Commission towards the<\/p>\n
earning from the Agency work undertaken by the deceased, the<\/p>\n
deduction of 1\/3rd towards personal expenses must be confined only to<\/p>\n
said amount. This would mean that the net loss of dependency, on<\/p>\n
account of the income from the Agency’s work, would come to<\/p>\n
Rs.16,000\/- per annum. Adding to the said amount, the value of services<\/p>\n
rendered to the family assessed at Rs.45,000\/-, the loss of dependency<\/p>\n
would come to Rs.61,000\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 16 to the<\/p>\n
said amount, the compensation works out to Rs.9,76,000\/-.        Adding<\/p>\n
Rs.75,000\/- to the said figure towards conventional amount, the total<\/p>\n
compensation payable to the claimants comes to Rs.10,51,000\/-.<\/p>\n
Case No. 346-DFT<\/p>\n
         In this case the deceased Mrs. Sakshi alias Rakesh Rani was<\/p>\n
a 25 years old housewife who used to take cooking classes at the time<\/p>\n
of her death in the fire tragedy. Her husband and son Bobby had<\/p>\n
claimed a sum of Rs.70,00,000\/- as compensation before the<\/p>\n
Commission.    The   evidence   before   the   Commission    comprised<\/p>\n
documents showing her academic qualification and other achievements.<\/p>\n
The Commission has, on the basis of the said evidence, taken the<\/p>\n
income of the deceased at Rs.2,100\/- per month and deducted 1\/3rd<\/p>\n
towards her personal expenses taking the loss of dependency to be<\/p>\n
Rs.40,800\/- per annum. The Commission has applied a multiplier of 18<\/p>\n
and awarded a sum of Rs.7,34,400\/-. The value of the services<\/p>\n
rendered by the deceased to the family should in our opinion be taken at<\/p>\n
Rs.45,000\/- per annum to which amount could be added Rs.16,800\/- per<\/p>\n
annum towards income earned from cooking classes. The total loss of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             128<\/span><\/p>\n
dependency would, therefore, come to Rs.61,800\/- per annum. Applying<\/p>\n
a multiplier of 18 the amount of compensation payable to the claimants<\/p>\n
would come to Rs.11,12,400\/-. Addition of Rs.75,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
conventional amount would take the figure to be Rs.11,87,400\/-.<\/p>\n
Case NO. 351-DFT<\/p>\n
         In this claim petition, the deceased Mrs. Nirmla alias Rani was<\/p>\n
a 34 years old housewife who was imparting training for tailoring and<\/p>\n
stitching work at the time of her death in the fire tragedy. A claim of<\/p>\n
Rs.60,00,000\/- was made by her husband and son Mohinder Kumar.<\/p>\n
The evidence adduced before the Commission suggested that the<\/p>\n
deceased was a diploma holder from Industrial Training Institute in<\/p>\n
Cutting and Tailoring as per National Trade Certificate issued by the<\/p>\n
Ministry of Labour, Government of India. The Commission had, on the<\/p>\n
basis of the material placed before it, taken the income of the deceased<\/p>\n
to be Rs.2,100\/- per month from her vocation and determined the total<\/p>\n
loss of dependency at Rs.40,800\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of<\/p>\n
17, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.6,94,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
compensation and directed its apportionment between the two<\/p>\n
claimants. In our opinion, while the income earned by the deceased<\/p>\n
from her tailoring work could be taken at Rs.1,400\/- per month or<\/p>\n
Rs.16,800\/- per annum after deduction of 1\/3rd towards her personal<\/p>\n
expenses, the value of the services rendered to the family could be<\/p>\n
assessed at Rs.45,000\/-. This would take the multiplicand to<\/p>\n
Rs.61,800\/-. Applying a multiplier of 17, the amount of compensation<\/p>\n
payable to the claimants would come to Rs.10,50,600\/-. Addition of<\/p>\n
Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount would take the total to
\n        Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                       129<\/span><\/p>\n
       Rs.11,25,600\/- which shall be apportioned between the claimants<\/p>\n
       equally.\n<\/p>\n
       Case No.486-DFT<\/p>\n
                      Deceased Mrs. Tulsi Devi, in this case was, a housewife, aged<\/p>\n
       about 19 years working as a Domestic Servant at the time of her death<\/p>\n
       in the fire tragedy. The Commission has taken the income of the<\/p>\n
       deceased at Rs.18,000\/- per annum, deducted 1\/3rd from the same<\/p>\n
       towards personal expenses, added the amount so determined to the<\/p>\n
       value of services rendered to the family to award a sum of<\/p>\n
       Rs.6,122,000\/- to the claimants. Taking the value of services of the<\/p>\n
       deceased at Rs.45,000\/- and the net income after deduction of 1\/3rd<\/p>\n
       towards her personal expenses to be Rs.12,000\/-, the multiplicand<\/p>\n
       comes to Rs.57,000\/-. Applying a multiplier of 17 to the said amount, the<\/p>\n
       amount of compensation comes to Rs.9,69,000\/- to which is added<\/p>\n
       Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional charges to take the total amount of<\/p>\n
       compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.10,44,000\/-.<\/p>\n
                      The final picture regarding the amounts payable in this<\/p>\n
       category, therefore, may be summed up as under:-<\/p>\n
\n\nSr. Case   Name & AgeAmount      Annual     Value of Multiplier Revised       ConventionalTotal\nNo. No.    of      theawarded byloss      ofServices Applied amount        of figure   (InAmount\n           Deceased   the        dependen rendered              compensation Rs.)         {8+9} (In\n                      Commission cy    afterto     the          held payable              Rs.)\n                      (In Rs.)   deducting family @             {5+6x7}   (In\n                                 1\/3rd      Rs.45000\/-          Rs.)\n                                 thereof    p.a.\n                                 (In Rs.)\n1     2           3           4         5        6         7          8            9         10\n 1 14-DFT Mrs. Asha         469200    3600     45000      17       826200        75000     901200\n          Rani 32\n          years\n 2 109-DFT Mrs. Rekha       867000    24174    45000      18      1245132        75000    1320132\n           Rani 29\n           years\n       Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 130<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n3 124-DFT Mrs. Renu     693600     --       45000    17      765000       75000      840000\n          Bala 31\n          years\n4 138-DFT Mrs.          612000   12000      45000    17      969000       75000      1044000\n          Sushma\n          Gupta 34\n          years\n5 152-DFT Mrs. Kiran    378000    1200      45000    15      693000       75000      768000\n          Pal Grover\n          41 years\n6 160-DFT Mrs. Manju    640000   16000      45000    16      976000       75000      1051000\n          Bala 31\n          Years\n7 346-DFT Mrs. Sakshi   734400   16800      45000    18      1112400      75000      1187400\n          alias\n          Rakesh\n          Rani 25\n          years\n8 351-DFT Mrs. Nirmla   694000   16800      45000    17      1050600      75000      1125600\n          alias Rani\n          34 years\n9 486-DFT Mrs. Tulsi    612000   12000      45000    17      969000       75000      1044000\n          Devi 19\n          years\n                                        TOTAL                                        9281332\n\n\n\n      Category 5 cases:-\n\n<\/pre>\n
                  This category comprises claims in connection with 39 adult<\/p>\n
      males of different age groups who lost their lives in the fire incident. The<\/p>\n
      Commission of Inquiry has relied upon the decision of the Supreme<\/p>\n
      Court in Susamma ‘s case (supra), Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) and<\/p>\n
      the English decisions in Mallett Vs. Mc.Monagle, 1970 A.C. 166,<\/p>\n
      Davies Vs. Taylor, 1974 A.C. 207, Davies Vs. Powell Duffryn<\/p>\n
      Associated Collieries Ltd. (1942) A.C. (Privy Council) 601 as also the<\/p>\n
      decisions of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Chairman, A.P.SRTC<\/p>\n
      Vs. Shafiya Khatoon’s case (supra), Bhagwan Dass Vs. Mohd.<\/p>\n
      Aref’s case (supra) and A.P.STRC Vs. G.Ramanaiah’s case (supra),<\/p>\n
      observed that the multiplier method for determining compensation in<\/p>\n
      cases of death is legally well established and ensures not only `just’
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              131<\/span><\/p>\n
compensation but certainty of the awards also. A departure from the<\/p>\n
method could be justified only in rare and extraordinary circumstances<\/p>\n
and very exceptional cases.     The legal position as set out in the<\/p>\n
recommendations made by the Commission is, in our opinion,<\/p>\n
unexceptionable and does not call for any addition or any further<\/p>\n
discussion by us in this judgment. We may only add that the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court has in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and others       Vs. Delhi Transport<\/p>\n
Corporation and another, (2009) 6 Supreme Court Cases 121, on a<\/p>\n
review of the case law on the subject, restated the legal principles<\/p>\n
governing determination of compensation in cases under the Motor<\/p>\n
Vehicles Act. The decision lucidly reiterates the approach to be adopted<\/p>\n
for determination of compensation, addition of income towards future<\/p>\n
prospects, deduction of living expenses, selection of multiplier and<\/p>\n
computation of compensation etc.     We have, while dealing with the<\/p>\n
cases falling in other categories, already made a reference to the said<\/p>\n
decision in so far as the same lays down the principles governing<\/p>\n
addition of income towards future prospects. We need only add that<\/p>\n
the legal position as stated by the Supreme Court in the cases of<\/p>\n
Susamma Thommas (supra) and other cases referred to above,<\/p>\n
remains firmly established and has indeed been reiterated by their<\/p>\n
Lordships in Sarla Verma’s case (Supra).\n<\/p>\n
          The Commission, in category 5 cases, has awarded<\/p>\n
compensation ranging between Rs.61,200\/- to Rs.16,11,000\/-.<\/p>\n
          We propose to take up each one of these cases for a close<\/p>\n
scrutiny ad seriatim.\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              132<\/span><\/p>\n
Case No. 8-DFT<\/p>\n
         In this case arising out of the death of Gurdeep Singh, the<\/p>\n
Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000\/- and<\/p>\n
applied a multiplier of 13. The Commission found no evidence to support<\/p>\n
the claim for payment of Rs.70,00,000\/- made by the mother of the<\/p>\n
deceased. What is significant, however, is that the deceased was just<\/p>\n
about 19 years old at the time of his death. He was employed as a<\/p>\n
School Van Driver with Satluj Public School. The amount being earned<\/p>\n
by him could not, therefore, be said to be the optimum of what he was<\/p>\n
capable of earning with better experience in the years to come. It is<\/p>\n
common knowledge that a driver during the relevant period could earn<\/p>\n
upto Rs.6,000\/- per month depending upon his experience and good<\/p>\n
conduct. Deceased Gurdeep Singh had just started his career. A salary<\/p>\n
of Rs.3,000\/- could not, therefore, be said to be a real Index of what he<\/p>\n
would have earned in times to come. Super added to this is the fact that<\/p>\n
a housewife who simply renders services to the family is taken to be<\/p>\n
contributing upto Rs.45,000\/- per annum. An adult male who is bodily fit<\/p>\n
and gainfully employed as a driver could earn more than that amount.<\/p>\n
Having regard to all these circumstances and even when the income of<\/p>\n
the deceased was on the date of the fire incident said to be Rs.3,000\/-<\/p>\n
per month, we are inclined to accept his income to be Rs.4,500\/- per<\/p>\n
month. Deducting 1\/3rd of said amount towards personal expenses of the<\/p>\n
deceased the contribution to the family would work out to Rs.3,000\/- per<\/p>\n
month or Rs.36,000\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 13 to that<\/p>\n
figure, the amount of compensation works out to Rs.4,68,000\/-. We see<\/p>\n
no reason to deny conventional figure of Rs.75,000\/-, awarded by us in
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   133<\/span><\/p>\n
cases   falling   in   other   categories.   We   accordingly   award    the<\/p>\n
conventional amount of Rs.75,000\/- to the claimants in this case, which<\/p>\n
would take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.5,43,000\/-.<\/p>\n
Cases No. 9-DFT and 12-DFT<\/p>\n
          Ravinder Kumar and Ashwani Kumar, deceased were<\/p>\n
brothers. The Commission has awarded to the claimants in both these<\/p>\n
cases a sum of Rs.3,90,000\/- in each case to be apportioned equally<\/p>\n
between the parents of the deceased. While doing so, the Commission<\/p>\n
has taken the income of the two brothers at Rs.10,500\/- each, deducted<\/p>\n
1\/3rd towards personal expenses and applied a multiplier of 5.<\/p>\n
          In his testimony Roshan Lal, father of the deceased victims,<\/p>\n
stated that his sons were earning Rs.30,000\/- each every month which<\/p>\n
figure the Commission had disbelieved as according to it, business in a<\/p>\n
small town like Dabwali could not, in its opinion, yield that kind of return.<\/p>\n
It is true that apart from the statement of the father of the deceased,<\/p>\n
there is no other evidence to establish the true income of his sons from<\/p>\n
the business being carried on by them, even so, keeping in view the fact<\/p>\n
that both the boys were engaged in photography business, we see no<\/p>\n
reason why their income should not be taken at Rs.12,000\/- per month<\/p>\n
per person, instead of Rs.10,500\/- determined by the Commission.<\/p>\n
Deducting 1\/3rd of the said amount towards personal expenses, the net<\/p>\n
contribution to the family would come to Rs.8,000\/- per month or<\/p>\n
Rs.96,000\/- per annum per person. Taking into consideration the age of<\/p>\n
the parents, the multiplier of 5 chosen by the Commission is, in our<\/p>\n
opinion, appropriate which would take the amount payable to the<\/p>\n
parents to be Rs.4,80,000\/- in each case. Over and above the said
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                134<\/span><\/p>\n
figure we award Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional charges taking the<\/p>\n
total amount of compensation to Rs.5,55,000\/- in each one of these two<\/p>\n
cases to be apportioned equally between the parents.<\/p>\n
Case No.10-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case arises out of the death of Balbir Singh, who was<\/p>\n
working as a Cameraman. The Commission has taken the income of the<\/p>\n
deceased at Rs.3,000\/- per month against Rs.4,000\/- or Rs.5,000\/- per<\/p>\n
month stated to be his income according to the mother of the victim. In<\/p>\n
our opinion, the income of the deceased could have been taken to be<\/p>\n
Rs.4,000\/- per month in which case the net loss of dependency to the<\/p>\n
family would come to Rs.2,667\/- per month or Rs.32,000\/- per annum.<\/p>\n
Applying a multiplier of 17, chosen by the Commission to the said figure,<\/p>\n
the amount payable as compensation would work out to Rs.5,44,000\/-.<\/p>\n
Adding Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure, the total amount<\/p>\n
payable to the claimants in this case would come to Rs.6,19,000\/-.<\/p>\n
         Since the deceased has left behind his mother and a minor<\/p>\n
daughter, a sum of Rs.2,00,000\/- out of the said amount shall be paid to<\/p>\n
the mother, while the remaining amount shall be deposited in a Fixed<\/p>\n
Deposit Receipt till the daughter attains majority. The interest income<\/p>\n
accruing from the Fixed Deposit can, however, be withdrawn by the<\/p>\n
minor through her grand mother, the guardian periodically, to be spent<\/p>\n
on her upbringing and education etc.<\/p>\n
Case No. 11-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case arose out of the death of Ashok Gill aged 26 years<\/p>\n
who was working as a Music Teacher at the time of his death in the fire<\/p>\n
tragedy. The claimants are his widow and a minor daughter. The
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              135<\/span><\/p>\n
Commission has accepted the version given by the claimants that the<\/p>\n
deceased was earning Rs.150\/- per day by teaching music to school<\/p>\n
children. The income of the deceased has been determined at<\/p>\n
Rs.4,500\/- per month or Rs.54,000\/- per annum. Deducting 1\/3rd out of<\/p>\n
the said amount, towards his personal expenses, the Commission has<\/p>\n
determined the loss of dependency at Rs.36,000\/- per annum. Keeping<\/p>\n
in view the age of the claimants, the Commission has correctly applied a<\/p>\n
multiplier of 18 and awarded Rs.6,48,000\/- to the claimants. There is in<\/p>\n
our opinion no reason to interfere with the said amount except that the<\/p>\n
claimants would be entitled in addition to the amount awarded by the<\/p>\n
Commission to an amount of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure.<\/p>\n
The total amount thus payable to the claimants in this case would come<\/p>\n
to Rs.7,23,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 13-DFT<\/p>\n
          This claim arises out of the death of Bhagirath aged about 31<\/p>\n
years on the date of incident who was working as a Constable in the<\/p>\n
Police Department. His widow Smt.Uma Devi and minor son Baldev<\/p>\n
claimed Rs.70,00,000 as compensation before the Commission. The<\/p>\n
Commission has, however, determined the gross salary of deceased as<\/p>\n
Rs.3,134\/- per month on the basis of his certificate issued by the office<\/p>\n
of the Superintendent of Police, Sirsa. Deducting 1\/3rd of the said<\/p>\n
amount, the loss of dependency to the family has been determined as<\/p>\n
Rs.25,027\/- per annum. The Commission has applied a multiplier of 17<\/p>\n
to award Rs.4,26,224\/- which amount in our opinion deserves to be<\/p>\n
enhanced having regard to the fact that the deceased was holding a<\/p>\n
permanent job in the Police Department and had prospects of rising
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             136<\/span><\/p>\n
higher in the police department. Applying the principles stated by the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Sarla Verma’s case (supra), the income of the<\/p>\n
deceased can be taken to be Rs.4,701\/- per month. Deducting 1\/3rd of<\/p>\n
the said amount towards personal expenses of the deceased, the net<\/p>\n
loss of dependency can be taken as Rs.3,134\/- per month or Rs.<\/p>\n
37,608\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17 chosen by the<\/p>\n
Commission, the compensation payable to the claimants comes to<\/p>\n
Rs.6,39,336\/-. Addition of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount to<\/p>\n
that figure would take the total amount payable to the claimants      to<\/p>\n
Rs.7,14,336\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 15-DFT<\/p>\n
         This claim arises out of the death of Shri Ashok Wadhera, who<\/p>\n
was a Press Reporter running a News Agency at the time of his death in<\/p>\n
the fire tragedy. His wife and minor son and daughter made a claim for<\/p>\n
Rs.70,00,000\/-   before   the   Commission.    The   Commission     has<\/p>\n
determined the income of the deceased to be Rs.6,000\/-per month and<\/p>\n
the loss of dependency to be Rs.4,000\/- per month or Rs.48,000\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. Applying a multiplier of 17, the Commission has awarded<\/p>\n
Rs.8,16,000\/- towards compensation in this case and directed that out of<\/p>\n
the said amount, a sum of Rs. 3,16,000\/- be paid to Mrs. Usha Wadhera<\/p>\n
while a sum of Rs.2,50,000\/- each be paid to their son and daughter left<\/p>\n
behind by the deceased. It appears that the income of the deceased<\/p>\n
was stated to be between Rs.5,000\/- to Rs.7,000\/- per month. The<\/p>\n
Commission has therefore rightly taken the mean figure while<\/p>\n
determining the loss of dependency. We see no reason to interfere with<\/p>\n
the said determination or the multiplier chosen by the Commission. All
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                137<\/span><\/p>\n
that we need add is a sum of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount<\/p>\n
to take the total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.8,91,000\/-. A<\/p>\n
sum of Rs.3,50,000\/- out of the said amount shall be paid to the widow<\/p>\n
of the deceased while the remaining amount can be deposited in the<\/p>\n
Fixed Deposits in the name of the minor son and daughter of the<\/p>\n
deceased till the time they attain majority. The interest accruing from the<\/p>\n
said income can be withdrawn by the mother\/guardian of the children for<\/p>\n
upbringing and education of the children.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 16-DFT<\/p>\n
          This case arises out of the death of Radhey Shyam Shastri<\/p>\n
who was 36 years old at the time of incident and had been engaged in<\/p>\n
performing religious and pooja ceremonies to earn his livelihood. The<\/p>\n
evidence adduced by the Commission suggests that the deceased was<\/p>\n
earning Rs.15,000\/- per month from such Pooja and other ceremonies.<\/p>\n
The Commission, has, however, taken the income of the deceased to be<\/p>\n
Rs.7,500\/- per month, deducted 1\/3rd amount towards his personal<\/p>\n
expenses and taken the loss of dependency for the family to be<\/p>\n
Rs.5,000\/- per month or Rs.60,000\/- per year. Applying a multiplier of<\/p>\n
15, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.9,00,000\/- to the claimant<\/p>\n
in this case, to which we add Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure,<\/p>\n
taking the total amount of compensation to Rs.9,75,000\/-. There is, in<\/p>\n
our opinion, no room for making any other alteration in this case.<\/p>\n
Case No. 18-DFT<\/p>\n
          This case arises out of the death of Ravinder Kumar, aged 40<\/p>\n
years, who was a registered Medical Practitioner at the time of his<\/p>\n
death. The claimants happen to be his wife and two sons and a
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               138<\/span><\/p>\n
daughter. A claim of Rs.70,00,000\/- was made before the Commission.<\/p>\n
The Commission has eventually awarded a sum of Rs.1,16,000\/- only.<\/p>\n
The Commission has noted that the deceased had passed Ayurveda<\/p>\n
Rattan Examination and was a registered Medical Practitioner since<\/p>\n
1976 as per the certificate marked as Ex.P232\/18-DFT. The<\/p>\n
Commission also noted that the deceased was working as a Press<\/p>\n
Correspondent with a local newspaper. The Commission, has, however,<\/p>\n
come to the conclusion that the claim for payment of compensation was<\/p>\n
unsupported by any evidence and has accordingly taken the monthly<\/p>\n
wages fixed by the Deputy Commissioner, Sirsa for the years 1995-96<\/p>\n
and determined the monthly earning of deceased as Rs.1,322\/- or<\/p>\n
Rs.15,864\/- per year. Deducting 1\/3rd out of the said amount towards<\/p>\n
personal expenses, the Commission has taken the loss of dependency<\/p>\n
to be Rs.10,576\/- per annum. The Commission has in our opinion failed<\/p>\n
to take into consideration the fact that the deceased was a Registered<\/p>\n
Medical Practitioner for a number of years and was qualified to practice<\/p>\n
medicine in that capacity. The absence of any specific figure mentioned<\/p>\n
in the statement of the widow left behind by the deceased could not be<\/p>\n
taken as conclusive of the deceased not being gainfully employed in the<\/p>\n
profession for which he was trained. Having regard to the totality of the<\/p>\n
circumstances, we are of the opinion that the income of the deceased<\/p>\n
could be taken to be Rs.4,500\/- per month. Deducting 1\/3rd towards<\/p>\n
personal expenses, the net loss of dependency would come to<\/p>\n
Rs.36,000\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15 to the said figure, the<\/p>\n
claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.5,40,000\/-. Addition of<\/p>\n
Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount to that figure would take the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              139<\/span><\/p>\n
total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.6,15,000\/-.<\/p>\n
Case No. 19-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case arises out of the death of Om Parkash Mehta aged<\/p>\n
43 years on the date of fire tragedy. His wife and two sons claimed<\/p>\n
Rs.70,00,000\/- towards compensation and adduced evidence to show<\/p>\n
that the deceased was earning a sum of Rs.1,00,000\/- per annum from<\/p>\n
agricultural land and running the business of a Commission Agent in the<\/p>\n
name of M\/s Mehta Brothers, from which he was earning Rs. 2,00,000\/-<\/p>\n
per annum. Relying upon the decision of the Supreme Court in State of<\/p>\n
Haryana and another V. Jasbir Kaur and others, III(2003) Accident<\/p>\n
and Compensation Cases 90, the Commission held that there was no<\/p>\n
loss of income to the family by reference to the agricultural land owned<\/p>\n
and cultivated by the deceased. The Commission has also held that<\/p>\n
there was no evidence to show that after the death of the deceased Om<\/p>\n
Parkash Mehta, the family had engaged anyone to look after the land<\/p>\n
mutated in their favour. As regards the income from the Commission<\/p>\n
Agency, the Commission has determined Rs.36,490\/- per annum as<\/p>\n
income of the deceased. Deducting 1\/3rd towards personal expenses,<\/p>\n
the net loss of dependency has been determined at Rs.24,327\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. Applying a multiplier of 13, the Commission has awarded a sum<\/p>\n
of Rs.3,16,251\/- to the claimants to be distributed equally among all the<\/p>\n
three claimants.\n<\/p>\n
         There are only two aspects which we propose to highlight in<\/p>\n
this case, one relating to the money value of the contribution which the<\/p>\n
deceased was making towards cultivation of the agricultural land and<\/p>\n
managing the affairs concerning the same and the other regarding the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               140<\/span><\/p>\n
payment of conventional amount of Rs.75,000\/-. It may be true that the<\/p>\n
claimants have not established that any one has been engaged by them<\/p>\n
after the death of Om Parkash Mehta to manage the agricultural land,<\/p>\n
but the mere absence of any such alternative arrangement may not<\/p>\n
suggest that the deceased was not contributing anything towards the<\/p>\n
cultivation of land and the resultant income from the same. In our<\/p>\n
opinion, the monetary equivalent of the contribution made by the<\/p>\n
deceased in the matter of cultivation of the land held by him could not be<\/p>\n
less than Rs.1,000\/- per month or Rs.12,000\/- per year which amount<\/p>\n
could be added to the annual loss of dependency by reference to the<\/p>\n
Commission Agency business that the deceased was doing during his<\/p>\n
lifetime. Viewed thus, the annual loss of the dependency would work out<\/p>\n
to be Rs.36,327\/-. Applying a multiplier of 13 to the said figure, the<\/p>\n
claimants would be entitled to a sum of Rs.4,72,251.          Addition of<\/p>\n
Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount to that figure would take the<\/p>\n
total amount payable to the claimants to Rs.5,47,251.<\/p>\n
Case No. 20-DFT<\/p>\n
          The claim, in this case, arose out of the death of Des Raj who<\/p>\n
was, at the time of the incident, a 68 years old Pensioner. His widow<\/p>\n
Raj Rani and son Palwinder made a claim of Rs.50,00,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
compensation before the Commission who arrived at the conclusion<\/p>\n
that the Pensioner was drawing a pension of Rs.4,000\/- per month only<\/p>\n
and that the net loss of dependency after deduction of 1\/3rd towards his<\/p>\n
personal expenses would come to Rs.32,000\/- per annum. Applying a<\/p>\n
multiplier of 5, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.1,60,000\/- to be<\/p>\n
paid to both the claimants in equal share. In the absence of any material
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                            141<\/span><\/p>\n
to show that the deceased was having any additional income from any<\/p>\n
other source, we are inclined to accept the view taken by the<\/p>\n
Commission that the deceased was, as Pensioner, earning only<\/p>\n
Rs.4,000\/- and that the net loss of dependency was Rs.32,000\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. The Commission has not, however, awarded to the claimants<\/p>\n
the conventional figure of Rs.75,000\/- which we see no reason to deny<\/p>\n
them. We, accordingly, enhance the amount of Rs.1,60,000\/- awarded<\/p>\n
by the Commission to Rs.2,35,000\/- to be paid to both the claimants in<\/p>\n
equal shares.\n<\/p>\n
Claim No. 22-DFT<\/p>\n
         In this case, deceased Surinder Kumar was 37 years old and<\/p>\n
working as a Bank Collection Agent. The claimants before the<\/p>\n
Commission happened to be the widow, daughter, son and father of the<\/p>\n
deceased. The evidence adduced before the Commission attempted to<\/p>\n
prove that the Commission Agent was earning between Rs.30,000\/- to<\/p>\n
Rs.40,000\/- per annum apart from a sum of Rs. 5,000\/- per month from<\/p>\n
tuition work. The One Man Commission has, however, found no<\/p>\n
evidence to support the claim of income from the tuition work. The<\/p>\n
Commission has, all the same, accepted the version given by the<\/p>\n
claimants that the deceased was earning, from the Commission Agency,<\/p>\n
a sum of Rs.32,314.90 ps. in the year 1995. Making that income as the<\/p>\n
basis, the Commission deducted 1\/3rd towards personal expenses and<\/p>\n
determined the net loss of dependency to the family at Rs.21,550\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. The Commission has, it appears, gone entirely by the amount<\/p>\n
earned by the deceased from the Commission Agency in the year 1995<\/p>\n
ignoring the assertion made   by the claimants that the income was
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             142<\/span><\/p>\n
between Rs.30,000\/- to Rs.40,000\/- per annum. On an average,<\/p>\n
therefore, the income of the deceased could have been taken to be<\/p>\n
Rs.35,000\/- per annum instead of Rs.32,314.90 ps., as was done by the<\/p>\n
Commission. To that amount, we are inclined to add a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.15,000\/- towards income from tuition work, keeping in view the fact<\/p>\n
that the deceased was an academically qualified young man, for whom<\/p>\n
Commission Agency work could leave enough spare time to be spent on<\/p>\n
providing tuition for supplementing his income. The gross annual income<\/p>\n
of the deceased could, therefore, be taken to be Rs.50,000\/-. Deducting<\/p>\n
1\/3rd of the said amount towards his personal expenses the net loss of<\/p>\n
dependency would come to Rs.33,300\/-.      Applying a multiplier of 16<\/p>\n
chosen by the Commission, the amount payable to the claimants comes<\/p>\n
to Rs.5,32,800. To that amount, we need to add Rs.75,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
conventional amount taking the compensation to Rs.6,07,800\/- which we<\/p>\n
hereby award to the claimants.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 23-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case arose out of the death of Ramesh Chugh, aged 46<\/p>\n
years, who was an Agriculturist by profession and who was also one of<\/p>\n
the unfortunate victims of the fire incident. The claimants before the<\/p>\n
Commission comprised widow of the deceased and his two children.<\/p>\n
The claim for payment of a sum of Rs.70,00,000\/- as compensation was<\/p>\n
sought to be supported on the basis that the death of deceased had<\/p>\n
deprived the family of the entire income earned by him from 29 acres of<\/p>\n
cultivable land owned by him in village Lohgarh, Tehsil Dabwali. The<\/p>\n
Commission has, however, discussed the evidence and relying upon the<\/p>\n
decision of the Supreme Court in State of Haryana and Another v.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                143<\/span><\/p>\n
Jasbir Kaur and Others III (2003) Accident and Compensation<\/p>\n
Cases 90 (SC) came to the conclusion that the source of income<\/p>\n
remains available to the family since the landed property held by the<\/p>\n
deceased continues to remain available and stands mutated in favour of<\/p>\n
the claimants. The contribution      made by the deceased         towards<\/p>\n
management and cultivation of the said land could, however, be<\/p>\n
evaluated and an appropriate amount awarded as the family was forced<\/p>\n
to engage someone else to do what the deceased was doing during his<\/p>\n
life time. The Commission has, accordingly, taken the contribution of the<\/p>\n
deceased to be Rs.7,000\/- per month, deducted 1\/3rd amount out of the<\/p>\n
same towards his personal expenses to award a compensation of<\/p>\n
Rs.7,28,000\/- by applying a multiplier of 13. The Commission has, in<\/p>\n
our view, committed a mistake on both counts, viz. taking the<\/p>\n
contribution of the deceased at Rs.7,000\/- per month as also deducting<\/p>\n
1\/3rd out of the said amount. In the first place, there was no cogent<\/p>\n
evidence to establish that the family was indeed spending Rs.7,000\/-<\/p>\n
per month except engagement of one Bihari Lal,a graduate who had<\/p>\n
passed away in August 2003. Be that as it may, the engagement of a<\/p>\n
person to look after the lands could not be said to be improbable and<\/p>\n
unnatural having regard to the fact that ownership of the land and its<\/p>\n
cultivation was firmly established. In our opinion, the contribution of the<\/p>\n
deceased which now would necessitate the engagement of someone<\/p>\n
else to do what the deceased was doing could be assessed at<\/p>\n
Rs.5,000\/- per month. The net loss on account of the death of the<\/p>\n
deceased could, therefore, be Rs.60,000\/- per annum and no more.<\/p>\n
Applying a multiplier of 13 to the said figure, the amount of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             144<\/span><\/p>\n
compensation would come to Rs.7,80,000\/-. To that amount should be<\/p>\n
added the conventional figure of Rs.75,000\/- to take the total amount of<\/p>\n
compensation to Rs.8,55,000\/- to be paid to the claimants in      equal<\/p>\n
proportions.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 24-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case arose out of the death of Sanjay Kwatra, a 26 years<\/p>\n
old businessman who was also one of the victims of the fire incident.<\/p>\n
The claim was made by his minor daughter Simmy Kwatra for a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.70,00,000\/- as compensation. The claimant had lost both her parents<\/p>\n
in the incident. The claim proceeded on the assertion that the deceased<\/p>\n
was earning Rs.1,50,000\/- per annum from his readymade garments<\/p>\n
business. The Commission has, however, taken the monthly income of<\/p>\n
the deceased to be Rs.8,000\/-, deducted 1\/3rd out of the same towards<\/p>\n
personal expenses of the deceased and determined the annual loss of<\/p>\n
dependency at Rs.64,000\/-. Applying a multiplier of 18, the Commission<\/p>\n
has awarded a sum of Rs.11,52,000\/- with which we can find no fault<\/p>\n
except that, we need to add Rs.75,000\/- to the said amount as<\/p>\n
conventional figure taking the total amount payable to the claimant to<\/p>\n
Rs.12,27,000\/.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 25-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case arose out of the death of Niranjan Dass Bansal,<\/p>\n
Advocate, aged 60 years and a Member of the Executive Committee of<\/p>\n
D.A.V. School. The claimants happen to be his widow and two sons.<\/p>\n
The deceased was also invited to the function and was, according to the<\/p>\n
statements made before the Commission, earning upto Rs.12,000\/- to<\/p>\n
Rs.15,000\/- per month from his law practice.     The Commission has
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              145<\/span><\/p>\n
taken the income of the deceased at Rs.12,500\/- per month and after<\/p>\n
deducting 1\/3rd towards his personal expenses assessed the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency at Rs.1,00,000\/- per annum.           To that amount, the<\/p>\n
Commission has applied a multiplier of 5 having regard to the age of the<\/p>\n
deceased and awarded a sum of Rs.5,00,000\/- to the claimants. The<\/p>\n
award is, in our opinion, justified and does not call for any alteration<\/p>\n
except addition of a sum of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount.<\/p>\n
The total amount would, thus, stand enhanced to Rs.5,75,000\/- out of<\/p>\n
which a sum of Rs.3,00,000\/- shall be paid to the widow of the deceased<\/p>\n
while the remaining shall be distributed equally among the two sons.<\/p>\n
Case No. 26-DFT<\/p>\n
          This claim arose out of the death of Sanjay Grover, aged 30<\/p>\n
years,   working as a Chemist, who too had lost his life in the fire<\/p>\n
incident. The claim made by his widow and two sons was to the extent<\/p>\n
of Rs.70,00,000\/- on the basis that the deceased was earning about<\/p>\n
Rs.10,000\/- to Rs.12,000\/- per month from his Medical Store business.<\/p>\n
The deceased was a graduate and was also said to be taking part in<\/p>\n
social and extra curricular activities. The Commission has, however,<\/p>\n
taken the income of the deceased at Rs.9,000\/-, deducted 1\/3rd out of<\/p>\n
the said amount towards his personal expenses and determined the loss<\/p>\n
of dependency at Rs.72,000\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 17,<\/p>\n
the Commission has awarded Rs.12,24,000\/- out of which Rs.3,24,000\/-<\/p>\n
was to be paid to the widow, while remaining amount is to be distributed<\/p>\n
equally among the sons.      There is nothing wrong with the amount<\/p>\n
awarded by the Commission. All that we need to do is to add a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure which takes the total amount of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              146<\/span><\/p>\n
compensation to Rs.12,99,000\/-, rounded off to Rs.13,00,000\/-. A sum<\/p>\n
of Rs.5,00,000\/- out of the said amount shall be paid to the widow and<\/p>\n
the balance distributed equally among the other two claimants.<\/p>\n
Case No. 27-DFT<\/p>\n
          This case arises out of the death of Gurdas Singh, aged 25<\/p>\n
years, who was working as a Constable. The One Man Commission of<\/p>\n
Inquiry has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.3,000\/- and the net<\/p>\n
accretion to the family at Rs.2,000\/- per month or Rs.24,000\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. That amount, in our opinion, appears to be on the lower side<\/p>\n
having regard to the fact that the deceased was holding a permanent job<\/p>\n
and had future prospects of rise in the police force. Adding 50% towards<\/p>\n
future prospects in the light of the decision in Sarla Verma’s case<\/p>\n
(supra) the income determined by the Commission would go to<\/p>\n
Rs.4,500\/-. Deducting 1\/3rd towards his personal expenses, the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency to the family would work out to Rs.3,000\/- per month or<\/p>\n
Rs.36,000\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 18, chosen by the<\/p>\n
commission, the total amount payable to the claimants comes to<\/p>\n
Rs.6,48,000\/-. Addition of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional charges<\/p>\n
would take the figure to Rs.7,23,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 28-DFT<\/p>\n
          This claim was made by Master Venus Sethi and parents of<\/p>\n
Surinder Kumar, deceased, aged 30 years, who also lost his life in the<\/p>\n
fire incident. The deceased was, according to the claimants, running a<\/p>\n
Karyana Shop at Dabwali and earning Rs.20,000\/- to Rs.30,000\/- per<\/p>\n
month. The Commission has, however, declined to accept that version<\/p>\n
and determined the monthly income of the deceased at Rs.10,000\/-,
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             147<\/span><\/p>\n
deducted 1\/3rd out of the said amount and determined the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency at Rs.80,000\/- per annum.        The Commission has then<\/p>\n
applied a multiplier of 17 to award a sum of Rs.13,60,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
compensation. There is, in our opinion, no room for any enhancement<\/p>\n
in the amount awarded by the Commission. All that we need to do is to<\/p>\n
add a sum of Rs.75,000\/- as conventional figure to that amount, which<\/p>\n
would take the total to Rs.14,35,000\/-, out of which a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.2,50,000\/- each shall be paid to the parents of the deceased while<\/p>\n
the remaining shall be invested in a Fixed Deposit in the name of his<\/p>\n
minor son Venus Sethi till the time he attains majority. The interest<\/p>\n
accruing on the investment can, however, be withdrawn by the<\/p>\n
guardians for upbringing and education of the minor.<\/p>\n
Case No. 29-DFT<\/p>\n
         The claim, in this case, was made by the daughter of the<\/p>\n
deceased being the only surviving member of the family who perished in<\/p>\n
the incident. Ashok Kumar Sikka, the deceased father of the claimant,<\/p>\n
was a Rural Development Officer-cum-Branch Manager, State Bank of<\/p>\n
India, Dabwali. He, accompanied by his wife and the sister of the<\/p>\n
claimant, was attending the ill fated function only to meet a fiery end.<\/p>\n
The claim proceeded on the basis that the deceased was, at the time of<\/p>\n
his death, earning Rs. 13,424\/- per month as salary from the bank. The<\/p>\n
Commission deducted 1\/3rd out of the said amount and determined the<\/p>\n
loss of dependency at Rs.8,950\/- per month or Rs.1,07,400\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. The Commission has then applied a multiplier of 15 to award a<\/p>\n
sum of Rs.16,11,000\/-. Addition of a sum of Rs.75,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
conventional figure meets the ends of justice as there is nothing wrong
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              148<\/span><\/p>\n
either with the multiplicand or the multiplier chosen by the Commission.<\/p>\n
The addition of a sum of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount shall<\/p>\n
take the total amount of compensation payable to the claimant to<\/p>\n
Rs.16,86,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 30-DFT<\/p>\n
         In this case arising out of the death of Jagwinder Singh, the<\/p>\n
deceased was engaged in tent house business at the time of incident.<\/p>\n
The Commission had taken the income of the deceased to be<\/p>\n
Rs.3,000\/- per month only and loss of dependency at Rs.24,000\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. This amount, in our opinion, is on the lower side having regard<\/p>\n
to the fact that the deceased was, as per the evidence on record,<\/p>\n
engaged in tent house business and was, on the fateful day, at the<\/p>\n
venue to arrange the public address system for the ill fated function.<\/p>\n
The income of the deceased can, in our view, be taken to be Rs.4,500\/-<\/p>\n
per month. Deducting 1\/3rd of the said amount towards personal<\/p>\n
expenses, the loss of dependency to the family would work out to<\/p>\n
Rs.3,000\/- per month or Rs.36,000\/- per year. Applying a multiplier of<\/p>\n
13, chosen by the Commission, the total amount payable to the<\/p>\n
claimants would work out to Rs.4,68,000\/-. Adding a sum of Rs.75,000\/-<\/p>\n
towards conventional amount to that figure, the total compensation<\/p>\n
payable to the claimants would come to Rs.5,43,000\/-.<\/p>\n
Case No. 31-DFT<\/p>\n
         The claim in this case was made by Saloni Bhateja, daughter<\/p>\n
of Ravi Bhateja, who was a qualified doctor holding a MBBS degree,<\/p>\n
and posted as Medical Officer in Primary Health Center, Village Lambi,<\/p>\n
District Muktsar (Punjab). The deceased was aged 42 years drawing at
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               149<\/span><\/p>\n
the time of his death Rs.6,742\/- per month and was an income-tax<\/p>\n
assessee. He had, during the financial year preceding the year of his<\/p>\n
death, earned an annual income of Rs.62,250\/-. It was also alleged that<\/p>\n
the deceased was earning Rs.7,000\/- to Rs.8,000\/- from private<\/p>\n
practice. The Commission has, however, refused to accept that the<\/p>\n
deceased had any income from private practice and taken the income of<\/p>\n
the deceased at Rs.6,742\/- per month, deducted 1\/3rd out the same<\/p>\n
towards his personal expenses rounded off the net loss of dependency<\/p>\n
to Rs.4,500\/- per month or Rs.54,000\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier<\/p>\n
of 15, the Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.8,10,000\/-. The<\/p>\n
Commission does not appear to have taken into consideration the future<\/p>\n
prospects of the deceased having regard to the fact that the deceased<\/p>\n
was holding a permanent Government job and had prospects of further<\/p>\n
rise in service. Applying the principles laid down in Sarla Verma’s case<\/p>\n
(supra) addition of 30% of the salary income to the gross income at the<\/p>\n
time of incident would be perfectly justified. The gross monthly income of<\/p>\n
the deceased would, therefore, come to Rs.8,756\/- per month.<\/p>\n
Deducting 1\/3rd out of the said amount, the net loss of dependency to<\/p>\n
family would come to Rs.5,843\/- per month or Rs.70,120\/- per annum.<\/p>\n
Applying a multiplier of 15, the total amount of compensation payable to<\/p>\n
the claimant would work out to Rs.10,51,800\/-. To that amount, we add<\/p>\n
a sum of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure to take the total<\/p>\n
amount of compensation payable to the claimant to Rs.11,26,800\/-.<\/p>\n
Case No. 32-DFT<\/p>\n
          In this case, the deceased Sukhbir Singh was a 31 years old<\/p>\n
Contractor who left behind his parents to make a claim before the
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               150<\/span><\/p>\n
Commission for payment of Rs.70,00,000\/- as compensation.            The<\/p>\n
deceased was, according to the evidence led before the Commission, a<\/p>\n
graduate and had gone to the function along with his daughter and his<\/p>\n
wife where all of them got burnt to death. The deceased was, as per the<\/p>\n
evidence on record, a liquor contractor as well as a Property Dealer,<\/p>\n
earning between Rs.20,000\/-         to Rs.25,000\/- per month. The<\/p>\n
Commission has, however, declined to accept that version and taken the<\/p>\n
income of the deceased to be Rs.10,000\/- to Rs.12,000\/- jointly with his<\/p>\n
father.   The share of deceased in that income has been taken as<\/p>\n
Rs.6,000\/- per month or Rs.72,000\/- per annum. Deduction of 1\/3rd of<\/p>\n
the said amount has reduced the loss of dependency to Rs.48,000\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded a sum<\/p>\n
of Rs.2,40,000\/- to the claimants. The Commission has, in our opinion,<\/p>\n
assessed the income of the deceased at a lower figure. In the absence<\/p>\n
of any evidence in rebuttal, the income of the deceased could be taken<\/p>\n
to be Rs.12,000\/- per month, if not more. The net loss of dependency<\/p>\n
could, therefore, be taken at Rs.8,000\/- per month or Rs.96,000\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount payable to the parents<\/p>\n
would come to Rs.4,80,000\/-. To that we add a sum of Rs.75,000\/-<\/p>\n
towards conventional amount to take the total amount payable to the<\/p>\n
claimants to Rs.5,55,000\/- in equal proportion.<\/p>\n
Case No. 33-DFT<\/p>\n
          This case arises out of the death of Radhey Shyam, aged<\/p>\n
27 years. The Commission has taken the income of the deceased at<\/p>\n
Rs.8,100\/- per month on the date of incident and after deducting 1\/3rd of<\/p>\n
the said amount towards personal expenses, determined the loss of
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             151<\/span><\/p>\n
dependency for the family at Rs.64,800\/- per annum. Applying a<\/p>\n
multiplier of 5, the Commission had awarded a sum of Rs.3,24,000\/-. In<\/p>\n
our opinion, the income of the deceased could be taken at Rs.9,000\/-<\/p>\n
per month keeping in view the fact that the deceased was a Trained<\/p>\n
Graduate Teacher. We accordingly take the income of deceased at<\/p>\n
Rs.9,000\/- deduct 1\/3rd of the same towards personal expenses and<\/p>\n
determine the loss of dependency for the family at Rs.72,000\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. Applying the multiplier of 5, the total amount payable to the<\/p>\n
claimants would come to Rs.3,60,000\/-. Addition of Rs.75,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
conventional amount would take the amount of compensation to<\/p>\n
Rs.4,35,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 34-DFT<\/p>\n
            This claim arose out of the death of Gurdev Singh Shant, 63<\/p>\n
years old     Freedom Fighter and Chairman      of Improvement Trust,<\/p>\n
Dabwali. The claim was made by his wife Surjit Kaur for payment of<\/p>\n
Rs.70,00,000\/- as compensation. The claimants had stated that the<\/p>\n
deceased was earning Rs.10,000\/- per month from the jewellery shop of<\/p>\n
his brother. The Commission has, however, taken the income to be<\/p>\n
Rs.5,100\/- per month, deducted 1\/3rd to determine the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency to Rs.3,400\/- per month or Rs.48,000\/- per annum.<\/p>\n
Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission has awarded Rs. 2,04,000\/-<\/p>\n
to be paid to the widow of the deceased and son Iqbal Singh in equal<\/p>\n
shares. The assessment of the income of the deceased has not been, in<\/p>\n
our opinion, fair and reasonable in this case. The Commission could<\/p>\n
and indeed ought to have assessed the income of the deceased at<\/p>\n
Rs.9,000\/- per month and awarded compensation on that basis. We,
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               152<\/span><\/p>\n
accordingly, determine the loss of dependency in this case at Rs.6,000\/-<\/p>\n
per month after deduction of 1\/3rd towards his personal expenses. The<\/p>\n
annual loss of dependency would, thus, come to Rs.72,000\/-. Applying a<\/p>\n
multiplier of 5, we award a sum of Rs.3,60,000\/- to the claimants.<\/p>\n
Addition of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure would take the<\/p>\n
amount of compensation payable to the claimants to Rs.4,35,000\/-, out<\/p>\n
of which a sum of Rs.3,00,000\/- shall be paid to the widow of the<\/p>\n
deceased, while the balance shall be paid to his son Iqbal Singh.<\/p>\n
Case No.35-DFT<\/p>\n
         In this claim petition, deceased Pawan Kumar was a 40 years<\/p>\n
old bank employee. The claim was made by his wife and daughter for a<\/p>\n
sum of Rs.70,00,000\/-. The Commission has taken the income of<\/p>\n
deceased as Rs. 7685.39 ps., deducted 1\/3rd out of the said amount and<\/p>\n
determined the loss of dependency at Rs.5,124\/- per month or<\/p>\n
Rs.61,488\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the Commission has<\/p>\n
awarded Rs.9,22,320\/-, rounding it off Rs.9,22,500\/-, with which we find<\/p>\n
no fault, except that, we add a sum of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional<\/p>\n
figure to that amount taking the total amount of compensation payable to<\/p>\n
the claimants to Rs.9,97,500\/-. The amount shall be paid in equal<\/p>\n
shares to both the claimants.\n<\/p>\n
Case No.36-DFT<\/p>\n
         In case No. 36-DFT arising out of the death of Rajbir Singh,<\/p>\n
the Commission had taken the income of the deceased at Rs.1,530\/-<\/p>\n
and determined the loss of dependency to the family at Rs.12,240\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the Commission had awarded a<\/p>\n
meager amount of Rs.61,200\/- to the claimants. The Commission has in
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               153<\/span><\/p>\n
the process disbelieved the version given by the mother of the deceased<\/p>\n
that he was working as a Contractor and was earning Rs.15,000\/- to<\/p>\n
Rs.20,000\/- per month. The Commission has instead chosen to rely<\/p>\n
upon the minimum wages payable under the Minimum Wages Act as on<\/p>\n
the date of incident while determining the compensation payable to the<\/p>\n
claimants. The Commission, in our opinion, was not justified in doing so.<\/p>\n
The evidence on record may not have been conclusive, but in the<\/p>\n
absence of any evidence to the contrary, the same could give an<\/p>\n
indication of the amount which he was earning. The deceased had<\/p>\n
passed the Senior Secondary Examination and was an invitee at the<\/p>\n
function. In the totality of these circumstances, therefore, we are of the<\/p>\n
view that the income of the deceased could be taken to be Rs.15,000\/-<\/p>\n
per month which happens to be the lower of the figure mentioned by his<\/p>\n
mother who appeared as witness. Deducting 1\/3rd out of the said<\/p>\n
amount, the net loss of dependency to the family would come to<\/p>\n
Rs.10,000\/- or Rs.1,20,000\/- per year. Applying a multiplier of 5, the<\/p>\n
amount of compensation payable to the claimants would work out to<\/p>\n
Rs.6,00,000\/-. Addition of Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount<\/p>\n
would take the amount of total to Rs.6,75,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 37-DFT<\/p>\n
          In this case arising out of the death of Naresh Kumar, the<\/p>\n
Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.6,000\/- and<\/p>\n
determined the loss of dependency at Rs.4,000\/- per month.           The<\/p>\n
Commission had then applied a multiplier of 11 and awarded a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.5,28,000\/- to the claimants.     The income of the deceased was,<\/p>\n
according to the evidence adduced before the Commission between
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               154<\/span><\/p>\n
Rs.5,000\/- to Rs.7,000\/- per month. The Commission has, therefore,<\/p>\n
taken a mean figure while determining the amount of compensation.<\/p>\n
There is no error in that approach to warrant any interference from this<\/p>\n
Court. All that we need say is that Rs.75,000\/- shall stand added to that<\/p>\n
figure as conventional amount taking the amount of compensation to<\/p>\n
Rs.6,03,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 73-DFT<\/p>\n
          In this claim, deceased Manphool Chand was a Science<\/p>\n
Teacher in Government service at the time of his death. The claim was<\/p>\n
filed by his mother Jamuna Bai for payment of Rs.70,00,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
compensation. The deceased was, according to the claimant, getting a<\/p>\n
salary of Rs.5,000\/- per month as per the salary certificate issued by the<\/p>\n
Principal of the School. He was a trained Teacher and had gone to the<\/p>\n
function his son and daughter were also attending. The Commission<\/p>\n
has, taking the income of the deceased to be Rs.4,800\/- per month,<\/p>\n
awarded compensation of Rs.1,92,000\/- to the mother. In the process,<\/p>\n
the Commission has overlooked the fact that the deceased had future<\/p>\n
prospects of higher income on the principles stated in Sarla Verma’s<\/p>\n
case (supra). We, therefore, add 50% of the salary income to his gross<\/p>\n
monthly income which takes the total monthly income of the deceased to<\/p>\n
Rs.7,200\/- per month. Deducting 1\/3rd of the amount towards his<\/p>\n
personal expenses, the net loss of dependency would come to<\/p>\n
Rs.4,800\/- per month or Rs.57,600\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of<\/p>\n
5, the amount of compensation would work out to Rs.2,88,000\/-. To that<\/p>\n
amount, we add Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional amount, to take the<\/p>\n
total amount of compensation payable to the claimant to Rs.3,63,000\/-.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                            155<\/span><\/p>\n
Case No. 343-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case arose out of the death of Shalbh Juneja. The<\/p>\n
Commission has taken the monthly income of the deceased at<\/p>\n
Rs.2,352\/-, deducted 1\/3d of the said amount, and determined the loss<\/p>\n
of dependency at Rs.18,816\/-. Applying a multiplier of 13, the<\/p>\n
Commission has awarded a sum of Rs.2,44,608\/-. The deceased, in this<\/p>\n
case, was working as a Teacher in St. Joseph School at Dabwali at the<\/p>\n
time of his death and earning a salary of Rs.2,300\/- per month. He was<\/p>\n
B.Sc., B.Ed. He was at the ill fated venue with his nephew Vivek who<\/p>\n
was a student of D.A.V. School. The claimant in the case who happens<\/p>\n
to be the elder brother of the deceased was the only legal heir left<\/p>\n
behind. Taking into consideration all these circumstances, the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency to the family would indeed come to Rs.18,816\/- per month.<\/p>\n
Applying a multiplier of 13 the amount of compensation comes to<\/p>\n
Rs.2,44,608\/-. We need only to add Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional<\/p>\n
amount to take the total amount payable to the claimant to be<\/p>\n
Rs.3,19,608\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 344-DFT<\/p>\n
         Suresh Kumar Sethi aged 33 years was in private employment<\/p>\n
on the date of his death in the fire incident. The parents made a claim<\/p>\n
for the payment of Rs.70,00,000\/- towards compensation.            The<\/p>\n
deceased, according to them, was a graduate and was working at a<\/p>\n
shop at a monthly salary of Rs.2,000\/-. The Commission has accepted<\/p>\n
that version, deducted 1\/3rd of the income towards his personal<\/p>\n
expenses, determined the loss of dependency at Rs.16,000\/- per annum<\/p>\n
and awarded a sum of Rs.80,000\/- as compensation        by applying a
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                156<\/span><\/p>\n
multiplier of 5. The amount so determined does not appear to be just<\/p>\n
and reasonable and is more in the nature of pittance than reasonable<\/p>\n
compensation to which the parents of the deceased were entitled. The<\/p>\n
deceased, it is proved on the record, was a graduate. His employment in<\/p>\n
a shop at a paltry sum of Rs.2,000\/- per month was, therefore, only a<\/p>\n
temporary feature in life which was not an index of his real potential to<\/p>\n
earn a higher amount. We have, as seen earlier, taken even the value of<\/p>\n
the services rendered by a housewife to be Rs.45,000\/- per annum. We<\/p>\n
see no reason why we should not adopt that amount for a person who<\/p>\n
happened to be the only life support for the old parents. He was not only<\/p>\n
serving his parents but also earning Rs.2,000\/- per month to supplement<\/p>\n
the income       which take the loss of dependency to Rs.45,000\/- +<\/p>\n
Rs.1,6000\/- = Rs.61,000\/-. Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation would come to Rs.3,05,000\/-. To that figure, we add<\/p>\n
Rs.75,000\/-   towards    conventional   amount    taking   the   total   to<\/p>\n
Rs.3,80,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 345-DFT<\/p>\n
         The deceased, in this case, was 35 years old Rakesh Kumar.<\/p>\n
His parents made a claim for Rs.70,00,000\/- towards compensation for<\/p>\n
his death in the fire incident. According to the claimant, deceased was<\/p>\n
earning Rs.1,00,000\/- to Rs.1,50,000\/- per annum from his mobile oil<\/p>\n
business in the name and style of M\/s Gupta Auto Store, Dabwali. He<\/p>\n
was also an income-tax assessee and used to file his annual returns. A<\/p>\n
tax challan for payment of tax was also produced during the hearing<\/p>\n
before the Commission. The Commission has accepted that version<\/p>\n
and taken the income of the deceased at Rs.1,00,000\/- per annum.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               157<\/span><\/p>\n
Deducting 1\/3rd of the same determined the loss of dependency to<\/p>\n
Rs.67,000\/- per annum.      Applying a multiplier of 5, the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation came to Rs.3,35,000\/- to be apportioned equally between<\/p>\n
the parents. This amount, in our opinion, needs to be suitably enhanced<\/p>\n
especially when the deceased was not only proved to be gainfully<\/p>\n
employed in business but was earning a substantial amount from the<\/p>\n
same. Instead of Rs.1,00,000\/-, the income of deceased could be taken<\/p>\n
at Rs.1,25,000\/- per annum. Deducting 1\/3rd of the said amount, the net<\/p>\n
loss of dependency would come to Rs.83,334\/- per annum. Applying<\/p>\n
the multiplier chosen by the Commission, the amount of compensation<\/p>\n
would work out to Rs.4,16,670\/-. To that, we add Rs.75,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
conventional figure to take the total amount of compensation payable to<\/p>\n
the claimants to 4,91,670\/-, rounded off to Rs.4,92,000\/-.<\/p>\n
Case No. 362-DFT<\/p>\n
          In this case, deceased Bhim Sain aged 33 years was engaged<\/p>\n
in oil mill business. His father and widow filed the claim petition before<\/p>\n
the Commission in which it was alleged that the deceased was a partner<\/p>\n
in the Jyoti Oil Mills, Dabwali earning between Rs.40,000\/- to<\/p>\n
Rs.50,000\/- per annum. The Commission has accepted the income of<\/p>\n
the deceased to be Rs.45,000\/- per annum and after deducting 1\/3rd,<\/p>\n
taken the loss of dependency to be Rs.30,000\/- per annum. Applying a<\/p>\n
multiplier of 17, an amount of Rs.5,10,000\/- has been awarded to the<\/p>\n
claimants with which we cannot find any fault, except that the<\/p>\n
Commission ought to have awarded a sum of Rs.75,000\/- towards<\/p>\n
conventional figure also which we hereby award taking the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation payable to Rs.5,85,000\/-. The widow shall receive a sum
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               158<\/span><\/p>\n
of Rs.4,00,000\/- out of the said amount, while the balance shall go to the<\/p>\n
father of the deceased.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 366-DFT<\/p>\n
          In this case, deceased Ravi Kumar         aged 34 years was<\/p>\n
engaged in business. The claim for payment of compensation was made<\/p>\n
by his brother, his wife and his niece. Evidence adduced before the<\/p>\n
Commission suggested that the deceased was working as a<\/p>\n
Commission Agent at Dabwali in the name and style of M\/s Ravi Trading<\/p>\n
Company, Mandi Dabwali and earning an annual income of Rs.40,000\/-<\/p>\n
to Rs.50,000\/-. The Commission has also noted that the income of M\/s<\/p>\n
Ravi Trading Company was assessed at Rs.41,170\/- for the financial<\/p>\n
year 1995-96. Deducting 1\/3rd of the said amount, the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency has been worked out at Rs. 27,447\/-, rounded off to<\/p>\n
Rs.27,450\/-. Applying a multiplier of 16, the Commission has awarded<\/p>\n
Rs. 4,39,200\/- and directed the apportionment of the same among the<\/p>\n
claimants with which we can find no fault. We only add Rs.75,000\/- to<\/p>\n
that figure towards conventional amount to take the total amount<\/p>\n
payable to the claimants to Rs.5,14,200\/- to be proportionately<\/p>\n
distributed among the claimants.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 368-DFT<\/p>\n
          This case arose out of the death of Ashok Kumar, a 44 years<\/p>\n
old Brick-Kiln Owner. The claim was made by his widow, daughter and<\/p>\n
his son for a sum of Rs.70,00,000\/- as compensation. The evidence<\/p>\n
adduced before the Commission suggested that the deceased was an<\/p>\n
income-tax assessee and his income for the year 1994-95 was<\/p>\n
assessed at Rs.1,59,600\/-. The Commission deducted 1\/3rd of the same
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              159<\/span><\/p>\n
towards personal expenses of the deceased determining the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency for the family at Rs.1,06,400\/- per annum.       Applying a<\/p>\n
multiplier of 13, the Commission awarded a sum of Rs.13,84,000\/- as<\/p>\n
compensation.    There is, in our opinion, no room for enhancement in<\/p>\n
this case except that we add Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure<\/p>\n
which would take the total amount of compensation payable to the<\/p>\n
claimants to Rs.14,58,200\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 373-DFT<\/p>\n
         In this case, deceased Kishori Lal was 67 years old. He was<\/p>\n
an Income-tax Practitioner who left behind three sons, the claimants in<\/p>\n
the case. The evidence adduced before the Commission established<\/p>\n
that the deceased was earning an income of Rs.50,000\/- per annum.<\/p>\n
Deducting 1\/3rd out of the said amount, the Commission has taken the<\/p>\n
loss of dependency at Rs.33,334\/- per annum and applied a multiplier of<\/p>\n
5 to the same to award a sum of Rs.1,70,000\/-. Keeping in view the fact<\/p>\n
that income of the deceased as disclosed by the claimants has been<\/p>\n
accepted by the Commission and an appropriate multiplier applied to<\/p>\n
the same, we find no room for any enhancement in this case except that<\/p>\n
we add Rs.75,000\/- towards conventional figure to the amount awarded<\/p>\n
by the Commission which takes the total amount payable to the<\/p>\n
claimants to Rs.2,45,000\/- to be shared equally among the three<\/p>\n
claimants.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 377-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case pertains to the death of 60 years old pensioner<\/p>\n
named Sutanter Singh Bhatti who died in the fire incident. The claim was<\/p>\n
made by his wife and two sons for payment of a sum of Rs.70,00,000\/-.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               160<\/span><\/p>\n
The evidence on record established that the deceased was getting a<\/p>\n
pension of Rs.38,400\/- per annum, out of which the Commission has<\/p>\n
deducted 1\/3rd      of the said amount and determined the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency to Rs.25,600\/- per annum. Applying a multiplier of 5, the<\/p>\n
Commission has awarded Rs.1,28,000\/-. We see no reason to enhance<\/p>\n
the said amount except adding a sum of Rs.75,000\/- as conventional<\/p>\n
amount. The total compensation payable to the claimants would, thus,<\/p>\n
come to Rs.2,03,000\/-, out of which 75% shall be paid to the widow of<\/p>\n
deceased, while the remaining 25% shall be apportioned equally among<\/p>\n
the sons.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 472-DFT<\/p>\n
            In this case arising out of the death of Satkartar Singh, the<\/p>\n
Commission has taken the income of the deceased at Rs.2,712\/-,<\/p>\n
deducted 1\/3rd towards personal expenses and determined the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency at Rs.21,768\/-. Keeping in view the age of the claimant, the<\/p>\n
Commission has chosen a multiplier of 8 and awarded a sum of<\/p>\n
Rs.1,75,000\/-. The claimants happen to be the parents of the deceased<\/p>\n
who was serving as a Teacher in the private School at the salary<\/p>\n
mentioned above. The Commission has while doing so disbelieved the<\/p>\n
version given by the father that the deceased was also earning<\/p>\n
Rs.12,000\/- per month from tuition work. The deceased was a Trained<\/p>\n
Teacher which fact has not been disputed and stands firmly established<\/p>\n
by the certificates marked in the course of the inquiry. It would not,<\/p>\n
therefore, be incorrect to assume that the deceased may have been<\/p>\n
offering tuition to the students and supplementing his income. In the<\/p>\n
absence of any documentary evidence, we are inclined to hold that over
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              161<\/span><\/p>\n
and above Rs.2,712\/- per month towards salary, the deceased was also<\/p>\n
earning atleast Rs.3,300\/- per month from tuition taking his gross<\/p>\n
income to be Rs.6,000\/-. Deducting 1\/3rd of the said amount, the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency would come to Rs.4,000\/- or Rs.48,000\/- per annum.<\/p>\n
Applying a multiplier of 8 to that figure the amount payable to the<\/p>\n
claimants would come to Rs.3,84,000\/-. Addition of the conventional<\/p>\n
figure of Rs.75,000\/- would take the amount of compensation to<\/p>\n
Rs.3,84,000\/- + Rs.75,000\/- = Rs.4,59,000\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 490-DFT<\/p>\n
         This case arose out of the death of Shri Dharam Singh. The<\/p>\n
Commission has assessed the income of the deceased at Rs.2,100\/-<\/p>\n
per month and determined the loss of dependency to the family at<\/p>\n
Rs.16,800\/-. Applying a multiplier of 8, the Commission has awarded a<\/p>\n
sum of Rs.1,35,000\/- to the mother of the deceased who was 60 years<\/p>\n
old at the time of her statement before the Commission.<\/p>\n
         The deceased, in this case, was a young boy of 23 years and<\/p>\n
was not engaged in any vocation. The evidence on record shows that<\/p>\n
the deceased was a Matriculate and had completed two years Diploma<\/p>\n
Course in Agriculture D-Pharma from Sirsa. He was an able bodied<\/p>\n
person and could have well started      a career in due course. The<\/p>\n
commission has applied to him the minimum wage payable to a skilled<\/p>\n
worker and attributed to him an income of Rs.2,200\/- only. That amount<\/p>\n
appears to us to be on the lower side. Keeping in view the professional<\/p>\n
qualification which the deceased had acquired his gainful employment<\/p>\n
was only a matter of time. In our opinion, the notional income of the<\/p>\n
deceased could be taken for purposes of award of compensation at
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              162<\/span><\/p>\n
Rs.4,200\/-. Deducting 1\/3rd out of the said amount, the loss of<\/p>\n
dependency would come to Rs.2,800\/- per month or Rs.33,600\/- per<\/p>\n
annum. Applying a multiplier of 8 to the said figure, the amount payable<\/p>\n
to the claimant would come to Rs.2,68,800\/-. Addition of Rs.75,000\/-<\/p>\n
towards conventional amount to that figure would take the total amount<\/p>\n
payable to the claimant to Rs.3,43,800\/-.\n<\/p>\n
Case No. 492-DFT<\/p>\n
         In this case, the claim was made by the sons of deceased<\/p>\n
Som Nath Kamboj who was 40 years old serving in Haryana Civil<\/p>\n
Services and posted as Sub Divisional Magistrate, Dabwali. The<\/p>\n
evidence adduced before the Commission suggested that the deceased<\/p>\n
was a highly qualified officer and was selected for appointment in the<\/p>\n
Haryana Civil Services on the basis of a competitive examination. He<\/p>\n
was drawing a salary of Rs.9,668\/- per month on the date of his death.<\/p>\n
The Commission has deducted 1\/3rd out of the said amount towards<\/p>\n
personal expenses of the deceased and taken the loss of dependency to<\/p>\n
the family to be Rs.77,344\/- per annum. It has then applied a multiplier<\/p>\n
of 15 to award a sum of Rs.11,60,000\/-. This amount, in our opinion,<\/p>\n
needs to be suitably enhanced keeping in view the fact that the<\/p>\n
deceased was holding a permanent job in the State Government and<\/p>\n
had prospects of further rise. On the principles stated in Sarla Verma’s<\/p>\n
case (supra), an amount equivalent to 30% of the salary income of the<\/p>\n
deceased could be added to the gross income of the deceased which<\/p>\n
would take the gross monthly income of the deceased to Rs.12,568\/- per<\/p>\n
month or Rs.1,50,816\/- per annum. Deducting 1\/3rd out of the said<\/p>\n
amount, the loss of dependency would come to Rs.1,00,544\/- per
\n        Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                      163<\/span><\/p>\n
       annum. Applying a multiplier of 15, the total amount of compensation<\/p>\n
       would work out to Rs.15,08,160\/-. To that figure, we add Rs.75,000\/-<\/p>\n
       taking the total amount of compensation payable to the claimants to<\/p>\n
       Rs.15,83,160\/-.\n<\/p>\n
                       The amounts of compensation payable to the claimants in the<\/p>\n
       cases discussed above may now be summarised as under:-<\/p>\n
\n\nSr. Case   Name     &Amount    Annual Future      Annual lossRevised         ConventionalTotal\nNo. No.    Age of theawarded byIncome prospects of           amount       offigure    (InAmount\n           Deceased the        at     the(In Rs.) dependencycompensationRs.)             {8+9} (In\n                     Commissiontime of            {5+6-1\/3rd payable                     Rs.)\n                     (In Rs.)  death              towards    {7xmultiplier\n                               Iin Rs.)           personal   applied}    (In\n                                                  expenses} Rs.)\n                                                  (In Rs.)\n1     2            3             4        5       6        7         8            9         10\n1 8-DFT    Gurdeep             312000   54000     0      36000     468000       75000     543000\n           Singh,  19\n           years\n2 9-DFT    Ravinder            390000   144000    0      96000     480000       75000     555000\n           Kumar    20\n           years\n3 12-DFT Ashwani               390000   144000    0      96000     480000       75000     555000\n           Kumar,       29\n           years\n4 10-DFT Balbir Singh,         408000   48000     0      32000     544000       75000     619000\n           24 years\n5 11-DFT Ashok         Gill,   648000   54000     0      36000     648000       75000     723000\n           26 years\n6 13-DFT Bhagirath,            426300   37608    18804   37608     639336       75000     714336\n           32 years\n7 15-DFT Ashok                 816000   72000     0      48000     816000       75000     891000\n           Wadhera 32\n           years\n8 16-DFT Radhey                900000   90000     0      60000     900000       75000     975000\n           Shyam\n           Shastri,     36\n           years\n9 18-DFT Ravinder              160000   54000     0      36000     540000       75000     615000\n           Kumar        40\n           years\n10 19-DFT Om Parkash           316251   36490     0       36327    472251       75000     547251\n           Mehta,                                        (24327+\n           43years                                        12000)\n11 20-DFT Des Raj, 68          160000   48000     0      32000     160000       75000     235000\n           years\n12 22-DFT Surinder             345000   50000     0      33300     532800       75000     607800\n           Kumar        39\n           years\n        Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                               164<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n13 23-DFT Ramesh          728000      60000       0         60000           780000       75000   855000\n           Chugh,    46             (Contribut           (Contribution\n           years                       ion\n14 24-DFT Sanjay          1152000    96000        0         64000          1152000       75000   1227000\n           Kwatra,   26\n           years\n15 25-DFT Niranjan        500000     150000       0        100000           500000       75000   575000\n           Dass\n           Bansal,   60\n           years\n16 26-DFT Sanjay          1224000    108000       0         72000          1224000       75000   1300,000\n           Grover    30                                                                          (rounded\n           years                                                                                    off)\n17 27-DFT Gurdas          432000     36000       18000      36000           648000       75000   723000\n           Singh,    25\n           years\n18 28-DFT Surinder        1360000    120000       0         80000          1360000       75000   1435000\n           Kumar,    30\n           years\n19 29-DFT Ashok           1611000    161088       0        107400          1611000       75000   1686000\n           Kumar                                          (Rounded\n           Sikka,    43                                      off)\n           years\n20 30-DFT Jagwinder       362000     54000        0         36000           468000       75000   543000\n           Singh\n           21years\n21 31-DFT Ravi            810000     80904       24276      70120            1051800     75000   1126800\n           Bhateja, 40\n           years\n22 32-DFT Sukhbir         240000     144000       0         96000           480000       75000   555000\n           Singh,    31\n           years\n23 33-DFT Radhey          324000     108000       0         72000           360000       75000   435000\n           Sham,     27\n           years\n24 34-DFT Gurdev          204000     108000       0         72000           360000       75000   435000\n           Singh\n           Shant,    63\n           years\n25 35-DFT Pawan           922500      92232       0         61488           922500       75000   997500\n           Kumar                    (Rounded                             (Rounded Off)\n           Sharma, 40                  off)\n           years\n26 36-DFT Rajbir          61200      180000       0        120000           600000       75000   675000\n           Singh,    25\n           years\n27 37-DFT Naresh          528000     72000        0         48000           528000       75000   603000\n           Kumar,    25\n           years\n28 73-DFT Manphool        192000     57600       28800      57600           288000       75000   363000\n           Chand,    35\n           years\n29 343-DFT Shalbh         245000     28224        0         18816           244608       75000   319608\n           Juneja,   26\n           years\n        Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                          165<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n30 344-DFT Suresh           80000      24000       0      61000       305000        75000   380000\n           Kumar                                         (45000 +\n           Sethi,      33                                 16000)\n           years\n31 345-DFT Rakesh           335000    125000       0      83334       416670        75000    492000\n           Kumar,      33                                                                   (Rounded\n           years                                                                               off)\n32 362-DFT Bhim Sain,       510000     45000       0      30000       510000        75000   585000\n           33 years\n33 366-DFT Ravi Kumar,      439200     41170       0       27450      439200        75000   514200\n           34 years                                      (Rounded\n                                                            off)\n34 368-DFT Ashok            1384000   159600       0     106400       1384000       75000   1458200\n           Kumar,      44                                           (Rounded off)\n           years\n35 373-DFT Kishori Lal,     170000     50000       0      33334        170000       75000   245000\n           67 years                                                 (Rounded off)\n36 377-DFT Sutanter         128000     38400       0      25600       128000        75000   203000\n           Singh\n           Bhatti,     60\n           years\n37 472-DFT Satkartar        175000      72000      0      48000       384000        75000   459000\n           Singh,      26             (Rounded\n           years                         off)\n38 490-DFT Dharam           135000     50400       0      33600       268800        75000   343800\n           Singh       23\n           years\n39 492-DFT Som   Nath       1160000   116016     34800   100544       1508160       75000   1583160\n           Kamboj, 40\n           years\n                                            TOTAL                                           27697655\n\n\n\n       Category 6\n\n<\/pre>\n
                     In this category of cases fall 88 claim petitions filed by those<\/p>\n
       injured in the fire incident.           The Commission has categorized these<\/p>\n
       cases into different groups depending upon the extent of disability<\/p>\n
       suffered by them and awarded compensation accordingly. The first of<\/p>\n
       these groups comprises cases in which the victims suffered disability on<\/p>\n
       account of burn injuries ranging between 1% to 10%. In Table “A” to the<\/p>\n
       report submitted by the Commission are enumerated 29 such cases.<\/p>\n
       The second group comprises cases where the disability reported ranges<\/p>\n
       between 11% to 20% enumerated in Table “B” to the report. Similarly,<\/p>\n
       Table “C” to the report enumerates cases where the disability suffered is
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                166<\/span><\/p>\n
between 21% to 30%, while Table “D” enumerates cases in which the<\/p>\n
disability reported is between 31% to 40%. Tables “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, “I”<\/p>\n
and “J” similarly enumerate cases with disabilities ranging between 41%<\/p>\n
to 50%, 51% to 60%, so on and so forth. Table “K” is the last of the<\/p>\n
tables enumerating 9 cases in which the percentage of disability is<\/p>\n
reported to be 100%.\n<\/p>\n
          The Commission of Inquiry has, while dealing with the claims<\/p>\n
in question, referred to certain text books and articles dealing with “Burn<\/p>\n
Injuries”, “Burn Trauma” and their treatment. It has also referred to<\/p>\n
several judicial pronouncements that lay down the approach to be<\/p>\n
adopted by the Courts while awarding compensation in injury cases.<\/p>\n
While we see no error or misdirection on the part of the Commission in<\/p>\n
identifying and applying the principles governing assessment and award<\/p>\n
of compensation in injury cases, we may briefly refer to some of the<\/p>\n
decisions on the subject only to emphasise that the task and process of<\/p>\n
assessment of compensation in injury cases is by no means an easy<\/p>\n
task and that some amount of speculation and guess work is inherent in<\/p>\n
the process of adjudication of such claims.\n<\/p>\n
          In Wards v. James (1965) I All England Reports 563, Lord<\/p>\n
Denning     while dealing with the principles governing award of<\/p>\n
compensation for personal injury identified three distinct matters that<\/p>\n
need to be kept in mind while undertaking any such exercise. He said:-<\/p>\n
                    “Firstly, Accessibility: In case of grave injury,<\/p>\n
                    where the body is wrecked or the brain destroyed. It<\/p>\n
                    is very difficult to assess a fair compensation in<\/p>\n
                    money, so difficult that the award must basically be
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                167<\/span><\/p>\n
                   a conventional figure, derived from experience or<\/p>\n
                   from awards in comparable cases.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   Secondly, Uniformity:          There should be some<\/p>\n
                   measure of uniformity in awards so that similar<\/p>\n
                   decisions are given in similar cases; otherwise there<\/p>\n
                   will be great dissatisfaction in the community and<\/p>\n
                   much criticism of the administration of justice.<\/p>\n
                   Thirdly, Predictability: Parties should be able to<\/p>\n
                   predict with some measure of accuracy the sum<\/p>\n
                   which is likely to be awarded in a particular case, for<\/p>\n
                   by this means cases can be settled peaceably and<\/p>\n
                   not brought to court, a thing very much to be public<\/p>\n
                   good”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   It was further said:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   “Although you cannot give a man so gravely injured<\/p>\n
                   much for his ‘lost year’, you can, however,<\/p>\n
                   compensate him for his loss during his shortened<\/p>\n
                   span, that is, during his expected ‘years of survival’.<\/p>\n
                   You can compensate him for his loss of earnings<\/p>\n
                   during that time, and for the cost of treatment,<\/p>\n
                   nursing   and    attendance.   But   how    can    you<\/p>\n
                   compensate him for being rendered a helpless<\/p>\n
                   invalid? He may, owing to the brain injury, be<\/p>\n
                   rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or,<\/p>\n
                   owing to a back injury, be unable to rise from his<\/p>\n
                   bed. He has lost everything that makes life
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               168<\/span><\/p>\n
                   worthwhile. Money is no good to him. Yet Judges<\/p>\n
                   and Juries have to do the best they can and give<\/p>\n
                   him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it<\/p>\n
                   wellnigh insoluble. They are being asked to<\/p>\n
                   calculate the incalculable. The figure is bound to be<\/p>\n
                   for the most part a conventional sum. The Judges<\/p>\n
                   have worked out pattern and they keep it in line with<\/p>\n
                   the changes in the value of money”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         Reference may also be made to Thomas v. British Railway<\/p>\n
Board, 1977 ACJ 222 (CA. England), where Scarman, L.J. Observed:-<\/p>\n
                   “…the greatest element of damage in a case such as<\/p>\n
                   this is the pain, the suffering and the loss of the<\/p>\n
                   ordinary pleasures and convenience associated with<\/p>\n
                   healthy and mobile limbs. All that the court can do is<\/p>\n
                   to award such a sum as will enable the plaintiff to<\/p>\n
                   acquire some material possessions or to develop a<\/p>\n
                   lifestyle which will offset to some extent her terrible<\/p>\n
                   disability”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         In H.West & Son Limited v. Shephard 1958-65 ACJ 504<\/p>\n
(HL, England) the House of Lords emphasised the need for uniformity<\/p>\n
in the method and the approach to ensure that awards are reasonable,<\/p>\n
assessed with moderation and also to ensure that comparable injuries<\/p>\n
are compensated by comparable awards.\n<\/p>\n
         In Fowler v. Grace (1970) 114 Sol Jo 1993, the difficulty in<\/p>\n
the assessment of monetary compensation notwithstanding the need for<\/p>\n
valuation in terms of money was emphasized to avoid a situation where
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                   169<\/span><\/p>\n
the law became sterile and incapable of giving any remedy at all. The<\/p>\n
Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
                   “If a person in an accident loses his sight, hearing or<\/p>\n
                   smelling faculty or a limb, value of such deprivation<\/p>\n
                   cannot be assessed in terms of market value<\/p>\n
                   because there is no market value for the personal<\/p>\n
                   asset which has been lost in the accident, and there<\/p>\n
                   is no easy way of expressing its equivalent in terms<\/p>\n
                   of money. Nevertheless a valuation in terms of<\/p>\n
                   money must be made, because, otherwise the law<\/p>\n
                   would be sterile and not able to give any remedy at<\/p>\n
                   all. Although accuracy and certainty were frequently<\/p>\n
                   unobtainable, a fair assessment must be made.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
                   Although undoubtedly there are difficulties and<\/p>\n
                   uncertainties in assessing damages in personal<\/p>\n
                   injury cases, that fact should not preclude an<\/p>\n
                   assessment at best as can, in the circumstances be<\/p>\n
                   made”. (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
          To the same effect are the observations made by Lord Morris<\/p>\n
in Perry v. Cleaver 1969 ACJ 363 (H.L. England) where the Court<\/p>\n
stated:\n<\/p>\n
                   “To compensate in money for pain and for physical<\/p>\n
                   consequences     is   invariably   difficult   but   it   is<\/p>\n
                   recognized that no other process can be devised<\/p>\n
                   than that of making a monetary assessment”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Back home, the pronouncements of the Supreme Court have
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               170<\/span><\/p>\n
laid down the norms to be adopted in assessing compensation in injury<\/p>\n
cases and broadly classified damages payable under two distinct<\/p>\n
heads, namely pecuniary damages and non-pecuniary damages. The<\/p>\n
distinction between the two was pointed out by the Supreme Court in<\/p>\n
R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others<\/a> 1995<\/p>\n
ACJ (Supreme Court) 366 in the following words:-\n<\/p>\n
                   “Broadly speaking, while fixing an amount of<\/p>\n
                   compensation payable to a victim of an accident, the<\/p>\n
                   damages have to be assessed separately as,<\/p>\n
                   pecuniary    damages      and    special    damages.<\/p>\n
                   Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has<\/p>\n
                   actually incurred and which are capable of being<\/p>\n
                   calculated in terms of money; whereas non-<\/p>\n
                   pecuniary damages are those which are incapable<\/p>\n
                   of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. In<\/p>\n
                   order   to   appreciate   two   concepts    pecuniary<\/p>\n
                   damages may includes expenses incurred by the<\/p>\n
                   claimant: (i) medical attendance; (ii) loss of earning<\/p>\n
                   of profit up to the date of trial; (iii) other material<\/p>\n
                   loss. So far as non pecuniary damages are<\/p>\n
                   concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental<\/p>\n
                   and physical shock, pain and suffering already<\/p>\n
                   suffered or likely to be suffered in future; (ii)<\/p>\n
                   damages of compensate for the loss of amenities of<\/p>\n
                   life which may include a variety of matters, i.e., on<\/p>\n
                   account of injury the claimant may not be able to
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 171<\/span><\/p>\n
                    walk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of<\/p>\n
                    expectation of life, i.e. on account of injury the<\/p>\n
                    normal longevity of the person concerned is<\/p>\n
                    shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort,<\/p>\n
                    disappointment, frustration and mental stress in life”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
         The difficulties besetting the process of calculating damages<\/p>\n
were recognized by the Supreme Court even in Susamma Thomas’s<\/p>\n
case (supra) where the Court observed that calculation of damages<\/p>\n
necessarily remains in the realm of hypothesis in which reason,<\/p>\n
arithmetic is a good servant but a bad master. The overall picture is<\/p>\n
what matters. The amount of award, observed their Lordships, must not<\/p>\n
be niggardly since the law values life and limb in the free society in<\/p>\n
generous scales. To the same effect is the decision of the Supreme<\/p>\n
Court in Concord of India Insurance Co. Limited v. Nirmala Devi<\/a><\/p>\n
1980 ACJ 55 (SC).\n<\/p>\n
         Let us, in the light of the above pronouncements, now take up<\/p>\n
for consideration the first group of 29 cases appearing in Table “A” of<\/p>\n
the report in which percentage of disability suffered by the victims<\/p>\n
ranges between 1% to 10%. Table “A” contained in the report gives the<\/p>\n
particulars of the victim and the percentage of burns sustained by<\/p>\n
him\/her as also the percentage of disability reported by the doctors<\/p>\n
examined in each one of the cases. A closer look at the percentage of<\/p>\n
burns and the percentage of disability suffered by each victim would<\/p>\n
show that except in Claim Petition No. 426-DFT filed by Mrs. Surinderpal<\/p>\n
Kaur alias Shinder Pal Kaur where no burns or disability is reported, in<\/p>\n
all other cases set out in Table “A”, the disability reported is not
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              172<\/span><\/p>\n
necessarily equivalent to the extent of burns suffered by the victim. For<\/p>\n
instance, in Claim Petition No. 379-DFT against 2% burns, the disability<\/p>\n
suffered is 3%. A converse situation is found in Claim Petition No. 389-<\/p>\n
DFT where the percentage of burns is 10% but the disability is only 2%.<\/p>\n
In the case of Mehak claimant in Claim Petition No. 420-DFT the<\/p>\n
percentage of burns was reported to be 35% but the disability is only<\/p>\n
6%. Having said that, we must mention that in as many as 9 cases out<\/p>\n
of 29, enumerated in Table “A”, the extent of burn injuries and the<\/p>\n
percentage of disability are exactly the same. In the remaining, it is<\/p>\n
either more or less than the percentage of burns. The position is similar<\/p>\n
in cases enumerated in Table “B” also where the disability suffered is<\/p>\n
between 11% to 20%. The extent of burns and the disability are more or<\/p>\n
less comparable though not in all cases. That is true even in Table “C”<\/p>\n
with a few exceptions in which cases of disability ranging between 21%<\/p>\n
to 30% have been enumerated. In Table “D”, the disparity between the<\/p>\n
percentage of burns and the percentage of disability becomes more<\/p>\n
prominent. For instance, in Claim Petition No. 355-DFT filed by Vinod<\/p>\n
Bansal 25% burns give rise to 36% disability. So also in Claim Petition<\/p>\n
No. 432-DFT filed by Mrs. Shashi Bala 11% burns give rise to 40%<\/p>\n
disability. A converse situation is noticed in Claim Petition No. 435-DFT<\/p>\n
filed by Sanjay Midha where 65% burns have given rise to only 35%<\/p>\n
disability.\n<\/p>\n
              The inference that one can draw from the above state of<\/p>\n
affairs is that while burns and disability go hand in hand, one need not<\/p>\n
necessarily be proportionate to the other.     No definite co-relation is<\/p>\n
discernible between the extent of burns and the extent of disabilities
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  173<\/span><\/p>\n
suffered by the victims. Lesser burns have at times resulted in higher<\/p>\n
disability. The converse is also noticed in many cases where higher<\/p>\n
percentage of burns have resulted in relatively lower disability. It will<\/p>\n
not, therefore, be possible to adopt a norm or formula for calculation of<\/p>\n
compensation by reference to both i.e. Burns and disability.      Any such<\/p>\n
attempt may lead to anomalous and at times absurd results. The proper<\/p>\n
course, therefore, appears to be to make the extent of disability as the<\/p>\n
solitary basis for award of compensation regardless of the extent of<\/p>\n
burns suffered by the victim except may be in exceptional cases where<\/p>\n
the disability may be less but non pecuniary damages become<\/p>\n
awardable on account of loss of amenities such as marriage prospects<\/p>\n
for young girls and boys. Subject to that exception, we shall proceed to<\/p>\n
determine the amount of compensation payable on the basis of the<\/p>\n
extent of disability suffered by the victims on account of the burn injuries<\/p>\n
sustained by them.\n<\/p>\n
          The One Man Commission has, in cases appearing in Table<\/p>\n
“A” where the disability is between 1% to 10% awarded on a uniform<\/p>\n
basis a sum of Rs.2,00,000\/- towards compensation. It has, while doing<\/p>\n
so, drawn support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Lata<\/p>\n
Wadhwa’s case (supra)          where the     Court   noted    that   Justice<\/p>\n
Chandrachud had not awarded any compensation in cases where the<\/p>\n
burns were less than 10% but considered payment of Rs.2,00,000\/- in<\/p>\n
favour of each such victim to be just and reasonable. What is significant<\/p>\n
is that the report submitted by Justice Chandrachud and the judgment<\/p>\n
delivered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court have both taken the<\/p>\n
extent of burns as the basis for award of compensation. There was, it
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                 174<\/span><\/p>\n
appears, no material before the Supreme Court or before Justice<\/p>\n
Chandrachud for that matter to indicate the extent of disability suffered<\/p>\n
by the victims on account of the burn injuries sustained by them. Two<\/p>\n
questions, in the above backdrop, arise at the threshold, namely:-<\/p>\n
         i)         Whether award of Rs.2,00,000\/- in 28 cases<\/p>\n
                    appearing in Table “A” to the report is just and<\/p>\n
                    reasonable compensation in cases where the<\/p>\n
                    victims have suffered 1% to 10% disability (not<\/p>\n
                    burns); And<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n
         ii)        If a higher amount than what has been awarded in<\/p>\n
                    Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) is to be awarded what<\/p>\n
                    should that amount be, having regard to the time<\/p>\n
                    period that separates the two incidents.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          As noticed earlier, in cases enumerated in Table “A” of the<\/p>\n
report, the extent of disability in comparison to the percentage of burns<\/p>\n
is lower except in one case where 2% burns have resulted in 3%<\/p>\n
disability. It is also noteworthy that in Claim Petition No. 420-DFT while<\/p>\n
the disability is only 6%, the burns sustained were 35%. We, therefore,<\/p>\n
consider it reasonable to hold that if the extent of disability is the basis<\/p>\n
for award of compensation, the amount should be higher than what was<\/p>\n
awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) for a comparable percentage<\/p>\n
of burns. This means that for disability between 1% to 10% a higher<\/p>\n
amount of compensation ought to be payable than what was paid for<\/p>\n
burns sustained between 1% to 10%.\n<\/p>\n
          We are also of the view that payment of compensation to a<\/p>\n
victim who has suffered 10% disability at the same rate at which a
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               175<\/span><\/p>\n
victim who has suffered only 1% disability would also not be fair and<\/p>\n
reasonable. While the Supreme Court has accepted the classification of<\/p>\n
victims by reference to the extent of burns between 1% to 10% in Lata<\/p>\n
Wadhwa’s case (supra) we see no reason why victims cannot be<\/p>\n
classified more closely to reduce the disparity in the award of the<\/p>\n
amount as far as possible. The proper course, in our opinion, would be<\/p>\n
to classify the victims in Table “A” into two groups, one      who have<\/p>\n
suffered injuries between 1% to 5% and the other comprising victims<\/p>\n
who have suffered injuries between 6% to 10%.\n<\/p>\n
          Coming to the second question, viz. what is the reasonable<\/p>\n
amount of compensation payable to the victims in the two categories<\/p>\n
mentioned above, we are of the view that having regard to the totality of<\/p>\n
the circumstances, the nature of the evidence led and taking support<\/p>\n
from what the Supreme Court has awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case<\/p>\n
(supra) award of a sum of Rs.3,00,000\/- to victims who suffered 1% to<\/p>\n
5% disability should meet the ends of justice. The higher amount<\/p>\n
awarded by us would not only take care of the qualitative difference<\/p>\n
between the extent of burns and the resultant disability but also the time<\/p>\n
gap between the incident in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) and the one<\/p>\n
we are concerned with.\n<\/p>\n
          In so far as victims falling in second category namely those<\/p>\n
who suffered disability between 6% to 10% are concerned award of a<\/p>\n
sum of Rs.4,00,000\/- to each one of them would be just and fair in our<\/p>\n
opinion. This amount would include payment for shock, pain and<\/p>\n
suffering which the victims have gone through or may have to go<\/p>\n
through for the rest of their lives.\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                176<\/span><\/p>\n
          The second head under which amounts have been awarded to<\/p>\n
the victims is on account of loss of marriage prospects. The Commission<\/p>\n
has even for that purpose taken support from the decision of the<\/p>\n
Supreme Court in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) where compensation<\/p>\n
for loss of marriage prospects was related to the extent of burn injuries<\/p>\n
The compensation awarded, accordingly, ranged between Rs.3,00,000\/-<\/p>\n
to Rs.10,00,000\/- in the case of unmarried young girls and Rs.3,00,000\/-<\/p>\n
to Rs.5,00,000\/- in the case of unmarried young boys. It is noteworthy<\/p>\n
that in the case of victims who had 1% to 10% burns Justice<\/p>\n
Chandrachud had not awarded any amount by way of compensation.<\/p>\n
Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had, however, awarded a<\/p>\n
consolidated sum of Rs.2,00,000\/- to such victims ex-gratia. We have<\/p>\n
raised that amount to Rs.3,00,000\/- in cases where the disability is<\/p>\n
between 1% to 5% and to Rs.4,00,000\/- in cases where the disability is<\/p>\n
between 6% to 10%. We are of the opinion that every disability must in<\/p>\n
the case of unmarried girls and boys affect their marriage prospects<\/p>\n
also.    The difficulty arises only in quantifying the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation payable on that account. Taking a cue from the amount<\/p>\n
awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case (supra) on account of loss of<\/p>\n
marriage prospects, we are of the opinion that the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation could start at the base figure of Rs.2,00,000\/- in cases<\/p>\n
where the percentage of disability among girls was between 1% to 5%<\/p>\n
and rise by Rs.50,000\/- in every slab of 5% higher disability. This would<\/p>\n
mean that for the first category of cases involving young girls who<\/p>\n
suffered disability between 1% to 5% the total amount of compensation<\/p>\n
would be Rs.3,00,000\/- for disability in addition to Rs.2,00,000\/- for loss
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                        177<\/span><\/p>\n
of marriage prospects taking the total to Rs.5,00,000\/-. For boys in that<\/p>\n
category the loss of prospects of marriage could be compensated by<\/p>\n
award of Rs.1,00,000\/- with Rs.50,000\/- additional amount for every slab<\/p>\n
of 5% next above the first slab of 1% to 5%.\n<\/p>\n
              Adoption of the above method would, in our opinion, make the<\/p>\n
entire process uniform, transparent and predictable at the same time<\/p>\n
reduce the possibilities of any discrimination or unfair treatment in the<\/p>\n
matter of award of compensation. It goes without saying that in cases<\/p>\n
where the claimants are married men and women, the amount of<\/p>\n
compensation towards marriage prospects would not be                     due and<\/p>\n
payable. Applying the above norms, the final picture as regards<\/p>\n
compensation payable to the victims would be as under:-<\/p>\n
\n\nSr.    Case       Name of       Extent of Amount of non Amount     of Total Amount\nNo.     No.       Injured       disability pecuniary\/   compensation (In Rs.)\n                                (in %age) disability    for loss of\n                                           compensation marriage\n                                           (In Rs.)     prospects\n                                                        (In Rs.)\n                                UNMARRIED GIRLS\n 1 379-DFT Ramandeep                3        300000        200000       500000\n 2 450-DFT Pooja        alias       4        300000        200000       500000\n           Shweta\n 3 444-DFT Anju Rani                4        300000        200000       500000\n 4 415-DFT Prabhleen Kaur           4        300000        200000       500000\n           alias Heena\n 5 384-DFT Pooja Parihar            5        300000        200000       500000\n 6 420-DFT Mehak                    6        400000        250000       650000\n 7 425-DFT Manju                    6        400000        250000       650000\n 8 405-DFT Ritu Bala                7        400000        250000       650000\n 9 407-DFT Priya                    8        400000        250000       650000\n      386-DFT Neha      alias       8        400000        250000       650000\n10            Nikita\n11 453-DFT Simmi Monga              9        400000        250000       650000\n12 434-DFT Saniya                  11        500000        300000       800000\n13 429-DFT Gunjan Kamra            12        500000        300000       800000\n14 381-DFT Rekha Rani              17        600000        350000       950000\n15 421-DFT Bhavik                  24        700000        400000       1100000\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             178<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n16 393-DFT Pooja                  26     800000    450000    1250000\n17 411-DFT Gagan Monga            37     1000000   550000    1550000\n18 439-DFT Sakshi                 38.5   1000000   550000    1550000\n     394-DFT Varsha      alias    38.5   1000000   550000    1550000\n19           Anjli\n20 441-DFT Saloni Bhateja         40     1000000   550000    1550000\n21 454-DFT Chanda Rani            45     1100000   600000    1700000\n22 383-DFT Anmol Parihar          45     1100000   600000    1700000\n23 437-DFT Rinku Sethi            60     1400000   750000    2150000\n24 458-DFT Partima                68.5   1600000   850000    2450000\n25 436-DFT Neha Midha             100    2200000   1150000   3350000\n     431-DFT Gagandeep            100    2200000   1150000   3350000\n26           Butter\n27 410-DFT Seema Rani             100    2200000   1150000   3350000\n28 402-DFT Sarabjit Kaur          100    2200000   1150000   3350000\n29 396-DFT Suman Kaushal          100    2200000   1150000   3350000\n30 392-DFT Geeta Rani             100    2200000   1150000   3350000\n\n                                 UNMARRIED BOYS\n 1 451-DFT Abhishek                1     300000    100000    400000\n 2 457-DFT Harsimranjit            2     300000    100000    400000\n           Singh\n 3 418-DFT Rajinder Kumar          2     300000    100000    400000\n 4 389-DFT Dikshant                2     300000    100000    400000\n 5 475-DFT Rakesh Kumar           2.5    300000    100000    400000\n 6 438-DFT Sumit                   3     300000    100000    400000\n 7 422-DFT Lalit Kumar             3     300000    100000    400000\n 8 390-DFT Deepak                  3     300000    100000    400000\n 9 452-DFT Gaurav                  4     300000    100000    400000\n10 445-DFT Akash                   6     400000    150000    550000\n11 380-DFT Pankaj Mehta           10     400000    150000    550000\n12 446-DFT David                  13.5   500000    200000    700000\n13 417-DFT Rahul Grover           15     500000    200000    700000\n14 459-DFT Pawan Kumar            17     600000    250000    850000\n15 378-DFT Navdeep Singh          21.5   700000    300000    1000000\n16 403-DFT Subhash                26     800000    350000    1150000\n           Munna\n17 428-DFT Rohit Joshi            27.5   800000    350000    1150000\n18 385-DFT Sanjay Kumar           30     800000    350000    1150000\n19 395-DFT Vikku                  40     1000000   450000    1450000\n20 404-DFT Ashish     Kumar       50     1200000   550000    1750000\n           Bansal\n21 433-DFT Sahil                  54     1300000   600000    1900000\n22 419-DFT Rajan                  80     1800000   850000    2650000\n23 412-DFT Prabhjot               80     1800000   850000    2650000\n           Vishwas\n24 398-DFT Ankit Chugh            80     1800000   850000    2650000\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                           179<\/span>\n\n\n\n\n25 442-DFT Iqbal Singh         85     1900000   900000    2800000\n26 424-DFT Navjeet Sethi       85     1900000   900000    2800000\n27 387-DFT Venus Sethi         88     2000000   950000    2950000\n28 456-DFT Boby Girdhar        95     2100000   1000000   3100000\n29 399-DFT Umesh Kumar        100     2200000   1050000   3250000\n\n                              MARRIED WOMEN\n 1 426-DFT Surinderpal         0      150000      0        150000\n           Kaur       alias\n           Shinder     Pal\n           Kaur\n 2 423-DFT Sudha Rani          3      300000      0        300000\n 3 474-DFT Poonam Rani         7      400000      0        400000\n 4 449-DFT Kiran               7      400000      0        400000\n 5 460-DFT Veena Rani          8      400000      0        400000\n 6 406-DFT Savita Angi         15     500000      0        500000\n 7 448-DFT Alka               17.5    600000      0        600000\n 8 408-DFT Seema               28     800000      0        800000\n 9 447-DFT Sushma Rani        32.5    900000      0        900000\n10 432-DFT Shashi Bala         40     1000000     0       1000000\n11 416-DFT Kamlesh Rani        40     1000000     0       1000000\n12 443-DFT Rajni               50     1200000     0       1200000\n13 391-DFT Mitu Bala           50     1200000     0       1200000\n14 382-DFT Anju Rani           50     1200000     0       1200000\n15 427-DFT Savita Sharma       52     1300000     0       1300000\n16 455-DFT Madhu Bala          55     1300000     0       1300000\n17 413-DFT Veena Rani          70     1600000     0       1600000\n18 440-DFT Neera Jagga        100     2200000     0       2200000\n19 400-DFT Saroj Rani         100     2200000     0       2200000\n\n                               MARRIED MEN\n 1 430-DFT Mukesh Kamra        8      400000      0        400000\n 2 388-DFT Bir Singh           8      400000      0        400000\n 3 477-DFT Anil Kumar          22     700000      0        700000\n 4 356-DFT Ramesh                     800000      0        800000\n           Sachdeva            30<\/span>\n 5 435-DFT Sanjay Midha       30.5    900000      0        900000\n 6 414-DFT Jai Muni Goel       35     900000      0        900000\n 7 401-DFT Keshav              35     900000      0        900000\n           Sharma\n 8 355-DFT Vinod Bansal        36     1000000     0       1000000\n 9 397-DFT Nazir Singh         50     1200000     0       1200000\n10 409-DFT Girdhari Lal        70     1600000     0       1600000\n                              TOTAL                       112400000\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                180<\/span>\n\n\n\n\nRe: Question No.6\n\n\n<\/pre>\n
          There are three distinct aspects which need to be addressed<\/p>\n
while dealing with this question. The first relates to payment of interest<\/p>\n
on the amount awarded in favour of the claimants. Whether any interest<\/p>\n
is at all awardable, and, if so, from what date and at what rate would fall<\/p>\n
for determination while dealing with this aspect. The second aspect<\/p>\n
relates to the mode of recovery to be adopted in the event of a default in<\/p>\n
the payment of the amount by those held liable. The third aspect that<\/p>\n
needs to be addressed is whether the injured victims are entitled to a<\/p>\n
direction for treatment at the expense of the State in future.<\/p>\n
          Coming to the question of award of interest, it was argued on<\/p>\n
behalf of the School by Mr. Rajiv Atma Ram that the One Man<\/p>\n
Commission had not awarded any interest in favour of the claimants,<\/p>\n
which aspect has been left to be determined by this Court. He urged<\/p>\n
that no interest had been awarded even in Lata Wadhwa’s case<\/p>\n
(Supra) either by Justice Chandrachud, who conducted an Inquiry into<\/p>\n
the claims or by the Apex Court. This, according to the learned counsel,<\/p>\n
implied that award of interest was not an essential part of the award of<\/p>\n
compensation for the Torts suffered by the claimants.<\/p>\n
          On behalf of the claimants, it was per-contra argued that since<\/p>\n
the amount of compensation was being awarded on the principles<\/p>\n
governing claims made under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there was<\/p>\n
no reason why it should be denied to the claimants especially when<\/p>\n
Section 171 of the Act empowers the Tribunal to award interest at such<\/p>\n
rate and from such date not earlier than the date of making the claim as
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                              181<\/span><\/p>\n
may be specified by the Tribunal. It was contended that interest was<\/p>\n
awarded in M.S. Garewal’s case (Supra) and is invariably awarded in<\/p>\n
all Motor Vehicle Accident Claim cases.\n<\/p>\n
         Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 makes a specific<\/p>\n
provision for award of interest where any claim is allowed by the Motor<\/p>\n
Accident Claims Tribunal. The rate of interest and the date from which<\/p>\n
the same is payable is, however, in the discretion of the Tribunal,<\/p>\n
subject to the condition that the date of award of interest cannot be<\/p>\n
earlier to the date of making of the claim. As seen by us in the earlier<\/p>\n
part of this judgment award of compensation to the claimants in death<\/p>\n
and injury cases has been guided by the broad principles applicable to<\/p>\n
cases arising under the Motor Vehicles Act. The multiplier method of<\/p>\n
determination of compensation in death cases and the broad principles<\/p>\n
on which amounts have been determined by us in injury cases are not<\/p>\n
different from those applied and determined under the said Act. Such<\/p>\n
being the position, there is no reason why award of interest should be<\/p>\n
denied to the claimants especially when the right to claim and receive<\/p>\n
the amount relates back to the date on which the incident had taken<\/p>\n
place and the award of interest to the date on which a claim for payment<\/p>\n
of compensation filed. That apart award of interest simply ensures that<\/p>\n
the claimants are not prejudiced on account of the delay in<\/p>\n
determination of their claims by suitably compensating them, for such<\/p>\n
delay. No juristic principle has been cited by the respondents on which<\/p>\n
award of interest may be said to be impermissible in a case like the one<\/p>\n
at hand. Indeed even in M.S. Garewal’s case (Supra) the Court had<\/p>\n
awarded interest at the rate of 6% in favour of the claimants. The fact
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               182<\/span><\/p>\n
that no interest was awarded in Lata Wadhwa’s case (Supra) also<\/p>\n
cannot in our opinion, be construed as a declaration of law especially<\/p>\n
when the question whether interest was payable and if so, from what<\/p>\n
date and at what rate had not been urged before their Lordships for<\/p>\n
determination. If the judgment in Lata Wadhwa’s Case (Supra) is silent<\/p>\n
on the question of interest, the same cannot be cited as an authority for<\/p>\n
denial of interest to the claimants in the present case.<\/p>\n
          That brings us to the question as to what should be the rate of<\/p>\n
interest and from what date. Insofar as the date from which the interest<\/p>\n
is to be awarded is concerned, we see no reason to go against the<\/p>\n
provisions of the Section 171 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no matter<\/p>\n
that provision may have no direct application to the case at hand. It<\/p>\n
would be just and proper in our opinion to award interest only from the<\/p>\n
date of the filing of the claim petitions before the One Man Commission.<\/p>\n
The rate at which the said interest ought to be paid to the claimants also<\/p>\n
should not present any serious difficulty. Although there are decisions in<\/p>\n
which rate of interest has been as high as 12% per annum, as in the<\/p>\n
case of Kaushlya Devi Vs. Karan Arora & Ors. AIR 2007 SC 1912<\/p>\n
and Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay Vs. Shri Laxman<\/p>\n
Iyer and Anr., 2003(4) RCR (Civil) 764, we are of the view that simple<\/p>\n
interest at the rate of 6% from the date of filing of the claim petition<\/p>\n
would serve the ends of justice.\n<\/p>\n
          The next question relates to the mode of recovery of the<\/p>\n
amount awarded against the respondents in the event of their default in<\/p>\n
making the payment. It may be recalled that out of the total amount<\/p>\n
awarded by us, 45% has been made payable by the State Government
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               183<\/span><\/p>\n
out of which 15% is its own liability while the remaining 30% is the<\/p>\n
liability of the Dakshin Haryana Bijli Virtran Nigam and Municipal<\/p>\n
Committee, Dabwali with liberty to the State to recover the same from<\/p>\n
the Board and Municipal Committee, Dabwali. A direction issued to the<\/p>\n
State Government to pay the said amount within the time stipulated by<\/p>\n
us, would in our opinion, suffice as a violation of the said direction may<\/p>\n
itself be the subject matter of contempt proceedings before this Court.<\/p>\n
What is significant is that 55% of the amount awarded by us is payable<\/p>\n
by respondents No. 4, 5 and 9. While proceedings for disobedience of<\/p>\n
the direction to pay may be permissible even for enforcement of the said<\/p>\n
direction against the said respondents also we need to clarify that apart<\/p>\n
from recourse to those proceedings, the amount held recoverable from<\/p>\n
respondents No. No. 4, 5 and 9 shall be recoverable both as fine and\/or<\/p>\n
as arrears of land revenue. In the event of default in payment of the<\/p>\n
amount within the time that we are granting for such payment or in the<\/p>\n
event of a dispute as to the exact sum payable in terms of our order, the<\/p>\n
Court of Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali, shall be competent<\/p>\n
to determine the question and direct payment which direction\/order shall<\/p>\n
tantamount to a certificate for recovery of the amount so determined<\/p>\n
from the said respondents, as fine and\/or as arrears of land revenue by<\/p>\n
the concerned revenue authority.\n<\/p>\n
          That leaves us with the only other aspect viz. whether<\/p>\n
directions for treatment at the expense of the State need to be issued for<\/p>\n
the benefit of the injured victims. All that we need say in that regard is<\/p>\n
that this Court had, vide its orders dated 10.12.1996, 24.09.2001 &<\/p>\n
18.02.2002 directed such treatment. Treatment has been accordingly
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             184<\/span><\/p>\n
provided to the injured as and when required. All that we need say is<\/p>\n
that in case the State-run hospitals in Haryana are not equipped to<\/p>\n
provide the requisite treatment to the victims, such treatment may be<\/p>\n
provided either at the Post Graduate Institute of Medical Education and<\/p>\n
Research, Chandigarh, or at the All India Institute of Medical Sciences,<\/p>\n
New Delhi, at the Cost of the State Government upon satisfaction of the<\/p>\n
Director, Health Services, Government of Haryana that such treatment<\/p>\n
cannot be provided in the State run Hospitals.\n<\/p>\n
         Before concluding, we need to point out that while the hearing<\/p>\n
of these cases was, at an advanced stage, Civil Miscellaneous No.<\/p>\n
1011 of 2009 was filed by applicant Vinod Kumar claiming compensation<\/p>\n
on account of death of his wife and daughter namely Smt. Asha, aged<\/p>\n
28 years and Ganga alias Kunjan Rani aged about 3\u00bd years and Civil<\/p>\n
Miscellaneous No.16045 of 2009 was filed by applicant Smt. Anil Arora<\/p>\n
wife of Vijay Arora claiming compensation on account of death of her<\/p>\n
husband Vijay Kumar and sons namely Ankit aged six years and Archit<\/p>\n
aged seven years. It was submitted by Ms. Anju Arora, Advocate, that<\/p>\n
these claims could be entertained by this Court at this stage also and<\/p>\n
suitable directions be issued for claiming compensation. We regret our<\/p>\n
inability to do so.   The proceedings before the Commission had<\/p>\n
remained pending for nearly six years. No claim petition was, however,<\/p>\n
filed by the applicants before the One Man Commission. The applicants<\/p>\n
have attempted to offer an explanation for their failure. We do not,<\/p>\n
however, consider it necessary to examine either the explanation or the<\/p>\n
claim for the present proceedings, at this stage, which remained<\/p>\n
confined only to cases that were filed before the One Man Commission
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  185<\/span><\/p>\n
and in which evidence was adduced by the claimants in proof of their<\/p>\n
respective claims. Whether or not the applicants can maintain the claims<\/p>\n
at this distinct point of time and, if so, whether the allegations forming<\/p>\n
the basis of claim are supported by any material and, if so, what is the<\/p>\n
amount which can be awarded by way of compensation, are mixed<\/p>\n
questions of law and facts which we cannot, in these proceedings,<\/p>\n
entertain at this stage. To that we can say that the applicants shall be<\/p>\n
free to file appropriate proceedings permissible in law for such relief as<\/p>\n
may be due to them but subject to all just exceptions including<\/p>\n
maintainability and limitations.\n<\/p>\n
          In the result we pass the following order:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n
          1)         The amounts determined in each one of the cases<\/p>\n
                     referred to in the body of this judgment are hereby<\/p>\n
                     awarded in favour of the claimants with interest at<\/p>\n
                     the rate of 6% per annum w.e.f. date of the filing of<\/p>\n
                     the claim petition before the One Man Commission.<\/p>\n
          2)         Out of the total amount payable to each one of the<\/p>\n
                     claimant, the State of Haryana shall pay 45% of the<\/p>\n
                     total amount of compensation awarded in each one<\/p>\n
                     of the cases dealt with by us with liberty to recover<\/p>\n
                     15% each of the amount so paid from            Dakshin<\/p>\n
                     Haryana       Bijli   Virtran   Nigam   and   Municipal<\/p>\n
                     Committee, Dabwali. The balance 55% of the<\/p>\n
                     amount awarded shall be payable by respondents<\/p>\n
                     No.4, 5 and 9 jointly and severally.\n<\/p>\n
 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                               186<\/span><\/p>\n
         3)        The apportionment for the enhanced amount of<\/p>\n
                   compensation among the claimants shall be in the<\/p>\n
                   same ratio as recommended by the One Man<\/p>\n
                   Commission subject only to modifications and\/or<\/p>\n
                   further directions indicated by us in the body of this<\/p>\n
                   judgment. We make it clear that in cases where we<\/p>\n
                   have    directed     deposit   of   the   amount     of<\/p>\n
                   compensation in the name of minor claimants, the<\/p>\n
                   same shall be disbursed to the claimants in case<\/p>\n
                   they have already attained majority.\n<\/p>\n
         4)        The amount awarded by us together with interest<\/p>\n
                   shall be deposited by the respondents in the ratio<\/p>\n
                   indicated in para 2 above with the Additional Civil<\/p>\n
                   Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali for disbursement among<\/p>\n
                   the claimants within a period of 4 months from<\/p>\n
                   today, failing which the rate of interest awarded by<\/p>\n
                   us on the principal amount held payable, shall stand<\/p>\n
                   enhanced from 6% to 10% per annum from the date<\/p>\n
                   the period of 4 months expires till actual payment is<\/p>\n
                   made.\n<\/p>\n
         5)        In the event of any default by the respondents in the<\/p>\n
                   making of the payment, the claimants shall be free<\/p>\n
                   to not only institute proceedings for the breach of the<\/p>\n
                   direction of this Court but also approach the<\/p>\n
                   Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali for<\/p>\n
                   effecting recovery of the amount remaining unpaid.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                                  187<\/span><\/p>\n
         6)        The Additional Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Dabwali, shall,<\/p>\n
                   in any such event, initiate proceedings for recovery<\/p>\n
                   of the amount that remains unpaid as if the same<\/p>\n
                   was recoverable as fine and\/or as arrears of land<\/p>\n
                   revenue for which purpose he shall be competent to<\/p>\n
                   issue certificates and instructions to the Collector(s)<\/p>\n
                   concerned for recovering the amount outstanding.<\/p>\n
         7)        Treatment for the burn injury sustained by the<\/p>\n
                   injured victims shall be provided free of cost. In case<\/p>\n
                   the same is not available in the State-run hospitals<\/p>\n
                   in Haryana, the same shall be arranged in Post<\/p>\n
                   Graduate    Institute   of    Medical   Education    and<\/p>\n
                   Research, Chandigarh or at the All India Institute of<\/p>\n
                   Medical Sciences, New Delhi upon satisfaction by<\/p>\n
                   the Director, Health Services, Government of<\/p>\n
                   Haryana that such treatment is essential but cannot<\/p>\n
                   be provided in the State-run hospitals.\n<\/p>\n
         8)        Liberty is given to the petitioners to seek further<\/p>\n
                   clarification of this order at any stage, should the<\/p>\n
                   need so arise.\n<\/p>\n
         9)        Civil Miscellaneous Nos.1011 and 16045 of 2009<\/p>\n
                   are dismissed with liberty      to the applicants to file<\/p>\n
                   appropriate proceedings for payment of amount of<\/p>\n
                   compensation     and\/or other reliefs due to them<\/p>\n
                   subject to just exceptions including maintainability of<\/p>\n
                   claims and limitations etc.
\n Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996                             188<\/span><\/p>\n
         10)       The costs involved in the setting up of the<\/p>\n
                   Commission from beginning till end shall be borne<\/p>\n
                   by the State of Haryana.<\/p>\n
\n\n         11)       The parties shall bear their own costs in this Court,\n\n                   and in the proceedings       before the One Man\n\n                   Commission.\n\n\n\n                                                          (T.S.Thakur)\n                                                         Chief Justice\n\n\n\n                                          (Kanwaljit Singh Ahluwalia)\n                                                               Judge\nNovember 9th, 2009\n\"Deepak\"\n <\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Punjab-Haryana High Court Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims … vs Union Of India And Others on 9 November, 2009 Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 1 In the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, at Chandigarh. **** Civil Writ Petition No. 13214 of 1996 Date of Decision: 9.11.2009 Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims Association …Petitioner Versus […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,28],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-183759","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-punjab-haryana-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nDabwali Fire Tragedy Victims ... vs Union Of India And Others on 9 November, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/dabwali-fire-tragedy-victims-vs-union-of-india-and-others-on-9-november-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Dabwali Fire Tragedy Victims ... vs Union Of India And Others on 9 November, 2009 - 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