{"id":186506,"date":"1953-02-27T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1953-02-26T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/namdeo-lokman-lodhi-vs-narmadabai-and-others-on-27-february-1953"},"modified":"2017-07-03T18:55:11","modified_gmt":"2017-07-03T13:25:11","slug":"namdeo-lokman-lodhi-vs-narmadabai-and-others-on-27-february-1953","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/namdeo-lokman-lodhi-vs-narmadabai-and-others-on-27-february-1953","title":{"rendered":"Namdeo Lokman Lodhi vs Narmadabai And Others on 27 February, 1953"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Namdeo Lokman Lodhi vs Narmadabai And Others on 27 February, 1953<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_citations\">Equivalent citations: 1953 AIR  228, \t\t  1953 SCR 1009<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: M C Mahajan<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: Mahajan, Mehr Chand<\/div>\n<pre>           PETITIONER:\nNAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nNARMADABAI AND OTHERS\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n27\/02\/1953\n\nBENCH:\nMAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND\nBENCH:\nMAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND\nDAS, SUDHI RANJAN\n\nCITATION:\n 1953 AIR  228\t\t  1953 SCR 1009\n CITATOR INFO :\n D\t    1960 SC 260\t (13)\n R\t    1965 SC 225\t (15)\n R\t    1969 SC1349\t (8)\n R\t    1976 SC 588\t (14)\n\n\nACT:\nLease-Condition that the lessee's rights shall terminate  if\nrent  is not paid--Notice in writing by lessor to  terminate\nlease -Whether necessary-Suit for ejectment without  notice-\nMaintainability\t Transfer  of Property Act (IV\tof  1882  as\namended in 1929), s. 111(g)-Whether based on justice, equity\nand  good conscience-Applicability to lease  deeds  executed\nbefore 1st April, 1930.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThe  provision\tas  to notice in  writing  of  the  lessor's\nintention  to  determine  the lease,  container\t in  section\n111(g) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, as amended  in\n1929,  is not based on any principle of justice,  equity  or\ngood  conscience  and is not applicable to  leases  executed\nprior to 1st April, 1930.\nWhere a lease deed executed before the Transfer of  Property\nAct,  1882,  came  into force, provided\t that  the  lessee's\nrights should come to an end on default of payment of  rent,\nand, as rent was not duly paid, the lessor instituted a suit\nfor  ejectment of the lessee without giving him a notice  in\nwriting\t of  his (the lessor's) intention to  determine\t the\nlease :\nHeld, that the suit was maintainable.\nUmar  Pulavar  v.  Dawood Rowther  (A.1,R.  1947  Mad.\t68),\nBrahmayya v. Sundodaramma (A.I.R. 48 Mad. 275), Tatya  Savla\nSudrik\tv.  Yeshwanta  Kondiba Mulay  (52  Bom.\t  L.R.\t909)\ndisapproved.  Toleman v. Portbury (L.R. 6 Q.B. 245), Prakash\nChandra\t Das  v. Rajendra Nath Basu (I.L.R. 58\tCal.  1359),\nRama   Aiyangar\t v.  Guruswami\tChetty\t(35   M.L.J.   129),\nVenkatachari v. Rangaswami Aiyar (36 M.L.J. 532) and Krishna\nShetti\tv.  Gilbert Pinto (I.L.R. 42 Mad.  654)\t relied\t on.\nVenkatarama Aiyar v. Ponnuswamy Padayachi (A.I.R. 1935\tMad.\n918), Aditya Prasad v. Ram Ratanlal (57 I-A. 173),  Muhammad\nRaza  v.  Abbas Bandi Bibi (59 I.A. 236), Roberts  v.  Davey\n(110 E.R. 606) distinguished.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 154 of  1952.<br \/>\nAppeal\tfrom  the Judgment and Decree dated the\t 23rd  June,<br \/>\n1949, of the High<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">131<\/span><br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1010<\/span><br \/>\nCourt\tof   Judicature\t at  Bombay  (chagla   C.   J.\t and<br \/>\nGajendragadkar J.) in Second Appeal No. 557 of\t1945 against<br \/>\nthe  Judgment and Decree dated the 19th March, 1945, of\t the<br \/>\nCourt  of  Small Causes, Poona, in Civil Appeal No.  175  of<br \/>\n1943, arising from the Decree dated the 31st March, 1943, of<br \/>\nthe Court of the Extra Joint Sub-Judge of Poona in Suit\t No.<br \/>\n858 of 1941.\n<\/p>\n<p>C.   K.\t  Daphtary,   Solicitor-General\t for   India   (J.B.<br \/>\nDadachanji, with him) for the appellant.\n<\/p>\n<p>V. M. Tarkunde for the respondents.\n<\/p>\n<p>1953.  February 27.  The judgment of the Court was delivered<br \/>\nby<br \/>\nMAHAJAN\t J.-This  is an appeal by defendant No. I  from\t the<br \/>\ndecree\tof the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in  Second<br \/>\nAppeal No. 557 of 1945, whereby the High Court confirmed the<br \/>\ndecree\tof the lower courts granting possession of  land  to<br \/>\nthe respondents on the forfeiture of a lease.  The appeal is<br \/>\nconfined to survey No. 86\/2 at Mundhava in Poona district.<br \/>\nThe principal question arising for decision in the ap.\tpeal<br \/>\nis whether notice as contemplated by section III (g) of\t the<br \/>\nTransfer of Property Act is necessary for the  determination<br \/>\nof a lease for non-payment of rent even where such lease was<br \/>\nexecuted  before  the coming into force of the\tTransfer  of<br \/>\nProperty  Act.\t The  only other  question  that  falls\t for<br \/>\ndetermination\tis  whether  the  High\tCourt  should\thave<br \/>\ninterfered  with  the  discretion of  the  lower  courts  in<br \/>\nrefusing  relief against forfeiture in the circumstances  of<br \/>\nthis case.\n<\/p>\n<p>The  present respondents are the daughter and grand sons  of<br \/>\nthe original plaintiff Vinayakbhat.  His adoptive mother was<br \/>\nRamabai.   She owned two inam lands at Mundhava\t which\twere<br \/>\nthen  numbered Pratibhandi Nos. 71 and 72.   Present  survey<br \/>\nNos.  86\/1 and 86\/2 together correspond to  old\t Pratibhandi<br \/>\nNo.  71.   On  1st July, 1863, Ramabai,\t while\tshe  was  in<br \/>\nfinancial  difficulties,  passed a permanent lease  of\tboth<br \/>\nthese numbers to one Ladha Ibrahim Sheth.  The lessee paid a<br \/>\npremium of Rs. 999 for the lease, and also agreed to pay<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1011<\/span><br \/>\na  yearly rent of Rs. 80 to Ramabai during her lifetime\t and<br \/>\nafter  her death a yearly amount equal to the assessment  of<br \/>\nthe  two lands to the heirs of Ramabai.\t The lease  provided<br \/>\nthat in default of payment of rent the tenant&#8217;s rights would<br \/>\ncome  to an end.- On 18th August, 1870, Ladha  Ibrahim\tsold<br \/>\nhis  tenancy  rights to one Girdhari Balaram Lodhi  for\t Rs.<br \/>\n7,999.\tThe sale deed provided that in default of payment of<br \/>\nrent  to Ramabai or her heirs, the purchaser would  have  no<br \/>\nrights\twhatsoever left over the property.  On the same\t day<br \/>\nthe purchaser passed a rent note in favour of Ramabai.\t The<br \/>\nrent note provided for the payment of the agreed rent in the<br \/>\nmonth  of  Pousb  every year, and stated  that\tin  case  of<br \/>\ndefault the tenant or his heirs would have no right over the<br \/>\nland.\tDefendant  No. 1 and the other\tdefendants  are\t the<br \/>\ngrandsons of Seth Girdhari Balaram.\n<\/p>\n<p>In spite of the nullity clause in the lease it appears\tthat<br \/>\nthe lessee has been more or less a habitual defaulter in the<br \/>\npayment\t of rent.  In the year 1913, rent for six years\t was<br \/>\nin  arrears.  Vinayakbhat filed Suit No. 99 of 1913  in\t the<br \/>\ncourt of the II Class Sub-Judge, Poona, against the  present<br \/>\ndefendants  for\t possession of the demised premises  on\t the<br \/>\nground\tof forfeiture.\tA number of defences were raised  by<br \/>\nthem.  Inter alia, it was pleaded that as no notice had been<br \/>\ngiven  to  them the forfeiture was not\tenforceable.   These<br \/>\ncontentions  were  negatived but the  court  granted  relief<br \/>\nagainst\t forfeiture.   Defendant No. 1 was a minor  at\tthat<br \/>\ntime and became a major in or about 1925.\n<\/p>\n<p>In  the year 1928 again rent for two years was\tin  arrears.<br \/>\nVinayakbhat  filed  Civil Suit No. 258 of 1928\tagainst\t the<br \/>\npresent\t  defendants  for  possession  on  the\t ground\t  of<br \/>\nforfeiture.    The   plaintiff\t subsequently\twaived\t the<br \/>\nforfeiture by accepting three years&#8217; rent which by then\t had<br \/>\nfallen in arrears and costs of the suit.\n<\/p>\n<p>In  the\t year  1931 rent for three  years  again  fell\tinto<br \/>\narrears.   The amount was then sent by money order  and\t the<br \/>\nlandlord accepted it.\n<\/p>\n<p>In the year 1934 again rent for three years remained unpaid.<br \/>\nAt that time proceedings were started by Government for\t the<br \/>\nacquisition of the old survey No. 72.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1012<\/span><\/p>\n<p>The  landlord  claimed\tthat he was entitled  to  the  whole<br \/>\ncompensation  money  as the tenant&#8217;s rights  had  ceased  by<br \/>\nforfeiture for non-payment of rent.  Defendant No. 1 through<br \/>\nhis  pleader sent a notice to Vinayakbhat to come  and\ttake<br \/>\nthe arrears of rent.  &#8216;He agreed and accepted the arrears of<br \/>\nrent  and the forfeiture was again waived.  As a  result  of<br \/>\nthis  the defendants got Rs. 32,000 by way  of\tcompensation<br \/>\nfor the permanent tenancy rights in old survey No. 72, while<br \/>\nVinayakbhat   got  Rs.\t1,400  for  compensation   for\t the<br \/>\nacquisition of his rights as landlord in that land.<br \/>\nIn   1938  rent\t for  four  years  was\tagain  in   arrears.<br \/>\nVinayakbhat filed Civil Suit No. 982 of 1938 in the court of<br \/>\nthe  I\tClass  Sub-Judge at Poona against  all\tthe  present<br \/>\ndefendants  for possession of survey Nos. 86\/1 and  86\/2  on<br \/>\nthe  ground that the lease had determined by forfeiture\t for<br \/>\nnon-payment  of rent.  In that suit defendant No. 1  pleaded<br \/>\nthat  there was no forfeiture because no rent was  fixed  in<br \/>\nrespect\t of  the suit property and also because it  was\t for<br \/>\nthe, plaintiff to recover rent and not for the defendants to<br \/>\ngo  to\tthe plaintiff and pay it.   These  contentions\twere<br \/>\nnegatived.   It\t was held that forfeiture had  occurred\t but<br \/>\nrelief against forfeiture was again granted.<br \/>\nOn  plaintiff&#8217;s\t appeal in this case, the  learned  District<br \/>\nJudge refused to interfere with the discretion of the  trial<br \/>\njudge  in  granting relief against forfeiture  but  observed<br \/>\nthat   the   defendants\t having\t obtained   relief   against<br \/>\nforfeiture  thrice before should not expect to get it for  a<br \/>\nfourth\ttime  if they again make default in the\t payment  of<br \/>\nrent.\n<\/p>\n<p>The  default  which  has  given rise  to  the  present\tsuit<br \/>\noccurred on 28th January, 1941, and the plaintiff filed\t the<br \/>\nsuit  out of which this appeal arises for possession on\t the<br \/>\nground\tof  forfeiture\tand for the arrears  of\t rent  which<br \/>\nremained unpaid.  It was alleged in the plaint that the rent<br \/>\ndue  on 28th January, 1941, was not paid,  though  demanded.<br \/>\nPlaintiff asked for possession of survey Nos. 86\/1 and\t86\/2<br \/>\nafter  removal of the structures thereon.  Defendant  No.  1<br \/>\npleaded\t that as a result of partition rights in survey\t No.<br \/>\n86\/2 had fallen to<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1013<\/span><br \/>\nhis  share, that according to the terms of the rent note  it<br \/>\nwas  for the plaintiff to approach the defendants  and.\t not<br \/>\nfor  the  defendants to go to the plaintiff and\t pay  it,&#8217;-&#8216;<br \/>\nthat as the plaintiff did not approach the defendants and no<br \/>\ndemand\tfor  rent  was made, no\t forfeiture  occurred,\tthat<br \/>\ndefendant No. I did offer the rent to the plaintiff, but the<br \/>\nplaintiff  fraudulently\t refused  to  accept  it,  that\t the<br \/>\nplaintiff ought to have sent a notice according to law if he<br \/>\nwanted\tto enforce the right of forfeiture and that  without<br \/>\nprejudice  to  the above contentions he\t should\t be  granted<br \/>\nrelief against forfeiture.\n<\/p>\n<p>The  trial court decreed the plaintiff&#8217;s suit and  negatived<br \/>\nthe  contentions  raised  by the  defendants.\tIn  awarding<br \/>\nPossession of the entire property to the plaintiff the trial<br \/>\ncourt  imposed\ta  condition that  defendant  No.  I  should<br \/>\ncontinue to be in possession of the two structures in survey<br \/>\nNo.  86\/2  till\t the end of March, 1950.   On  the  question<br \/>\nwhether\t a  notice was necessary before the lease  could  be<br \/>\nterminated,  the  trial court expressed the  view  that\t the<br \/>\nprovision  in the rent note that on non-payment of rent\t the<br \/>\nrights\tof the tenant would come to an end was a  clause  of<br \/>\nnullity\t and not merely a clause of forfeiture and that\t the<br \/>\nlease was therefore determined under section 111 (b) and not<br \/>\nunder  section III (g) of the Transfer of Property  Act\t and<br \/>\nthat no notice as required by section 111 (g) was  necessary<br \/>\nfor  terminating  the lease in suit.  On the  issue  whether<br \/>\nforfeiture should be relieved against, the trial court\tsaid<br \/>\nthat  relief  could have been given to\tthe  lessee  against<br \/>\nforfeiture  under section 1 14 had it not been for the\tfact<br \/>\nthat the defendants had disentitled themselves to relief  by<br \/>\ncontumacious  conduct on their part, that even\tthis  paltry<br \/>\nrent  had  never been paid in time during  the\tlast  twenty<br \/>\nyears  at  any\trate, and that after  defendant\t No.  I\t had<br \/>\nattained majority and got the estate in his charge in  1922-<br \/>\n23  he\thad uniformly defaulted in the payment of  rent\t and<br \/>\nthat  the  defendants raised totally false defences  and  in<br \/>\nevery  suit  a\tfalse excuse was set up\t in  an\t attempt  to<br \/>\njustify the arrears of rent.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1014<\/span><\/p>\n<p>In  pursuance  of the trial court&#8217;s  decree  plaintiff\ttook<br \/>\npossession of all the suit lands in April, 1943, except\t one<br \/>\nacre  which  he\t took possession on  13th  September,  1943.<br \/>\nDefendant No. I remained in possession of the two structures<br \/>\non survey No. 86\/2.  Against the decision of the trial judge<br \/>\ndefendant No. I-alone filed an appeal to the District  Judge<br \/>\nof Poona.  The lower appellate court confirmed the decree of<br \/>\nthe trial court with two modifications.\t Defendant No. I was<br \/>\nallowed to remove the buildings on survey No. 86\/2 and\talso<br \/>\nthe trees therein within three months.\tOn the issue whether<br \/>\na  notice was necessary, the appellate court found that\t the<br \/>\nlease  came  to an end not under section  111(b)  but  under<br \/>\nsection\t 111 (g) of the Transfer of Pro perty Act, but\tthat<br \/>\nno notice of forfeiture was necessary as the lease had\tbeen<br \/>\nexecuted  prior to the coming into force of the Transfer  of<br \/>\nProperty  Act.\tThe appellate court saw no valid reason\t for<br \/>\ninterfering  with  the\tfinding of the trial  judge  on\t the<br \/>\nquestion concerning relief against forfeiture.<br \/>\nFrom  this appellate decree defendant No. I filed  a  second<br \/>\nappeal\tto  the\t High Court of Judicature  at  Bombay.\t The<br \/>\nplaintiff filed cross-objections in regard to the trees\t and<br \/>\ncosts.\tThe High Court dismissed the appeal and allowed\t the<br \/>\ncross-objections.   An\tapplication was made  for  leave  to<br \/>\nappeal\tto  the\t Supreme  Court\t and  it  was  granted\twith<br \/>\nreference to survey -No. 86\/2.\n<\/p>\n<p>The  law  with\tregard to the determination of\ta  lease  by<br \/>\nforfeiture  is contained is section III (g) of the  Transfer<br \/>\nof Property Act.  Under that provision a lease is determined<br \/>\nby forfeiture in case the lessee breaks an express condition<br \/>\nwhich  provides\t that on breach thereof the lessor  may\t re-<br \/>\nenter, or in case the lessee renounces his character as such<br \/>\nby setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title<br \/>\nin  himself, or the lessee is adjudicated an  insolvent\t and<br \/>\nthe  lease  provides  that the lessor  may  reenter  on\t the<br \/>\nhappening of such event and a certain further act is done by<br \/>\nthe   lessor  as  thereinafter\tmentioned.   Prior  to\t its<br \/>\namendment  by  Act  XX of  1929,  this\tsub-section  further<br \/>\nprovided<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1015<\/span><br \/>\n&#8220;And in any of these cases the lessor or his transferee does<br \/>\nsome act showing his intention to determine the lease.&#8221;<br \/>\nBy  Act\t XX  of 1929, this subsection was  amended  and\t the<br \/>\namended sub-section now reads:-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;And  in  any of these cases the lessor\t or  his  transferee<br \/>\ngives  notice in writing to the lessee of his  intention  to<br \/>\ndetermine the lease.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>Section\t 111 (g) in terms makes the further act an  integral<br \/>\ncondition  of the forfeiture.  In other words, without\tthis<br \/>\nact there is no completed forfeiture at all.  Under the\t old<br \/>\nsection an overt act evidencing the requisite intention\t was<br \/>\nessential.  As the law stands today under the Act, notice in<br \/>\nwriting\t by  the  landlord is a\t condition  precedent  to  a<br \/>\nforfeiture and the right of re-entry.  Section 63 of Act  XX<br \/>\nof  1929,  restricts  the operation  of\t this  amendment  to<br \/>\ntransfers of property made after 1st April, 1930.  The lease<br \/>\nin  this case was executed before the Transfer\tof  Property<br \/>\nAct  came into force in 1882.  The amendment therefore\tmade<br \/>\nin   this   sub-section\t by  Act  XX  of  1929\t not   being<br \/>\nretrospective, cannot touch the present lease and it is also<br \/>\nexcluded  from the reach of the Transfer of Property Act  by<br \/>\nthe provisions of section 2. The position was not  seriously<br \/>\ndisputed  in the High Court or before us that the  statutory<br \/>\nprovisions  of\tsection\t 111(g) as such cannot\tbe  made  to<br \/>\ngovern\tthe  present lease which was executed  in  the\tyear<br \/>\n1870.\tIt  was however strongly argued that  the  amendment<br \/>\nmade  in  1929\tto  section 111(g) of  the  Act\t embodies  a<br \/>\nprinciple  of  justice,\t equity\t and  good  conscience\t and<br \/>\nnotwithstanding\t section  2 of the Act, that  principle\t was<br \/>\napplicable  in\tthis  case and there can  be  no  forfeiture<br \/>\nunless\tnotice in writing to the lessee of his intention  to<br \/>\ndetermine the lease by the lessor bad been given.<br \/>\nIt is axiomatic that the courts must apply the principles of<br \/>\njustice,  equity and good conscience to\t transactions  which<br \/>\ncome  up  before  them for  determination  even\t though\t the<br \/>\nstatutory provisions of the Transfer of<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1016<\/span><br \/>\nProperty Act are not made applicable to these  transactions.<br \/>\nIt  follows therefore that the provisions of the  Act  which<br \/>\nare  but  a statutory recognition of the rules\tof  justice,<br \/>\nequity\t&#8216;and  good conscience also govern  those  transfers.<br \/>\nIf,   therefore,  we  are  satisfied  that  the\t  particular<br \/>\nprinciple  to which the legislature has now given effect  by<br \/>\nthe  amendment\tto section 111 (g) did in fact\trepresent  a<br \/>\nprinciple   of\t justice,  equity   and\t  good\t conscience,<br \/>\nundoubtedly  the case will have to be decided in  accordance<br \/>\nwith the rule laid down in the section, although in  express<br \/>\nterms  it  has not been made applicable to  leases  executed<br \/>\nprior to 1929 or even prior to the Transfer of Property\t Act<br \/>\ncoming into force.\n<\/p>\n<p>The  main  point  for consideration &#8211; thus  is\twhether\t the<br \/>\nparticular  provision  introduced  in  sub-section  (g)\t  of<br \/>\nsection 111 of the Transfer of Property Act in 1929 is but a<br \/>\nstatutory recognition of a principle of justice, equity\t and<br \/>\ngood  conscience, or whether it is merely a  procedural\t and<br \/>\ntechnical rule introduced in the section by the\t legislature<br \/>\nand  is\t not  based on any well\t established  principles  of<br \/>\nequity.\t  The  High Court held, and we think  rightly,\tthat<br \/>\nthis  provision in sub-section (g) of section III in  regard<br \/>\nto  notice  was\t not based upon any  principle\tof  justice,<br \/>\nequity and good conscience.  In the first instance it may be<br \/>\nobserved  that\tit  is\terroneous  to  suppose\tthat   every<br \/>\nprovision  in  the  Transfer  of  Property  Act\t and   every<br \/>\namendment  effected  is necessarily based on  principles  of<br \/>\njustice,  equity and good conscience.  It has to be seen  in<br \/>\nevery  case  whether the particular provisions\tof  the\t Act<br \/>\nrelied upon restates a known rule of equity or whether it is<br \/>\nmerely\ta  new\trule laid down by  the\tlegislature  without<br \/>\nreference to any rule of equity and what is the true  nature<br \/>\nand  character of the rule.  Now, so far as section 111\t (g)<br \/>\nof  the\t Act is concerned, the insistence therein  that\t the<br \/>\nnotice\tshould be given in writing is intrinsic evidence  of<br \/>\nthe  fact  that\t the formality is merely  statutory  and  it<br \/>\ncannot trace its origin to any rule of equity.\tEquity\tdoes<br \/>\nnot  concern itself with mere forms or modes  of  procedure.<br \/>\nIf  the purpose of the rule as to notice is to indicate\t the<br \/>\nintention of the lessor to<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1017<\/span><br \/>\ndetermine  the\tlease and to avail himself of  the  tenant&#8217;s<br \/>\nbreach of covenant it could as effectively be achieved by an<br \/>\noral  intimation  as  by a written one without\tin  any\t way<br \/>\ndisturbing the mind of a chancery judge.  The requirement as<br \/>\nto  written notice provided in the section therefore  cannot<br \/>\nbe said to be based on any general rule of equity.  That  it<br \/>\nis  not\t so  is\t apparent from\tthe  circumstance  that\t the<br \/>\nrequirement of a notice in writing to complete a  forfeiture<br \/>\nhas  been  dispensed with by the legislature in\t respect  to<br \/>\nleases\texecuted before 1st April, 1930.  Those\t leases\t are<br \/>\nstill governed by the unamended sub-section (g) of section 1<br \/>\n1 1. All that was required by that sub-section was that\t the<br \/>\nlessor\twas to show his intention to determine the lease  by<br \/>\nsome  act  indicating  that intention.\t The  principles  of<br \/>\njustice, equity and good conscience are not such a  variable<br \/>\ncommodity,   that  they\t change\t and  stand  altered  on   a<br \/>\nparticular  date on the mandate of the legislature and\tthat<br \/>\nto leases made between 1882 and 1930 the principle of equity<br \/>\napplicable  is\tthe one contained in sub-section (g)  as  it<br \/>\nstood  before 1929, and to leases executed after 1st  April,<br \/>\n1930, the principle of equity is the one stated in the\tsub-<br \/>\nsection\t as  it\t now stands.  Question may  also  be  posed,<br \/>\nwhether\t according  to English law a notice is\ta  necessary<br \/>\nrequisite to complete a forfeiture.\n<\/p>\n<p>The  English law on the subject is stated in  Foa&#8217;s  General<br \/>\nLaw  of\t Landlord and Tenant (7th edition) at  page  316  in<br \/>\nthese terms :-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8221;  In no case can the lessee take advantage of\tthe  proviso<br \/>\nfor  re-entry in order to avoid the lease, even where it  is<br \/>\nin the form (not that the lessor may reenter, but) that\t the<br \/>\nterm  shall cease, or that the lease shall be void  for\t all<br \/>\npurposes, or &#8216;absolutely forfeited&#8217;; for expressions of this<br \/>\nkind  only  mean  that the tenancy shall  determine  at\t the<br \/>\noption\t of  the  lessor&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;  This\t has  been   usually<br \/>\nexpressed by saying that the lease is voidable and not void;<br \/>\nbut  the  true principle appears to be that the\t lease\tdoes<br \/>\nbecome\tvoid  to all intents and purposes,  though  this  is<br \/>\nsubject\t to the condition that the party who is\t seeking  to<br \/>\nset up its invalidity<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">132<\/span><br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1018<\/span><br \/>\nis not himself in default, for otherwise he would be  taking<br \/>\nadvantage  of  his  own wrong.\tIt follows  that  where\t the<br \/>\nproviso makes the lease void, the landlord must, in order to<br \/>\ntake  advantage of it, do some unequivocal act\tnotified  to<br \/>\nthe lessee, indicating his intention to avail himself of the<br \/>\noption\tgiven  to  him.\t  The service  upon  the  lessee  in<br \/>\npossession of a writ in ejectment is sufficient&#8221;.<br \/>\nThe   Law  of  Property\t Act,  1925,  by  section  146\t has<br \/>\nconsolidated  the  law\tin England  on\tthis  subject.\t The<br \/>\nprovision with regard to the giving of notice before a right<br \/>\nof re-entry accrues to the landlord is expressly excluded by<br \/>\nsub-section (11) in cases of re-entry on forfeiture for non-<br \/>\npayment of rent.  In England it is not necessary in case  of<br \/>\nnon-payment  of rent for a landlord to give notice before  a<br \/>\nforfeiture results.  It cannot, therefore, be said that what<br \/>\nhas  been  enacted in sub-section (g) of section II 1  is  a<br \/>\nmatter\twhich even today in English law is considered  as  a<br \/>\nmatter\tof justice, equity and good conscience.\t In  English<br \/>\nlaw  the  bringing  of an action which\tcorresponds  to\t the<br \/>\ninstitution  of\t a suit in India is itself an act  which  is<br \/>\ndefinitely  regarded as evidencing an intention on the\tpart<br \/>\nof  the\t lessor to determine a lease with  regard  to  which<br \/>\nthere has been a breach of covenant entitling the lessor  to<br \/>\nre-enter  : vide Toleman v. Portbury and Prakashchandra\t Das<br \/>\nv. Rajendranath Basu(2).\n<\/p>\n<p>In  India there is a substantial body of judicial  authority<br \/>\nfor  the proposition that in respect of leases\tmade  before<br \/>\nthe  Transfer  of Property Act forfeiture is  incurred\twhen<br \/>\nthere  is a disclaimer of title or there is  non-payment  of<br \/>\nrent.\tAny subsequent act of the landlord electing to\ttake<br \/>\nadvantage  of a forfeiture is not a condition  precedent  to<br \/>\nthe  right  of\taction for ejectment.\tThe  bringing  by  a<br \/>\nlandlord  of  a\t suit  for ejectment is\t simply\t a  mode  of<br \/>\nmanifesting  his  election.  The principle  of\tthese  cases<br \/>\nrests  upon the ground that the forfeiture is complete\twhen<br \/>\nthe  breach of the condition or the denial of title  occurs.<br \/>\nBut  as it is left to the lessor&#8217;s option to take  advantage<br \/>\nof it or not, the<br \/>\n(1)  L.R. 6 Q.B. 245.(2) (1931)58 cal. 1359.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1019<\/span><\/p>\n<p>election is not a condition precedent to the right of action<br \/>\nand   the  institution\tof  the\t action\t is   a\t  sufficient<br \/>\nmanifestation  of  the\telection.   The\t same  principle  is<br \/>\napplied for actions for relief on the ground of fraud. [vide<br \/>\nPadmabhaya  v. Ranga(1) ; Korapalu v. Narayana(2)]. In\tRama<br \/>\nAiyangar v. Guruswami Chetty(3),it was saidthat as the lease<br \/>\nwas  not  governed  by the Transfer  of\t Property  Act,\t the<br \/>\ninstitution  of the suit was a sufficient  determination  of<br \/>\nthe  lease  and no other previous act determining  the\tsame<br \/>\nsuch  as a notice to quit was necessary for maintaining\t the<br \/>\naction.\t  The  same view was expressed\tin  Venkatachari  v.<br \/>\nRangaswami  Aiyar(4).\tIn Venkatarama Aiyar  v.  Ponnuswami<br \/>\nPadayachi(5),  it was observed that the forfeiture will\t not<br \/>\nbe  produced  merely  by the unilateral act  of\t ceasing  to<br \/>\ncomply with the conditions upon which the property is  held,<br \/>\nbut  it\t must involve also some expression of  intention  to<br \/>\nenforce the forfeiture on the part of the lessor.  In  other<br \/>\nwords, the lessee cannot by his unilateral act terminate the<br \/>\nlease, and cannot take advantage of his own wrong.  That  is<br \/>\nan intelligible principle and is based on a maxim of equity.<br \/>\nBut  the  defaulting lessee cannot claim the  benefit  of  a<br \/>\nnotice\tin  writing  to\t complete  the\tforfeiture  he\t has<br \/>\nincurred.   The\t lessor has to simply express  an  intention<br \/>\nthat he is going to avail of the forfeiture and that can  be<br \/>\ndone  by  the filing of a suit, as in English  law,  in\t all<br \/>\ncases not governed by the Transfer of Property Act.<br \/>\nAgain  in Ramakrishna Mallaya v. Baburaya (6), it  was\tsaid<br \/>\nthat in an ejectment suit based on leases executed prior  to<br \/>\nthe  Transfer  of Property Act, no act on the  part  of\t the<br \/>\nlandlord  showing that he elected to take advantage  of\t the<br \/>\nforfeiture  for\t non-payment  of rent  was  necessary.\t The<br \/>\ncontrary  view\texpressed  in  Nourang\tSingh  v.   Janardan<br \/>\nKishor(7),  that  the institution of a\tsuit  for  ejectment<br \/>\ncould  not  be\tregarded  as a requisite  act  to  show\t the<br \/>\nintention of a<br \/>\n(1)  (1911) I,L.R. 34 Mad. 161.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2)  (1915) I.L.R. 38 Mad. 445.\n<\/p>\n<p>(3)  (1918) 35 M.L.J. 129.\n<\/p>\n<p>(4)  (1919) 36 M.L.J. 532.\n<\/p>\n<p>(5)  A.I.R. 1935 Mad. 918.\n<\/p>\n<p>(6)  (1914) 24 I.C. 139.\n<\/p>\n<p>(7)  (1918) I.L.R. 45 Cal. 469,<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1020<\/span><br \/>\nlandlord to determine a lease within the meaning of  section<br \/>\n111  (g),  was\tdissented from\tin  Prakashchandra   Das  v.<br \/>\nRajendranath  Basu(1);\tand  it was said that  there  is  no<br \/>\nspecial\t reason\t why the lessor&#8217;s election must be  made  at<br \/>\nsome time prior to the institution of a suit and that it was<br \/>\ndifficult to find a raison d&#8217;etr for the view that the cause<br \/>\nof action has not completely accrued if the election is made<br \/>\nat the moment when the suit is instituted, i.e., the  moment<br \/>\nthe  plaint is presented.  The cause of action for the\tsuit<br \/>\ncan arise simultaneously with the presentation of a  plaint.<br \/>\nIn  our opinion the provision as to notice in writing  as  a<br \/>\npreliminary to a suit for ejectment based on forfeiture of a<br \/>\nlease  is not based on any principle of justice,  equity  or<br \/>\ngood  conscience and cannot govern leases made prior to\t the<br \/>\ncoming into force of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882,  or<br \/>\nto leases executed prior to 1st April, 1930.  The rights and<br \/>\nobligations  under  those  leases  have\t to  be\t  determined<br \/>\naccording  to the rules of law prevailing -at the  time\t and<br \/>\nthe only rule applicable seems to be that a tenant cannot by<br \/>\nhis unilateral act and by his own wrong determine the  lease<br \/>\nunless\tthe lessor gives an indication by  some\t unequivocal<br \/>\nexpression  of intention on his part of taking advantage  of<br \/>\nthe breach.  On no principle of equity is a tenant  entitled<br \/>\nto  a notice in writing telling him that the lease has\tbeen<br \/>\ndetermined.  The High Court was therefore right in the\tview<br \/>\nthat  it took of the matter and there are no  valid  reasons<br \/>\nfor taking a contrary view.\n<\/p>\n<p>Considerable  reliance\twas placed by Mr.  Daphtary  on\t the<br \/>\ndecision  of Chandrasekhara Aiyar J. sitting singly  in\t the<br \/>\ncase  of  Umar\tPulavar v. Dawood  Rowther(2),\twherein\t the<br \/>\nlearned\t Judge said that section 111 (g) as amended in\t1929<br \/>\nembodied a principle of justice, equity and good  conscience<br \/>\nand  must  be held to govern even  agricultural\t leases\t and<br \/>\nwhere  there  was a forfeiture by denial of  the  landlord&#8217;s<br \/>\ntitle,\ta  notice  in  writing\tdetermining  the  lease\t was<br \/>\nnecessary.  it\twas  there observed that  the  principle  so<br \/>\nembodied<br \/>\n(1) (1931) I.L.R. 58 Cal. 1359.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2) A.I.R. 1947 Mad. 68.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1021<\/span><\/p>\n<p>in the sub-section as a result of the amendment becomes,  so<br \/>\nto say, a principle of justice, equity and. good conscience.<br \/>\nThe  learned  Judge  for this view placed  reliance  on\t the<br \/>\ndecision in Krishna Shetti v. Gilbert Pinto(&#8216;), in which  it<br \/>\nwas  said that the Transfer of Property Act was\t framed.  by<br \/>\neminent\t English lawyers to reproduce the rules\t of  English<br \/>\nlaw, in so far as they are of general. application and\trest<br \/>\non  principle  as well as authority and its  provisions\t are<br \/>\nbinding\t on  us\t as  rules  of\tjustice,  equity  and\tgood<br \/>\nconscience.   With  respect, we are constrained\t to  observe<br \/>\nthat  this is too broad a statement to make.  It seems\tthat<br \/>\nthe  attention\tof the learned judges was not drawn  to\t the<br \/>\nfact that the provision as to notice for determining a lease<br \/>\nfor  nonpayment of rent was not a part of the  English\tlaw.<br \/>\nIt  also does not seem to have been fully  appreciated\tthat<br \/>\nthe rule enunciated in sub-section (g) of section 111  prior<br \/>\nto  its\t amendment in 1929 and which  still  governs  leases<br \/>\nexecuted  before  1st April, 1930, OD the reasoning  of\t the<br \/>\ndecision  would also be a rule of justice, equity  and\tgood<br \/>\nconscience and according to it the institution of a suit for<br \/>\nejectment would be sufficient indication on the part of\t the<br \/>\nlandlord  for  determination of the lease and  a  notice  in<br \/>\nwriting\t as required by the amended section would not  be  a<br \/>\nprerequisite  for institution of such a suit.  In our  judg-<br \/>\nment,  this  case was wrongly decided and we are  unable  to<br \/>\nsupport it.\n<\/p>\n<p>As  pointed  out by Napier J. in Krishna Shetti\t v.  Gilbert<br \/>\nPinto  (1),  the courts should be very careful\tin  applying<br \/>\nstatutory  provisions and the assistance of the Transfer  of<br \/>\nProperty Act as a guide on matters which have been  excluded<br \/>\nfrom  the purview of the Act by express words should not  be<br \/>\ninvoked, unless the provisions of the Act embody  principles<br \/>\nof general application.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr.  Daplitary also placed reliance on certain\tobservations<br \/>\ncontained in the Full Bench decision Brahmayya v. Sundaramma<br \/>\n(1).   There  it was said that although section 106  of\t the<br \/>\nTransfer of Property Act does not<br \/>\n(1) (1919) I.L.R. 42 Mad. 654.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2) A.I.R. 1948 Mad. 275.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1022<\/span><\/p>\n<p>apply  to  leases  for agricultural  purpose  by  virtue  of<br \/>\nsection\t 117 of the Act, nevertheless the rules\t in  section<br \/>\n106  and  in the other -sections (sections 105 to 11  6)  in<br \/>\nChapter V of the Act are founded upon reason and equity\t and<br \/>\nthey are the principles or English law and should be adopted<br \/>\nas  the\t statement of the law in India\tapplicable  also  to<br \/>\nagricultural leases.  In our opinion, the above statement is<br \/>\nagain formulated in too wide a language.  Section 105  gives<br \/>\na  statutory definition of the word &#8220;lease&#8221;.  It  enunciates<br \/>\nno  principle of equity.  The relation of lessor and  lessee<br \/>\nis  one\t of contract and in Bacon&#8217;s Abridgement a  lease  is<br \/>\ndefined as a contract between the lessor and the lessee\t for<br \/>\nthe  possession\t and  profits of land on the  one  side\t and<br \/>\nrecompense by rent or other consideration on the other.\t The<br \/>\nstatute\t has  given a more comprehensive definition  of\t the<br \/>\nterm.  Section 107 makes registration of a lease compulsory.<br \/>\nThis section again does not concern itself with any  princi-<br \/>\nple  of justice or equity.  Section 108 (j) enacts that\t the<br \/>\nlessee\tmay  transfer  absolutely  by  way  of\tmortgage  or<br \/>\nsublease  the  whole  or any part of  his  interest  in\t the<br \/>\nproperty  and  any transferee of such interest or  part\t may<br \/>\nagain  transfer\t it.  The law in India and England  on\tthis<br \/>\nsubject is not the same and it cannot be said that this sub-<br \/>\nsection\t enacts\t or  enunciates\t any  general  principle  of<br \/>\nequity.\t  Parts of sections 109, 1 10 and Ill  contain\tmere<br \/>\nrules  of procedure or rules of a technical  nature.   These<br \/>\ncertainly  cannot be said to be based on any  principles  of<br \/>\nequity.\t  In our judgment, therefore, the statement in\tthis<br \/>\ndecision  that\tsections  105  to 116  of  the\tTransfer  of<br \/>\nProperty  Act  are  founded upon principles  of\t reason\t and<br \/>\nequity cannot be accepted either as correct or precise.\t  Of<br \/>\ncourse,\t to the extent that those sections of the  Act\tgive<br \/>\nstatutory  recognition to principles of justice, equity\t and<br \/>\ngood  conscience  they\tare applicable\talso  to  cases\t not<br \/>\ngoverned by the Act.\n<\/p>\n<p>Reference  was also made to the decision of the Bombay\tHigh<br \/>\nCourt  in Tatya Savla Sudrik v. Yeshwanta Kondiba Mulay\t (1)<br \/>\nwhere it was said that the<br \/>\n(1)  (1950) 52 Bom.  L.R. 909.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1023<\/span><\/p>\n<p>principle  embodied  in section 111 (g) of the\tTransfer  of<br \/>\nProperty  Act  that in the case of forfeiture by  denial  of<br \/>\nlandlord&#8217;s title a notice in writing determining them  lease<br \/>\nmust  be  given is a principle of justice, equity  and\tgood<br \/>\nconscience  which must be held to govern  even\tagricultural<br \/>\nleases.\t  In that case it was contended that following\tupon<br \/>\nforfeiture  which had been incurred a suit was filed by\t the<br \/>\nplaintiffs in eviction and nothing more needed to be done by<br \/>\nthe plaintiffs.\t For this contention reliance was placed  on<br \/>\ntwo  earlier  decisions of the Bombay  High  Court,  Venkaji<br \/>\nKrishna\t  Nadkarni   v.\t Lakshman  Devji  Kandar   (1)\t and<br \/>\nVidyavardhak  Sang Co. v. Avvappa (2).\tThis  contention was<br \/>\nnegatived in view of the decision of Chandrasekhara Aiyar J.<br \/>\nabove referred to, and also in view of a binding decision of<br \/>\na Division Bench of that court in Mahiboobkhan Muradkhan  v.<br \/>\nGhanashyam  Jamnaji(3).\t  The learned Chief Justice  in\t the<br \/>\njudgment under appeal has explained the distinction  between<br \/>\nthe present case and that case and has not followed his\t own<br \/>\nearlier decision in arriving at his conclusions here.\tWith<br \/>\nrespect we think that that decision did not state the law on<br \/>\nthe point correctly.  Under English law the institution of a<br \/>\nsuit for ejectment has always been considered an unequivocal<br \/>\nact on the part of the landlord for taking advantage of\t the<br \/>\ndefault\t of the tenant and for enforcing the  forfeiture  in<br \/>\ncase of non-payment of rent, and even in other cases  except<br \/>\nwhere statutory provisions were made to the contrary.<br \/>\nReference  was\talso  made  to\tthe  observations  of  their<br \/>\nLordships of the Privy Council in Aditya Prasad v.  Ramratan<br \/>\nLal (1).  Their Lordships dealing with the question  whether<br \/>\na certain document created a charge upon a village  observed<br \/>\nthat  the appellant could not redeem it without paying\tboth<br \/>\nthe mortgage debt and the amount subsequently raised and  it<br \/>\nwas said that the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act<br \/>\non the point were identical with the principles of  justice,<br \/>\nequity\tand good conscience.  The observation made  in\tthat<br \/>\ncase must be limited to that case and cannot be<br \/>\n(1)  (1896) I.L.R 20 Bom, 354 F.B.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2)  (1925) 27 Bom, L.R. 1152.\n<\/p>\n<p>(3)  Unreported.\n<\/p>\n<p>(4)  (1930) 57 I.A. 173.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1024<\/span><\/p>\n<p>held  as applicable to all cases irrespective of the  nature<br \/>\nof  the\t provisions  involved.\t Similar  observations\t are<br \/>\ncontained  in  another decision of their  Lordships  of\t the<br \/>\nPrivy  Council\tin Muhammad Raza v. Abbas  Bandi  Bibi\t(1),<br \/>\nwhich concerned the provisions of section 10 of the Transfer<br \/>\nof  Property Act which recognizes the validity of a  partial<br \/>\nrestriction  upon  a power of disposition in the case  of  a<br \/>\ntransfer  inter\t vivos.\t  It  was held\tthat  there  was  no<br \/>\nauthority that a different principle applied in India before<br \/>\nthe  Act  was passed and that under English  law  a  partial<br \/>\nrestriction  was&#8217;  not\trepugnant  even in  the\t case  of  a<br \/>\ntestamentary gift.\n<\/p>\n<p>Lastly,\t Mr. Daphtary drew our attention to the decision  in<br \/>\nRoberts\t v. Davey(2), which relates to a licence.  There  it<br \/>\nwas observed that it was necessary for the licensor to\thave<br \/>\ndone some act showing his intention to determine the licence<br \/>\nand  until  such  act  was shown,  it  continued  in  force.<br \/>\nLittledale  J. in this case said that the instrument was  &#8220;a<br \/>\nmere  licence to dig, and did not pass the land.  An  actual<br \/>\nentry,\ttherefore,  was\t unnecessary to\t avoid\tit;  but  by<br \/>\nanalogy to what is required to be done in order to determine<br \/>\na freehold lease which, by the terms of it, is to be void on<br \/>\nthe  non-performance of covenants, it seems to follow  that,<br \/>\nto put an end to this licence, the grantor should have given<br \/>\nnotice\tof  his\t intention  so to do&#8221;.\t The  basis  of\t the<br \/>\ndecision  was that some act amounting to an exercise of\t the<br \/>\noption\thad to be proved before the licence was\t determined.<br \/>\nThis  decision\ttherefore  does not in any  way\t affect\t the<br \/>\ndecision of the High Court in this case.\n<\/p>\n<p>On  the question whether the tenant should have\t been  given<br \/>\nrelief\tagainst\t forfeiture  the High Court  held  that\t the<br \/>\nmatter\twas one of discretion and both the lower courts\t had<br \/>\nexercised  their discretion against the appellant  and\tthat<br \/>\nbeing so, unless they were satisfied that the discretion was<br \/>\nnot  judicially\t exercised or was exercised  without  proper<br \/>\nmaterials  they\t would not ordinarily interfere with  it  in<br \/>\nsecond\tappeal.\t  It was said that the non-payment  in\tthis<br \/>\ncase seems to have<br \/>\n(1) (1932) 59 I.A. 236.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2) 110 E.R. 606.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1025<\/span><\/p>\n<p>become chronic and that this was not a case for the exercise<br \/>\nof equitable jurisdiction.\n<\/p>\n<p>Mr.  Daphtary  contended  that\tthe  High  Court  failed  to<br \/>\nappreciate  the\t rule  applicable for the  exercise  of\t the<br \/>\ndiscretion in such cases and that the rule is that if at the<br \/>\ntime  relief is asked for the position has been\t altered  so<br \/>\nthat relief cannot be given without causing injury to  third<br \/>\nparties relief will be refused, but if that position is\t not<br \/>\naltered\t so that no injustice will be done there is no\treal<br \/>\ndiscretion and the court should make the order and give\t the<br \/>\nrelief.\t  Reference was made to the decision of Page  J.  in<br \/>\nDebendralal Khan v. F. M. A. Cohen (1), wherein it was\tsaid<br \/>\nthat   the  court  normally  would  grant   relief   against<br \/>\nforfeiture for non-payment of rent under section 114 of\t the<br \/>\nTransfer of Property Act and that if the sun) required under<br \/>\nthe  section  was  paid or tendered to\tthe  lessor  at\t the<br \/>\nhearing\t of  the suit the court has no\tdiscretion.  in\t the<br \/>\nmatter and must grant relief to the tenant.  We do not think<br \/>\nthat  the learned Judges intended to lay down any  hard\t and<br \/>\nfast rule.  Indeed the learned Judge proceeded to observe as<br \/>\nfollows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;In  exercising\t the discretion with which it  is  invested<br \/>\nunder  section\t114  a court in India is not  bound  by\t the<br \/>\npractice  of  a court of Chancery in England, and I  am\t not<br \/>\ndisposed  to limit the discretion that it  possesses,  Those<br \/>\nwho  seek equity must do equity, and I do not  think  merely<br \/>\nbecause\t a tenant complies with the conditions laid down  in<br \/>\nsection 114 that he becomes entitled as of right to relief&#8221;<br \/>\nIn our opinion, in exercising the discretion, each case must<br \/>\nbe  judged by itself, the delay, the conduct of the  parties<br \/>\nand  the  difficulties to which the landlord. has  been\t put<br \/>\nshould\tbe  weighed against the tenant, This  was  the\tview<br \/>\ntaken by the Madras High Court in Appaya Shetty v.  Mohammad<br \/>\nBeari (2) , and the matter was discussed at some length.  We<br \/>\nagree  with  the ratio of that decision.  It is a  maxim  of<br \/>\nequity that a person<br \/>\n(1) (1927) I.L.R. 54 Cal. 485.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2) (1916) I.L.R, 39 Mad. 834.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">133<\/span><br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1026<\/span><\/p>\n<p>who comes in equity must do equity and must come with  clean<br \/>\nhands  and  if the conduct of the tenant is   such  that  it<br \/>\ndisentitles him to relief in equity, then the court&#8217;s  hands<br \/>\nare  not  tied to exercise it in his favour.   Reference  in<br \/>\nthis  connection may also be made to Ramakrishna  Mallya  v.<br \/>\nBaburaya(1), and Ramabrahmam v. Rami Reddi (2).<br \/>\nThe  argument  of  Mr.\tDaphtary  that\tthere  was  no\treal<br \/>\ndiscretion  in\tthe court and relief could  not\t be  refused<br \/>\nexcept\tin  cases where third party interests  intervene  is<br \/>\ncompletely  negatived by the decision of the House of  Lords<br \/>\nin Hyman v. Rose (3).  Relief was claimed in that case under<br \/>\nthe  provisions\t of section 14(2) of the  Conveyancing\tAct,<br \/>\n1881,  against\tforfeiture for breaches of covenant  in\t the<br \/>\nlease.\tThe appellants offered as the terms on which  relief<br \/>\nshould be granted to deposit a sum sufficient to ensure\t the<br \/>\nrestoration of the premises to their former condition at the<br \/>\nend  of the term and make full restitution.  It\t was  argued<br \/>\nthat  the matter was one of discretion and the court  should<br \/>\nlean  to  relieve a tenant against forfeiture  and  if\tfull<br \/>\nrecompense can be made to the landlord the relief should  be<br \/>\ngranted.   Lord\t Loreburn in delivering the opinion  of\t the<br \/>\nHouse observed as follows:-\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;I  desire  in\tthe first instance to  point  out  that\t the<br \/>\ndiscretion given by the section is very wide.  The court  is<br \/>\nto  consider  all the circumstances and the conduct  of\t the<br \/>\nparties.  Now it seems to me that when the Act is so express<br \/>\nto provide a wide discretion, meaning, no doubt, to  prevent<br \/>\none man from forfeiting what in fair dealing belongs to some<br \/>\none  else, by taking advantage of a breach from which he  is<br \/>\nnot  commensurately  and  irreparably  damaged,\t it  is\t not<br \/>\nadvisable  to  lay  down any rigid rules  for  guiding\tthat<br \/>\ndiscretion.  I do not doubt that the rules enunciated by the<br \/>\nMaster of the Rolls in the present case are useful maxims in<br \/>\ngeneral, and that in general they reflect the point of\tview<br \/>\nfrom which judges would regard<br \/>\n(1)  (1914) 24 I.C. 139.\n<\/p>\n<p>(2)  A.I.R. 1928 Mad. 250.\n<\/p>\n<p>(3) [1912] A.C. 623.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">1027<\/span><\/p>\n<p>an  application\t for  relief.  But I think it  ought  to  be<br \/>\ndistinctly  understood that there may be cases in which\t any<br \/>\nor all of them may be disregarded.  If it were otherwise the<br \/>\nfree  discretion given by the statute would be\tfettered  by<br \/>\nlimitations  which  have nowhere been enacted.\t It  is\t one<br \/>\nthing  to  decide what is the true meaning of  the  language<br \/>\ncontained in an Act of Parliament.  It is quite a  different<br \/>\nthing  to place conditions upon a free discretion  entrusted<br \/>\nby  statute to the court where the conditions are not  based<br \/>\nupon  statutory enactment at all.  It is not safe, I  think,<br \/>\nto  say\t that  the court must and will\talways\tinsist\tupon<br \/>\ncertain\t things when the Act does not require them, and\t the<br \/>\nfacts of some unforeseen case may make the court wish it had<br \/>\nkept a free hand.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>With  great  respect we think that  the\t observations  cited<br \/>\nabove  contain sound principles of law.\t We are,  therefore,<br \/>\nunable\tto  accede to the contention of\t Mr.  Daphtary\tthat<br \/>\nthough section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act confers a<br \/>\ndiscretion  on\tthe court, that discretion except  in  cases<br \/>\nwhere  third  party  interests\tintervene  must\t always\t  be<br \/>\nexercised  in  favour  of the  tenant  irrespective  of\t the<br \/>\nconduct\t of the tenant.\t It is clear that in this  case\t the<br \/>\ntenant is a recalcitrant tenant and is a habitual defaulter.<br \/>\nFor the best part of 25 years he has never paid rent without<br \/>\nbeing sued in court.  Rent has been in arrears at times\t for<br \/>\nsix years, at other times for three years and at other times<br \/>\nfor four years and so on, and every time the landlord had to<br \/>\nfile a suit in ejectment which was always resisted on  false<br \/>\ndefences.  No rule of equity, justice or good conscience can<br \/>\nbe invoked in the case of a tenant of this description.\t  He<br \/>\ncannot always be allowed to take advantage of his own  wrong<br \/>\nand  to plead relief against forfeiture on  every  occasion,<br \/>\nparticularly when he was warned by the court of appeal on  a<br \/>\nprevious occasion.  He had already had relief three times on<br \/>\nequitable grounds and it is time that the court withheld its<br \/>\nhands and ordered his ejectment.  In this situation the High<br \/>\nCourt  was fully justified in finding that in second  appeal<br \/>\nit would not interfere with the<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">1028<\/span><br \/>\ndiscretion    of  the courts  below  in\t refusing  to, grant<br \/>\nrelief against forfeiture.\n<\/p>\n<p>The result therefore is that this appeal fails is  dismissed<br \/>\nwith costs.\n<\/p>\n<p>Appeal dismissed.\n<\/p>\n<p>Agent for  appellant: R.A. Govind.\n<\/p>\n<p>Agent for respondents: Rajinder Narain.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India Namdeo Lokman Lodhi vs Narmadabai And Others on 27 February, 1953 Equivalent citations: 1953 AIR 228, 1953 SCR 1009 Author: M C Mahajan Bench: Mahajan, Mehr Chand PETITIONER: NAMDEO LOKMAN LODHI Vs. RESPONDENT: NARMADABAI AND OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 27\/02\/1953 BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND BENCH: MAHAJAN, MEHR CHAND DAS, SUDHI RANJAN [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-186506","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Namdeo Lokman Lodhi vs Narmadabai And Others on 27 February, 1953 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/namdeo-lokman-lodhi-vs-narmadabai-and-others-on-27-february-1953\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Namdeo Lokman Lodhi vs Narmadabai And Others on 27 February, 1953 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; 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