{"id":189440,"date":"2009-07-30T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2009-07-29T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/new-delhi-110-003-vs-companies-act-on-30-july-2009"},"modified":"2015-07-15T16:48:48","modified_gmt":"2015-07-15T11:18:48","slug":"new-delhi-110-003-vs-companies-act-on-30-july-2009","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/new-delhi-110-003-vs-companies-act-on-30-july-2009","title":{"rendered":"New Delhi 110 003. vs Companies Act on 30 July, 2009"},"content":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court<\/div>\n
New Delhi 110 003. vs Companies Act on 30 July, 2009<\/div>\n
Bench: A.M. Khanwilkar<\/div>\n
                                 1\n\n            IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY\n\n\n\n\n                                                                 \n                ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION\n\n\n\n\n                                         \n                     APPEAL NO.229 OF 2009\n                             IN\n              CHAMBER SUMMONS NO. 218 OF 2009\n                             IN\n\n\n\n\n                                        \n                    SUIT NO. 95 OF 2006\n\n\n     NTPC Limited                              )\n     (Formerly National Thermal Power          )\n\n\n\n\n                              \n      Corporation Limited) a Company           )\n     incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956)\n                 \n     and having its Registered                 )\n     office at NTPC Bhawan, Scope Complex, 7, )\n     Institutional Area, Lodhi Road            )\n                \n     New Delhi 110 003.                        ).. APPELLANT\n\n          VERSUS\n      \n\n     Reliance Industries Limited                       )\n     a Company incorporated under the                  )\n   \n\n\n\n     Companies Act, 1956 and having its                )\n     Registered Office at 3rd Floor, Maker             )\n     Chambers IV, 222, Nariman Point                   )\n     Mumbai 400 021.                                   ).. RESPONDENT\n\n\n\n\n\n     Mr. D.D. Madan with Mr. V.R. Dhond and Mr. S.V. Doijode and\n     Ms. Meenakshi Iyer i\/b Doijode Associates for the Appellant.\n\n     Mr. Milind Sathe a\/w Mr. C.S. Balsara i\/b M\/s. Junnarkar &\n\n\n\n\n\n     Associates for the Respondent.\n\n\n\n                CORAM : SWATANTER KUMAR, C.J. And\n                        A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.\n\n\n          JUDGMENT RESERVED   ON : 22ND JULY 2009\n          JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON : 30TH JULY 2009\n\n\n\n\n                                         ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 14:51:02 :::\n                                  2\n\n\n     JUDGMENT (Per Swatanter Kumar, C.J.)\n<\/pre>\n
                The National Thermal Power Corporation Limited<\/p>\n
     (for short “NTPC”) claims that it is the largest thermal<\/p>\n
     electricity generating company of India and it intends to<\/p>\n
     enhance the capacity of its existing combined cycle power<\/p>\n
     stations in the State of Gujarat. Thus it invited International<\/p>\n
     competitive bids for supplying natural gas to its Power Plants.\n<\/p>\n
     As per the terms inviting the tender, the NTPC issued RFP<\/p>\n
     documents to the qualifying bidders and after financial<\/p>\n
     evolution of techno-commercially acceptable bids, the NTPC<\/p>\n
     was to issue Letter of Intent (for short “LOI”) to the preferred<\/p>\n
     bidder. Reliance Industries Limited (for short “RIL”) was also<\/p>\n
     one of the bidders.    The terms were amended vide letter<\/p>\n
     dated 15th March 2004. According to the NTPC, RIL confirmed<\/p>\n
     unconditional acceptance of all provisions of RFP documents<\/p>\n
     read together with amendments. As the Letter of Intent was<\/p>\n
     issued and as required RIL vide its letter dated 17th June 2004<\/p>\n
     acknowledged receipt of the LOI dated 16th June 2004 and<\/p>\n
     sent the duplicate copy thereof duly signed.                   The Co-\n<\/p>\n
     ordinating Committee of the NTPC along with representatives<\/p>\n
     of RIL was constituted. A meeting was held on 20th October<\/p>\n
     2004 where it was proposed that a master network of various<\/p>\n
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\n                                  3<\/span><\/p>\n
     activities to be undertaken by the parties be drawn and key<\/p>\n
     milestone dates be identified to be used as the basis for<\/p>\n
     monitoring the progress.    Vide letter dated 6th May 2005,<\/p>\n
     certain changes were suggested by RIL. Though NTPC was<\/p>\n
     not required to even consider the same but certain<\/p>\n
     amendments were made as suggested in letters dated 19th<\/p>\n
     May 2005 and 17th June 2005 as RIL further wanted some<\/p>\n
     changes in the project. This was carried on and according to<\/p>\n
     NTPC, RIL’s action and conduct clearly spelt out their<\/p>\n
     intention not to perform their contract and it constituted an<\/p>\n
     anticipatory breach\/ repudiation of the contract. In addition<\/p>\n
     to this, there were certain disputes on quantum pricing and<\/p>\n
     finalisation of GSPA. This compelled the NTPC to file a Suit<\/p>\n
     on the Original Side of this Court for declaration and specific<\/p>\n
     performance. The prayers made in the Suit were as under :-\n<\/p>\n
          “(a) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to
\n          declare that a valid, concluded and binding
\n          contract exists between the parties for supply of<\/p>\n
          Natural Gas of 132 Trillion btu annually for a
\n          period of 17 years between the Plaintiff and the
\n          Defendant having regard to the documents
\n          Exhibits D, E, F and G hereto and the Letter of
\n          Intent duly issued by the Plaintiff and signed and
\n          returned by the Defendant.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (b) That this Hon’ble Court be pleased to pass a
\n          decree of specific performance of the valid,
\n          concluded and binding contract set out in prayer\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (a) above including directing the Defendant to<\/p>\n
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\n                                  4<\/span><\/p>\n
          rectify the document sent by them and sign the
\n          same in conformity and accordance with agreed<\/p>\n
          terms and for that purpose if necessary to direct
\n          the Defendant to initial corrections made by the
\n          Plaintiff in the document sent by the Defendant to<\/p>\n
          the Plaintiff which would be in accordance with
\n          the Agreement.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (c) That pending the hearing and final disposal<\/p>\n
          of this Suit the Defendant, its servants and agents
\n          be restrained by an order of injunction of this
\n          Hon’ble Court from supplying and entering into
\n          any contract or arrangement or making any
\n          commitment for any part of the 132 trillion Btu of<\/p>\n
          Natural Gas to be supplied to the Plaintiff annually
\n          for a period of 17 years from its Gas Field situated<\/p>\n
          at KG Basin (Block KG-DWN-98-3) in the State of
\n          Andhra Pradesh.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (d) For interim and ad interim relief in terms of
\n          prayer (c) above.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (e)   For costs of the Suit.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          (f)   For such further and other reliefs as may be<\/p>\n
          required by the nature and circumstances of the
\n          case.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     2.         Written Statement had been filed on behalf of RIL.\n<\/p>\n
     Various objections were taken including that the Plaint does<\/p>\n
     not disclose cause of action, there was suppression of<\/p>\n
     material facts, Natural Gas is a traded commodity and a Suit<\/p>\n
     for specific performance for sale thereof is not maintainable<\/p>\n
     in law. On merits, the stand taken is that correct facts have<\/p>\n
     not been stated. According to the Defendant, as per case<\/p>\n
     made out by Plaintiff there were discussions between the<\/p>\n
                                         ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:51:02 :::<\/span>
\n                                  5<\/span><\/p>\n
     parties and in furtherance thereto letters dated 12th August<\/p>\n
     2004 and 15th July 2004 were issued and accordingly 30 days<\/p>\n
     time to sign the GSPA from the date of acceptance of LOI was<\/p>\n
     reckoned. According to the Defendant, case made out by the<\/p>\n
     Plaintiff is inconsistent as Plaintiff alleges several different<\/p>\n
     dates and events by which concluded and binding contract<\/p>\n
     came into existence. Whereas Defendant specifically denied<\/p>\n
     that there was complete, and concluded contract between<\/p>\n
     the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Defendant denied that it had<\/p>\n
     attempted to renegotiate the terms. The Defendant denied<\/p>\n
     that all terms of draft GSPA had been agreed upon or were<\/p>\n
     finalized.   According to Defendant, no LOI was accepted<\/p>\n
     resulting into concluded contract. The Defendant specifically<\/p>\n
     denied that in May 2004 it had made an offer which was<\/p>\n
     accepted by the Plaintiff and communicated the acceptance<\/p>\n
     by letter dated 16th June 2004.     Defendant denies having<\/p>\n
     made any offer capable of being accepted.                    Defendant<\/p>\n
     denies that any act on its part amounts to anticipated<\/p>\n
     breach\/repudiation    of   any   contract.         Defendant            has<\/p>\n
     specifically denied that Plaintiff is entitled to specific<\/p>\n
     performance of any contract pertaining to supply of natural<\/p>\n
     gas as there is no valid and subsisting agreement.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                   6<\/span><\/p>\n
     3.         As is evident from the pleadings of the Defendant<\/p>\n
     that it had taken a plea of there being no concluded contract<\/p>\n
     between the parties and thus prayed that the Suit of the<\/p>\n
     Plaintiff be dismissed.   During pendency of the Suit, RIL filed<\/p>\n
     Chamber Summons No.218 of 2009 under Order VI Rule 17 of<\/p>\n
     the Code of Civil Procedure seeking to amend its written<\/p>\n
     statement. In the affidavit in support of the said Chamber<\/p>\n
     Summons, it was averred that the amendments prayed for<\/p>\n
     were material and necessary for appropriate adjudication of<\/p>\n
     the suit. The main ground for seeking amendment was that<\/p>\n
     certain events which had transpired after filing of the written<\/p>\n
     statement, which was filed on 31st October, 2007, and the<\/p>\n
     submission as an alternative to the plea already taken was<\/p>\n
     that there was no valid, subsisting, binding and concluded<\/p>\n
     agreement between the parties. The Defendant wanted to<\/p>\n
     take up the plea that even if there was an agreement, it had<\/p>\n
     been frustrated or had become incapable of performance in<\/p>\n
     view of the subsequent events.       These subsequent events<\/p>\n
     included declaration of New Exploration and Licensing Policy<\/p>\n
     of 1999.   The Government of India had constituted                        an<\/p>\n
     Empowered Group of Ministers (EGOM) to take decisions in<\/p>\n
     relation to NELP Contract. On 12th September, 2007, the said<\/p>\n
     EGOM had taken a decision in regard to commercial<\/p>\n
                                          ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:51:02 :::<\/span>
\n                                  7<\/span><\/p>\n
     utilization and pricing of gas under NELP and had approved<\/p>\n
     the formula for valuation and sale of natural gas under the<\/p>\n
     Production Sharing Contract. The Defendant had submitted<\/p>\n
     the formula under which the price discovered by the<\/p>\n
     Defendant was US$ 4.32 per MMBTU. However, the EGOM<\/p>\n
     modified the same by which the said price had been reduced<\/p>\n
     and fixed at US$ 4.20 per MMBTU. This decision had been<\/p>\n
     communicated to the Plaintiff by the letter dated 10th<\/p>\n
     October, 2007. Another ground taken was that, on 28th May,<\/p>\n
     2008 and 27th October, 2008, NGOP took decisions in regard<\/p>\n
     to commercial utilization of natural gas under NELP and<\/p>\n
     framed the guidelines for sale of natural gas by NELP<\/p>\n
     contractors which are to be binding and the same relates to<\/p>\n
     the allocation of gas.     A reference is also made to the<\/p>\n
     affidavit filed by the Union of India during the course of<\/p>\n
     hearing of the appeal in a company matter where it intended<\/p>\n
     to improve on certain facts which have bearing on the<\/p>\n
     contract in question were disclosed in those affidavits and<\/p>\n
     they were not known to the Defendants earlier. This affidavit<\/p>\n
     was filed on 13th January, 2009 and it also stated the decision<\/p>\n
     which had been taken in regard to the commercial utilization<\/p>\n
     of gas. With particular reference to Article 21.6.2(b) of these<\/p>\n
     decisions, the matter with regard to the scope and<\/p>\n
                                         ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:51:02 :::<\/span>
\n                                 8<\/span><\/p>\n
     interpretation for Production Sharing Contract which is<\/p>\n
     subject matter of the present suit was also covered and<\/p>\n
     referred to by these different decisions. The Applicants pray<\/p>\n
     that the price to be determined under Article 21.6.2(b) is not<\/p>\n
     different from the price fixed pursuant to Article 21.6.2(c).\n<\/p>\n
     Thus, the entire matter is interconnected.\n<\/p>\n
     4.         This application of the RIL was opposed by the<\/p>\n
     NTPC on various grounds including undue delay, that the<\/p>\n
     evidence of the Plaintiff in the suit had already started as<\/p>\n
     they had filed their affidavits by way of evidence and the<\/p>\n
     matter was fixed for cross examination. While relying upon<\/p>\n
     the judgment of the Supreme Court in Vidyabai & Ors. v.\n<\/p>\n
     Padmalatha & Anr., JT 2009 (1) SC 302, where the issues<\/p>\n
     were framed and trial had commenced, the Plaintiff prayed<\/p>\n
     that the amendment should not be permitted.              The learned<\/p>\n
     Single Judge noticed that the amendment application has to<\/p>\n
     be dealt with while keeping in mind the facts and<\/p>\n
     circumstances of a given case and relying on the judgment<\/p>\n
     of Supreme Court in Shikharchand        Jain v. Digambar Jain<\/p>\n
     Praband Karini Sabha & Ors.,<\/a> (1974) 1 SCC 675 referred to<\/p>\n
     the subsequent events and certain facts which ought to be<\/p>\n
     brought to the notice of the Court for proper and full<\/p>\n
                                        ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:51:02 :::<\/span>
\n                                 9<\/span><\/p>\n
     adjudication to give complete justice to the parties. Learned<\/p>\n
     Single   Judge   allowed    the      Chamber         Summons             and<\/p>\n
     consequently granted the amendments prayed for. Relevant<\/p>\n
     part of the order reads as under:-\n<\/p>\n
          “21. These EgoMs, though referred and observed
\n          specifically to exclude the dispute\/suit from its
\n          decision or recommendation yet just cannot be<\/p>\n
          overlooked by the Court while considering the
\n          case of the plaintiffs as averred. As noted, the
\n          documents and the averments as raised\/made by<\/p>\n
          the plaintiffs itself, based upon and revolve
\n          around terms and conditions of GSPA and all
\n          other necessary and connected aspects. The say<\/p>\n
          of Government and such policies always play
\n          important role. In my view, all these issues are
\n          interlinked and interconnected and depends upon
\n          the declared policy and the scheme of such<\/p>\n
          agreement to apply of natural gas.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          22. I am not accepting the submission that if
\n          chamber summons is allowed, it would cause
\n          grave harm and irreparable loss and injury to the
\n          plaintiffs. In view of the events and material on<\/p>\n
          record, I am of the view the amendment is bona
\n          fide and filed within the reasonable time. The
\n          affidavit of Government dated 13.01.2009 play an
\n          important role in a matter of this nature
\n          specifically when it deals with the natural
\n          resource and in the present case the supply of<\/p>\n
          gas. Those averments\/affidavit and the respective
\n          stand and the submission of the Government in
\n          other matter is within the knowledge of the
\n          defendant, who is concerned defendant in the
\n          present case also. Therefore, moved this
\n          application to bring of those material on record
\n          for adjudication of the Suit in question, where the
\n          plaintiff is also claiming the respective quantity of
\n          gas from the defendants again based upon the
\n          relevant terms and conditions of GSPA, in my
\n          view such amendment and the material are<\/p>\n
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\n                                 10<\/span><\/p>\n
          necessary for proper adjudication of the
\n          controversy involved in the present suit also.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          Therefore, this chamber summons filed on
\n          6.2.2009, just cannot bar or attract the proviso of
\n          Order 6, Rule 17 of CPC as contended by the<\/p>\n
          learned sr. counsel for the plaintiffs.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
          23. Once the conditions are fulfilled and the
\n          Court comes to a conclusion that it is necessary<\/p>\n
          to determine the controversy between the
\n          parties, based upon the facts and circumstances
\n          of the case, it is primary duty of the court to pass
\n          an appropriate order to give full opportunity to
\n          both the parties. This proviso, no way restricts<\/p>\n
          the power of the court to grant amendment, if
\n          case is made out.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     5.         With development of law the provisions of Order<\/p>\n
     VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure have received<\/p>\n
     liberal construction.   Despite its liberal construction, the<\/p>\n
     principles dealing with the application for amendment during<\/p>\n
     the pendency of a suit are well settled.                 In fact, the<\/p>\n
     provisions of the Code were amended by the Amending Act<\/p>\n
     of 2002 with effect from 1st July, 2002 wherein proviso to<\/p>\n
     Order VI Rule 17 was introduced.     In terms of this proviso,<\/p>\n
     there was a kind of restriction placed upon the Court to allow<\/p>\n
     application for amendment after trial had commenced unless<\/p>\n
     the Court came to the conclusion that: (a) in spite of due<\/p>\n
     diligence, the party could not have raised the matter before<\/p>\n
     the commencement of trial. This proviso has to be read and<\/p>\n
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\n                                  11<\/span><\/p>\n
     construed keeping in view the language of the principle<\/p>\n
     provision which opens with the words “the Court may at any<\/p>\n
     stage of the proceedings allow either party to alter or amend<\/p>\n
     its pleadings in such manner and on such terms as may be<\/p>\n
     just.”     The Court has also to keep in mind that the<\/p>\n
     amendments to be made are necessary for the purpose of<\/p>\n
     determining the real question in controversy between the<\/p>\n
     parties.   Thus, it is evident that wide judicial discretion is<\/p>\n
     vested in the Court while dealing with application for<\/p>\n
     amendment of the pleadings.       The Court is expected to be<\/p>\n
     more careful while dealing with application for amendment in<\/p>\n
     cases where trial has commenced but there is no absolute<\/p>\n
     bar in law in allowing application for amendment in cases<\/p>\n
     where trial has even begin. The legislature in its wisdom has<\/p>\n
     not created an absolute bar thus this bar in absolute terms<\/p>\n
     cannot be created by the judge made law.               In fact, it would<\/p>\n
     depend on the facts and circumstances of a given case and it<\/p>\n
     is not possible to state a strait-jacket formula which can<\/p>\n
     universally be applied to all cases.\n<\/p>\n
     6.          In the case of Salem Advocate Bar Association,<\/p>\n
     T.N. v. Union of India,<\/a> (2005) 6 SCC 344, a three Judge<\/p>\n
     Bench of the Supreme Court examined the validity of the<\/p>\n
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\n                                 12<\/span><\/p>\n
     amended provisions of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil<\/p>\n
     Procedure and held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
          “26. Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code deals with
\n          amendment of pleadings. By Amendment Act 46
\n          of 1999, this provision was deleted. It has again<\/p>\n
          been restored by Amendment Act 22 of 2002 but
\n          with an added proviso to prevent application for
\n          amendment being allowed after the trial has
\n          commenced, unless the court comes to the
\n          conclusion that in spite of due diligence, the party<\/p>\n
          could not have raised the matter before the
\n          commencement of trial. The proviso, to some<\/p>\n
          extent, curtails absolute discretion to allow
\n          amendment at any stage. Now, if application is
\n          filed after commencement of trial, it has to be<\/p>\n
          shown that in spite of due diligence, such
\n          amendment could not have been sought earlier.
\n          The object is to prevent frivolous applications
\n          which are filed to delay the trial. There is no<\/p>\n
          illegality in the provision.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     7.        In the case of Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and<\/p>\n
     Anr., JT<\/a> 2002(7) SC 182, the Supreme Court held as under:-\n<\/p>\n
          “9. Order 6 rule 17 of the CPC confers
\n          jurisdiction on the court to allow either party to<\/p>\n
          alter or amend his pleadings at any stage of the
\n          proceedings and on such terms as may be just.
\n          Such amendments as are directed towards
\n          putting-forth and seeking determination of the
\n          real questions in controversy between the parties
\n          shall be permitted to be made. The question of
\n          delay in moving an application for amendment
\n          should be decided not by calculating the period
\n          from the date of institution of the suit alone but
\n          by reference to the stage to which the hearing in
\n          the suit has proceeded. Pre-trial amendments<\/p>\n
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\n                                          13<\/span><\/p>\n
             are allowed more liberally than those which are
\n             sought to be made after the commencement of<\/p>\n
             the trial or after conclusion thereof. In former
\n             case generally it can be assumed that the
\n             defendant is not prejudiced because he will have<\/p>\n
             full opportunity of meeting the case of the
\n             plaintiff as amended. In the latter cases the
\n             question of prejudice to the opposite party may
\n             arise and that shall have to be answered by<\/p>\n
             reference to the facts and circumstances of each
\n             individual case. No strait-jacket formula can be
\n             laid down. The fact remains that a mere delay
\n             cannot be a ground for refusing a prayer for
\n             amendment.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     8.             The   principles   in   relation   to   amendment   of   pleadings <\/p>\n
     have remained quite consistent over a considerable period of time but <\/p>\n
     amendments   which are   necessary  to  provide  a  solution   to  the  real <\/p>\n
     controversy between the parties without really altering, especially, the <\/p>\n
     cause of action can be allowed and a hyper-technical approach need <\/p>\n
     not be encouraged in relation to such law.   Prejudice is one of the <\/p>\n
     factors   that  may  be   considered  by  the  Court   but   it  is  not  the  sole <\/p>\n
     criteria   for   accepting   or   rejecting   an   application   for   amendment.\n<\/p>\n
     Another important facet of the law of amendment is that the proposed <\/p>\n
     amendment should not result in injustice to the other side and should <\/p>\n
     not   lead   to   unexplained   withdrawal   of   an   admission   which   had <\/p>\n
     provided other party with the benefit of such an admission.   These <\/p>\n
     principles were referred with approval by the Supreme Court in the <\/p>\n
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\n                                          14<\/span><\/p>\n
     case   of  B.K.   Narayana   Pillai   v   Parameshwaran   Pillai   and   another, <\/p>\n
     (2000) 1 SCC 712,   where the Court held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
            “3.    The purpose and object of Order 6 Rule 17 CPC is
\n            to allow either party to alter or amend his pleadings in
\n            such  manner  and  on   such  terms   as  may  be   just.   The <\/p>\n
            power   to   allow   the   amendment   is   wide   and   can   be
\n            exercised at any stage of the proceedings in the interests
\n            of justice on the basis of guidelines laid down by various
\n            High   Courts   and   this   Court.     It   is   true   that   the <\/p>\n
            amendment cannot be claimed as a matter of right and
\n            under all circumstances.   But it is equally true that the <\/p>\n
            courts  while deciding  such prayers should not adopt a
\n            hypertechnical approach.  Liberal approach should be the
\n            general  rule   particularly  in  cases   where   the   other  side <\/p>\n
            can be compensated with the costs.  Technicalities of law
\n            should   not   be   permitted   to   hamper   the   courts   in   the
\n            administration   of   justice   between   the   parties.
\n            Amendments   are   allowed   in   the   pleadings   to   avoid <\/p>\n
            uncalled-for multiplicity of litigation.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     This principle was stated by the Supreme Court as back as in 1957 in <\/p>\n
     the case of  Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v Kalgonda Shidgonda Patil and  <\/p>\n
     others,  AIR  1957   SC   363  and  was   again   reiterated   in   the   case   of <\/p>\n
     North   Eastern   Railway   Administration,   Gorakhpur   v   Bhagwan   Das  <\/p>\n
     (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 511, where the Supreme Court held as <\/p>\n
     under :-\n<\/p>\n
            “16.  Insofar as the principles which govern the question
\n            of granting  or disallowing  amendments  under  Order  6
\n            Rule   17   CPC   (as   it   stood   at   the   relevant   time)   are
\n            concerned, these are also well settled.  Order 6 Rule 17 <\/p>\n
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\n                                           15<\/span><\/p>\n
            CPC postulates amendment of pleadings at any stage of
\n            the proceedings.  In Pirgonda Hongonda Patil v Kalgonda <\/p>\n
            Shidgonda Patil, AIR 1957 SC 363 which still holds the
\n            field,   it   was   held   that   all   amendments   ought   to   be
\n            allowed   which   satisfy   the   two   conditions   :   (a)   of   not <\/p>\n
            working   injustice   to   the   other   side;   and   (b)   of   being
\n            necessary for the purpose determining the real questions
\n            in controversy between the parties.  Amendments should
\n            be refused only where the other party cannot be placed <\/p>\n
            in   the   same   position   as   if   the   pleading   had   been
\n            originally correct, but the amendment would cause him
\n            an   injury   which     could   not   be   compensated   in   costs.
\n            (Also see Gajanan Jaikishan Joshi v Prabhakar Mohanlal <\/p>\n
            Kalwar, (1990) 1 SCC 166″.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     9.             In the case of Usha Balasaheb Swami and others v Kiran  <\/p>\n
     Appaso   Swami  and   others,  (2007)  5   SCC   602,  the   Supreme   Court <\/p>\n
     noticed that the provisions of Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code of Civil <\/p>\n
     Procedure clearly confer the Courts with the power to allow, at any <\/p>\n
     stage   of   the   proceedings,   alterations   and   amendments   of   the <\/p>\n
     pleadings   and   also   explained   the   restriction   placed   in   the   proviso.\n<\/p>\n
     The Court while specifying the distinction in law between amendment <\/p>\n
     of a plaint and a written statement, indicated that the Courts would <\/p>\n
     be more liberal while dealing with the application for amendment of <\/p>\n
     written statement and held as under :-\n<\/p>\n
            “19.  It is equally well-settled principle that a prayer for
\n            amendment of the plaint and a prayer for amendment of
\n            the written statement stand on different footings.   The
\n            general principle that amendment of pleadings cannot be
\n            allowed so as to alter materially or substitute cause of <\/p>\n
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\n                                    16<\/span><\/p>\n
      action or the nature of claim applies to amendments to
\n      plaint.  It has no counterpart in the principles relating to <\/p>\n
      amendment   of   the   written   statement.     Therefore,
\n      addition of a new ground of defence or substituting or
\n      altering   a   defence   or   taking   inconsistent   pleas   in   the <\/p>\n
      written   statement   would   not   be   objectionable   while
\n      adding, altering or substituting a new cause of action in
\n      the plaint may be objectionable.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      20. Such being the settled law, we must hold that in
\n      the case of amendment of a written statement, the courts
\n      are more liberal in allowing an amendment than that of
\n      a plaint as the question of prejudice would be far less in <\/p>\n
      the   former   than   in   the   latter   case   (see   B.K.   Narayana
\n      Pillai   v   Parameswaran   Pillai   (2000)   1   SCC   712   and <\/p>\n
      Baldev   Singh   v   Manohar   Singh,   (2006)   6   SCC   498).
\n      Even the decision relied on by the plaintiff in Modi Spg.
\n      (1976)  4 SCC  320,  clearly  recognises  that  inconsistent <\/p>\n
      pleas can be taken in the pleadings.  In this context, we
\n      may also refer to the decision of this Court in Basavan
\n      Jaggu   Dhobi   v   Sukhnandan   Ramdas   Chaudhary,   1995
\n      Supp   (3)   SCC   179.     In   that   case,   the   defendant   had
\n      initially taken up the  stand that he  was a joint tenant <\/p>\n
      along   with   others.   Subsequently,  he   submitted   that  he <\/p>\n
      was   a   licensee   for   monetary   consideration   who   was
\n      deemed to be a tenant as per the provisions of Section
\n      15-A   of   the   Bombay   Rents,   Hotel   and   Lodging   House
\n      Rates   Control   Act,   1947.     This   Court   held   that   the <\/p>\n
      defendant could have validly taken such an inconsistent
\n      defence. While allowing the amendment of the written
\n      statement, this Court observed in Basavan Jaggu Dhobi
\n      case as follows : (SCC p. 180, para 3)<\/p>\n
      ”       3.   As regards the first contention, we are afraid
\n      that the courts below have gone wrong in holding that it
\n      is   not   open   to   the   defendant   to   amend   his   written
\n      statement   under   Order   6   Rule   17   CPC   by   taking   a
\n      contrary   stand   than   what   was   stated   originally   in   the
\n      written statement.  This is opposed to the settled law.  It
\n      is open to a defendant to take even contrary stands or
\n      contradictory stands, thereby the cause of action is not in
\n      any manner affected.   That will apply only to a case of
\n      the plaint being amended so as to introduce a new cause
\n      of action.””\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                             17<\/span><\/p>\n
     10.             Another   purpose   of   taking   a   liberal   approach   while <\/p>\n
     dealing with amendment application is   to ensure that there is no <\/p>\n
     multiplicity of litigation and furthermore the rights of the parties are <\/p>\n
     not   jeopardize   to   an   extent   that   the   real   controversy   between   the <\/p>\n
     parties becomes incapable of solution.  The purpose before the Court <\/p>\n
     keeping   in   view   the   scheme   of   the   Code   is   to   frame   issues   on   all <\/p>\n
     factual matters which the parties are at dispute and then to record <\/p>\n
     finding on each issue while giving the parties chance to lead evidence <\/p>\n
     in   support   of   their   respective   claims.     The   purpose   is   to   ensure <\/p>\n
     complete  adjudication of  the  real dispute  and controversy between <\/p>\n
     the parties.  The amendments which are necessary for determination <\/p>\n
     of real controversy in the suit can be allowed and it will take within <\/p>\n
     its   ambit   inconsistent   pleas   particularly   when   they   are   taken   as <\/p>\n
     alternative pleas.   Much greater care is needed to be taken by the <\/p>\n
     Court   where   there   are   inconsistent\/destructive   pleas   which   would <\/p>\n
     vary   the   cause   of   action   and   cause   great   prejudice   or   loss   of   an <\/p>\n
     accrued   right  to   the   other   side.  In   such  cases   the   Court   would   be <\/p>\n
     justified in rejecting an application for amendment.  It is well settled <\/p>\n
     law that though the rights of the parties have normally to be decided <\/p>\n
     as on the date of the suit, but in the interest of justice subsequent <\/p>\n
     events   normally   would   form   a   sufficient   ground   for   favourably <\/p>\n
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\n                                            18<\/span><\/p>\n
     considering the application for amendment of the written statement.\n<\/p>\n
     It may be more so where the amendments are being claimed on the <\/p>\n
     basis   of   some   benefits   without   altering   the   cause   of   action   and <\/p>\n
     primarily founded on subsequent events.  Alternative pleas which are <\/p>\n
     not   destructive   of   each   other   can   be   considered   by   the   Court <\/p>\n
     particularly when the application moved is not intended to delay the <\/p>\n
     suit   unnecessarily.     (See  Mehar   v   Yash   Pal,  1999   (1)   PLR   403).\n<\/p>\n
     Another settled principle is that amendments prayed for as a result of <\/p>\n
     subsequent events, the Court is not concerned with the merits of the <\/p>\n
     amendments   i.e.   it   is   not   for   a   Court   to   examine   whether   on   the <\/p>\n
     amended facts the Petitioner will succeed or fail. It is a matter to be <\/p>\n
     gone   into   during   the   trial   of   the   suit   and   is   not   a   relevant <\/p>\n
     consideration   for   considering   an  application  for  amendment   unless <\/p>\n
     the amendment otherwise was impermissible in law. (See Baldev Raj  <\/p>\n
     v Municipal Committee Palwal and another, 1993 (3) PLR 573).\n<\/p>\n
     11.            Reverting back to the facts of the present case, it is clear <\/p>\n
     that the written statement on behalf of the present Respondent had <\/p>\n
     been filed on 31st October, 2007.  All the decisions of the authorities <\/p>\n
     concerned including the Government of India which are sought to be <\/p>\n
     introduced by way of amendment are of subsequent period.     The <\/p>\n
     affidavit   which   was   filed   by   the   Union   of   India   discloses   certain <\/p>\n
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\n                                            19<\/span><\/p>\n
     material facts and its policy decision taken on 13th  January, 2009.\n<\/p>\n
     The   details   of   all   these   facts   have   been   given   by   the <\/p>\n
     Respondent\/Applicant   in   the   affidavit-in-support   of   the   Chamber <\/p>\n
     Summons   in   paragraphs   4(i)   to   4(ix).     The   Government   decisions <\/p>\n
     that have been stated therein relate to the dates of 28th  May, 2008 <\/p>\n
     and 23rd October, 2008; and 9th January, 2009, respectively.   It has <\/p>\n
     been averred that despite their due diligence, the Applicant could not <\/p>\n
     have brought these facts on record because relevancy of these facts <\/p>\n
     have been pleaded as, according to the Applicant, Empowered Group <\/p>\n
     of   Ministers’   decisions   have   a   bearing   on   the   concept   of   gas <\/p>\n
     utilization   policy   which  in   turn   is   a   general   and  specific   policy  in <\/p>\n
     regard to the utilization as well as pricing of the natural gas.     An <\/p>\n
     ancillary but an important question that has to be further considered <\/p>\n
     by us is the  relevancy of these amendments for complete, proper and <\/p>\n
     just   adjudication     of   the   dispute   between   the   parties.       We   have <\/p>\n
     already noticed in some details at the opening of this judgment the <\/p>\n
     facts   pleaded   by   the   parties   in   their   respective   pleadings.     After <\/p>\n
     denying various averments made in the plaint, the Respondent had <\/p>\n
     taken the stand that there was no concluded subsisting agreement <\/p>\n
     between   the   parties   and   as   such   the   suit   for   specific   performance <\/p>\n
     would not lie.  By way of amendment, the Respondent wants to add <\/p>\n
     an alternative plea on the basis of the same cause of action within the <\/p>\n
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\n                                            20<\/span><\/p>\n
     ambit and scope of the existing suit and by referring  the subsequent <\/p>\n
     events that even if there was a contract it stands frustrated as it is <\/p>\n
     incapable   of   being   performed   because   of   these   subsequent   events.\n<\/p>\n
     Thus, it is difficult for the Court to hold that the subsequent events <\/p>\n
     are   not   relevant.     They   have   a   specific   bearing   upon   the   factual <\/p>\n
     matrix of the case. The dispute between the parties as well as the <\/p>\n
     issues would require determination of the Court to completely and <\/p>\n
     finally dispose of the suit in accordance with law.   The relevancy is <\/p>\n
     the   construction   of   limited   scope   and   the   merits   of   the   amended <\/p>\n
     pleading is not of much consequence.   It is nobody’s case that the <\/p>\n
     amendment   sought   to   be   made   by   the   present   Respondents   are <\/p>\n
     barred by any law, per se.\n<\/p>\n
     12.            It is well settled principle of law that it is open to the <\/p>\n
     parties   to   raise   even   mutually   inconsistent   pleas   and   if   the   relief <\/p>\n
     could be founded on the alternative plea, it could be granted.  ( Ref :\n<\/p>\n
     Arundhati Mishra (Smt.) v. Sri Ram Charitra Pandey,  (1994)2 SCC <\/p>\n
     29.)<\/p>\n
     13.            A very serious objection has been raised on behalf of the <\/p>\n
     NTPC on the ground that the trial in the present case has already <\/p>\n
     commenced and therefore, the application for amendment would be <\/p>\n
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\n                                           21<\/span><\/p>\n
     liable to be rejected in face of the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 of the <\/p>\n
     Code of Civil Procedure.  This argument at a first glance is attractive <\/p>\n
     but when examined in some depth with reference to the facts and <\/p>\n
     circumstances     of   the   case,   we   hardly   find   any   merit   in   the <\/p>\n
     submissions.  The principal provision of Order VI Rule 17 of the Code <\/p>\n
     is the Court to permit the amendment of the pleadings at any stage of <\/p>\n
     the suit.  Of course, this jurisdiction and discretion of the Court is to <\/p>\n
     be exercised cautiously and in accordance with well settled cannons <\/p>\n
     of civil  jurisprudence.     The  proviso while  imposes  a limitation  of <\/p>\n
     exercise of power of the Court to allow amendment there it clearly <\/p>\n
     states that the amendment can be allowed even after commencement <\/p>\n
     of a trial where despite due diligence, an Applicant was not able to <\/p>\n
     bring the facts on record.   Thus, the test is exercise of due diligence <\/p>\n
     and bonafide of the applicant.   In the case of  Usha Devi v. Rijwan  <\/p>\n
     Ahamd   &   Ors.,  (2008)3   SCC   717,   the   Supreme   Court   noticed   as <\/p>\n
     under: –\n<\/p>\n
           “12. He lastly submitted that the prayer for amendment <\/p>\n
           was made after the commencement of the trial and the
\n           trial court had, therefore, rightly rejected the prayer.  He
\n           maintained   that   the   trial   of   the   suit   would   commence
\n           with   the   settlement   of   the   issues.     In   support   of   the
\n           submission   that   the   framing   of   the   issues   marked   the
\n           commencement of trial  of the  suit, Mr. Sharma, relied
\n           upon   the   decision   of   this   Court   in   Ajendraprasadji   N.
\n           Pandey v. Swami Keshavprakeshdasji N., (2006)12 SCC\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           1.  In para 57 of the decision, it was observed as follows: <\/p><\/blockquote>\n
           (SCC p.18)<\/p>\n
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\n                                      22<\/span><\/p>\n
      “57.  It is submitted that the date of settlement of issues
\n      is   the   date   of   commencement   of   trial.     (Kailash   v.\n<\/p>\n
      Nankhu, (2005)4 SCC 480). Either treating the date of
\n      settlement of affidavit which is treated as examination-
\n      in-chief   as   date   of   commencement   of   trial,   the   matter <\/p>\n
      will   fall   under   proviso   to   Order   6   Rule   17   CPC.     The
\n      defendant has, therefore, to prove that in spite of due
\n      diligence, he could not have raised the matter before the
\n      commencement of trial.  We have already referred to the <\/p>\n
      dates   and   events   very   elaborately   mentioned   in   the
\n      counter-affidavit which proves lack of due diligence on
\n      the   part   of   Defendants   1   and   2   (the
\n      appellants )”   (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n
      From   the   above   quoted   passage,   it   appears   that   the <\/p>\n
      decision did not hold that settlement of issues marks the
\n      commencement   of   trial.     Earlier   in   the   decision,   the
\n      Court exhaustively examined the proceedings from date <\/p>\n
      to date and on that basis came to hold and find that the
\n      prayer   for   amendment   was   made   after   the
\n      commencement of trial.”\n<\/p>\n
      “15. In view of the decision in Sajjar Kumar (2005) 13 <\/p>\n
      SCC 89 we are of the view that this appeal too deserves <\/p>\n
      to be allowed. We may clarify here that in this order we
\n      do   not   venture   to   make   any   pronouncement   on   the
\n      larger   issue   as   to   the   stage   that   would   mark   the
\n      commencement of trial of a suit but we simply find that <\/p>\n
      the appeal in hand is closer on facts to the decision in
\n      Sajjan Kumar and following that decision the prayer for
\n      amendment   in   the   present   appeal   should   also   be
\n      allowed.\n<\/p>\n
                      xxxx            xxxxx            xxxxx<\/p>\n
      18. This appeal is accordingly allowed. The orders of
\n      the trial court and the High Court are set aside and it is
\n      directed that the appellant may be allowed to make the
\n      proposed amendment in the plaint subject to payment of
\n      Rs.10,000   as   cost   to   the   respondent-defendants.   The
\n      amendment will be allowed in case the amount of cost is
\n      paid within two months from today.”\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                             23<\/span><\/p>\n
     14.             In   the   present   case   certain   issues   were   framed   and <\/p>\n
     evidence by way of affidavit had been filed.     If we assume this as <\/p>\n
     commencement of the trial even then we are of the considered view <\/p>\n
     that there is sufficient ground that the Applicant could not bring the <\/p>\n
     facts   on   record   despite   exercise   of   due   diligence   inasmuch   as <\/p>\n
     practically     all   the   events   occurred   subsequent   to   the   filing   of   the <\/p>\n
     written statement.   The Applicants have acted with due diligence and <\/p>\n
     bonafidely.    There is no occasion for the Court to disturb the order <\/p>\n
     passed by the learned Single Judge.  Furthermore, the learned Single <\/p>\n
     Judge has exercised its judicial discretion and we find no error in the <\/p>\n
     impugned order as a result of which any interference of this Court is <\/p>\n
     called for.\n<\/p>\n
     15.             Learned   counsel   appearing   for   the   Respondents   had <\/p>\n
     raised an objection with regard to the maintainability of the present <\/p>\n
     appeal, as, according to him, in view of the judgment in the case of <\/p>\n
     Shah Babulal Khimji v. Jayaben D. Kania & Anr.,<\/a> (1981)4 SCC 8, and <\/p>\n
     Full   Bench   Judgment   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Mohd.   Riyazur  <\/p>\n
     Rehman   Siddiqui   v.   Deputy   Director   of   Health   Services,  2008   (6) <\/p>\n
     Mh.L.J. 941, the present appeal is not maintainable as by allowing <\/p>\n
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\n                                           24<\/span><\/p>\n
     the application, no rights of the parties have been decided.  There is <\/p>\n
     no determination finally or otherwise of any of the issues that are <\/p>\n
     subject   matter   of   the   suit   and   as   such   the   appeal   would   not   be <\/p>\n
     maintainable.  On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the <\/p>\n
     Appellant   while   relying   upon   some   part   of   the   same   judgments <\/p>\n
     contended that the same appeal would be maintainable.\n<\/p>\n
     16.<\/p>\n
                    In Paragraph 120 of Shah Babulal Khimji’s case (supra),  <\/p>\n
     the   Supreme   Court   had   spelled   out   certain   illustrations   of <\/p>\n
     interlocutory   orders   which   may   be   judgment   and   therefore <\/p>\n
     appealable.   Sn   order   granting   leave   to   amend   the   plaint   by <\/p>\n
     introducing a new cause of action which completely alters the nature <\/p>\n
     of the suit and takes away a vested right of limitation or any other <\/p>\n
     valuable   right   accrued   to   the   defendant,   the   order   would   be <\/p>\n
     appealable.         Furthermore,   this   is   an   order   which   to   an   extent <\/p>\n
     certainly decide the right of the parties.     To the extent and in the <\/p>\n
     sense that earlier RIL could not have pleaded frustration of contract <\/p>\n
     and   its   case   was   restricted   only   to   there   being   no   binding   and <\/p>\n
     subsisting contract.  Allowing this alternative plea and to some extent <\/p>\n
     inconsistent has given a cause to the NPTC to raise grievance in the <\/p>\n
     appeal as the order passed by the learned Single Judge would in the <\/p>\n
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\n                                           25<\/span><\/p>\n
     facts   and   circumstances   of   the   case   be   a   judgment   within   the <\/p>\n
     meaning   of   Clause   15   of   the   Letters   Patent   Act.   But   for   such <\/p>\n
     amendment,   the   appellant   could   not   have   pleaded   and   the <\/p>\n
     Respondents   were   not   required   to   meet   the   case   of   frustration   of <\/p>\n
     contract.  Thus, to that extent, the rights of the parties stand affected.\n<\/p>\n
     Even in the case of  Jugal Kishore Paliwal v. S. Sat Jit Singh & Anr., <\/p>\n
     (1984)1 SCC 358, the Supreme Court had held that an order refusing <\/p>\n
     amendment   of   written   statement   at   the   time   of   framing   of   issues <\/p>\n
     would certainly not be a purely interlocutory order against which no <\/p>\n
     Letters Patent Appeal would lie and following the view taken in Shah  <\/p>\n
     Babulal Khimji’s case (supra), the order was held to be appealable.\n<\/p>\n
     17.            Even the Full Bench of this Court in the case of  Mohd.\n<\/p>\n
     Riyazur Rehman Siddiqui  (supra), while discussing Clause 15 of the <\/p>\n
     Letters Patent, had explained the word “judgment” appearing in the <\/p>\n
     clause, and observed that the word “judgment” has undoubtedly a <\/p>\n
     concept of finality in a broader and not a narrower sense.\n<\/p>\n
     18.            The   nature   of   the   right   affected   is   also   a   relevant <\/p>\n
     consideration.   The right in strict sense is duty which is something <\/p>\n
     owed   by   one   to   another.   Correspondingly   the   latter   has   a   right <\/p>\n
     against   the   former.   Every   legal   right   has   distinguishable <\/p>\n
                                                     ::: Downloaded on – 09\/06\/2013 14:51:02 :::<\/span>
\n                                          26<\/span><\/p>\n
     characteristics, like it is vested in a person, it is available against a <\/p>\n
     person   and   such   right   is   enforceable   in   accordance   with   the <\/p>\n
     provisions of law.  Right to appeal is a statutory right.   It is neither <\/p>\n
     natural   nor   fundamental   right.     Such   rights   are   capable   of   being <\/p>\n
     determined by judgment of the Court of law.  The judgment therefore <\/p>\n
     could   be   order   which   is   determinative   of   some   substantial <\/p>\n
     controversy  between   the  parties  and  is  prejudicially  affecting  their <\/p>\n
     rights in the trial.  It is said that effect of an order, whatever its form <\/p>\n
     may be, would depend on the nature of the application on which it is <\/p>\n
     made if it puts an end to the suit or proceedings so far the Court <\/p>\n
     before which the suit or proceedings is pending is concerned and it is <\/p>\n
     something more than a mere formal expression of adjudication.\n<\/p>\n
     19.            Applying these tests to the present case, we have already <\/p>\n
     noticed that the order passed by the Court substantially affects the <\/p>\n
     rights of the parties as the nature and scope of the suit itself would be <\/p>\n
     on a different footing for such an amendment.  Therefore, we are of <\/p>\n
     the considered view that the present appeal is maintainable and the <\/p>\n
     objections raised by the Respondents is without merit.   Hence, we <\/p>\n
     decline to reject the argument as to the maintainability of the present <\/p>\n
     appeal.\n<\/p>\n
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\n                                             27<\/span><\/p>\n
     20.              For   the   reasons   afore-stated,   we   find   no   merit   in   the <\/p>\n
     contentions raised by the Appellant but would modify the order of <\/p>\n
     the learned Single Judge only to the extent that the Respondent shall <\/p>\n
     be liable to pay costs of Rs.25,000\/- (Rupees Twenty Five thousand <\/p>\n
     only) for seeking amendment in question.\n<\/p>\n
                         ig                                  CHIEF JUSTICE\n                       \n                                                          A.M. KHANWILKAR, J.\n      \n   \n\n\n\n\n\n\n     uday\/judgments09\/appeal229-09\n\n\n\n\n                                                        ::: Downloaded on - 09\/06\/2013 14:51:02 :::<\/span>\n <\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Bombay High Court New Delhi 110 003. vs Companies Act on 30 July, 2009 Bench: A.M. Khanwilkar 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION APPEAL NO.229 OF 2009 IN CHAMBER SUMMONS NO. 218 OF 2009 IN SUIT NO. 95 OF 2006 NTPC Limited ) (Formerly National Thermal Power ) […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[11,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-189440","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-bombay-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nNew Delhi 110 003. vs Companies Act on 30 July, 2009 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/new-delhi-110-003-vs-companies-act-on-30-july-2009\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"New Delhi 110 003. vs Companies Act on 30 July, 2009 - 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