{"id":191234,"date":"1975-09-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1975-09-09T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975"},"modified":"2016-01-24T01:49:12","modified_gmt":"2016-01-23T20:19:12","slug":"partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975","title":{"rendered":"Partap vs The State Of U.P on 10 September, 1975"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Partap vs The State Of U.P on 10 September, 1975<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 966, \t\t 1976 SCR (1) 757<\/div>\n
Author: R S Sarkaria<\/div>\n
Bench: Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nPARTAP\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nTHE STATE OF U.P.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT10\/09\/1975\n\nBENCH:\nSARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH\nBENCH:\nSARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH\nBEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH\nBHAGWATI, P.N.\n\nCITATION:\n 1976 AIR  966\t\t  1976 SCR  (1) 757\n 1976 SCC  (2) 798\n CITATOR INFO :\n R\t    1979 SC 391\t (9)\n F\t    1980 SC 660\t (16)\n R\t    1990 SC1459\t (21)\n\n\nACT:\n     Indian Evidence  Act (1  of 1872) -Sec. 105 Prosecution\nfor murder- Plea of self-defence-Scope of proof.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     The appellant, his father and another were charged with\nmurder\tand   convicted\t by   the  trial  court.  The  first\ninformation  referred\tto  eye\t  witnesses,  of   whom\t the\nprosecution  examined\tonly  two.  These  two\twere  chance\nwitnesses of another village, but the others who belonged to\nthe village  where  the\t occurrence  took  place,  were\t not\nexamined. The  third accused was acquitted on appeal. by the\nHigh Court  and the father died after his conviction was con\nfirmed by  the High  Court. The\t appellants plea  of private\ndefence was  rejected both  by the  trial court and the High\nCourt.\n     Allowing the appeal to this Court,\n^\n     HELD (Per\tM. H.  Beg J.):\t Section 105 of the Evidence\nAct contains  two kinds of burden on the accused who sets up\nan exception  (i) the  onus  of\t proving  the  existence  of\ncircumstances bringing the case within any of the general or\nspecial exceptions  in the  I.P.C. Or  in any other law; and\n(ii)  the   burden  of\t introducing  or  showing  evidence,\nresulting from\tthe last  part of  the provision  which says\nthat  the   court  shall   presume  the\t  absence  of\tsuch\ncircumstances. The  effect of  the obligatory presumption at\nthe end\t of Section  105 is  that the  court must  start  by\nassuming that  no facts\t exist which  could  be\t taken\tinto\nconsideration for considering the plea of self-defence as an\nexception to the criminal liability which would otherwise be\nthere. But  when both  sides  have  led\t evidence  of  their\nrespective versions the accused' can show, from the evidence\non record,  whether  tendered  by  the\tprosecution  or\t the\ndefence that  the mandatory presumption is removed. The last\nmentioned burden  is not really a burden of establishing the\nplea  fully   but  of  either  introducing  or\tshowing\t the\nexistence of  some evidence  to justify the taking up of the\nplea. The  burden resulting  from the obligatory presumption\nis not\tdifficult to  discharge and  its removal  may not be\nenough for acquittal. But the right of the accused to obtain\nthe benefit of reasonable doubt is the necessary outcome and\ncounter\t part\tof  the\t prosecution's\tundeniable  duty  to\nestablish its case beyond reasonable doubt and that right is\navailable to  the accused  even if he fails to discharge his\nown duty  to prove  fully the  exception  pleaded.  [762A-D;\n763E]\n     In the  present case,  even if  the appellant  did\t not\nfully establish his plea. yet, there is sufficient evidence,\nboth direct  and circumstantial, to justify the finding that\nthe  prosecution   has\tnot   established  its\tcase  beyond\nreasonable doubt  against  the\tappellant  on  an  essential\ningredient of the offense of murder namely the required mens\nrea. An\t examination of\t all  the  facts  and  circumstances\nrevealed by  the entire\t evidence, including  the effect  of\nnon-production of  the better  evidence available which. for\nsome unexplained  reason was  not produced,  shows that\t the\nplea of private defence cannot be reasonably ruled out. Even\nif the\tdeceased was  not positively  proved to be advancing\nthreateningly with  a spear  poised for\t attack, towards the\nappellant or  his father,  yet, a consideration of the whole\nevidence leads\tto the\tinference that\tthis was  reasonably\nlikely to be true. [763C-764A-E]\n     (1) The  trial court  was inclined\t to believe that the\ndefence version was true to the extent that the deceased had\nrushed to  the scene  with a  spear. It\t overlooked that the\ndeceased while\tgoing to help P.W. 1, had actually expressed\nhis intention  to break\t the heads  of the  members  of\t the\naccused party  and that\t he was\t acting in  such a was as to\nappear to be bent on physically aggressive interference in a\nquarrel between\t the two  sides. If  that was the conduct of\nthe deceased,  it is  reasonable to  infer that he must have\ndone some-\n758\nthing which  gave rise\tto the\tright of  private defence in\nfavour of  the appeallant  Otherwise,  the  conduct  of\t the\nappellant,  in\tsparing,  P  W.\t 1,  who  according  to\t the\nprosecution had\t given offence to his father in the past and\non the\tday of\tthe incident.  and was advancing towards the\nfather threatening  to strike him with a spade, but shooting\nthe deceased who appeared on the scene subsequently and was,\naccording  to\tthe  prosecution   version  unarmed  becomes\ninexplicable If\t the right  of self-defence  had arisen\t the\nshooting could not be murder, even if the right was exceeded\nthe offence  could not\the culpable  homicide  amounting  to\nmurder.[760B-F]\n     (2) Further,  the prosecution version is supported only\nby two\tchance witnesses,  hut the  other persons,  who\t had\naccording  to\tthe  prosecution   version   witnessed\t the\noccurrence and\twhose names  were mentioned in the FIR. were\nneither produced  by the  prosecution nor were they examined\nas court witnesses [760G-761B]\n     (3) Moreover  the High Court itself did not rely on the\nstatements of  the alleged  eye witnesses  when it acquitted\nthe third accused who was also alleged to have shot with his\npistol [764H]\n     Parbhoo v. Emperor, AIR 1941 All 402(FB) and Rishi Kesh\nSingh ors. v. The State AIR 1970 All] 51 (FB), referred to\n     (Per P. N. Bhagwati and R.S. Sarkaria, JJ)\n     The appellant  had established  by a  preponderance  of\nprobability,  that   the  deceased  was\t within\t a  striking\ndistance poised\t for imminent attack on the appellant with a\nspear, when  the appellant  fired the fatal shot, and hence.\nthe death was caused by the appellant in the exercise of the\nright of private defence.[769F-G]\n     (1) Nothing  turns on the evidence or the two witnesses\nwho were  examined but\tthe approach  of the trial court and\nthe High  Court to  the plea  of self-defense  raised by the\nappellant was  wrong necessitating a  review of the evidence\nby this Court [767D,G]\n     (2) The burden on the accused under s.105, Evidence Act\nis not\tas onerous  as that  which lies\t on the\t prosecution\nunder s\t 101, Evidence\tAct, to\t prove its  case. While\t the\nprosecution is\trequired to prove its case beyond reasonable\ndoubt, the  accused can discharge his onus by establishing a\nmere preponderance of probability [767-T]\n     (3) The  plea of private defence was specifically taken\nby the appellant at the trial in his examination under s 342\nCr.P.C., and  was put  to P.W.\t1. the chief eye-witness for\nthe prosecution.  The High  Court was wrong in branching the\nplea as\t an after-though on the ground that he did not raise\nit  in\t the  committal\t court,\t especially  when  there  is\nfoundation for\tit in  the prosecution\tevidence itself. The\nrecord also  shows that only a composite question was put to\nthe appellant  and that\t he was not properly examined in the\ncommittal court. [767;768E-G]\n     (4) The  appellant plea  that the deceased was about to\nstrike with  his spear\twhen the  gun was  fired was  highly\nprobable. The  prosecution  case  was  that,  following\t the\nthreatening gesture  made by  P.W. 1.  to break the father's\nhead with  a spade  and the call given by him, the appellant\ncame to the scene of occurrence with a gun; that immediately\nthereafter the\tdeceased came  proclaiming  that,  he  would\nbreak the  heads of, and settle scores with everyone of, the\naccused party,\tand that the deceased had reached a distance\nof 3  or 4  paces from the appellant and was charging at him\nwith the  appellant fired.  The prosecution  story that\t the\ndeceased was  unarmed  is  improbable.\tHe  would  not\thave\nbehaved in  that bold  and truculent  manner unless  he\t was\narmed with a formidable weapon. [767H-767D]\n     (5) The  defence witness  also testified  that  he\t was\nattracted from\this house  to the scene of occurrence by the\noutcry of the father, that he saw the deceased\n759\narmed with  a spear  running towards the scene of occurrence\nand that  he saw the deceased Lying dead with a spear beside\nhim. He\t was an\t independent witness and nothing was brought\nout in\tthe cross-examination  to show\tthat he\t was  either\nhostile towards\t the complainant's  party or had any special\ninterest in  the accused.  His version\twas probable and the\nHigh Court Was wrong in rejecting his evidence. [769D-F]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CRIMINAL APPELLATE\t JURISDICTION: Criminal\t Appeal\t No.
\n120 of 1971.\n<\/p>\n
     Appeal by\tSpecial Leave  from the\t Judgment and  order
\ndated the  24th July,  1970 of\tthe Allahabad  High Court at
\nAllahabad in Criminal Appeal No. 581 of 1968.\n<\/p>\n
     A. N. Mulla and O. N. Mohindroo for the Appellant.
\n     D. P. Uniyal and O. P. Rana for the Respondent.
\n     The Judgment  of P.  N. Bhagwati and R. S. Sarkaria was
\ndelivered by  R. S.  Sarkaria, J.  Beg, J.  gave a  separate
\nopinion.\n<\/p>\n
     BEG, J.  I have  had the advantage of going through the
\njudgement of  my learned  brother Sarkaria. I confess that I
\ndo not\tfeel confident\tenough about  the  veracity  of\t the
\ndefence case  and the  evidence found in support of it to be
\nable  to   hold\t that\tit  is\t proved\t on   a\t balance  of
\nprobabilities. But,  I think  that what\t transpires  from  a
\nconsideration of the whole evidence is enough to entitle the
\naccused to a benefit of doubt for the reasons given below.\n<\/p>\n
     The findings  of the Trial Court on the defence version
\nindicate that  a question  of law  arise here which seems to
\nhave troubled  several High Courts. It gave rise to two Full
\nBench decisions\t of the\t Allahahad High\t Court, the first in
\nParbhoo v.  Emperor,(l) and the second in Rishi Kesh Singh &
\nors. v.\t the  State(‘).\t It  does  not\tseem  to  have\tbeen
\nconsidered in the same form by this Court. r I think this is
\nan appropriate\tcase in\t which this Court could consider and
\ndecide it,  and, it  is because\t this aspect of the case was
\nignored by  the Trial Court as well as the High Court that I
\nconsider this  to be  a fit  case for  a reconsideration  of
\nevidence and interference by this Court under Article 136 or
\nthe Constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     The Trial\tCourt, after assuming that there may be some
\ntruth in  the defence  version that Ram Nath had gone to the
\nscene of occurrence with a bhala, said:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Even if  Ram Nath  had arrived  there armed\twith
\n     bhala, there  could be  no\t apprehension  of  death  or
\n     grievous hurt  to any one of the accused persons as the
\n     accused persons  were armed  with gun  and\t pistol\t and
\n     could defend  themselves if  Ram Nath  tried t(3 strike
\n     them with ‘bhala’.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Pratap and  Suresh’accused could  not be justified
\n     in firing gun-shots and pistol-shots at Ram Nath in the
\n     expectation that  Ram Nath\t may reach  the place  where
\n     Puttu Lal\taccused was standing and may strike him with
\n     ‘bhala’.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (1) A.l.R. 1941 All. 402 (FB).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2) AIR 1970 All. Sl (FB).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
760<\/span><\/p>\n
\t  Pratap and  Suresh accused  had started from their
\n     house A with gun and pistol before they had known about
\n     the reaching  of Ram Nath at that place with a ‘bhala’.
\n     It can  reasonably be inferred from the own case of the
\n     defence that  Pratap and  Suresh accused,\tor at  least
\n     Pratap accused, had arrived there with the intention of
\n     committing the  murder of\tRaj Kumar or of any body who
\n     may interfere  in the wordy duel between Raj Kumar P.W.
\n     and Puttu Lal accused”.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     This shows that the Trial Court was inclined to believe
\nthat the  defence version  was true  to the  extent that Ram
\nNath had  rushed to  the scene\tof occurrence  with a bhala,
\nwhen a\tquarrel between the two sides was taking place. But,
\nit overlooked here that Ram Nath, while going to the help of
\nRaj Kumar, had actually expressed his intention to break the
\nheads  of  members  of\tPuttu  Lal’s  party.  At  any  rate,
\naccording to  the prosecution evidence., Ram Nath was acting
\nin  such   a  way  as  to  appear  like\t a  “lion”  bent  on
\ninterference to\t protect Raj  Kumar in a quarrel between the
\ntwo sides. If this was Ram Nath’s conduct, could he not have
\ndone something\twhich gave  rise to  the  right\t of  private
\ndefence of  person ?  If that  right had  arisen  how  could
\nshooting him be murder ? Even if it was exceeded the offence
\ncould not be culpable homicide amounting to murder.\n<\/p>\n
     Why should Pratap, the appellant, have spared Raj Kumar
\nwho, according to the prosecution evidence itself, had given
\noffence to  Puttu Lal  in the  past and\t then on the date of
\nincident by  actually demolishing  a nali and then advancing
\ntowards him  with his  phawra, threatening  to strike  Puttu
\nLal, but  shoot at  Ram Nath  who appeared  subsequently and
\nwas, according\tto the\tprosecution version, quite unarmed ?
\nThe prosecution\t evidence is  that Puttu  Lal had called his
\nson Pratap  and asked  him to  bring his  gun only  when Raj
\nKumar had  threatened to  attack him with his phawra and had
\nadvanced towards  Puttu Lal. Nevertheless, Pratap and Suresh
\nare alleged to have shot down Ram Nath, even though Ram Nath
\nwas empty  handed, but\tdid nothing  to Raj  Kumar who\twas,
\naccording to  the prosecution  version, more  offensive\t and
\nthreatening with  a phawrah  and was  the cause of the whole
\ntrouble\t  Such conduct,\t attributed to Pratap and Suresh, in
\nthe setting alleged, seems quite unnatural and eccentric.\n<\/p>\n
     Raj Kumar, P.W. 1, also stated that Atma Ram, Achhe Ram
\nand Sia\t Ram, Pradhan,\ttook their  stand in  parti land  at
\nabout the same time as Ram Nath had arrived on the scene and
\nhad asked  Ram Nath  not to loose heart or to be discouraged
\nas he  was coming  to deal  with each  one  of\tRaj  Kumar’s
\nadversaries. Then,  at Puttu  Lal’s instigation,  Pratap and
\nSuresh are  alleged to have shot at Ram Nath. Why is it that
\nthis version  of the  obviously interested  Raj Kumar, PW 1,
\nis, only  supported  by\t two  chance  witnesses\t of  another
\nvillage, but  neither Atma  Ram nor  Achhe Ram, nor Sia Ram,
\nPradhan of  village Sant  Kuiyan, who  had, according to the
\nprosecution version,  witnessed the  occurrence not produced
\nby the prosecution at all ? The prosecution could select its
\nwitnesses. But, why was such an objectionable selection made
\n? Was it not a case in which the Court should have exercised
\nits power  under Section  540  Criminal\t Procedure  Code  to
\nsummon at least Sia Ram
\n761<\/span>
\n     Pradhan, in  whose grove  Ram Nath\t was shot,  so as to
\nascertain the  whole truth more satisfactorily ? Had not the
\nTrial Court  and the  High Court  too readily  assumed\tthat
\nabsolute truth\tfell from  the lips of prosecution witnesses
\nas regards  the commencement  of aggression  even when their
\nown statements\tcontained  admissions  indicating  that\t the
\nwhole or  the real  truth had  not been\t revealed by  them ?
\nThese are  some of  the doubts\twhich the  rather mechanical
\nexamination of\tevidence by  the Trial\tCourt and  the\tHigh
\nCourt do not dispel.\n<\/p>\n
     The question  which arises in this case is: Even if the
\ndefence version\t is not\t held to  be fully established, by a
\nbalance of probabilities, were there not sufficient pointers
\nin evidence  of what was probably the truth which leaked out
\nfrom some statements of the prosecution witnesses themselves
\n? They\thad indicated the bellicose and threatening attitude
\nof Ramnath  while he  was advancing.  Did this\tnot tend  to
\ncorroborate  the   defence  version  that  he  was  actually
\nadvancing menacingly armed with a bhala piosed for an attack
\nwith it when he was shot at ?\n<\/p>\n
     It was  held in the case of Rishi Kesh Singh (supra) by
\na majority  of a  Full Bench of nine Judges of the Allahabad
\nHigh Court explaining and relying upon the decisions of this
\nCourt discussed there (at p. 51):\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The accused\tperson who  pleads an  exception  is
\n     entitled to be acquitted if upon a consideration of the
\n     evidence as  a whole  (including the  evidence given in
\n     support  of  the  plea  of\t the  general  exception)  a
\n     reasonable doubt  is created  in the  mind of the Court
\n     about the built of the accused”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In that case, the result of a consideration of the decisions
\nof this\t Court in  relation to the provisions of Section 105
\nof the\tEvidence Act was summed up by me as follows (at page
\n97-98):\n<\/p>\n
\t  “. . . an accused’s plea of an exception may reach
\n     one  of   three  not  sharply  demarcated\tstages,\t one
\n     succeeding the  other, depending upon the effect of the
\n     whole evidence  in the case judged by the standard of a
\n     prudent  man   weighing  or   balancing   probabilities
\n     carefully. These  stages are: firstly, a lifting of the
\n     initial obligatory\t presumption given  at\tthe  end  of
\n     section 105  of the  Act; secondly,  the creation\tof a
\n     reasonable doubt  about the  existence of an ingredient
\n     of the  offence; and,  thirdly, a complete proof of the
\n     exception by  ‘a preponderance  of probability’,  which
\n     covers even a slight tilt of the balance of probability
\n     in favour\tof the\taccused’s plea.\t The accused  is not
\n     entitled to  an acquittal\tif his\tplea  does  not\t get
\n     beyond the first stage. At the second stage, he becomes
\n     entitled to  acquittal by\tobtaining a  bare benefit of
\n     doubt. At\tthe third  stage, he is undoubtedly entitled
\n     to an  acquittal. This, in my opinion, is the effect of
\n     the majority  view in  Parbhoo’.  case  which  directly
\n     relates to\t first two  stages only.  The Supreme  Court
\n     decisions have  considered the  last two stages so far,
\n     but the  first  stage  has\t not  yet  been\t dealt\twith
\n     directly or separately there in any case brought to our
\n     notice.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
18-L925SupCl\/75
\n762<\/span>
\n     Provisions of  Section 105\t of the\t Evidence Act, which
\nare applicable\t in  such cases, contain what are really two
\nkinds of  burden of  the accused  who sets  up an exception;
\nfirstly,  there\t is  the  onus\tlaid  down  of\tproving\t the
\nexistence of  circumstances bringing  the case within any of
\nthe General  exceptions in the Indian Penal Code, or, within
\nany special exception or proviso contained in any other part
\nof the\tsame Code,  or in any law defining the offence, and,
\nsecondly, there\t is the\t burden of  introducing\t or  showing
\nevidence which\tresults from  the last part of the provision
\nwhich says that “the Court shall presume the absence of such
\ncircumstances”. The effect of this obligatory presumption at
\nthe end of Section 105 of the Evidence Act is that the Court
\nmust start  by assuming\t that no  facts exist which could be
\ntaken into  consideration for  considering the\tplea of self
\ndefence as  an exception  to the  criminal  liability  which
\nwould otherwise\t be there.  But, when  both sides  have\t led
\nevidence of their respective versions, the accused can show,
\nfrom any  evidence on  the record,  whether tendered  by the
\nprosecution or\tthe defence,  that the mandatory presumption
\nis removed. the last mentioned burden is not really a burden
\nof establishing\t the plea fully but of either introducing or
\nof showing  the existence  of some  evidence to\t justify the
\ntaking up  of  the  plea.  The\tburden\tresulting  from\t the
\nobligatory presumption is not difficult to discharge and its
\nremoval may not be enough nor an acquittal. D
\n     Section 105  of the  Evidence Act was thus explained in
\nRishi Kesh Singh’s case (supra) (at P. 95):\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Even a  literal interpretation  of the first part
\n     of Section\t 105 could  indicate  that  ‘the  burden  of
\n     proving the  existence of\tcircumstances  bringing\t the
\n     case’ within  an exception\t is meant  to cover complete
\n     proof of  the exception  pleaded, by a preponderance of
\n     probability, as  well as proof of circumstances showing
\n     that the  exception may  exist which  will entitle, the
\n     accused to\t the benefit  of doubt on the ingredients of
\n     an offence. If the intention was to confine the benefit
\n     of bringing  a case  within an exception to cases where
\n     the exception  was established  by a  pre-ponderance of
\n     probability, more\tdirect and  definite language  would
\n     have been\temployed by  providing that the accused must
\n     ‘prove the\t existence’ of\tthe exception  pleaded. But,
\n     the language  used in  the first  part of\tSection\t 105
\n     seems to  be deliberately\tless  precise  so  that\t the
\n     accused, even  if he fails to discharge his duty fully,
\n     by establishing  the existence of an exception, may get
\n     the benefit  of the  exception  in\t directly  when\t the
\n     prosecution fails\tin its\tduty  to  eliminate  genuine
\n     doubt about his guilt introduced by the accused. Again,
\n     the last  part of\tSection 105,  even if  strictly\t and
\n     literally interpreted, does not justify reading into it
\n     the meaning  that the  obligatory presumption must last
\n     until the\taccused’s plea\tis fully established and not
\n     just till\tcircumstances (i.e.  not necessarily all) to
\n     support the  plea are  proved. Moreover,  a restrictive
\n     interpretation of\tSection 105, excluding an accused 11
\n     from  the\tbenefit\t of  bringing  his  case  within  an
\n     exception until he fully proves it, is ruled out by the
\n     declaration of  law by  the Supreme Court that there is
\n     no conflict between Section
\n763<\/span>
\n     105 and the prosecution’s duty to prove its case beyond
\n     reasonable doubt. Hence, the obligatory presumption, at
\n     the end  of Section  105, cannot  be held to last until
\n     the  accused   proves  his\t  exception   fully   by   a
\n     preponderance of probability. It is necessarily removed
\n     earlier or\t operates only\tinitially as held clearly by
\n     judges taking the majority view in Parbhoo’s case, 1941
\n     All LJ 619-AIR 1941 All 402 (FB)”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     It was also said there (at p. 89):\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “The legal position of a state of reasonable doubt
\n     may Be  viewed and stated from two opposite angles. One
\n     may recognise,  in a  realistic fashion, that, although
\n     the law  prescribes  only\tthe  higher  burden  of\t the
\n     prosecution to  prove its\tcase beyond reasonable doubt
\n     and the accused’s lower burden of proving his plea by a
\n     preponderance of  probability only,  yet, there  is, in
\n     practice, a  still lower burden of creating reason able
\n     doubt about  the accused’s guilt, and that an accused’s
\n     can obtain an acquittal by satisfying this lower burden
\n     too in  practice. The  objection to  stating the law in
\n     this fashion  is that  it looks  like introducing a new
\n     type of  burden of\t proof, although, it may be said, in
\n     defence of\t such a\t statement of  the law, that it only
\n     recognises what  is true.\tAlternatively, one  may\t say
\n     that the  right of the accused to obtain the benefit of
\n     a\treasonable   doubt  is\tthe  necessary\toutcome\t and
\n     counterpart of  the prosecution’s\tundeniable  duty  to
\n     establish its  case beyond\t reasonable doubt  and\tthat
\n     this right is available to the accused even if he fails
\n     to discharge  his own duty to prove fully the exception
\n     pleaded. This  technically more  correct way of stating
\n     the law was indicated by Woolmington’s case and adopted
\n     by the  majority in Parbhoo’s case, and, after that, by
\n     the Supreme  Court. It  seems to me that so long as the
\n     accused’s legal duty to prove his plea fully as well as
\n     his equally  clear legal right to obtain the benefit of
\n     reasonable doubt,\tupon a\tconsideration of  the  whole
\n     evidence,\ton   an\t ingredient   of  an   offence,\t are
\n     recognised, a mere difference of mode in describing the
\n     position, from  two different  angles, is an immaterial
\n     matter of\tform only.  Even if  the latter form appears
\n     somewhat artificial,  it must  be preferred  after\t its
\n     adoption by the Supreme Court”. (See: K. M. Nanavati v.
\n     State of Maharashtra-AIR<\/a> 1962 SC 605).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Applying the\tprinciple of  benefit of doubt, as I
\n     had’ explained above, to the plea of private defence of
\n     person in\tthe instant  case, I think that, even if the
\n     appellant did  not fully establish his plea, yet, there
\n     is sufficient evidence, both direct and circumstantial,
\n     to justify\t the finding  that the\tprosecution has\t not
\n     established its  case beyond  reasonable doubt  against
\n     Pratap on\tan essential  ingredient of  the offence  of
\n     murder: the  required mens rea. After examining all the
\n     facts and\tcircumstances revealed\tby  the\t prosecution
\n     evidence  itself\tand   the   defence   evidence\t and
\n     considering the  effect of non-production of the better
\n     evidence available\t which for  some unexplained reason,
\n     was not produced, I am not satis-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
764<\/span><\/p>\n
fied that  the plea  of private\t defence of  person  can  be
\nreasonably ruled  A out here. This is enough, in my opinion,
\nto entitle the appellant to get the benefit of doubt.\n<\/p>\n
     I may  observe here  that the  High Court\thad not only
\nfailed to  grapple with\t this difficulty  arising  from\t the
\nevidence in  the case  and some of the findings of the Trial
\nCourt, which seemed to think that the intention to murder or
\nthe required  mens rea\tfor murder must be presumed from the
\nmere fact of homicide (a wholly incorrect approach in a case
\nwhere a\t plea of  private defence had been raised and sought
\nto be  established by  some evidence),\tbut, the  High Court
\nitself started\tfrom  a\t totally  unsound  premise  when  it
\nobserved:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It was Puttu Lal who was committing aggression by
\n     insisting that  Raj Kumar should not dismantle the Nali
\n     It is again admitted by Puttu Lal that he cried out for
\n     help in  response to  which Pratap arrived armed with a
\n     double barrel gun.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     In other  words, the  High Court  assumed that  a\tmere
\ninsistence by  Puttu Lal that Raj Kumar should not dismantle
\nthe  nali  amounted  to\t an  “aggression”  begun.  The\tword
\n“aggression” is generally used for an actual invasion of the
\nproperty of  another or an attack on the body of another. It
\nis true\t that it  is not  necessary that  an  actual  attack
\nshould commence before a right of private defence can arise.
\nNevertheless, a\t reasonable apprehension of injury could not
\nbe said to arise by a mere prohibition to dig up a “nali” or
\ndrain. It  could arise\tif a  man is  advancing aggressively
\ntowards others holding out threats to break their heads even
\nif he  is armed\t with a\t lathi with which he could carry out
\nsuch a\tdeclared intention.  The extent\t of the right or its
\njustification is  another matter  depending again upon facts
\nwhich  have  a\tbearing\t on  extent  of\t the  right  or\t its
\nreasonable exercise. In the circumstances of the case before
\nus, I  think, we  can hold,  that, even\t if Ram Nath was not
\npositively proved to be threateningly advancing with a bhala
\npoised for  attack towards  Pratap, appellant, or Puttu Lal,
\nyet, a\tconsideration of  all the probabilities and evidence
\non record  leads us to infer that this was reasonably likely
\nto be  true. If\t this was so, it is clear that the appellant
\nmust have  discharged his gun when Ram Nath had advanced and
\ncome near  enough in  a\t manner\t which\tmust  have  been  so
\nmenacing as  to raise  an apprehension of an attack with the
\nbhala. Such  an assumption fits in with medical evidence too
\nshowing that  the shots were fired from a close enough range
\nto cause charring.\n<\/p>\n
     Another feature  of the  case is  that the\t High  Court
\nitself did  not rely  on the  statements of  the alleged eye
\nwitnesses when\tit acquitted Suresh, who was also alleged to
\nhave shot  with his  pistol” giving him the benefit of doubt
\nbecause, unlike\t Puttu Lal  and Pratap,\t he had\t denied\t his
\npresence or  participation in the occurrence and was said to
\nbe only distantly related to Puttu Lal.\n<\/p>\n
765<\/span><\/p>\n
     I think, on an analysis of the whole evidence, that the
\nappellant Pratap was also entitled to the benefit of a doubt
\nwhich could be said to be reasonable.\n<\/p>\n
     I, therefore,  concur  in\tthe  order  proposed  by  my
\nlearned Brother.\n<\/p>\n
     SARKARIA, J.  This appeal\tby special leave is directed
\nagainst a judgment of the High Court of Allahabad dismissing
\nthe  appeal   of  Partap   appellant  and   maintaining\t his
\nconviction under  s. 302,  Penal  Code.\t The  facts  of\t the
\nprosecution case  as narrated at the trial by Raj Kumar, the
\nstar witness of the prosecution, were as follows:\n<\/p>\n
     Raj Kumar\thad installed  a Tubewell in his field known
\nas ‘Chharelawala.field’\t in the\t revenue estate\t of  village
\nSant Kuiyan,  in the  year 1962.  The water  pumped out from
\nthis tubewell  was utilised  by him  not only for irrigating
\nhis own\t fields but  also those\t of the\t neighbours  against
\ncharges. Subsequently,\tPuttu Lal  accused  also  set  up  a
\ntubewell in his land situate in the vicinity of Chharelawala
\nfield. Puttu  Lal, too,\t started letting  out the use of his
\ntubewell on  hire. An  unhealthy competition  ensued between
\nRaj Kumar  and Puttu  Lal in  this water business, and their
\nrelations became strained. There was a water channel running
\nfrom north to south in Raj Kumar’s field through which Puttu
\nLal used  to  supply  water  to\t others.  To  the  south  of
\nChharelawala field,  there is  grove belonging\tto Sia\tRam,
\nPardhan of the village. The tubewell of Puttu Lal is located
\ntowards the  south  of\tthat  grove.  To  the  west  of\t the
\nChharelawala field, is a plot belonging to Puttu Lal.\n<\/p>\n
     Two or  three days\t before the  occurrence in question,
\nthere was  an exchange\tof hot\twords between  Raj Kumar and
\nPuttu Lal  when the  latter insisted on taking water through
\nthe said channel. Raj Kumar firmly refused Puttu Lal the use
\nof that channel.\n<\/p>\n
     on S-1-1967,  at about  7.45 a.m.,\t Raj Kumar  and\t his
\nbrothers Ramchander  and Bhagwan  Sahai, started demolishing
\ntheir channel so that Puttu Lal should not be able to supply
\nwater through  it. About  fifteen minutes  thereafter, Puttu
\nLal and his son, Ram Parkash, appeared on the northern ridge
\nof the grove of Siya Ram. Puttu Lal was carrying a lathi and
\nRam Parkash  a bhala.  Puttu Lal  asked Raj  Kumar  and\t his
\ncompanions not\tto demolish  the channel.  Raj Kumar  rudely
\nrefused asserting  that the  channel belonged  to him and he
\nhad every  right to  erase it.\tRaj Kumar  advanced  towards
\nPuttu Lal  threatening to break his head with the spade, and
\nthus settle the matter once for all. On being so threatened,
\nPuttu Lal  shouted  to\this  son,  the\tappellant,  to\tcome
\nimmediately with  his gun.  In response to Puttu Lal’s call,
\nthe appellant,\tarmed with the double-barrel licensed gun of
\nPuttu Lal,  and Puttu  Lal’s other son, Suresh, armed with a
\npistol, came.  A couple\t of minutes after the arrival of the
\nappellant and  Suresh, the deceased Ram Nath who was the son
\nof Raj\tKumar’s wife’s\tbrother, came  out running  from the
\ngrove. He shouted to
\n766<\/span>
\nRaj Kumar  not to  be afraid  as he  would settle the matter
\nwith every-  A one  of the accused and break their heads. On
\nseeing the  deceased, Puttu  Lal said: “He thinks himself to
\nbe  a\tlion,  let  us\tsee  him  first\t of  all”.  On\tthis
\ninstigation, Partap  fired  his\t gun  at  Ram  Nath  from  a
\ndistance of  four or  five paces. On receiving the gun-shot,
\nRam Nath  turned back when he was hit by a second shot fired
\nby Suresh  from his  pistol. Ram  Nath,\t dropped  dead.\t The
\naccused then  ran away\ttaking their  weapons with them. Raj
\nKumar PW  1 went  home, scribed\t the report.  Exh. ka-3, and
\nhanded it  over in  the Kain  Ganj Police  Station, 8  miles
\naway, at  9.30 a.m. After registering a case on the basis of
\nthis report, Sub-Inspector Kartar Singh reached the spot and
\nstarted the  investigation. He\tprepared the  inquest report
\nand sent the body for post-mortem examination.\n<\/p>\n
     The autopsy  was conducted\t by Dr. S. P. Chaturvedi, PW
\n3, on  6-1-1967, at 12.40 p.m. The Doctor found five gunshot
\nwounds of entry and three of exit on the deadbody. There was
\nblackening around all the wounds of entry. The death, in the
\nopinion of  the Doctor,\t was due to shock and haemorrhage on
\naccount of  the gunshot\t wounds of  the head  and the  right
\nlung. The accused surrendered in the court of the Additional
\nDistrict Magistrate, Farrukhabad on 7-1-1969, and thereafter
\ntheir custody was taken over by the Police. After conducting
\nthe preliminary\t enquiry the Magistrate committed Puttu Lal,
\nSuresh and  Partap accused for trial to the court of Session
\non charges  under ss.  302\/34, 109  Penal Code All the three
\naccused were  convicted and  each of  them was\tsentenced to
\nimprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 200\/-.\n<\/p>\n
     The plea  of the  accused was  one\t of  denial  of\t the
\nprosecution case.  Suresh pleaded  alibi and  alleged  false
\nimplication. Partap  pleaded that  the deceased was about to
\nstrike him  with a  bhalla and\tconsequently, he  fired\t two
\nshots, in  self-defence, from  his double-barrel  gun at the
\ndeceased.\n<\/p>\n
     The accused examined Chhote Khan, DW 1. in defence.
\n     The  trial\t judge\trejected  the  defence\tversion\t and
\nconvicted and sentenced the accused as aforesaid.\n<\/p>\n
     In appeal,\t the High Court acquitted Suresh accused but
\nmaintained the\tconviction of  Puttu Lal  and Partap. Before
\nthe admission  of the  special leave  petition under Article
\n136 of\tthe Constitution by this Court, Puttu Lal died. Thus
\nonly the  appellant’s conviction  survives for consideration
\nin this appeal.\n<\/p>\n
     The decision  of the  courts below\t rests mainly on the
\ntestimony of  the three eye-witnesses, namely, Raj Kumar, PW
\n1, Atma Ram PW 2, and Achhey Ram, PW 4.\n<\/p>\n
     Mr. A.  N. Mulla, the learned Counsel for the appellant
\ncontends that  the evidence  of P.Ws. 2 and 4 was not worthy
\nof credence;  that being  residents of\tanother village\t and
\nhaving failed  to give\ta credible reason for their presence
\nat the\tscene of  occurrence, they  were chance witnesses of
\nthe worst type; that as admitted by their brother” Bisheshar
\nDayal, PW 15, they were not only related to the deceased but
\nwere
\n767<\/span>
\nstock witnesses\t of the Police. that since the witnesses did
\nnot frankly and fully admit their mutual blood relationship”
\nthey were of a type to whom truth, even in trifles, appeared
\nto be  unpalatable;  that  the\tprosecution  had  failed  to
\nexamine Siya  Ram and  Mahabir who  were also  named as eye-
\nwitnesses in  the F.I.R.  and the  courts below had erred in
\nnot drawing  an adverse inference against the prosecution on
\nthat score.\n<\/p>\n
     Although this  criticism levelled against P.Ws. 2 and 4
\nis not\ttotally devoid\tof force,  we  do  not\tthink  it  a
\nsufficient  ground  to\tdepart\tfrom  the  settled  rule  of
\npractice according  to which  this Court  does not,  in\t the
\nabsence of  material irregularity,  illegality\tor  manifest
\nerror, itself  reappraise the  evidence. In  spite of  these
\ninfirmities, the  courts below\thave believed their presence
\nat the\ttime and  place of  occurrence. The reasons given by
\nthe witnesses  for  their  presence  at\t the  spot,  may  be
\nvulnerable, even  wrong. True,\tthey are  residents  of\t the
\nneighbouring village,  1 1\/2  or 2 miles away, and belong to
\nthe caste  of the  deceased.  PW  15  may  be  bearing\tsome
\nrelationship with  the deceased.  But the  fact remains that
\nPWs 2  and 4  have been named as eye-witnesses in the F.I.R.
\nwhich was  lodged in  the Police Station, 8 miles away, with
\nutmost promptitude.\n<\/p>\n
     Be that  as it may, the fate of the case did not depend
\non the evidence of these two witnesses. Raj Kumar’s evidence
\ncorroborated by\t the F.I.R.  and the  other evidence  on the
\nrecord, was by itself, sufficient to hold that the appellant
\nhad fired a fatal shot at the deceased from close range with
\nthe double-barrel gun of his father. Thus, the only question
\nthat falls  to be  considered in  this appal is, whether Ram
\nNath was  shot dead  by the appellant in the exercise of his
\nright of private defence ?\n<\/p>\n
     We have  carefully scrutinised  the  judgments  of\t the
\ncourts below. In our opinion, their finding in regard to the
\nplea of\t self-defence is  clearly erroneous.  They appear to
\nhave overlooked\t he distinction between the nature of burden
\nthat rests  on an  accused under  s. 105   Evidence  Act  to
\nestablish a  plea of  self-defence and\tthe one\t cast on the
\nprosecution by\tSection 101  to prove  its case. It is well-
\nsettled that  the burden on the accused is not as onerous as
\nthat which lies on the prosecution. While the prosecution is
\nrequired to  prove its\tcase beyond  a reasonable doubt, the
\naccused can  discharge\this  onus  by  establishing  a\tmere
\npreponderance of probability.\n<\/p>\n
     Since the\tapproach of  the courts\t below is  basically
\nwrong, it  has become  necessary to  examine the material on
\nrecord bearing\ton the\tplea of\t self-defence. This plea was
\nspecifically taken  by the  appellant at  the trial  in\t his
\nexamination under  s. 342,  Cr. P.C. It was put to Raj Kumar
\nPW 1,  the  chief  witness  of\tthe  prosecution,  in  cross
\nexamination. Raj Kumar replied: “It is wrong to suggest that
\nRam Nath  would have murdered Partap if Partap had not fired
\nat him.\t Ram Nath had nothing in his hand.” The courts below
\nhave accepted without demur the ipse dixit of Raj Kumar that
\nthe deceased  was unarmed.  We find it impossible to swallow
\nthis so\t improbable a  version the  credibility of which was
\nextremely underminded by the telling
\n768<\/span>
\ncircumstances  appearing   in  the    prosecution  evidence,
\nitself. It  was the  admitted case  of the  prosecution that
\nfollowing the threatening gesture made by Raj Kumar to break
\nPuttu Lal’s head with the spade, and the call given by Puttu
\nLal,  the   appellant  came  there  armed  with\t a  gun\t and
\nimmediately   thereafter,   the\t  deceased   came   running,
\nproclaiming that  he would break the heads of and settle the
\nscores with  everyone of  the accused  party. It  is further
\nadmitted that the deceased had reached at a distance of 3 or
\n4 paces\t from the  appellant  when  the\t latter\t fired.\t The
\nblackening found  around the wounds of entry on the deadbody
\nby the medical witness, confirm that the deceased was within
\nsix feet  of the  assailant when he received those injuries.
\nAgain, it is the case of the prosecution that at the time of
\nthe first  gun-fire the\t deceased was  facing the appellant.
\nThe medical  evidence also  confirms  it,  inasmuch  as\t two
\nentrance wounds\t (1 and 5) were located on the front side of
\nthe  deceased.\t From  this   circumstance  it\t is  clearly
\ndiscernible that the deceased was charging at the gunman and
\nhad reached  within a  striking distance when his charge was
\nfoiled by  the gun-fire. It is difficult to believe that the
\ndeceased would have behaved in the bold and truculent manner
\nhe did,\t if he\twere not  armed with a formidable weapon. It
\nwas put to Raj Kumar by the defence that if the deceased was
\nempty handed-as\t was alleged  by  the  witness\thow  did  he
\nproclaim to  break the heads of the accused. The witness had
\nno  satisfactory   answer  to  it.  Conscious  that  he\t was
\nsuppressing the\t fact in  question, all that he could say in
\nbefuddled embarrassment,  was: ‘`I  do not  know  with\twhat
\nweapon he was going to break the heads.”\n<\/p>\n
     The appellant’s  plea that\t the deceased  was going  to
\nstrike him with a Bhalla, when the gun was fired, was highly
\nprobable.\n<\/p>\n
     one of  the reasons  given by the learned Judges of the
\nHigh Court  for ignoring  this plea  was that it was belated
\nand had\t not  been  set\t up  by\t the  appellant\t during\t his
\nexamination in\tthe Committal  Court. A glance at the record
\nof that\t examination would  show that  he was  not  properly
\nexamined in  that court.  Only\ta  composite  question\twith
\nregard to all the circumstances of the prosecution case, was
\nput to\thim in\tthe Committal  Court, which  he denied.\t The
\nomission of  the appellant  to set  up the  plea of  private
\ndefence in  the Committal Court, therefore, was no ground to
\nbrand it  as an\t after-thought, particularly  when there was
\nfoundation for it in the prosecution evidence, itself.\n<\/p>\n
     The  circumstances\t  appearing   in   the\t prosecution
\nevidence, and  the statement of the appellant recorded under
\nSec 342, Cr. P.C. did not exhaust the material in support of
\nthe plea  of self-defence. There was the direct testimony of
\nChhote Khan,  DW 1, who testified that he was attracted from
\nhis house  to the  spot by  the outcry\tof Puttu Lal accused
\nwhich was  to the  effect, that he was being killed. Witness
\nsaw Ram\t Nath deceased,\t armed with a spear, running towards
\nthe move  of Siya  Ram. Thereafter,  he heard two reports of
\ngun-fire. On  reaching the  grove, the\twitness saw Ram Nath
\nlying dead  with a  spear by  his side. Partap appellant and
\nPuttu Lal were also seen running away from the scene. Partap
\nwas carrying  a gun.  Witness did  not see  Suresh  and\t Ram
\nParkash there. Excepting the precise words of
\n769<\/span>
\nPuttu Lal’s  call and  the fact\t of the deceased being armed
\nwith a\tspear, Chhote  Khan’s evidence in so far as it goes,
\nfits in with the prosecution story.\n<\/p>\n
     The High  Court has  rejected hi, evidence without much
\ndiscussion  for\t two  reasons;\tfirstly,  that\the  was\t not
\nspeaking the  truth inasmuch as he stated that Puttu Lal was
\nraising an  outcry that he  was being killed, because it was
\nno-body’s case\tthat any  body\tassaulted  or  attempted  to
\nassault Puttu  Lal. Secondly, the witness did not appear and
\nmake any statement before the investigating officer. Neither
\nof these  was a\t good ground  to reject his testimony but of
\nhand. Chhote  Khan was\ta resident  of the same village. The
\nplace of  occurrence is\t not situated  at a far off distance
\nfrom the  village, Indeed,  it was the prosecution case that
\nthe appellant  and deceased  came to  the spot after hearing
\nthe shouts  of Puttu Lal and Raj Kumar. Chhote Khan’s coming
\nto the spot from the village on hearing the same shouts, was
\ntherefore, equally  probable. In  any case, his reaching the
\nscene on hearing the reports of gun-fire and seeing Ram Nath
\nlying dead with a spear, was a highly probable fact.\n<\/p>\n
     Nor could\this version  that Puttu\t Lal was  raising an
\noutcry that  he\t  was being killed, be rejected outright. It
\nwas admitted  by Raj Kumar in cross-examination, that he and
\nhis companions\thad advanced  2 paces  towards\tthe  accused
\nPuttu Lal  and others, threatening to break their heads with
\nthe Phawra  (spade and\tthat the  witness was  then carrying
\n(rather brandishing)  the spade. It is further admitted that
\nit was\tafter this  threat that Puttu Lal gave a call to the
\nappellant to  come armed with the gun. In the face of such a
\nthreat, it  was not  improbable for Puttu Lal to cry out for
\nhelp saying that he was being killed.\n<\/p>\n
     Chhote Khan  was an  independent witness.\tNothing\t was
\nbrought out in cross-examination to show that he was hostile
\ntowards- the  complainant party\t or had any special interest
\nin the defence.\n<\/p>\n
     In the light of the above discussion, the conclusion is
\ninescapable that the appellant had succeeded in establishing
\nby a  preponderance of\tprobability, that  the deceased\t was
\nwithin a  striking distance,   poised for imminent attack on
\nthe appellant  with a spear, when the latter fired the fatal
\ngunshot. In  such a  situation, the appellant had reasonable
\nand immediate  apprehension that  he would  suffer death  or
\ngrieous hurt  if he  did not  fire at the deceased. Thus the
\ndeath was,  in all   probability, caused by the appellant in
\nthe exercise of his right of private defence.\n<\/p>\n
     For the  foregoing reasons\t we allow  the\tappeal,\t set
\naside the conviction of the appellant and acquit him.\n<\/p>\n
V.P.S\t\t\t\t\t    Appeal allowed .\n770<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Partap vs The State Of U.P on 10 September, 1975 Equivalent citations: 1976 AIR 966, 1976 SCR (1) 757 Author: R S Sarkaria Bench: Sarkaria, Ranjit Singh PETITIONER: PARTAP Vs. RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF U.P. DATE OF JUDGMENT10\/09\/1975 BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BENCH: SARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH BEG, M. HAMEEDULLAH BHAGWATI, P.N. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-191234","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nPartap vs The State Of U.P on 10 September, 1975 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Partap vs The State Of U.P on 10 September, 1975 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1975-09-09T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2016-01-23T20:19:12+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"36 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Partap vs The State Of U.P on 10 September, 1975\",\"datePublished\":\"1975-09-09T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2016-01-23T20:19:12+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975\"},\"wordCount\":5775,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/partap-vs-the-state-of-u-p-on-10-september-1975\",\"name\":\"Partap vs The State Of U.P on 10 September, 1975 - 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