{"id":193664,"date":"2005-04-07T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2005-04-06T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005"},"modified":"2018-02-01T01:27:05","modified_gmt":"2018-01-31T19:57:05","slug":"ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005","title":{"rendered":"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing … vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing … vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005<\/div>\n
Author: S.B. Sinha<\/div>\n
Bench: N. Santosh Hegde, B.P. Singh, S.B. Sinha<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (crl.)  523 of 2005\n\nPETITIONER:\nRanjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma\t\t\t\t\n\nRESPONDENT:\nState of Maharashtra & Anr.\t\t\t\t\t\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 07\/04\/2005\n\nBENCH:\nN. Santosh Hegde,B.P. Singh & S.B. Sinha\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
J U D G M E N T
\n(Arising out of SLP (Crl.)  No.3879 of 2004)<\/p>\n
S.B. SINHA,  J :\n<\/p>\n
\tLeave granted.\n<\/p>\n
 \tInterpretation and application of the Maharashtra Control of
\nOrganised Crime Act, 1999 (for short ‘MCOCA’) is involved in this appeal
\nwhich arises out of a judgment and order dated 16th July, 2004 passed by a
\nlearned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court in Criminal Application No.
\n572\/2004 refusing bail to the Appellant herein.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Appellant is a former Commissioner of Police.  He was posted in
\nthe city of Pune in the said capacity between 30th April, 2000 and 31st
\nDecember, 2000.  He was appointed Commissioner of Police, Mumbai on or
\nabout 1st January, 2003.  Allegedly, he was so posted upon supercession  of a
\nfew officers.  A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against him on
\n25.11.2003 but without taking any further action thereupon, he was allowed
\nto superannuate on 30.11.2003.\n<\/p>\n
 \tOne  Abdul Karim Ladsa Telgi (hereinafter referred to as ‘Telgi’) was
\narrested and proceeded against for alleged commission of offence of printing
\ncounterfeit stamps and forgery in various States including the State of
\nMaharashtra.  He was lodged in Bangalore Jail since November, 2001.\n<\/p>\n
 \tDuring the Appellant’s tenure as Commissioner of Police, Pune, fake
\nstamp papers worth Rs. 2.98 lacs were seized whereupon a first information
\nreport bearing C.R. No. 135 of 2002 came to be registered at Bund Garden
\nPolice Station, Pune under Sections 120-B, 255, 249, 260, 263(a) and (b),
\n478, 472 and 474 read with Section 34 of the IPC.   The said offence was
\nbeing investigated by one Mr. Deshmukh but having regard to the magnitude
\nthereof, three teams lead by one Mr. S.M. Mushrif, Addl. Commissioner of
\nPolice (Crime) were formed.  The said Mr. Mushrif is said to be a brother of
\na Minister of the Government of Maharashtra.  On or about 16.07.2002,
\nhowever a proposal was mooted to invoke Section 3 of the MCOCA and
\nupon obtaining the opinion of Senior Public Prosecutor therefor, the same
\nwas invoked.\n<\/p>\n
 \tOne Mr. Mulani, Assistant Commissioner of Police (Crime Branch)
\nhad been included in the field work team along with other officers in
\nconnection with the investigation of the said crime.  Overall supervision of
\nthe said crime, however, was entrusted to one Mr. Maheshgauri, Joint
\nCommissioner of Police.\n<\/p>\n
 \tOn the ground of alleged involvement in the aforementioned case, the
\nAppellant was arrested on 1.12.2003 whereafter a remand application for 15
\ndays of police custody was made but he was remanded to police custody
\nfrom 2.12.2003 to 9.12.2003 and thereafter to judicial custody.  His
\napplication for bail was rejected by the Special Court, Pune by an order
\ndated 19.1.2004 whereupon he filed an application for grant of bail before
\nthe High Court.  By reason of the impugned order, the said application has
\nbeen rejected.\n<\/p>\n
 \tBefore adverting to the rival contentions raised in this appeal, we may
\nnotice some admitted facts.\n<\/p>\n
 \tOn the basis of the information received by the Appellant and on his
\ndirection to intercept the car and on his telephonic instruction thereabout, a
\nfirst information report dated 7.6.2002 was lodged.  During the course of the
\ninvestigation of the said case, number of places were raided and huge
\nquantity of stamps, printing machinery worth Rs. 21,28,47,63,824\/- were
\nseized from several accused persons.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe provisions of the MCOCA were invoked against Telgi who
\nfigured as accused No. 23 and Mr. Shabir Sheikh, accused No. 25 on the
\nground that a period of 90 days was coming to an end on 3.9.2002.  On or
\nabout 22.11.2002, Mr. Jaiswal, DIG, SRPF, Mumbai granted an approval to
\ninvoke the provisions of the MCOCA whereupon DCP, Dr. Jai Jadhav took
\nover investigation of the said case.\n<\/p>\n
 \tBefore the High Court, the role of the Appellant was said to be
\nrendition of help and support to organized crime syndicate by certain acts of
\nomission and commission,  i.e., by  rendering  help  or  support  to Mulani, a
\nco-accused when he was Commissioner of Police, Pune and through API-
\nDilip Kamat, co-accused while he was the Commissioner of Police,
\nMumbai.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe allegations against the Appellant as have been noticed by the
\nHigh Court are as under:\n<\/p>\n
“I. The applicant knew the adverse antecedents of
\nMulani since 1996. The respondents have relied on
\nthe following circumstances and the sequence of
\nevents in support of their case against the
\napplicant.\n<\/p>\n
(a) A complaint about corruption was received in
\nrespect of Mulani on 14.9.1996, who was then the
\nSr. Inspector of Police at Dongri Police Station,
\nMumbai. A copy of this complaint was also
\nreceived by the applicant, who was then working
\nas Jt. Commissioner of Police, Mumbai and bears
\nhis signature on it. The said complaint was
\nforwarded by the applicant to Anti Corruption
\nBureau, Mumbai.\n<\/p>\n
(b) In the affidavit dated 29.10.2002 filed by the
\napplicant in his capacity as Commissioner of
\nPolice, Pune before the Maharashtra State
\nAdministrative Tribunal (MAT) against Mulani he
\nhas categorically affirmed that conduct of Mulani
\nwas found to be highly suspicious in sensational
\nmurder case of one Faizulla Khan.\n<\/p>\n
(c) On 6.9.2002, the Investigation was handed over
\nto DCP Jay Jadhav as by then the provisions of
\nMCOCA were invoked against two of the Accused
\nin C.R. No. 135\/2002. New teams were formed for
\nthe investigation under MCOCA. While forming
\nthe team, the applicant included Mulani’s name in
\nthe investigation team in connection with the
\ninvestigation of C.R. No. 135\/2002 (Page No.
\n12694 of chargesheet) though he was specifically
\ntold by DCP Jay Jadhav not to include him in the
\nteam (statement of CDP Jay Jadhav Page 11941 of
\nthe Chargesheet). It was on the pretext that PI
\nDeshmukh was too overburdened being in charge
\nof Bund Garden police station and it was only
\nMulani who knew all the facets of the case.\n<\/p>\n
(d) The investigation revealed that Ashok Basak,
\nAddl. Chief Secretary (Home), State of
\nMaharashtra (for short, “Basak”) had informed the
\napplicant on 6.9.2002 about Mulani being in
\ntelephonic contact with Telgi, who was then
\nlodged in Central Jail at Bangalore and his tainted
\nrole in fake stamp case. This information was
\npassed on to Basak by Adhip Choudhari, Addl.
\nChief Secretary (Home), Government of
\nKarnataka. The applicant had assured Ashok
\nBasak that he would remove Mulani from
\ninvestigation. Despite this, Mulani was not
\nneutalised by the applicant and he was allowed to
\ncontinue in the investigation team.\n<\/p>\n
(e) There is no dispute that atleast on 6.9.2002
\nBasak had shared the said information with the
\napplicant.\n<\/p>\n
(f) A complaint of corruption dated 15.7.2002
\nreceived from President, Pune Forum Citizen,
\nagainst ACP Mulani, was received by the applicant
\non 31.8.2002.\n<\/p>\n
(g) Mulani was transferred to Jat, Dist-Sangli by
\nthe order of the Government dated 4.9.2002. This
\norder was received in Pune on 6.9.2002. The order
\nof transfer of Mulani was not served till he had
\nobtained a stay against the transfer from the MAT
\non 6.9.2002 (Page 12843).\n<\/p>\n
(h) The Stay was for transfer to JAT Division and
\nnot for internal transfer. Yet, Mulani was not
\ntransferred from the investigation of C.R. No.
\n135\/2002, on the other hand, Mulani was sent to
\nBangalore on 18.9.2002 all alone without the I.O.\n<\/p>\n
(i) The Government of Maharashtra had
\nconstituted Special Task Force (STF) for enquiring
\ninto all the pending cases relating to counterfeit
\nstamps in the State of Maharashtra and the
\napplicant was appointed as the Chairman to head
\nthe STF. Not a single meeting of this STF was
\nconvened by the applicant.\n<\/p>\n
(j) Mulani was allowed to be associated with the
\ninvestigation till 30.9.2002 and he was transferred
\nto Special Branch only on 30.9.2002 (Page No.
\n12846).\n<\/p>\n
(k) On 10.10.2002 certain names were
\nrecommended for reward in connection with the
\ninvestigation of C.R. No. 135\/2002. Although
\nMulani’s name was not listed initially, it was
\nspecifically added by the applicant in his own
\nhandwriting.\n<\/p>\n
(l) The applicant did not ensure the filing of a
\nproperly reasoned chargesheet in C.R. No.
\n135\/2002 P.S. Bund Garden and did not ensure the
\ntimely application of MCOCA to the whole case.
\nReference statement of the Director General of
\nPolice, Maharashtra Shri S.C. Malhotra. The filing
\nof the chargesheet was hurried through by the
\napplicant (Reference statement of Kishore Jadhav –
\nPage 11947).\n<\/p>\n
II. On this background, on and from 1.1.2003 the
\napplicant was posted as Commissioner of Police,
\nMumbai.\n<\/p>\n
(a) The applicant was well aware about various
\ncases of stamps scam which were pending in
\nMumbai, while he was working as Jt.\n<\/p>\n
Commissioner, Mumbai during the year on
\n8.6.2002, he had sent a wireless message calling
\nfor the details of these cases.\n<\/p>\n
(b) On 9.1.2003, DIG Jaiswal alongwith Addl.
\nD.G. Karnataka Shri Kumar personally met and
\ninformed the applicant about Telgi enjoying all
\ncomforts in his flat at Cuffe Parade, Mumbai. He
\nought to have immediately taken coercive action
\nand ensured its implementation.\n<\/p>\n
(c) Thereafter, a written report (Page 12181) dated
\n10.1.2003 was sent by DIG Jaiswal setting out in
\ndetail the facts noticed by him during their visit to
\nCuffe Parade flat. On this letter, the applicant had
\nmade a noting that API Kamat and the constables
\nbe placed under suspension with immediate effect.
\nHowever, the record shows that they were not
\nsuspended till 15.1.2003 and no active steps were
\ntaken by the applicant to ensure the immediate
\nsuspension though it was within his powers to
\nensure that the same was done with immediate
\neffect. The noting dated 15.1.2003 on (Page Nos.
\n12202 and 12203) clearly shows that till 15.1.2003
\nthese police personnel were not suspended.\n<\/p>\n
(d) It is significant to mention that DIG Jaiswal in
\nhis report had specifically voiced an apprehension
\nthat a big seizure may be concocted in order to
\nprotect the erring police officer, API Dilip Kamat
\nand in fact, this apprehension came though because
\nof the conspiracy that was hatched between the
\nofficials of Crime Branch, Mumbai (Statement of
\nACP Padwal at Page No. 11087).\n<\/p>\n
III. According to the prosecution, following
\ncircumstances could not be explained by the
\napplicant.\n<\/p>\n
(a) The fact that he had a closed door meeting with
\nA.K. Telgi in isolation between himself and
\nA.K.L. Telgi only to the exclusion of other high
\nranking officers (Statement of ACP Supriya Patil
\nat Page No. 11912, DCP (H.Q.) Koregaonkar at
\nPage No. 11898 and DCP Jay Jadhav at Page No.
\n111940).\n<\/p>\n
(b) The applicant knew A.K.L. Telgi even when he
\nwas at Mumbai earlier is also apparent from the
\nstatement of DCP Vasant Koregaonkar (Page No.
\n11898)\n<\/p>\n
(c) Brain Maping (P-300) of AKL Telgi, shows
\nthat he had given positive responses to the question
\nrelating to payment made to the applicant, favour
\nshown by the applicant in Pune cases and facilities
\nprovided in Mumbai custody by the applicant
\n(Page No. 12960 to 12963).”\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe plea taken by the Appellant herein about his innocence was
\nrejected by the High Court upon arriving the following findings:\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tDespite possession of powers which he could have used against
\naccused involved in the case, as also against the erring officers, he
\nprotected and projected Mulani and Kamat as good and responsible
\nofficers.  The Appellant was aware of the tainted background and
\nadverse antecedents of Mulani and both the accused visited Bangalore
\nwith him.  After the provisions of the MCOCA were invoked and Dr.
\nJai Jadav was appointed as investigating officer, the name of Mulani
\nwas included in the investigation team by the Appellant herein.  A
\ncalculated attempt was made by the Appellant herein to continue
\nMulani in the investigation team and was assigned responsible role to
\nplay.  Despite his transfer to Jat, district Sangli by the order dated
\n4.9.2002 which was received on 6.9.2002, Mulani was not neutralized
\ntill 30th September, 2002 although the Appellant had received an
\ninformation from the Additional Chief Secretary,
\nAshok Basak that Mulani had been contacting Telgi telephonically
\nwho was then lodged in Central Jail.\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\t“Instead, he allowed Mulani to continue in the investigation team
\neven after 6.9.02, this lapse on the part of the applicant under any
\ncircumstances cannot be termed as innocent, innocuous and
\ninadvertent. This observation becomes stronger if we look at the
\nsubsequent events, i.e. overtacts of the applicant after 6.9.02. After
\n6.9.02 Mulani was continued in the investigation team. He was sent to
\nBangalore all alone on 18.9.02. When a proposal was placed before
\nthe applicant to recommend names of officers for rewards for their
\noutstanding role in the fake stamps case consisting of nine names, the
\napplicant on 10.10.02 included the name of Mulani in his own
\nhandwriting in the said list of officers. This cannot be termed as
\ninnocent dereliction of duties. At every stage it, prima facie, shows
\nthat there was a calculated attempt on the part of the applicant to
\ncontinue Mulani in the investigation team and see that he is projected
\nas most efficient officer despite the knowledge of his adverse
\nantecedents and the tainted role in the investigation of fake stamps
\ncase.”\n<\/p>\n
(iii)\t“The facts of the case would go to show that his association with
\nMulani were with actual knowledge or atleast there are reasonable
\ngrounds to believe that the applicant was aware that Mulani was
\nengaged in assisting the organised crime syndicate of Telgi.”\n<\/p>\n
(iv)\t“In my opinion, the acts and commissions on the parts of the applicant
\nin helping and supporting Mulani and Kamat would, prima facie, fall
\nwithin the first part of Section 24 and therefore it would not be correct
\nto state that Section 24 is not attracted. The role of the applicant
\nclearly demonstrates that he rendered help and support to the member
\nof an organised crime syndicate.”\n<\/p>\n
(v)\t“In so far as “Cuffe Parade flat” episode is concerned, it is true that
\nthe applicant took over as Commissioner of Police Mumbai on
\n1.1.2003. The custody of Telgi was with Mumbai police from
\n20.10.02 to 21.1.03. However, fact remains that on 9.1.2003, DIG
\nJaiswal along with Addl. D.G. Karnataka-Shri Srikumar had
\npersonally met the applicant and informed him about Telgi’s enjoying
\nall comforts in his flat at Cuffe Parade, and conducting his unlawful
\nactivities on mobile phone, requesting him to take immediate coercive
\naction and ensure its implementation.”\n<\/p>\n
(vi)\tAs regard application of the provisions of the MCOCA, the High
\nCourt was of the opinion that as the Appellant knowingly facilitated
\nthe commission of an organized crime through Mulani at Pune and
\nKamat at Mumbai, prima facie, he committed an offence under
\nSection 3(2) of the MCOCA and having abetted them also committed
\nan offence under Section 4 thereof.\n<\/p>\n
 \tSubmissions of Mr. V.R. Manohar, learned senior counsel appearing
\non behalf of the Appellant are as under:\n<\/p>\n
(a)\tThe Appellant did not include Mulani in the investigating team.  In
\nfact he was included in the field track team by Mr. Mushrif for the
\npurpose of tracing and arresting accused persons which does not come
\nwithin the purview of the investigation of the offence or interrogation
\nof the accused.\n<\/p>\n
(b)\tAs regard the allegation regarding abetment of Kamat, it was pointed
\nout that when custody of  Telgi was taken by Mumbai Police between
\n20th October, 2002 and 21.st January, 2003, one Mr. M.N Singh was
\nthe Commissioner of Mumbai Police during which period Telgi was
\nallegedly not kept in custody and was staying in his own flat or hotel
\nand only on or about 9th January, 2003 when Mr. Jaiswal upon visting
\nthe flat of Mr. Telgi found out the same and brought it to the notice of
\nthe Appellant orally whereupon the order of suspension was passed on
\ntelephone by him.  On 10th January, 2003 which happened to be a
\nFriday, Jaiswal addressed a letter to the Chief Secretary, Maharashtra
\nwith a copy to the Appellant which was received in his Office on 12th
\nJanuary, 2003 and on that day itself an order of suspension was passed
\nbut the Joint Commissioner actually placed Kamat and others on
\nsuspension on 15th January, 2003.\n<\/p>\n
(c)\tEven during the raids made in the Bhiwandi Godown on the night of
\n9th January, 2003 seizure of stamps worth Rs.820 crores was made,
\nout of which some were found to be genuine ones and, thus, such
\nseizures whether directed against Telgi or Sheikh having resulted in
\ndemolition of Telgi empire, the Appellant cannot be said to have aided
\nor abetted the commission of any offence.  In any event, having regard
\nto the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Appellant thereby
\ndid not aid or abet Telgi who was proceeded against under MCOCA,
\nbut merely abetted the abettors and, thus, the provisions thereof are
\nnot applicable.\n<\/p>\n
(d)\tSo far as alleged acts of omissions and commissions on the part of the
\nAppellant between the period 9th January, 2003 to 15th January, 2003
\nare concerned, even in the chargesheet he is said to have only aided
\nMulani and, thus, the provisions of the MCOCA are not applicable.\n<\/p>\n
(e)\tAs regard the allegations that the Appellant continued to keep Mulani
\nin the investigation team, our attention has been drawn to the fact that
\nimmediately after the order of transfer was passed on 4th September,
\n2002, Mulani moved the Administrative Tribunal and obtained an
\norder of stay on 6th September, 2002 which was in the following
\nterms:\n<\/p>\n
“The Applicant, who is working as Assistant
\nCommissioner of Police, Crime Branch, Pune has
\nto retire within about 11 months.  His service
\nrecord seems to be very good.  Hence transfer
\norder of the applicant dated 04-09-2002 is stayed
\nuntil further orders.  Respondents to file a reply.”\n<\/p>\n
It is only on that date, the Appellant was informed by Shri Basak
\nabout Mulani’s integrity.   Mulani was pulled out of the Crime Branch
\nand posted in a Special Branch by the Appellant despite threat of
\ncontempt and in fact a contempt petition was filed by Mr. Mulani in
\nthe Maharashtra State Administrative Tribunal, at Mumbai.\n<\/p>\n
(f)\tEven the Director General of Police had certified Mulani as an
\nexcellent officer in the year 2003 and upon invocation of MCOCA,
\nDr. Jai Jadav was appointed as investigating officer.  Though he was
\nrequired to find out suitable officers to be included in his team, Dr. Jai
\nJadav made inquiries from the Appellant as also the Joint
\nCommissioner, as to the names of the suitable officers therefor and the
\nname of Mulani was suggested.  Thus, it would not be correct to
\ncontend that Mr. Mulani was kept in the investigating team by the
\nAppellant.\n<\/p>\n
(g)\tEven assuming that there had been gross dereliction or carelessness on
\nthe part of the Appellant, there is nothing on record to show that the
\nAppellant had benefitted himself in any manner whatsoever or had the
\nrequisite mens rea.\n<\/p>\n
As regard filing of chargesheet against the wife, daughter and brother
\nof Telgi, there had been difference of opinion between Mushrif and
\nDeshmukh wherewith the Appellant was not involved.  Mr. Jaiswal
\nprejudged the Appellant’s guilt.\n<\/p>\n
(h)\tAs regard initiation of disciplinary proceeding, our attention was
\ninvited to the fact that the Special Investigation Team (SIT) was
\nconstituted on 2nd November, 2002 in the following terms:\n<\/p>\n
“Government Resolution : Government has
\ndecided to create a Special Investigation Team
\n(S.I.T.) to make in-depth investigation and follow-
\nup of action in bogus stamp case headed by Shri
\nS.K. Jaiswal, Deputy Inspector General of Police
\nS.R.P.F., Mumbai.  He will be assisted by one
\nDeputy Commissioner of Police, one Assistant
\nCommissioner of Police, and three inspectors of
\nPolice.  The names of these team members will be
\ndecided by the Director General of Police.  The
\ninfrastructural support in terms of manpower,
\nvehicle and communication, etc., will be provided
\nby the Pune City Police.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe team will report to Shri A.K. Agarwal,
\nAdditional Director General of Police, C.I.D.,
\nPune.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Special Investigation Team will also
\nlook into the charges made by Shri Mushrif,
\nAdditional Commission of Police, Pune.”\n<\/p>\n
Mr. Jaiswal found the Appellant’s guilt of dereliction of duty as early
\nas on 3rd April, 2003 and despite the limited jurisdiction of the Special
\nInvestigation Team, he exceeded his brief implicating the Appellant.
\nIn this connection our attention has also been drawn to the
\nrecommendation made by SIT against various persons who do not
\nfigure as accused, viz., Prakash Deshmukh, Ashok Kamble, Kishore
\nJadhav, DCP Dr. Jai Jadhav, Vasant Koregaonkar which are as under:\n<\/p>\n
“(v) Number of acts of omission and commission
\nduring the course of investigation lie squarely at
\ndoor of Senior formations of Pune City Police.
\nThis investigation was extremely crucial as the
\ncase had national ramifications and the financial
\nstructure of the State of Maharashtra and Govt. of
\nIndia was being undermined systematically.
\nHence, it is for the Govt. to consider appropriate
\naction against Shri S.M. Mushrif, Shri M.S.
\nMaheshgauri and Shri R.S. Sharma for their
\nseveral acts of omission and commission as
\ndetailed earlier.”\n<\/p>\n
It has been pointed out that despite such adverse comments both
\nMushrif and Maheshgauri have been cited only as witnesses and, thus,
\nthe Appellant was discriminated against.\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tAs regard application of MCOCA, the learned counsel would contend
\nthat the provisions thereof cannot be given such wide interpretation as
\nhas been done by the learned Single Judge.\n<\/p>\n
(j)\tAs Mulani never visited Bangalore alone, the learned Judge
\ncommitted a factual error in this behalf.\n<\/p>\n
(k)\tAs regard recommendations for grant of reward in favour of Mulani, it
\nwas pointed out that the learned Judge had misread and misinterpreted
\nthe context in which such recommendation was made.  It was pointed
\nout that DCP Zone II on 10.10.2002 gave a list of officers who have
\ndone the best works which is as under:\n<\/p>\n
“(1)\tP.I. Shri Prakash Deshmukh
\n(2)\tPSI Shri Chavan
\n(3)\tPC Shri Katke N.K. BN 4059
\n(4)\tPC Shri Steven Sundaram, B.N. 756
\n(5)\tP.I. Shri Kadam (who has refused to take up
\ninvestigation)
\n(6)\tAPI Shri Thakare
\n(7)\tPSI Shri Ballal
\n(8)\tAPI Shri Karnire
\n(9)\tCivilian Computer Software Engineer, Mr.
\nDavis K.T.\n<\/p>\n
(10)\tH.C. Lele”\n<\/p>\n
According to the Appellant, however, in order of priority, the name of
\n(1) PSI Shri Chavan, (2) P.I. Shri Prakash Deshmukh (3) P.I. Shri Kadam,
\n(4) PC Shri Steven Sundaram, B.N. 756, (5)\tPC Shri Steven Sundaram, B.N.
\n756, (6) H.C. Lele were recommended and, furthermore, the following
\nendorsement was made:\n<\/p>\n
“I have indicated priority above.  Also include
\nnames of ACP Mulani\/Yadav and Davies in the
\ntext.”\n<\/p>\n
The names of ACP Mulani\/Yadav and Davies, thus, were directed to
\nbe included only in the text, i.e., the history of the case and not for the
\npurpose of grant of any reward.\n<\/p>\n
 \tMr. A. Sharan, the learned Addl. Solicitor General appearing on
\nbehalf of the CBI, on the other hand, would contend that the Appellant had
\nknown Telgi both as a scamster as well as a person for a long time, as would
\nappear from the statement of one Mr. R.S. Mopalwar, an IAS officer <\/p>\n
 \tIt was urged that from the statement of Mr. Maheshgauri, it would
\nappear that the Appellant met Telgi alone,  apparently for the purpose of
\ninterrogation, but no record thereof is available.  The said statement is
\nsupported by Smt. Supriya Patil Yadav and Shri Vasant Koregaonkar, an
\naffidavit of Mr. Mushrif in the Public Interest Litigation by Shri Anna
\nHazare.\n<\/p>\n
 \tAccording to the learned counsel the Appellant has helped those
\nofficers who did not want to make Telgi’s wife, daughter and brother as
\naccused by dragging his feet.\n<\/p>\n
 \tMr. Sharan would contend that Mulani had in fact been involved in
\nthe investigating team work, as would appear from the notesheet file of
\ninvestigation, inasmuch as he had interrogated some witnesses.  Our
\nattention has also been drawn to the answers given by the Appellant himself
\nin response to the questionnaire dated 7.11.2003 contending that the
\nAppellant accepted that Mulani had not been taken out of the team till 30th
\nSeptember, 2002 although he was transferred on 4th September, 2002.\n<\/p>\n
 \tOur attention has further been drawn to the brain mapping test of
\nTelgi to show that the Appellant had accepted unlawful gratification from
\nhim.\n<\/p>\n
 \tAccording to the learned counsel, since beginning the Appellant had
\nknowledge about the magnitude of the offence but despite the same, he
\nhelped Kamat by not implementing his order of suspension till 15th January,
\n2003 and, thus, allowed him to take steps to protect himself by arranging a
\nfake seizure as was apprehended by Mr. Jaiswal.  \tDrawing our attention to
\nthe judgment of the learned Single Judge, it was contended that having
\nregard to the provisions of the MCOCA, the Appellant must be held to have
\nconspired with the members of the organizing team by facilitating
\ncommission of the crime.  According to the learned counsel, in view of the
\nsub-section (4) of Section 21 of the MCOCA, the High Court has rightly
\nrefused to grant bail to the Appellant.\n<\/p>\n
\tMCOCA was enacted to make special provisions for prevention and
\ncontrol of, and for coping with, criminal activity by organized crime
\nsyndicate or gang, and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Statement of Objects and Reasons for enacting the said Act are as
\nunder:\n<\/p>\n
“Organised crime has been for quite some years
\nnow come up as a very serious threat to our
\nsociety.  It knows no national boundaries and is
\nfueled by illegal wealth generated by contract,
\nkilling, extortion, smuggling in contrabands, illegal
\ntrade in narcotics kidnappings for ransom,
\ncollection of protection money and money
\nlaundering, etc.  The illegal wealth and black
\nmoney generated by the organized crime being
\nvery huge, it has had serious adverse effect on our
\neconomy.  It was seen that the organized criminal
\nsyndicates made a common cause with terrorist
\ngangs and foster terrorism which extend beyond
\nthe national boundaries.  There was reason to
\nbelieve that organized criminal gangs have been
\noperating in the State and, thus, there was
\nimmediate need to curb their activities.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt was also noticed that the organized
\ncriminals have been making extensive use of wire
\nand oral communications in their criminal
\nactivities.  The interception of such
\ncommunications to obtain evidence of the
\ncommission of crimes or to prevent their
\ncommission would be an indispensable aid to law
\nenforcement and the administration of justice.\n<\/p>\n
 \t2. The existing legal frame work i.e. the
\npenal and procedural laws and the adjudicatory
\nsystem were found to be rather inadequate to curb
\nor control the menace of organized crime.\n<\/p>\n
Government, therefore, decided to enact a special
\nlaw with stringent and deterrent provisions
\nincluding in certain circumstances power to
\nintercept wire, electronic or oral communication to
\ncontrol the menace of the organized crime.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt is the purpose of this act to achieve these
\nobjects.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tSection 2 is the interpretation clause.  Section 2(1)(a), (d), (e) and (f)
\nwhereof read thus:\n<\/p>\n
“2(1) In this act, unless the context otherwise
\nrequires,;\n<\/p>\n
(a) “abet”, with its grammatical variations and
\ncognate expressions, includes, –\n<\/p>\n
(i) the communication or association with any
\nperson with the actual knowledge or having reason
\nto believe that such person is engaged in assisting
\nin any manner, an organised crime syndicate;\n<\/p>\n
(ii) the passing on or publication of, without any
\nlawful authority, any information likely to assist
\nthe organised crime syndicate and the passing on
\nor publication of or distribution of any document
\nor matter obtained from the organised crime
\nsyndicate; and\n<\/p>\n
(iii) the rendering of any assistance, whether
\nfinancial or otherwise, to the organised crime
\nsyndicate;\n<\/p>\n
(d) “continuing unlawful activity” means an
\nactivity prohibited by law for the time being in
\nforce, which is a cognizable offence punishable
\nwith imprisonment of three years or more,
\nundertaken either singly or jointly, as a member of
\nan organised crime syndicate or on behalf of such
\nsyndicate in respect of which more than one
\nchargesheets have been filed before a competent
\nCourt within the preceding period of ten years and
\nthat Court has taken cognizance of such offence;\n<\/p>\n
(e) “organised crime” means any continuing
\nunlawful activity by an individual, singly or
\njointly, either as a member of an organised crime
\nsyndicate or on behalf of such syndicate, by use of
\nviolence or threat of violence or intimidation or
\ncoercion, or other unlawful means, with the
\nobjective of gaining pecuniary benefits, or gaining
\nundue economic or other advantage for himself or
\nany other person or promoting insurgency;\n<\/p>\n
(f) “organised crime syndicate” means a group of
\ntwo or more persons who, acting either singly or
\ncollectively, as a syndicate or gang indulge in
\nactivities of organised crime;”\n<\/p>\n
 \tSub-section (2) of Section 3 provides for punishment for organized
\ncrime in the following terms:\n<\/p>\n
“(2) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit or
\nadvocates, abets or knowingly facilitates the
\ncommission of an organized crime or any act
\npreparatory to organized crime, shall be punishable
\nwith imprisonment for a term which shall be not
\nless than five years but which may extend to
\nimprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to a
\nfine, subject to a minimum fine of rupees five
\nlacs.”\n<\/p>\n
\tSection 4 provides for punishment for possessing unaccountable
\nwealth on behalf of member of organised crime syndicate.  Section 20
\nprovides for forfeiture and attachment of property, sub-section (2) whereof
\nreads as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“(2) Where any person is accused of any offence
\nunder this Act, it shall be open to the Special Court
\ntrying him, to pass on order that all or any
\nproperties, movable or immovable or both
\nbelonging to him, shall, during the period of such
\ntrial, be attached, and where such trial ends in
\nconviction, the properties so attached shall stand
\nforfeited to the State Government, free from all
\nencumbrances.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tSection 21 provides for modified application of certain provisions of
\nthe Code of Criminal Procedure, sub-section (4) whereof is as under:\n<\/p>\n
“(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the
\nCode, no person accused of an offence punishable
\nunder this Act shall, if in custody, be released on
\nbail or on his own bond, unless\n<\/p>\n
(a) the Public Prosecutor has been given an
\nopportunity to oppose the application of such
\nrelease; and\n<\/p>\n
(b) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the
\napplication, the Court is satisfied that there are
\nreasonable grounds for believing that he is not
\nguilty of such offence and that he is not likely to
\ncommit any offence while on bail.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tSection 24 reads, thus:\n<\/p>\n
“24. Whoever being a public servant renders any
\nhelp or support in any manner in the commission
\nof organised crime, as defined in Clause (e) of
\nSection 2, whether before or after the commission
\nof any offence by a member of an organised crime
\nsyndicate or abstains from taking lawful measures
\nunder this act or intentionally avoids to carry out
\nthe directions of any Court or of the superior
\npolice officers in this respect, shall be punished
\nwith imprisonment of either description for a term
\nwhich may extend to three years and also with
\nfine.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe interpretation clause as regard the expression ‘abet’ does not refer
\nto the definition of abetment as contained in Section 107 of IPC.  It refers to
\nsuch meaning which can be attributed to it in the general sense with
\ngrammatical variations and cognate expressions.  However, having regard to
\nthe cognate meaning, the term may be read in the light of the definition of
\nthese words under Sections 107 and 108 of the Indian Penal Code.  The
\ninclusive definition although expansive in nature, “communication” or
\n“association” must be read to mean such communication or association
\nwhich is in aid of  or render assistance in  the commission of organized
\ncrime.  In our considered opinion, any communication or association which
\nhas no nexus with the commission of organized crime would not come
\nwithin the purview thereof.  It must mean assistance to organised crime or
\norganised crime syndicate or to a person involved in either of them. It,
\nhowever, includes (a) communication or (b) association with any person
\nwith the actual knowledge or (c) having reason to believe that such person is
\nengaged in assisting in any manner, an organised crime syndicate.
\nCommunication to, or association with, any person by itself, as was
\ncontended by Mr. Sharan, would not, in our considered opinion, come within
\nmeaning of the aforementioned provision.  The communication or
\nassociation must relate to a person.  Such communication or association to
\nthe person must be with the actual knowledge or having reason to believe
\nthat he is engaged in assisting in any manner an organised crime syndicate.
\nThus, the offence under Section 3(2) of MCOCA must have a direct nexus
\nwith the offence committed by an organised crime syndicate.  Such abetment
\nof commission of offence must be by way of accessories before the
\ncommission of an offence.  An offence may be committed by a public
\nservant by reason of acts of omission and commission which would amount
\nto tampering with the investigation or to help an accused.  Such an act would
\nmake him an accessory  after the commission of  the offence.  It is
\ninteresting to note that whereas Section 3(2) having regard to the definition
\nof the term ‘abet’ refers directly to commission of an offence or assisting in
\nany manner an organised crime syndicate, Section 24 postulates a situation
\nwhere a public servant renders any help or support both before or after the
\ncommission of an offence by a member of an organised crime syndicate or
\nabstains from taking lawful measures under this Act.
\n \tInterpretation clauses contained in Sections 2(d), 2(e) and 2(f) are
\ninter-related.  An ‘organised crime syndicate’ refers to an ‘organised crime’
\nwhich in turn refers to ‘continuing unlawful activity’.  As at present advised,
\nit may not be necessary for us to consider as to whether the words “or other
\nlawful means” contained in Section 2(e) should be read “ejusdem generis”\/
\n“noscitur-a-sociis” with the words (i) violence, (ii) threat of violence, (iii)
\nintimidation or (iv) coercion.  We may, however, notice that the word
\n‘violence’ has been used only in Section 146 and 153A of the Indian Penal
\nCode.  The word ‘intimidation’ alone has not been used therein but only
\nSection 506 occurring in Chapter XXII thereof refers to ‘criminal
\nintimidation’.  The word ‘coercion’ finds place only in the Contract Act.  If
\nthe words ‘unlawful means’ is to be widely construed as including any or
\nother unlawful means,  having regard to the provisions contained in Sections
\n400, 401 and 413 of the IPC relating to  commission of  offences  of
\ncheating or criminal breach of trust, the provisions of the said Act can be
\napplied, which prima facie, does not appear to have been intended by the
\nParliament.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Statement of Objects and Reasons clearly state as to why the said
\nAct had to be enacted.  Thus, it will be safe to presume that the expression
\n‘any unlawful means’ must refer to any such act which has a direct nexus
\nwith the commission of a crime which MCOCA seeks to prevent or control.
\nIn other words,  an offence falling within the definition of organised crime
\nand committed by an organised crime syndicate is the offence contemplated
\nby  the Statement of Objects and Reasons.  There are offences and offences
\nunder the Indian Penal Code and other penal statutes providing for
\npunishment of three years or more and in relation to such offences more than
\none chargesheet may be filed.  As we have indicated hereinbefore, only
\nbecause a person cheats or commits a criminal breach of trust, more than
\nonce, the same by itself may not be sufficient to attract the provisions of
\nMCOCA.\n<\/p>\n
 \tFurthermore, mens rea is a necessary ingredient for commission of a
\ncrime under MCOCA.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn Shri Ram Vs. The State of U.P. [AIR 1975 SC 175], it was stated:\n<\/p>\n
“6Thus, in order to constitute abetment, the
\nabettor must be shown to have “intentionally”
\naided the commission of the crime. Mere proof
\nthat the crime charged could not have been
\ncommitted without the interposition of the alleged
\nabettor is not enough compliance with the
\nrequirements of Section 107. A person may, for
\nexample, invite another casually or for a friendly
\npurpose and that may facilitate the murder of the
\ninvitee. But unless the invitation was extended
\nwith intent to facilitate the commission of the
\nmurder, the person inviting cannot be said to have
\nabetted the murder. It is not enough that an act on
\nthe part of the alleged abettor happens to facilitate
\nthe commission of the crime. Intentional aiding
\nand therefore active complicity is the gist of the
\noffence of abetment under the third paragraph of
\nSection 107.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tSub-section (2) of Section 3 inter alia provides for facilitating
\nconspiracy or abetting or  commission of a crime by a person knowingly or
\nany act preparatory to organised crime.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe expression ‘conspiracy’ is not a term of art.  It has a definite
\nconnotation.  It must be read having regard to the legal concept which is now
\nwell-settled having regard to several decisions of this Court in Kehar Singh
\nand others Vs. The State (Delhi Admn.) [AIR 1988 SC 1883], State of
\nKarnataka Vs. L. Muniswamy and others [AIR 1977 SC 1489] and P.K.
\nNarayanan Vs. State of Kerala [1995 (1) SCC 142].\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn Kehar Singh (supra), it is stated:\n<\/p>\n
“275. From an analysis of the section, it will be
\nseen that Section 10 will come into play only when
\nthe court is satisfied that there is reasonable ground
\nto believe that two or more persons have conspired
\ntogether to commit an offence. There should be, in
\nother words, a prima facie evidence that the person
\nwas a party to the conspiracy before his acts can be
\nused against his co-conspirator. Once such prima
\nfacie evidence exists, anything said, done or
\nwritten by one of the conspirators in reference to
\nthe common intention, after the said intention was
\nfirst entertained, is relevant against the others. It is
\nrelevant not only for the purpose of proving the
\nexistence of conspiracy, but also for proving that
\nthe other person was a party to it. It is true that the
\nobservations of Subba Rao, J., in Sardar Sardul
\nSingh Caveeshar v. State of Maharashtra<\/a> [(1964) 2
\nSCR 378 : AIR 1965 SC 682] lend support to the
\ncontention that the admissibility of evidence as
\nbetween co-conspirators would be liberal than in
\nEnglish law. The learned Judge said : (at p. 390)
\n“The evidentiary value of the said acts is limited
\nby two circumstances, namely, that the acts shall
\nbe in reference to their common intention and in
\nrespect of a period after such intention was
\nentertained by any one of them. The expression “in
\nreference to their common intention” is very
\ncomprehensive and it appears to have been
\ndesignedly used to give it a wider scope than the
\nwords “in furtherance of” in the English law; with
\nthe result, anything said, done or written by a co-
\nconspirator, after the conspiracy was formed, will
\nbe evidence against the other before he entered the
\nfield of conspiracy or after he left it.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn P.K. Narayanan (supra), it is stated:\n<\/p>\n
“10. The ingredients of this offence are that there
\nshould be an agreement between the persons who
\nare alleged to conspire and the said agreement
\nshould be for doing of an illegal act or for doing by
\nillegal means an act which by itself may not be
\nillegal. Therefore the essence of criminal
\nconspiracy is an agreement to do an illegal act and
\nsuch an agreement can be proved either by direct
\nevidence or by circumstantial evidence or by both
\nand it is a matter of common experience that direct
\nevidence to prove conspiracy is rarely available.
\nTherefore the circumstances proved before, during
\nand after the occurrence have to be considered to
\ndecide about the complicity of the accused. But if
\nthose circumstances are compatible also with the
\ninnocence of the accused persons then it cannot be
\nheld that the prosecution has successfully
\nestablished its case. Even if some acts are proved
\nto have been committed it must be clear that they
\nwere so committed in pursuance of an agreement
\nmade between the accused who were parties to the
\nalleged conspiracy. Inferences from such proved
\ncircumstances regarding the guilt may be drawn
\nonly when such circumstances are incapable of any
\nother reasonable explanation. From the above
\ndiscussion it can be seen that some of the
\ncircumstances relied upon by the prosecution are
\nnot established by cogent and reliable evidence.
\nEven otherwise it cannot be said that those
\ncircumstances are incapable of any other
\nreasonable interpretation.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn Saju Vs. State of Kerala [AIR 2001 SC 175], this Court held:
\n“7. In a criminal case the onus lies on the
\nprosecution to prove affirmatively that the accused
\nwas directly and personally connected with the
\nacts or omissions attributable to the crime
\ncommitted by him. It is a settled position of law
\nthat act or action of one of the accused cannot be
\nused as evidence against another. However, an
\nexception has been carved out under Section 10 of
\nthe Evidence Act in the case of conspiracy. To
\nattract the applicability of Section 10 of the
\nEvidence Act, the court must have reasonable
\nground to believe that two or more persons had
\nconspired together for committing an offence. It is
\nonly then that the evidence of action or statement
\nmade by one of the accused could be used as
\nevidence against the other.”\n<\/p>\n
It was observed:\n<\/p>\n
“In short, the section can be analysed as follows
\n: (1) There shall be a prima facie evidence
\naffording a reasonable ground for a court to
\nbelieve that two or more persons are members of a
\nconspiracy; (2) if the said condition is fulfilled,
\nanything said, done or written by any one of them
\nin reference to their common intention will be
\nevidence against the other; (3) anything said, done
\nor written by him should have been said, done or
\nwritten by him after the intention was formed by
\nany one of them; (4) it would also be relevant for
\nthe said purpose against another who entered the
\nconspiracy whether it was said, done or written
\nbefore he entered the conspiracy or after he left it;
\n(5) it can only be used against a co-conspirator and
\nnot in his favour.'”\n<\/p>\n
\tMens rea, thus, to commit the crime must be established besides the
\nfact of agreement.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe High Court does not say that the Appellant has abetted Telgi or
\nhad conspired with him.  The findings of the High Court as against the
\nAppellant are attributable to allegations of abetting Kamat and Mulani.  Both
\nKamat and Mulani were public servants.  They may or may not have any
\ndirect role to play as regard commission of an organised crime but unless a
\nnexus with an accused who is a member of the organised crime syndicate or
\nan offence in the nature of organised crime is established, only by showing
\nsome alleged indulgence to Kamat or Mulani, the Appellant cannot be said
\nto have conspired or abetted commission of an organised crime.  Prima
\nfacie, therefore, we are of the view that Section 3(2) of MCOCA is not
\nattracted in the instant case.\n<\/p>\n
 \tSection 24 of MCOCA must be given a proper meaning.  A public
\nservant can be said to have committed an offence within the meaning of the
\nsaid provision if he (i) renders any help or support in any manner in the
\ncommission of an organised crime; (ii) whether before or after the
\ncommission of an offence by a member of an organised crime syndicate or\n<\/p>\n
(iii) abstains from taking lawful measures under this Act or (iv) intentionally
\navoids to carry out the directions of any Court or of the superior police
\nofficers in this respect.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe purported acts of omission and commission on the part of the
\nAppellant does not attract the first part of Section 24 of MCOCA.  It is not
\nthe contention of the Respondents that he has committed any act which
\ncomes within the purview of Clauses (3) and (4) hereinbefore.  The
\nprovisions of MCOCA, as for example, Section 20 casts a duty upon the
\npersons concerned to see that properties of a member of the organised crime
\nsyndicate are attached.  In view of Section 4, it also becomes the duty of the
\npersons connected with the investigation of crime to see that persons, who
\nare in possession of movable or immovable property which cannot be
\nsatisfactorily accounted for are brought to book.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Act is deterrent in nature.  It provides for deterrent punishment.
\nIt envisages three to ten years of imprisonment and may extend to life
\nimprisonment.  Death penalty can also be imposed if somebody commits a
\nmurder.  Similarly, fines ranging between three to ten lakhs can be imposed.\n<\/p>\n
 \tPresumption of innocence is a human right.  [See Narendra Singh and
\nAnother Vs. State of M.P., (2004) 10 SCC 699, para 31]  Article 21 in view
\nof its expansive meaning not only protects life and liberty but also envisages
\na fair procedure.  Liberty of a person should not ordinarily be interfered with
\nunless there exist cogent grounds therefor.  Sub-Section (4) of Section 21
\nmust be interpreted keeping in view the aforementioned salutary principles.
\nGiving an opportunity to the public prosecutor to oppose an application for
\nrelease of an accused appears to be reasonable restriction but Clause (b) of
\nSub-section (4) of Section 31 must be given a proper meaning.
\n \tDoes this statute require that before a person is released on bail, the
\ncourt, albeit prima facie, must come to the conclusion that he is not guilty of
\nsuch offence?  Is it necessary for the Court to record such a finding?  Would
\nthere be any machinery available to the Court to ascertain that once the
\naccused is enlarged on bail, he would not commit any offence whatsoever?\n<\/p>\n
 \tSuch findings are required to be recorded only for the purpose of
\narriving at an objective finding on the basis of materials on records only for
\ngrant of bail and for no other purpose .\n<\/p>\n
 \tWe are furthermore of the opinion that the restrictions on the power of
\nthe Court to grant bail should not be pushed too far.  If the Court, having
\nregard to the materials brought on record, is satisfied that in all probability
\nhe may not be ultimately convicted, an order granting bail may be passed.
\nThe satisfaction of the Court as regards his likelihood of not committing an
\noffence while on bail must be construed to mean an offence under the Act
\nand not any offence whatsoever be it a minor or major offence.  If such an
\nexpansive meaning is given, even likelihood of commission of an offence
\nunder Section 279 of the Indian Penal Code may debar the Court from
\nreleasing the accused on bail.  A statute, it is trite, should not be interpreted
\nin such a manner as would lead to absurdity.  What would further be
\nnecessary on the part of the Court is to see the culpability of the accused and
\nhis involvement in the commission of an organised crime either directly or
\nindirectly.  The Court at the time of considering the application for grant of
\nbail shall consider the question from the angle as to whether he was
\npossessed of the requisite mens rea.  Every little omission or commission,
\nnegligence or dereliction may not lead to a possibility of his having
\nculpability in the matter which is not the sine qua non for attracting the
\nprovisions of MCOCA.  A person in a given situation may not do that which
\nhe ought to have done.  The Court may in a situation of this nature keep in
\nmind the broad principles of law that some acts of omission and commission
\non the part of a public servant may attract disciplinary proceedings but may
\nnot attract a penal provision.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn Abdulla Mohammed Pagarkar etc. Vs. State (Union Territory of
\nGoa, Daman and Diu) [AIR 1980 SC 499], it is stated:
\n“15. Learned counsel for the State sought to
\nbuttress the evidence which we have just above
\ndiscussed with the findings recorded by the learned
\nSpecial Judge and detailed as items (a) to (e) in
\nparagraph 5 and items (i) and (iii) in paragraph 6
\nof this judgment. Those findings were affirmed by
\nthe learned Judicial Commissioner and we are
\nclearly of the opinion, for reasons which need not
\nbe restated here, that they were correctly arrived at.
\nBut those findings merely make out that the
\nappellants proceeded to execute the work in
\nflagrant disregard of the relevant Rules of the
\nG.F.R. and even of ordinary norms of procedural
\nbehaviour of government officials and contractors
\nin the matter of execution of works undertaken by
\nthe government. Such disregard however has not
\nbeen shown to us to amount to any of the offences
\nof which the appellants have been convicted. The
\nsaid findings no doubt make the suspicion to which
\nwe have above adverted still stronger but that is
\nwhere the matter rests and it cannot be said that
\nany of the ingredients of the charge have been
\nmade out.\n<\/p>\n
Apart from the findings and evidence referred to
\nearlier in paragraph, no material has been brought
\nto our notice on behalf of the State such as would
\nindicate that the bills or the summaries in question
\nwere false in any material particular.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn C. Chenga Reddy and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR
\n1996 SC 3390], it is stated:\n<\/p>\n
“55. The learned counsel appearing for all the
\nappellants also during the course of their
\narguments were unable to point out any error in
\nthose findings and according to them in the
\nestablished facts and circumstances of the case, the
\nirregularities, administrative lapses and violation
\nof the codal provisions, could only have resulted in
\na departmental action against the officials but
\ncriminal prosecution was not justified. Their
\nargument has force and appeals to us..”\n<\/p>\n
 \tEvery act of negligence or carelessness by itself may not be a
\nmisconduct.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe provisions of the said Act, therefore, must receive a strict
\nconstruction so as to pass the test of reasonableness.\n<\/p>\n
 \tSection 21(4) of MCOCA does not make any distinction between an
\noffence which entails punishment of life imprisonment and an imprisonment
\nfor a year or two.  It does not provide that even in case a person remains
\nbehind the bars for a period exceeding three years, although his involvement
\nmay be in terms of  Section 24 of the Act, the court is prohibited to enlarge
\nhim on bail.  Each case, therefore, must be considered on its own facts.  The
\nquestion as to whether he is involved in the commission of organized crime
\nor abetment thereof must be judged objectively.  Only because some
\nallegations have been made against a high ranking officer, which cannot be
\nbrushed aside,  may not by itself be sufficient to continue to keep him behind
\nthe bars although on an objective consideration the court may come to the
\nconclusion that the evidences against him are not such as would lead to his
\nconviction.  In case of circumstantial evidence like the present one, not only
\nculpability or mens rea of the accused should be prima facie established, the
\nCourt must also consider the question as to whether the circumstantial
\nevidence is such whereby all the links in the chain are complete.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe wording of Section 21(4), in our opinion, does not lead to the
\nconclusion that the Court must arrive at a positive finding that the applicant
\nfor bail has not committed an offence under the Act.  If such a construction
\nis placed,  the court intending to grant bail must arrive at a finding that the
\napplicant has not committed such an offence.  In such an event, it will be
\nimpossible for the prosecution to obtain a judgment of conviction of the
\napplicant.  Such cannot be the intention of the Legislature.  Section 21(4) of
\nMCOCA, therefore, must be construed reasonably.  It must be so construed
\nthat the Court is able to maintain a delicate balance between a judgment of
\nacquittal and conviction and an order granting bail much before
\ncommencement of trial.  Similarly, the Court will be required to record a
\nfinding as to the possibility of his committing a crime after grant of bail.
\nHowever, such an offence in futuro must be an offence under the Act and
\nnot any other offence.  Since it is difficult to predict the future conduct of an
\naccused, the court must necessarily consider this aspect of the matter having
\nregard to the antecedents of the accused, his propensities and the nature  and
\nmanner in which he is alleged to have committed the offence.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt is, furthermore, trite that for the purpose of considering an
\napplication for grant of bail,  although detailed reasons are not necessary to
\nbe assigned, the order granting bail must demonstrate application of mind at
\nleast in serious cases as to why the applicant has been granted or denied the
\nprivilege of bail.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe duty of the court at this stage is not to weigh the evidence
\nmeticulously but to arrive at a finding on the basis of broad probabilities.
\nHowever, while dealing with a special statute like MCOCA having regard to
\nthe provisions contained in Sub-section (4) of Section 21 of the Act, the
\nCourt may have to probe into the matter deeper so as to enable it to arrive at
\na finding that the materials collected against the accused during the
\ninvestigation may not justify a judgment of conviction.  The findings
\nrecorded by the Court while granting or refusing bail undoubtedly would be
\ntentative in nature,  which may not have any bearing on the merit of the case
\nand the trial court would, thus, be free to decide the case on the basis of
\nevidence adduced at the trial, without in any manner being prejudiced
\nthereby.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav and
\nAnother [(2004) 7 SCC 528], this Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
“18. We agree that a conclusive finding in regard
\nto the points urged by both the sides is not
\nexpected of the court considering a bail
\napplication. Still one should not forget as observed
\nby this Court in the case Puran v. Rambilas and
\nAnr. (SCC p. 344, para 8):\n<\/p>\n
“Giving reasons is different from discussing merits
\nor demerits. At the stage of granting bail a detailed
\nexamination of evidence and elaborate
\ndocumentation of the merits of the case has not to
\nbe undertaken. …… That did not mean that whilst
\ngranting bail some reasons for prima facie
\nconcluding why bail was being granted did not
\nhave to be indicated.”\n<\/p>\n
We respectfully agree with the above dictum of
\nthis Court. We also feel that such expression of
\nprima facie reasons for granting bail is a
\nrequirement of law in cases where such orders on
\nbail application are appealable, more so because of
\nthe fact, that the appellate court has every right to
\nknow the basis for granting the bail. Therefore, we
\nare not in agreement with the argument addressed
\nby the learned counsel for the accused that the
\nHigh Court was not expected even to indicate a
\nprima facie finding on all points urged before it
\nwhile granting bail, more so in the background of
\nthe facts of this case where on facts it is
\nestablished that a large number of witnesses who
\nwere examined after the respondent was enlarged
\non bail had turned hostile and there are complaints
\nmade to the court as to the threats administered by
\nthe respondent or his supporters to witnesses in the
\ncase. In such circumstances, the Court was duty-
\nbound to apply its mind to the allegations put forth
\nby the investigating agency and ought to have
\ngiven at least a prima facie finding in regard to
\nthese allegations because they go to the very root
\nof the right of the accused to seek bail. The non-
\nconsideration of these vital facts as to the
\nallegations of threat or inducement made to the
\nwitnesses by the respondent during the period he
\nwas on bail has vitiated the conclusions arrived at
\nby the High Court while granting bail to the
\nrespondent. The other ground apart from the
\nground of incarceration which appealed to the
\nHigh Court to grant bail was the fact that a large
\nnumber of witnesses are yet to be examined and
\nthere is no likelihood of the trial coming to an end
\nin the near future. As stated herein above, this
\nground on the facts of this case is also not
\nsufficient either individually or coupled with the
\nperiod of incarceration to release the respondent on
\nbail because of the serious allegations of tampering
\nwith the witnesses made against the respondent.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn Jayendra Saraswathi Swamigal Vs. State of T.N. [(2005) 2 SCC
\n13], this Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
“16.  The considerations which normally weigh
\nwith the Court in granting bail in non-bailable
\noffences have been explained by this Court in State
\nv. Capt. Jagjit Singh<\/a> (1962) 3 SCR 622: AIR 1962
\nSC 253 and Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi
\nAdmn.) (1978) 1 SCC 118: (1978) 2 SCR 358:\n<\/p>\n
AIR 1978 SC 179: and basically they are – the
\nnature and seriousness of the offence; the character
\nof the evidence; circumstances which are peculiar
\nto the accused; a reasonable possibility of the
\npresence of the accused not being secured at the
\ntrial; reasonable apprehension of witnesses being
\ntampered with; the larger interest of the public or
\nthe State and other similar factors which may be
\nrelevant in the facts and circumstances of the
\ncase”\n<\/p>\n
\tIn Kalyan Chandra Sarkar Vs. Rajesh Ranjan Alias Pappu Yadav and
\nAnother [2005 (2) SCC 42], this Court observed:
\n“18. It is trite law that personal liberty cannot be
\ntaken away except in accordance with the
\nprocedure established by law. Personal liberty is a
\nconstitutional guarantee. However. Article 21
\nwhich guarantees the above right also
\ncontemplates deprivation of personal liberty by
\nprocedure established by law. Under the criminal
\nlaws of this country, a person accused of offences
\nwhich are non bailable is liable to be detained in
\ncustody during the pendency of trial unless he is
\nenlarged on bail in accordance with law. Such
\ndetention cannot be questioned as being violative
\nof Article 21 since the same is authorised by law.
\nBut even persons accused of non bailable offences
\nare entitled for bail if the court concerned comes to
\nthe conclusion that the prosecution has failed to
\nestablish a prima facie case against him and\/or if
\nthe court is satisfied for reasons to be recorded that
\nin spite of the existence of prima facie case there is
\na need to release such persons on bail where fact
\nsituations require it to do so. In that process a
\nperson whose application for enlargement on bail
\nis once rejected is not precluded from filing a
\nsubsequent application for grant of bail if there is a
\nchange in the fact situation. In such cases if the
\ncircumstances then prevailing requires that such
\npersons to be released on bail, in spite of his earlier
\napplications being rejected, the courts can do so.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt was, however, observed:\n<\/p>\n
“42. While deciding the cases on facts, more so in
\ncriminal cases the court should bear in mind that
\neach case must rest on its own facts and the
\nsimilarity of facts in one case cannot be used to
\nbear in mind the conclusion of fact in another
\ncase”\n<\/p>\n
 \tWe are not oblivious of the fact that in certain circumstances, having
\nregard to the object and purport of the Act, the Court may take recourse to
\nprinciples of ‘purposive construction’ only when two views are possible.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe High Court, in our considered view, considered the matter from a
\nwrong perspective.  Only because the Appellant had the power, the same
\nwould not by itself lead to a conclusion that he was a privy to the crime.  As
\nregard Mulani’s visit to Bangalore, it is accepted that on all occasions he
\nwas accompanied by other officers.  The purpose of such visit was to have a
\nhigh level conference so as to enable the Government of Maharashtra to
\nobtain custody of Telgi.  On 9.7.2002, Mulani visited Bangalore in the
\ncompany of the Appellant.  On 23.7.2002, he visited in the company of
\nAppellant as also the Additional Chief Secretary, Shri Basak.  Those two
\nvisits were prior to 6.9.2002.  On 11th September, 2002, he went to
\nBangalore in the company of Shri Sampat Kadam as the case of Telgi was
\nfixed on that day.  He is said to have been sent by Shri Mushrif.  Dr. Jai
\nVasantrao Jadhav in his investigation note dated 15.12. 2003 stated:\n<\/p>\n
“On 09\/09\/2002 Mushrif sahib called me to his
\noffice and told me the story of his trip to
\nBangalore.  He himself had gone there with the
\ntransfer warrant to bring Telgi to Pune.  Similarly,
\nhe informed me about the future date i.e.
\n12\/09\/2002, set by the Bangalore court for hearing
\nand that Advocate general of Maharashtra P.
\nJanardanan and an advocate from Pune Raman
\nAgrawal as special public prosecutor will be going
\nthere for the hearing.  For the said hearing ACP
\nMulani, police inspector Sampat Kadam were to
\nprocered to Mumbai and they will go to Bangalore
\ncourt along with P. Janardanan.  In this connection
\na discussion had already been held, said Mushrif.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tOn 18.9.2002, Mr. Mulani visited Bangalore in the company of the
\nAddl. Advocate General of Maharashtra on which date the Court passed the
\norder under Section 268 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.\n<\/p>\n
 \tAs regards Mr. Mulani’s participation in the investigation, we may
\nnotice that Dr. Jadav again in his statement dated 2.4.2002 stated:\n<\/p>\n
“He has done the work of searching the
\nabsconding accused in the aforesaid crime and he
\nshould be deputed with the same work.\n<\/p>\n
Accordingly, ACP Shri Mulani was assisting me in
\nthe work of searching the absconding accused.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tAs regards his inclusion in the team, Dr. Jadav had stated:\n<\/p>\n
“The investigation of Crime 135\/2002, of Bund
\nGarden Police Station was handed over to me on
\n4.9.2002 under written orders.  Thereafter, a
\nmeeting had taken place between Police
\nCommissioner Shri R.S. Sharma, Joint Police
\nCommissioner Shri Mahesh Gauri and myself for
\ndeciding which officers should be included for the
\ninvestigation work.  At that time Shri Sharma
\nSaheb told me that you take whatever officers you
\nwant for the investigation.  On this, I told him that
\nI do not personally know the officers in Pune.
\nBeing on the post of DCP (Departmental
\nEnquiries), I am not conversant with the
\ninvestigating skill of the officers in Pune city.
\nAfter I told so, they finalized the names of the
\nmembers of the investigation team.  In that the
\nname of ACP Mulani was first.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Appellant, therefore, did not suggest the name of Mulani himself.
\nHe did so at the instance of Dr. Jadav and that too both by him as also the
\nJoint Commissioner.\n<\/p>\n
 \tSo far as the recommendation of the Appellant for inclusion of Mr.
\nMulani’s name in the list of officers who were to be rewarded for having
\ndone best work,  is concerned, it appears that 10 names were suggested for
\nthe said purpose.  The Appellant changed the priority in the manner as
\nindicated hereinbefore.  Only those persons whose names are referred in the
\nlist were to receive award.  The names of Mulani, Yadav and Davies were
\ndirected to be included in the text which would mean mentioning of their
\nnames in the history of case,  as evidently they were involved in the
\ninvestigation throughout.\n<\/p>\n
 \tFurthermore, the name of Mulani alone was not added but names of
\ntwo other officers were also added.  We may further notice that the
\nAppellant by letter dated 22.11.2002 addressed to the Director General of
\nPolice made serious complaints against Mr. Mushrif stating:\n<\/p>\n
“The request of Additional Commissioner of
\nPolice Mr. Mushrif for removing the names of near
\nrelatives of Mr. Abdul Kareem Ladsab Telgi, his
\nwife and daughter because of their financial
\npartners.  Thus, being a supervising officer it was
\nhis duty to collect evidence during the
\ninvestigation and to take proper decision like the
\nInvestigating Officer, being a Supervisory Officer.
\nIt appears that Shri Mushrif has neglected these
\nthings intentionally.\n<\/p>\n
 \tPrior to this also Shri Mushrif has written
\nletters to the Investigating Officers to obstruct the
\ninvestigation directly or indirectly, which came to
\nbe noticed because of the complaints made by the
\nofficers.  Similarly, he being Officer of the rank of
\nDeputy Inspector General of Police, he was
\ncapable of invoking provisions of Maharashtra
\nControl of Organised Crime Act, still Mr. Mushrif
\ndespite being the Senior Officer of the crime
\navoided to invoke the said provision.  From all
\nthese things the otherwise intention of Mr. Mushrif
\nto obstruct the investigation is apparent.\n<\/p>\n
 \tMr. Mushrif has written a letter on
\n23.10.2002, in which it is stated that the
\nInvestigating Officer should remove the names of
\nthe five accused persons, who are absconding,
\nwithout giving any reason and with the malafide
\nand corrupt intention he has suggested the addition
\nof six names as absconding accused.  The copy of
\nthe said letter is already submitted to you.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn fact it is said that the five names which
\nare removed are the part of information prepared
\non the computer of Mr. Mushrif.  Out of which, I
\nhave submitted the clear report that we have no
\nobjection if the cases of Shri Manoj Kotharath and
\nShri Bajrang are transferred to Central Crime
\nInvestigation Department.\n<\/p>\n
 \tShri Mushrif is informing the media that the
\nInquiry of this matter be conducted by Shri P.D.
\nDirector General of Police, Anti Corruption
\nBureau or Shrigarvel Director General of Police.
\nIn this connection, I wish to state that all these
\nmatters be investigated immediately and therefore
\na retired Judge of the High Court be appointed for
\nthe said purpose.  Thereby not only allegations
\nmade by Mr. Mushrif will be enquired into but this
\nalso will be seen as to in these important crime,
\nwhich is spread over the entire country when the
\ninvestigation is reached upto the very important
\nstage, who is trying to indirectly help the main kin
\npin of the crime Telgi by obstructing the
\ninvestigating right from the beginning?\n<\/p>\n
 \tSince now the investigation of this crime is
\nbeing made by the Special Investigation Team, it is
\nrequested that the truth behind all these matters be
\nbrought to surface and the appropriate action be
\ntaken against the concerned persons at the
\nearliest.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tAbout Mulani’s lack of integrity, admittedly facts were made known
\nto the Appellant only on 6.9.2002.  Prior thereto, Mulani received very good
\nremarks from his superior officers as would appear from a letter dated
\n21.3.2002 addressed by Shri A.K. Sharma to M.C. Mulani.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt is undisputed, as would appear from the stand taken by the  State
\nbefore the Maharashtra State Administration Tribunal, that transfer of
\nMulani was not by way of penalty but on administrative grounds.  The State
\nGovernment through Shri Ashok Basak also could have suspended Mulani.
\nIt does not appear from the records that apart from field work and searching
\nfor the accused Mulani took any part in investigation between 6.9.2002 and
\n30.9.2002.\n<\/p>\n
 \tMr. Mushrif in answer to the questionnaire categorically stated that
\nfour teams were formed for investigation and Mulani was in the team of
\nfield work.  He, having been brought by Mr. Mushrif, had been working
\nearlier.  Mr. Mushrif accepts that the Appellant had asked him to supervise
\nthe investigation of the teams.  He had drawn a broad outline as to how to
\nproceed systematically:\n<\/p>\n
“On 12.6.2002 I had drawn a broad outline as to
\nhow to proceed systematically.  My concept was as
\nunder:\n<\/p>\n
(a)\tA team for appraised of seized evidence
\npaperwork.\n<\/p>\n
(b)\tInvestigation team\n<\/p>\n
(c)\tField work”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt is also noteworthy that in the said statement, in certain matters, the
\nAppellant’s role was described as under:\n<\/p>\n
“12. CP’s source information led to the registration
\nof Cr. No. 135\/2002.  When you received
\ninformation about this?  Being incharge of Crime
\nbranch, What immediate steps were taken by you
\nfor further investigation?\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt seems that a verifiable information was
\nreceived by Shri Kale, PI Crime, P.S. Bundgarden.
\nIn this connection he sent for two suspects.  The
\nsuspects did not reveal much.  The informer was
\nasked to further cultivate the suspects.  That two
\nsuspects had been allowed to go was mistaken that
\nthey are being left off.  This information came to
\nthe notice of CP who intervened and asked Sr. P.I.
\nDeshmukh, P.S. Bundgarden, to apprehend the
\nsuspects and further interrogate them.  This
\ninterrogation revealed vital information
\nimplicating the suspects and the others.\n<\/p>\n
Interrogations revealed further information that to
\na trap.  PI Kale himself lodged the complaint and
\nthe F.I.R. came to be registered.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tSo far as the inspection of Cuffe Parade flat is concerned, the High
\nCourt failed to notice that at the time of inspection of the flat Jaiswal could
\nhave taken certain action which he did not.  At least he could have seized his
\nmobile.  The Appellant took all steps which he could take.  He passed
\ntelephonically an order of suspension of the officers in presence of Jaiswal
\nwhen the matter was brought to his notice.  When the letter dated 10.1.2003
\nreached him on 12.1.2003 he also passed an order of suspension in writing.
\nIt was for the Joint Commission to implement the said order of suspension.
\nIt is too much to expect that an officer passing an order of suspension must
\nalso see to it that his order is  implemented by all concerned.  The High
\nCourt is also not correct in attributing motive to the Appellant as regards
\nseizure of fake stamps and genuine stamps from the Bhiwandi godown on
\n12.1.2003.  The Appellant had no role to play therein.  Before the learned
\nSingle Judge admittedly a wrong contention was raised on behalf of the
\nRespondents that Jaiswal had at one point of time expressed  a suspicion that
\nthe magnitude of Kamat’s involvement may be minimized by making a fake
\nraid.\n<\/p>\n
 \tFor all intent and purport, the High Court has placed the onus of proof
\nupon the Appellant, which is impermissible.\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe Appellant faced a contempt petition before the Maharashtra State
\nAdministrative Tribunal and in his affidavit, he categorically stated that
\nneither Mulani was the investigating officer nor supervisory officer.  In his
\naffidavit, as regard reason for his transfer to Special Branch from Crime
\nBranch, he stated:\n<\/p>\n
“8. With reference to paras 6(5)(v) of the
\napplication, I say that this was a very sensational
\nmurder case and the applicant was the immediate
\nsupervisory officer of its investigation.  But as the
\nmain culprit could not be arrested, the case was
\ntransferred to State C.I.D. by the C.I.D. It
\ntranspired that the deceased Faizulla Khan along
\nwith two other persons had met the applicant in his
\noffice a couple of hours before his assignation.
\nBut this vital information was not disclosed by the
\napplicant anywhere in the investigation, though he
\nwas the immediate Supervisory Officer of the case.
\nThus, his conduct was found to be highly
\nsuspicious in this sensational case.  Under these
\ncircumstances it was not desirable to keep the
\napplicant in the Crime Branch.  This is one of the
\nreasons for his transfer out of the Crime Branch.\n<\/p>\n
17. With reference to para 6(13) of the application,
\nI say the allegations in this para are denied as the
\napplicant has been retained as A.C.P., Pune City.
\nHowever, there is no stay granted to the internal
\norders issued by the respondent no. 2 of the
\napplicant.  Neither the applicant has prayed in his
\nO.A. No. 863\/2002 that he should not be
\ntransferred anywhere from the Crime Branch, Pune
\nCity.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569], this Court
\nobserved:\n<\/p>\n
“352. It is true that on many occasions, we have
\ncome across cases wherein the prosecution
\nunjustifiably invokes the provisions of the TADA
\nAct with an oblique motive of depriving the
\naccused persons from getting bail and in some
\noccasions when the courts are inclined to grant bail
\nin cases registered under ordinary criminal law, the
\ninvestigating officers in order to circumvent the
\nauthority of the courts invoke the provisions of the
\nTADA Act. This kind of invocation of the
\nprovisions of TADA in cases, the facts of which do
\nnot warrant, is nothing but sheer misuse and abuse
\nof the Act by the police. Unless, the public
\nprosecutors rise to the occasion and discharge their
\nonerous responsibilities keeping in mind that they
\nare prosecutors on behalf of the public but not the
\npolice and unless the Presiding Officers of the
\nDesignated Courts discharge their judicial
\nfunctions keeping in view the fundamental rights
\nparticularly of the personal right and liberty of
\nevery citizen as enshrined in the Constitution to
\nwhich they have been assigned the role of sentinel
\non the qui vive, it cannot be said that the
\nprovisions of TADA Act are enforced effectively
\nin consonance with the legislative intendment.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn Prakash Kumar Alias Prakash Bhutto Vs. State of Gujarat [(2005) 2
\nSCC 409], the Constitution Bench of this Court while noticing Kartar Singh
\n(supra) observed:\n<\/p>\n
“44. In our view the above observation is
\neloquently sufficient to caution police officials as
\nwell as the Presiding Officers of the Designated
\nCourts from misusing the Act and to enforce the
\nAct effectively and in consonance with the
\nlegislative intendment which would mean after the
\napplication of mind. We reiterate the same.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tThe learned Additional Solicitor General, however, had drawn our
\nattention to the statement of Mr. R.S. Mopalwar.  The said statement was
\nrecorded on 21.6.2004.  Shri U.K. Goel has also not been examined on the
\nground that he has gone out of the country.  This material was not used
\nbefore the learned Single Judge.\n<\/p>\n
 \tMr. Saran, laid emphasis on the fact that Telgi was interrogated alone
\nby the Appellant after asking all others to leave the room without
\nmaintaining any record therefor.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn this connection, we may notice the questionnaire and statement of
\nShri Maheshgauri, question No. 50 whereof reads as under:\n<\/p>\n
“50) Did CP ever interrogate Telgi in prison? Did
\nCP ever record his statement on the tape recorder?
\nAre you aware about it?\n<\/p>\n
Ans: – CP did interrogate Telgi in camera in his
\nown chamber.  We were present in chamber of CP
\nwhen AKL Telgi was ushered in by either Mulani
\nor PI Deshmukh.  By we I mean DCP Koregaokar
\nwas also present when Telgi entered.  CP said,
\n“rwgh oks gS uk tks cWkEcs
\ngWkLihVy ds nxsZ is vk;k djrk
\nFkk uk” Then we moved out.  I do not know if
\nthe conversation was tape recorded.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tIf the Appellant was knowing Telgi, there was no reason to seek to
\nidentify Telgi by  reference to a person who used to visit Bombay Hospital,
\nDargah.  Our attention has also been drawn to the report of the brain
\nmapping test of Telgi.  In the said report, it is stated:\n<\/p>\n
“Pursuant to the request made vide letter cited
\nunder reference, accused Mr. Karim Telgi was
\nbrought for polygraph examination on 20th
\nDecember 2003.  The cited suspect was first
\ninterviewed and interrogated.  It was found during
\nthe interrogation and the interview that the suspect
\nappeared to be concealing some of the relevant
\ninformation and not truthful to his statement with
\nregard to the involvement of politician and police
\nofficers in the fake stamp paper.  He was further
\nsubjected for “Brain Mapping” test on 21
\nDecember 2003.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tAs regard what transpired in the meeting with Telgi during
\ninterrogation by the Appellant, Dr. Jadhav made the following statement in
\nthe investigation note:\n<\/p>\n
“On 19\/10\/2002 accused Telgi was granted
\nmagisterial custody and hence, he was to be taken
\nto Yerwada jail.  But police commissioner Mr.
\nSharma ordered us, “Bring the accused to my
\nchamber for the purpose of interrogation” and we
\nhad to comply.  We took accused Telgi to the
\noffice of the police commissioner at around 18.00
\nhrs.  We kept Telgi outside and informed
\ncommissioner Sharma by going into his chamber
\nthat we had brought Telgi in the office.  Then on
\nhis direction, we came out of the chamber and sent
\naccused Telgi alone inside as per Mr. Sharma’s
\ninstructions.  After this, Sharma Sahib interrogated
\nthe accused Telgi from 18.00 hrs. to 20.00 hrs.
\nThe Yerwada jail officials do not allow the
\naccused in the jail late in the night as a regular
\npractice.  When we came to know about this, we
\ninformed additional police commissioner Mahesh
\nGauri, accordingly.  Then on Mr. Gauri’s
\ndirection, we went inside Mr. Sharma’s cabin and
\ninformed him accordingly.  That time he said that,
\nhe would finish within ten minutes.  Then after 10-
\n15 minutes Sharma sahib called us in and ordered
\nus to take Telgi away.  Then along with Telgi, we
\nstarted moving outside the commissioner’s office
\nand towards the Yerwada jail and we asked Telgi
\nabout the interrogation by the Sharma Saheb.
\nHere, Telgi told us, “Sharma sahib asked me about
\nthe place where I had hided the remaining stamps?
\nTo whom and how much money did I give?  Who
\nare the political figures of my acquaintance? etc.
\nhis main thrust was on these questions, After
\nasking the questions, Mr. Sharma’s right hand was
\nmoving towards the button of the tape-recorder as
\nhe wanted to tape my answers.  I was not able to
\nsee the tape recorder, but it was evident from the
\nmovements of his hand that he was trying to
\nswitch on the tape for recording my answers.”
\nThen we reached the Yerwada Jail.  Police sub
\ninspector Mr. Hanumansingh Subbalkar (crime
\nbranch, Pune Police Commissionerate) was the
\nchief officer appointed to keep the custody of Telgi
\nand party.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tTherefore, there is some substance in the contention of Mr. Manohar
\nthat the Commissioner of Police may not like to interrogate an accused
\nperson as regard his political connections, if any,  in presence of others,  but
\nthe line of interrogation was revealed by Telgi immediately after he came
\nout of his chamber.  It further appears from the record that even Mushrif had
\ninterrogated Telgi exclusively.\n<\/p>\n
 \tFurthermore, it appears that it is Mushrif who wanted to keep wife,
\ndaughter and brother of Telgi out of the chargesheet, as would appear from
\nthe statement of Mr. Kishore Eknath Yadav to the following effect:\n<\/p>\n
“Names of accused Fathima and Javed were
\nmentioned in the case diary as suspects however
\nfull names and addresses of these accused could
\nnot be made accused.  Because the information is
\nnot available against them and they are only
\nservants, such instructions were issued by Addl.
\nCommissioner of police during the time of
\nbeginning of the investigation and on other
\noccasions.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIt was further stated:\n<\/p>\n
“Although for the said purpose note was made for
\nseeking written orders, Honourable Additional
\nCommissioner of Police has not made any specific
\norder.  Apart from this who should be made
\naccused or not was the primary right of D.C.P.
\nZone  II as per the decision taken by Additional
\nCommissioner of Police and the final decision
\nabout the same was to be that of Addl.\n<\/p>\n
Commissioner of Police (Order dated 13\/6\/2002).\n<\/p>\n
 \tApart from the fact that nothing has been brought on record to show
\nas to how far a report of brain mapping test can be relied upon,  the report
\nappears to be vague.   It appears, the Respondents themselves did not want
\nto put much reliance on the said report.\n<\/p>\n
 \tFurthermore, the admissibility of a result of a scientific test will
\ndepend upon its authenticity.  Whether the brain mapping test is so
\ndeveloped that the report  will have a probative value so as to enable a court
\nto place reliance thereupon, is a matter which would require further
\nconsideration, if and when the materials in support thereof are placed before
\nthe Court.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn Frye Vs. United States [293 F 1013 (DC Cir) (1923)], the principles
\nto determine the strength of any investigation to make it admissible were
\nstated in the following terms:\n<\/p>\n
“Just when a scientific principle or discovery
\ncrosses the line between the experimental and
\ndemonstrable stages is difficult to define. Some
\nwhere in the twilight zone the evidential force
\nmust be recognized, and while the Courts will go a
\nlong way in admitting the expert testimony
\ndeducted from a well recognized scientific
\nprinciple or discovery, the thing from which the
\ndeduction is made must be sufficiently established
\nto have gained general acceptance in the particular
\nfield in which it belongs.\n<\/p>\n
 \tFrye (supra), however, was rendered at a time when the technology,
\nthe polygraph test, was in its initial stage and was used in few laboratories.
\nThe guidelines issued therein posed a threat of lack of judicial adaptation of
\nthe new developments and ignored the reliability on a particular piece of
\nevidence.\n<\/p>\n
 \tA change of approach was, however, found in Daubart Vs. Merryll
\nDow Pharmaceuticals Inc. [113 Sct 2786 (1993)] where the courts while
\nallowing “general acceptance” stated that this might not be a precondition
\nfor admissibility of the scientific evidence, for which the Court may consider
\nthe following:\n<\/p>\n
(a)\tWhether the principle or technique has been or can be reliably
\ntested?\n<\/p>\n
(b)\tWhether it has been subject to peer review or publication?\n<\/p>\n
(c)\tIt’s known or potential rate of error?\n<\/p>\n
(d)\tWhether there are recognized standards that control the procedure
\nof implementation of the technique?\n<\/p>\n
(e)\tWhether it is generally accepted by the Community? And\n<\/p>\n
(f)\tWhether the technique has been introduced or conducted
\nindependently of the litigation?\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn a case involving an issue as to whether on-job-exposure to the
\nmanufacturers products promoted small cell lung cancer, the U.S. Supreme
\nCourt in General Electric Co. Vs. Robert K. Joiner [522 US 139 L.Ed. 2d]
\nfollowing Daubert (supra), held that in cases involving the issue of expert
\nevidence the appellate court should only consider whether there is any abuse
\nof discretion in admitting such evidence by the trial courts and should not go
\ninto reviewing the evidence itself as  it is for the trial courts to assume the
\n“gate keeper’s role” in screening such evidence to ensure whether it is not
\nonly relevant but also reliable.  This was further expanded in Kumho Tire
\nCo. Ltd. Vs. Carmichael [(1999) 119 S.Ct. 1167]  whereby the ‘gate
\nkeeping’ obligation of the Trial Judge to ensure the relevancy and reliability
\nfor admitting the evidence extended not only to scientific but also to all
\nkinds of expert evidence.\n<\/p>\n
 \tIn R. Vs. Watters  [(2000) All ER (D) 1469], it was held :\n<\/p>\n
“DNA evidence may have a great significance
\nwhere there is supporting evidence, dependent, of
\ncourse, on the strength of that evidence.”\n<\/p>\n
“in every case one has to put the DNA evidence
\nin the context of the rest of the evidence and
\ndecide whether taken as a whole it does amount to
\na prima facie case.”\n<\/p>\n
 \tAs at present advised, thus, and having regard to the fact that the
\nprosecution did not rely upon the said report before the High Court, we also
\nfor the purpose of the present matter do not intend to place any reliance
\nthereupon.\n<\/p>\n
 \tMr. Manohar’s contention to the effect that those officers whose
\nconduct was not above board and who did not take any action for attaching
\nthe property of the accused and his relations in terms of the Act, have not
\nbeen made accused, may also be correct.  He has further brought to our
\nnotice that witnesses have also changed their stand after the Appellant was
\nplaced under arrest.  At this juncture, it may not be necessary for us to go
\ninto details on the aforementioned contention.\n<\/p>\n
\tWe have referred to the aforementioned materials only for the purpose
\nof showing that the High Court may not be entirely correct in coming to the
\nconclusion that the Appellant prima facie committed an offence under
\nSection 3(2) as well as Section 24 of MCOCA.\n<\/p>\n
 \tFor the reasons aforementioned, we are of the opinion that the order
\ndated 4.11.2004 granting interim bail to the Appellant should continue
\nsubject to the same conditions.\n<\/p>\n
\tThis appeal is allowed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing … vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: N. Santosh Hegde, B.P. Singh, S.B. Sinha CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 523 of 2005 PETITIONER: Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing Sharma RESPONDENT: State of Maharashtra & Anr. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07\/04\/2005 BENCH: N. Santosh Hegde,B.P. Singh & […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-193664","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nRanjitsing Brahmajeetsing ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"2005-04-06T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2018-01-31T19:57:05+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"69 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\/\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing … vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005\",\"datePublished\":\"2005-04-06T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-01-31T19:57:05+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005\"},\"wordCount\":13710,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005\",\"name\":\"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"2005-04-06T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2018-01-31T19:57:05+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing … vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/\",\"url\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"2005-04-06T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2018-01-31T19:57:05+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"69 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing … vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005","datePublished":"2005-04-06T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-01-31T19:57:05+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005"},"wordCount":13710,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005","name":"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing ... vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"2005-04-06T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2018-01-31T19:57:05+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ranjitsing-brahmajeetsing-vs-state-of-maharashtra-anr-on-7-april-2005#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing … vs State Of Maharashtra & Anr on 7 April, 2005"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/193664","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=193664"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/193664\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=193664"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=193664"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=193664"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}