{"id":194210,"date":"1996-04-25T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1996-04-24T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/suresh-kumar-ors-dalmia-cement-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-april-1996"},"modified":"2015-03-04T04:30:44","modified_gmt":"2015-03-03T23:00:44","slug":"suresh-kumar-ors-dalmia-cement-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-april-1996","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/suresh-kumar-ors-dalmia-cement-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-april-1996","title":{"rendered":"Suresh Kumar & Ors.Dalmia Cement … vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 April, 1996"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Suresh Kumar & Ors.Dalmia Cement … vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 April, 1996<\/div>\n
Author: K Ramaswamy<\/div>\n
Bench: K. Ramaswamy, S. Saghir Ahmad, G.B. Pattanaik<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nSURESH KUMAR & ORS.DALMIA CEMENT (BHARAT) LTD. & ANR. ETC.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nUNION OF INDIA & ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\t25\/04\/1996\n\nBENCH:\nK. RAMASWAMY, S. SAGHIR AHMAD, G.B. PATTANAIK\n\n\n\n\nACT:\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
\t\t\t    WITH
\n\t      TRANSFER CASE [C] NO.177 OF 1988
\nT.C. [C] Nos. 178-189, CMP No. 10091\/89,  14930\/89,  IA Nos.
\n5 &  6\/90 in  TC No.  S.1-7\/89, CPM  No. 25857\/88,   CPM No.
\n17552\/89, TC  Nos. 25-26\/89,  CPM Nos.\t5913-14\/89, 8736\/89,
\nTC  No. 27\/89,\tWP No. 1235\/89, 1277\/90,  1278\/90, IA Nos. 1
\n& 5\/89,\t in WP\tNo. 922\/90,  1164\/90, IA  No. 6\/92,   WP No.
\n921\/92, IA Nos. 5-6\/93 in T.P. No. 286\/94, 294\/94  W.P. Nos.
\n778\/95 and 826\/95.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t      J U D G M E N T
\nK. RAMASWAMY, J.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t this\tbunch\tof   cases   the   petitioners\t are
\nmanufacturers of  cement, sugar\t and other  commodities\t and
\nPlastic bags  (for short, ‘HDPE’). The HDPE industries are a
\nsmall-scale sector  that secured  loans from the banks. They
\nallege that  due to operation of the Jute packaging Material
\n(compulsory Use\t in  Packing  Commodities)  Act,  1987\t(for
\nshort, the  ‘Act’) their  industries are running into losses
\nand many  of them are compelled to close their business. The
\ncapital obtained  from the nationalised bends has become bad
\ndebt. Repeal  of the Act of gradually phasing out compulsory
\npacking of  the commodities  with gunny\t bags would  relieve
\nhardships to  them. The would relieve hardships to them. The
\nconstitutionality of the Act and the Jute Packaging Material
\n(compulsory Use\t in Packing  commodities) Rules and standing
\norder No.  539(E) dated\t May 29,  1987 are impugned as ultra
\nvires and  mandatory direction to the respondents to forbear
\nenforcement thereof  in packing their finished products with
\njute bags etc., is sought for.\n<\/p>\n
     We have  had the advantage of fearing galaxy of learned
\nsenior counsel\twith their  forensic legal  skills to assail
\nthe constitutionality  of Section  3 to 5 of the Act and the
\norders issued  by the  central Government  on the  anvil  of
\nArticles 14,   19(1)  (9) and  301 of  the constitution\t and
\ntheir repudiation  with equal vehemence by counsel appearing
\nfor respondent. The petitioners’ fundamental premise is that
\ntheir right  to carry  on trade\t and business  guaranteed by
\nArticle 19(1)  (9) and\tfree  flow  of\ttrade  and  commerce
\nthroughout the territory of India under Article 301 has been
\nimpeded by  operation of  the Act,  the Rules and the orders
\nissued by  the central\tGovernment the restriction by way of
\ncompulsory packing  of their  finished products\t with  gunny
\nbags is\t an unreasonable  restriction; further, it is not in
\nthe interests of general consumer public. The word ‘general’
\nqualifies the  whole public; in other words, the restriction
\nmust be\t in the\t interest  of  the  entire  general  public,
\nnamely, the  consumers of  diverse goods. It must not merely
\nbe small   section  of the  public, namely,  the producer of
\njute. The  restriction also  must be or the advancement of ,
\nor to  benefit of the society as a whole.  Packing with jute
\nbags made  compulsion irrespective  of\tcosts,\tsuitability,
\navailability, consumers,  is arbitrary.\t Executive priority,
\nor preference  to   Jute sector at the cost, of and in total
\ndisregard of  the interests  of other  sectors like  cement,
\nsugar or  alternative industry\tor alternative\tindustry  or
\ngeneral public\twould be  unreasonable, arbitrary  and total
\nprohibition. Therefore,\t the Act is illegal and void. No law
\nshould impose restriction for the benefit of a small section
\nof the\tpublic at  the detriment of an over-whelmingly large
\nmajority of  the people.  The Act  intends to benefit only a
\nsmall  section\tof  the\t society  as  is  disclosed  bu\t the
\nstatement  of\tobjects\t and   Reasons,\t namely,  vague\t and
\nindeterminate 4\t million rural agricultural families and 2.5
\nlacs industrial\t workers in  the jute industry in comparison
\nwith general  consumers’ community  for\t whose\tbenefit\t the
\nEssential  commodities\tAct,  1955  and\t the  orders  issued
\nthereunder was made regulating equitable distribution of the
\nessential commodities at reasonable price.\n<\/p>\n
     The  compulsion   to  pack\t  cement,  sugar  and  other
\nessential commodities,\twith jute  bags, not only, as stated
\nearlier, hampers  free flow  of trade  and commerce but also
\nescalates the  cost of\tthe essential commodities. Jute bags
\nare unsuitable\tto particular  commodity. Emphasis  in\tthis
\nbehalf is  laid on  cement. Packing  cement with  jute\tbags
\ncauses loss  in weight\tduring the  course  of\thandling  in
\ntransit, recurring  wastage of\t  raw material like minerals
\nand electricity,  an d loss to\tthe consumers was repeatedly
\nreiterated bu  the counsel.  The wastage worked out, for the
\nyear 1987-88,  is to  the tune\tof approximately  3  million
\ntonnes of  lime stone, a non-renewable natural resource, 240
\nmillion units  of electrical  energy land 0.5 million tonnes
\nof coal\t which is  another non-renewable natural resource of
\nthe country.  The statistical  data is only illustrative. On
\nthe other  hand, packing  cement with  HPDE prevents,  apart
\nfrom  cost  factors,  loss  of\tthe  essential\tcommodities,
\npollution and  health hazards to the  workmen. The Act casts
\nno corresponding  obligation on jute manufacturers to supply
\ngunny bags  as per  growing demand nor are they obligated to
\npass on\t the benefits to the growers of raw jute. The report
\nof the\tHigh power  committee of  1992 would  show that\t the
\ngrowers are  victims of\t exploitation at  the hands  of\t the
\nmanufacturers to supply gunny bags as per growing demand nor
\nare they obligated to pass on the benefits to the growers of
\nraw jute.  The report  of the  High power  committee of 1992
\nwould show  that the  growers are victims of exploitation at
\nthe hands  of the  manufactures. They  are not receiving any
\nbenefit from the Act.\n<\/p>\n
     The Act  does not provide any guidelines to protect the
\ninterests of  the growers.  On the  other  hand,  compulsory
\npacking of  the commodities  with jute\tbags is\t intended to
\nbenefit only  jute will\t owners who have already taken large
\nsums of\t money by way of subsidy from the central Government
\nand modernised\ttheir mills. Yet jute bags are not available
\nto the required demands, which would establish that they had
\ndiversified the jute products. No guidelines are provided to
\nstrike a  balance between  the interests  of the Jute Sector
\nand  of\t  the  general\tconsumers  and\tproducers  of  other
\ncommodities.\n<\/p>\n
     The fact that the Government of India had issued orders
\npermitting the\tpetitioners to\tpurchase  second-hand  gunny
\nbags for  packing the  essential commodities is an admission
\nthat the  required quantity of qualitative jute bags are not
\nbeing produced. The study reports establish gradual decrease
\nin  cultivation\t  area\tof   jute.  The\t Jute  industry\t has
\ndiversified the\t manufacture of jute products in India which
\nare exported abroad. The jute industry is importing raw jute
\nfrom Bangladesh.  The  Act  does  not  expressly  intend  to
\noperate\t as   permanent\t measure,   and\t being\ta  temporary
\nenactment to tide over the business crisis in jute industry,
\nthe Act\t is  required  to  gradually  phase  out  compulsion
\npacking of  the commodities  with jute bags proportionately.
\nThe  committee\tappointed  by  the  central  Government\t had
\nrecommended  to\t  the  central\t Government  to\t  phase\t out
\ncompulsory packing  of the  essential commodities  with jute
\nbags by\t the end of Eighth Five Years Plan, namely, 1995-96.
\nInstead of  repealing the  Act, fresh  orders,\tthe  central
\nGovernment have\t imposed hundred  per cent use of gunny bags
\nin sugar  industry etc.\t No heed  was paid  by\tthe  central
\nGovernment  to\t several   representations   made   by\t the
\nmanufacturers, individually  and collectively, through their
\nassociations. The  High power committee’s report in para 6.3
\nhas been  repeatedly referred  to and  relied on by Sri G.L.
\nSanghi. It reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
     ”\tThe   Jute  industry  cannot  be
\n     artificially  propped  up\tby  this
\n     piece   of\t  legislation\tfor   an
\n     indefinite period, in a liberalised
\n     economy  when  free  market  forces
\n     have come\tto operate. In any case,
\n     this legislative  measure was  only
\n     intended to  provide support to the
\n     industry as  an interim measure for
\n     a brief  period  during  which  the
\n     industry\t was\t expected     to
\n     restructure   and\t readjusts   its
\n     capacity linked to production value
\n     added diversified\tproducts for the
\n     domestic and  international market.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The committee  is award of the fact
\n     that the constitutional validity of
\n     the Jute  packaging Act  is pending
\n     before  the   supreme  Court  of  a
\n     decision.\t Hence,\t   without   any
\n     prejudice to  the out  come of  the
\n     court  proceedings,  the  committee
\n     recommend that  the  provisions  in
\n     there  existing  orders  should  be
\n     diluted gradually\tin two\tor three
\n     stages, and by 1994-95 it should be
\n     rescinded altogether.”
\n     In addition,  they relied on paragraphs 6.1; 2.9; 2.10;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
9.1 and 9.6.\n<\/p>\n
     The  standing   Advisory  committee  constituted  under
\nsection 4  of the  Act is not a representative committee nor
\nthe  manufacturers   find  their   representatives  in\t the
\ncommittee. The\tHDPE is much cheaper than the gunny bag. The
\nincidence of  cost of  the gunny  bag being component of the
\nsale price of the essential commodity, needless burden would
\nbe passed  on to  the consumers.  In this  regard, the sugar
\nindustry pointed  out that  there is  increase in  the sugar
\nfactories and  production of sugar industry pointed out that
\nthere is  increase in  the sugar factories and production of
\nsugar over  the years  from 216 to 435 from 37.40 lac tonnes
\nto 146.35  lac tonnes respectively. On the other hand, there
\nis gradual  decline  in\t jute  cultivated  area\t from  11.03
\nhectors to  9.10 hector.  Consequently, import\tof jute from
\nBangladesh has\tbeen increased from 3.10 to 54 tonnes. It is
\n,  contended  that  it\tis  no\tlonger\tfeasible  to  obtain
\nsufficient quantity of ‘A’ class bags fit for packing sugar.
\nThe Act\t being a  penal Act,  the Rules\t made and the orders
\nissued\tthereunder   are,  therefore,\tarbitrary  offending
\nArticle 14.\n<\/p>\n
     Interplay of  the operational  efficacy of the Act, the
\nRules and  orders, on  fundamental rights of the petitioners
\nto  carry  on  trade  or  business  guaranteed\tby  Articles
\n19(1),14  and  301  of\tthe  constitution  would  be  better
\nappreciated only if we have a grasp of their backdrop. India
\nlives in  villages. agricultural economy is the bed-rock for
\nrural  India.  Property\t assures  them\tsocial\tdignity\t and
\neconomic  equality.  Agriculture  is  the  main\t source\t for
\neconomic sustenance and equality of status to the tillers of
\nthe soil  who too  have fundamental  rights to\tequality  of
\nstatus\tand   of  opportunity\tand  right   to\t livelihood.
\nAgricultural operations are their prime source of livelihood
\nand sustained of the business and of urban population.\n<\/p>\n
     Professor\tHarold\tLaski,\tan  inconoclastic  humanist,
\nexpressing  his\t  belief  in  Indian  Independence  and\t its
\nsocialist destiny  stated in  his  “Congress  socialist”  of
\nApril 11, 1936, thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “Attainment   of\t natural   self-
\n     government to mean no more than the
\n     exchange of  the control by British
\n     capitalism\t for   that  by\t  Indian
\n     capitalism.  Those\t  who  know  the
\n     normal life  of  the  poor\t …will
\n     realise   enough\t that\t without
\n     economic security,\t liberty is  not
\n     worth living.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The Avadi\tResolution of  congress envisaged  to redeem
\nthe plight  of the tiller of soil granting permanent tenures
\nand conferment\ttitle to  the lands  held under\t feudalistic
\nsocial\torder.\tKarachi\t resolution  of\t 1931  assured\tthat
\n“Political freedom  must include  real economic\t freedom  of
\nstarving   millions”.\t The   founding\t  fathers   of\t the
\nconstitution,  therefore,   in\tthe   objective\t Resolution,
\nspeaking on behalf of, “we, the people of India”, pledged on
\ntheir\tbehalf\tto  accord  justice,  social,  economic\t and
\npolitical to  all  the\tcitizens,  equality  of\t status\t and
\nopportunity and dignity of person with stated liberties.\n<\/p>\n
     In Kartar Singh Vs. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569],
\na constitution\tBench of  this court  to which one of us, K.
\nRamaswamy, J.,\twas a  member was to consider the inter-play
\nof life,  liberty and  equality. The  evolution to the state
\nfrom police  state to  a welfare  state accepted  democratic
\nsociety to  safe-guard the life, liberty and equality of the
\ncitizens. The  exercise of  right to  liberty is  subject to
\nsocial control,\t lest it  would become anti-social or  would
\nundermine the  security\t of  the  state.  Indian  democracy,
\nproduct of  rule of  law,  aims\t not  only  to\tprotect\t the
\nfundamental rights  of its citizens but also to establish an
\negalitarian social  order. Individual has to live within the
\nsocial\tconfines  suppressing  his  unsocial  and  unbridled
\ngrowth\tfor   reconciling  individual  liberty\twith  social
\ncontrol. Liberty  must be controlled in the interests of the
\nsociety. The  societal interest must never br overbearing to
\njustify total  deprivation of  individual  liberty.  Liberty
\ncannot stand  alone. It\t must be  paired  with\ta  companion
\nvirtue; liberty\t and  morality;\t liberty  law;\tliberty\t and
\njustice; liberty and common good; liberty and responsibility
\nwhich are  concomitants\t for  orderly  progress\t and  social
\nstability. Man\tbeing a\t rational individual  has to live in
\nharmony with the equal rights of others more differently for
\nthe attainment\tof antithetic  desires. Liberty\t would\tnot,
\ntherefore, be always an absolute licence but must arm itself
\nwithin the  confines of law. In that case, the question was:
\nwhether TADA  Act is constitutionally valid? while declaring
\npart of\t the Act as invalid, the above statement of law came
\nto be  laid therein.  In Kesawananda  Bharati vs.  Union  of
\nIndia<\/a> [(1973)  Supp. SCR  1], the  Full court  had held that
\npreamble  of  the  constitution\t is  integral  part  of\t the
\nconstitution. In  S.R. Bommai  vs. Union  of India<\/a> [(1994) 3
\nSCC 1], the preamble has been held to be the basic structure
\nof the constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     The preamble  of the constitution is the epitome of the
\nbasic  structure  guilt\t in  the  constitution\tguaranteeing
\njustice-social, economic  and political-  equality of status
\nand of opportunity with dignity of person and fraternity. To
\nestablish and  egalitarian social  order, the  trinity,\t the
\npreamble, the  fundamental Rights  in Part III and Directive
\nprinciples of  state policy  (for  short,  `Directives’)  in
\nchapter IV  of the constitution delineated the socioeconomic
\njustice. The word ‘justice’ envision in the preamble is used
\nin broad  spectrum to  harmonise individual  rights with the
\ngeneral welfare\t of the\t society. The  constitution  is\t the
\nsupreme law.  The purpose  of law  is realisation of justice
\nwhose content  and scope  vary depending upon the prevailing
\nsocial environment.  Every social and economic change causes
\nchange in  the law.  In a democracy governed by rule of law,
\nit is  not possible  to change\tthe legal  basis  of  socio-
\neconomic  life\tof  the\t community  without  bringing  about
\ncorresponding change  in the  law, endeavor needs to be made
\nto harmonise  the individual  interest\twith  the  paramount
\ninterest of the community keeping pace with the realities of
\never changing  social and  economic life  of  the  community
\nenvisaged in  the  constitution.  Justice  in  the  preamble
\nimplies\t equality  consistent  with  the  competing  demands
\nbetween\t distributive\tjustice\t with  those  of  cumulative
\njustice. Justice  aims to  promote the general well-being of
\nthe  community\tas  well  as  individual’s  excellence.\t The
\nprincipal end  of society is to protect the enjoyment of the
\nindividuals  subject   to  social   order,  well-being\t and
\nmorality. Establishment\t of priorities\tof  liberties  is  a
\npolitical judgment.\n<\/p>\n
     Law is  the manifestation\tof  principles\tof  justice,
\nequity and  good conscience.  Rule of law should establish a
\nuniform pattern\t for harmonious existence in a society where
\nevery individual  would exercise  his  rights  to  his\tbest
\nadvantage  to  achieve\texcellence,  subject  to  protective
\ndiscrimination. The  best advantage  of one  person could be
\nthe worst  disadvantage to another. Law steps in to iron out
\nsuch  creases\tand  ensures   equality\t of   protection  to
\nindividual as  well as\tgroup liberties.  Man’s status\tis a
\ncreature of  substantive as well as procedural law  to which
\nlegal  incidents   would  attach.   justice,  equality\t and
\nfraternity are trinity for social and economic equality. Law
\nis the\tfoundation on  which the  potential of\tthe  society
\nstands. Law  is an  instrument for  social  change  as\talso
\ndefender for  social change. In Madhu Kishwar & Ors. etc. v.
\nstate of  Bihar &  Ors. [Writ  petition (C) No. 5723 of 1982
\ndated April  17,1996], the  question was: whether the tribal
\nwomen are entitled to equality in matters of succession with
\nmale members?  One of  us (K.  Ramaswamy, J.)  has held that
\nthey are entitled to equality in matters of succession.\n<\/p>\n
     Social justice  is the  comprehensive  form  to  remove
\nsocial imbalances  by\tlaw harmonising\t the rival claims or
\nthe interests  of different  groups and\/or  sections in\t the
\nsocial structure  or individuals  by means of which alone it
\nwould be  possible to build up a welfare state. The ideal of
\neconomic justice  is to\t make equality\tof status meaningful
\nand the life worth living at its best removing inequality of
\nopportunity and of status- social, economic and political.\n<\/p>\n
     The content  ambit and  interplay of justice and social
\njustice was  elucidated in  Consumer  Education\t &  Research
\nCentre &  Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.<\/a> [(1995) 3 SCC 42] by
\na Bench\t of three  Judges of  this Court  in paragraph 18 at
\npage 67.  The court  observed that  the constitution  is the
\nsupreme law  envisaging social justice as its arch to ensure
\nlife to\t everyone to  be meaningful  and livable  with human
\ndignity. Jurisprudence\tis the\teye of law giving an insight
\ninto the  environment of  which it  is\tthe  expression.  it
\nrelates the  law to  the spirit\t of the\t time and  makes  it
\nricher. Law  is the ultimate aim of every civilised society,
\nas a  key system  in a\tgiven era,  to meet  the  needs\t and
\ndemands\t of   its   time.   Justice,   according   to\tlaw,
\ncomprehensive social  urge and commitment. Justice, liberty,
\nequality and fraternity are supreme constitutional values to
\nestablish the  egalitarian social,  economic  and  political
\ndemocracy. Social  justice, equality  and dignity  of person
\nare  cornerstones   of\tsocial\t democracy.  social  justice
\nconsists of  diverse principles\t essential for\tthe  orderly
\ngrowth and  development of  personality\t of  every  citizen.
\nJustice is  the generic\t sense and  social  justice  is\t its
\nfacet, a  dynamic device  to mitigate  the sufferings of the
\ndisadvantaged and  to eliminate\t handicaps so  as to elevate
\nthem to\t the level  of equality to live life with dignity of
\nperson, social\tjustice is  not a simple or single idea of a
\nsociety but is an essential part of complex social change to
\nrelieve the  poor etc.\tfrom handicaps, penury, to ward them
\noff from  distress and\tto  make  their\t lives\tlivable\t for
\ngreater good  of  the  society\tat  large.  social  justice,
\ntherefore, gives  substantial degree of social, economic and
\npolitical equality,  which is  the constitutional  right  of
\nevery  of    every  citizen.  In  para\t19,  it\t is  further
\nelaborated that\t social justice is one of the disciplines of
\njustice which  relates to the society. What is due cannot be
\nascertained  by\t  absolute  standard  which  keeps  changing
\ndepending  upon\t the  time,  place  and\t circumstances.\t The
\nconstitutional concern\tof social  justice,  as\t an  elastic
\ncontinuous process,  is to  transform and  accord justice to
\nall sections  of the  society by  providing  facilities\t and
\nopportunities to  remove  handicaps  and  disabilities\twith
\nwhich the  poor etc.  are languishing.\tIt  aims  to  secure
\ndignity of  their person.  It is  the duty  of the  state to
\naccord justice\tto all\tmembers of the society in all facets
\nof human  activity. The\t concept of  social  justice  embeds
\nequality to  flavour and enlivens practical content of life.
\nsocial justice\tand equality are complementary to each other
\nso that\t both should  maintain their  vitality. Rule of law,
\ntherefore, is a potent instrument of social justice to bring
\nabout  equality\t in  result.  Article  1  of  the  universal
\nDeclaration of\tHuman Rights envisions that all human beings
\nare born  free and  equal in  dignity and  rights  and\teach
\nshould act  towards one\t another in a spirit of brotherhood.
\nIn that\t case the  question was:  whether rights  to  social
\nsecurity is a fundamental right to workman? to make the life
\nof the\tworkman worth  living with  health, it was held that
\nright to health is a fundamental right and it is the duty of
\nthe  state   and  the\temployer  to  provide  facility\t and
\nopportunities for ensuring sustained good health and leisure
\nto the workman as facet of right to life under article 21.\n<\/p>\n
     In Mrs.  Valsamma Paul  v. Cochin University & Ors. [JT
\n1996(1) SC  57], a  Bench of  this court has held that human
\nrights are  derived from  the dignity  and worth inherent in
\nthe human person. Human rights and fundamental freedoms have
\nbeen  reiterated  in  the  universal  declaration  of  human
\nrights. Democracy, development and respect for human rights.
\nDemocracy, development\tand respect for human rights and the
\nfundamental freedoms  are inter-dependent  and\thave  mutual
\nreinforcement. Article\t29(2) of  the Declaration  of  Human
\nRights provides\t that “in  the exercise\t of this  rights and
\nfreedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations
\nas are\tdetermined by law solely for the rights and freedoms
\nof others  and of leading the just requirements of morality,
\npublic order  and general  welfare in a democratic society.”
\nThe  concept   of  equality  and  equal\t protection  of\t law
\nguaranteed by  Article 14 of the constitution in its propers
\nspectrum  encompasses  social  and  economic  justice  in  a
\npolitical democracy as its species to eliminate inequalities
\nin status  and to provide facilities and opportunities among
\nthe individual and groups of people to secure adequate means
\nof livelihood  which is\t the  foundation  for  stability  of
\npolitical democracy.\n<\/p>\n
     Social democracy  means a\tway of life which recognises
\nliberty, equality and fraternity as principles of life. They
\nare the\t trinity. One cannot diverse from the other. Without
\nequality, liberty  would produce  supremacy of\tthe few over
\nthe  many.   Equality  without\t liberty  would\t denude\t the
\nindividual of  his initiative to improve excellence. Without
\nfraternity, liberty  and equality would not nurture as their
\nnatural\t habitat.   Social  and\t  economic  justice   is   a
\nconstitutional\tright\tto  socio-economic  justice  in\t the
\ntrinity, the  preamble, Fundamental Rights and Directives is
\nto make\t the quality  of life  of there disadvantaged people
\nmeaningful.  Equal  protection\tin  Article  14,  therefore,
\nrequires affirmative  action by\t the state to those unequals
\nby providing  facilities  and  opportunities.  The  question
\ntherein was:  whether\tright to reservation is available to
\nwomen belonging\t by birth  to forward section of the society
\nbut married  to male  member of disadvantaged section of the
\nsociety on  par with  the persons  from the  caste to  which
\nreservation was\t provided ?  In that  context, the  right to
\nsocio-economic\tjustice,   equality   and   fraternity\t was
\nconsidered and the above law was laid down.\n<\/p>\n
     Gandhiji, the  Father of  the Nation,  on\tthe  eve  of
\nindependence had  stated that  ” independence  did not\tmean
\nmere freedom  from British  Rule by  breaking the  bonds  of
\nslavery but it meant more than that. It meant justice to all
\ncitizens of India, irrespective of religion, caste, creed or
\nlanguage,  each\t  getting  his\tlegitimate  due”.  The\t42nd
\namendment Act  of the  constitution introduced, ” secularism
\nand socialism”\tin the\tpreamble which\tare implicit  in the
\nDirectives and\tthe Fundamental Rights read together. Social
\nand  economic\tjustice\t in   the  context   of\t our  Indian
\nconstitution   must,   therefore,   be\t understood   in   a
\ncomprehensive  sense  to  remove  every\t inequality  and  to
\nprovide\t  opportunity to  all citizens\tin social as well as
\neconomic justice  means\t the  abolition\t of  those  economic
\nconditions which  ultimately result  in\t the  inequality  of
\neconomic  values  between  mem.\t It  means  to\testablish  a
\ndemocratic way\tof life\t built upon socio-economic structure
\nof the society to make the rule of law dynamic.\n<\/p>\n
     Article 14\t of the constitution is a shining star among
\nthe fundamental\t rights which  guarantees equality  to every
\ncitizen\t and  equal  protection\t of  laws  to  all  persons.
\nEquality before\t laws ins correlative to the concept of rule
\nof law\tfor all-round  evaluation of  healthy social  order.
\nDirectives  set\t  forth\t social\t  principles  to   eliminate
\ninequalities in\t income, in  status and\t opportunity and  to
\nprovide facilities  and opportunities  to every\t citizen  to
\nmake the fundamental rights meaningful and the life of every
\ncitizen worth  living and  at its  best, with the dignity of
\nperson and  fraternity, lest  they remain empty- vessels and
\nteasing illusions to majority population .\n<\/p>\n
     The constitution  adopted mixed economy and the planned
\ndevelopment has\t become a  constitutional scheme  to realise
\negalitarian  social   order.  The   second  Five  year\tplan
\nenvisaged that\t“The patron of development and the structure
\nof the\tsocio-economic relation\t should be  so planned\tthat
\nthey result in appreciable increase in income and employment
\nbut also  in greater  equality in  income and  wealth.”\t The
\nDirectives of  the state  policy have  delineated  in  broad
\nspectrum  socio-economic   justice  to\t all  people.\t“The
\nsocialistic  patron  of\t society  is  a\t more  comprehensive
\nexpression   of\t   the\t approach.   Economic\tpolity\t and
\nconstitutional changes\thave to\t be planned in a manner that
\nwould ensure  economic advance\talong  with  democratic\t and
\negalitarian lines.”\n<\/p>\n
     In the  Eighth Five  Year plan  1992-97,  the  planning
\ncommission, in\tits blue-print\thas stated  on\tagricultural
\neconomy and  need for  stepping up  production in para 1.1.1
\nthat agriculture and allied activities constitute the single
\nlargest contributor  to\t the  Gross  Domestic  product(GDP),
\naccounting for\talmost 33%  if the  total. They are vital to
\nthe national  well-being as,  besides  providing  the  basic
\nneeds of  the society  and the raw materials for some of the
\nimportant  segment   of\t Indian\t  industry,   they   provide
\nlivelihood for\talmost two  thirds of  the work\t force.\t The
\nshare of  the agricultural  products  in  the  total  export
\nearnings, both\tin primary  and\t processed  forms,  is\tvery
\nsignificant. In paragraph 1.2.7 Jute and Mesta, it is stated
\nthat the average production of jute and mesta in the seventh
\nplan was  8.8  million\tbales.\tInadequate  availability  of
\nimproved  seeds\t  and  retting\t facilities  are   the\tmain
\nconstraints to increasing the production of quality jute and
\nmesta. Development  of jute   and  mesta during\t the seventh
\nplan was  undertaken  through  a  special  Jute\t Development
\nprogram, funded\t by the Ministry of Textiles. Use of natural
\nfiber as  the packing  material is  on the revival trail and
\ndiverse jute  products are now exported. The minimum support
\nprice policy to the farmers and the role of Jute corporation
\nof India  (JCI)\t  need to  be reviewed\tfor their  effective
\noperation. It  is stated in para 1.11.1 that the Eighth plan
\naims at consolidating the gains from the base built over the
\nyears in  agricultural production sustaining the improvement
\nin productivity\t and  production.  To  meet  the  increasing
\ndemands of  the growing\t population enlarging  the income of
\nthe farmers  and realising the country potential by stepping
\nup agricultural\t exports effective  steps are directed to be
\ntaken. In  paragraph 1.11.7,  it is  stated  that  marketing
\ninfrastructure has  to be further augmented and streamlined,
\nespecially in  respect of  perishable  commodities.  In\t the
\nlight  of   the\t  technological\t  advancement\tand   gains,
\nagricultural produce  requires\tto  promote  diversification
\nwithin and outside the country which gains importance in the
\ncoming years.  In paragraph  1.11.9, it\t is stated  that the
\nchanges in  the trade  policies\t have  vastly  improved\t the
\nprospects for  realising the  full potential  of the country
\nwith its  varied agro-climatic\tconditions from\t tropical to
\ntemperate regions,  in\tproducing  commodities\tfor  export.
\nMaximising  the\t  production  of   the\ttraditional   export
\ncommodities  etc.  requires  to\t be  stepped  up  on  modern
\ntechnologies and  sustained efforts  should be\tmade in\t the
\ncoming years.  In paragraph  1.11.11, it  is stated that the
\npromotion of   initiatives outside the Government to further
\nsocioeconomic development  is of  cardinal importance and is
\ncentral to  the strategy  of the  Eighth plan.\tIn paragraph
\n1.11.12, it  is stated that many a programme and scheme will
\nhave to be continued from the previous plans, with necessary
\nrefinements or\tmodifications to  address themselves sharply
\nto the\tproblems for  their overcome.  A policy\t was made in
\neloquent terms\tpromising in  para 11  that “Government will
\nendeavour to  create a\tpositive trade or investment climate
\nfor agriculture at  par with industries to develop effective
\nsystems and  to bestow\tsimilar benefits  on agricultural as
\nexit   in   industry.\tThey   issued\tand   ensured\tthat
\nagriculturists are  not subjected  to the regulatory and tax
\ncollection machinery of Government.”\n<\/p>\n
     Article 38\t of the\t Constitution enjoins  the state  to
\nstrive to  promote the welfare of the people by securing and
\nprotecting, as\teffectively as\tit may,\t the social order in
\nwhich justice-social,  economic and  political-shall, inform
\nall the\t institutions  of  the\tnational  life\tstriving  to
\nminimise inequalities  in income  and endeavour to eliminate
\ninequalities in\t status, facilities,  opportunities  amongst
\nindividuals and groups of people residing in different areas
\nor engaged  in\tdifferent  avocations.\tAs  stated  earlier,
\nagriculture  is\t  the  main   stay  to\trural  economic\t and
\nempowerment of\tthe agriculturists.  Agriculture, therefore,
\nis an  industry. To  the  tiller  of  the  soil,  livelihood
\ndepends on  the production  and return\tof the\tagricultural
\nproduce and  sustained agro-economic  growth.  The  climatic
\nconditions throughout  Bharat are  not uniform. The climatic
\nconditions throughout Bharat are not uniform. They vary from
\ntropical to  moderate conditions.  Tillers of the soil being
\nunorganised sector,  their voice  is scarcely  heard and was
\nnot even  remotely voiced  in these cases. Their fundamental
\nright to cultivation is as a part of right to livelihood. It
\nis a bastion of economic and social justice envisaged in the
\npreamble and  Article 38  of  the  constitution.  As  stated
\nearlier, the  rights, liberties\t and privileges\t assured  to
\ncitizen are  linked  with  corresponding  concept  of  duty,
\npublic order  and morality.  Therefore, the jural postulates
\nform the foundation for the functioning of just society. The
\nfundamental rights  ensured in part III are, therefore, made
\nsubject to  restrictions i.e. , public order in the interest
\nof general  public. In\tenliving the  fundamental rights and
\nthe public interest or public purpose in part IV Directives,
\nparliament is  the best Judge to decide what is good for the
\ncommunity by  whose suffrage it comes into existence and the
\nmajority political  party assumed governance of the country.
\nThe Directive  principles  are\tthe  fundamentals  in  their
\nmanifestos.  Any   digression\tis   unconstitutional.\t The
\nconstitution enjoins upon the Executive, Legislature and the
\nJudiciary to  balance the  competing and  conflicting claims
\ninvolved in  a dispute\tso as  to  harmonise  the  competing
\nclaims to  establish an\t egalitarian social  order. It\tis a
\nsettled law  that the  Fundamental Rights  and the Directive
\nprinciples are two wheels of the chariot; none of the two is
\nless important than the other. Snap one, the other will lose
\nits efficacy.  Together, they  constitute the  conscience of
\nthe constitution to bring about social revolution under rule
\nof law.\t The Fundamental  Rights  and  the  directives\tare,
\ntherefore, harmoniously interpreted to make the law a social
\nengineer to provide flesh and blood to the dry bones of law.
\nThe Directives\twould serve  the court\tas a beacon light to
\ninterpretation. Fundamental Rights are rightful means to the
\nend, viz.,  social and\teconomic  justice  provided  in\t the
\nDirectives and\tthe preamble. The Fundamental Rights and the
\nDirectives establish  the trinity  of equality,\t liberty and
\nfraternity  in\tan  egalitarian\t social\t order\tand  prevent
\nexploitation.\n<\/p>\n
     Social  justice,\ttherefore,  forms   the\t  basis\t  of
\nprogressive stability  in the  society and  human  progress.
\nEconomic justice  means abolishing  such economic conditions
\nwhich removed  the inequality of economic value between man,
\nconcentration of wealth and means of production in the hands
\nof a  few and  are detrimental\tto the\tvast. Law, therefore
\nmust seek to serve as a flexible instrument of socioeconomic
\nadjustment   to\t  bring\t  about\t  peaceful   socio-econnomic
\nrevolution  under   rule  of   law.  The  constitution,\t the
\nfundamental supreme  lex  distributes  the  sovereign  power
\nbetween the  Executive, the  Legislature and  the Judiciary.
\nThe three  instrumentalities, within their play endeavour to
\nelongate the  constitutional basic  structure built  in\t the
\npreamble,  Fundamental\t Rights\t and   Directives,   namely,
\nestablishment of  an egalitarian social order in which every
\ncitizen receives  equality of  opportunity  and\t of  status,
\nsocial and  economic justice.  The  court,  therefore,\tmust
\nstrive to  give harmonious  interpretation to propel forward
\nmarch  and  progress  towards  establishing  an\t egalitarian
\nsocial order.\n<\/p>\n
     From   this    perspective,   let\t us   consider\t the
\nconstitutionality  of\tthe  provisions\t  of  the  Act.\t The
\nstatement and objects and the preamble of the Act, would, in
\nunmistakable terms,  indicate that  it\tintends\t to  provide
\nlivelihood to  nearly 4\t million rural agricultural families
\nand 2.5\t lacs industrial workers The ancient agro-based jute
\nindustry occupied  a significant  position in  our  national
\neconomy, in  particular in  the economy of the north-eastern
\nregion of the country. It is agro-based and labour-intensive
\nindustry. It  is also  an export-oriented  one and  its\t raw
\nmaterial is  based entirely  on indigenous  jute produced by
\nthe  above   agricultural  families.   Parliament   avowedly
\nintended to protect the interests of the persons involved in
\njute   production;   jute   industry,\ttherefore,   require
\nprotection.\n<\/p>\n
     A balanced\t view of  the developments  in the  national
\neconomy requires  to be\t taken into consideration to protect
\nthe interests  of the  farmers who produce jute or any other
\nagricultural produce  and in  the  interests  of  agro-based
\nindustry of  the country  and workers  who deliver  finished
\nproducts. with\tthat objective in view, the Act was made for
\ncompulsory use\tof jute\t packing material  in the supply and
\ndistribution of\t certain  commodities  in  the\tinterest  of
\nproduction of  raw jute\t packing material  and\tthe  persons
\nengaged in  the production thereof for the matters connected
\ntherewith. Section 3,4 and 5 reads thus:\n<\/p>\n
     “3.  (1)  Notwithstanding\tanything
\n     contained in  any other law for the
\n     time being\t in force,  the\t Central
\n     Government,   may,\t   if\tit    is
\n     satisfied,\t after\tconsidering  the
\n     recommendations made  to it  by the
\n     standing Advisory\tcommittee,  that
\n     it is  necessary so  to do\t in  the
\n     interest of  production of raw jute
\n     and jute packaging material, and of
\n     persons engaged  in the  production
\n     thereof, by  order published  in to
\n     time, that\t such commodity or class
\n     of commodities  or such  percentage
\n     thereof, as may be specified in the
\n     order, be\tpacked for  the purposes
\n     of its  supply or\tdistribution  in
\n     such jute packaging material as may
\n     be specified in the order:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (a) the  existing level of usage of
\n     jute material;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (b)  the\tquantity  of   raw  jute
\n     available;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (c) the  quantity of  jute material
\n     available:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (d) the  protection of  interest of
\n     persons   engaged\t in   the   jute
\n     industry and  in the  production of
\n     row jute;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (e)   the\t  need\t for   continued
\n     maintenance of jute industry;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (f)  the  quantity\t of  commodities
\n     which, in its opinion, is likely to
\n     be required  for  packing\tin  jute
\n     material;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (g)  such\t other\tmatters\t as  the
\n     standing  Advisory\t  committee  may
\n     think fit.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     5. Where  an order\t has  been  made
\n     under  Section   3\t requiring   any
\n     commodity, class  of commodities or
\n     any percentage thereof to be packed
\n     in\t jute\tpackaging  material  for
\n     their supply  or distribution, such
\n     commodity, class  of commodities of
\n     percentage thereof\t shall\tnot,  on
\n     and from the date specified in such
\n     order, be\tsupplied or  distributed
\n     unsell  the   same\t is   packed  in
\n     accordance with that order:
\n     Provided  that   nothing  in   this
\n     section shall  apply to  the supply
\n     or distribution  of  any  commodity
\n     before that  date such  commodities
\n     or three  months from the aforesaid
\n     date  such\t if  immediately  before
\n     that  date\t such  commodity  before
\n     that date\tsuch commodity, class of
\n     commodities or  percentage, thereof
\n     were being packaging material other
\n     than jute packging material.”
\n     Provided that  until such\ttime  as
\n     the standing  Advisory committee is
\n     constituted under\tsection\t 4,  the
\n     central  Government  shall,  before
\n     making any\t order under  this  sub-
\n     section(2) of  section 4,\tand  any
\n     order  so\t made  shall   cease  to
\n     operator at the expiration of three
\n     months from  the date  on which the
\n     standing Advisory\tcommittee  makes
\n     its recommendations.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2) Every\torder  made  under  sub-
\n     section
\n     (1) shall\tbe laid,  as soon as may
\n     be after  it is  made, before  each
\n     House of parliament, while it is in
\n     session,  for  a  total  period  of
\n     thirty days  which may be comprised
\n     in one  session or\t in two\t or more
\n     successive sessions, and if, before
\n     the   expiry    of\t  the\t session
\n     immediately following  the\t session
\n     or\t   the\t  successive\tsessions
\n     aforesaid,\t both  Houses  agree  in
\n     making  any   modification\t in  the
\n     order or both Houses agree that the
\n     order should not be made, the order
\n     shall thereafter  have effect  only
\n     in such  modified form  or br of no
\n     effect, as\t the case  may\tbe;  so,
\n     however, that any such modification
\n     or\t annulment   shall  be\t without
\n     prejudiced\t to   the  validity   of
\n     anything previously done under that
\n     order. (emphasis supplied)\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     4.(1) The Central Government shall,
\n     with  a  view  to\tdetermining  the
\n     commodity\tthereof\t in  respect  of
\n     which jute packaging material shall
\n     be\t  used\t  in   their\tpacking,
\n     constitute\t a   standing\tAdvisory
\n     committee\t consisting    of   such
\n     Government the  necessary expertise
\n     to give advise in the matter.<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     (2) The standing Advisory committee
\n     shall,   after    considering   the
\n     following\tmatters,   indicate  its
\n     recommendations  to   the\t central
\n     Government, namely :<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Sections 6\t to 8 are machinery provisions. Section 9 to
\n11 are\tpenal provisions.  Section 16  gives  power  to\t the
\nCentral Government,  to exempt\tby notification published in
\nthe official  Gazette, any commodity or class of commodities
\nfrom the  operation of\tany order  made under section 3. The
\norder should be laid under sub-section (2) before each House
\nof parliament  as provided  therein. The orders issued under
\nsection 3  are subject\tto modification\t by the\t parliament.
\nSection\t 17   gives  rule-   making  power  to\tthe  central
\nGovernment. Rules,  namely,  the  Jute\tpackaging  Materials
\n(compulsory use\t in packing  commodities) Rules,  1987\t(for
\nshort,\tthe   ‘Rules’)\twere   made.  Rule  3  provides\t for
\nconstitution of the commodities.\n<\/p>\n
     Sub-section (1)  of  section  3,  with  a\tnon-obstante
\nclause, excludes,  excludes the\t operation of  any other law
\nfor the\t time being  in force  and, regulates use of jute or
\njute  packaging\t material  in  supply  and  distribution  of
\ncertain\t commodities.\tIt  gives   power  to\tthe  Central
\nGovernment, on\tbeing satisfied,  on  consideration  of\t the
\nrecommendations\t made\tto  it\t by  the  standing  Advisory
\nCommittee empowered to issue direction from time to time for
\nuse of\tthe packing material. The primary purpose and object
\nof such\t directions is\tto protect the interests of producer
\nof raw jute and jute making material. The Central Government
\nis enjoined  to protect\t the interests of persons engaged in
\nthe production thereof.\t Such orders  should be published in
\nthe official Gazette. The orders need to be passed from time
\nto time. From the date of such order specified therein, such
\ncommodity  or\tclass  of  commodities\tor  such  percentage
\nthereof, as  specified in  the order  should be\t packed with
\njute packaging\tmaterial specified  in there  order for\t the
\npurpose of  supply or  distribution  of\t such  commodity  or
\ncommodities. Under the proviso, before making any order, the
\nmatter as  specified in\t sub-section (2)  of section  4. The
\nCentral Government, may make an order thereunder which shall
\ncease to operate at the expiration of 3 months from the date
\nof the recommendations of the standing Advisory committee.\n<\/p>\n
     Every such\t order shall  be laid  before each  House of
\nparliament while  it is in session, for a period of 30 days.
\nIt would  be open to the parliament to make any modification
\nto the\torder. Both  the Houses of parliament may also agree
\nthat  such   order  should   not  be   made.  After   making
\nmodifications, if  any, such  amended or modified order will
\nbe the\toperative order.  Any action  taken on\tthe on going
\norder, before  modification, shall  be without\tprejudice to
\nthe action already taken.\n<\/p>\n
     Under  sub-section\t  (1)  of  section  4,\tthe  central
\nGovernment should  constitute a\t standing Advisory committee
\nconsisting of  such persons  as have,  in its  opinion,\t the
\nnecessary expertise to give advice in the matter with a view
\nto determine  the  commodity  or  class\t of  commodities  or
\npercentage  thereof  in\t respect  of  which  jute  packaging
\nmaterial shall be used in the packing. The standing Advisory
\ncommittee,  after  considering\tthe  matters  enumerated  in
\nclauses (a) to (9), would furnish its recommendations to the
\nGovernment. Section  5 created\tembargo on  the\t supply\t and
\ndistribution  of   such\t specified  commodity  or  class  of
\ncommodities or\tany percentage\tthereof\t with  reference  to
\nwhich an  order under  section 3  came to be made. Rule 3 of
\nthe  Rules   carries  out   the\t purpose  of  section  4  in
\nestablishment and  constitution\t of  the  standing  Advisory
\ncommittees consisting  of chairman and members not exceeding
\n20, nominated  by the central Government for a term of three
\nyears. The  date of the constitution of the committee and of
\nfilling up of all the vacancies and manner in which it is to
\nbe done is provided thereunder.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  true that  though a committee was constituted by
\nthe  central   Government,  in\taddition  to\tthe  Advisor
\ncommittee which\t recommended to\t the Government\t to  abolish
\ncompulsory  use\t of  jute  packing  material  by  1997,\t the
\nGovernment and\tthe Advisory  committee did  not consider it
\ndesirable to  completely phase\tout compulsory\tuse of\tJute
\npackaging Material.  It\t issued\t directions  for  compulsory
\npacking of the commodities with jute packaging material with
\nvarying percentage.  In the  case of sugar, 100% use of jute
\npackaging material is insisted to be continued.\n<\/p>\n
     The question,  therefore, is:  whether direction issued
\nby the\tcentral Government for the compulsory packing of the
\ncommodities with  jute packaging  material, [in\t respect  of
\nsugar 100%  use of  the gunny bags and at varying percentage
\nfor  other   commodities  is   unconstitutional?  As  stated
\nearlier, the  Act aims\tto accord  socio-economic justice to
\nthe tillers of the soil by protecting the cultivation of raw
\njute and  employment of\t the workmen  engaged  in  the\tjute
\nmanufacturing  industry.   Jute\t is   being   produced\t and
\nmanufactured  in   north-eastern  states,  West\t Bengal\t and
\nAndhara Pradesh\t etc.  as  mentioned  in  the  affidavit.  A
\nreading of  the Debates\t on the\t  floor of the parliament on
\nthe Bill,  does establish,  cutting across  the party lines,
\nall  the   members  have   spoken  in  favour  of  directing
\ncompulsory use\tof jute\t packaging material (gunny bags) for
\nsupply\tand  distribution  of  the  commodities.  As  stated
\nearlier, the  object of\t the benign  measure primarily is to
\nprotect the  interests of  growers of  agricultural produce,
\nwho  cultivate\tof  growers  of\t agricultural  produce,\t who
\ncultivate raw  jute. Incidentally, the manufacturers and the
\nworkman get  benefit therefrom. Agricultural economy accords
\nto the\tgrower socio-economic justice economy accords to the
\ngrower socio-economic justice to provided dignity of person,
\nequality of opportunity to have his produce used in industry
\netc. Agriculture  is treated  as industry  on par  with\t any
\nother any  other industry.  the\t state\tshould\tprovide.  by
\nlegislative  or\t  executive  measure   all  facilities\t and
\nopportunities to  get them  due price for their products and
\nhave them  marketed  for  use  in  are\tmade  subjection  to
\nparliamentary control  and subject  to modification  by both
\nHouses.\n<\/p>\n
     Equally, the  competing right  to\tcarry  on  trade  or
\nbusiness guaranteed  to a  citizen or  person is  also to be
\nprotected. In  the  clash  of  competing  rights  of  socio-
\neconomic  justice  of  the  producers  of  the\tagricultural
\ncommodities and\t of the\t individual right  of a\t citizen  to
\ncarry on  trade or  business, the  latter yield place to the
\nparamount social  right. However,  as rightly pointed out by
\nthe counsel, a balances view has to be struck by the central
\nGovernment in  directing use  of jute  packaging material at
\nthe percentage\tof jute\t bags  to  be  used  for  compulsory
\npacking of the commodities which is subject to parliamentary
\ncontrol and  approval. Parliament  is the  spokesmen to\t the
\npeople where  the need\tis felt most accute. When the orders
\npassed under  section 3\t are subject  to modification by the
\nparliament, parliament\tpreserved to itself a great salutary
\ncontrol over executive exercise of power under section 3(1).
\nIt is  such a  valuable public protection and safeguard kept
\nwith the  parliament itself.  Parliament would\tbe the\tbest
\nJudge to  discuss in  each House as to what extent competing
\ninterests of  the agricultural\tindustry  and  the  industry
\ninvolved in  commercial products  need to  be protected\t and
\nwould  guide   the  central   Government  appropriately\t  by
\nresolution or  otherwise. When\tparliament  debates  on\t the
\nsubject, it  focuses its  attention on\tall its constituents
\nand  it\t  would\t be  open  to  debate,\ton  the\t subject  by
\nparticipants from  all the  members of\tthe  parliament\t and
\npolitical parties  and of  shades of  opinion. Parliament is
\nentitled to  direct the\t Central Government  to place on the
\nfloor of  each House  the  necessary  factual  material\t for
\ndiscussion. They  are  the best judges to direct the central
\nGovernment to act on their advice in a particular way, based
\non  the\t  existing  factual   material.\t The  parliament  is
\nempowered  to  overrule\t of  the  central  Government  under
\nsection 3(1) by disapproval.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  a question\tof fact,  to be\t considered in\teach
\ncase, as  to what  percentage is  required to  be used it is
\nprimarily  of\tthe  central  Government  to  be  decide  as
\nexecutive policy.  The central\tGovernment is  guided by the
\nmaterial placed\t before it  and the advice tendered to it by
\nthe standing  Advisory committee constituted under Section 4
\nof the Act. It depends upon the availability of the jute and
\nits products in the market, the quantum of raw jute produced
\nby the\tagriculturists, its  demand in\tthe market  and\t its
\ncapability  for\t diversification  into\tother  industry\t for
\nancillary use  of the  jute  material  and  hosts  of  other
\nfactors enter into the decision making process. The exercise
\nis required to be undertaken from time to time. The Act, the
\nRules and the material placed before it by the Committee and
\nthe advice  tendered by\t the expert body form the basis. The
\ndecision taken and directions issued cannot be said to smack
\nof arbitrariness. Guidelines are available under the Act and
\nthe Rules  made\t in  this  behalf.  They  are  Parliamentary
\ncontrol. Paramount  public interest  is to  provide economic
\nsecurity and  equality and  justice to\tthe producers of the
\nraw jute  and the workers engaged in manufacturing and other
\njute packaging material.\n<\/p>\n
     In Shri  Sitaram Sugar  Co. Ltd.  & Anr.  vs. Union  of
\nIndia & Ors. [(1990) 3 SCC 223], the question arose; whether
\nfixation of  price for\tsugar under  Section 3\t(3-C) of the
\nEssential Commodities  Act, 1955  was an  administrative  or
\nlegislative function  and whether  the Court could interfere
\nin fixation  of price  thereof? A Constitution Bench of this
\nCourt had  held that price fixation is legislative function.
\nIn paragraph  57, it  was held\tthat judicial  review is not
\nconcerned with\tmatters of  economic policy.  The Court does
\nnot substitute\tits judgment  for that of the Legislature or
\nits agents  as to matters within the province of either. The
\nCourt does  not supplant  the “feel of the expert” by it own
\nviews. When  the Legislature  acts within  the sphere of its
\nauthority and  delegates power\tto its agent, it may empower
\nthe agent  to make  findings of\t fact which  are  conclusive
\nprovided such  findings satisfy\t the test of reasonableness.
\nIn all\tsuch cases,  judicial inquiry  is  confined  to\t the
\nquestion whether  the findings\tof fact are reasonably based
\non evidence and whether such findings are sustainable at law
\nof the land. Judicial function in respect of such matters is
\nexhausted  when\t the  court  finds  rational  basis  to\t the
\nconclusion reached  by the  authority.\tIn  the\t matters  of
\npolicy and  planning, it should adopt one or other system of
\ncontrol in  the best economic interest of the sugar industry
\nand  the   general  public   grouping  sugar   factories  on
\ngeographical-cum-agro-economic\tfactors\t  to  determine\t the
\nprice. It  was held  that the fixation of price to the sugar
\nwas not amenable to judicial review.\n<\/p>\n
     In R.K.  Garg etc.\t vs. Union of India & Ors. [(1981) 4
\nSCC  675],   when  Special   Bearer  Bonds  (Immunities\t and
\nExemptions) Act,  1981 was  challenged in  this Court  under
\nArticle 32 of the Constitution, this Court per majority, had
\nheld that  legislation particularly  in economic matters, is
\nessentially empiric  and it  is\t based\ton  experimentation.
\nThere may be crudities, inequities and even possibilities of
\nabuse but on that account alone, it cannot be struck down as
\ninvalid. These\tcan always be remedied by the legislature by
\npassing amendments.  The Court\tmust, therefore, adjudge the
\nconstitutionality of  such legislation\tby the generality of
\nits provisions\tand not\t by its\t crudities. Laws relating to
\neconomic activities  should be\tviewed with greater latitude
\nthan laws  touching civil rights such as freedom to speak or
\npractise any  religion. There  is always  a  presumption  in
\nfavour of the constitutionality of the Act. Burden is on the
\npetitioner to show that there has been a clear transgression
\nof constitutional  principles. The  legislature\t understands
\nand correctly  appreciates the\tneeds of its own people; its
\nlaws are  directed to  problems made  manifest by experience
\nand its\t discrimination is  based on  adequate\tgrounds.  In
\nadjudging, the\tCourt may  take\t into  consideration  common
\nknowledge, matters of common report, the history of the time
\nand may assume every state of affairs which can be conceived
\nof as  existing at the time of legislation. The Act was made
\nand held to be valid.\n<\/p>\n
     In Morey  vs. Doud\t [354 Us  457 =\t L.Ed. 2nd 1485], in
\ndissenting  judgment,  Frankfaster,  J.\t held  that  in\t the
\nutilities, tax,\t economic regulation  cases  judicial  self-
\nrestraint, if not judicial deference to legislative judgment
\nwas emphasised.\t The court  is always  to remember  that the
\nparliament has\taffirmative responsibility to solve problems
\nthat were  felt most  accute. In economic measure, the court
\nwhile claiming\tthe constitutionality  of a legislation must
\ndefer to legislative judgment.\n<\/p>\n
     In Peerless  General Finance  & Investment\t Co. Ltd.  &
\nAnr. VS.  Reserve Bank\tof India  [(1992) 2 SCC 343], one of
\nus, K.\tRamaswamy, J., in a separate but concurrent judgment
\nheld in\t paragraph 69  that it\tis well settled law that the
\ncourt is  not tribunal\tfrom the crudities and inequities of
\ncomplicated   experimental    economic\t legislation.\t The
\ndiscretion in  evolving economic  measures, rests  with\t the
\npolicy makers  and not\twith the  judiciary.  Indian  social
\norder is  beset with social and economic inequalities and of
\nstatus, and  in our  socialist secular, democratic republic,
\ninequality is  an anathema  to social  and economic justice.
\nThe Reserve  Bank of  India Act\t assigned the  power to\t the
\nReserve Bank  of India\tto regulate  monetary system and the
\nexperimentation of  the economic  legislation, can  best  be
\nleft to\t the executive\tunless it is found to be unrealistic
\nor manifestly  arbitrary. Even\tid a  law  is  found  to  be
\nwanting\t on  trial,  it\t is  better  that  its\tdefects\t are
\ndemonstrated and  removed by  amendment than that law should
\nbe aborted  by judicial\t fiat. Such an assertion of judicial
\npower  deflects\t  responsibilities  from  those\t on  whom  a
\ndemocratic society  ultimately rests.  The court  has to see
\nwhether\t the   scheme,\tmeasure\t or  regulation\t adopted  is
\nrelevant or  appropriate  to  the  power  exercised  by\t the
\nauthority. In  that  case,  the\t directions  issued  by\t the
\nReserve Bank  of India\tfor regulating the money circulation
\nwere held valid.\n<\/p>\n
     In City  of New  Oreleans vs. Nancy dukes [427 US 297 =
\n49  L.Ed.   2nd\t 511   at  518),   the\tdissenting  view  of
\nFrankfaster, J.\t was upheld  and the  court had stated that”
\nMorey was  the\tonly  case  in\tthe  last  half\t century  to
\ninvalidate a  wholly economic  regulation  solely  on  equal
\nprotection and\tnow we\tare satisfied  that the decision was
\nerroneous”.\n<\/p>\n
     In Charles\t Roberts &  Co. Ltd.  vs.  British  Railways
\nBoard [(1965)  1 W.L.R.\t  396]\t, the  chancery Division had
\nheld that,  in general, Judges are not qualified to the said
\nquestions of  economic policy  and such\t questions by  their
\nnature are not justiciable. But, in England, judicial review
\nof parliamentary  enactment was not available. That decision
\nmay not be of much assistance.\n<\/p>\n
     Robert Jackson,  J. in  H.P. Hood\t&  sons\t vs.  Dumond
\n(1949), had  stated that our system is that every farmer and
\nevery craftsman\t shall\tbe  encouraged\tto  produce  by\t the
\ncertainty that\the will\t have free access to every market in
\nthe nation,  that no  home embargo will withhold his exports
\nand  that  no  foreign\tstate  will  by\t custom,  duties  or
\nregulation exclude  them [vide: The Encyclopedia of American
\nConstitution  on  the  chapter\tEconomic  Analysis  and\t the
\nconstitution at\t page 597]. At page 598, it is stated that ”
\nsince  1937,   the  court   has\t consistently\tdeclined  to
\ninvalidate economic  legislation on  substantive due process
\ngrounds\t and   has  stubbornly\t refused  to   subject\tsuch
\nlegislation to even minimal review”. Economic analysis is an
\nacquired taste; courts should not insist that legislature be
\neducated in basic economic concepts let alone that they keep
\nabreast of  the\t current  literature  on  externalities\t and
\npublic goods.  Most  economists\t would\tacknowledge  that  a
\nlegislature  may   properly  choose  to\t sacrifice  economic
\nefficiency in  order to achieve some desired distribution of
\nwealth among  social groups.  Even if  a private  conduct is
\neconomically  acceptable,   a  legislature   could  properly
\nconclude that\tthe conduct is interpersonally unfair in the
\nparticular way, it enables to cause harm to people.\n<\/p>\n
     It would,\tthus, be  clear that   the Court is not will
\nequipped to  adjudge crudities\tand inequities emerging from
\neconomic  legislation.\t The  legislature  is  empowered  to
\nexperiment on  economic legislation in its attempt to remove
\ninequalities in\t income or  status  or\tprovide\t social\t and
\neconomic justice  to the society or a particular descernable
\nsegments of  society or\t toe remove  the  defect  where\t the
\nlegislature felt  most acute. There is always presumption in
\nfavour of constitutionality. The legislature appreciates the
\nneeds of  the people  and directs  the laws  to the problems
\nmade manifest  by experience  and discrimination is based on
\nadequate grounds.  The court  does not supplant the feel and
\nexperiment  of\tthe  expert  by\t its  own  views.  Court  in
\ndeference to  legislative judgement,  imposes self-restraint
\nto adjudge  on crudities and experiment but concern  on core
\nconstitutionality.\n<\/p>\n
     Another serious  contention of  the petitioners is that
\nthe Act\t is a  class legislation intended to benefit a small
\nsector of jute or the producers of raw jute or their workmen
\nwhile the total impact on the consumers at large or right to
\ntrade\tor    business\t  in\tanother\t   commodities\t  is
\ndisproportionately large.  Therefore, the Act is ultra vires
\nas devoid  of substance.  The diversity\t is so\tvast that no
\ncomparison would  be possible in terms of population. In the
\nentire south  India, paddy  cultivation is  primary  economy
\nwhile in  Kerala spices and in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and
\nTamil Nadu  sugarcane, Tobacco,\t pulses,  cotton  and  other
\ncommercial commodities\twould supplement  paddy cultivation.
\nIn  Gujarat   and  Maharashtra,\t  commercial   crops   would
\nsupplement the paddy cultivation. In coastal Andhra Pradesh,
\njute also  is cultivated as a second crop. In other areas in
\nsouth Eastern region, as is evident, apart from agriculture,
\njute  also  is\tthe  main  agricultural\t product.  In  Uttar
\nPradesh, sugarcane  gets intensive  cultivation\t apart\tfrom
\npaddy and  wheat. In Gangatic platue, apart from agriculture
\nintensive sugarcane  cultivation is  the special feature. In
\nPunjab\tand  Haryana,  wheat\tand    paddy  are  the\tmain
\ncultivation.  In   Rajasthan,\tbazra,\t pulses\t  etc.\t are
\ncultivated.  Throughout\t  the  country\tbut  cultivation  of
\nagriculture produce  is\t the  sole  resource  of  the  rural
\npopulation as  majority is  compared to\t urban population in
\nthe country.  It is,  therefore, clear\tthat raw agriculture
\nproduce is  an input  of  finished  product  for  commercial
\npurposes and its regulation, by the Acts or Rules or orders,
\ncannot be  assailed as\tultra vires  the legislature  on the
\nbasis of  the  population  of  the  agriculturists  when  it
\naffects\t consumer   public  or\t manufacturers\tof  finished
\nproducts  whose\t  business   avocation\t incidentally\tgets
\naffected. On  that account, the Act cannot be declared\tvoid
\nor Ultra vires the power of the parliament to enact the law.\n<\/p>\n
     The main  Plank of\t the petitioners,  to  demolish\t the
\nvalidity of the Act as ultra vires of Article 19(1) (9) , is
\nfounded on  the ratio  in Chintaman  Rao vs.  The  state  of
\nMadhya Pradesh\t[(1950) SCR  759]. The central Provinces and
\nBerar  Regulation   of\tManufacture  of\t Bidis\t(Agriculture
\npurposes) Act  (LXIV of\t 1948), (pre-consolidation  Act) was
\nmade empowering the Deputy commissioner by a notification to
\nfix a  period to  be agricultural  season  with\t respect  to
\nspecifies villages  to prohibit deployment of labour in bidi
\nmanufacturing of  bidis in certain villages which came to be
\nchallenged under  Article 32 of the constitution. This court
\nhad held  that the object of the statute being a measures to
\nprovide supply\tof adequate labour for agricultural purposes
\nin the\tarea of\t the province,\tthe purpose  would have been
\nachieved by  legislation restricting  the employment  of the
\nagricultural labour  in the manufacture of bidis during\t the
\naforesaid season  without prohibiting altogether manufacture
\nof bidis themselves. Therefore, it was held that the Act has
\nno reasonable relation to the object in view and it did\t not
\nimpose any reasonable restriction under Article 19(6) of the
\nconstitution. Reasonable  restriction cannot that there is a
\nlimitation imposed  in enjoyment  of the  right which should
\nnot be\tarbitrary or  excessive in  nature  beyond  what  is
\nrequired in  the  interest  of\tthe  public.  Reasonableness
\nimplies intelligent  care and deliberation, i.e., the choice
\nof  a\tcourse\twhich\treason\tdictates   an  arbitrary  or
\nexcessively invades the right cannot be said to contain\t the
\nquality of  reasonableness unless  it strikes proper balance
\nbetween the  freedom guaranteed\t under Article 19(1) (9) and
\nthe social control permitted under clause (6) of Article 19,
\nmust be\t held to be wanting to be reasonable. As pointed out
\nby this\t court, the legislature could have prohibited use of
\nlabour during  the particular  period of agricultural season
\nin the area in which bidis are manufactured; instead the Act
\npermitted the  offer to\t issue notification  imposing  total
\nprohibition on manufacture of bides. It was, therefore, held
\nthat it\t was unreasonable  restriction not  saved by Article
\n19(6). Far from helping appellants, the ratio indicates that
\nif the Act strikes a reasonable balance between the exercise
\nof the fundamental rights and reasonable restrictions in the
\ninterest of  the general  public, the Act would be valid. In
\nNarendra Kumar\t& ors.\tvs. The\t Union of India & ors.<\/a> [1960
\n(2)  SCR   375].  This\tcourt  upheld  imposition  of  total
\nprohibition  in\t the  purchase\tand  import  of\t copper\t and
\nfixation of  the prices in view of policy of eliminating the
\ndealers from  such trade  as not  violative of Article 19(a)
\n(9) of\tthe  constitution.  It\twas  held  that\t restriction
\nincludes total\tprohibition. In view of the foreign exchange
\ncrunch, the  prohibition on  import of copper, lead etc. Was
\nupheld that  the  court\t is  to\t see  whether  the  test  of
\nreasonableness is  satisfied by\t considering the question in
\nthe background\tof factual  circumstances  under  which\t the
\norder came to be made, taking into account the nature of the
\nevil that was sought to be remedied by law, the ratio of the
\nharm caused  to the  individual\t citizens  by  the  proposed
\nremedy, the  beneficial effect\treasonably expected  to\t the
\ngeneral public\tand whether  the restrain  caused by the law
\nwas more  than necessary  in the  interest  of\tthe  general
\npublic. In  M\/s. Dwarka\t Prasad Laxmi  Narayan\tvs.  Stateof
\nUtter Pradesh  & Two ors.<\/a> [(1954) SCR 803], it was held that
\nregulating the\ttrade or   business  in\t normally  available
\ncommodities was\t unreasonable. U.P.  coal control  order had
\ngiven absolute power to the licensing authority to renew the
\nlicence under the order. In that case, since the commodities
\nwere freely  available in  the market,\tit was held that the
\nrestriction was\t not a\treasonable restriction under Article
\n19(6) of  the constitution.  It is  not necessary  to pursue
\nthis reasoning after the Essential commodities Act, 1955 was
\nenacted giving\tpower to  regulate  distribution,  sale\t and
\nsupply of  the essential  commodities to  general public and
\nfixing prices thereof.\n<\/p>\n
     In Parvej\tAktar &\t Ors. vs.  Union of India & Ors.<\/a> [JT
\n1993 (1)  SC 453],  a Bench  of three Judges was to consider
\nthe reservation of certain articles for exclusive production
\nby the hand-looms whether violative of Articles 19 and 14 of
\nthe constitution.  This court held that there is no question
\nof monopoly  create in\tfavour\tof  the\t handloom  industry.
\nCertain\t articles   were  reserved   for  the\thandloom  on
\ntraditional looms  engaged since  1950. Recently,  when\t the
\npower-loom  started   manufacturing  the  items\t which\twere
\ntraditionally  being  manufactured  by\tthe  handlooms\tthat
\ncaused\ta   serious  inroad   into  the\t handloom  industry.
\nConsequently, the  stepped into\t the business  and regulated
\nthe use of certain specified articles for being manufactured
\nby handlooms  with traditional\tmethods. Same is the view in
\nG.T.N. Textiles\t Ltd. & Anr. vs. Assistant Directors, R.O.T.
\nCommissioner &\tors. [JT  1993 (2) SC 416]. Therein, pack of
\nyarn was  regulated by\tdirection issued  by notification by
\nthe  Textile  commissioner  to\tuse  certain  percentage  of
\nproduction in  hank form. Clause 16 of the Textile (control)
\norder, 1986  was challenged  as violative  of Articles 19(1)
\nand 14\tnoticing that the Textile (control) order was issued
\nonly in respect of packing yarn in hank form exclusively for
\nhandloom sector\t which is  the largest\tcottage industry  in
\nIndia. The  regulation\twas  held  to  be  not\tultra  vires
\nArticles 19  and  14  but  a  reasonable  restriction  under
\nArticle 19(6).\n<\/p>\n
     In Municipal  corporation of  the city  of Ahmedabad  &
\nors. vs\t Jan Mohammed  Usmanbhai & Anr.<\/a> [(1986) 3 SCC 20], a
\nconstitution Bench  of this  court held\t that  normally\t the
\nlegislature is\tbest judge of what is good for the community
\nbut the\t court should  not shirk  its duty  to determine the
\nvalidity of  the law.  In determining  the reasonableness of
\nthe restriction\t imposed by the law under Article 19(6), the
\ncourt  cannot  proceed\ton  a  general\tnotion\tof  what  is
\nreasonable in  the abstract  or even  on a  consideration of
\nwhat is reasonable from the view of the person or persons on
\nwhom the restrictions are imposed. The court has to consider
\nwhether the  restrictions are  reasonable in the interest of
\nthe general  public. The question of the interest of general
\npublic\tis   of\t wide  import  comprehending  public  order,
\neconomic welfare  of the public, public security, morals and
\nthe objects  mentioned in the Directive principles. The test
\nof reasonableness  has to  be viewed  in the  context of the
\nissues which  faced the\t legislature. In  constructing\tsuch
\nlaws and  judging their\t validity, courts  must approach the
\nproblem from  the point\t of view  of furthering\t the  social
\ninterest which is the purpose of the legislation to promote.
\nThey are  not in  these matters\t functioning in vacuo but as
\npart of\t society which\tis trying,  by the  enacted law,  to
\nsolve the  problems  and  further  the\tmoral  and  material
\nprogress of the community as a whole.\n<\/p>\n
     In Sushila\t Saw Mill vs. State of Orissa & ors.<\/a> [(1995)
\n5 SCC 615], the orissa saw mills and saw pits (control) Act,
\n1991 and  in particular\t section 4 thereof was challenged as
\nviolative of Articles 19(1) (g) and 301 of the constitution.
\nSection 4  imposed  restriction\t on  establishing  saw\tmill
\nwithin the  notified prohibited\t zones. It was held that the
\nright to  carry on  trade or  business is  subject to public
\ninterest. The  restriction imposed  total bar  on saw  mills
\noperating in  the prohibited  area. Prohibition was held not
\nviolative either  of Article  14 or 301. It was held that it
\nis  class   regulation\t to   protect\tforest.\t  Therefore,
\nprohibition on\testablishing saw mills within the prohibited
\nzone cannot be on geographical contiguity and was held to be
\nreasonable restriction\tin the interest of society. In State
\nof Kerala  vs. Joseph  Antony<\/a> [(1994)  1  SCC  301],  Kerala
\nmarine Fishing\tRegulation Act,\t 1980 and  the\tnotification
\nissued under  section 4(1)  thereof, prohibiting  fishing by
\nmechanized vessels  in territorial  waters by  use of  gears
\nlike purse,  seine, ring  seine, pelagic trawl and mid-water
\ntrawl etc.  were challenged  as violative  of Article  19(1)\n<\/p>\n
(g). In\t considering the  above\t question,  this  court,  in
\nparagraph 9,  had held\tthat  the  court  has  to  keep\t the
\nbackground facts  of social  and marine\t life at the back of
\nthe mind  of the  court to  appreciate the issue involved in
\nthe case.  After careful  examination, this  court had\theld
\nthat the  High court  was not  right in\t striking  down\t the
\nnotification on\t the ground  that the  Government had issued
\ntwo fresh notifications on the basis of the report submitted
\nby the\tspecial officers. In paragraphs 20, confining to the
\nfact of 98.5% of the fishing corporation who were engaged in
\nthe traditional\t fishing were pushed below the poverty line.
\nTherefore, it  was held\t that the  Act was  to protect their
\nrights. This court had upheld the regulatory measure.\n<\/p>\n
     In Kerala\tSwathanthra Malaya  Thozhilali Federation  &
\nors. Kerala  Trawlnet Board  operators\tAssociation  &\tors.
\n[(1994) 5 SCC 23]. the Kerala marine Fishing Regulation Act,
\n1980 (10  of  1981)  and  the  Rules  made  thereunder\twere
\nchallenged on  the ground  that restrictions  upon  all\t the
\nboats or  all the  horse power of the engine and particulars
\nof fishing  gear to  be carried\t in  boats going for bottom-
\ntrawling beyond\t territorial  waters,  was  impugned  to  be
\nviolative of  Article 19(1)  (g). This\tcourt negatived\t the
\ncontention holding  that regulation  was intended  to ensure
\nlivelihood to  lacs and lacs of fisherman engaged in fishing
\nby traditional methods.\n<\/p>\n
     The next  question is:  whether the prohibition of 100%
\nuse of gunny bags by sugar industry and 70% by the cement is
\nreasonable? It is true that the committee constituted by the
\nGovernment had recommended to phase out use of gunny bags on
\nthe ground  that in  a free  market.  It  is  not  justified
\nprimarily to  encourage free  market. It  is seen  that\t the
\nstate has not abandoned and cannot abandon the mixed economy
\nand  power  of\tregulation  as\tmandated  by  constitutional
\npolicy. The Act was made in implementation of socio-economic
\nequality and  policies. Even a private industry by operation
\nof Directive  contained in  part IV,  is bound to adopt them
\nimplement them\tand the\t Government policies to establish an
\negalitarian social  order. The\tcommittee in its free market
\nfrenzy became  oblivion of  the policy\tresolution of Eighth
\nFive year  plan, the  Trinity, Preamble,  Fundamental Rights
\nand Directives.\t The executive policy of the state  would be
\ncognizant to  these mandated  which should  always bind\t the
\nGovernment and\tall agencies  including private agencies. As
\nseen, the Advisory committee constituted under section 4 has
\nrecommended 100%  use of  packing the sugar with gunny bags.
\nOn consideration  of the  report, the  Government had  acted
\nupon the  same. the economic policy to render socio-economic
\njustice to  the growers\t of the\t raw jute and the workman is
\nbased on the above constitutional policy. Lest the report of
\nthe committee  on the basis of the free market economy would
\nbe in negation of the preamble, the Directive principles and
\nthe  Fundamental   Rights  to\teconomic  justice   to\t the
\nagriculturists. So  the contention is clearly unsustainable.
\nThe  standing\tAdvisory  commit,  therefore,  had  properly
\nadvised and  the Government  obviously has taken decision to
\ncontinue the  policy of compulsory packing of commodities or
\nclass of commodities with jute bags, regulated under section
\n3 the Act. The parliament did not negate the same.\n<\/p>\n
     The  further   contention\tthat   on  account   of\t the
\nregulation, HDPE  industry has become unviable and is on the
\nbrink of liquidation and the Act tends to create monopoly in
\nfavour of  private industry  which does\t not get  protection
\nunder Art.  19(6),  is\tuntenable.  This  viability  of\t the
\nrespective  industries.\t  It  would   be  for\tthe  central
\nGovernment and\tparliament and\tnot for\t this court  to take
\ninto consideration  declaring the Act as void. The court has
\nto see\twhether\t the  Act  serves  public  purpose  and\t the
\nrestriction are reasonable. The Advisory committee goes into
\nfactual details.  The Government  examines and\ttakes policy
\ndecision. It lays the order on the table of both the Houses.
\nThe parliament\tcontrols exercise  of\tpolicy. Restrictions
\nare in-built and self-evident.\n<\/p>\n
     Further contention\t that the  jute is being import from
\nBangladesh which  would show that no adequate supply of jute
\nis available  in India and that no gunny bags are adequately
\navailable to  meet the growing demand of sugar industry etc.
\n, cannot be given acceptance. It is state by the respondents
\nthat imported  jute from  Bangladesh is\t a finer quality for
\nuse as\ta component  in exportable jute products but not for
\ndomestic  consumption.\t It  is\t next  contended  that\tjute
\nproduction has fallen due to decrease in the cultivated area
\nof raw\tjute and the order to use gunny bags as arbitrary is
\nwithout\t force.\t From  the  report  submitted  by  the\tjute
\nindustry and  from the\tEight Five year plan material, it is
\nseen that  considerable increase in the quantity of the jute
\nis produced. The further contention is that the Act is aimed
\nto benefit only the manufacturers of jute who has taken huge
\nsums as\t loans or  subsidy from\t the central  Government for
\nmodernisation of their industry; They have diversified their
\nproduction for\texport. Neither\t the workman nor the growers
\nof the\tjute are  benefited from  the regulation.  We cannot
\ndecide the  validity of\t the Act  on that basis. May be that
\nthere does not appear to be any control on the prices of the
\nraw jute  supplied by  the farmers to the jute factories. If
\nthat is\t  the situation, the Government should look into the
\nproblem and  met out  justice to  the  producers  for  whose
\nbenefits the  Act was  primarily enacted.  Corrective  steps
\nshould be taken to protect the interests of the growers. For
\nthe labour,  they demands.  But on  that  account,  the\t Act
\ncannot be struck down.\n<\/p>\n
     The  further   contention\tthat  since  the  Act  is  a
\ntemporary  measure   to\t benefit   the\tjute  industry,\t the
\nregulation  should  be\tphased\tout  gradually,\t is  without
\nsubstance. From\t the Eighth  plan and  the Resolution, it is
\nevident\t that\tthe  Government\t  intends  to  continue\t the
\nregulation. The\t further contention  that the  jute products
\nare  being   diversified  and\tthe  need   for\t regulation,
\ntherefore, no  longer subsists\t, cannot  be accepted. It is
\nfor the\t Central Government  to take  into consideration, on
\nthe basis  of the  material placed  before it,\tas  to\twhat
\nextent the  regulation would  need modification. The further
\ncontention is  since no\t adequate supply of the jute bags is
\navailable to  meet the\tdemand, the  order is bad in law and
\ncannot be  gone into to invalidate the Act on that basis. It
\nwould be for the Central Government subject to parliamentary
\ncontrol to  take a  decision  and  equally  of\tthe  alleged
\nwastage.\n<\/p>\n
     Yet another  contention that  requires consideration is
\nthat in\t the committee\tconstituted under  section 4(1) only
\nsecretaries  represented   and\t no   one   represents\t the
\npetitioners in the committee and that, therefore, the Act is
\nvoid. This  contention also  cannot  be\t accepted  as  sound
\nprinciple of  law. However,  as seen  from the\trecord,\t the
\ncommittee consists  of the  secretaries representing various
\nof industries  through\trecognised  office  bearers  of\t the
\nassociations may  be nominated\tor given  notice before\t the
\nAdvisory committee meets to place their view and material in
\nsupport thereof\t  to  evaluate the  need for  regulation and
\nextent of  regulation thereof.\tThe persons representing the
\nparticular   advice    the   Government\t   before    issuing
\ndirections\/orders under section 3. The provisions of the Act
\ncontain\t guidelines   as  is   self-evident.  Socio-economic
\njustice is the public policy. It is subject to parliamentary
\ncontrol. They  bear reasonable nexus to the object sought to
\nbe achieved by the Act.\n<\/p>\n
     Considered from  this perspective,\t we  hold  that\t the
\nprovisions of  sections 3,  4 and  5 are  not  violative  of
\nArticle 14  or 19(1)  (g) of  the constitution.\t The Act and
\norders impose  reasonable restriction saved by Article 19(6)
\nof the constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     There is  no restriction  on the stream of transport of
\ncommodities or\tclass thereof  by the  citizens nor is there
\nany impediment on its movement by the Act. The Act regulates
\nonly packing of the commodities or class of commodities with
\njute packaging\tmaterial. Transportation  on account thereof
\nstands no  impediment for  the said  trade and commerce. The
\ncommerce clause\t in Art.301, therefore, stands no impediment
\nfor free  flow of  trade and commerce in the commodities for
\nfree flow of trade and commerce in the commodities for class
\nof  commodities\t covered  by  the  provisions  of  the\tAct.
\nConsidered from\t this perspective,  we hold  the Act  is not
\nviolative of Article 301 of the constitution.\n<\/p>\n
     The Transfer  cases and  writ petitions are accordingly
\ndismissed and  the applications\t disposed  of  but,  in\t the
\ncircumstances, with  costs quantified at Rs.10,000\/- payable
\nto the\tsupreme court legal Aid committee within a period of
\nthree months  from the\tdate of\t receipt of  this order.  On
\nfailure thereof,  it would  open to  the supreme court Legal
\nAid  committee\t to  have  this\t order\texecuted  as  decree
\naccording to law.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Suresh Kumar & Ors.Dalmia Cement … vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 April, 1996 Author: K Ramaswamy Bench: K. Ramaswamy, S. Saghir Ahmad, G.B. Pattanaik PETITIONER: SURESH KUMAR & ORS.DALMIA CEMENT (BHARAT) LTD. & ANR. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: UNION OF INDIA & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25\/04\/1996 BENCH: K. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-194210","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nSuresh Kumar & Ors.Dalmia Cement ... vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 April, 1996 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/suresh-kumar-ors-dalmia-cement-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-25-april-1996\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Suresh Kumar & Ors.Dalmia Cement ... vs Union Of India & Ors on 25 April, 1996 - 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