{"id":194270,"date":"2011-11-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2011-11-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bhagchand-uttamchand-vs-the-inspector-of-police-on-4-november-2011"},"modified":"2018-10-12T00:07:33","modified_gmt":"2018-10-11T18:37:33","slug":"bhagchand-uttamchand-vs-the-inspector-of-police-on-4-november-2011","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bhagchand-uttamchand-vs-the-inspector-of-police-on-4-november-2011","title":{"rendered":"Bhagchand Uttamchand vs The Inspector Of Police on 4 November, 2011"},"content":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court<\/div>\n
Bhagchand Uttamchand vs The Inspector Of Police on 4 November, 2011<\/div>\n
       \n\n  \n\n  \n\n \n \n BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT\n\nDATED: 04\/11\/2011\n\nCORAM\nTHE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE R.MALA\n\nCrl.O.P.(MD) No. 8741 of 2011\nand\nCrl.O.P.(MD) No.9385 of 2011\n&\nM.P.Nos. 1 and 1 of 2011\nand\nCrl.O.P.(MD) Nos.8765 to 8767, 8773, 9058, 9282 of 2011\n\nBhagchand Uttamchand                    .. Petitioner\/Accused-1\n  Galada\t\t                    in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.8741\/2011\n\nE.N.Palanisamy\t\t                 .. Petitioner\/Accused-2\t\t\n\t\t\t\t            in Crl.O.P.(MD)No.9385\/2011\n\nvs.\n\n1.The Inspector of Police\n   Kodaikanal Police Station\n   Dindigul District.                    .. 1st Respondent\/Complainant<\/pre>\n
2.John Roger\t\t\t         .. 2nd Respondent\/Defacto\n                                                    complainant\n                                                  (in both Crl.O.P.(MD) Nos.\n                                                           8741 and 9385 of 2011)\n1.C.Vijayakumar\n2.Sudhir D.Jain                          .. Petitioners\/Accused in\n                                            Crl.O.P.(MD)No.8765\/2011\n\nJ.Govindan\t\t\t\t .. Petitioner\/Accused in\n                                            Crl.O.P.(MD)No.8766\/2011\n\nD.Reuban\t\t\t\t .. Petitioner\/Accused in\n                                            Crl.O.P.(MD)No.8767\/2011\n\nK.C.A.Kurian Abraham\t\t\t ..  Petitioner\/Accused in\n                                             Crl.O.P.(MD)No.8773\/2011\t\nKannan\t\t\t\t\t ..  Petitioner\/Accused in\n                                             Crl.O.P.(MD)No.9058\/2011\n\nBhagchand Uttamchand\nGalada\/A1\t\t\t\t ..  Petitioner\/Accused in\n                                             Crl.O.P.(MD)No.9282\/2011\nvs.\n\n$The state rep. by Inspector of Police\nKodaikkanal Taluk\nKodaikkanal.\n(Crime No.203 of 2011)\n\nPrayer\n\n<\/pre>\n
Petitions in Crl.O.P.(MD) Nos. 8741 and 9385 of 2011 filed under
\nSection 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to  call for the records
\npertaining to F.I.R.No.203 of 2011 on the file of the first respondent police
\nand to quash the same.\n<\/p>\n
!For Petitioner
\nin Crl.O.P(MD)No.8741\/2011 … Mr.Vijay Narayan, senior counsel
\n\t\t\t       for Mr.R.R.Kannan
\nFor Petitioner
\nin Crl.O.P(MD)No.9385\/2011 … Mr.R.Yashod Vardhan
\n                               senior counsel for
\n                               Mr.K.Muthuramalingam
\n^For Respondent No.1       … Mr.K.Chellapandian
\n\t\t\t       Addl. Advocate General for
\n\t\t\t       Govt. of Tamil Nadu in all Crl.OPs.\n<\/p>\n
For Respondent No.2        … Mr.M.Ajmalkhan in both Crl.O.Ps.<\/p>\n
\nFor Petitioners in\nCrl.O.P.(MD)Nos.8765,      ... Mr.S.Prabakaran for\n8767, 9282\/2011                Mr.Arunprasad\nFor Petitioner in\nCrl.O.P(MD)No.8766\/2011    ... Mr.S.Muthukumar\nFor Petitioner in\nCrl.O.P(MD)No.8773\/2011    ... Mr.S.Alagumani\nFor Petitioner in\nCrl.O.P(MD)No.9058\/2011    ... Mr.T.Lenin Kumar\n\n:COMMON ORDER\n\n<\/pre>\n
\tThe petitions in Crl.O.P.Nos.8741 and 9385 of 2011 have been filed by the
\nfirst and second accused in Crime No.203 of 2011 on the file of the Inspector of
\nPolice, Kodaikanal.\n<\/p>\n
\t2.The averments in the petitions are as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) The case has been registered against the petitioners\/A1 & A2 and
\nothers under Crime No.203 of 2011 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 448,
\n294(b), 387 and 420 I.P.C.\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) The property bearing D.No.41\/67, Welwyn inn Cottage,   Kodaikanal
\ntown, Dindigul District, is originally belongs to one John Tapp and he
\nbequeathed the property to his legal heirs by a will dated 09.10.1939 and the
\nsame was probated vide order dated 16.12.1941 in O.P.No.58 of 1941 on the file
\nof the District Judge, Madurai.\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) On 24.04.1989, the said property has been purchased by Bhagchand
\nUttamchand Galada\/A1 and his other family members from the legal heirs of John
\nTapp vide registered sale deeds. The patta is also stands in their names.\n<\/p>\n
\t(iv) In the above said property, there were two tenants, one is Mani Iyer
\nand another Zavior Michael, the father of the second respondent herein. In order
\nto evict the tenants,  the said Galada\/A1 has filed R.C.O.P.Nos.2 & 3 of 2001
\nbefore the District Munsif at Kodaikanal against the above said tenants. Pending
\nR.C.O.P. Proceedings, one tenant Mr.Mani Iyer entered into compromise between
\nGalada, accordingly he vacated the premises by filing joint memo before the Rent
\nControl Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t(v) On 10.12.2003, eviction order was passed in R.C.O.P.No.3 of 2001
\nagainst Zavior Michael. Against that order, he filed R.C.A.No.1 of 2004 and the
\nsame was allowed on 09.10.2009 by the Appellate authority\/Subordinate Judge at
\nPalani and thereby the eviction order was reversed. Thereafter, the said
\nGalada\/A1 filed C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 before this Hon’ble Court and on
\n24.08.2010, both parties entered into compromise and accordingly joint memo has
\nbeen filed and consent decree was passed by this  Court.  As per the joint memo,
\nthe said Zavior Michael handed over the possession to Galada in compliance of
\nthe consent decree passed by this Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t(vi) While being so, on 02.09.2010, Galada\/A1 and his family members have
\ndecided to sell the property to one Reuban and executed power of attorney in his
\nfavour. Taking advantage of the circumstances that both the parties are at
\nChennai, the said Zavior Michael started to create problem by trespassing into
\nthe property and he demanded further amount for vacating the illegal occupation
\nin violation of the consent decree passed by this Hon’ble Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t(vii) In order to purchase peace, the said Galada\/A1 and Reuban\/A4, the
\npurchaser of the property have agreed to settle the illegal demands of Zavior
\nMichael and accordingly, a house property was purchased on 07.02.2011 in the
\nname of Zavior Michael vide registered sale deed and entire sale consideration
\nfor this purchase of property has been paid by Reuban.The petitioner herein is
\nthe first accused. On perusal of an F.I.R., no offence is made out and that the
\nentire proceedings arising out of a civil transaction, which is according to the
\npetitioners\/accused have already been settled and attained finality. The present
\ncomplaint has been preferred by the defacto complainant only in order to threat
\nand harass the petitioner for certain extraneous reasons and considerations.\n<\/p>\n
\t(viii)In order to justify the illegal occupation of the property,  on
\n25.09.2010, son of Zavior Michael, the second respondent herein made a
\nrepresentation to the Director General of Police, Chennai, seeking police
\nprotection for him and his family members. The above said petition was enquired
\nby the then Deputy Superintendent of Police in C.S.R.No.501 of 2010 on
\n15.10.2010. In  that enquiry, the defacto complainant and his family members
\nhave requested not to proceed further and prayed to close the said petition,
\nsince the matter was already settled and the second respondent and his family
\nmembers have stated that the said petition was sent due to some distress and
\nwithout consent of Zavior Michael. Accordingly, the said complaint was closed on
\n15.10.2010.\n<\/p>\n
\t(ix) Galada\/A1 is a permanent resident of Chennai and even  the defacto
\ncomplainant is a resident of Chennai and it is only the father of the defacto
\ncomplainant who is living in Kodaikanal. The complaint failed to lay down the
\nfactual foundation for making out the offence as alleged.\n<\/p>\n
\t(x)E.N.Palanisamy\/A2 is the Managing Director of  M\/S.Mookambikai Textile
\nMills at Vada Madurai and he is having high reputation and respect in the
\nsociety. In fact, the second respondent and his family members are very well
\nknown to the petitioner since from the year 1990 and on several occasions, the
\npetitioner had helped the second respondent monetarily and on humanitarian
\ngrounds. They had also approached the petitioner to get aid for education and
\nmedical expenses. While being so, the second respondent had lodged a false
\ncomplaint and without appreciation of facts and materials, the first respondent
\nregistered the case and investigated the matter in an improper way.\n<\/p>\n
\t(xi)The entire complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an
\noffence under Sections 147, 148, 448, 294(b), 387 and 420 I.P.C. The entire
\nproceedings arise out of a civil transaction, which has been already settled and
\nattained finality by the decree passed by this Court in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of
\n2010 dated 24.08.2010. Since the consent decree is in existence, the second
\nrespondent has estopped from making contradictory statements in other forum.\n<\/p>\n
\t(xii)The Apex Court consistently held that there should not be second
\nF.I.R. for the same offence,  in this case also on the complaint, an enquiry was
\nconducted in C.S.R.No.501 of 2010 on the file of the first respondent and after
\nenquiry, the matter was closed on 15.10.2010, thereafter on 27.04.2011, the
\nimpugned F.I.R. has been registered on the very same complaint, which is totally
\nagainst the principles laid down by the Apex Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t(xiii)On perusal of F.I.R., the date of alleged occurrence said to have
\ntaken place on 23.04.2010 and the complaint was sent to the Director General of
\nPolice on 25.09.2010 and thereafter, after enquiry on 15.10.2010, C.S.R.No.501
\nof 2010 was closed as withdrawn.  The impugned F.I.R. has been registered on
\n27.04.2011 after one year from the date of alleged occurrence and there is no
\nexplanation for the said delay in registering the case. The complaint lodged by
\nthe second respondent is clear abuse of the process of the Court and clear
\nviolation of the consent decree passed in civil revision petition. Hence, they
\nprayed for quashing the F.I.R.\n<\/p>\n
\t3.The gist and essence of the counter affidavit filed by both the
\nrespondents are as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t(i)On the complaint preferred by the defacto complainant  before the
\nDirector General of Police, Tamil Nadu, on 25.09.2010,  preliminary enquiry was
\nconducted and inasmuch as prima facie case was established to proceed against
\nthe accused, a case was registered in Crime No.203 of 2011 on the file of the
\nKodaikanal Police Station under Sections 147, 148, 448, 294(b), 387 and 420
\nI.P.C. and investigation was going on.\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) The first accused filed a petition before the Rent Controller-cum-
\nDistrict Munsif, Kodaikanal and obtained a decreetal order in R.C.O.P.No.3 of
\n2001 dated 10.12.2003 in his favour, against which, the father of the defacto
\ncomplainant had preferred R.C.A.No.1 of 2004. On 09.10.2009, the Rent Control
\nAppellate Authority and Sub-Court, Palani allowed the appeal and eviction order
\nwas set aside,  against which, the petitioner\/A1 filed C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of
\n2010.  In the civil revision petition, which was ended in compromise, without
\nthe knowledge of the family of the defacto complainant, a joint memo of
\ncompromise was entered purportedly at the behest of the second accused, who
\nacted as the power agent of the father of the defacto complainant and one Reuban
\nwith the active connivance of certain powerful persons just to grab the lands
\nheld by the family of the defacto complainant for more than 40 years. The joint
\nmemo submitted before the Court was mislead to the effect that the possession of
\nthe property was handed over to the petitioner herein which resulted in this
\nCourt  passing the said order closing the Civil Revision Petition on 24.08.2010.
\nOn coming to know of the order passed against the father of the defacto
\ncomplainant, he has filed an application to recall the order which is pending in
\nC.R.P.SR.No.38719 of 2011. They have not vacated on their own volition from the
\npremises. On the other hand, they were forcibly evicted by using force and the
\nbuilding which stood for more than 85 years were demolished on 07.02.2011 by one
\nReuban and his henchmen, who  came to the spot with pockalines and bulldozers
\ntook possession of the building forcibly before demolishing them. The strong arm
\nact was perpetrated with active connivance of powerful people and land grabbers.\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) The defacto complainant presented a petition before the Director
\nGeneral of Police, Chennai on 25.09.2010 stating that at the behest of certain
\npowerful people, his family is being harassed to vacate the property which was
\nunder their possession and enjoyment for more than 40 years. He was also alleged
\nthat they have been receiving threatening calls and the family head, being a
\npastor, a peace loving person engaged in welfare activities were forced to sign
\nblank papers and inasmuch as the rowdy elements armed with deadly weapons are
\nfrequently visiting their abode, they fear for their life and hence requested
\nnecessary action. The Inspector General of Police, South Zone, also directed the
\nDeputy Superintendent of Police,  Kodaikanal, to take action on the complaint
\ndated 25.09.2010.  With the active connivance of several high-ups, the father of
\nthe defacto complainant was forced to sign a petition withdrawing the said
\ncomplaint on 15.10.2010. On the same day, it appears that they got in touch with
\none Father Joseph, 72 years old leader of the Minority Community Education
\nFoundation and appraised of their predicament and on seeing their plight,  he
\ntook up cudgels on his behalf and sent petition to the President of India among
\nothers which was forwarded to the hierarchy of Officials and reached the
\nSuperintendent of Police, Dindigul, who verified the veracity of the complaint
\nand directed the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nilakottai, in-charge,
\nKodaikanal Sub-Division to register a case and investigate the same.  On the
\ninstructions given by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Nilakottai, in-charge
\nof Kodaikanal Sub-Division on 27.04.2011, the aforesaid case has been registered
\nand the investigation was taken up which is perfectly legal.\n<\/p>\n
\t(iv) This is a case where the accused No.1 has used his political and
\npolice power so as to throw away the defacto complainant’s family without
\nfollowing the due process of law. Since the accused No.1 had continuously
\nthreatened the informant family, the informant’s father Zavior Michael met his
\nchildhood friend one Sivanandi, who is arrayed as A3 in this case. The said
\nSivanandi who is serving as Inspector General of Police, Tamil Nadu had
\nintroduced one Palanisamy, who is the petitioner\/accused No.2 herein, a mill
\nowner so as to render assistance to the informant family. The petitioner\/A2 had
\ngiven a false hope that he would give all legal assistance. The
\npetitioner\/accused No.1 had gained confidence of informant’s family by giving
\nsuggestions to the family. In the mean while, A2 and A3 have been gained by A1
\nand they have shifted their loyalty in favour of A1 for extraneous
\nconsiderations. From 06.06.2010 and  04.10.2010,  A2\/Palanisamy had continuously
\nthreatened the informant’s father to vacate the premises and A3 had also
\nthreatened to vacate the premises and hand over the same to A1. On 23.04.2010,
\nthe defacto complainant appeared before the Director General of Police and
\nlodged the present complaint seeking action against the accused No.1  and other
\naccused persons. The said complaint was forwarded to the Inspector General of
\nPolice, South Zone, Madurai for enquiry. On receipt of the said complaint,  the
\nInspector General of Police, South Zone, Madurai, had forwarded the same to the
\nDeputy Superintendent of Police, Kodaikanal to register a case and investigate
\ninto the matter. Though, a specific direction was given by the then Inspector
\nGeneral of Police, South Zone,  that the then Deputy Superintendent of Police,
\nKodaikanal had colluded with the accused and not registered any F.I.R. against
\nthe accused. Instead the then D.S.P. Kodaikanal under the pressure from the then
\nInspector General of Police, West Zone (Sivanandi) had closed the complaint on
\n15.10.2010 as if the informant’s father Zavior Michael had requested him to drop
\nall further proceedings against the accused persons and withdrawn the complaint.
\nThe accused persons had misused the order obtained behind the back of
\ninformant’s family in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 and the signatures obtained
\nin the blank sheets by A2.\n<\/p>\n
\t(v)On 04.10.2010, the Kodaikanal Municipality Chairman one Ibrahim\/A5 came
\nto informant’s house and taken the informant’s father, mother and aunty Rubi to
\nthe house of the former Municipal Chairman one Kurian Abraham\/A6. The
\npetitioner\/A2, Reuban\/A4, Deva\/A6, Soleman\/A7, Subbaiah\/A12, Thannashi\/A13 were
\npresent in the house. At that time, all the accused had threatened the
\ninformant’s father and his family members and obtained signatures in blank and
\nunfilled documents and white sheet under coercion. Due to the illegal
\nconfinement and life threat made to the informant’s family members, they had no
\nother go than to sign in the documents as directed by the accused persons.\n<\/p>\n
\t(vi)The respondent police has come forward to register the case against
\nthe accused, because of the consistent effort of informant’s family. One of the
\naccused is presently serving as Inspector General of Police and others are
\nhighly influential persons. There is a specific allegations and averments made
\nin the F.I.R. as well as the statements given under Section 161(3) of Cr.P.C. by
\nthe informant and his family members against A2. That on 04.10.2010, the first
\naccused and other accused had threatened the informant’s family members and
\nobtained their signatures under coercion so as to  use the same for illegal
\npurpose. So the averments made in the quash petitions are not correct. The
\ndocuments relied on by him are fabricated to grab the property. If really the
\npossession was handed over by virtue of the order passed in C.R.P., there was no
\nnecessity to enter into a memorandum of understanding on 27.01.2011 for vacating
\nand handing over the vacant possession of the property. The inconsistent stand
\ntaken by the petitioners\/accused in taking possession of the property would go
\nto prove the case that the defacto complainant and his family members had been
\nput in fear of death and dishonestly induce them to sign in documents to deprive
\nof their valuable property.\n<\/p>\n
\t(vii)A prima facie case of criminal force being used to vacate the family
\nmembers of the defacto complainant,  prima facie criminal nexus and intention
\nare clearly made out as an outcome of the investigation, as culled out from the
\ntestimony of Tvl.Fathinathan, Rajesh, Raja, Doss, Vasu, Julie, Kannan, Beulah,
\nPandi and Bala who dwell in close proximity to the land in question. It has been
\nheld in cantina of cases both by Apex Court as well as this Court that only in
\nrare and rarest of cases quashing of F.I.R. should be ordered. The Apex Court
\nheld that the power of quashing an F.I.R. and criminal proceedings should be
\nexercised sparingly by the Courts. Indeed, the High Court has the extraordinary
\nor inherent powers to reach out injustice and quash the F.I.R. and criminal
\nproceedings keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this Court in various
\njudgements. Hence, they prayed for the dismissal of the petitions.\n<\/p>\n
\t4.The petitioners in Crl.O.P.(MD)Nos.8765 to 8767, 8773, 9058, 9282 of
\n2011 filed the above said petitions for anticipatory bail stating that they are
\ninnocent and their names have been falsely implicated in this case. Now they are
\napprehending for arrest at the hands of the  respondent police, hence they have
\ncome forward with these petitions for seeking anticipatory bail.  Heard the
\nlearned counsel for the petitioners\/accused and the learned Additional Advocate
\nGeneral for respondent.\n<\/p>\n
\t5.It is appropriate to consider the backdrop of the case. The quash
\npetitions have been filed by the first and second accused to quash the F.I.R.
\nregistered in crime No.203 of 2011 for the alleged offence under Sections 147,
\n148, 448, 294(b), 387 and 420 I.P.C.  pending on the file of the first
\nrespondent police. Even though the complaint was nil dated, it was received by
\nthe Director General of Police on 25.09.2010. So hereafter, for our convenience
\nsake, it was mentioned as compliant dated 25.09.2010.\n<\/p>\n
\t6.Admittedly, the property bearing D.No.41\/67, Welwyn inn Cottage,
\nKodaikanal town, Dindigul District, is originally belongs to one John Tapp and
\nhe bequeathed the property to his legal heirs by a will dated 09.10.1939 and the
\nsame was probated vide order dated 16.12.1941 in O.P.No.58 of 1941 on the file
\nof the District Judge, Madurai.  John Tapp bequeathed all the reminder of his
\nproperty movable and immovable wherever situated to his nephew Victor Tapp and
\nthat has been properly probated, after the death of the said John Tapp, Victor
\nTapp was filed O.P.No.58 of 1941 before the District Court, Madurai and Letters
\nof Administration has been issued. The said Victor Tapp\/Legatee died on
\n14.07.1972 at Greenwich, London. The  Reserve Bank of India has given a
\npermission in favour of the legal heirs of Victor Tapp to hold the immovable
\nproperties mentioned therein in terms of Section 31(1) of the Foreign Exchange
\nRegulation Act, 1973. The licence to hold the immovable properties in India has
\nbeen granted in favour of the following four persons viz., (1) John Edward Tapp
\n(2) Mary Eleanor Rogers (3) Victor Alfred Henry Tapp and (4) Robert Arthur
\nWilliam Tapp. This disputed property is mentioned as item No.1. Since the heirs
\nof the said Victor Tapp want to dispose the property,  they obtained a
\npermission from Reserve Bank of India. On 08.08.1988, the heirs executed the
\npower of attorney in favour of one Rajendrakumar Pukharajmal Lunkad.  The first
\naccused had purchased the property along with three persons vide registered sale
\ndeed dated 24.04.1989 from the power of attorney of legal heirs of Victor Tapp.
\nThe land and building namely, ‘Welwyn’ bearing D.No.17\/99 is situated at Old
\nS.No.50, New T.S.No.22, Kodaikanal Town with an extent of 1.44.0 hec. and the
\nsaid property was rented out to the tenants namely, Zavior Michael, who is the
\nfather of the defacto complainant\/R2 and one Mani Iyer.  Since dispute arose
\nbetween the above referred tenants, the petitioner\/first accused had preferred
\nR.C.O.P.Nos.2 and 3 of 2001 against Mani Iyer and Zavior Michael before the Rent
\nController-cum-District Munsif Court, Kodaikanal.  R.C.O.P.No.2 of 2001 was
\nended in compromise and dismissed as settled out of Court and R.C.O.P.No.3 of
\n2001 was ordered in his favour. Since the eviction was ordered, the said Zavior
\nMichael had preferred R.C.A.No.1 of 2004 on the file of the Rent Control
\nAppellate Authority-cum-Sub-Court Palani, which was allowed on reversing the
\nfair and decreetal order dated 10.12.2003 made in R.C.O.P.No.3 of 2001, against
\nwhich, the first accused herein had preferred C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010
\nagainst the father of the defacto complainant\/R2 and the same has been ended in
\ncompromise on 24.08.2010. The order was passed by recording joint memo filed by
\nthem.  The present complaint was presented by the defacto complainant on
\n25.09.2010 to the Director General of Police for taking steps. That complaint
\nwas closed as withdrawn on the basis of statement given by defacto complainant
\nand his family members on 15.10.2010. Subsequently, on the intervention of the
\nHon’ble President of India, the said complaint was forwarded to the
\nSuperintendent of Police, Dindigul and on the basis of the above complaint dated
\n25.09.2010, the case has been registered in Crime No.203 of 2011 on 27.04.2011.\n<\/p>\n
\t7.The learned senior counsels appearing for the petitioners\/accused raised
\nthe following grounds for quashing F.I.R.\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) This case has been generated only on the property dispute. So this
\ndispute is civil in nature.\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 has been disposed of recording the
\ncompromise memo filed by both the parties. Judges’ record is conclusive.\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) On the basis of the complaint dated 25.09.2010, which was taken on
\nfile in C.S.R.No.501 of 2010 was closed as withdrawn on 15.10.2010. So the
\nF.I.R. is liable to be quashed, since F.I.R. has been   registered only on the
\nbasis of the complaint dated 25.09.2010.\n<\/p>\n
\t(iv) Subsequent events proved that the F.I.R. is abuse of process of Court
\n(i.e.) on 27.01.2011, a memorandum of understanding was entered. In pursuance of
\nthat the defacto complainant’s father got the property on 07.02.2011.\n<\/p>\n
\t(v) The ingredients of offences have not been prima facie made out, which
\nwas mere abuse of process of Court.\n<\/p>\n
To substantiate their arguments, they relied upon the decisions of Apex Court
\nand this Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t8.The learned counsel for the second respondent\/defacto complainant
\ncontended that without the knowledge of the defacto complainant,
\nC.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 was disposed of by recording compromise and they
\nare taking steps to set aside that order. He further submitted that F.I.R. is in
\ninitial stage and there is no necessity to quash the same. The documents
\nproduced by the accused need not be relied upon. To substantiate his argument,
\nhe also relied upon the decisions of the Apex Court and this High Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t9.The learned counsel for the second respondent Mr.M.Ajmalkhan would
\nfurther submit that it is pre-matured to consider the documents filed by the
\npetitioners. They may very well produce the documents before the investigating
\nagency and put forth their case. If the charge sheet is filed,  they can work
\nout their remedy to file the petition to quash the charge sheet. It is pre-
\nmatured to quash the F.I.R. at this initial stage, since the case has been
\nregistered only on 27.04.2011.\n<\/p>\n
\t10.The learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that as soon as
\nthey received the complaint, it was closed as withdrawn. But as soon as the
\ncomplaint received from the office of the Hon’ble  President, they registered
\nthe case. Now the investigation is going on, witnesses were examined and
\nSections 161 & 164 Cr.P.C. statements were recorded. So it is very pre-matured
\nstage to decide the quash petitions. Hence, he prayed for the dismissal of the
\npetitions.\n<\/p>\n
\t11.Considering the rival submissions as well as perusal of the record,
\nthis Court has considered the following points.\n<\/p>\n
\tWhether the documents filed by the accused to be looked into?
\n\tThe learned counsel for the defacto complainant\/R2 has submitted that the
\ndocuments filed by the petitioners\/accused could not be relied upon, since the
\ncase is in initial stage and the documents are not accepted by the defacto
\ncomplainant. Hence he prayed for the dismissal of the quash petitions.\n<\/p>\n
\t12.At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the following decisions
\nrelied upon by both sides counsel.\n<\/p>\n
\t(i)AIR 1992 SC 1379 (Smt.Chand Dhawan v. Jawahar Lal and others<\/a>) in
\nparagraphs-6 and 8, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“6.The High Court, relying on the decision of this Court in State of Bihar
\nv. Murad Ali Khan, AIR<\/a> 1989 SC 1, pointed out that when the High Court is called
\nupon to exercise the jurisdiction to quash a proceeding at the stage of the
\nmagistrate taking cognizance of an offence, the High Court is guided by the
\nallegations whether those allegations set out in the complaint or the charge-
\nsheet do not in law constitute or spell out any offence and that resort to
\ncriminal proceedings within the circumstances amount to an abuse of the process
\nof the court or not. The High Court, has however, in approaching the question
\nmisdirected itself in analysing the truth or otherwise of the allegations on the
\nbasis of the materials which could not be relied on without legal proof. It is
\nnot disputed that the complaint filed by the appellant does disclose an offence
\nunder section 494, I.P.C. The allegations made by the complainant in law
\nconstitute and spell out an offence. If so, the only question that could have
\nbeen considered at this stage is whether the continuance of the proceedings
\nwould be an abuse of the process of the court. This court has in various
\ndecisions examined the scope of the power under section 482, Cr.P.C., and has
\nreiterated the principle that the High Court can exercise its inherent
\njurisdiction of quashing a criminal proceedings only when the allegations made
\nin the complaint do not constitute an offence or that the exercise of the power
\nis necessary either to prevent the abuse of the process of the court or
\notherwise to secure the ends of justice. No inflexible guidelines or rigid
\nformula can be set out and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
\ncase wherein such power should be exercised. When the allegations in the
\ncomplaint prima facie constitute the offence against any or all of the
\nrespondents in the absence of materials on record to show that the continuance
\nof the proceedings would be an abuse of the process of the court or would defeat
\nthe ends of justice, the High Court would not be justified in quashing the
\ncomplaint.\n<\/p>\n
\t8. .. .. The High Court was not justified in reaching the conclusion that
\nthe proceedings were liable to be quashed on the basis of additional materials
\nproduced by the accused as those were required to be proved. When those
\nmaterials were not accepted by the complainant.\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii)AIR 2005 SC 359 (State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi)<\/a> in paragraph-
\n21, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“Regarding the argument of accused having to face the trial despite being
\nin a position to produce material of unimpeachable character of sterling
\nquality, the width of the powers of the High Court under Section 482 of the Code
\nand Article 226 of Constitution of India is unlimited whereunder in the
\ninterests of justice the High Court can make such orders as may be necessary to
\nprevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of
\njustice within the parameters laid down in Bhajan Lal’s case.”\n<\/p>\n
\t“21. It is evident from the above that this Court was considering the rare
\nand exceptional cases where the High Court may consider unimpeachable evidence
\nwhile exercising jurisdiction for quashing under Section 482 of the Code. In the
\npresent case, however, the question involved is not about the exercise of
\njurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code where along with the petition the
\naccused may file unimpeachable evidence of sterling quality and on that basis
\nseek quashing, but is about the right claimed by the accused to produce material
\nat the stage of framing of charge.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) (2011) 3 SCC 351 (Harshendra Kumar D. v. Rebatilata Koley and
\nothers<\/a>) in paragraphs-25 and 26, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“25.In our judgment, the above observations cannot be read to mean that in
\na criminal case where trial is yet to take place and the matter is at the stage
\nof issuance of summons or taking cognizance, materials relied upon by the
\naccused which are in the nature of public documents or the materials which are
\nbeyond suspicion or doubt, in no circumstance, can be looked into by the High
\nCourt in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 or for that matter in
\nexercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code. It is fairly
\nsettled now that while exercising inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 or
\nrevisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Code in a case where complaint
\nis sought to be quashed, it is not proper for the High Court to consider the
\ndefence of the accused or embark upon an enquiry in respect of merits of the
\naccusations. However, in an appropriate case, if on the face of the documents –
\nwhich are beyond suspicion or doubt – placed by accused, the accusations against
\nhim cannot stand, it would be travesty of justice if accused is relegated to
\ntrial and he is asked to prove his defence before the trial court. In such a
\nmatter, for promotion of justice or to prevent injustice or abuse of process,
\nthe High Court may look into the materials which have significant bearing on the
\nmatter at prima facie stage.\n<\/p>\n
\t26.Criminal prosecution is a serious matter; it affects the liberty of a
\nperson. No greater damage can be done to the reputation of a person than
\ndragging him in a criminal case. In our opinion, the High Court fell into grave
\nerror in not taking into consideration the uncontroverted documents relating to
\nthe appellant’s resignation from the post of Director of the Company. Had these
\ndocuments been considered by the High Court, it would have been apparent that
\nthe appellant has resigned much before the cheques were issued by the Company. ”\n<\/p>\n
 \t(iv) (2009) 1 SCC 681 (B.Jagdish and another v. State of Andhra Pradesh
\nand another) in paragraph-24, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
           “24.The question is as to whether the High Court should have
\ninterfered with the order summoning the appellant at this stage? It is now a
\nwell settled principle of law that at the stage of quashing of an order taking
\ncognizance, an accused cannot be permitted to use the material which would be
\navailable to him only as his defence. In his defence, the court would be left to
\nconsider and weigh materials brought on record by the parties for the purpose of
\nmarshalling and appreciating the evidence. The jurisdiction of the Courts, at
\nthis stage, is limited as whether a case of reckless\/gross negligence has been
\nmade out or not will depend upon the facts of each case.”\n<\/p>\n
In the above citations, it was held that in the quash application,
\nunimpeachable, sterling document can be looked into. But, in the case on hand,
\nmost of the documents filed by the petitioners\/accused are public documents
\neither Court proceedings or the registered documents. In such circumstances, as
\nper the dictum of the Apex Court, I am of the considered view that the Court is
\nempowered to be considered those documents in quash applications.\n<\/p>\n
\t13.Now this Court has to consider the following decisions relied upon by
\nboth sides for what circumstance, the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed.\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) 1992 SCC (Crl) 426 (State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and
\nothers<\/a>), in para-102, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant
\nprovisions of the code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated
\nby this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the
\nextraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482
\nof the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following
\ncategories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised
\neither to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the
\nends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly
\ndefined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae
\nand to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power
\nshould be exercised.\n<\/p>\n
\t(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the
\ncomplaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their
\nentirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against
\nthe accused.\n<\/p>\n
\t(2) Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other
\nmaterials, if any, accompanying the F.I.R do not disclose a cognizable offence,
\njustifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code
\nexcept under an order of Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the
\nCode.\n<\/p>\n
\t(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint
\nand the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission
\nof any offence and make out a case against the accused.\n<\/p>\n
\t(4) Where the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable
\noffence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is
\npermitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as
\ncontemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.\n<\/p>\n
\t(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and
\ninherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a
\njust conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the
\naccused.\n<\/p>\n
\t(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions
\nof the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is
\ninstituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and\/or where
\nthere is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing
\nefficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
\n\t(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
\nand\/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive
\nfor wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
\nprivate and personal grudge.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) (1995) 6 SCC 194 (Rupan Deol Bajaj (MRS) and another v. Kanwar Pal
\nSingh Gill and Another) and (B.R.Bajaj v. State of Punjab and others) in
\nparagraph-8, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“8.The question under what circumstances and in what categories of cases
\nthe High Court can quash an F.I.R. or a complaint in exercise of its powers
\nunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India or under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has
\nhad been engaging the attention of this Court for long. Indeed, the learned
\ncounsel for the parties invited our attention to some of those decisions. We
\nneed not, however, refer to them as in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal<\/a> 1992 Supp
\n(1) SCC 335 this Court considered its earlier decisions. ..
\n\t.. .. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of
\nquashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with
\ncircumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not
\nbe justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness
\nor otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the
\nextraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the
\ncourt to act according to its whim or caprice.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) 1995 SCC (cri) 387 (State of T.N. v. Thirukkural Perumal),<\/a> in
\nparagraph-4, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“4.M.S.K.Shanmugovol Chettiyar lodged a first information report at P.S.
\nTallakulam against the respondents alleging commission of offences under
\nSections 147\/148\/342\/323\/395\/506 (ii) and 109 IPC. Investigation was taken in
\nhand and some evidence was collected by the investigating agency. The respondent
\nfiled a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in the High Court and by the impugned
\norder the petition was allowed and the proceedings emanating from Crime Case
\nNo.246 of 1992 (supra) were quashed. From a bare perusal of the order of the
\nlearned single Judge it appears that while quashing the proceedings,  reliance
\nhas been placed upon some evidence collected by the investigating agency during
\nthe investigation. The approach of the learned Judge in relying upon such
\nevidence, which is yet to be produced before the trial court, to quash the
\ncriminal proceedings in Crime Case No.246 of 1992 (supra) was not proper. The
\npower of quashing an FIR and criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly
\nby the Courts. Indeed, the High Court has the extra-ordinary or inherent power
\nto reach out injustice and quash the First Information Report and criminal
\nproceedings, keeping in view the guidelines laid down by this Court in various
\njudgments (reference in this connection may be made with advantage to State of
\nHaryana v. Bhajan Lal<\/a> (1992 Supp. (1) 335) but the same has to be done with
\ncircumspection. The normal process of the criminal trial cannot be cut short in
\na rather casual manner. The Court, is not justified in embarking upon an enquiry
\nas to the reliability or genuineness of the allegations made in the FIR or the
\ncomplaint on the basis of the evidence collected during investigation only while
\ndealing with a petition under Section 432 Cr.P.C. seeking the quashing of the
\nFIR and the criminal proceedings. The learned single Judge apparently fell into
\nan error in evaluating the genuineness and reliability of the allegations made
\nin the FIR on the basis of the evidence collected during the investigation. The
\norder of the learned single Judge cannot, therefore, be sustained. This appeal
\nsucceeds and is allowed. The impugned order of the High Court is hereby set
\naside.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iv) (2000) 8 SCC 115 (Mahavir Prashad Gupta and another v. State of
\nNational Capital Territory of Delhi and others) in paragraph-5, it is stated as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“If complaint itself discloses an offence, High Court should not embark
\nupon an inquiry as to genuineness of the allegations made in the complaint or
\nwhether those allegations were likely to be established on evidence or not.
\n\t“5.The law on the subject is very clear. In the case of State of Bihar v.
\nMurad Ali Khan<\/a> reported in 1988 (4) SCC 655, it has been held that jurisdiction
\nunder Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure has to be exercised
\nsparingly and with circumspection. It has been held that at an initial stage a
\nCourt should not embark upon an inquiry as to whether the allegations in the
\ncomplaint are likely to be established by evidence or not. Again in the case of
\nState of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal<\/a> reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, this Court has
\nheld that the power of quashing criminal proceedings must be exercised very
\nsparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases. It
\nhas been held that the Court would no be justified in embarking upon an inquiry
\nas to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the
\nFIR or the complaint. It has been held that the extraordinary or inherent powers
\ndid not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its
\nwhim or caprice.\n<\/p>\n
\t(v)(2002) 3 SCC 89 (State of Karnataka v. M.Devendrappa and<\/a> another) in
\nparagraphs-7 to 9, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“7. In R.P.Kapur v. State of Punjab,<\/a> this Court summarized some categories
\nof cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the
\nproceedings.\n<\/p>\n
(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the
\ninstitution or continuance, e.g. want of sanction;\n<\/p>\n
(ii) Where the allegations  in the first information report or complaint taken
\nat its face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence
\nalleged;\n<\/p>\n
(iii) Where the allegations constitute an offence, but there is no legal
\nevidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove
\nthe charge.\n<\/p>\n
\t8. .. ..  At the same time the section is not an instrument handed over to
\nan accused to short-circuit a prosecution and bring about its sudden death. The
\nscope of exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code and the categories of
\ncases where the High Court may exercise its power under it relating to
\ncognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to
\nsecure the ends of justice were set out in some detail by this Court in State of
\nHaryana v. Bhajan Lal. A<\/a> note of caution was, however, added that the power
\nshould be exercised sparingly and that too in rarest of rare cases. .. ..\n<\/p>\n
\t9.As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482
\nof the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great
\ncaution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in
\nexercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should
\nnot be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the
\nhighest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
\ndecision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when
\nthe evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
\ninvolved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their
\ntrue perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule
\ncan be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
\nextraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See: Janata
\nDal  v. H.S. Chowdhary and Raghubir Saran (Dr)<\/a> v. State of Bihar).  It would not
\nbe proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light
\nof all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be
\nsustainable and on such premises  arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings
\nare to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and
\nconclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted
\non complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called
\nfor only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is
\nfrivolous, vexatious or oppressive. .. .. ”\n<\/p>\n
\t(vi) \t(2008) 2 SCC (cri) 430 (Central Bureau of Investigation v.
\nK.M.Sharan)<\/a> in paragraphs-25 and 26, it is stated as follows:
\n\t“25.This court in Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary<\/a> observed thus: (SCC p.355,
\npara 132)\n<\/p>\n
\t132. The criminal courts are clothed with inherent power to make such
\norders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. Such power though
\nunrestricted and undefined should not be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised,
\nbut should be exercised in appropriate cases, ex debito justitiae to do real and
\nsubstantial justice for the administration of which alone the courts exist. The
\npowers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide
\nand the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise.
\nCourts must be careful to see that their decision in exercise of this power is
\nbased on sound principles.\n<\/p>\n
\t26.This court in Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala observed thus: (SCC p.597,
\npara 18)
\n\t“18. It is well settled that the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C has to be
\nexercised by the High Court, inter alia, to prevent abuse of the process of any
\ncourt or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Where criminal proceedings are
\ninitiated based on illicit material collected on search and arrest which are per
\nse illegal and vitiate not only a conviction and sentence based on such material
\nbut also the trial itself, the proceedings cannot be allowed to go on as it
\ncannot but amount to abuse of the process of the court; in such a case not
\nquashing the proceedings would perpetuate abuse of the process of the court
\nresulting in great hardship and injustice to the accused. In our opinion,
\nexercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash proceedings in a case like
\nthe one on hand, would indeed secure the ends of justice.\n<\/p>\n
\t(vii)(2009) 8 SCC 787 (State of Maharashtra v. Sayed Mohammed Masood and
\nAnother)<\/a> in paragraph-11, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“11. The legal position in regard to exercise of jurisdiction by the High
\nCourt for quashing of an FIR is now well settled. It is not necessary for us to
\ndelve deep thereinto as the propositions of law have recently been stated by
\nthis Court in R.Kalyani v.Janak C.Mehta (2009) 1 SCC 516 in the following terms:\n<\/p>\n
15. Propositions of law which emerge from the said decisions are :
\n\t(1) The High Court ordinarily would not exercise its inherent jurisdiction
\nto quash a criminal proceeding and, in particular, a First Information Report
\nunless the allegations contained therein, even if given face value and taken to
\nbe correct in their entirety, disclosed no cognizable offence.
\n\t(2) For the said purpose, the Court, save and except in very exceptional
\ncircumstances, would not look to any document relied upon by the defence.
\n\t(3) Such a power should be exercised very sparingly. If the allegations
\nmade in the FIR disclose commission of an offence, the court shall not go beyond
\nthe same and pass an order in favour of the accused to hold absence of any mens
\nrea or actus reus.\n<\/p>\n
\t(4) If the allegation discloses a civil dispute, the same by itself may
\nnot be a ground to hold that the criminal proceedings should not be allowed to
\ncontinue.\n<\/p>\n
The cantina of citations would settle the legal position regarding the exercise
\nof jurisdiction for quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court, the
\npower of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised very sparingly and
\nwith circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.\n<\/p>\n
\t14.Now this Court has to decide whether the case on hand is rarest in rare
\ncases?. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the dictum laid down in
\nState of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal’s<\/a> case. The learned counsel for the
\npetitioners\/accused would rely upon the clauses-3 and 7 in para-102 of the above
\nsaid decision reported in 1992 SCC (Crl) 426 (State of Haryana and others v.
\nBhajan Lal and others<\/a>), which are extracted hereunder:
\n\t“(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint
\nand the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission
\nof any offence and make out a case against the accused.\n<\/p>\n
\t(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide
\nand\/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive
\nfor wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to
\nprivate and personal grudge.”\n<\/p>\n
\t15.Now this Court has to decide whether the present F.I.R. is abuse of
\nprocess of law,  where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior
\nmotive for wreaking vengeance on the accused.\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) It is appropriate on the part of this Court to consider the arguments
\nadvanced by both sides in respect of previous civil dispute. The subject matter
\nof the issue is only the property situated at Kodaikanal town. While perusing
\nthe documents filed by the accused, the said Zavior Michael, who is none other
\nthan the father of the defacto complainant\/R2 has declared as a tenant. In his
\nown document,  he himself filed a suit in O.S.No.30 of 1989 on the file of the
\nDistrict Munsif Court, Kodaikanal against John Edward Tapp and R.P.Lunkad and
\nsought for a prayer as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“For declaring the plaintiff  is the “statutory tenant” under the Rent
\nControl Act and consequently, pass an order of permanent injunction against the
\ndefendant restraining the defendant, their subordinates, men or agents seeking
\nto interfere with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and enjoyment until the
\nplaintiff evicts under due process of Court of law. ”\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) It is pertinent to note that the first accused herein filed
\nO.S.No.179 of 1990 for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The
\nwritten statement filed by Zavior Michael on 12.04.1993, in which, he has stated
\nas follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“The defendant is in physical possession of the entire extent of suit
\nproperty and all the building therein. The defendant took the suit property on
\nlease from Mrs.Henderson the power agent of Mr.Victor Tapp who was managing the
\nsuit property as care taker. Ever since tenancy in 1974, the defendant has been
\nin exclusive possession of the suit property which is called Welwyn Bungalow.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) Furthermore, Zavior Michael filed another suit on 17.05.1995 for
\ndeclaration of title that he is the owner of the property and also for
\nconsequential injunction. He was examined as R.W.1 in R.C.O.P.No.3 of 2001 in
\nthat,  he has fairly conceded in his cross-examination that he has filed
\nO.S.No.30 of 1989. His candid admission is that the property belongs to Victor
\nTapp and he is a tenant under him and paid rent of Rs.65\/-. So his statement has
\nclearly proved that the father of the defacto complainant was only a tenant.
\nFurthermore, the first accused herein had filed R.C.O.P.No.3 of 2001 and
\neviction has been ordered against which, Zavior Michael  preferred R.C.A.No.1 of
\n2004, which was allowed, against which, the land lord, who is the first accused
\nherein had preferred  C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010, which was ended in
\ncompromise. A joint compromise memo has been filed and that has been recorded.
\nBut now the second respondent\/defacto complainant has disputed the compromise
\nmemo filed before this Court. So the above facts are clearly proved that it is
\nonly a civil dispute.\n<\/p>\n
\t16.As already discussed that there was a civil dispute, which was ended in
\ncompromise on 24.08.2010. Thereafter,  this complaint has been generated on
\n25.09.2010.  At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the complaint given
\nby the second respondent, in which, it was stated as follows:
\n\t“Subject: Request for police protection since our entire family is facing
\nthreatening of life by anti-social elements with deadly weapons and lot of
\nmuscle power-immediate action requested.”\n<\/p>\n
While perusing the complaint,  he never mentioned that since R.C.A.No.1 of 2004
\nhas been allowed,  C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 has been filed and ended in
\ncompromise. The complaint was received by the Director General of Police, Tamil
\nNadu, Camp on 25.09.2010 and forwarded the same to the Inspector General of
\nPolice, Southern Zone, Madurai, for enquiry and report. Then, Deputy
\nSuperintendent of Police, Kodaikanal was directed by the Inspector General of
\nPolice, Southern Zone, Madurai to register the case and investigate. After
\nenquiry, report has been sent on 09.11.2010 to the Director General of Police,
\nChennai, in which, it was specifically mentioned that the defacto complainant
\nhas given a letter stating that no need to pursue the same. The letter dated
\n05.10.2010 was signed by the defacto complainant, son-in-law, daughter,
\ndaughter-in-law. On that basis, C.S.R.No.501 of 2010 has been closed. But it is
\nnot the case of the defacto complainant\/R2 that after giving complaint on
\n25.09.2010,  he was forced to give such statement and their signatures were
\nobtained. Admittedly, no complaint was preferred after 25.09.2010 till F.I.R.
\nregistered on 27.04.2011.\n<\/p>\n
\t17.At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that the defacto complainant
\nhad brought to the notice of his plight to the religious heads in minority
\ncommunity. One Rev.Fr. Joseph, leader of Minority Community Education and
\nFoundation on knowing the plight of the defacto complainant, had written a
\nletter to the Hon’ble President of India and other officials and a communication
\nwas given to the Superintendent of Police, Dindigul District from the office of
\nthe Hon’ble President of India for taking appropriate action. On receipt of the
\nsaid communication, on 27.04.2011, a case has been registered in Crime No.203
\n2011 for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 448, 294(b), 387 and 420 I.P.C.
\nagainst the accused 1 and 2.\n<\/p>\n
\t18.On perusal of the file relating to C.S.R.No.501 of 2010, it is seen
\nthat one Rev.Fr.Joseph, Chennai Education Foundation, Chennai, Tamil Nadu, has
\nsent a representation to the Hon’ble President on 01.10.2010 stating that
\natrocities at Minority(Christian) Community at Dindigul, Tamil Nadu. That
\ncomplaint was sent along with the news published in Nakkeeran (Tamil Bi-Weekly
\nMagazine). On that basis,  report has been called for on 20.04.2011 and result
\nof enquiry was forwarded by Additional Superintendent of Police, Dindigul.
\nThereafter, the case has been registered on 27.04.2011. It is pertinent to note
\nthat there is no complaint was preferred by the defacto complainant after
\n05.10.2010.\n<\/p>\n
\t19.The learned senior counsel for the petitioners\/accused submitted that
\nclauses-(3) and (7) in the referred para-102 in 1992 SCC (Crl) 426 (cited supra)
\nare applicable to the facts of the present case. Clause-(3) is extracted
\nhereunder:\n<\/p>\n
\t“(3)Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. or complaint
\nand the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission
\nof any offence and make out a case against the accused.”\n<\/p>\n
They mainly focussed their forceful argument that the defacto complainant’s
\nfather is a tenant, who was evicted under due process of law. He has not filed
\nany application to set aside the order passed in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010.
\nHe filed only C.R.P.Sr.No.38719 of 2011 to recall the order made in C.R.P.,
\nwhich was yet to be numbered. It is pertinent to note that after filing of
\ncounter affidavit by R1 in quash petitions, the petitioners initiated contempt
\nproceedings against R1. Then only, R2 filed C.R.P.Sr.No.38719 of 2011.
\nAdmittedly, on 07.02.2011, after the complaint, the property worth about
\nRs.40,00,000\/- has been registered in the name of the tenant viz., Zavior
\nMichael and wherein  the family members of the defacto complainant are residing
\nand the same was also admitted in the counter affidavit filed by the defacto
\ncomplainant\/second respondent. Since it is a civil dispute, if at all Zavior
\nMichael is having any ill feeling,  he can very well work out his remedy before
\nthe Civil Court of law instead of filing criminal proceedings.\n<\/p>\n
\t20.Now this Court has to follow the dictum laid down in 1992 SCC (Crl) 426
\n(State of Haryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others<\/a>). Considering the facts of
\nthe case,  the property was purchased by the first accused, who also filed
\nR.C.O.P.No.3 of 2001 against the father of the second respondent and obtained an
\norder of eviction. That eviction order was set aside by the Rent Controller
\nAppellate Authority, Sub-Court Palani in R.C.A.No.1 of 2004, against which, the
\nfirst accused had preferred a revision in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010,  which
\nwas ended in compromise on 24.08.2010.\n<\/p>\n
\t21.The learned counsel for the defacto complainant\/second respondent would
\nsubmit that the aforestated joint compromise memo has not been signed by the
\nfather of the defacto complainant, who is a tenant and a fraud has been played
\nupon before the Court and obtained an order. They had filed an application to
\nrecall that order which is still pending.\n<\/p>\n
\t22.At this juncture, the learned counsel for the petitioners would rely
\nupon the following decisions for the propositions (i.e.) consent\/ compromise
\ndecree is valid,  until it was set aside by the same Court and Judges’ record is
\nconclusive.\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) (2010) 5 SCC 104 (Shanti Budhia Vesta Patel and others v. Nirmala
\nJayprakash Tiwari and others<\/a>), in which, it was held as follows:
\n\t“Consent decree recorded on basis of compromise entered into on behalf of
\nappellants by their power of attorney holder. Burden to prove that compromise
\nwas tainted by coercion or fraud lies upon party alleging the same. If coercion
\nor fraud is alleged, it must be set out with full material particulars.
\nAppellants failed to furnish full and precise particulars with regard to the
\nalleged fraud. Consent decree is valid.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) (2007) 1 MLJ 257 (Hawa Ummal v. Mohammed Yousuf<\/a> (deceased) and
\nothers) in paragraphs-10 and 23, it was held as follows:
\n\t“10. .. .. the Supreme Court has held that on compliance of order 23 Rule
\n3 C.P.C., in terms of Order 3 Rule 1 C.P.C., the counsel can act on behalf of
\nthe parties and held that it is not open to the appellant to contend to the
\ncontrary.\n<\/p>\n
\t23.The record of the proceedings made by the Court is sacrosanct and the
\nparties cannot dispute the correctness of the Court proceedings on record. ‘The
\nJudges’ record was conclusive. Neither lawyer nor  litigant may claim to
\ncontradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else. The Court
\ncould not launch into inquiry as to what transpired in the High Court.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) AIR 2003 SC 4596 (Jineshwardas (D) by Lrs. and others v. Smt.Jagrani
\nand another) in paragraphs-39 and 40, it was held as follows:
\n\t“39. To insist upon the party himself personally signing the agreement or
\ncompromise would often cause undue delay, loss and inconvenience, especially in
\nthe case of non-resident persons. It has always been universally understood that
\na party can always act by his duly authorized representative. If a power of
\nattorney holder can enter into an agreement or compromise on behalf of his
\nprincipal, so can counsel, possessed of the requisite authorization by
\nvakalatnama, act on behalf of his client. Not to recognise such capacity is not
\nonly to cause much inconvenience and loss to the parties personally, but also to
\ndelay the progress of proceedings in Court. If the legislature had intended to
\nmake such a fundamental change, even at the risk of delay, inconvenience and
\nneedless expenditure, it would have expressly so stated.\n<\/p>\n
\t40. Accordingly, we are of the view that the words ‘in writing and signed
\nby the parties’, inserted by the C.P.C. (Amendment) Act, 1976, must necessarily
\nmean, to borrow the language of Order III, Rule 1 C.P.C.\n<\/p>\n
\t“any appearance, application or act in or to any Court, required or
\nauthorised by law to be made or done by a party in such Court, may except where
\notherwise expressly provided by any law for the time being in force, be made or
\ndone by the party in person, or by his recognized agent or by a pleader,
\nappearing, applying or acting as the case may be, on his behalf.
\n\tProvided that any such appearance shall, if the Court so directs, be made
\nby the party in person.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iv) AIR 1988 SC 400 (Gurpreet Singh v. Chatur Bhuj Goel),<\/a> in paragraph-
\n10, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“10.Under R. 3 as it now stands, when a claim in suit has been adjusted
\nwholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise, the compromise must be
\nin writing and signed by the parties and there must be a completed agreement
\nbetween them. To constitute an adjustment, the agreement or compromise must
\nitself be capable of being embodied in a decree. When the parties enter into a
\ncompromise during the hearing of a suit or appeal, there is no reason why the
\nrequirement that the compromise should be reduced in writing in the form of an
\ninstrument signed by the parties should be dispensed with. The Court must
\ntherefore insist upon the parties to reduce the terms into writing.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(v) (2007) 4 SCC 241 (Bhagubhai Dhanabhai Khalasi and another v. State of
\nGujarat and others) in paragraph-13, it is held as follows:
\n\t“13.There is nothing on record to show that the Division Bench while
\nentertaining the letters patent appeal intended to enter into any other
\nquestion. Judges’ record as is well known is final and conclusive. Any dispute
\nin relation thereto must be raised before the same Court.”\n<\/p>\n
 \t(vi) (2005) 4 SCC 120 (Commissioner of Endowments and others v. Vittal Rao
\nand others<\/a>) in which, it was stated as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“On facts held, compromise order cannot be annulled on ground that  compromise
\nwas not in writing and was not signed by the petitioner.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(vii) AIR 1982 SC 1249 (State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak and<\/a>
\nanother) in paragraphs-4 and 7, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“4. .. .. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done,
\nsaid or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The
\nprinciple is well-settled that statements of fact as to what transpired at the
\nhearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the facts so
\nstated and no one can contradict such statements by affidavit or other evidence.
\nIf a party thinks that the happenings in Court have been wrongly recorded in a
\njudgment, it is incumbent upon the party. While the matter is still fresh in the
\nminds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the
\nrecord to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a
\nstatement that had been made in error.\n<\/p>\n
\t7.So the Judges’ record is conclusive. Neither lawyer nor litigant may
\nclaim to contradict it, except before the Judge himself, but nowhere else.”\n<\/p>\n
So unless the order passed in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 has been set aside,
\nthat order is valid and conclusive.\n<\/p>\n
\t23. Order of this Court in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 dated 24.08.2010,
\nin which, it was stated as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“The respondent accept that the revision petitioner is the landlord and
\nalso handed over the possession to the revision petitioner and the revision
\npetitioner took possession of the same and as on today he is in actual
\npossession.”\n<\/p>\n
In the decreetal order, it was stated as follows”\n<\/p>\n
\t“1)That the petitioner be and hereby is declared as the land lord since
\nthe respondent already handed over the possession of the property.\n<\/p>\n
\t2)That the respondents shall not have any interest in respect of the
\nproperty.\n<\/p>\n
\t3)That this petition be and hereby is closed as per the joint memo.”\n<\/p>\n
After a month only,  the present complaint has been preferred by the defacto
\ncomplainant.  Admittedly, the defacto complainant had suppressed the order
\npassed in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 on 24.08.2010. As per the counter
\naffidavit filed by the defacto complainant, in paragraph-8,  he has stated that
\non coming to know of the order passed  against his father, he has filed a
\npetition for recall before this Court in C.R.P.SR.No.38719 of 2011 and the same
\nis pending and filed only after filing of the application which is yet to be
\nnumbered,  as per the version of the learned counsel for the second respondent.
\nIt is clearly proved that the dispute between the first accused and the defacto
\ncomplainant’s father is only a civil dispute.\n<\/p>\n
\t24.It is pertinent to note as per the dictum of the Bhajanlal’s case,
\ncriminal proceedings should not be encouraged,   when it is found to be mala
\nfide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court. Superior Courts while
\nexercising this power should also strive to serve the ends of justice. Now it is
\nappropriate to consider the decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the
\npetitioners\/accused.\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) (2007) 14 SCC 776 (All Cargo Movers (India) Private Limited and others
\nv. Dhanesh Badarmal Jain and<\/a> another) in  paragraph-16, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“16. .. .. Where a civil suit is pending and the complaint petition has
\nbeen filed one year after filing of the civil suit, we may for the purpose of
\nfinding out as to whether the said allegations are prima facie correct, take
\ninto consideration the correspondences exchanged by the parties and other
\nadmitted documents. It is one thing to say that the Court at this juncture would
\nnot consider the defence of the accused but it is another thing to say that for
\nexercising the inherent jurisdiction of this Court, it is impermissible also to
\nlook to the admitted documents. Criminal proceedings should not be encouraged,
\nwhen it is found to be mala fide or otherwise an abuse of the process of the
\nCourt. Superior Courts while exercising this power should also strive to serve
\nthe ends of justice.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) AIR 2008 SC 1683 (Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd., v. Rajvir
\nIndustries Ltd., & Others)<\/a>  in paragraph-22, it is held as follows:
\n\t“22.Ordinarily, a defence of an accused although appears to be plausible
\nshould not be taken into consideration for exercise of the said jurisdiction.
\nYet again, the High Court at that stage would not ordinarily enter into a
\ndisputed question of fact. It, however, does not mean that documents of
\nunimpeachable character should not be taken into consideration at any cost for
\nthe purpose of finding out as to whether continuance of the criminal proceedings
\nwould amount to an abuse of the process of Court or that the complaint petition
\nis filed for causing mere harassment to the accused. While we are not oblivious
\nof the fact that although a large number of disputes should ordinarily be
\ndetermined only by the civil courts, but criminal cases are filed only for
\nachieving the ultimate goal namely to force the accused to pay the amount due to
\nthe complainant immediately. The Courts on the one hand should not encourage
\nsuch a practice; but, on the other, cannot also travel beyond its jurisdiction
\nto interfere with the proceeding which is otherwise genuine. The Courts cannot
\nalso lose sight of the fact that in certain matters, both civil proceedings and
\ncriminal proceedings would be maintainable.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) (2010) 10 SCC 673 (Manoj Mahavir Prasad Khaitan v. Ram Gopal Poddar
\nand<\/a> another) in para-12, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“12.We reiterate that when the criminal Court looks into the complaint, it
\nhas to do so with an open mind. True it is that that is not the stage for
\nfinding out the truth or otherwise in the allegations; but where the allegations
\nthemselves are so absurd that no reasonable man would accept the same, the High
\nCourt could not have thrown its arms in the air and expressed its inability to
\ndo anything in the matter. Section 482 Cr.P.C. is a guarantee against injustice.
\nThe High Court is invested with the tremendous powers thereunder to pass any
\norder in the interests of justice. Therefore, this would have been a proper case
\nfor the High Court to look into the allegations with the openness and then to
\ndecide whether to pass any order in the interests of justice. In our opinion,
\nthis was a case where the High Court ought to have used its powers under Section
\n482 Cr.P.C.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iv) (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 259 (Inder Mohan Goswami and another v. State of
\nUttaranchal and others) in paragraphs-29,30 and 37, it is held as follows:
\n\t“29. In Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh<\/a> in a landlord and tenant matter
\nwhere criminal proceedings had been initiated, this Court observed in para 1 at
\npage 467 as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t“A frustrated landlord after having met his waterloo in the hierarchy of
\ncivil courts, has further enmeshed the tenant in a frivolous criminal
\nprosecution which prima facie appears to be an abuse of the process of law. The
\nfacts when stated are so telling that the further discussion may appear to be
\nsuperfluous.”\n<\/p>\n
\t30. The court noticed that the tendency of perjury is very much on the
\nincrease. Unless the courts come down heavily upon such persons, the whole
\njudicial process would come to ridicule. The court also observed that chagrined
\nand frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their
\nfrustration by cheaply invoking jurisdiction of the criminal court.\n<\/p>\n
\t37. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd.,<\/a> this Court again
\ncautioned about a growing tendency in business circles to convert purely civil
\ndisputes into criminal cases. The Court noticed the prevalent impression that
\ncivil law remedies are time consuming and do not adequately protect the
\ninterests of lenders\/creditors. The Court further observed that:(SCC page 749,
\npara 13)
\n“13. … Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve
\nany criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should
\nbe deprecated and discouraged. ” ”\n<\/p>\n
The above citations along with the facts of the present case would prove because
\nof the civil dispute, the defacto complainant with a malafide intention initiate
\nthe criminal proceedings against the petitioners.\n<\/p>\n
\t25. Whether F.I.R. is liable to be quashed, since the same complaint is
\nclosed as withdrawn.\n<\/p>\n
\tAt this juncture,  it is appropriate on the part of this Court to consider
\nthe argument advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the
\ncomplaint was given by the defacto complainant on 25.09.2010, which was closed
\non 15.10.2010. For the same set of facts,  no second complaint will be
\nentertained, so it is liable to be quashed. To substantiate his argument,  he
\nrelied upon the decision reported in 2007 (2) MLJ (Cri) page 1647 (A.Yousuf Khan
\nand others v. Inspector of Police)<\/a> in paragraphs-8 and 14, it is stated as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“8.It is also pertinent to note that in the very same order, this Court
\nfurther observed and quashed the proceedings as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“As the complainant suppressed earlier proceedings and memo filed between the
\nparties, this Court without any hesitation is of the opinion that the
\nproceedings pending in C.C.No.325 of 2004 has got to be quashed. Accordingly,
\nthe same is quashed.”\n<\/p>\n
14.This Court has no hesitation to hold that the present complaint in this case
\nsquarely comes within the above said guideline stipulated by the Hon’ble Apex
\nCourt for quashing the F.I.R. In view of the sequence of events, viz.,
\nsuppression of present first complaint, preferring second complaint, findings of
\nthis Court regarding suppression of material facts by the defacto complainant in
\nthe order dated 11.10.2004 in Crl.O.P.No.23083 of 2004 and the findings of the
\nlearned Judicial M Class Magistrate No.II, Kochi, this present complaint is
\nliable to be quashed. ”\n<\/p>\n
Considering the above citation along with the facts of the present case,
\nadmittedly, on the basis of the complaint given on 25.09.2010, the case was
\ntaken on file in C.S.R.No.501 of 2010 and the same was  closed as withdrawn.
\nAgain, the case has been registered on 27.04.2011 on the basis of the complaint
\ndated 25.09.2010. Till 27.04.2011, R2 had not taken any steps and preferred any
\ncomplaint stating that the signatures obtained forcibly from the complainants
\nfor closing C.S.R.No.501 of 2010.  Only in the counter affidavit, R2 raised such
\na plea. In such circumstances, as per the decision reported in 2007(2) MLJ (Cri)
\npage 1647(cited supra), I am of the considered view, it is only deemed to be
\nsecond complaint, on the basis of the complaint dated 25.09.2010. Since the
\nfirst complaint dated 25.09.2010 was  closed as withdrawn,  I am of the view
\nthat the F.I.R. is liable to be quashed, since the case has been registered on
\nthe basis of the complaint dated 25.09.2010.\n<\/p>\n
\t26.It is appropriate to consider the arguments advanced by the learned
\ncounsel appearing for the petitioners\/accused that on 07.02.2011,  property
\nworth about Rs.40,00,000\/- has been purchased in the name of the defacto
\ncomplainant’s father, where they are put up. In the counter affidavit, the
\ndefacto complainant himself has stated that now they are residing at Lobo
\nCottage, which was purchased on 07.02.2011 in the name of Zavior Michael and the
\namount has been paid by the agent of the first accused. It is also pertinent to
\nnote that on 27.01.2011, there was a compromise agreement entered into between
\none of the accused viz., Reuban and the defacto complainant’s father. Clause-1
\nof the said compromise agreement was stated as follows:
\n\t@1) 1tJ ghh;l;o 2tJ ghh;l;of;F bfhilf;fhdy; lt[d;. ky;yp nuhL fhd;btz;l;
\nnuhL nrUk; gFjpapy; 25 brz;l; epyKk;. nkw;go epyj;jpy; cs;s nyhngh fhl;nl$; vd;w
\nbgahpy; cs;s tPLk; nrh;j;J 1tJ ghh;l;o jdJ brhe;j brytpy; 2tJ ghh;l;of;F 04-02-
\n2011?k; njjpf;Fs; fpiuak; Koj;J bfhLf;f ntz;oaJ\/ nkYk; 2tJ ghh;l;of;F 1tJ
\nghh;l;o U:\/2.50.000-? U:gha; ,uz;L yl;rj;J Ik;gjhapuk; bfhLf;ft[k; xg;g[f;
\nbfhz;L. mjd;go moapw;fz;l rhl;rpfs; Kd;dpiyapy; 1tJ ghh;l;oaplkpUe;J 2tJ
\nghh;l;oa[k;. mtUila FLk;gj;jhh;fSk; nrh;e;J nkw;go bjhifapy; ehsJ njjpapy;
\nU:gha;-  U:gha;  Ik;gjhapuj;ij 1tJ ghh;l;oaplkpUe;J 2tJ ghh;l;o buhf;fk; bgw;Wf;
\nbfhz;oUf;fpwhh;fs;\/ v”;rpa  U:gha;-  U:gha; ,uz;L yl;rj;ij nkw;go fpiuak;
\ngjpa[k; njjpapy; 1tJ ghh;l;oaplkpUe;J 2tJ ghh;l;o bgw;Wf; bfhs;s ntz;oaJ\/@<\/p>\n
In the above clause, it was stated that the ‘Lobo cottage’ is going to be
\nregistered in the name of the defacto complainant’s father. In pursuance of
\nthat,  ‘Lobo Cottage’ has been purchased and registered on 07.02.2011, in which,
\nthe defacto complainant had appeared before the sub-Registrar’s office,
\nKodaikanal and he signed and affixed his Left Thumb impression before the Sub-
\nRegistrar at Kodaikanal. After the complaint dated 25.09.2010,  Lobo Cottage has
\nbeen purchased in the name of the defacto complainant’s father and he is in
\npossession. It was also admitted by the defacto complainant\/R2. But the case was
\nregistered on 27.04.2011 on the basis of the complaint given on 25.09.2010.\n<\/p>\n
\t27.Even though the defacto complainant has stated that on 07.02.2011, one
\nReuban demolished the structures and they had transferred from Welwyn Cottage
\n(disputed property) to Lobo Cottage in his counter, but admittedly no complaint
\nwas lodged either on 07.02.2011 or after or before registering this case on
\n27.04.2011 for the alleged occurrence said to have been taken place on
\n07.02.2011.  As already stated that the case in Crime No.203 of 2011 has been
\nregistered on 27.04.2011 only on the complaint given by the defacto complainant
\non 25.09.2010.  Considering this aspect, I am of the view that without any
\nbasis, the case has been registered in Crime No.203 of 2011, even after
\ncomplaint dated 25.09.2010 was closed as withdrawn.\n<\/p>\n
\t28.At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider the following decisions
\nrelied upon by the learned counsel for the second respondent.\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) (2001) 6 SCC 181 (T.T.Antony v. State of Kerala and others<\/a>), in which,
\nit is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“There can be no second F.I.R. and no fresh investigation on receipt of
\nevery subsequent information in respect of the same cognizable offence or same
\noccurrence giving rise to one or more cognizable offences. All such subsequent
\ninformation will be covered by Section 162 Cr.P.C. Officer in charge of the
\npolice station has to investigate not merely the cognizable offence reported in
\nthe F.I.R. but also other connected offences found to have been committed in the
\ncourse of the same transaction or the same occurrence and file one or more
\nreports as provided in Section 173 Cr.P.C.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) AIR 1993 SC 1637 (Ajay Agarwal v. Union of India and others<\/a>), in
\npara-25, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“25. A conspiracy  thus is a continuing offence and continues to subsist
\nand committed wherever one of the conspirators does an act or series of acts. So
\nlong as its performance continues, it is a continuing offence till it is
\nexecuted or rescinded or frustrated by choice or necessity A crime is complete
\nas soon as the agreement is made, but it is not a thing of the moment.  It does
\nnot end with the making of the agreement. It will continue so long as there are
\ntwo or more parties to it intending to carry into effect the design. Its
\ncontinuance is a threat to the society against which it was aimed at and would
\nbe dealt with as soon as that jurisdiction can properly claim the power to do
\nso. The conspiracy designed or agreed abroad will have the same effect as in
\nIndia,  when part of the acts, pursuant to the agreement are agreed to be
\nfinalised or done, attempted or even frustrated and vice versa.”\n<\/p>\n
He submitted that even though the complaint has been given on 25.09.2010, the
\ncase has been registered on 27.04.2011 and the occurrence has been taken place
\non 07.02.2011. Hence, it is only a continuing offence and prayed for dismissal
\nof the quash petitions. On the basis of the complaint, the case has been
\nregistered only under the provisions under Sections 147, 148, 294(b), 387, 448
\nand 420 I.P.C. not under Section 120B I.P.C. Considering the ingredients of the
\noffence, it is not a continuing offence and hence, the above citations are not
\napplicable to the facts of the present case.\n<\/p>\n
\t29.In the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, he would
\nclearly averred that only on 07.02.2011, they were physically evicted from the
\ndisputed property and the entire structures situated in the disputed property
\nwere demolished. At this juncture alone, the learned counsel Mr.Ajmal Khan would
\nsubmit that second F.I.R. is not necessary, since it is a continuing offence.
\nBut the citations reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181 (cited supra) and AIR 1993 SC
\n1637 (cited supra) are not applicable to the facts of the present case,  because
\nin the Antony’s case, it was specifically mentioned that no second F.I.R. in
\nrespect of the same transaction or same occurrence.  But here, in the complaint,
\nit was stated that the accused are attempted to trespass into the property. But
\nas per the averment in the counter affidavit filed by the second respondent, it
\nwas specifically mentioned that they have been physically shifted from the
\ndisputed property to the Lobo Cottage only on 07.02.2011. So the argument
\nadvanced by the learned counsel for the second respondent does not merit
\nacceptance. I am of the considered view that the occurrence alleged to have been
\ntaken place on 07.02.2011 is not a continuing offence. The complaint has been
\ngiven on 25.09.2010. The alleged occurrence said to have been taken place after
\nentering into compromise. In the complaint, it was specifically mentioned that
\nthe signatures were  obtained.  But admittedly,  it was not produced before the
\nCourt in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010. Filing of C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010
\nand pendency and disposal of the same have not been disclosed in the complaint
\ndated 25.09.2010. As per the counter affidavit filed by the defacto
\ncomplainant\/R2,  on 07.02.2011 alone they were shifted from the disputed
\nproperty to Lobo cottage and the superstructure in the disputed property has
\nbeen demolished. So the incident alleged to have been taken place on 07.02.2011
\nis not a continuing offence. So the decisions reported in (2001) 6 SCC 181
\n(cited supra) and AIR 1993 SC 1637 (cited supra)  are not applicable.\n<\/p>\n
\t30.The learned counsel for the petitioners\/accused submitted that the
\ningredients of the penal provisions have not been made out, for the reason he
\nwould rely upon the decision reported in AIR 2001 SC 3721 (Charanjit Singh
\nChadha and others v. Sudhir Mehra)<\/a> in paragraph-17, it is held as follows:
\n\t“17.The hire-purchase agreement in law is an executory contract of sale
\nand confers no right in rem on hirer until the conditions for transfer of the
\nproperty to him have been fulfilled. Therefore, the re-possession of goods as
\nper the term of the agreement may not amount to any criminal offence. .. ..”\n<\/p>\n
\t31. As per the dictum laid down in Janata Dal  v. H.S. Chowdhary and
\nRaghubir Saran (Dr)<\/a> v. State of Bihar, there is no hard-and-fast rule can be
\nlaid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
\nextraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedings at any stage. Now it is
\nappropriate to consider the following decisions relied upon by the learned
\ncounsel for the second respondent.\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) (2002) 3 SCC 89 (State of Karnataka v. M.Devendrappa and<\/a> another), in
\nparagraph-9, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“9.As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section
\n482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great
\ncaution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its decision in
\nexercise of this power is based on sound principles. The inherent power should
\nnot be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. The High Court being the
\nhighest Court of a State should normally refrain from giving a prima facie
\ndecision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when
\nthe evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court and the issues
\ninvolved, whether factual or legal, are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their
\ntrue perspective without sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule
\ncan be laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise its
\nextraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See: Janata
\nDal  v. H.S. Chowdhary and Raghubir Saran (Dr)<\/a> v. State of Bihar).  It would not
\nbe proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light
\nof all probabilities in order to determine whether a conviction would be
\nsustainable and on such premises  arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings
\nare to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and
\nconclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceeding instituted
\non complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quash the proceedings is called
\nfor only in a case where the complaint does not disclose any offence or is
\nfrivolous, vexatious or oppressive. .. .. ”\n<\/p>\n
\tConsidering the above citation, there is no hard-and-fast rule for
\nquashing the F.I.R.\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii) (2004) 1 SCC 691 (State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta and others<\/a>) in
\nparagraphs-11 and 13, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“11. .. .. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute
\nthe offence of which cognizance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to
\nthe High Court to quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under
\nSection 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be
\nmeticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case
\nwould end in conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as a whole.
\nIf it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light of the
\nstatement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or
\noffences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint is
\nmala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification
\nfor interference by the High Court. When an information is lodged at the police
\nstation and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would
\nbe of secondary importance. It is the material collected during the
\ninvestigation and evidence led in the Court which decide the fate of the accused
\nperson. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no
\nconsequence and cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings.\n<\/p>\n
\t13.It is to be noted that the investigation was not complete and at that
\nstage it was impermissible for the High Court to look into materials, the
\nacceptability of which is essentially a matter for trial. While exercising
\njurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, it is not permissible for the Court
\nto act as if it was a trial Judge. Even when charge is framed at that stage, the
\nCourt has to only prima facie be satisfied about existence of sufficient ground
\nfor proceeding against the accused. For that limited purpose, the Court can
\nevaluate material and documents on records but it cannot appreciate evidence.
\nThe Court is not required to appreciate evidence to conclude whether the
\nmaterials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused. In Chand
\nDhawan v. Jawahar Lal,<\/a> it was observed that when the materials relied upon by a
\nparty are required to be proved, no inference can be drawn on the basis of those
\nmaterials to conclude the complaint to be unacceptable. The Court should not act
\non annexures to the petitions under Section 482 of the Code, which cannot be
\ntermed as evidence without being tested and proved. When the factual position of
\nthe case at hand is considered in the light of principles of law highlighted,
\nthe inevitable conclusion is that the High Court was not justified in quashing
\nthe investigation and proceedings in the connected case (Crime No. 116 of 1994)
\nregistered by the Special Police Establishment, Lokayukta, Gwalior. We set aside
\nthe impugned judgment. The State shall be at liberty to proceed in the matter
\nfurther.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) (2007) 12 SCC 93 (T.Vengama Naidu v. T.Dora Swamy Naidu and others<\/a>)
\nin paragraph-8, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“8.A glance at FIR suggests that there were serious allegations against
\nboth the accused, respondents 1 and 2 herein inasmuch as it was specifically
\nalleged that inspite of the revocation of the general power of attorney and
\ninspite of a specific notice to that effect by the complainant to the first
\nrespondent, the first respondent went on dishonestly to execute the sale deed in
\nfavour of his own daughter on the basis of the said revoked general power of
\nattorney. It is alleged against the first respondent that he had no right over
\nthe property and yet he had executed a document in favour of the second
\nrespondent without any authority with an intention to cause loss to the
\ncomplainant and to cheat him. It was alleged against the second respondent that
\nshe was well aware that the first respondent was not competent to sell the
\nproperty so as to defraud and cheat the complainant and, therefore, she also was
\nliable to be punished under Sections 464, 423, 420 read with Section 34 IPC. It
\nwas not for the learned Judge at the stage of investigation to examine the
\nnature of the transaction and further to examine as to whether any offence was
\nactually committed by the accused persons or not. At that stage the only inquiry
\nwhich could have been made was as to whether the complaint or FIR did contain
\nallegations of any offence. Whether those offences were made out, even prima
\nfacie, could not have been examined at that stage as the investigation was
\npending then. We, therefore, do not agree with the learned Single Judge that FIR
\nwas liable to be quashed. We also do not agree with the learned Judge that there
\nare no ingredients of the offences complained of in the FIR and this was a civil
\ndispute. .. ..”\n<\/p>\n
\t(iv) (2009) 15 SCC 429 (Ramesh Dutt and others v. State of  Punjab and
\nothers<\/a>), in which, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“The appellants had committed acts of criminal misconduct while trying to
\nobtain orders of mutation but it is another thing to say that only because they
\nfiled such an application, the same by itself would tantamount to commission of
\na criminal offence. Hence, institution of a criminal case must be held to be  an
\nact of mala fide on the part of the respondents.”\n<\/p>\n
\t(v) (2011) 4 SCC 593 (Kaushalya Devi Massand v. Roopkishore Khore)<\/a> in
\nparagraph-11, it is held as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“11.Having considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties, we
\nare of the view that the gravity of a complaint under the Negotiable Instruments
\nAct cannot be equated with an offence under the provisions of the Penal Code,
\n1860 or other criminal offences. An offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable
\nInstruments Act, 1881, is almost in the nature of a civil wrong which has been
\ngiven criminal overtones.”\n<\/p>\n
As per the above citations, it is clearly held that ingredients of the offences
\nshall prima facie made out in the complaint\/F.I.R.\n<\/p>\n
\t32.It is well settled dictum that F.I.R. is not an encyclopaedia as per
\nthe decision reported in CDJ 2007 MHC 4147 (G.Jeyaseelan v.T.Chandran). But
\nhowever, there must be some prima facie case to take cognizance of an offence
\nand there must be some elements of ingredients of the offence to be mentioned in
\nthe F.I.R. On perusal of the F.I.R. along with penal provisions under Sections
\n147, 148, 448, 294(b), 387 and 420 I.P.C., no ingredients for the above offences
\nhave been prima facie made out.  It is true,  it would not be proper for the
\nHigh Court to analyse the case of the accused, in order to determine whether the
\nconviction would be sustainable.  But here, this Court is not analysing the
\nevidence. But this Court has made cursory glance over this F.I.R. and the
\nIngredients of the penal provisions were not prima facie made out.\n<\/p>\n
\t33.Now it is appropriate to incorporate the entire complaint, which is as
\nfollows:\n<\/p>\n
\t“Subject:Request for police protection since our entire family is facing
\nthreatening of life by anti-social elements with deadly weapons and lot of
\nmuscle power-Immediate action requested-Reg.\n<\/p>\n
\tWe have been in peaceful possession and enjoyment of bearing property
\nBlock No.14, T.S.No.50, New Survey No.22, Door No.41\/67, Old No.17\/99,
\nKodaikanal Taluk, in an extent of 3 acres and 98 cents for the past 40 years.
\nPatta stood in the name of one Thiru.Tapp & Zavior Michael, Pastor & head of our
\nfamily. Zavior Michael has been doing a dedicated service to the religious
\npeople at large and has been doing welfare activities, charitable work etc. to
\nthe local people. All these activities are being done only from the above
\nmentioned address. EB connection, telephone connection, revenue receipts all
\nstood only in the name of one Thiru.Tapp and Zavior Michael.\n<\/p>\n
\tWhile that being so, some anti-social elements with the intention to grab
\nthe said property from us started threatening us to vacate the property and hand
\nit over to them. In this regard, we have been receiving weapons.\n<\/p>\n
\tFurther the women members of the family more particularly were, tortured,
\nharassed, and shouted at by filthy language. In this regard we have preferred  a
\npolice complaint on 23.04.2010 before the Kodaikanal police station the copy of
\nthe receipt issued by the police station is enclosed herewith.\n<\/p>\n
\tOne Thiru.Bhagchand Uttamachand Galada a business man from Chennai and his
\naides are the main culprits, who have been indulging in all the above said
\nillegal and atrocious activities. It is relevant to state here that the said
\nGalada had filed a rent control suit in District Munsif Court, Kodaikanal vide
\nR.C.O.P.No.3\/2001. The said suits were decreed in his favour vide order dated
\n10.12.2003. Thereafter, Zavior Michael our family head preferred an appeal
\nbefore the Sub-Court, Palani (Kodaikanal Camp Court) vide appeal No.1\/2004. In
\nthe said appeal lower Court order was set aside and appeal was allowed in favour
\nof Zavior Michael, our family head. Therefore, there is no right in any manner
\nto Thiru.Galada or any of his aides over the above mentioned property.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn the aforesaid circumstances, we have been repeatedly receiving
\nthreatening calls,  as stated earlier.  Further, Zavier Michael, our family head
\nwas threatened and forced to sign on various papers including blank papers
\nrecently.  Thereafter, more such threatening calls are being received and also
\nfrequent visits of rowdy elements with deadly weapons are being made and our
\nlife put to peril and danger.\n<\/p>\n
\tIt is pertinent to state here that the said Thiru. Galada  a business
\nheavy weight Chennai is being supported by Thiru.P.Sivanandi, I.G. of Police,
\nCoimbatore Range and  E.N. Palanisamy, Mill Owner, Dindigul.  Only with their
\nassistance and background the said Galada has been ending rowdy elements,
\nthreatening our lives, to grab the property.  It is very unfortunate that a
\nPolice Officer in the rank of Inspector General supporting land grabbers and
\nanti social elements.  Moreover,  signatures were forcefully obtained from
\nZavier Michael, our family head to the effect that he would vacate the premises
\nand hand over the possession to them.  So, it is utmost necessary that the
\nhonourable Director General intervenes in the above matter and take necessary
\nactions.  We are helpless, ordinary people with our family head doing religious
\nactivities & belonging to minority community and  now are at your mercy.  Kindly
\nprotect our lives from business heavy weights,  anti-social elements.”\n<\/p>\n
\t34. The case was registered under Sections 147, 148, 294(b), 387, 448 and
\n420 I.P.C. As per Section 420 I.P.C. is concerned,  on perusal of F.I.R.,
\nelements of cheating has not been made out. Neither the defacto complainant nor
\nhis family members have been cheated the valuable of the property belonging to
\nthem. Because it is not the case of the defacto complainant that his property
\nhas been cheated by the accused. Now it is appropriate to consider the essential
\ningredients of following Sections, which are extracted hereunder:\n<\/p>\n
        Section 294(b):\n<\/p>\n
(1)Accused did some act.\n<\/p>\n
(2)Accused sang, recited or uttered a song or ballad.\n<\/p>\n
(3)It was obscene.\n<\/p>\n
(4)It was done in a public place.\n<\/p>\n
(5)It caused annoyance to others.\n<\/p>\n
        Section 387
\n(1)Accused put some person or attempted to put some person in fear of death or
\ngrievous hurt.\n<\/p>\n
(2) He did so to commit extortion.\n<\/p>\n
        Section 420
\n(1)Accused cheated the complainant.\n<\/p>\n
(2)Accused did so dishonestly.\n<\/p>\n
(3)Thereby induced the complainant:\n<\/p>\n
 (i) to deliver some property to accused or to some other person.\n<\/p>\n
 (ii) to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of the valuable security
\nor anything which was signed, sealed, and which was capable of being converted
\ninto valuable security.\n<\/p>\n
         Section 448
\n(1)Complainant was in possession of the property.\n<\/p>\n
(2)Accused entered into such building, tent or vessel.
\n(3)Accused having lawfully entered into such building remained there unlawfully.
\n(4)With intent to commit offence of insult, annoyance, intimidation.
\nOn considering the ingredients of penal provisions along with the complaint, I
\nam of the view that the ingredients of the provisions under Sections 147, 148,
\n294(b), 387, 448 and 420 I.P.C. have not been prima facie made out.\n<\/p>\n
\t 35.As per the dictum of (2010) 10 SCC 673 (cited supra), it is held that
\nSection 482 Cr.P.C. is a guarantee against injustice. The High Court is invested
\nwith the tremendous powers thereunder to pass any order in the interests of
\njustice. Therefore, this would have been a proper case for the High Court to
\nlook into the allegations with the openness and then to decide whether to pass
\nany order in the interests of justice. In our opinion,  this was a case where
\nthe High Court ought to have used its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.\n<\/p>\n
\t36.To sum up, the conclusions are as follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t(i) There was a civil dispute (i.e.) in Rent Control proceedings in
\nrespect of the disputed property in between the first accused and the defacto
\ncomplainant’s father, C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010 has been disposed of by
\nrecording joint compromise memo on 24.08.2010. The compromise decree is valid
\ntill it was set aside by the concerned Court. The Judges’ record is conclusive.\n<\/p>\n
\t(ii)The present complaint was preferred on 25.09.2010, in which, the
\ndefacto complainant had sought for protection. On perusal of the complaint,
\ningredients of penal provisions have not been prima facie made out.\n<\/p>\n
\t(iii) After the disposal of the case in C.R.P.(NPD)(MD)No.853 of 2010, son
\nof the tenant, who is the defacto complainant herein has taken vengeance and
\ngave a complaint, which is abuse of process of law.\n<\/p>\n
\t(iv) Already on the basis of the complaint dated 25.09.2010, the case has
\nbeen closed as withdrawn and for the same, the defacto complainant\/R2 had not
\ntaken any steps.\n<\/p>\n
\t(v) On 07.02.2011, though they were alleged to transfer from the disputed
\nproperty to Lobo cottage,  no complaint has been given till the case has been
\nregistered on 27.04.2011 on the basis of the complaint given on 25.09.2010,
\nwhich was already closed. Hence,  F.I.R. was registered on the basis of the
\ncomplaint dated 25.09.2010, which is not sustainable.\n<\/p>\n
\t(vi) On 27.01.2011, a Memorandum of Understanding was entered into between
\nthe father of the defacto complainant and one of the accused viz., Reuban, Lobo
\ncottage has been purchased in the name of the father of the defacto complainant
\nand he was put in possession.\n<\/p>\n
\t(vii) The conduct of the defacto complainant and his family members has
\nshown that the clause-7 of the para-102 of the dictum laid down in (State of
\nHaryana and others v. Bhajan Lal and others<\/a>) (i.e.) where a criminal proceeding
\nis manifestly attended with mala fide and\/or where the proceeding is maliciously
\ninstituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused  abuse
\nof process of Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t37.For the foregoing reason, I am of the view that it is a fit case for
\nquashing the F.I.R.\n<\/p>\n
\t38.In fine,
\n      The Criminal Original Petitions in Crl.O.P.(MD) Nos. 8741 and
\n      9385 of 2011 are allowed.\n<\/p>\n
       F.I.R. in Crime No.203 of 2011 on the file of the first
\n      respondent police, Kodaikanal Police Station, Dindigul District, is
\n      hereby quashed.\n<\/p>\n
      Consequently,  connected Miscellaneous Petitions are closed.
\n      Since the F.I.R. in respect of the Crime No.203 of 2011 is
\n      quashed,   Anticipatory Bail petitions in Crl.O.P.(MD) Nos.8765
\n      to 8767, 8773, 9058, 9282 of 2011 are dismissed as
\n      infructuous.\n<\/p>\n
kj\t<\/p>\n
To<\/p>\n
1.The Inspector of Police
\n   Kodaikanal Police Station
\n   Dindigul District.\n<\/p>\n
2.The Public Prosecutor
\n   Madurai Bench of Madras High Court.\n<\/p>\n
3.The Record Keeper
\n   V.R.Section, High Court.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Madras High Court Bhagchand Uttamchand vs The Inspector Of Police on 4 November, 2011 BEFORE THE MADURAI BENCH OF MADRAS HIGH COURT DATED: 04\/11\/2011 CORAM THE HONOURABLE MS.JUSTICE R.MALA Crl.O.P.(MD) No. 8741 of 2011 and Crl.O.P.(MD) No.9385 of 2011 & M.P.Nos. 1 and 1 of 2011 and Crl.O.P.(MD) Nos.8765 to 8767, 8773, 9058, 9282 of […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[8,13],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-194270","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-high-court","category-madras-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\nBhagchand Uttamchand vs The Inspector Of Police on 4 November, 2011 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/bhagchand-uttamchand-vs-the-inspector-of-police-on-4-november-2011\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Bhagchand Uttamchand vs The Inspector Of Police on 4 November, 2011 - 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