{"id":194695,"date":"2008-04-24T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2008-04-23T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anil-kak-vs-kumari-sharada-raje-ors-on-24-april-2008"},"modified":"2018-05-18T16:59:19","modified_gmt":"2018-05-18T11:29:19","slug":"anil-kak-vs-kumari-sharada-raje-ors-on-24-april-2008","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anil-kak-vs-kumari-sharada-raje-ors-on-24-april-2008","title":{"rendered":"Anil Kak vs Kumari Sharada Raje &amp; Ors on 24 April, 2008"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Anil Kak vs Kumari Sharada Raje &amp; Ors on 24 April, 2008<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: S.B. Sinha<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: S.B. Sinha, V.S. Sirpurkar<\/div>\n<pre>           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (civil)  2965 of 2008\n\nPETITIONER:\nAnil Kak\n\nRESPONDENT:\nKumari Sharada Raje &amp; Ors\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 24\/04\/2008\n\nBENCH:\nS.B. Sinha &amp; V.S. Sirpurkar\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n<p>J U D G M E N T<br \/>\nREPORTABLE<\/p>\n<p>CIVIL APPEAL NO.     2965             OF 2008<br \/>\n[Arising out of  SLP (Civil) No. 2791 of 2006]<br \/>\nWITH<br \/>\nCIVIL APPEAL NOs. 2974,2975,2977   OF 2008<br \/>\n[Arising out of  SLP (Civil) Nos. 13865, 5831 and 9080 of 2006]<\/p>\n<p>S.B. SINHA, J :\n<\/p>\n<p>1. \tLeave granted.\n<\/p>\n<p>2. \tThese appeals are directed against a judgment and order dated<br \/>\n18.05.2001 passed by a learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High<br \/>\nCourt at Indore dismissing two applications for grant of probate\/ letters of<br \/>\nadministration with the copy of the annexed Will in respect of the assets of<br \/>\nLate Maharani Sharmishthabai Holkar (hereinafter called as &#8220;the testatrix&#8221;),<br \/>\nthe widow of Late Maharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar, former ruler of the<br \/>\nerstwhile Holkar State.\n<\/p>\n<p>3. \tMaharaja Tukoji Rao Holkar died on 21.05.1978 leaving behind four<br \/>\ndaughters, Sharada Raje Holkar, Sita Raje Ghatge, Sumitra Raje Dalvi and<br \/>\nSushila Raje Holkar.  He had executed a Will on 27.11.1942 bequeathing all<br \/>\nhis properties in favour of the testatrix.  Indisputably, a letter of<br \/>\nadministration had been granted in favour of the testatrix in respect of the<br \/>\nWill dated 27.11.1942 made in her favour by her husband.  Apart from the<br \/>\nproperties inherited by the testatrix from her husband, she had also her own<br \/>\nStridhan properties.  She purported to have executed a Will on or about<br \/>\n23.08.1978 in favour of Kumari Sharada Raje.  She, however, allegedly<br \/>\nexecuted another Will on or about 4.11.1992, by reason whereof, she<br \/>\npurported to have revoked the Will executed by her on 23.08.1978 and\/ or<br \/>\nthe Codicil.  She appointed one K.R.P. Singh and the appellant Anil Kak as<br \/>\njoint executors.  She also appointed Mr. T.N. Unni, her Chartered<br \/>\nAccountant to assist the executors in administering and distributing the<br \/>\nestate and executing the said Will.  She categorized her properties in two<br \/>\nparts, viz., Part A and Part B.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tPart A consisted of those properties which were bequeathed in her<br \/>\nfavour by her husband and Part B consisted of properties other than those<br \/>\nspecified in Part A.  By reason of the said Will, the said two sets of the<br \/>\nproperties were to be administered separately.  Whereas Part A properties<br \/>\nwere bequeathed in favour of four daughters, Part B properties were sought<br \/>\nto be bequeathed in favour of her four grand children.\n<\/p>\n<p>4. \tIndisputably, the said Will was purported to have been attested by one<br \/>\nGita Sanghi, who examined herself as PW-5 and one Baljit Bawa, who was<br \/>\nnot examined.  The Will contained a few appendices.  Whereas the attesting<br \/>\nwitnesses purported to have put their signatures in each page of the Will,<br \/>\nthey did not put any signature on the appendices to the said Will.\n<\/p>\n<p>5. \tWith a view to appreciate the relationship of the parties, we may<br \/>\nnotice the family tree, which is as under:\n<\/p>\n<p> \tAppellant Anil Kak is the husband of Gangesh Kumari and son-in-law<br \/>\nof Sumitra Raje Dalvi.  Appellant Arjun Kak is son of the appellant Anil<br \/>\nKak.\n<\/p>\n<p>6. \tBefore proceeding further, we may notice that whereas the application<br \/>\nfor grant of Letters of Administration with a copy of the Will dated<br \/>\n23.08.1978 annexed, filed by Kumari Sharada Raje was marked as Suit No.<br \/>\n2 of 1998; Anil Kak and Kumar Rampratap filed an application for grant of<br \/>\nprobate in their capacity as executors appointed under the said Will dated<br \/>\n4.11.1992, which was marked as Suit No. 3 of 1998.  Both the suits were<br \/>\ndirected to be consolidated.  The parties examined their witnesses in both the<br \/>\nsuits by adducing common evidence.\n<\/p>\n<p>7. \tWhereas the Will dated 23.08.1978 was a very short document, the<br \/>\nWill dated 4.11.1992 was a detailed one running into six typed pages besides<br \/>\nthree long appendices and two statements containing her investments in<br \/>\nvarious shares within and outside the country.\n<\/p>\n<p>8. \tA learned Single Judge of the High Court by reason of the impugned<br \/>\njudgment refused to grant probate and\/ or letters of administration in respect<br \/>\nof both the Wills.\n<\/p>\n<p>9. \tWhereas Civil Appeals arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 2791, 5831 and<br \/>\n9080 of 2006 have been filed against that part of the judgment whereby and<br \/>\nwhereunder grant of probate in respect of the Will dated 4.11.1992 has been<br \/>\nrejected, Civil Appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 13865 of 2006 was filed in<br \/>\nrespect of the Will dated 23.08.1978.\n<\/p>\n<p>10. \tThe Letters Patent Appeals were filed against the judgment of the<br \/>\nlearned Single Judge of the High Court by both the parties which have been<br \/>\ndismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court as not maintainable.\n<\/p>\n<p>11. \tThe learned counsel appearing for both the parties, have addressed us<br \/>\non the merit of the matter.  We are not considering the correctness or<br \/>\notherwise of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court holding<br \/>\nthe Letters Patent Appeals to be not maintainable, nor it is necessary for us<br \/>\nso to do.\n<\/p>\n<p>12. \tWe may also at the outset place on record that no argument has been<br \/>\nadvanced in regard to the findings of the learned Single Judge of the High<br \/>\nCourt refusing to grant letters of administration in respect of the Will dated<br \/>\n23.08.1978 of the testatrix.\n<\/p>\n<p>13. \tThe learned Single Judge framed the following issues:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;(1)\tWhether the alleged Will with its appendices<br \/>\ndated 4.11.1992 was duly executed by late<br \/>\nMaharani Sharmishthabai Holkar out of her free<br \/>\nwill, while she was in sound disposing state of<br \/>\nmind;\n<\/p>\n<p>(2)\tWhether the Will dated 4.11.1992 has been<br \/>\nacted upon by the parties, if so, its effect;<br \/>\n(3)\tWhether late Maharani Sharmishthabai<br \/>\nHolkar had executed only one Will, i.e., dated<br \/>\n23.8.1978 out of her free will while she was in<br \/>\nsound disposing state of mind;&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>14. \tThe learned Single Judge in its judgment inter alia held that the<br \/>\nexecution of the Will dated 4.11.1992 has not been proved as:\n<\/p>\n<p>(i)\tAppendices were not signed by the attesting witnesses;\n<\/p>\n<p>(ii)\tThe  Will remained in the custody of Anil Kak for a long time;\n<\/p>\n<p>(iii)\tAnil Kak did not examine himself as a witness;\n<\/p>\n<p>(iv)\tAs an unequal division of the properties described in Part B of the<br \/>\nWill effected, there existed suspicious circumstances.\n<\/p>\n<p>(v)\tAnil Kak took part in preparation of the Will<\/p>\n<p>15. \tMr. Arun Jaitley and Mr. R.F. Nariman, learned senior counsel<br \/>\nappearing on behalf of the appellants, in support of the appeal, submitted:\n<\/p>\n<p>(i)\tThe High Court committed a serious error in passing the impugned<br \/>\njudgment insofar as it failed to take into consideration that the<br \/>\ntestatrix had divided her properties equally amongst her four<br \/>\ndaughters as also her grand children and, therefore, there did not<br \/>\nexist any circumstance to suspect the genuineness of the Will.\n<\/p>\n<p>(ii)\tThe High Court committed a serious factual error insofar as it<br \/>\nproceeded on the premise that Part B assets were divided only<br \/>\namongst three grand children; whereas in fact fourth grand child<br \/>\nVijayendra Ghatge was also a beneficiary under the Will.\n<\/p>\n<p>(iii)\tAppendices were annexed with the Will for the purpose of<br \/>\nbringing out clarities in regard to the division of the properties.\n<\/p>\n<p>(iv)\tMedical certificates were annexed to the Will go to show that the<br \/>\ntestatrix had a sound disposing mind, and, thus, the burden of proof<br \/>\nwas on the caveators to prove contra.\n<\/p>\n<p>(v)\tThe High Court committed a serious error insofar as it failed to<br \/>\ntake into consideration the effect and purport of Sections 64, 87<br \/>\nand 103 of the Indian Succession Act (for short &#8220;the Act&#8221;).\n<\/p>\n<p>16. \tMr. S.B. Upadhyay, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the<br \/>\nrespondents, on the other hand, urged:\n<\/p>\n<p>(i)\tThe Will dated 4.11.1992 was surrounded by suspicious<br \/>\ncircumstances as one of the executors was husband of one of the<br \/>\ngrand children and son-in-law of one of the daughters, whose<br \/>\nfamily in turn was the beneficiary of the maximum number of<br \/>\nproperties, viz., 27 out of 35 items.\n<\/p>\n<p>(ii)\tIn view of a clear finding of fact arrived at by the High Court that<br \/>\nthe appellant Anil Kak had not only taken away the Will, he had<br \/>\nalso not disclose thereabout to the near relatives for a long time, is<br \/>\nalso a pointer to show that the execution of the Will by the testatrix<br \/>\nwas doubtful.\n<\/p>\n<p>(iii)\t  Appendices attached to the Will having been brought into<br \/>\nexistence at a later date, the provisions contained in Sections 64,<br \/>\n87 and 103 of the Act will have no application, in the instant case.\n<\/p>\n<p>17. \tTestatrix at the time of execution of the Will was 85 years old.  She<br \/>\nwas owner of substantial properties.\n<\/p>\n<p> 18.\tAlthough all the four daughters of the testatrix were the beneficiaries<br \/>\nof the properties described in Part A of the Will, detailed directions as to<br \/>\nhow the said estate is to be administered had been made therein.  Even in<br \/>\nrelation to the criteria as regards distribution of assets including the manner<br \/>\nin which the tax and other liabilities are to be made and how the investments<br \/>\nwith banks and others are to be encashed, if necessary to be encashed have<br \/>\nbeen stated.  More importantly, however, the shares in the companies were<br \/>\nto be held in the joint names of the testatrix as also the joint executors.  The<br \/>\nexecutors were to hold the same in trust.  Whether the said direction had<br \/>\nbeen carried out and, if so, how and in what manner is not known.<br \/>\nExecutors had also been granted express power to recall and repossess the<br \/>\njewellery, money or money&#8217;s wroth possessed by any beneficiary of the Will<br \/>\nor legatee but ownership of which was not conferred on them for the purpose<br \/>\nof meeting government dues, liabilities or expenses.\n<\/p>\n<p>19. \tWe may at this stage notice a few stipulations made in the said Will<br \/>\ndated 4.11.1992, which are as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;B-4. The Executors will distribute the shares in<br \/>\ncompanies as detailed in Appendix &#8216;B&#8217; together<br \/>\nwith the rights accruing thereto.\n<\/p>\n<p>B-5.\tThe jewellery belonging to me other than<br \/>\ndescribed in Part &#8216;A&#8217; have been divided and<br \/>\nearmarked in different names as per Appendix &#8216;C&#8217;.<br \/>\nI bequeath the items of my jewellery accordingly.<br \/>\nB-6. I bequeath my shares in companies and<br \/>\ndeposit with the Seattle Bank in U.S.A. in favour<br \/>\nof the respective nominees\/ joint-holders as per<br \/>\nAppendix.  All expenses, liabilities, taxes, fees,<br \/>\netc. in realizing and distributing the said assets<br \/>\nshall be borne proportionately by the nominees\/<br \/>\njoint-holders.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>20. \tThe Will was purported to have been executed in presence of one<br \/>\nShanta Kumari Jain, a notary.  Two medical certificates; one issued by Dr.<br \/>\nS.K. Mukherjee and the other by Dr. Normal Sharma, were also annexed<br \/>\nthereto.\n<\/p>\n<p>21. \tIt is not denied or disputed that the appellant Anil Kak took an active<br \/>\npart in the matter of preparation and execution of the Will.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tFor proving the said Will, the appellants examined one of the<br \/>\nexecutors, viz., Kumar Rampratap Singh as PW-1.  He was not aware of the<br \/>\ncontents of the Will.  It was handed over to him on 10.09.1993 by Shri T.N.<br \/>\nUnni (PW-6), Chartered Accountant.  It was in turn handed over to Anil<br \/>\nKak.  The said Will was not executed in his presence.  He was not even<br \/>\naware of the execution thereof.\n<\/p>\n<p>22. \tShanta Kumari Jain, Notary, Geeta Sanghi, one of the attesting<br \/>\nwitnesses and T.N. Unni examined themselves in support of the case of the<br \/>\nappellants.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tAccording to T.N. Unni, he had drafted only pages one to six of the<br \/>\nWill.  The said Will was purported to have been executed at his residence at<br \/>\nIndore.  Geeta Sanghi and Baljeet Bawa were the attesting witnesses.  Baljit<br \/>\nBawa, as noticed hereinbefore, was not examined.  Geeta Sanghi sought to<br \/>\nprove the testatrix&#8217;s signature as also her own signatures on the Will.\n<\/p>\n<p>23. \tIt is beyond any doubt or dispute that none of the attesting witnesses<br \/>\nhad put their signatures on appendices A to C.  Appendices A to C contain<br \/>\nthe list of jewelleries in great details and which jewellery should be given to<br \/>\nwhich grand daughter.  The Wealth Tax assessment for the year 1992-93<br \/>\nwas also annexed by way of a statement showing the market value of the<br \/>\nshares of the companies registered in India.  Another appendix specified that<br \/>\nACC and TISCO shares were to be equally divided amongst four daughters,<br \/>\nviz., as per their average market value on the date of latest Wealth Tax<br \/>\nassessment.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tA statement showing the market value of the shares of the companies<br \/>\nregistered in U.K. as per the wealth tax assessment for the year 1992-93 was<br \/>\nalso annexed.  In regard to the division thereof, it is stated that &#8220;each<br \/>\ncompany&#8217;s share is divided equally amongst my four daughters&#8221;.  Names of<br \/>\nthe daughters had again been mentioned therein.  Statement showing the<br \/>\nvalue of quoted shares as per wealth tax assessment for the year 1992-93 had<br \/>\nalso been appended, the division whereof were to be done in the following<br \/>\nmanner:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The shares in each company will be divided into<br \/>\nsix equal divisions.  My grand children Gangesh<br \/>\nKumari, Jagat Bingley and Ashish Dalvi will get<br \/>\none Division each and my great grand children are<br \/>\nbequeathed three remaining shares as follows<br \/>\nChildren of Gangesh Kumari get one division,<br \/>\nChildren of Jagat Bingley get one division,<br \/>\nchildren of Vijayendra Ghatge get one division.  In<br \/>\ncase Ashish Dalvi is married and has children<br \/>\nbefore my demise, the shares in each company will<br \/>\nbe divided into seven equal divisions and<br \/>\ndistribution remains the same with the additional<br \/>\ndivision going to the children of Ashish Dalvi.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>24. \tIt also contained bequeaths of jewellery from the personal list of the<br \/>\ntestatrix as valued on 31st March, 1992 done by M\/s. J.R.M. Bhandari.  It<br \/>\nagain contained the statement showing the value of quoted shares in respect<br \/>\nof certain companies and the mode and manner in which division thereof<br \/>\nshould be carried out.\n<\/p>\n<p>25. \tIt has furthermore been admitted that those appendices did not see the<br \/>\nlight of the day when the Will was executed by the testatrix and attested and<br \/>\nnotarised.\n<\/p>\n<p>26. \tIt has furthermore not been disputed that whereas Gangesh Kumari,<br \/>\nJagat Bingley and Ashish Dalvi are children of Sumitra Raje Dalvi, the only<br \/>\nother grand child of testatrix Vijayender Ghatge is son of Sita Raje Ghatge.<br \/>\nFrom the list containing the details of the jewellery, it appears that Vijendera<br \/>\nGhatge and family had been given one semi rectangle clip set with diamond<br \/>\nand ruby cabochon and two buttons studded with diamonds and pearls set in<br \/>\ngold.  Umika Ghatge  had also been given one square diamond ring and one<br \/>\nbracelet watch set with diamonds ruby and emerald.\n<\/p>\n<p>\t It furthermore appears that Arjun Kak is also a beneficiary under the<br \/>\nWill.\n<\/p>\n<p>27.  \tThe High Court made a distinction between the documents which are<br \/>\nmere appendices to an otherwise complete Will and those which are part and<br \/>\nparcel of the Will forming its integral part.\n<\/p>\n<p>28. \tFrom what has been noticed hereinbefore it is clearly evident that<br \/>\ndivision has not been made per stripe or per capita but by species.  Each one<br \/>\nof the jewelleries which was to be bequeathed to each of the beneficiary<br \/>\nthereunder had specifically been specified.  Moreover, from the valuation<br \/>\nreport, it would appear that the respective distribution purported to have<br \/>\nbeen made in terms of the appendices would not make them of equal value<br \/>\nor nearabout which was the desire of the testatrix.\n<\/p>\n<p>29. \tWe may now notice the provisions of Sections 64, 87 and 103 of the<br \/>\nAct whereupon strong reliance has been placed by the learned counsel<br \/>\nappearing for the appellants.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tSection 64 of the Act reads as under:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;64. Incorporation of papers by reference  if a<br \/>\ntestator, in a will or codicil duly attested, refers to<br \/>\nany other document then actually written as<br \/>\nexpressing any part of his intentions, such<br \/>\ndocument shall be deemed to form a part of the<br \/>\nwill or codicil in which it is referred to.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>30. \tThe rule of incorporation by reference is well-known.  One document<br \/>\nis incorporated by reference in another when it is referred to, as if it would<br \/>\nform an integral part thereof.  [<a href=\"\/doc\/613978\/\">See Sarabjit Rick Singh v. Union of India<\/a><br \/>\n2007 (14) SCALE 263]<\/p>\n<p>31. \tPrinciple of incorporation by reference was evolved so as to avoid<br \/>\nunnecessary repetition of the same documents again and again in different<br \/>\nparts of the original document.  For invoking the said principle, a document<br \/>\nmust be in existence.  It cannot be brought into existence later on.  The<br \/>\nexecutor of a document must know what the other document which he<br \/>\nintends to incorporate in the Will contains.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tThis aspect of the matter has been considered by the House of Lords<br \/>\nin William Henry Singleton v. Thomas Tomlinson and others [1878 (3) AC<br \/>\n404], wherein it was held:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;The question which arose in the Court below was<br \/>\nwhether in construing the will and in determining<br \/>\nwhat the meaning of the testator was, this schedule<br \/>\ncould be looked at; and, my Lords, on that point it<br \/>\nwill be quite sufficient if I refer to the two<br \/>\npropositions which were laid down, and which<br \/>\nindeed were not challenged by any of the counsel<br \/>\nat your Lordships&#8217; Bar.  It was said that there are<br \/>\ncertain cases in which, although a document is not<br \/>\nadmitted to probate, still it may be referred to in a<br \/>\nwill in such a way as that you are entitled to look<br \/>\nat the document, because it is virtually<br \/>\nincorporated in that which is admitted to probate;<br \/>\nand the two propositions which were laid down as<br \/>\nthe tests of the case in which a document under<br \/>\nthose circumstances could be looked at were these:<br \/>\nfirst, that it must be clearly identified by the<br \/>\ndescription given of it in the will; and secondly,<br \/>\nthat it must be shown to have been in existence at<br \/>\nthe time when the will was executed.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p> \t[See also Theobald on Wills, Sixteenth Edition, pages 59-61]<\/p>\n<p>\tIn Halsbury&#8217;s Laws of England, Fourth Edition, Paragraph 817 at<br \/>\npages 433-34, it is stated:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Incorporation of documents: In certain cases<br \/>\ndocuments referred to in a testator&#8217;s will or codicil,<br \/>\nthough not themselves duly executed, may be<br \/>\nincorporated in the will and included in the<br \/>\nprobate[ Re Mardon [1944] P 109 at 112, [1944] 2<br \/>\nAll ER 397 at 399.] Such a document must be<br \/>\nstrictly identified with the description contained in<br \/>\nthe will; but extrinsic evidence is admissible for<br \/>\nthe purpose of identification [See for instance,<br \/>\nAllen v. Maddock (1858) I I Moo PCC 427; Re<br \/>\nAlmosnino (1859) I SW &amp; TR 508]. The reference<br \/>\nmust be to a document as an existing document [<br \/>\nRe Mordon ] and not to one which is to come into<br \/>\nexistence at a future date[Re Sunderland (1866)<br \/>\nLR I P &amp; D 198; Re Reid (1868) 38 LJP &amp; M I;\n<\/p>\n<p>Durham v. Northen [1895] P 66; Re Smart [1902]<br \/>\nP 238. Certainty and identification is the very<br \/>\nessence of incorporation: Croker v. Marquess of<br \/>\nHertford (1844) 4 Moo PCC 339 at 366, per Dr.<br \/>\nLushington.] The onus of proving the identity of<br \/>\nthe document and its existence at the date of the<br \/>\nwill lies upon the party seeking to establish it<br \/>\n[Singleton v. Tomlinson], but the court will draw<br \/>\ninferences from the circumstances surrounding the<br \/>\nexecution of the will.\n<\/p>\n<p>If the will prima facie refers to the document as an<br \/>\nexisting document, then, even though it appears<br \/>\nfrom the surrounding circumstances, namely the<br \/>\ndate of the signing of the document, that it was not<br \/>\nin existence at the date when the will was<br \/>\noriginally executed, the document may<br \/>\nnevertheless be admitted to probate, since the will<br \/>\nis treated as speaking from the date of its re-<br \/>\nexecution by the codicil; but if the will, treated as<br \/>\nspeaking at the date of the codicil, still in terms<br \/>\nrefers to a future document, the document cannot<br \/>\nbe admitted to probate even though it was in<br \/>\nexistence at the date of the codicil.\n<\/p>\n<p>[ Re Smart [1902] P 238].&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>32. \tSection 87 of the Act provides that testator&#8217;s intention to be<br \/>\neffectuated as far as possible, stating:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;87. Testator&#8217;s intention to be effectuated as far as<br \/>\npossible. The intention of the testator shall not<br \/>\nbe set aside because it cannot take effect to the full<br \/>\nextent, but effect is to be given to it as far as<br \/>\npossible.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>33. \tIn a case of this nature, however, in our opinion, Section 87 of the Act<br \/>\nwill have no application.\n<\/p>\n<p>34. \tIf the appendices formed an integral part of the Will and in their<br \/>\nabsence the Will was not complete, then the intention of the testator cannot<br \/>\nbe effectuated.  A distinction must be made between an incomplete Will and<br \/>\na complete Will although intention of the testator cannot be effectuated.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe testator&#8217;s intention is collected from a consideration of the whole<br \/>\nWill and not from a part of it.  If two parts of the same Will are wholly<br \/>\nirreconcilable, the court of law would not be in a position to come to a<br \/>\nfinding that the Will dated 4.11.1992 could be given effect to irrespective of<br \/>\nthe appendices.  In construing a Will, no doubt all possible contingencies are<br \/>\nrequired to be taken into consideration.  Even if a part is invalid, the entire<br \/>\ndocument need not be invalidated, only if it forms a severable part. [<a href=\"\/doc\/2425\/\">See<br \/>\nBajrang Factory Ltd. and Another v. University of Calcutta and Others<\/a><br \/>\n(2007) 7 SCC 183]<\/p>\n<p>\tIn Halsbury&#8217;s Laws of England, Fourth edition, Volume 50, page 332-<br \/>\n33, it is stated:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;462. Leading principle of construction: The<br \/>\nleading principle of construction which is<br \/>\napplicable to all wills without qualification and<br \/>\noverrides every other rule of construction is that<br \/>\nthe testator&#8217;s intention is collected from a<br \/>\nconsideration of the whole will taken in connection<br \/>\nwith any evidence properly admissible, and the<br \/>\nmeaning of the will and of every part of it is<br \/>\ndetermined according to that intention.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p> \tIn P. Manavala Chetty and five Ors. v. P. Ramanujam Chetty and Anr.<br \/>\n[(1971)1MLJ127] , a single judge of the Madras High Court on the duty of<br \/>\nthe court of construction to give  intention to the wishes of the testator<br \/>\nopined:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;It is the obvious duty of the Court to ascertain and<br \/>\ngive effect to the true intentions of the testator and<br \/>\nalso avoid any construction of the will which will<br \/>\ndefeat or frustrate or bring about a situation which<br \/>\nis directly contrary to the intentions of the testator.<br \/>\nAt the same time, it must be borne in mind that<br \/>\nthere are obvious limits to this doctrine that the<br \/>\nCourt should try to ascertain and give effect to the<br \/>\nintentions of the testator. The law requires a will to<br \/>\nbe in writing and it cannot, consistently with this<br \/>\ndoctrine, permit parol evidence or evidence of<br \/>\ncollateral circumstances to be adduced to<br \/>\ncontradict or add to or vary the contents of such a<br \/>\nwill. No evidence, however powerful it may be,<br \/>\ncan be given in a Court of construction in order to<br \/>\ncomplete an incomplete will, or project back a<br \/>\nvalid will, if the terms and conditions of the<br \/>\nwritten will are useless and in-effective to amount<br \/>\nto a valid bequest, or to prove any intention or<br \/>\nwish of the testator not found in the will. The<br \/>\ntestator&#8217;s declarations or evidence of collateral<br \/>\ncircumstances cannot control the operation of the<br \/>\nclear provisions of the will. The provisions of the<br \/>\nIndian Succession Act referred to earlier indicate<br \/>\nthe limits of the Court&#8217;s power to take note of the<br \/>\ntestator&#8217;s declarations and the surroundings<br \/>\ncircumstances, i.e., evidence of collateral<br \/>\ncircumstances.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                [Emphasis Supplied]<\/p>\n<p> \tAs regards two inconsistent wills, with the latter being an incomplete<br \/>\none, the judgment of Bagnall, Re [[1948] W.N. 324] necessitates one<br \/>\ndiscussions. In the said case, the testatrix had made two wills, one in 1936<br \/>\nand the other in 1943. In the first will, she gave certain legacies and disposed<br \/>\nof the residue. In the second will, she provided legacies of the same amounts<br \/>\nand in favour of the same persons but did not dispose of the residue. The<br \/>\nsecond will was not described as a codicil to the first, nor did it expressly<br \/>\nrevoke it, but it was manifestly incomplete, ended without any stop and in<br \/>\nthe middle of a sentence and was signed by the testator at the bottom of the<br \/>\npage leaving a large gap between the last words and the signature. Probate<br \/>\nwas granted of both wills.  It was held:\n<\/p>\n<p>(i)\tThough the second will was far removed in date from the first and<br \/>\nwas not called the &#8220;last will&#8221;, it was intended, at any rate so far as<br \/>\nit went, to take the place of the first will, and, therefore, the<br \/>\nlegacies given by the second will were in substitution so far as they<br \/>\nwent for those in the first;\n<\/p>\n<p>(ii)\t An examination of the two documents, did not support the<br \/>\nconclusion that the intention of the testatrix, when she executed the<br \/>\nsecond will, was entirely to supersede the earlier instrument, and,<br \/>\nconsequently, the first will effectively disposed of the residue, and<br \/>\none legacy given in the first will but not repeated in the second will<br \/>\nwas not revoked by the latter.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tIn the judgment, the case of Kidd v. North [ 16 L.J. Ch. at p. 117] was<br \/>\nreferred to. There, an incomplete testamentary paper containing a legacy of<br \/>\n500 Pounds in favour of one Bridgett Bibby was admitted to probate with a<br \/>\nwill and three codicils of prior date and the question was whether this legacy<br \/>\nwas in substitution for a larger sum given by the first codicil. Lord<br \/>\nChancellor, held, thus:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;When the testamentary papers of which probate is<br \/>\ngranted appear to give several legacies to the same<br \/>\npersons, it is often extremely difficult to ascertain<br \/>\nwhat was the real intention of the testator,; and to<br \/>\nattain that object as far as possible certain rules<br \/>\nhave  been laid down and nice distinctions taken;<br \/>\nbut such rules and distinctions are applicable only<br \/>\nto cases in which there is no internal evidence of<br \/>\nintention; for where there that is to be found; it<br \/>\nmust prevail. Such is the present case; for I<br \/>\nconceive it to be clear that the last testamentary<br \/>\npaper was intended to be in substitution for all the<br \/>\nothers, and to supersede the provisions contained<br \/>\nin them. It is indeed incomplete; but the<br \/>\necclesiastical court having granted probate of it, no<br \/>\nquestion can be made as to its being testamentary<br \/>\nand operative as such so far as it goes. It is<br \/>\nreasonable to give such effect to the incomplete<br \/>\ninstrument, if it contains within itself evidence of<br \/>\nan intention to make an entirely new disposition;<br \/>\nand for that purpose to undo all that had been done<br \/>\nbefore; but if the new disposition applies only to<br \/>\npart of the subject matter, the instrument being<br \/>\nupon the face of it incomplete, and not applying to<br \/>\nother parts, it is consistent with the principle  to<br \/>\ngive effect to this intention, so far as it is<br \/>\nexpressed, but to consider the first disposition as<br \/>\noperative, so far as no substituted disposition is<br \/>\nprovided in its place.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>35. \tBut, the aforementioned principle cannot be applied in the instant case<br \/>\ninasmuch as appendices appended to the Will clearly specify as to how and<br \/>\nin what manner the intention of the testatrix to divide her properties equally<br \/>\namongst her daughters and\/ or her grand children was to be implemented.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tIt is not a case where a general division was to be made leaving the<br \/>\nmanner of application to the executors.  The Will refers to appendices.  Once<br \/>\nit refers to the appendices indicating that the distribution shall be in terms<br \/>\nthereof, it is difficult to comprehend as to how without the same, the Will<br \/>\ncan be said to be a complete one so as to effectuate the intention of the<br \/>\ntestator.  The intention of the testator in other words must be found out from<br \/>\nthe entire Will.  It has to be read as a whole.  An endeavour should be made<br \/>\nto give effect to each part of it.  Only when one part cannot be given effect<br \/>\nto, having regard to another part, the doctrine of purposive construction as<br \/>\nalso the general principles of construction of deed may be given effect to.  In<br \/>\nthe instant case, the document is one.  It is inseparable.  Whereas the<br \/>\nprincipal document provides for the broad division, the principles of division<br \/>\nlaid down therein would be followed if the appendices are to be taken<br \/>\nrecourse to.  If the principles of equality as has been suggested by the<br \/>\nlearned counsel is to be given effect to, it was expected that the testatrix<br \/>\nintended to confer the same benefit or the benefit having same value or<br \/>\nnearabout to be conferred on each of the legatees.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tIn effect and substance, the purported directions contained in the<br \/>\nappendices which did not see the light of the day on the date of execution of<br \/>\nthe Will, make the application of the directions of the testatrix wholly<br \/>\nimpossible to be carried out.  It is in that sense the provisions of Section 87<br \/>\nof the Act are applicable.\n<\/p>\n<p>36.\tThe High Court has assigned good and cogent reasons in support of its<br \/>\njudgment for not accepting the evidence of Mr. Unni.  Mr. Unni admitted<br \/>\nthat the appendices were to be brought by Anil Kak.  If the same had not<br \/>\nbeen brought to her on the day the Will was executed, we wonder how the<br \/>\ntestatrix had knowledge thereabout.  It now almost stands admitted that the<br \/>\nappendices did not form part of the Will at the time of its purported<br \/>\nexecution.  If the Will was incomplete the question of its proving the<br \/>\nexecution does not arise.  An integral part of the document for the purpose of<br \/>\nsatisfying the tests laid down under Section 63(1)(c) of the Act and Section<br \/>\n68 of the Evidence Act must mean a complete document.\n<\/p>\n<p>37. \tIn &#8220;Jarman on Wills&#8221;, Volume 1, Eight Edition (Sweet &amp; Maxwell) at<br \/>\nPages 145-46 on Incomplete Wills, it is stated:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;XII.- Incomplete Wills: Cases sometimes<br \/>\noccurred under the old law, and may possibly arise<br \/>\nunder the present, in which something more than<br \/>\nmere compliance with legal requirements was<br \/>\nmade necessary to the efficacy of the will by the<br \/>\ntestator himself, he having chose to prescribe to<br \/>\nhimself a special mode of execution; for in such<br \/>\ncase, if the testator afterwards neglects to comply<br \/>\nwith the prescribed formalities, the inference to be<br \/>\ndrawn from these circumstances is, that he had not<br \/>\nfully and definitely resolved on adopting the paper<br \/>\nas his will [ Accordingly, under the old law, which<br \/>\ndid not require wills of personalty to be<br \/>\nauthenticated by the testator&#8217;s signature or by<br \/>\nattestation, the Prerogative court in several<br \/>\ninstances refused to probate of wills, concluding<br \/>\nwith the words &#8220;In Witness&#8221;, etc , but not signed:<br \/>\nAbbot v. Peters, 4 Hagg. 380. Questions as to the<br \/>\ntestamentary validity of incomplete papers rarely<br \/>\noccur in practice, now that authentication of<br \/>\nsignature and attestation are essential to such<br \/>\nvalidity.] The presumption is slight where the<br \/>\ninstrument is duly signed and attested, and perfect<br \/>\nin all other respects, but must apparently be<br \/>\nrebutted by some evidence before it can be<br \/>\nadmitted to probate.[ Per Sir J. Nicholl in Beaty v.<br \/>\nBeaty. See also 1 Wms. Exors., Pt. 1., Bk. II , Ch.<br \/>\nII, s.2.].\n<\/p>\n<p>But this doctrine in favour of imperfect papers<br \/>\nobtains only where the defect is in regard to some<br \/>\nformal act, which the testator has prescribed as<br \/>\nnecessary for the authentication of his will, and not<br \/>\nwhere it applies to  the contents of the instrument;<br \/>\nfor, if in its actual state the paper contains only a<br \/>\npartial disclosure if the testamentary scheme of the<br \/>\ndeceased, it necessarily fails of effect, even though<br \/>\nits completion was prevented by circumstances<br \/>\nbeyond his control [ Montefiore v. Montefiore, 23<br \/>\nAd. 354; see also Griffin v. Griffin, 4 Ves. 197, n.<br \/>\nThis case afforded two sufficient grounds for the<br \/>\nrejection of the paper; first, that it was not the<br \/>\nwhole will; and secondly, that its completion was<br \/>\nnot prevented by inevitable circumstances].\n<\/p>\n<p>In short, the presumption is always against a paper<br \/>\nwhich bears self-evident marks of being<br \/>\nunfinished; and it behoves those who assert its<br \/>\ntestamentary character distinctly to show, either<br \/>\nthat the deceased intended the paper in its actual<br \/>\ncondition to operate as his will, or that he was<br \/>\nprevented by involuntary accident from<br \/>\ncompleting it [Reay v. Cowcher, 1 hagg. 75, 2 ib.<br \/>\n249; Wood v. medley, 1 ib. 661; In b. Robinson,<br \/>\nib. 643; Bragge v. Dyer, 3 hag. 207; Gillow v.<br \/>\nBourne, 4 Hagg. 192. And to the contrary<br \/>\npresumption in favour of a regularly executed and<br \/>\napparently completed will, vide Shadbolt v. Wagh.<br \/>\n570; Blewitt v. Blewitt, 4 Hagg. 410.]&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p> \t To the same effect is Alexander on &#8220;Commentaries on Wills&#8221; Vol. I,<br \/>\nExceution at page 193-94 which states:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;prior to the Statute of Wills of 1 Vict., ch. 26, and<br \/>\nthe American statutes, which require the same<br \/>\nformalities in the execution and attestation of wills<br \/>\nof personalty as in devises of realty, the courts<br \/>\nallowed imperfectly executed testamentary<br \/>\nwritings to take effect as nuncupative dispositions<br \/>\nof personalty, where it appeared that the testators<br \/>\nintended them to operate in  the form in which they<br \/>\nwere found, and that the failure to completely<br \/>\nexecute them arose for some reason other than a<br \/>\npurpose to abandon.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p> \tIt was further stated:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;But the courts always viewed such instruments<br \/>\nwith suspicion and, in proportion to the<br \/>\nincompleteness of the document, demanded a<br \/>\nhigher degree of evidenceBut the more modern<br \/>\nday doctrine is that a nuncupative will can be made<br \/>\nonly by spoken words or by signs and that, if the<br \/>\nwords be reduced to writing by the testator or by<br \/>\nsomeone else at his request, they lose their<br \/>\nnuncupative character.  And it seems that under the<br \/>\nmodern statutes and rulings, even verbal<br \/>\ninstructions for drawing up a written will, although<br \/>\nspoken in the presence of the proper number of<br \/>\nwitnesses, can not be admitted to probate as a<br \/>\nnuncupative will.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>38. \tSection 103 of the Act speaks of a residuary bequest but the same<br \/>\nevidently has no application in this case.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tThe execution of the Will becomes impossible both in respect of the<br \/>\nproperties described in Part A and Part B.\n<\/p>\n<p>39.\tFurthermore, the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tThe execution of a Will does not only mean proving of the signatures<br \/>\nof the executors and the attesting witnesses.  It means something more.  A<br \/>\nWill is not an ordinary document.  It although requires to be proved like any<br \/>\nother documents but the statutory conditions imposed by reason of Section<br \/>\n63(c) of the Act and Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act cannot be<br \/>\nignored.\n<\/p>\n<p> \t<a href=\"\/doc\/1613023\/\">In B. Venkatamuni v. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh &amp; Ors.<\/a> [2006 (11)<br \/>\nSCALE 148], this Court held:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;It is, however, well settled that compliance of<br \/>\nstatutory requirements itself is not sufficient as<br \/>\nwould appear from the discussions hereinafter<br \/>\nmade.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p> \tIt was observed:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Yet again Section 68 of the Indian Evidence Act<br \/>\npostulates the mode and manner in which proof of<br \/>\nexecution of document which is required by law to<br \/>\nbe attested stating that the execution must be<br \/>\nproved by at least one attesting witness, if an<br \/>\nattesting witness is alive and subject to the process<br \/>\nof the Court and capable of giving evidence.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p> \tYet again in <a href=\"\/doc\/870840\/\">Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi v. Mrudula Jyoti Rao &amp;<br \/>\nOrs.<\/a> [2006 (14) SCALE 186], this Court held:<br \/>\n&#8220;Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act<br \/>\nlays down the mode and manner of execution of an<br \/>\nunprivileged Will.  Section 68 of the Indian<br \/>\nEvidence Act postulates the mode and manner of<br \/>\nexecution of document which is required by law to<br \/>\nbe attested.  It in unequivocal terms states that<br \/>\nexecution of Will must be proved at least by one<br \/>\nattesting witness, if an attesting witness is alive<br \/>\nsubject to the process of the court and capable of<br \/>\ngiving evidence.  A Will is to prove what is<br \/>\nloosely called as primary evidence, except where<br \/>\nproof is permitted by leading secondary evidence.<br \/>\nUnlike other documents, proof of execution of any<br \/>\nother document  under the Act would not be<br \/>\nsufficient as in terms of Section 68 of the Indian<br \/>\nEvidence Act, execution must be proved at least by<br \/>\none of the attesting witnesses.  While making<br \/>\nattestation, there must be an animus attestandi, on<br \/>\nthe part of the attesting witness, meaning thereby,<br \/>\nhe must intend to attest and extrinsic evidence on<br \/>\nthis point is receivable.\n<\/p>\n<p>The burden of proof that the Will has been validly<br \/>\nexecuted and is a genuine document is on the<br \/>\npropounder.  The propounder is also required to<br \/>\nprove that the testator has signed the Will and that<br \/>\nhe had put his signature out of his own free will<br \/>\nhaving a sound disposition of mind and understood<br \/>\nthe nature and effect thereof.  If sufficient evidence<br \/>\nin this behalf is brought on record, the onus of the<br \/>\npropounder may be held to have been discharged.<br \/>\nBut, the onus would be on the applicant to remove<br \/>\nthe suspicion by leading sufficient and cogent<br \/>\nevidence if there exists any.  In the case of proof of<br \/>\nWill, a signature of a testator alone would not<br \/>\nprove the execution thereof, if his mind may<br \/>\nappear to be very feeble and debilitated.  However,<br \/>\nif a defence of fraud, coercion or undue influence<br \/>\nis raised, the burden would be on the caveator.<br \/>\n[<a href=\"\/doc\/428148\/\">See Madhukar D. Shende v. Tarabai Shedage<\/a><br \/>\n(2002) 2 SCC 85 and <a href=\"\/doc\/747481\/\">Sridevi &amp; Ors. v. Jayaraja<br \/>\nShetty &amp; Ors.<\/a> (2005) 8 SCC 784]. Subject to<br \/>\nabove, proof of a Will does not ordinarily differ<br \/>\nfrom that of proving any other document.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\t[See also <a href=\"\/doc\/666927\/\">Adivekka and Others v. Hanamavva Kom Venkatesh (Dead)<br \/>\nBy LRs. and Another<\/a> (2007) 7 SCC 91]<\/p>\n<p>40. \tWhereas execution of any other document can be proved by proving<br \/>\nthe writings of the document or the contents of it as also the execution<br \/>\nthereof, in the event there exists suspicious circumstances the party seeking<br \/>\nto obtain probate and\/ or letters of administration with a copy of the Will<br \/>\nannexed must also adduce evidence to the satisfaction of the court before it<br \/>\ncan be accepted as genuine.\n<\/p>\n<p>41. \tAs an order granting probate is a judgment in rem, the court must also<br \/>\nsatisfy its conscience before it passes an order.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tIt may be true that deprivation of a due share by the natural heir by<br \/>\nitself may not be held to be a suspicious circumstance but it is one of the<br \/>\nfactors which is taken into consideration by the courts before granting<br \/>\nprobate of a Will.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tUnlike other documents, even animus attestandi is a necessary<br \/>\ningredient for proving the attestation.\n<\/p>\n<p> \t<a href=\"\/doc\/799228\/\">In Benga Behera &amp; Anr. v. Braja Kishore Nanda &amp; Ors.<\/a> [2007 (7)<br \/>\nSCALE 228], this Court held:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;46.\tExistence of suspicious circumstances itself<br \/>\nmay be held to be sufficient to arrive at a<br \/>\nconclusion that execution of the Will has not duly<br \/>\nbeen proved.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p> \t<a href=\"\/doc\/1613023\/\">In B. Venkatamuni v. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh &amp; Ors.<\/a> [2006 (11)<br \/>\nSCALE 148], it was stated:\n<\/p>\n<p> &#8220;However, having regard to the fact that the Will<br \/>\nwas registered one and the propounder had<br \/>\ndischarged the onus, it was held that in such<br \/>\ncircumstances, the onus shifts to the contestant<br \/>\nopposing the Will to bring material on record<br \/>\nmeeting such prima facie case in which event the<br \/>\nonus shifts back on the propounder to satisfy the<br \/>\ncourt affirmatively that the testator did not know<br \/>\nwell the contents of the Will and in sound<br \/>\ndisposing capacity executed the same.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tEach case, however, must be determined in<br \/>\nthe fact situation obtaining therein.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe Division Bench of the High Court was,<br \/>\nwith respect, thus, entirely wrong in proceeding on<br \/>\nthe premise that compliance of legal formalities as<br \/>\nregards proof of the Will would sub-serve the<br \/>\npurpose and the suspicious circumstances<br \/>\nsurrounding the execution thereof is not of much<br \/>\nsignificance.\n<\/p>\n<p>\tThe suspicious circumstances pointed out by<br \/>\nthe learned District Judge and the learned Single<br \/>\nJudge of the High Court, were glaring on the face<br \/>\nof the records.  They could not have been ignored<br \/>\nby the Division Bench and in any event, the<br \/>\nDivision Bench should have been slow in<br \/>\ninterfering with the findings of fact arrived at by<br \/>\nthe said court.  It applied a wrong legal test and<br \/>\nthus, came to an erroneous decision.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p> \tYet again in <a href=\"\/doc\/1626809\/\">Savithri &amp; Ors. v. Karthyayani Amma &amp; Ors.<\/a> [JT 2007<br \/>\n(12) SC 248], this Court held:\n<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;18.\tWe do not find in the fact situation obtaining<br \/>\nherein that any such suspicious circumstance was<br \/>\nexisting.  We are not unmindful of the fact that the<br \/>\ncourt must satisfy its conscience before its<br \/>\ngenuineness is accepted.  But what is necessary<br \/>\ntherefor, is a rational approach.\n<\/p>\n<p>19.\tDeprivation of a due share by the natural<br \/>\nheirs itself is not a factor which would lead to the<br \/>\nconclusion that there exist suspicious<br \/>\ncircumstances.   For the said purpose, as noticed<br \/>\nhereinbefore, the background facts should also be<br \/>\ntaken into consideration.  The son was not meeting<br \/>\nhis father.  He had not been attending to him.  He<br \/>\nwas not even meeting the expenses for his<br \/>\ntreatment from  1959, when he lost his job till his<br \/>\ndeath in 1978.  The testator was living with his<br \/>\nsister and her children.  If in that situation, if he<br \/>\nexecuted a Will in their favour, no exception<br \/>\nthereto can be taken.  Even then, something was<br \/>\nleft for the appellant.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>42. \tThe court is, thus, required to adopt a rational approach in a situation<br \/>\nof this nature.  Once the court is required to satisfy its conscience, existence<br \/>\nof suspicious circumstances play a prominent role.  The Will, as noticed<br \/>\nhereinbefore, is in two parts.  Whereas the first part deals with the property<br \/>\nbelonging to the husband of the testatrix, the second part deals with the<br \/>\nproperties which purportedly belongs to her.  Distribution of assets,<br \/>\nhowever, was not specifically stated in the Will.  They were to be made as<br \/>\nper the appendices annexed thereto.  The appendices which were required to<br \/>\nbe read as a part of the main Will so as to effectuate the intention of the<br \/>\ntestatrix have not been proved.  The Will by its own cannot be given effect<br \/>\nto.  The Will must be read along with the appendices.  No doubt in<br \/>\nconstruing a Will arm chair rule is to be adopted.  The Will was, therefore,<br \/>\nnot complete.  It is not correct to contend that the appendices were very<br \/>\nmuch in existence at the time when the Will was executed.  Existence of a<br \/>\ndocument must mean the actual existence.\n<\/p>\n<p> \tWe are, therefore, of the opinion that no case has been made out for<br \/>\ninterference with the impugned judgment.\n<\/p>\n<p>43.\tFor the reasons aforementioned, the appeals are dismissed with costs.<br \/>\nCounsel&#8217;s fee assessed at Rs. 50,000\/-.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India Anil Kak vs Kumari Sharada Raje &amp; Ors on 24 April, 2008 Author: S.B. Sinha Bench: S.B. Sinha, V.S. Sirpurkar CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2965 of 2008 PETITIONER: Anil Kak RESPONDENT: Kumari Sharada Raje &amp; Ors DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24\/04\/2008 BENCH: S.B. Sinha &amp; V.S. Sirpurkar JUDGMENT: J U D G [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-194695","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Anil Kak vs Kumari Sharada Raje &amp; Ors on 24 April, 2008 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/anil-kak-vs-kumari-sharada-raje-ors-on-24-april-2008\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Anil Kak vs Kumari Sharada Raje &amp; 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