{"id":195264,"date":"2010-08-17T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-08-16T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vs-union-of-india-on-17-august-2010"},"modified":"2017-12-05T16:03:39","modified_gmt":"2017-12-05T10:33:39","slug":"vs-union-of-india-on-17-august-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vs-union-of-india-on-17-august-2010","title":{"rendered":"====================================== vs Union Of India on 17 August, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"
Gujarat High Court<\/div>\n
====================================== vs Union Of India on 17 August, 2010<\/div>\n
   Gujarat High Court Case Information System \n\n  \n  \n    \n\n \n \n    \t      \n         \n\t    \n\t\t   Print\n\t\t\t\t          \n\n  \n\n\n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t \n\t\n\n\n \n\n\n\t \n\nLPAST\/334\/2004\t 22\/ 24\tORDER \n \n \n\n\t\n\n \n\n\nIN\nTHE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD\n \n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\nLETTERS\nPATENT APPEAL (STAMP) No. 334 of 2004\n \n\n\nIn\n\n\n \n\n\nSPECIAL\nCIVIL APPLICATION No. 8991 of 2002\n \n\n\n======================================\n\n\n \n\n\nS.P\nBHATT \n\n \n\n\nVersus\n \n\n\nSTATE\nOF GUJARAT \n\n \n\n======================================\nPresent: \nShri M.M. Parmar, for the\nappellant.  \nShri A.G. Desai, Assistant Government Pleader for the\nrespondent. \n====================================== \n\n \n\t  \n\t \n\t  \n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nCORAM\n\t\t\t: \n\t\t\t\n\t\t\n\t\t \n\t\t\t \n\nHONOURABLE\n\t\t\t MR.JUSTICE G.S. SINGHVI\n\t\t\n\t\n\n \n\n\t\t\t\n and \n\n \n\n\t\t\t\nHONOURABLE MR.JUSTICE P.B.MAJMUDAR\n \n\n\t\t\t\tDate\n: 07\/09\/2005 \n\n \n\nPer\n: G.S. Singhvi, J.\n \n\n\n\tThis\nappeal is directed against order dated 11.12.2003 vide which the\nlearned Single Judge dismissed  Special Civil Application No. 8991 of\n2002 filed by the appellant for quashing  order dated 22.2.2002\npassed by  Gujarat Civil Services Tribunal [for short 'the Tribunal']\nin Appeal No. 382 of 2000.\n \n\n\n\tThe\nappellant  was appointed as  Clerk on 22.6.1981 in Roads and\nBuildings Department of the Government of Gujarat.  She availed 862\ndays leave without pay with effect from 1.5.1995 by citing different\nreasons.  At one time she gave out that she had conceived after 14\nyears of marriage and, therefore, it was not possible for her to\nattend to the work.  At another time she gave out that she was\nrequired to look after the aged parents-in-law.  On 4.6.1997, the\ndepartment instructed the appellant not to proceed on long leave off\nand on.  She was also told that her request for leave will not be\nentertained in future.  Notwithstanding this, the appellant again\napplied for leave without pay for a period from 1.7.1997 to 31.7.1998\nby citing personal and social reasons.    Her request was turned down\nby the department vide letter dated 7.10.1997 and she was instructed\nto report for duty.  Vide letter dated April 2, 1998, she was\ninstructed to appear before the Medical Board at Ahmedabad for\ncheck-up but she did not comply with the said direction. \nConsequently, a departmental enquiry  was initiated against her under\nthe Gujarat Civil Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1971 (for\nshort 'the Rules') on the charges of remaining absent from duty and\ndisobeying the direction given by the department requiring her to\nappear before the Medical Board.  English translation (supplied by\nthe office of the High Court) of the relevant extract of charges\ncontained in memo dated 21.1.1999 reads as under:\n ?SSmt.  S.P.  Bhatt, a clerk on General Duty, has  remained very much  irregular  regarding  her presence in the office.  She has availed in all  862  days  Leave  Without  Pay  on  different reasons for  the  period  from  01\/05\/95 to 08\/08\/97.  The Road & Building Department has, vide it's Memo No.  RJA-1293\/55\/F  dated 04\/06\/97, instructed Smt.  Bhatt not to proceed on long leave off and on  and also informed Smt.  Bhatt that if it is repeated, her leave will not be granted in future.  Yet Smt.  Bhatt applied for Leave  Without  Pay  for  a  period from 01\/09\/97 to 31\/07\/98 for personal, social reasons and also  for  looking  after  her  aged parents-in-law (father-in-law  & mother-in-law).  It was rejected vide the Department's Letter No.   RJA-1293\/55\/F  dated  07\/10\/97 and Smt.    Bhatt  was instructed to report for duty immediately. Thereafter, again vide Letter No.  RJA-1293\/55\/F dated  12\/11\/97, she was instructed to report for duty within 3 days failing which they  will  have  to  take  actions  against  her  for initiating disciplinary proceedings which may be noted.  The said letter was refused to the Department  as  her  address  is  changed.   Smt. Bhatt,  vide application dated 25\/11\/97, requested to grant Leave Without Pay for a period from dt.  01\/09\/97 to  28\/02\/98  as  she was  sick  and  forwarded a medical certificate of Dr.(Mrs.) D.A.Ratani of Niki Maternity Home.  She was advised to take rest from September '97 to April '98 i.e.  till her delivery  as  mentioned in the  medical  certificate.  In this connection, the Department had, vide it's letter no.  RJA-1298\/55\/F  dated  02\/04\/98,  asked Smt.  Bhatt to appear before the Medical Board, Ahmedabad for her medical  check-up  and  then to forward an opinion of the Medical Board.  In this connection  Smt.    Bhatt  appears  to  have  not followed up.   Moreover, different reasons of leave are mentioned in the applications date 01\/09\/97 and  25\/11\/97  for  the  leaves starting from  one  &  same  date 01\/09\/97.  Therefore, there has arisen a question that  if  Smt.    Bhatt  was  advised  to  have complete bed-rest from September '97 to April '98 as mentioned in the  certificate  of  Dr.(Mrs.)  Ratani,  why  this reason is not mentioned in  the  application  dated  01\/09\/97  ?    Though  she proceeded  on  leave  from  01\/09\/97,  the medical certificate is submitted on dt.  25\/11\/97.  A question has also arisen  that  if she herself is not well,  how  would  she  look  after  her  aged in-laws?  Smt.  Bhatt has, vide her application dated 30\/03\/98, requested to grant her maternity leave  from  dt.    01\/03\/98  to 13\/07\/98.  Smt.   Bhatt  has  stated  in  her  application dated 25\/05\/98 that she had received the letter dated 02\/04\/98 of  Road & Building Department  late.  Smt.  Bhatt has undergone delivery, on 15\/03\/98, by caesarian.  So there is no question of  appearing before the Medical  Board.    Smt.    Bhatt,  vide the letter no. RJA-1298\/55\/F dated  11\/08\/98,  was  asked  to  report  for  duty immediately  failing which her entire absence shall be treated as unauthorised and  disciplinary  proceedings  shall  be  initiated against her for disregarding government instructions which may be noted.  Smt.    Bhatt,  vide  letter  no.    RJA-1298\/55\/F  dated 05\/09\/98, was instructed to report for duty  immediately  failing which  her  entire  absence  shall be treated as unauthorised and disciplinary proceedings  shall  be  initiated  against  her  for disregarding government  instructions  which  may be noted.  Smt. Bhatt, vide  letter  no.  RJA-1298\/55\/F  dated  24\/09\/98, was instructed  to  show cause as to why the disciplinary proceedings should  not  be  initiated  against  her  for  disregarding   the department's letter  no.  RJA-1298\/55\/F dated 11\/08\/98 & 05\/09\/98 and also instructed to report for duty immediately failing  which an  ex-parte  proceedings  shall  be  initiated  against  her  on assuming that she does not want to say anything. However, Smt. Bhatt has neither submitted any explanation nor reported for duty till today.   Thus  Smt.    Bhatt  has committed a breach of Rule 3(1)(3) of Gujarat Civil Services Rules(Conduct) Rules-1971,  for which she is responsible.??\n \n\n\n\tIn\nher reply dated 4.5.1999, the appellant denied the charges by making\nthe following assertions:\n \n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n?S Over\n and  above  Government employee, I, being a social human being,\nperform many other duties.  Over  and above  my personal  duties  and\n responsibilities,  I am absolutely dedicated to the Government\nduties, therefore,  I expect that liberal actions may be taken\nagainst me.\n \n\n\nIn\n fact,  I  have  availed in all 862 days Leave Without Pay from dt.\n01\/05\/95 to 08\/08\/97 on the  ground of  beyond  control  social &\nfamily responsibilities as well as physical unfitness. I  have\nsubmitted  details thereof  in  writing  as well as made oral\nsubmissions in person to the Government from time to time which shows\nmy   devotion  and  feeling  of  dedication  to  the duties.  \nInspite  of  the  fact  that I have been given particular\ninstructions vide letter dated 04\/06\/97  of  the  Road  &\nBuilding Department,   I,  vide  my  application  dated 01\/09\/97, \nhave requested  to  grant  Leave  Without Pay  because my aged\nin-laws are living with us in  our  large family.   As my\nfather-in-law has retired from the Police Department on\nsuperannuation after enjoying  a  long  and brilliant  career,  the\nresponsibility of maintaining him was shouldered upon me and my\nhusband.  After retirement,  health of both my father-in-law &\nmother-in-law (in-laws)  in my family members, was getting weak day\nby day, so  an additional  responsibility  to  look after them was on\nmy   shoulder.  As my husband has been performing duty as  the \nDeputy  Collector,  G.A.S.,  Class-I,  for administrative  reasons, \nhe  is  transferred  on  liable  posts  in  the different   districts\n of  Gujarat  from  time  to  time.  Therefore, in his absence,\nnaturally my responsibility to  look after  aged  in-laws  was \nfolded  double.   Which  Government can  understand.    The \nGovernment itself has   accepted motto of joint family from time  to \ntime.  In these circumstances, if my case is considered positively,\nthere may not found any irregularity on my behalf.\n \n\n\nI\n have,  vide  an  application  dated  25\/11\/97,  requested  to grant\nLeave Without Pay for the period from dt.  01\/09\/97 to 28\/02\/98 on\nthe reason of my ill-health.  After the application was submitted, as\nI have to undergo further medical check-up and treatment  suddenly \non  the same  day, I have submitted necessary medical certificate  of\nDr.(Mrs.) D.A.  Ratani\/Niki Maternity Home.    As  the  government \nhas  accepted  medical  and  scientific truth        under rules that\nlady  employee  requires  to  have  rest during  the period of\ndelivery, the government too grants maternity leave to each lady\nemployee during her delivery period.    Though   I   have   been \ninformed  vide  this Department's Memo dated 02\/04\/98 to appear\nbefore Medical Board for medical check-up and then to forward an\nopinion of the Medical Board.  In fact, this approach is  inhuman and\nagainst the policy established by the government.  In        this\nconnection, I have made submission to the government        vide my\nletter   dated   25\/05\/98. In  fact,  it  is    comprehensive\nquestion that after delivery  period  which   special  test and\ncheck-up would be there as well as what expert opinion may  the \nMedical  Board  give  after  the   period of delivery, because it is\nan undisputed fact that I have undergone delivery.  Being a lady\nemployees, it is  not  becoming  that  I  state  anything  further \nin this  regards.  Therefore, as an allegation this point  is  not   \n   tenable,  so  it shall be rejected and I heartily request to show\ncourtesy towards me being a woman.\n \n\n\nThere\n has  been raised a question that if I have been advised to take\ncomplete bed-rest from September '97 to April  '98  as  mentioned  in\n the  certificate  dated 01\/09\/97  of  Dr.(Mrs.)  Ratani,  why  this\nreason is not  mentioned in the application dated 01\/09\/97. Regarding\nwhich my detailed, reply is already submitted herewith at  above\npoint no.   5.  Moreover,  this  question is not  logical and\nconsistent.  A question that how would have I  looked  after \npersonally  my   aged   in-laws   in   the       circumstances  when \nI  myself  was  not  well,  is  also        absolutely improper and\nagainst the living  standards  of an  average  Indian  Woman, \nbecause  according to Indian Culture,  in joint family, each member\nof family performs one's  personal  moral  duty  at  the  time  of \nanyone's  ill-health.   It  is  very well known fact of our society \nthat a mother-in-law,  though  not  well  herself,  looks after  her \ndaughter-in-law  pleasantly  on her delivery.   Further discussion,\nin this regards,  is  not  necessary.        Thus, both these\nquestions, arisen by the government vide        above   memo,   are  \nabsolutely   inhuman   and  against        established  living  \nstandards   of   the   family-life.  Therefore, I, neither agree nor\naccept the same.\n \n\n\nThe\n  government  has,  vide  it's  letter  dated 11\/08\/98, instructed me\nto report for duty.   Thereafter,  vide  letter  dated  05\/09\/98,  I\nwas again instructed as  above.   The  government  has  also \ninformed   that   my  explanation  was  asked  for  vide letter dated\n24\/09\/98,though I have not submitted any explanation and thereby I \nhave committed breach of  Rule  3(1)(3)  of  the  Gujarat  State\nServices (Conduct) Rules-1971.\n \n\n\nIn\n fact,  in  view of what is stated above in my explanation, it has\nnot established anywhere that I  have  ever  committed  breach  of \nRule - 3(1)(3) with malafied intention.  Therefore, I do not  become \nresponsible  any  how.   Before this, I have performed my government\nduties  diligently for a long  time.    There  has  never  arisen \ndisputable  or  admonishable incident during tenure of my      \nduties which may  be  seen  from  my  government  record.        Even\nthough,  in the circumstances beyond my control, as I        have to\nperform my social and family  duties  inevitably, as per rules I have\nsubmitted applications with necessary documents to grant leave under\nrules.  Thus, it has never happened  that  I  would have not informed\nthe government about  the  facts  which  shows  my  dedication  to  \nthe government.   Moreover,  there  were  no  reasons for not \ngranting my submission and even if there would  have  any reason, the\ngovernment has not informed me about the same at  the  relevant time,\notherwise it is fact that I would  have reported for my duties facing\n even  beyond  control        circumstances.\n \n\n\nIn\n view  of  my  above explanation, as the above  alleged charges\nagainst me are not established, I am  not liable  for any of the\npunishment prescribed under rule-6 of the Rules - 1971.  Therefore,\nit is requested that the said fact too may be considered.\n \n\n\nAs\n  I  have  not  committed  any  irregularities  deliberately as per\nthe charges  mentioned  made  in  the  government's  letter  dated \n21\/01\/99, I again refuse the  same emphatically and  also  request \nto  file  aforesaid alleged charges against me showing humanity.??\n \n\n\n\tShri\nDhansukhlal Arjunbhai Dhumasia (retired Joint Secretary), who was\nappointed as Enquiry Officer  submitted report dated 1.12.1999 with\nthe finding that the charges levelled against the appellant have been\npartly proved. A copy of the inquiry report was supplied to her, and\nshe was given opportunity to make representation. She submitted\nrepresentations dated 7.1.2000 and 28.2.2000 and reiterated that she\nhad to remain on leave for personal and social reasons   and that she\nnever wanted to defy the orders of the superior officers. The\nDisciplinary Authority did not accept her explanation and dismissed\nher from service vide order dated 20.6.2002.  The English translation\nof that order  shows that after making a mention of the charges\nlevelled against the appellant, the statement of defence submitted by\nher, the report of the Enquiry Officer and submissions made by the\nappellant, the disciplinary authority passed the order of punishment\nwithout assigning any reason whatsoever for not accepting the points\nraised by the appellant.  This is clearly revealed from paragraphs 2\nto 4 of the order of punishment, which are reproduced below:\n \n\n\n?S2)\nIn connection with the  above  chargesheet,  Smt.    S.P. Bhatt has\nsubmitted a statement of defence vide her letter dated 04\/05\/99.   \nAfter   considering   the   same,   for   initiating departmental\ninquiry under  rules,  Mr.    D.A.  Dumasia, Retired Joint \nSecretary,  was  appointed  as  the  Departmental  Inquiry Officer \nvide  this Department's even number order dated 07\/08\/99 and he was \nassigned  further  proceedings  of  the departmental inquiry.\n \n\n\n3)\nThe Departmental Inquiry Officer has submitted an inquiry report vide\n his  letter  dated  01\/12\/99.    Wherein the charges levelled\nagainst Smt.  S.P.  Bhatt  were  proved  partly.    Smt.S.P. Bhatt\nwas forwarded a copy of inquiry report of the Inquiry Officer and as\non informed to make submissions within 15 days, if any, Smt.   S.P.  \n Bhatt  has  made further submissions vide her letter dated\n07\/01\/2000 & 28\/02\/2000.\n 4)\tAfter  careful  consideration  of  the  charges  levelled against Smt.  S.P.  Bhatt, a clerk on general duty,  Smt.    S.P. Bhatt's  say  in  connection with the same, the Inquiry Officer's inquiry report, further submissions by Smt.  S.P.  Bhatt, a clerk on general duty and entire facts, an order is passed \"to dismiss\" Smt.  S.P.  Bhatt with immediate effect under rule  6(8)  of  the Gujarat  Civil  Services(Discipline  & Appeal) Rules-1971 for the irregularities committed by Smt.  S.P.  Bhatt.?? \n\n\n\tThe\nappellant challenged the order of dismissal by filing an appeal\nbefore the Tribunal. She pleaded that the inquiry held against her\nwas vitiated due to violation of rules of natural justice and that\nthe punishment of dismissal from service was  wholly unjustified,\narbitrary and unreasonable. The Tribunal rejected the appellant's\nchallenge to the procedure adopted by the Enquiry Officer and the\nfinding recorded by him but substituted the penalty of dismissal with\nthat of removal from service.  The Tribunal was of the view that even\nthough the appellant  may have remained away from duty because she\nwas pregnant and was expecting a child, there was no justification\nfor disobeying the orders of the superiors.  The Tribunal  held that\nthe appellant had not shown sincerity towards the Government job and\nshe had no business to dictate terms in the matter of her appearance\nbefore the Medical Board.  However, the Tribunal felt that the\npunishment was unreasonable and directed that the order of dismissal\nbe treated as one of removal. Paragraph 23 of the English translation\nof order dated 22.2.2002 passed by the Tribunal, which contains\ndiscussion on this issue reads as under:\n \n\n\n?SBut\nall said and done the last point about penalty being too harsh is\nappealing.  You do not dismiss a person for absence.  The appellant\nis not the chip of deadwood and her serverance from service can be\nachieved by removal, compulsory retirement or discharge or\ntermination.  The Disciplinary Authority ?  respondent has not given\nthought on this point.  She has put in 13 years of service.  If she\napplies for pension and if it is available to her the department or\ngovernment may decide graciously to do so, they may.  With these\nreasons we pass the following order.\n \n\n\n \n\n\n \n\n\n ORDER\n<\/pre>\n
\tThe
\nappeal is partly allowed.  We modify the order that instead of
\ndismissal, she be removed from service.  If she is entitled to  any
\nbenefits she be given the same.??\n<\/p>\n
\tFeeling
\ndis-satisfied with the order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed
\nwrit petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, which
\nwas registered as Special Civil Application No. 8991 of 2002. The
\nlearned Single Judge declined to entertain her plea for invalidation
\nof the Tribunal’s order and  the order of punishment by observing
\nthat the misconduct found proved against her was of a serious nature.
\nThe learned Single Judge felt that the appellant’s absence from
\nservice for a long period of 5 years was detrimental to the
\nadministrative work of the Government, and, therefore, she did not
\ndeserve any sympathy.\n<\/p>\n
\tWe
\nhave heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perused the
\nrecord. The scope of judicial review of the discretion exercised by
\nthe employer in the matter of imposition of penalty on a delinquent
\nemployee is very limited.    The Court cannot  sit in appeal over the
\njudgment of the employer and  nullify the punishment simply because
\nit feels that a lesser punishment would meet the ends of justice or
\nmerely because two views are possible of the nature of misconduct
\nfound proved against the delinquent and the desirability  of imposing
\na particular penalty.  The Court can interfere in such matters only
\nif it is  convinced that the punishment imposed by the employer is
\nshockingly disproportionate or is wholly arbitrary or is one which no
\nreasonable person would have imposed in the circumstances of the
\ncase.  The principle of proportionality which was
\ninvoked by the Supreme Court in  Ranjit Thakore Vs. Union of India
\n(1987) 4 SCC 6611 and some other cases by relying on the decision in
\n Council for Civil Services Union Vs. Minister of Civil
\nServices 1983 1 AC p.76 was
\nextensively considered by the Supreme Court in  Union of
\nIndia Vs. G. Ganayutham
\n(1997) 7 SCC 463 and  Om Kumar Vs. Union of India
\n(2001) 2 SCC 386.  In  Ganayutham’s
\ncase (supra), M. Jagannadha Rao, J. applied the ‘Wednesbury’
\nprinciple and the doctrine of ‘Proportionality’ and laid down the
\nfollowing proposions:\n<\/p>\n
(1)\tTo
\njudge the validity of any administrative order or statutory
\ndiscretion, normally the Wednesbury test is to be applied to find out
\nif the decision was illegal or suffered from procedural improprieties
\nor was one which no sensible decision-maker could, on the material
\nbefore him and within the framework of the law, have arrived at.  The
\ncourt would consider whether relevant matters had not been taken into
\naccount or whether irrelevant matters had been taken into account or
\nwhether the action was not bona fide.  The court would also consider
\nwhether the decision was absurd or perverse.  The court would not
\nhowever go into the correctness of the choice made by the
\nadministrator amongst the various alternatives open to him.  Nor
\ncould the court substitute its decision to that of the administrator.
\n This is the Wednesbury test.\n<\/p>\n
(2)\tThe
\ncourt would not interfere with the administrator’s decision unless it
\nwas illegal or suffered from procedural impropriety or was irrational
\n?  in the sense that it was in outrageous defiance of logic or moral
\nstandards.  The possibility of other tests, including proportionality
\nbeing brought into English administrative law in future is not ruled
\nout.  These are the CCSU principles.\n<\/p>\n
(3)<\/span><\/p>\n
(a)\tAs per Bugdaycay, Brind and Smith as long as the Convention is
\nnot incorporated into English law, the English courts merely exercise
\na secondary judgment to find out if the decision-maker could have, on
\nthe material before him, arrived at the primary judgement in the
\nmanner he has done.\n<\/p>\n
(3)<\/span><\/p>\n
 (b)  If the Convention is incorporated in England making available
\nthe principle of proportionality, then the English courts will render
\nprimary judgment on the validity of the administrative action and
\nfind out if the restriction is disproportionate or excessive or is
\nnot based upon a fair balancing of the fundamental freedom and the
\nneed for the restriction thereupon.\n<\/p>\n
(4)<\/span><\/p>\n
(a)  The position in our country, in administrative law, where no
\nfundamental freedoms as aforesaid are involved, is that the
\ncourts\/tribunals will only play a secondary role while the primary
\njudgment as to reasonableness will remain with the executive or
\nadministrative authority.  The secondary judgment of the court is to
\nbe based on Wednesbury and CCSU principles as stated by Lord Greene
\nand Lord Diplock respectively to find if the executive or
\nadministrative authority has reasonably arrived at his decision as
\nthe primary authority.\n<\/p>\n
(4)(b)
\n  Whether in the case of administrative or executive action affecting
\nfundamental freedoms, the courts in our country will apply the
\nprinciple of ?Sproportionality?? and assume a primary role, is left
\nopen, to be decided in an appropriate case where such action is
\nalleged to offend fundamental freedoms.  It will be then necessary to
\ndecide whether the courts will have a primary role only if the
\nfreedoms under Articles 19, 21 etc. are involved and not for Article\n<\/p>\n
14.??\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n Om Kumar’s case (supra), the Supreme Court considered the
\napplicability of the doctrine of ‘Proportionality’ in the context of
\nArticle 14 of the Constitution, referred to the judgements in  Ranjit
\nThakur Vs. Union of India (supra),  B.C. Chaturvedi Vs. Union
\nof India (1995) 6 SCC and then observed:\n<\/p>\n
?SIn
\nthis context, we shall only refer to these cases.  In Ranjit Thakur
\nV. Union of India<\/a> this Court referred to ?Sproportionality?? in the
\nquantum of punishment but the Court observed that the punishment was
\n?Sshockingly?? disproportionate to the misconduct proved.  In B.C.
\nChaturvedi Vs. Union of India this Court stated that the court will
\nnot interfere unless the punishment awarded was one which shocked the
\nconscience of the court.  Even then, the court would remit the matter
\nback to the authority and would nor normally substitute one
\npunishment for the other.  However, in rare situations, the court
\ncould award an alternative penalty.  It was also so stated in
\nGanayutham.??\n<\/p>\n
?SThus,
\nfrom the above principles and decided cases, it must be held that
\nwhere an administrative decision relating to punishment in
\ndisciplinary cases is questioned as ?Sarbitrary?? under Article 14,
\nthe court is confined to Wednesbury principles as a secondary
\nreviewing authority.  The court will not apply proportionality as a
\nprimary reviewing court because no issue of fundamental freedoms nor
\nof discrimination under Article 14 applies in such a context.  The
\ncourt while reviewing punishment and if it is satisfied that
\nWednesbury principles are violated, it has normally to remit the
\nmatter to the administrator for a fresh decision as to the quantum of
\npunishment.  Only in rare cases where there has been long delay in
\nthe time taken by the disciplinary proceedings and in the time taken
\nin the courts, and such extreme or rare cases can the court
\nsubstitute its own view as to the quantum of punishment.??\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n State Bank of India Vs. Samrendra Kishore Endow (1994) 2 SCC
\n537;  State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Ashok Kumar Singh (1996) 1 SCC
\n302;  State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Nandkishore Shukla (1996) 3
\nSCC 750;  State of Punjab Vs. Baxi Singh (1997) 6 SCC 381;
\n Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation Vs. A.K. Parul
\n(1998) 9 SCC 416;  Union of India Vs. J.R. Gheman (1999) 6 SCC
\n403;  Secretary A.P. SWRE I Society Vs. J. Prathap (2002) 10
\nSCC 430; the Supreme Court has consistently held that in exercise of
\njurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High
\nCourt will not interfere with the punishment imposed by the competent
\nauthority merely because it feels that it is harsh or that a
\ndifferent view could have been taken of the misconduct committed by
\nthe employee.  The Court can direct the competent authority to
\nreconsider the question of punishment only if it comes to a definite
\nconclusion that the same is shockingly disproportionate or is totally
\narbitrary or there has been a non-consideration of the relevant
\nfactors or where irrelevant considerations have weighed with the
\ncompetent authority for imposing the particular punishment.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\nthe light of the guiding principles laid down by the Supreme Court in
\nGanayutham’s case [supra] and Om Kumar vs. Union of India<\/a> (supra),
\nwe shall now consider whether the punishment of dismissal from
\nservice imposed on the appellant can be termed as shockingly
\ndisproportionate or wholly arbitrary so as to warrant judicial
\nintervention. While considering this issue, we are conscious of the
\nfact that the Tribunal did feel appalled by the magnitude of the
\npenalty  imposed on the appellant but refrained from giving
\nsubstantive relief to her and felt satisfied by converting the
\npenalty of dismissal into that of removal,  and the learned Single
\nJudge, by a rather brief order, refused to entertain the appellant’s
\nplea for further reduction in the quantum of punishment.\n<\/p>\n
\tRule
\n6 of the Rules enumerates the minor as well as major penalties which
\ncan be imposed on a member of the State, Subordinate or Inferior
\nServices. It lays down that without prejudice to the provision of any
\nlaw for the time being in force, the penalties enumerated therein
\nmay, for good and sufficient reasons, be imposed upon any member of
\nthe State, Subordinate or Inferior Service.  \tA careful reading of
\nthis rule makes it clear that the competent authority can impose any
\nof the eight penalties on a delinquent employee provided there exist
\ngood and sufficient reason for doing so.  The penalties enumerated in
\nRule 6 include censure, withholding of increments or promotion,
\nrecovery from pay of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused
\nto government by negligence or breach of orders, reduction to a lower
\nstage in the time scale of pay for a specific period, reduction to a
\nlower time scale of pay, grade, post or service, compulsory
\nretirement, removal from service and dismissal from service. It is
\nthus evident that the disciplinary authority has large amount of
\ndiscretion in the matter of imposition of punishment.   However, this
\ndiscretion has to be exercised objectively and the order made by the
\ndisciplinary authority must be supported by good and sufficient
\nreasons.\n<\/p>\n
\tThe
\nexpression ?Sgood and sufficient reasons?? appearing in rule 6 of
\nthe Rules has not been defined, but on the basis of service
\njurisprudence which has developed in our country during the last 55
\nyears, it can be said that while imposing any particular penalty on a
\ndelinquent employee, the competent authority is duty bound to take
\ninto consideration the following factors:\n<\/p>\n
\ta)\tthe
\n\tnature of employment\/service;\n<\/p>\n
\tb)\ttotal
\n\tlength of service of the employee [delinquent];\n<\/p>\n
\tc)\tthe
\n\tnature of misconduct and its gravity;\n<\/p>\n
\td)\tthe
\n\tservice record of the employee, and<\/p>\n
\te)\tthe
\n\timpact of the misconduct on the establishment where the \t\temployee
\n\tis employed.\n<\/p>\n
\tOrdinarily,
\nan employer will  be justified in imposing extreme penalty of
\ndismissal, removal or compulsory retirement where the employee is
\nguilty of financial irregularities or moral turpitude or is found
\nguilty of gross disobedience of the lawful orders passed by the
\ncompetent authority,  but if the delinquency does not relate to
\nmis-appropriation, embezzlement etc. or the act of the employee does
\nnot violate the code of morality, the competent authority may impose
\ncomparatively less severe penalty.  Every violation of the conduct
\nrule may not warrant or justify imposition of major penalty.  The
\nemployer may, after taking into consideration the gravity and
\nmagnitude of the misconduct, past record of the employee, his status
\nand the impact of misconduct on other members of service, may impose
\na minor penalty.\n<\/p>\n
In our opinion, the rigor of the penalty imposed always must be
\ncommensurate with the degree of misconduct found proved and the
\nnature of service.  In the case of disciplined forces, a misconduct
\nwhich may be treated as minor in relation to civil services may be
\nviewed with greater seriousness. As a matter of fact, Courts have
\nbeen extremely loath to exercise the power of judicial review in
\nmatters involving the disciplined forces, but the same will not be
\nheld true for  civil services.  What we wish to emphasis is that in
\nits zeal to maintain discipline the employer should not readily pass
\nan order which may result in depriving the employee and his family of
\nthe only source of livelihood.  We can take judicial notice of the
\nfact that misconduct like absence from duty or non-compliance of the
\ndepartmental instructions or rules by the employees belonging to
\nClass III and Class IV services do not vitally affect the others and
\nif the employees of these cadres are not found guilty of financial
\nmisdemeanour or of a  charge which can be treated as falling within
\nthe dominion of moral turpitude, the employer may take a lenient view
\nparticularly when the past record of the employee  is not
\nblameworthy.\n<\/p>\n
If the appellant’s case is viewed in the light of the above
\ndiscussion, it is not possible to sustain the order of dismissal
\nbecause while imposing the extreme penalty, the disciplinary
\nauthority did not advert to the factors like length of her service
\nand past record, the nature of misconduct found proved, the
\nbackground in which the appellant had remained absent from duty, viz.
\nthat she conceived after 14 years of marriage and that she was
\nrequired to look after her ailing father-in-law, and the fact that
\nshe was holding a clerical job and her absence from duty could not
\nhave materially hampered the work of the department. We are sure that
\nif the disciplinary authority had kept these factors in mind, then
\nthe penalty of dismissal would not have been imposed ignoring the
\nfact that the appellant had proceeded on leave to avail the most
\nprecious gift given by the Almighty God. The Tribunal was alive to
\nthis defect in the order of punishment, but stopped short of giving
\neffective relief to the appellant.  To the misfortune of the
\nappellant, after having made a beginning in the right direction,  the
\nTribunal faulted at the end of the post, and felt contended by
\nconverting the penalty of dismissal into that of removal, which did
\nnot  give any tangible relief to the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
\tAnother
\ngrave error committed by the Tribunal was that it failed to take
\ncognizance of the fact that the order of punishment passed by the
\nGovernment was devoid of reasons and did not satisfy the test of a
\nspeaking order.  A bare reading of the relevant extracts of order
\ndated 20.6.2000 shows that while imposing the extreme penalty of
\ndismissal from service, the disciplinary authority did not take into
\naccount the fact that as on the date of the punishment the appellant
\nhad completed 19 years service;  that she had remained away from work
\npartially due to personal and social reasons and that her past record
\nwere not blameworthy.  In our view the failure of the disciplinary
\nauthority to objectively consider these facts has   introduced a
\nfatal defect in the order of punishment.    The requirement of
\nrecording of reasons by every quasi-judicial authority and even
\nadministrative authority entrusted with the task of deciding lis
\nbetween the parties or of making an order which affects the rights of
\nother persons has been treated as an integral part of the rules of
\nnatural justice.  This principle has been laid down and reiterated in
\nvarious decisions of the Supreme Court including the following:\n<\/p>\n
\t Harinagar
\nSugar Mills Vs Shyam Sunder
\nAIR 1961 SC 1669,  Bhagat Raja Vs. Union of India
\nAIR 1967 SC 1606,  M\/s. Mahavir Oil Industries Vs. State of
\nU.P AIR 1970 SC 1031,
\n Travancore Rayons Ltd. Vs. The Union of India and others
\nAIR 1971 SC 862,  State of Punjab Vs. Bakhtawar Singh
\nAIR 1972 SC 2083,  Ajanta Industries Vs. Union of India
\nAIR 1976 SC 434,  The Siemens Engineering and Manufacturing
\nCo. of India Ltd. Vs. The Union of India and another
\nAIR 1976 SC 1785,  S.N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India
\nAIR 1990 SC 1984,  Cyril Lasrado Vs. Juliana Maria Lasrado
\n(2004) 7 SCC 431,  State of Orissa Vs. Dhaniram Luhar
\n(2004) 5 SCC 568,  State of Rajasthan Vs. Sohan Lal
\n(2004) 5 SCC 573 and  Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works Vs. C.I.T
\n(2005) 2 SCC 329.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n State of Punjab Vs. Bakhtawar Singh (supra),
\nthe Supreme Court considered the legality of an order passed by the
\nState Government removing the respondent who was a member of the
\nElectricity Board. While quashing the order of the State Government,
\nthe Supreme Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
?S….\n<\/p>\n
That apart, the order of the Minister removing him does not disclose
\nthat he had applied his mind to the material on record. That order
\ndoes not show what charges against Shri Abrol have been established.
\nThe order reads:\n<\/p>\n
?SI
\nhave gone through the charges and the explanation furnished by Shri
\nR.P. Abrol. From the material on the file, I am definitely of the
\nopinion that he is not a fit person to be retained as part-time
\nmember of the Electricity Board. I, therefore, order that Shri Abrol
\nmay be removed from membership under sub-clause (iv) of Cl. (e) of
\nsub-s. (1) of Section 10 of the Electricity Supply Act, 1948. C.M may
\nkindly see. After C.M has seen, immediate orders be issued.??\n<\/p>\n
?S13.\n<\/p>\n
This order cannot be said to be a speaking order. It is arbitrary to
\nthe core. Such an order cannot be upheld. Hence it is not necessary
\nto go into the other contentions advanced on behalf of Shri Abrol.??\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n S.N.Mukherjee’s
\ncase (supra) the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court after a
\ndetailed survey of English, American and Australian law on the
\nsubject and making reference to various judgements of the Supreme
\nCourt laid down the following propositions:\n<\/p>\n
?SReasons,
\nwhen recorded by an administrative authority in an order passed by it
\nwhile exercising quasi-judicial functions, would no doubt facilitate
\nthe exercise of its jurisdiction by the appellate or supervisory
\nauthority. But the other considerations, referred to above, which
\nhave also weighed with this Court in holding that an administrative
\nauthority must record reasons for its decision are of no less
\nsignificance. These considerations show that the recording of reasons
\nby an administrative authority serves a salutary purpose, namely, it
\nexcludes chances of arbitrariness and ensures a degree of fairness in
\nthe process of decisions-making. The said purpose would apply equally
\nto all decisions and its application cannot be confined to decisions
\nwhich are subject to appeal, revision or judicial review. In our
\nopinion, therefore, the requirement that reasons be recorded should
\ngovern the decisions of an administrative authority exercising
\nquasi-judicial functions irrespective of the fact whether the
\ndecision is subject to appeal, revision or judicial review.??\n<\/p>\n
?SThe
\nobject underlying the rules of natural justice “is to prevent
\nmiscarriage of justice” and secure “fair play in action.”
\nAs pointed out earlier the requirement about recording of reasons for
\nits decision by an administrative authority exercising quasi-judicial
\nfunctions achieves this object by excluding chances of arbitrariness
\nand ensuring a degree of fairness in the process of decision-making.
\nKeeping in view the expanding horizon of the principles of natural
\njustice, we are of the opinion, that the requirement to record reason
\ncan be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice which
\ngovern exercise of power by administrative authorities. The rules of
\nnatural justice are not embodied rules. The extent of their
\napplication depends upon the particular statutory framework
\nwhereunder jurisdiction has been conferred on the administrative
\nauthority. With regard to the exercise of a particular power by an
\nadministrative authority including exercise of judicial or
\nquasi-judicial functions the legislature, while conferring the said
\npower, may feel that it would not be in the larger public interest
\nthat the reasons for the order passed by the administrative authority
\nbe recorded in the order and be communicated to the aggrieved party
\nand it may dispense with such a requirement. It may do so by making
\nan express provision to that effect as those contained in the
\nAdministrative Procedure Act, 1946 of U. S. A. and the Administrative
\nDecisions (Judicial Review) Act, 1977 of Australia whereby the orders
\npassed by certain specified authorities are excluded from the ambit
\nof the enactment. Such an exclusion can also arise by necessary
\nimplication from the nature of the subject matter, the scheme and the
\nprovisions of the enactment. The public interest underlying such a
\nprovision would outweigh the salutary purpose served by the
\nrequirement to record the reasons. The said requirement cannot,
\ntherefore, be insisted upon in such a case.??\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n Cyril Lasrado Vs. Juliana Maria Lasrado
\n(supra) the Supreme Court reiterated the necessity of recording of
\nreasons in the following words:\n<\/p>\n
?SReasons
\nsubstitute subjectivity by objectivity. The emphasis on recording
\nreasons is that if the decision reveals the ‘inscrutable face of the
\nsphinx’, it can, by its silence, render it virtually impossible for
\nthe courts to perform their appellate function or exercise the power
\nof judicial review in adjudging the validity of the decision. Right
\nto reason is an indispensable part of a sound judicial system,
\nreasons at least sufficient to indicate an application of mind to the
\nmatter before court. Another rationale is that the affected party can
\nknow why the decision has gone against him. One of the salutary
\nrequirements of natural justice is spelling out reasons for the order
\nmade, in other words, a speaking out. The ‘inscrutable face of the
\nsphinx’ is ordinarily incongruous with a judicial or quasi-judicial
\nperformance.??\n<\/p>\n
?SReasons
\nintroduce clarify in an order. On plainest consideration of justice,
\nthe High Court ought to have set forth its reasons, howsoever brief,
\nin its order indicative of an application of its mind, all the more
\nwhen its order is amenable to further avenue of challenge. The
\nabsence of reasons has rendered the High Court’s judgement not
\nsustainable.??\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n State of Orissa Vs. Dhaniram Luhar
\n(supra) and  State of Rajasthan Vs. Sohan Lal
\n(supra) the Supreme Court considered the question whether a petition
\nfor leave to appeal filed under Section 378(3) of the Code of
\nCriminal Procedure could be dismissed by the High Court without
\nreasons and answered the same in the negative. In  Sohanlal’s
\ncase (supra), the Supreme Court laid down the following propositions:\n<\/p>\n
?SThe
\nHallmark of a judgment\/order and exercise of judicial power by a
\njudicial forum is to disclose the reasons for its decision and giving
\nof reasons has been always insisted upon as one of the fundamentals
\nof sound administration justice delivery system, to make known that
\nthere had been proper and due application of mind to the issue before
\nthe Court and also as an essential requisite of principles of natural
\njustice.??\n<\/p>\n
?SThe
\ngiving of reasons for a decision is an essential attribute of
\njudicial and judicious disposal of a matter before courts, and which
\nis the only indication to know of the manner and quality of exercise
\nundertaken, as also the fact that the court concerned had really
\napplied its mind. All the more so, when refusal of leave to appeal
\nhas the effect of foreclosing once and for all a scope for scrutiny
\nof the judgement of the trial court even at the instance and hands of
\nthe first appellate court.??\n<\/p>\n
?SThe
\nSupreme Court in Dhaniram Luhar case, (2004) 5 SCC 568, while
\nreiterating the view expressed in the earlier cases for the past two
\ndecades emphasised the necessity, duty and obligation of the High
\nCourt to record reasons in disposing of appeals arising under Section
\n378 Cr.P.C, 1973. The fact that the entertaining of an appeal at the
\ninstance of the State against an order of acquittal for an effective
\nconsideration of the same on merits is made subject to the
\npreliminary exercise of obtaining of leave to appeal from the High
\nCourt, is no reason to consider it as an appeal of any inferior
\nquality or grade, when it has been specifically and statutorily
\nprovided for, or sufficient to obviate and dispense with the obvious
\nnecessity to record reasons. The need for recording reasons for the
\nconclusion arrived at by the High Court under Section 378 has nothing
\nto do with the fact that the appeal envisaged under Section 378 has
\nnothing to do with the fact that the appeal envisaged under Section
\n378 Cr.P.C is conditioned upon the seeking for an obtaining of leave
\nfrom the court.??\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n Mangalore Ganesh Beedi Works Vs. C.I.T
\n(supra) the Supreme Court held that even the appellate order passed
\nunder Sections 260A and 260B of Income Tax Act, 1961 must satisfy the
\nrequirement of a speaking order and observed:\n<\/p>\n
?SIn
\nan order of affirmation, repetition of reasons elaborately may not be
\nnecessary. But even then the arguments advanced and the points urged
\nhave to be dealt with. Reasons for affirmation have to be indicated,
\nthough in appropriate cases they may be briefly stated.??\n<\/p>\n
?SRecording
\nof reasons is a part of fair procedure. Reasons are harbinger between
\nthe mind of maker of the decision in the controversy and the decision
\nor conclusion arrived at. They substitute subjectivity with
\nobjectivity. Therefore, the matter is remitted to the High Court to
\nconsider the relevant points afresh.??\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n Ucharan Singh Vs. Healing Touch Hospital and ors.
\nAIR 2000 SC 3138 and  Manorama Sachan Vs. Lucknow
\nDevelopment Authority (2005)
\n9 SCC 425, the Supreme Court held that the Consumer Disputes
\nRedressal Forums and National Commission are required to record
\nreasons in support of their decisions.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\n Testeels Limited Vs. N.M. Desai Conciliation Officer and
\nanother AIR 1970 (Gujarat) 1,
\na Full Bench of this Court speaking through Shri P.N. Bhagwati, Chief
\nJustice (as His Lordship then was) made a lucid enunciation of law on
\nthe subject and we can do no better than to extract some portions of
\nthat judgement, which read as under:-\n<\/p>\n
“There
\nare two strong and cogent reasons why we must insist that every
\nquasi-judicial order must disclose reasons in support of it. The
\nnecessity of giving reasons flows as a necessary corollary from the
\nrule of law which constitutes one of the basic principles of our
\nconstitutional set-up. Our Constitution posits a welfare State in
\nwhich every citizen must have justice social, economic and political
\nand in order to achieve the ideal of welfare State,the State has to
\nperform several functions involving acts of interferences with the
\nfree and unrestricted exercise of private rights. The State is called
\nupon to regulate and control the social and economic life of the
\ncitizen in order to establish socio-economic justice and remove the
\nexisting imbalances in the socio-economic structure. The State has,
\ntherefore, necessarily to entrust diverse functions to administrative
\nauthorities which involve making of orders and decisions and
\nperformance of acts affecting the rights of individual members of the
\npublic. In exercise of some of these functions, the administrative
\nauthorities are required to act judicially. Now what is involved in a
\njudicial process is well settled and as pointed out by Shah J, in
\nJaswant Sugar Mill’s case, AIR 1963 SC 677 (supra),a quasi-judicial
\ndecision involves the following three elements:\n<\/p>\n
 (1)    It is in substance a  determination  upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts  found in the light of pre-existing legal rules.\n<\/p>\n
(2)     It declares right or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and<\/p>\n
(3)<\/span>
\nThe investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes
\ncontemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party,
\nascertainment of facts by means of material if a dispute be on
\nquestion of facts, and if the dispute be on question of law, on the
\npresentation of legal argument, and a decision resulting in the
\ndisposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law
\nand fact.??\n<\/p>\n
 ?SAnother reason of equal cogency which weighs with  us in spelling out the necessity for giving reasons is based on the power of judicial  review which is possessed by the High Court under Article 226 and the Supreme Court  under  Article 32. The  High  Court  under Article 226 and the Supreme Court under Article 32 have the power  to quash  by certiorari a quasi-judicial order made by an administrative officer and  this power  of review exercisable by issue of certiorari can be effectively exercised only  if  the order  is  a speaking  order and reasons are given in support of it.  If no reasons are given, it would not  be possible  for the High Court or the Supreme Court exercising  its power  of  judicial  review   to examine  whether the  administrative officer has made any error of law in making the order.    It would  be the easiest thing for an administrative officer to avoid judicial scrutiny and correction by omitting to give reasons in  support  of  his order.   The  High  Court  and the Supreme Court would be powerless to interfere so as to keep the administrative officer within the limits  of  the law.   The  result  would  be  that the power of judicial  review  would  be  stultified and   no redress being  available  to  the citizen, there would be insidious encouragement to arbitrariness and caprice.  The power of judicial review  is  a necessary  concomitant  of the rule of law and if judicial  review  is  to  be  made  an  effective instrument for maintenance of the rule of law, it is   necessary that   administrative   officers discharging  quasi-judicial  functions  must be required  to  give  reasons  in  support of their orders so that they can be  subject  to  judicial scrutiny and correction.”\n<\/p>\n
\tThe
\norder passed by the learned Single Judge shows that she was of the
\nview  that the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was
\nnot grave enough warranting intervention by the Court. It appears to
\nus that the counsel appearing for the appellant did not bring to the
\nnotice of the learned Single Judge the fatal flaw with which the
\norder of the Disciplinary Authority suffered, viz. non-consideration
\nof the factors which have direct bearing on the quantum of punishment
\nand the fact that the order of punishment was non-speaking and was,
\ntherefore, vitiated due to violation of the rules of natural justice.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\nview of the above, we may have ourselves substituted the penalty of
\nremoval from service with a  lesser penalty so as to enable the
\nappellant to reap the benefits of 13 years of past service, which is
\nnot shown to be blameworthy. However keeping in view the limited
\nscope of jurisdiction under clause 15 of the Letters Patent, we
\nrefrain from exercising our jurisdiction as if we are sitting in
\nappeal over the action of the disciplinary authority, and are of the
\nview that ends of justice would be met by remanding the matter to
\nDisciplinary Authority, with a direction to re-consider the issue of
\npunishment. In our opinion, penalty of stoppage of increments with or
\nwithout cumulative effect would be commensurate with the misconduct
\nfound proved against the appellant.\n<\/p>\n
\tIn
\nthe result, the appeal is allowed. The order of learned Single Judge
\nas well as the order of the Tribunal are set aside. The order of
\npunishment dated 20th June 2000 is quashed  with a
\ndirection that the Disciplinary Authority shall re-consider the issue
\nof punishment and pass appropriate order within two months from the
\ndate of receipt of certified copy of this order.\n<\/p>\n
We hope and trust that the Disciplinary Authority will adopt a human
\napproach, sympathetically consider the background in which the
\nappellant had remained absent and impose appropriate penalty.\n<\/p>\n
\tIt
\nis, however, made clear that the appellant shall not be entitled to
\nmonetary benefits for the intervening period, i.e. between the date
\nof commencement of her absence from duty and the date of the order of
\nreinstatement which shall have to be passed by the competent
\nauthority in pursuance of this order. The period of her absence from
\nduty including the period during which she will be deemed to have
\nremained out of employment on account of the order of dismissal shall
\nbe  regularised by granting extra-ordinary leave so that she may earn
\nfuture service benefits.\n<\/p>\n
[G.S.SINGHVI]<\/p>\n
JUDGE<\/p>\n
[P.B.MAJMUDAR]<\/p>\n
JUDGE<\/p>\n
mathew\/*Mohandas<\/p>\n
\t\t   \u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n
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Gujarat High Court ====================================== vs Union Of India on 17 August, 2010 Gujarat High Court Case Information System Print LPAST\/334\/2004 22\/ 24 ORDER IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD LETTERS PATENT APPEAL (STAMP) No. 334 of 2004 In SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION No. 8991 of 2002 ====================================== S.P BHATT Versus STATE OF GUJARAT ====================================== […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[16,8],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-195264","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-gujarat-high-court","category-high-court"],"yoast_head":"\n====================================== vs Union Of India on 17 August, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/vs-union-of-india-on-17-august-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"====================================== vs Union Of India on 17 August, 2010 - 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