{"id":196131,"date":"1979-10-10T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1979-10-09T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-balakrishna-rao-and-ors-vs-hazi-abdulla-sait-and-ors-on-10-october-1979"},"modified":"2016-11-25T02:41:40","modified_gmt":"2016-11-24T21:11:40","slug":"k-balakrishna-rao-and-ors-vs-hazi-abdulla-sait-and-ors-on-10-october-1979","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/k-balakrishna-rao-and-ors-vs-hazi-abdulla-sait-and-ors-on-10-october-1979","title":{"rendered":"K. Balakrishna Rao And Ors vs Hazi Abdulla Sait And Ors on 10 October, 1979"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
K. Balakrishna Rao And Ors vs Hazi Abdulla Sait And Ors on 10 October, 1979<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1980 AIR 214, \t\t 1980 SCR (1) 875<\/div>\n
Author: E Venkataramiah<\/div>\n
Bench: Venkataramiah, E.S. (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nK. BALAKRISHNA RAO AND ORS.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nHAZI ABDULLA SAIT AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT10\/10\/1979\n\nBENCH:\nVENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)\nBENCH:\nVENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J)\nGUPTA, A.C.\n\nCITATION:\n 1980 AIR  214\t\t  1980 SCR  (1) 875\n 1980 SCC  (1) 321\n\n\nACT:\n     The Tamil\tNadu Buildings\t(Lease and Rent Control) Act\n1960 as amended by the Amending Act of 1964-S. 30(iii)-Scope\nof.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n     In July,  1940 the\t plaintiffs father  leased  out\t the\nbuilding of  which he  was the\towner, to the defendant on a\nmonthly rent of Rs. 950 for running a restaurant. Even after\nthe expiry  of\tthe  period  of\t lease\tin  July,  1943\t the\ndefendant continued  to be in possession of the building. By\nvirtue of  the Madras Non-residential Buildings Rent Control\norder, 1946  the defendant  became a  statutory\t tenant\t and\nunder the order fair rent was fixed at Rs. 1680 p.m. In 1949\nthe 1946-order\twas replaced  by the Madras Buildings (Lease\nand Rent  Control) Act.\t 1949. On the death of his father in\n1955 the plaintiff became the owner of the building.\n     The 1949  Act was\trepealed and  replaced by  the Tamil\nNadu Buildings\t(Lease and  Rent Control  ) Act,  1960\t(the\nPrincipal  Act).   Section  30(iii)  of\t the  Principal\t Act\nprovided that  it  was\tnot  applicable\t to  non-residential\nbuildings, the\trental value  of  which,  according  to\t the\nassessment of  the Corporation\tof Madras,  exceeded Rs. 400\np.m. Even  so the defendant continued to be in possession of\nthe building.  Since the  building was\tnot governed  by the\nPrincipal Act  the plaintiff  issued notice to the defendant\nto quit\t and instituted a civil suit in the City Civil Court\non March 2, 1964 for eviction and damages.\n     In the meantime in June, 1964, by an amendment Act, the\nexemption contained in s. 30 of the Principal Act in respect\nof non-residential buildings was withdrawn so that from then\non non-residential  buildings with  a monthly  rent  of\t Rs.\n400\/- and above were also governed by the Principal Act. Sec\nion 3 of the Amending Act also provided that proceedings for\neviction of  the tenants  of such  non-residential buildings\ninstituted in  civil courts  should  be\t treated  as  having\nabated.\n     In view  of the  amendment in  December 1964  the\tCity\nCivil Court dismissed the plaintiff s suit as having abated.\nThereupon the plaintiff filed an application under O. IX, r.\n9 of  the Code\tof Civil  Procedure to\tset aside, its order\ndismissing the\tsuit as\t having abated. This application was\nallowed. The  defendants filed additional written statements\nin the\tCity Civil  Court raising the plea that the suit had\nactually abated\t by virtue  of s.  3 of the Amending Act. In\nthe meantime  as a  result of  the plaintiff  s\t application\nunder s. 24, Code of Civil Procedure the High Court withdrew\nthe  suit  to  its  file  (on  the  death  of  the  original\ndefendant, defendants  2 to  10 were  impleaded as his legal\nrepresentatives).\n     On the  issue whether  the suit  had abated on June 10,\n1964 by\t virtue of  s. 3 of the Amending Act the trial judge\nof the\tHigh Court  refused to record a finding and disposed\nof the suit as if it was a fresh suit after the death of the\n876\noriginal defendant.  He passed\ta decree  for possession and\ndamages for use and occupation.\n     On appeal\tby the\tdefendants the Division Bench of the\nHigh Court  held  that\tfrom  March  1,\t 1964  the  original\ndefendant was  a trespasser, that he was not entitled to the\nbenefit of  the Principal  Act, that  with the\tcoming\tinto\nforce of  the Amending\tAct the\t building itself was outside\nthe scope  of the  principal Act,  that s. 3 of the Amending\nAct did\t not apply  to the  suit and  so it did not abate on\nJune 30,  1964\tand  that  on  the  death  of  the  original\ndefendant, defendants  2 to  10 were  not  entitled  to\t the\nprotection against  eviction  under  the  Principal  Act  as\namended in 1973.\n     Allowing the appeal,\n^\n     HELD: Section  3 of  the Amending Act was applicable to\nthe suit as it was a proceeding instituted in the City Civil\nCourt on  the ground  that the\tbuilding was exempt from the\nprovisions of  the Principal  Act by  virtue of\t s.  30(iii)\nthereof although  no express  allegation  was  made  in\t the\nplaint to that effect. [891 B]\n     1. (a)  The view of the Division Bench that s. 3 of the\nAmending Act  was not  applicable to this case was erroneous\nin the\tabsence of  a contention  by the plaintiff that s. 3\nwas unconstitutional.  It was  not  for\t the  court  to\t ask\nwhether there  was any\tjustification for the legislature to\nmake a\tcontrary provision  in respect\tof the\tsuits of the\npresent nature.\t There was  every justification for enacting\ns. 3 in order to give protection to the tenants against whom\nsuits for  eviction had been filed for buildings. which were\nbrought within\tthe scope  of the  Principal ACT by deleting\ncl. (iii) of s. 30 of the Principal Act. [886G, 887B]\n     (b) In  the context  in which  s. 3 of the Amending Act\nwas enacted it could not be said that it was not possible to\nidentify the  proceedings to  which that provision referred.\nIn P.  J. Gupta's  case this  Court held  that a  proceeding\nwhich  had  been  instituted  on  the  ground  that  a\tnon-\nresidential building  was exempt  from the provisions of the\nPrincipal Act by virtue of s. 30(iii) and was pending on the\ndate of publication of the amendment in the official gazette\nwould abate  but did  not consider  the type  of cases which\nwould fall  within the scope of 3 of the Amending Act [888A-\nB, 889G-H]\n     P. J.  Gupta &  Co. v.  K. Venkatesan  Merchant &\tors.<\/a>\n[1975] 2 S.C.R. 401; held inapplicable.\n     (e) The  words \"instituted\t on  the  ground  that\tsuch\nbuilding or  part was  exempt from  the\t provisions  of\t the\nPrincipal Act  by virtue  of cl.  (iii)\t of  s.\t 30  of\t the\nPrincipal Act\"\tshould be  construed in the context in which\nthey appeared  as referring  to a  proceeding which had been\ninstituted in  the light  of s. 30(iii) of the Principal Act\nwhich granted  exemption in  respect of\t the buildings refer\nred to\ttherein from the operation of the Principal Act. Any\nother construction  would defeat  the object of the Amending\nAct. [890E-F]\n     In the  instant case  the original\t plaint was filed on\nthe basis  that The  tenancy had been terminated with effect\nfrom the  expiry of  February 29, 1964. The plaintiff prayed\nfor the\t eviction of  the  defendant  damages  for  use\t and\noccupation and\tnot the\t fair  rent  fixed  under  the\tRent\nControl law.  The suit\tcould be  filed only  because of the\nexemption contained in s. 30(iii) of the Principal Act\n877\nbecause in the absence of such exemption no effective decree\nfor ejectment  could be\t passed by  the City  Civil Court in\nview of s. 10 of the Principal Act. [890 G-H]\n     2. The  original defendant\t was  not  a  trespasser  in\npossession of  the premises after June 10, 1964. He became a\nstatutory tenant  of the  premises and\tcould not be evicted\nfrom them  except in accordance with the procedure specified\nin the\tPrincipal Act.\tThe position  would  not  have\tbeen\ndifferent even\tif a  decree for  eviction had\tbeen  passed\nagainst him before June 10, 1964 and the decree had not been\nexecuted or satisfied in full on that date [894 C-D]\n     3. (a)  The building  in question was a building within\nThe meaning  of that expression in s. 21'>) of the Principal\nAct on\tthe date  when s.  3 of\t the amending  Act came into\nforce. [896 F-G]\n     (b) The  view of  the  Division  Bench  that  the\tsuit\nproperty was  not a \"building\" within the meaning of s. 2(2)\non the\tground that there was no lease in force and hence it\nwas not\t let and  that on  that date  the plaintiff  had  no\nintention to lease it and therefore it was not to be let was\nerroneous. A definition clause does not necessarily apply in\nall possible  contents in  which the  word may be found. The\nopening clause\tof s.  2 of  the Principal Act suggests that\nany expression\tdefined in  that section  should be  given a\nmeaning assigned  to it therein unless the context otherwise\nrequires. [896 B-C]\n     4.\t The  original\tdefendant  became  entitled  to\t The\nprotection of  the Principal  Act on  June 10,\t1964 and  he\ncould be  evicted from\tthe building only after an order was\nmade by\t the Rent Controller. The High Court did not pass an\norder the suit had abated on June 10, 1964 till the death of\nthe original  defendant on  January 15, 1968. As a result of\nthe proceedings\t instituted by\tone  or\t the  other  of\t the\nparties the  case was  treated as pending although in law it\nwas not open to the Court to proceed with it after 10. 1964.\n[896G-897A]\n     5. It  has not permissible for the trial court to treat\nthe  proceeding\t  which\t had  been  instituted\tagainst\t the\noriginal  defendant  prior  to\tJune  10,  1964\t as  a\tlive\nproceeding  which   could  be\tconverted  into\t fresh\tsuit\ninstituted against defendants No. 2 to 10 after the death of\nthe original  defendant.  An  amendment\t of  the  plaint  by\ninclusion of  a new prayer or by addition of new parties can\nbe made\t only where  in the  eye of  law a  suit is  pending\nbefore a  Court. When  the suit filed on March 2, 1964 stood\nterminated with the coming into force of the amending Act on\nJune 10, 1964 there was no plaint in a live suit which could\nbe amended  by the addition of new parties and the inclusion\nof a  new prayer.  Therefore the  addition of  parties which\ntook place after the death of the original defendant and the\namendment of the plaint in 1973 requesting the court to pass\na decree against defendants 2 to 10 who were not' parties to\nthe suit  prior to  June 10, 1964 on a cause of action which\naccrued\t subsequent   to  January   15,\t 1968  were  without\njurisdiction. [898A-D]\n     B. Banerjee  v. Anita  Pan,<\/a> [1975]\t 2 S.C.R.  774; held\ninapplicable.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
     CIVIL APPELLATE  JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 1172 of
\n1979.\n<\/p>\n
     Appeal by\tSpecial Leave  from the\t Judgment and  order
\ndated 1-2-1979 of the Madras High Court in O.S.A. No. 75\/77.\n<\/p>\n
878<\/span><\/p>\n
     G.\t Swaminathan,\tA.C.  Muthana,\tM.  Subramaniam,  K.
\nRajendra Chowdhary and N.N. Sivam for the Appellant.\n<\/p>\n
     P. Chidambaram,  Shakeel Ahmed,  M.N.  Krishnamani\t and
\nM.A. Malik for Respondent No. 1.\n<\/p>\n
     S.V. Gupte and V. N. Ganpule for Respondent 2, 4-6.
\n     The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n     VENKATARAMIAH, J. The question involved in this case is
\nwhether a  suit for  ejectment filed  in respect of any non-
\nresidential building  or part  thereof\tpending\t before\t any
\ncourt on  the date  on which the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease
\nand  Rent  Control)  Act,  1960\t (Act  No.  XVIII  of  1960)
\n(hereinafter referred to as ‘the principal Act’) was amended
\nby  the\t Tamil\tNadu  Buildings\t (Lease\t and  Rent  Control)
\nAmendment Act,\t1964  (Act  No.\t XI  of\t 1964)\t(hereinafter
\nreferred to as ‘the Amending Act’) could have been proceeded
\nwith  after   that  date.   It\tarises\t in  the   following
\ncircumstances:\n<\/p>\n
     Haji Mohamed Hussain Sait, the father of the plaintiff,
\nHaji Abdulla  Sait was\tthe owner  of a building situated in
\nthe city  of Madras.  He leased\t it out\t in  favour  of\t the
\ndefendant, K.  Seetharama Rao  under a lease deed dated July
\n8, 1940\t for the  purpose of  Running a\t restaurant known as
\n‘Modern Cafe’  in it for a period of three years with effect
\nfrom July  15, 1940  on a  monthly rent\t of Rs.\t 950\/-.\t The
\nagreed h  period of  lease expired  in July,  1943  but\t the
\ndefendant continued to be in possession of the building as a
\ntenant holding\tover. On the coming into force of the Madras
\nNon-residential Buildings  Rent Control\t order in  1946, the
\ndefendant became a statutory tenant of the said building and
\nfair rent in respect of it was fixed under that order in the
\nyear 1946  at Rs. 1,680\/- per month. The aforesaid order was
\nreplaced by  the Madras\t Buildings (Lease  and Rent Control)
\nAct. 1949 which was also applicable to the said building. On
\nthe death of the landlord Haji Mohamed Hussain Sait in 1955,
\nunder a partition amongst his heirs the plaintiff became the
\nowner of  the building.\t The protection\t which the defendant
\nwas enjoying  under the\t Act of\t 1949 came  to an end on the
\npassing of the principal Act by virtue of section 35 thereof
\nwhich repealed\tthe Act\t of 1949 and section 30(iii) thereof
\nwhich provided\tthat nothing  contained in the principal Act
\nwas applicable\tto any\tnon-residential building, the rental
\nvalue of  which on  the date  of  the  commencement  of\t the
\nprincipal Act as entered in the property tax assessment book
\nof the\tmunicipal  council,  district  board,  panchayat  or
\npanchayat  union   council  or\tthe  Corporation  of  Madras
\nexceeded Rs.  400\/-  per  mensem.  The\tdefendant,  however,
\ncontinued to  be in possession of the building by paying the
\nrent every month.\n<\/p>\n
879<\/span><\/p>\n
The plaintiff  issued a\t notice to the defendant terminating
\nthe tenancy with effect from the expiry of February 29, 1964
\nand as the building was not governed by the principal Act at
\nthat point  of time,  he instituted a suit in Civil Suit No.
\n730 of\t1964 on\t the file of the City Civil Court, Madras on
\nMarch 2,  1964 for  eviction and  for damages at the rate of
\nRs. 6000\/-  per\t month.\t The  defendant\t filed\this  written
\nstatement on  May 2,  1964 before  the City’ Civil Court. On
\nJune 10,  1964,\t the  Amending\tAct  came  into\t force.\t The
\nrelevant part of it is reproduced below:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “2. Amendment\t of section  30, Madras Act XVlII of
\n     1960.-In section  30 of the Madras Buildings (Lease and
\n     Rent Control) Act, 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the
\n     principal Act)-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (i)  in clause (ii) the word “or” occurring at the
\n\t       end shall be omitted;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  (ii) clause (iii) shall be omitted;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t   (iii) in the Explanation, for the words, brackets
\n\t       and figures  “clauses (ii)  and (iii)  “, the
\n\t       word,  brackets\tand  figures  “clause  (ii)”
\n\t       shall be substituted.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  3. Certain  pending  proceedings  to\tabate.-Every
\n     proceeding in  respect of\tany non-residential building
\n     or part  thereof pending  before  any  court  or  other
\n     authority or  officer on the date of the publication of
\n     this Act  in the Fort St. George Gazette and instituted
\n     on the  ground that  such building\t or part  was exempt
\n     from the  provisions of  the principal Act by virtue of
\n     clause (iii)  of section 30 of the principal Act, shall
\n     abate in  so far  as the  proceeding  relates  to\tsuch
\n     building or  part. All  rights and privileges which may
\n     have accrued  before  such\t date  to  any\tlandlord  in
\n     respect of any non-residential building or part thereof
\n     by\t virtue\t of  clause  (iii)  of\tsection\t 30  of\t the
\n     principal Act,  shall cease and determine and shall not
\n     be enforceable:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  Provided that\t nothing contained  in this  section
\n     shall be deemed to invalidate any suit or proceeding in
\n     which the\tdecree or  order passed has been executed or
\n     satisfied in  full before\tthe date  mentioned in\tthis
\n     section.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The statement  of objects\tand reasons  appended to the
\nBill which  ultimately\tbecame\tthe  Amending  Act  read  as
\nfollows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The Madras  Buildings (Lease\t and  Rent  Control)
\n     Act, 1960\t(Madras Act  18 of  1960),  relates  to\t the
\n     regulation of
\n880<\/span>
\n     the  letting   of\t residential   and   non-residential
\n     buildings and  the control\t of rents  of such buildings
\n     and the  prevention of unreasonable eviction of tenants
\n     therefrom in  the State  of Madras. Under section 30 of
\n     the said  Act, certain  buildings are exempted from the
\n     provisions\t of   the  said\t  Act.\tAny  non-residential
\n     building or  part thereof occupied by any one tenant if
\n     the monthly  rent\tpaid  by  him  in  respect  of\tthat
\n     building or  part exceeds\tfour hundred  rupees is\t one
\n     such building  or\tpart  is  exempted  under  the\tsaid
\n     section 30.  It has  been brought\tto the notice of the
\n     Government that  the landlords  of such non-residential
\n     buildings, taking\tadvantage of the exemption, referred
\n     to above,\tdemand exorbitant  rents from the tenants of
\n     such buildings,  who  mostly  belong  to  the  business
\n     community, and  threaten to  evict the tenants when the
\n     latter do not concede to the demands for such rents. In
\n     order to  provide relief  to such tenants and to ensure
\n     that the  interests of  trade  and\t industries  do\t not
\n     suffer by\tdemands of  landlords for  unreasonable\t and
\n     exorbitant rents.\tthe  Government\t consider  that\t the
\n     exemption now available to any non-residential building
\n     or part  thereof fetching a monthly rent exceeding four
\n     hundred rupees  should be\twithdrawn. At the same time,
\n     the Government  consider that  there is no need to take
\n     away  the\t exemption  available\tat  present  to\t any
\n     residential building or part thereof fetching a monthly
\n     rent exceeding Rs. 250\/-.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  The Bill seeks to achieve the above object.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The result\t of the\t amendment was\tthat  the  buildings
\nwhich had  been exempted from the operation of the principal
\nAct under  clause (iii)\t of section 30 came within the scope
\nof the\tprincipal Act and the relationship between landlords
\nand tenants of such buildings was to be regulated thereafter
\nin accordance  with the\t provisions of\tthe  principal\tAct.
\nApparently in  order to\t give protection  to tenants of such
\nbuildings against  whom proceedings  for eviction  had\tbeen
\ninstituted in  civil courts,  section 3\t of the Amending Act
\nprovided that  such proceedings\t should be treated as having
\nabated. The proviso to section 3 of the Amending Act however
\nprovided that  nothing contained  in that  section should be
\ndeemed to  invalidate any  suit or  proceeding in  which the
\ndecree or  order passed\t had been  executed or\tsatisfied in
\nfull before  the date  mentioned in  that section,  the said
\ndate being,  June 10,  1964. This  by necessary implication,
\nsection 3  of the  Amending Act\t was applicable\t even to the
\ncase of a building in respect of which a decree for eviction
\nhad been  passed but  had not  been executed or satisfied in
\nfull before  June 10,  1964. In view of the above provision,
\nthe City
\n881<\/span>
\nCivil Court dismissed the suit as having abated by its order
\ndated December 4, 1964. The plaintiff filed two applications
\nbefore the City Civil Court in March, 1965-one under order 9
\nRule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure to set aside the order
\ndated December\t4, 1964 dismissing the suit as having abated
\nand another  under section  5  of  the\tLimitation  Act\t for
\ncondoning delay\t in filing  the application,  under order 9,
\nRule 9\tof the\tCode of\t Civil Procedure.  He also  filed an
\nappeal in A.S. No. 266 of 1965 on the file of the High Court
\nof Madras  against the\torder of  the City Civil Court dated
\nDecember 4,  1964. Both\t the above applications were allowed
\nby the\tCity Civil  Court on  August 3,\t 1965. On August 13,
\n1965, the  defendant filed  an additional  written statement
\nbefore the  City Civil\tCourt raising the plea that the suit
\nhad actually  abated by\t virtue of section 3 of the Amending
\nAct. He\t also filed two revision petitions against the order
\npassed by the City Civil Court allowing the two applications
\non August  3, 1965. In the meanwhile, on an application made
\nunder section  24 of  the Code\tof Civil  Procedure  by\t the
\nplaintiff, the\tsuit was  withdrawn to\tthe file of the High
\nCourt and  it was  renumbered as  C.S. No.  218 of  1965. It
\nshould be mentioned here that owing to the alteration of the
\npecuniary jurisdiction\tof the\tCity Civil  Court, the\tsuit
\nstood transferred  to the  file of  the High Court on May 1,
\n1964 itself.  The defendant died on January 15, 1968. He had
\nmade will  on  January\t7.  1968  appointing  executors\t and
\nadministrators\tin   respect  of   his\tassets\tand  issuing
\ndirections regarding  the manner  in which his assets should
\nbe disposed  of. By an order dated July 20, 1970 made by the
\nHigh Court,  defendants Nos.  2 to 10 who had been appointed
\nexecutors  an\tadministrators\twere   impleaded  as   legal
\nrepresentatives of the defendant (who was shown as defendant
\nNo. 1 thereafter). The two civil revision petitions filed by
\nthe defendant! against the order passed on August 3,.1965 by
\nthe City  Civil Court  and the\tAppeal Suit  No. 266 of 1965
\nfiled by  the plaintiff\t against the order of the City Civil
\nCourt dated  December 4, 1964 were disposed of by a Division
\nBench of  the High Court of Madras by a common order on June
\n28, 1972, the relevant part or which read as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It is  seen from  the foregoing dates that at the
\n     time of  the dismissal of the suit, the lower court had
\n     no jurisdiction  to deal with suit and in that view the
\n     counsel appearing\ton both\t sides\trepresent  that\t the
\n     order dismissing  the suit\t as having abated may be set
\n     aside and the suit may be tried on the original side of
\n     this Court.  We accordingly  allow the  appeal and\t set
\n     aside the\torder of dismissal of the suit on the ground
\n     that the City Civil Court had no jurisdiction to deal
\n882<\/span>
\n     with the  same on\tthe date of dismissal and direct the
\n     suit to  be posted on the original side for being dealt
\n     with.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     It may  be mentioned  here that  as stated earlier, the
\nsuit had  already been\twithdrawn to  the file\tof the\tHigh
\nCourt under  section 24\t of the\t Code of Civil Procedure and
\nhad been  numbered as  Civil Suit  No. 218 of 1965. In July,
\n1973, the  plaintiff  sought  an  amendment  of\t the  plaint
\npraying for  relief against  defendants Nos.  2 to 10 on the
\nground that after the death of the original defendant No. 1,
\nthey were  not entitled\t to continue  in possession  of\t the
\nbuilding  as   ‘statutory  tenants  and\t the  plaintiff\t was
\nentitled to  a decree  against them  in that  very suit. The
\nabove  contention   was\t based\ton  the\t definition  of\t the
\nexpression “tenant”  in section 2(8) of the principal Act as
\nit stood  then. After  the amendment  of the  plaint,  fresh
\nwritten statements  were filed\tby defendants  Nos. 2  to 10
\nraising several\t pleas including the pleas which had already
\nbeen raised in the written statements filed by defendant No.
\n1  before  the\tCity  Civil  Court.  On\t the  basis  of\t the
\npleadings, the trial court framed the following issues:-\n<\/p>\n
     “1.  Is the suit maintainable ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     2.\t  Has  the   plaintiff\tgiven\tproper\t notice\t  of
\n\t  termination of the suit premises ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     3.\t  Does the suit abate by reason of Act XI of 1964 ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     4.\t   Are\tnot the\t defendants entitled  to  protection
\n\t  under\t the   Madras  Buildings   (Lease  and\tRent
\n\t  Control) Act, 1960, as amended by Act 23 of 1973 ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     5.\t  Whether the tenancy came. to an end upon the death
\n\t  of K. Seethararma Rao ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     6.\t   Whether  the defendants have no legal interest in
\n\t  the  premises\t  and  consequently   liable  to  be
\n\t  rejected ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     7.\t  To what reliefs are the parties entitled ?<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     At the  conclusion of the trial, the learned Judge held
\non issue  No. 1 that the suit was maintainable, on issue No.
\n2 that\tthe  notice  to\t quit  had  validly  terminated\t the
\ntenancy, on  issue  No.\t 4  that  the  defendants  were\t not
\nentitled to protection under the Madras Buildings (Lease and
\nRent Control) Act, 1960; on issue No. S that the tenancy had
\ncome to an end even on March 1, 1964 and on issue No. 6 that
\nthe defendants\thad no\tlegal interest\tin the premises. He,
\nhowever, declined to record any finding on issue No. 3 which
\nrelated to  the question  whether the suit had abated ar not
\non June\t 10, 1964  by virtue of section 3 of ,; the Amending
\nAct. The  learned Judge\t proceeded to dispose of the suit as
\nif it  was a  fresh suit  instituted after  the death of the
\noriginal
\n883<\/span>
\ndefendant No. 1 on January 15, 1968 even though there was no
\nspecific issue\ton the\tquestion whether  it cd\t be  treated
\nsuch. This  appears to\tbe  so\tin  view  of  the  following
\nobservations made  by the  trial Judge\tin the course of his
\njudgment:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Under the  above circumstances,  if the plaintiff
\n     files  a  suit  today  against  the  defendants  he  is
\n     entitled to  get an  executable decree  for  possession
\n     (without the  necessity of\t going to  the Rent  Control
\n     Court) inasmuch  as defendants 2 to 10 had never become
\n     ‘tenants’ under  the Act.\tTherefore even\tif the\tsuit
\n     filed in.\tthe City Civil Court is held to have abated,
\n     under the peculiar circumstances of this case, I see no
\n     reason why\t I should not treat the suit before me to be
\n     a fresh  one. It  is to  be seen  that the\t application
\n     under section  24 of  the Code  of Civil  Procedure for
\n     transfer of  the suit  from City  Civil Court  to\tthis
\n     court was\tconsented by the defendants. In A.S. No. 266
\n     of\t 1965,\t apart\tfrom  setting  aside  the  order  of
\n     abatement passed  by the  City Civil  Court, this Court
\n     directed that the suit be tried on the original side of
\n     this Court.  Even\tif  the\t City  Civil  Court  had  no
\n     pecuniary jurisdiction  to deal  with  the\t matter\t and
\n     record abatement,\tthe defendants could have pressed in
\n     A.S. No.  266 of  1965 for\t an order by this Court that
\n     the suit  had abated. It is need less to point out that
\n     the order\tthat was  under appeal\twas one by which the
\n     City Civil\t Court held  that the  suit had\t abated.  No
\n     doubt that was passed without jurisdiction, inasmuch as
\n     the pecuniary  jurisdiction  of  that  Court  had\tbeen
\n     reduced. But  it is  open to this Court to have held in
\n     the said  appeal itself  that the\tsuit had abated. But
\n     the order\twas that  the suit  was to  be tried  on the
\n     original side.  The suit  had been\t originally filed in
\n     1964, that\t is more  than\t12  years  ago.\t Under\tsuch
\n     circumstances, I  think it\t is  wholly  unnecessary  to
\n     drive the plaintiff to a fresh suit.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     On the  basis of  the findings  recorded  by  him,\t the
\nlearned trial  Judge passed  a\tdecree\tfor  possession\t and
\ndamages for  use and  occupation. The quantum of damages was
\ndirected to  be determined  under order\t 20, Rule  12 of the
\nCode of\t Civil Procedure.  Defendants Nos.  2  to  10  were,
\nhowever,  allowed   three  years’  time\t to  deliver  vacant
\npossession of  the premises.  Aggrieved by the decree passed
\nby the\ttrial Court,  the plaintiff  filed O.S.A.  No. 23 of
\n1977 and  defendant No. 2 filed O.S.A 75 of 1977 on the file
\nof the\tHigh Court  of Madras.\tThe plaintiff  in his appeal
\nquestioned the\tdecree of the trial court only to the extent
\nit granted  a period  of three\tyears to  the defendants  to
\ndeliver possession
\n884<\/span>
\nof the\tpremises. Defendant  No. 2  in his appeal questioned
\nthe entire  decree. Both  the appeals  came up\tfor  hearing
\nbefore a  Division Bench of the High Court. In the course of
\nits judgment,  the Division  Bench formulated  the following
\npoints for its consideration:-\n<\/p>\n
     “1.  What was  the status\tof late Seetharama Rao after
\n\t  the termination  of the  tenancy-whether he  was a
\n\t  trespasser or a tenant holding over or a tenant at
\n\t  sufferance ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      2.   Did\tthe suit building come within the purview of
\n\t  the Act  and did  late  Seetharama  Rao  become  a
\n\t  tenant as  defined in\t the Act, on the coming into
\n\t  force of the Tamil Nadu Act XI of 1964 ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      3.   Whether  the suit  instituted  by  the  plaintiff
\n\t  abated in  view of section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Act
\n\t  XI of 1964 ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      4.   Whether  the “tenancy”  came to  an end  upon the
\n\t  death of Seetharama Rao ?\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
      5.   Whether  defendants\t2  to  10  are\tentitled  to
\n\t  protection against eviction from the suit property
\n\t  by virtue  of the Act as amended by the Tamil Nadu
\n\t  Act 23 of 1973 ?”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The  Division   Bench  held  that\tthe  status  of\t the
\ndefendant, Seetharama  Rao from\t March 1, 1964 was that of a
\ntrespasser and\the was\tliable to pay profits or damages for
\nuse and\t occupation to\tthe plaintiff;\tthat the  defendant,
\nSeetharama Rao\twas not\t entitled  to  the  benefit  of\t the
\nprincipal Act  by the  coming into force of the Amending Act
\nas  the\t building  itself  was\toutside\t the  scope  of\t the
\nprincipal Act and even if the building was within its scope,
\nhe was\tnot a  tenant as  defined in the principal Act; that
\nsection 3  of the  Amending Act did not apply to the suit in
\nquestion and  hence it\tdid not\t abate on  June 10, 1964 and
\nthat after  the death  of  the\tdefendant,  Seetharama\tRao,
\ndefendants 2  to 10  were not  entitled\t to  the  protection
\nagainst eviction  under the  principal Act as amended by the
\nTamil Nadu Act No. 23 of 1973. Accordingly, it dismissed the
\nappeal filed  by defendant  No. 2.  The appeal\tfiled by the
\nplaintiff was also dismissed as a period of 2.6 years out of
\nthe period  of three  years’ time granted by the trial court
\nhad  expired   by  the\ttime  the  judgment  in\t appeal\t was
\ndelivered. Aggrieved  by the  decree passed  by the Division
\nBench, defendants  2 to 4 and 10 have filed the above appeal
\nby special leave in this Court.\n<\/p>\n
     The principal contention urged in support of the appeal
\nbefore us was that the suit having abated on the coming into
\nforce of  the Amending\tAct, it\t was not  open to  the trial
\ncourt to  treat the  proceedings before\t it as\ta  new\tsuit
\ninstituted after  the death of the defendant, Seetharama Rao
\nagainst defendants Nos. 2 to 10 and to pass a decree. In the
\n885<\/span>
\ninstant case,  as noticed  earlier, the\t trial court did not
\ndecide the  question whether  the suit\tabated on the coming
\ninto force  of the  Amending Act.  The Division Bench of the
\nHigh Court  has held  that the\tprovisions of section of the
\nAmending Act were not applicable to the suit and, therefore,
\nthe question of its abatement did not arise.\n<\/p>\n
     The undisputed  facts in  this case are: (1) Seetharama
\nRao  held   the\t suit\tproperty  as  a\t lessee\t before\t the
\ninstitution of\tthe  suit;  (2)\t that  the  lease  had\tbeen
\nterminated by  the issue  of a\tnotice\tin  accordance\twith
\nsection 106 of the Transfer of Property Act; (3) that a suit
\nfor eviction  of Seetharama  Rao was  filed on March 2, 1964
\nbefore the  City Civil\tCourt, Madras which was competent to
\ntry it on the date of its institution; (I) that by virtue of
\nalteration of  the pecuniary  jurisdiction of the City Civil
\nCourt and  consequential provisions made in that connection,
\nthe suit  stood transferred to the file of the original side
\nof the\tHigh Court with effect from May 1, 1964 and that the
\nsuit was, therefore, deemed to be pending in law on the file
\nof the\tHigh Court  on June  10,  1964\ton  which  date\t the
\nAmending Act  was published  in the  official  Gazette\teven
\nthough in fact the file was Lying on that date with the City
\nCivil Court.  The other proceedings which have been referred
\nto above  in some detail are not relevant for the purpose of
\ndeciding  the  question\t whether  the  suit  abated  on\t the
\npublication of the Amending Act in the official Gazette.\n<\/p>\n
     Section 2\t(ii) of\t the Amending  Act  repealed  clause\n<\/p>\n
(iii) of  section 30  of the principal Act. Consequently any
\nnon-residential building,  the rental  value of which on the
\ndate of\t the commencement of the principal Act as entered in
\nthe property  tax assessment  book of the municipal council,
\ndistrict Board,\t panchayat or panchayat union council or the
\nCorporation of\tMadras, as  the case  may be  exceeded\tfour
\nhundred rupees\tper mensem was also brought within the scope
\nof the\tprincipal  Act\tand  the  relationship\tbetween\t the
\nlandlord and tenant of such building came to be regulated by
\nit with effect from June 10, 1964.\n<\/p>\n
     Section 3\tof the Amending Act consists of three parts.
\nUnder the  first part,\tit directed that every proceeding in
\nrespect of  any\t nonresidential\t building  or  part  thereof
\npending before\tany court  or other  authority or officer on
\nthe date  of the publication of the Amending Act in the Fort
\nSt. George  Gazette and\t instituted on\tthe ground that such
\nbuilding or  part was  exempt from  the\t provisions  of\t the
\nprincipal Act by virtue of clause (iii) of section 30 of the
\nprincipal Act abated in so far as the proceedings related to
\nsuch building  or part.\t Under the  second part, it provided
\nthat all  rights and  privileges which\tmight  have  accrued
\nbefore such  date to  any landlord  in respect\tof any\tnon-
\nresidential building  or part  thereof by  virtue of  clause\n<\/p>\n
(iii) of section 30 of
\n886<\/span>
\nthe principal Act would cease and determine and would not be
\nenforceable. The  proviso to  section 3\t which is  the third
\npart of\t that section  provided that  nothing  contained  in
\nsection 3  should  be  deemed  to  invalidate  any  suit  or
\nproceeding in  which the  decree or  order passed  had\tbeen
\nexecuted or  satisfied in  full before the date mentioned in
\nthat section.\n<\/p>\n
     On behalf\tof the\tplaintiff,  three  contentions\twere
\nurged in  the appeal before the High Court in support of his
\ncase that  section 3 of the Amending Act was inapplicable to
\nthe present  case. They\t were (i)  that\t section  3  of\t the
\nAmending Act  had no  reference to  a suit at all; (ii) that
\neven if\t it had any reference to a suit, it did not apply to
\na suit\tof the\tpresent nature\tand (iii)  that even  if  it
\napplied to  a suit  of\tthe  present  nature  still  on\t the
\npleadings  of  the  plaintiff.\tthe  present  suit  was\t not
\naffected by  the said provision. The Division Bench rejected
\nthe first  contention of the plaintiff that section 3 had no
\nreference to  a suit  at all but it, however, upheld me case
\nof the\tplaintiff on the basis of the other two contentions.
\nRelying upon  the language of section 10(l) of the principal
\nAct which  provided that  a tenant  was\t not  liable  to  be
\nevicted whether in execution of a decree or otherwise except
\nin  accordance\twith  the  provisions  of  that\t section  or
\nsections 14  to 16 and the decision of the Madras High Court
\nin Theruvath  Vittil Muhammadunny  v. Melepurakkal  Unniri &
\nAnr. and  the decision\tof this Court in B.V. Patankar & ors
\nv. C.G.\t Sastry, the Division Bench held that it was settled
\nlaw that  the principal\t Act itself  did  not  prohibit\t the
\nfiling of a suit by a landlord for recovery of possession of
\nthe property  from a  tenant but only a decree passed in the
\nsaid suit  could not  be executed  except in accordance with
\nthe provisions of the principal Act and if that was the true
\nlegal position\tin respect  of the  buildings to  which\t the
\nprincipal Act  applied from  its commencement’\tthere was no
\njustification whatever for the Legislature making a contrary
\nprovision in  respect of  non-residential buildings to which
\nthe  principal\tAct  became  applicable\t by  virtue  of\t the
\nAmending Act.  The  Division  Bench,  therefore,  held\tthat
\nsection 3 of the Amending Act was not applicable to the case
\non hand. We are of the view that the above conclusion of the
\nDivision Bench\tis erroneous. It is not for the Court to ask
\nwhether there  was any\tjustification for the Legislature to
\nmake a\tcontrary provision  in respect\tof the\tsuits of the
\npresent nature.\t It was\t not the contention of the plaintiff
\nthat section  3 of the Amending Act was unconstitutional. In
\nthat situation,\t the High  Court had  no option but to apply
\nthe provision in question to the case on hand without going
\n887<\/span>
\ninto the  question whether  there was  any justification for
\nenacting it.  We are,  however. Of  the\t view  that  in\t the
\ncircumstances in  which the Amending Act came to be enacted,
\nthere was  every justification\tfor enacting  section  3  in
\norder to  give protection to  tenants against whom suits for
\neviction had  been filed  from buildings  which were brought
\nwithin the  scope of  the principal  Act by  deleting clause\n<\/p>\n
(iii) of section 30 of the principal Act.\n<\/p>\n
     The third\tcontention of  the plaintiff  in support his
\nplea that section 3 of the Amending Act was inapplicable was
\nformulated thus:  The provisions  of the aforesaid section 3
\nwould apply  only when\tthe three  conditions viz.  (i) that
\nthere should be a proceeding in respect of a non-residential
\nbuilding or  part thereof;  (ii) that  proceeding should  be
\npending before\tany court  or other  authority or officer on
\nthe date  of the publication of the Amending Act in the Fort
\nSt. George  Gazette; and  (iii) that  proceeding should have
\nbeen instituted\t on the\t ground that  such building  or part
\nthereof was  exempt from the provisions of the principal Act
\nby virtue  of clause  (iii) of\tsection 30  of the principal
\nAct, existed.  It was argued that since the present suit did
\nnot satisfy  the third\trequirement referred to above as the
\nplaintiff had  not referred to clause (iii) of section 30 of
\nthe principal  Act in  the plaint, section 3 of the Amending
\nAct should  be held  to be  inapplicable to it. The Division
\nBench upheld the above contention observing that in order to
\nattract section\t 3 of  the Amending  Act, there should be an
\nallegation in  the plaint  that the building in question was
\nexempt from the provisions of the principal Act by virtue of
\nclause (iii) of section 30 of the principal Act. In order to
\narrive at  the above conclusion, it relied upon the decision
\nof the\tMadras High  Court in  M\/s. Raval  & Co\t v.   K.  G.
\nRamachandran &\tOrs. and the<\/a> decision of this Court in P. J.
\nGupta\tCo. v.\tK. Venkatesan Merchant & ors. The<\/a> passage in
\nthe case  of M\/s.  Raval &  Co (supra) on which the Division
\nBench relied was follows:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It  has  to\tbe  immediately\t conceded  that\t the
\n     wording of this section can by no means be described as
\n     happy, or\tfree from  any cloud of ambiguity. It is not
\n     very clear\t how a proceeding could have been instituted
\n     ‘on the  ground that  such building  or part was exempt
\n     from the  provisions of  the principal Act by virtue of
\n     clause (iii) of s. 30’, or what is the precise scope of
\n     the rights\t and privileges\t which\tmay  accrue  to\t the
\n     landlord, and which are to cease and determine.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
888<\/span><\/p>\n
     We do  not think that in the context in which section 3
\nof the\tAmending Act  was enacted,  it could be said that it
\nwas not\t possible to  identify the proceedings to which that
\nprovision referred.  In the  case  of  P.  J.  Gupta  &\t Co.
\n(supra), the  effect of section 3 of the Amending Act is set
\nout as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “The obvious result of section 30(iii) of the Act,
\n     as it  stood before  the amendment,  was that,  if\t the
\n     rental value of a non-residential building,, as entered
\n     in the  property tax  book of the Municipality exceeded
\n     Rs. 400\/-per mensem, a description which applies to the
\n     premises under  consideration before  us  the  landlord
\n     would have\t no right  to proceed against the tenant for
\n     eviction under  section  10(2)  (ii)  a)  of  the\tAct.
\n     Section 3\tof the\tAmending Act,  on the  face  of\t it,
\n     applies  to   two\tkinds\tof  cases.  Its\t heading  is
\n     misleading in so far as it suggests that it is meant to
\n     apply only\t to one\t of these  two\tkinds.\tIt  applies:
\n     firstly, to  cases\t in  which  a  proceeding  has\tbeen
\n     instituted\t “on  the  ground”  that  a  non-residential
\n     building  “was   exempt  from  the\t provisions  of\t the
\n     principal Act”  and is  pending; and secondly, to cases
\n     where “rights  and privileges,  which may\thave accrued
\n     before such  date to)  any landlord  in respect of non-
\n     residential building  by  virtue  of  clause  (iii)  of
\n     section 30\t of the principal Act” exist. In the kind of
\n     case falling  in the first category, the amendment says
\n     that the  pending proceedings  shall abate.  As regards
\n     the second\t kind of  case, the amendment says that “the
\n     rights and\t privileges of\tthe landlord shall cease and
\n     determine shall not be enforceable.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Proceeding further, this Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
\t  “It is not necessary, for the purposes of tho case
\n     before us,\t to speculate about the types of cases which
\n     may actually fall within the two wings of the obviously
\n     inartistically drafted  section 3\tof the Amending Act.
\n     It is  enough for us to conclude, as we are bound to on
\n     the language  of the provision, that the case before us
\n     falls outside it.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The above\tobservations were  made by  this Court\tin a
\ncase where  a proceeding  had been initiated before the City
\nRent Controller in December, 1964 by a landlord for eviction
\nof his\ttenant from  a non-residential\tbuilding situated in
\nthe city  of Madras  which had\tbeen leased at Rs. 600\/- per
\nmonth on  the ground that the building had been sub-let. The
\nCity Rent  Controller ordered the eviction of the tenant. In
\nappeal, the Court of Small Causes at Madras allowed the
\n889<\/span>
\ntenant’s appeal\t holding that the tenant had the right under
\nthe original  lease of\tAugust 21, 1944 to sub-let, and also
\nbecause even  violation of  a clause of the subsequent lease
\nof April  3, 1963,  prohibiting subletting, did not entail a
\nforfeiture of  tenancy rights  under the  provisions of\t the
\nTransfer of  Property Act. Its view was that, in the case of
\nwhat it\t described as “a contractual tenancy” the provisions
\nof the\tTransfer of Property Act applied to the exclusion of
\nthe remedies  provided by  the principal  Act so that unless
\nthe lease  deed itself provided for a termination of tenancy
\nfor  sub-letting   in  addition\t  to  a\t  condition  against
\nsubletting, the\t tenancy right itself could not be forfeited
\nor determined  by such\ta breach of the contract of tenancy.
\nIn exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, under section 25
\nof The\tprincipal Act, the High Court of Madras reversed the
\njudgment and order of the Small Cause Court holding that the
\nrights of  the landlord and tenant were governed on the date
\nof the application for eviction by section 10(2) (ii) (a) of
\nthe principal Act which contained a prohibition against sub-
\nletting which involved parting with possession. On appeal to
\nthis Court,  the decision  of  the  Madras  High  Court\t was
\naffirmed holding  that the  effect of the amendment was that
\nthe landlord  acquired a  new right  to evict a tenant under
\nsection 10(2)  (ii) a).\t This Court  held that\tby virtue of
\nsection 3  of the  Amending Act,  all rights  and privileges
\nwhich might  have accrued  before the date of publication of
\nthe Amending  Act in the official Gazette to any landlord in
\nrespect of  any non-residential\t building or part thereof by
\nreason of  clause (iii)\t of section  30 of the principal Act
\nalone became  enforceable. But the right to seek eviction of
\nthe tenant  Under section 10(2) (ii) (a) was unaffected even
\nthough the sub-letting of the building had taken place prior
\nto the enactment of the Amending Act.\n<\/p>\n
     From a reading of he above decision, it is obvious that
\nThis Court  held that  the right which the landlord acquired
\nunder section  10(2) (ii)  (a) to evict the tenant was a now
\nright and  was not a pre-existing right which could possibly
\nbe affected  by section\t 3  of\tthe  Amending  Act.  It\t is,
\nhowever, clear from the observations of this Court extracted
\nabove that  a proceeding  which had  been instituted “on the
\nground” that a non-residential building “was exempt from the
\nprovisions of  the principal  Act” by virtue of clause (iii)
\nof section  30 of  The principal  Act and was pending on the
\ndate of publication of the amendment in the official Gazette
\nwould abate.  This Court  did  not,  however,  go  into\t the
\nquestion as  to what  types of\tcases would  fall within the
\nscope of  section 3  of the Amending Act. We are of the view
\nthat the  identification of  such cases\t depends on the true
\ncons-\n<\/p>\n
890<\/span><\/p>\n
truction of  the said  provision. In this case, we are faced
\nwith that question.\n<\/p>\n
     It is  appropriate\t to  refer  at\tthis  stage  to\t the
\nfollowing passage  occurring in Craies on Statute Law (Sixth
\nEdition) at page 99:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “In Bratt  v. Bratt  [1926] 3 Addams 210, 216, Sir
\n     John Nicholl  M. R.  said as  follows: “The  key to the
\n     opening of\t every law  is the  reason and spirit of the
\n     law; it  is the animus imponentis, the intention of the
\n     law-maker expressed  in the  law  itself,\ttaken  as  a
\n     whole. Hence,  to arrive  at the  true meaning  of\t any
\n     particular phrase\tin a  statute, the particular phrase
\n     is not  to be  viewed detached  from its context in the
\n     statute; it  is to\t be viewed  in connection  with\t its
\n     whole con\ttext, meaning  by this as well the title and
\n     preamble  as  the\tpurview\t or  enacting  part  of\t the
\n     statute.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     We have  already referred\tto the object with which the
\nAmending Act  was passed and that was to give relief against
\nunreasonable evictions\tand demands for unconscionable rates
\nof rents  to tenants  of buildings which had been originally
\nexempted from  the operation  of the  principal Act.  It  is
\nclear that  while doing\t so the Legislature gave relief also
\nto persons  against whom suits had been filed. WE think that
\nthe words  “instituted on  the ground  that such building or
\npart was  exempt from the provisions of the principal Act by
\nvirtue , of clause (iii) of section 30 of the principal Act”
\nshould be  construed in\t the context in which they appear as
\nreferring to  a proceeding  which had been instituted in the
\nlight of  section 30(iii) of the principal Act which granted
\nexemption in  respect of  the buildings\t referred to therein
\nfrom the  operation of\tthe  principal\tAct  and  any  other
\nconstruction would defeat the object of the Amending Act. lt
\nis seen\t that in  the instant  case, the original plaint was
\nfiled on the basis that the tenancy had been terminated with
\neffect from  the expiry\t of February 29, 1964. The plaintiff
\nprayed for eviction of the original defendant and also for a
\ndecree for damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs.
\n6000\/- per  month from\tthe date of the plaint till delivery
\nof the\tvacant possession  on the  assumption that after the
\ntermination of\tthe lease  the original\t defendant No. 1 was
\nnot a  tenant and was liable to pay damages and not the rent
\nof Rs.\t1,680\/- per  month which  was the fair rent fixed in
\nrespect of  the building  in a\tformer proceeding  under the
\nrent control  law in  force then. The suit in the above form
\ncould be filed for the relief referred to above only because
\nof the\texemption granted  by clause  (iii) of section 30 of
\nthe principal  Act because in the absence of such exemption,
\nno effective  decree for  ejectment could  be passed  by the
\nCity Civil Court in view of section
\n891<\/span>
\n10 of  the principal Act which provided that no tenant could
\nbe evicted  from a  building except  in accordance  with the
\nprovisions of  section 10  and section 14 to 16 thereof. The
\nplaintiff could not also have asked for a decree for damages
\nat Rs.\t6000\/- per  month which he had claimed in the plaint
\nbut for\t such exemption. We are, therefore. Of the view that
\nsection 3  of the Amending Act was applicable to the suit in
\nquestion as it was a proceeding instituted in the City Civil
\nCourt on the ground that the building in question was exempt
\nfrom the provisions of the principal Act by virtue of clause\n<\/p>\n
(iii) of  section 30  thereof although no express allegation
\nwas made in the plaint to that effect.\n<\/p>\n
     In\t order\tto  get\t over  the  inevitable\tconsequences
\nflowing from section 3 of the Amending Act and the effect of
\nan earlier  decision of\t a Division Bench of the Madras High
\nCourt in  Moolchand Gupta  v. Madras  Piece Goods  Merchants
\nCharitable Trust  a novel and ingenious contention was urged
\non behalf  of the  plaintiff, the said contention being that
\nafter the termination of the lease with effect from February
\n29, 1964  by the  issue of a notice under section 106 of the
\nTransfer of  Property Act,  the original  defendant became a
\ntrespasser and\tthe premises  in question  ceased  to  be  a
\nbuilding as defined in section 2(2) of the principal Act. On
\nthe  above   basis,  it\t was  contended\t that  the  original
\ndefendant  could  not  claim  the  benefit  of\tany  of\t the
\nprovisions of  the  principal  Act  and\t section  3  of\t the
\nAmending Act.  It was argued that since a contention of this
\nnature had  not been  considered in  the case  of  Moolchand
\nGupta (supra),\tit had\tno binding  effect on  the  Division
\nBench which heard this case. It is appropriate at this stage
\nto set\tout the\t passage from  the judgment  of the Division
\nBench of  the High  Court in  which the\t binding  nature  of
\nMoolchand Gupta’s case (supra) is considered:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “In this  context, Mr.  Govind Swaminathan brought
\n     to our  notice a  decision of  a Bench of this Court in
\n     Moolchand\tGupta\tv.  Madras   Piece  Goods  Merchants
\n     Charitable Trust  (supra) to  which one  of  us  was  a
\n     party. In\tour opinion,  in that decision this question
\n     was not considered. That case also was concerned with a
\n     non-residential building  which did not fall within the
\n     purview of\t the Act  because of  section 30(iii) of the
\n     Act. The  tenancy was  terminated on 31st October, 1960
\n     and the  suit in ejectment was instituted on 19-12-1960
\n     which ended  in a compromise decree dated 31st January,
\n     1963. The\tdecree provided for a direction for eviction
\n     against the quondam tenant, subject to cer-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
892<\/span><\/p>\n
     tain terms\t thereafter mentioned,\tto wit, the landlord
\n     being entitled to take possession of the portion of the
\n     premises in  occupation of one Panchand and the Bullion
\n     Market Post  Office immediately by executing the decree
\n     in so  far as  The said  portion was  concerned and the
\n     quondam tenant delivering possession of the rest of the
\n     portion in\t his occupation\t on or\tbefore 31st January,
\n     1964 and the quondam tenant paying mesne profits at Rs.
\n     1340\/- per\t month for the period from 1st November 1960
\n     to 31st  January, 1963 and further mesne profits at Rs.
\n     800\/- per\tmonth for  the period  commencing  from\t 1st
\n     February, 1963  till delivery of possession. The decree
\n     also provided  that if  there was default in payment of
\n     the sum  of Rs.  800\/- or\tthe other sum per month, the
\n     landlord  would  be  entitled  to\texecute\t the  decree
\n     immediately. Time\tfor vacating was extended and before
\n     the building  was actually\t vacated the Tamil Nadu ‘Act
\n     11 of  1964 intervened.  The question  was, whether  by
\n     virtue of\tthe intervention of the Tamil Nadu Act 11 of
\n     1964, the\tdecree could  be executed. The learned trial
\n     Judge felt that in view of the fact that there had been
\n     a surrender  of a\tpart of\t the holding  by the quondam
\n     tenant’s sub-tenant,  there was  a\t disruption  of\t the
\n     entire holding  and therefore  the quondam tenant would
\n     not be a statutory tenant within the meaning of section
\n     2(8)  of\tthe  Act.  The\tBench  disagreed  with\tthis
\n     conclusion and  held that the quondam tenant would be a
\n     tenant under section 2(8) of the Act as he continued to
\n     remain in\tpossession of  the property  even after\t the
\n     termination of  the tenancy in his favour. No point was
\n     urged before  the Court that the termination of tenancy
\n     having taken  place ?  before Tamil Nadu Act 11 of 1964
\n     came into force, the definition of the term ‘tenant’ in
\n     section 2(8)  did not  apply to  the quondam  tenant in
\n     that case\tand therefore  the said\t decision cannot  be
\n     considered to  be an  authority for  the point which is
\n     now raised before us.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     From the  facts of Moolchand Gupta’s case (supra) it is
\nclear that  the Division  Bench of the Madras High Court had
\nheld that  a tenant  whose tenancy  had been terminated with
\neffect from  October 31,  1960 and against whom a decree for
\neviction had  been passed prior to the date on which section
\nof the\tAmending Act  came into\t force was  entitled  to  be
\ntreated as a tenant by virtue of the said provision since he
\nhad continued  to remain  in possession of the property even
\nafter
\n893<\/span>
\nthe termination of the tenancy. The only ground on which the
\nDivision Bench\twhich heard  the present case did not follow
\nthe ruling  in Moolchand  Gupta’s case\t(supra) is  that the
\neffect of  the termination  of tenancy\tprior to the date on
\nwhich Tamil  Nadu Act No. Xl of 1964 came into force had not
\nbeen considered\t in that  case.\t The  binding  effect  of  a
\ndecision, as  observed by  this Court  in Smt.\tSommavanti &
\nOrs. v.\t The Sate  of Punjab  & Ors  does  not\tdepend\tupon
\nwhether a particular argument was considered therein or not,
\nprovided that  the point with reference to which an argument
\nwas subsequently  advanced was\tactually decided.  On  going
\nthrough the  decision in  Moolchand Gupta’s  case (supra) we
\nare of\tthe view  that the  appropriate procedure  which the
\nDivision Bench\tshould have  followed in  this case  was  to
\nrefer it  to a\tfull Bench  instead of\tbypassing  the\tsaid
\ndecision in  the manner\t in which  it has  been done in this
\ncase. The well-settled practice to be followed in such cases
\nis succinctly  put by Das Gupta, J. in Mahadeolal Kanodia v.
\nThe Administrator-General of West Bengal<\/a> as follows:-\n<\/p>\n
\t  “Before we  part with\t this appeal, however, it is
\n     our duty  to refer\t to one\t incidental matter.  We have
\n     noticed with some regret that when the earlier decision
\n     of two judges of the same High Court in Deorajan’s case
\n     (1953) 58\tC.W.N.\t64  was\t cited\tbefore\tthe  learned
\n     Judges’ who  heard the  present  appeal  they  took  on
\n     themselves to say that the previous decision was wrong,
\n     instead of\t following the\tusual procedure\t in case  of
\n     difference of  opinion with  an  earlier  decision,  of
\n     referring the  question to\t a  larger  Bench.  Judicial
\n     decorum no\t less than  legal propriety forms the! basis
\n     of judicial  procedure. If\t one thing is more necessary
\n     in law  than any  other thing,  it is  the\t quality  of
\n     certainty. That  quality  would  totally  disappear  if
\n     judges of\tco-ordinate jurisdiction  in  a\t High  Court
\n     start  overruling\t one  another’s\t  decision.  If\t one
\n     Division Bench of a High Court is unable to distinguish
\n     a previous\t decision of  another  Division\t Bench,\t and
\n     holding the  view that  the earlier  decision is wrong,
\n     itself gives  effect to  that view\t the result would be
\n     utter confusion.  The position  would  be\tequally\t bad
\n     where a  Judge sitting  singly in\tthe High Court is of
\n     opinion that  the previous\t decision of  another single
\n     Judge on a question of law is wrong and gives effect to
\n     that view\tinstead of  referring the matter to a larger
\n     Bench.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
894<\/span><\/p>\n
     In such  a case  lawyers would  not know  how to advise
\n     their the\tclients and  all courts\t subordinate to\t the
\n     High Court\t would find  themselves in  an\tembarrassing
\n     position  of   having  to\tchoose\tbetween\t dissentient
\n     judgments of their own High Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  As far  as we are aware it is the uniform practice
\n     in all  the High  Courts in  India that if one Division
\n     Bench differs from an earlier view on a question of law
\n     of another\t Division Bench,  a reference  is made\tto a
\n     larger Bench.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     Be that  as it  may, we  are of  the view\tthat  having
\nregard to our finding that the suit stood abated on June 10,
\n1964 by\t virtue of  the\t provisions  of\t section  3  of\t the
\nAmending Act,  the original defendant, Seetharama Rao became
\na statutory  tenant of the premises in question and he could
\nnot be\tevicted from  the premises except in accordance with
\nthe procedure  specified in  the principal Act. The position
\nwould not  have been different even if a decree for eviction
\nhad been  passed against  him before  June 10,\t1964 and the
\ndecree had  not been  executed or  satisfied in full on that
\ndate. The  several decisions on which reliance was placed by
\nthe  Division\tBench  for   determining  the  character  of
\npossession of  the original  defendant, Seetharama Rao after
\nthe expiry  of the  notice given  under section\t 106 of\t the
\nTransfer of  Property Act  were not relevant for the purpose
\nof this\t case because in none of them there was any occasion
\nto consider  the effect\t of a provision similar to section 3
\nof the\tAmending Act.  We, therefore,  do not agree with the
\nfinding of  the Division  Bench that  the original defendant
\nwas a  trespasser in  possession of the premises in question
\nafter June 10, 1964.\n<\/p>\n
     We also  find it difficult to agree with the finding of
\nthe Division  Bench that  the premises in question was not a
\n‘building’ as  defined in section 2(2) of the principal Act.
\nThe reason  given by the Division Bench for holding that the
\nbuilding in question was not a ‘building’ within the meaning
\nof section  2(2) of  the principal Act was that it was not a
\nbuilding which\twas either  ‘let’ or  ‘to be let’ separately
\nfor residential or non-residential purposes. It is necessary
\nto extract  that part  of the judgment of the Division Bench
\nwhere the above question is dealt with:-\n<\/p>\n
     “The definition  of the word ‘building’ in section 2(2)
\n     states:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “building’ means  any building or hut or part of a
\n     building or  hut, let  or\tto  be\tlet  separately\t for
\n     residential or non-residential purposes ……..\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
895<\/span><\/p>\n
     Consequently it is not every building that comes within
\n     the scope\tof the Act, but only a building let or to be
\n     let  separately   for  either   of\t the  two  purposes.
\n     Admittedly on  10-6-1964 the  suit building was not let
\n     because the  tenancy came\tto an  end by  29-2-1964 and
\n     late Seetharama Rao was not occupying the building from
\n     1-3-1964 as  a tenant,  as found  by us. Therefore, the
\n     only other\t question is,  whether the suit building can
\n     be said  to be a building to be let separately for non-
\n     residential purposes  on  10-6-1964.  We  have  already
\n     referred to  the claim of their plaintiff in his plaint
\n     that he  needed the  building for\this own\t use and the
\n     contention\t of  late  Seetharama  Rao  in\this  written
\n     statement dated 25-4-1964 that the plaintiff was merely
\n     anxious to\t extort higher rent and for that purpose had
\n     from time\tto time approached him, that although he was
\n     prepared to  pay a\t reasonable rent, he was not willing
\n     to pay  anything exorbitant  and that  it is because of
\n     that the plaintiff had instituted the present suit on a
\n     pretence of  requiring it\tfor his\t own business.\tWith
\n     reference to  the notice  Ex. P-2,\t late Seetharama Rao
\n     stated that  notice was  merely  in  keeping  with\t the
\n     previous notices  to the  same effect  which  were\t not
\n     intended to  be acted  upon. However  before the  trial
\n     Judge the\tclaim of  the plaintiff that he required the
\n     premises for  his own  need was not put in issue and no
\n     issue was\tframed with  reference thereto.\t Tho learned
\n     Judge himself states in his judgment:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t  “On the  relevant date,  undoubtedly there  was no
\n\t  letting of  the building  and it  is nobody’s case
\n\t  that the same was to be let.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The correctness of this statement found in the judgment
\n     of the learned Judge, namely, that it was nobody’s case
\n     that the building was to be let has not been challenged
\n     either in\tthe ground  of the appeal filed before this-
\n     Court or  in the arguments before us. Therefore we have
\n     to proceed on the basis that it was not the case of the
\n     defend  its  that\tthe  plaintiff\twanted\tto  let\t the
\n     premises in  question. This  Court\t has  construed\t the
\n     relevant  expression,  namely,  ‘building\tto  be\tlet’
\n     occurring\tin  section  2(2)  of  the  Act\t as  meaning
\n     ‘building intended to be let’ in R. K. Veerappa Naidu &
\n     Anr. v.  N. Gopalan  (1961 1 M.L.J. 223. In the present
\n     case on 10-6-1964 it was not the case of the defendants
\n     that the building was intended to be let and it was not
\n     also their\t case  that  at\t any  stage  thereafter\t the
\n     plaintiff intended to let the
\n896<\/span>
\n     suit building.  Therefore, it  follows  that  the\tsuit
\n     building did  not come within the purview of the Act as
\n     a result of the amending Act 11 of 1964.”<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
     The reason given by the Division Bench for holding that
\nthe building  in question  was not  a ‘building’  within the
\nmeaning of section 2(2) of R the principal Act appears to be
\na strange one.\n<\/p>\n
     A definition clause does not necessarily in any statute
\napply in  all possible\tcontexts in  which the word which is
\ndefined may  be found therein. The opening clause of section
\n2 of  the principal  Act itself suggests that any expression
\ndefined in that section should be given the meaning assigned
\nto it  therein unless’\tthe content  otherwise requires. The
\ntwo-fold reasoning  of the  Division Bench  for holding that
\nthe building  in question  was not  a ‘building’  is that on
\nJune 10,  1964 (i)  there was no lease in force and hence it
\nwas not\t let and (ii) that on that date the plaintiff had no
\nintention to lease it and therefore it was not to be let. We
\nare of\tthe view  that the  words “any building….. let.. ”
\nalso refer  to a  building which was the subject matter of a
\nlease which  has been  terminated by  the issue\t of a notice
\nunder section  106 of the Transfer of Property Act and which
\nhas continued  to remain  in occupation\t of the tenant. This
\nview receives  support from the definition of the expression
\n‘tenant’ in section 2(8) of the principal Act which includes
\na person  continuing in\t possession after the termination of
\nthe tenancy  in his  favour. If\t the  view  adopted  by\t the
\nDivision Bench\tis accepted  then it  would not be necessary
\nfor a  landlord to issue a notice of vacancy under section 3
\nof the\tprincipal Act  when a building becomes vacant by the
\ntermination of\ta tenancy  or any the eviction of the tenant
\nwhen he\t wants to occupy it himself. In law he cannot do so.
\nHe would  be entitled  to  occupy  it  himself\twhen  he  is
\npermitted to  do  so  under  section  3(3)  or\tany  of\t the
\nprovisions of  section 3A  of the  principal Act.  This also
\nillustrates  that   the\t view\tof  the\t Division  Bench  is
\nerroneous. We, therefore, hold that the building in question
\nwas a  ‘building’ within  the meaning  of that expression in
\nsection 2(2)  of the  principal Act  on the  date  on  which
\nsection 3 of the Amending Act became operative.\n<\/p>\n
     It thus  becomes clear  that the Suit came to an end in
\nthe eye\t of law\t on June 10, 1964 and the original defendant
\nbecame entitled\t to the\t protection of the principal Act. He
\ncould thereafter  be evicted from the building only after an
\norder  was   made,  by\tthe  Controller\t under\tany  of\t the
\nprovisions of the principal Act which conferred jurisdiction
\non him\tto do  so. As mentioned earlier, no formal order was
\npassed by  the High  Court on its original side stating that
\nthe suit  had abated  on June 10, 1964 till the death of the
\noriginal defendant which took
\n897<\/span>
\nplace. On  January 15,\t1968. Owing  to certain\t proceedings
\nwhich were  instituted by  one or  the other of the parties,
\nthe case  was treated as a pending proceeding on the file of
\nthe High Court although in law, it was not open to the court
\nto proceed with it after June 10, 1964.\n<\/p>\n
     The next  significant step\t that was  taken before\t the
\nHigh Court  was the application made by the appellant in the
\nyear 1973  requesting the  Court to  permit him to amend the
\nplaint by  the inclusion  of a prayer for possession against
\ndefendants Nos.\t 2 to  10 on  the basis\t that they  were not
\n‘tenants’ as  defined in  section 2(8) of the principal Act.
\nThat application  was  allowed.\t Defendants  Nos.  2  to  10
\nthereafter filed  their written\t statements and\t the  issues
\nframed\tin  the\t suit  were  recast  in\t the  light  of\t the
\npleadings.  The\t  learned  trial  Judge,  as  stated  above,
\ndisposed of  the suit  as a  fresh one as against defendants
\nNos. 2\tto 10  without recording  a finding  on the question
\nwhether it  had abated\tor June\t 10, 1964. The learned trial
\nJudge does  not state in the course of its judgment the date
\nfrom which  the proceeding  was treated\t as a fresh suit. In
\nthe instant  case, the\tsuit itself  was originally flied on
\nMarch 2,  1964. The  original defendant\t died on January 15,
\n1968. Even  if the  proceeding was  treated as\ta fresh suit
\nagainst defendants Nos. 2 to 10, it could be treated as such
\nonly from  a date  subsequent to  January 15,  ‘968 on which
\ndate the  original defendant did since the contention of the
\nplaintiff which\t found favour  with the learned single judge
\nand the Division Bench of the High Court was that defendants
\nNos. 2\tto 10 who were legal representatives of the original
\ndefendant could\t not succeed  to the  tenancy right  of\t the
\noriginal defendant. In the instant case, since the plaintiff
\nbased his  claim on  the above\tcontention in  the year 1973
\nwhen he\t made the application for 1 amendment of the plaint,
\nthe date  of the  institution of the fresh suit could not be
\nearlier than the date on which the application for amendment
\nwas made  even if  it was  permissible\tto  do\tso.  By\t his
\njudgment the  learned  single  Judge  passed  a\t decree\t for
\npossession against  defendants Nos.  2 to 10 and for damages
\nto be determined under order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil
\nProcedure without  specifying the  date from  which  damages
\nwould be  payable. In  the absence  of such – specification,
\nthe plaintiff  became entitled\tto claim damages under order
\n20, Rule  12 of\t the Code  of Civil  Procedure even from the
\ndate of\t the suit  i.e. March 2, 1964. The Division Bench by
\nits judgment  affirmed that  part of the decree of the trial
\ncourt. The  direction for payment, of mesne profits given in
\nthe decree  of the trial court without specify the date from
\nwhich damages  should be computed could not have been passel
\nconsistently with  its judgment\t in which it had been stated
\nthat the  suit was  being treated  as  a  fresh\t suit.\tThis
\ndefect, however is of a 3-473SCI\/79
\n898<\/span>
\nminor character.  What is  more fundamental  in this case is
\nthat it was not permissible for the trial court to Treat the
\nproceeding which  had been  instituted against\tthe original
\ndefendant prior\t to June 10, 1964 as a live proceeding which
\ncould be  converted into  a fresh  suit\t instituted  against
\ndefendants NOS.\t 2 to  10 after\t the death  of the  original
\ndefendant, Seetharama  Rao. An\tamendment  of  a  plaint  by
\ninclusion of  a new prayer or by addition of new parties can
\nbe made\t only where  a suit is pending before a court in the
\neye of\tlaw.  On  June\t10,  1964,  the\t entire\t proceedings
\ncommenced with\tthe plaint  filed on  March  2,\t 1964  stood
\nterminated and\tthere was  no plaint  in a  live suit  which
\ncould be  amended by  the addition  of new  parties and\t the
\ninclusion of  a new  prayer. We\t are of\t the view  that\t the
\naddition of  new parties which took place after the death of
\nSeetharama Rao and the amendment of ‘ the plaint in the year
\n1973 and  the passing  of the  decree  by  the\ttrial  Judge
\nagainst defendants  Nos. 2 to 10 who were not parties to the
\nsuit prior  to June  10, 1964  on a  cause of  action  which
\naccrued subsequent  to January\t15, 1968  were\tall  without
\njurisdiction. It  was, however,\t argued\t on  behalf  of\t the
\nplaintiff before  us relying upon the decision of this Court
\nin B. Banerjee v. Anita. Pan<\/a> that since the parties had gone
\nto trial with open eyes knowing fully that the plaintiff was
\nrelying upon  a cause  of action which accrued in his favour
\nafter the  death of  the original defendant and on the basis
\nof the\tamendment of the plaint in the year 1973, the decree
\npassed by the trial court and affirmed by the Division Bench
\nof the\tHigh Court  should not\tbe interfered  with  in\t the
\ninterests of justice and equity. It is no doubt true that in
\nthe decision  referred to  above, this Court permitted the t
\nparties\t to  file  fresh  pleadings  and  to  prosecute\t the
\nproceedings after  the disposal\t of the\t case by  this Court
\nhaving regard  to the delay which had already ensued. It was
\npossible for  this Court to do so in that case because there
\nwas no\tlegal impediment  as we have in the present case. To
\nrepeat, in the present case, the suit abated by reason of an
\nexpress provision  in a\t statute on  June 10,  1964, the new
\ncause of  action on  which the plaintiff depended accrued on
\nJanuary 15,  1968 i.e. the date of the death of the original
\ndefendant, the\tplaint itself  was amended  in the year 1973
\nclaiming relief against defendants Nos. 2 to 10 not as legal
\nrepresentatives who  inherited\tthe  tenancy  right  of\t the
\noriginal defendant  but as persons who had not inherited the
\nsaid right . It is thus seen that there was no proceeding in
\nthe eye\t of law\t rending after\tJune 10,  1964, the cause of
\naction on  the basis of which relief was claimed was totally
\ndifferent and the persons against whom the relief was sought
\nwere also different. Parties could not either by
\n899<\/span>
\nconsent or  acquiescence confer\t jurisdiction on  court when
\nlaw had taken it away.\n<\/p>\n
     In these  circumstances, we  feel that  the only course
\nwhich we can adopt is to set aside the findings of the trial
\ncourt and  of the  Division Bench  on issues relating to the
\nclaim of  the plaintiff\t to get\t possession of\tthe property
\nfrom defendants\t Nos. 2\t to 10\ton the ground that they were
\nnot statutory  tenants i.e. issues Nos. 4 and 6 and to leave
\nthe questions involved in them open reserving liberty to the
\nparties to  agitate them in appropriate proceedings. In view
\nof our\tfinding on  issue No.  3, we  hold that\t the  decree
\npassed by  the trial  court  and  the  appellate  court\t are
\nunsustainable.\n<\/p>\n
     We accordingly  allow the appeal, set aside the decrees
\npassed by  the trial  court and by the Division Bench of the
\nHigh Court  and dispose of the suit as having abated on June
\n10, 1964.  The findings on issues Nos. 4 and 6 are set aside
\nwithout expressing  any opinion on them reserving liberty to
\nthe  parties   to  agitate   the  question   in\t appropriate
\nproceedings. Having regard to the peculiar circumstances of:
\nthe case,  we direct  the parties  to bear  their own  costs
\nthroughout.\n<\/p>\n
P.B.R.\t\t\t\t\t     Appeal allowed.\n900<\/span>\n\n\n\n<\/pre>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India K. Balakrishna Rao And Ors vs Hazi Abdulla Sait And Ors on 10 October, 1979 Equivalent citations: 1980 AIR 214, 1980 SCR (1) 875 Author: E Venkataramiah Bench: Venkataramiah, E.S. (J) PETITIONER: K. BALAKRISHNA RAO AND ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: HAZI ABDULLA SAIT AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT10\/10\/1979 BENCH: VENKATARAMIAH, E.S. (J) […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-196131","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nK. 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