{"id":197932,"date":"2007-03-12T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2007-03-11T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/geejaganda-somaiah-vs-state-of-karnataka-on-12-march-2007"},"modified":"2015-12-27T08:44:40","modified_gmt":"2015-12-27T03:14:40","slug":"geejaganda-somaiah-vs-state-of-karnataka-on-12-march-2007","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/geejaganda-somaiah-vs-state-of-karnataka-on-12-march-2007","title":{"rendered":"Geejaganda Somaiah vs State Of Karnataka on 12 March, 2007"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Geejaganda Somaiah vs State Of Karnataka on 12 March, 2007<\/div>\n
Author: . A Pasayat<\/div>\n
Bench: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, Lokeshwar Singh Panta<\/div>\n
           CASE NO.:\nAppeal (crl.)  311 of 2007\n\nPETITIONER:\nGEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSTATE OF KARNATAKA\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT: 12\/03\/2007\n\nBENCH:\nDr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
JUDGMENT<\/p>\n
Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J.\n<\/p>\n
1. Leave granted.\n<\/p>\n
2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment rendered by a Division Bench
\nof the Karnataka High Court dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant
\nquestioning correctness of the conviction recorded by the Fast Track Court.
\nThe said Court found the appellant guilty of offence punishable under
\nSection 302 of the India Penal Code, 1860 (in short the ‘IPC’) and
\nsentenced him to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of
\nRs.8,000\/- with default stipulation.’<\/p>\n
3. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows:\n<\/p>\n
One Chengapa (hereinafter referred to as the ‘deceased’), his wife Smt.
\nBaby Chengappa (PW-1), the accused and most of the witnesses are the
\nresidents of Garvale village.  There is no much dispute that the accused
\nand the deceased were related.  According to the prosecution the Geejaganda
\nfamily to which the accused and the deceased belong owned nearly 348 acres
\nof land.  Out of the same, donation of about 48 acres, was made and the
\nremaining area was with the family.  There were six sharers in the said
\nGeejaganda family. The said six sharers were in possession of the
\nrespective portion of the remaining area. The deceased was claiming
\nequitable partition and share in family land which was opposed by the
\naccused and this resulted in ultimate murder of the deceased Chengappa on
\n23.9.1995 at 8.00 p.m.  It is relevant to note that there is no much
\ndispute that on 21.9.1995 i.e. two days before the incident, the Revenue
\nInspector had visited and inspected the family lands on the request made by
\nthe deceased for having equitable partition.  On 23.9.1995 in the morning
\nthe deceased left the house informing his wife PW-1, that he is going to
\nMadapura to meet the Revenue Inspector.  At that time, he was wearing one
\nHMT Watch, gold ring with inscription “GDC”, a gold chain and a sum of
\nRs.2,500\/-.  He informed PW-1 that he may return in the evening and if he
\ndoes not, he will come back on the next day morning.  Since the deceased
\ndid not come back even in the morning of 24.9.1995, PW-1 went to the coffee
\nland to attend the work and on the way on Thakeri-Garvale Road, saw the
\ndead body of her husband lying by the side of the road with injuries on his
\nperson.  On seeing it she went back to the house and informed the incident
\nto her children and all the family members came back to the place.  By then
\nthe police who had received incomplete information also arrived at the spot
\nand after recording the statement of PW-1 and treating the same as first
\ninformation report, registered a case in Crime No.215\/1995 for the offence
\npunishable under Section 302 IPC read with Section 34 IPC against the two
\naccused persons including the appellant- accused no.1 and investigation was
\ntaken up.\n<\/p>\n
4. After registration of the case the mandatory procedures like holding of
\nmahazar, drawing up of inquest proceedings were conducted. Statements of
\nwitnesses were recorded and search for the accused was carried out.  On the
\nsame day, i.e., on 24.9.1995, accused no.1 voluntarily appeared before the
\nInvestigating Officer and surrendered.  He was taken into custody and
\ninterrogated and from his voluntary statement, the permissible portion
\nmarked as Ex.P-14 was recorded.  On the basis of the voluntary statement,
\ngold chain, ring belonging to the deceased and the weapon alleged to have
\nbeen used in the crime in question were discovered from the house of the
\naccused no.1.  Those were seized along with the bloodstained clothes which
\nwere subjected to forensic science examination.  On receipt of all the
\nreports including F.S.L., autopsy, serologist and on completion of the
\ninvestigation, charge sheet was filed against the accused persons for the
\noffence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.\n<\/p>\n
5. In order to establish its accusations the prosecution examined 16
\nwitnesses. The accused persons pleaded innocence and stated that because of
\nenmity they have been falsely implicated.\n<\/p>\n
6. The Trial Court on consideration of the evidence on record found the
\nappellant guilty. However, the co-accused was given the benefit of doubt
\nand order of acquittal was recorded.\n<\/p>\n
7. The entire case of the prosecution revolves around the evidence which is
\ncircumstantial in nature, as there were no eye witnesses to the actual
\nassault.  The circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are:\n<\/p>\n
(i)\tMotive;\n<\/p>\n
(ii)\tLast seen together’<\/p>\n
(iii)\tDiscovery\/recovery of the golden ornaments by the deceased and the
\nmurder weapon seized from the house of the accused no.1 along with the
\nbloodstained clothes of the accused no.1; and lastly<\/p>\n
(iv)\tabsence of any explanation by the accused no.1.\n<\/p>\n
8. The High Court found that the circumstances were conclusive to prove
\nguilt of the accused and, therefore, confirmed the conviction and the
\nsentence by dismissing the appeal.\n<\/p>\n
9. In support of the appeal leaned counsel for the appellant submitted that
\nthe factual scenario as projected by the prosecution does not establish the
\nguilt of the accused and the circumstances highlighted by the prosecution
\nto establish its case does not present a complete chain of circumstances to
\nwarrant any interference of guilty.\n<\/p>\n
10. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand supported the
\njudgment of the High Court affirming that the judgment of the Trial Court.\n<\/p>\n
11. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case
\nrests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be
\njustified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found
\nto be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any
\nother person. (See Hukam Singh v. State of Rajasthan, AIR<\/a> (1977) SC 1063,
\nEradu v. State of Hyderabad, AIR<\/a> (1956) SC 316, Earabhadrappa v. State of
\nKarnataka, AIR (1983) SC 446, State of U.P. v. Sukhbasi, AIR<\/a> (1985) SC
\n1224, Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1987) SC 350, and Ashok
\nKumar Chatterjee v. State of M.P.<\/a> ,AIR (1989) SC 1890. The circumstances
\nfrom which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be
\nproved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected
\nwith the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. In
\nBhagat Ram v. State of Punjab AIR (1954 )SC 621 it was laid down that where
\nthe case depends upon the conclusion drawn from circumstances the
\ncumulative effect of the circumstances must be such as to negative the
\ninnocence of the accused and bring home the offences beyond any reasonable
\ndoubt.\n<\/p>\n
We may also make a reference to a decision of this Court in C. Chenga Reddy
\nv. State of A.P., (1996) 10 SCC 193, wherein it has been observed thus:\n<\/p>\n
“21. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the settled law is that
\nthe circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is drawn should be
\nfully proved and such circumstances must be conclusive in nature. Moreover,
\nall the circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in
\nthe chain of evidence. Further, the proved circumstances must be consistent
\nonly with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally
\ninconsistent with his innocence.”\n<\/p>\n
In Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P. AIR (1990) SC 79, it was laid down
\nthat when a case rests upon circumstantial evidence, such evidence must
\nsatisfy the following tests:\n<\/p>\n
(1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is sought to be
\ndrawn, must be cogently and firmly established;\n<\/p>\n
(2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency unerringly
\npointing towards guilt of the accused;\n<\/p>\n
(3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so complete
\nthat there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human
\nprobability the crime was committed by the accused and none else; and<\/p>\n
(4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction must be
\ncomplete and incapable of explanation of any other hypothesis than that of
\nguilt of the accused and such evidence should not only be consistent with
\nthe guilt of the accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.”\n<\/p>\n
In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava<\/a> (1992) Crl. LJ 1104, it was
\npointed out that great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial
\nevidence and if the evidence relied on is reasonably capable of two
\ninferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. It was also
\npointed out that the circumstances relied upon must be found to have been
\nfully established and the cumulative effect of all the facts so established
\nmust be consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt.\n<\/p>\n
12. Sir Alfred Wills in his admirable book `Wills’ Circumstantial Evidence’
\n(Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be observed in the
\ncase of circumstantial evidence: (1) the facts alleged as the basis of any
\nlegal inference must be clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt
\nconnected with the factum probandum; (2) the burden of proof is always on
\nthe party who asserts the existence of any fact, which infers legal
\naccountability; (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial
\nevidence the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case
\nadmits; (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory
\nfacts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable
\nof explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his
\nguilt; and (5) if there be any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
\naccused, he is entitled as of right to be acquitted.\n<\/p>\n
13. There is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial
\nevidence but it should be tested by the touchstone of law relating to
\ncircumstantial evidence laid down by this Court as far back as in 1952.\n<\/p>\n
In Hanumant Govind Nargundkar v. State of M.P. AIR (1952) SC 343,  it was
\nobserved thus:\n<\/p>\n
“It is well to remember that in cases where the evidence is of a
\ncircumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt
\nis to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established, and
\nall the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
\nof the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a
\nconclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every
\nhypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be
\na chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground
\nfor a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must
\nbe such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been
\ndone by the accused.”\n<\/p>\n
A reference may be made to a later decision in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v.
\nState of Maharashtra, AIR<\/a> (1984) SC 1622, Therein, while dealing with
\ncircumstantial evidence, it has been held that the onus was on the
\nprosecution to prove that the chain is complete and the infirmity of lacuna
\nin the prosecution cannot be cured by a false defence or plea. The
\nconditions precedent in the words of this Court, before conviction could be
\nbased on circumstantial evidence, must be fully established. They are:\n<\/p>\n
(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn
\nshould be fully established. The circumstances concerned must or should and
\nnot may be established;\n<\/p>\n
(2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis
\nof the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should not be explainable
\non any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty;\n<\/p>\n
(3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;\n<\/p>\n
(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be
\nproved; and<\/p>\n
(5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any
\nreasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the
\naccused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been
\ndone by the accused.\n<\/p>\n
14. Some of the circumstances which need to be highlighted are recovery of
\nthe gold ornaments of the deceased as well as the weapon used in the crime.
\nThe bloodstained clothes of the appellant were also seized. Prosecution has
\nrelied on the evidence of PWs 6 and 12 to establish its stand about the
\nrecovery.  PW-6, the goldsmith who was called for testing and weighing gold
\nornaments. He admitted that he accompanied police officer for recovery of
\nthe ornaments from the accused but resiled from certain parts of the
\nstatement made during investigation. PW-12 specifically stated that the
\nappellant led the police and the mahazar witness for discovery of the
\narticles namely, gold chain MO 10, bloodstained clothes i.e. MO 14 of the
\naccused.  These are along with clothes were sent for forensic examination.
\nThe evidence of FSL Officer and his report equally established that the
\nbloodstains were there.  Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in
\nshort ‘Evidence Act’) has also application.  As held by this Court in J.P.
\nAnand v. D.G. Baffna, AIR<\/a> (2002) SC 141, and Ezhil and Ors. v. State of
\nTamil Nadu,  AIR<\/a> (2002) SC 2017, in the absence of explanation of the
\naccused as to legitimate or origin of their possession of articles
\nbelonging to the deceased, keeping in view of the time within which the
\nmurder was supposed to have been committed and the body found and the
\narticles recovered from the possession of the accused an inference can be
\ncan be safely drawn that not only the accused was in possessions of those
\narticles belonging to the deceased but also committed murder of the
\ndeceased. The articles belonging to the deceased were in possession of the
\naccused who had voluntarily disclosed and as such presumption under Section
\n114 of the Evidence Act was clearly applicable.\n<\/p>\n
15. The most important circumstance for the prosecution in the case is the
\ndisclosure statements of the accused persons and recoveries of the stolen
\nproperty, blood stained shirt and weapon of offence consequent upon such
\nstatements. The admissibility of the statements made by the accused persons
\nto the police is challenged on twin grounds, i.e., (i) factually no such
\nstatement was made, and (ii) the statement made was inadmissible in
\nevidence.\n<\/p>\n
Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates that no confession made to a police
\nofficer shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence.
\nSimilarly Section 26 of the Evidence Act provides that confession by the
\naccused person while in custody of police cannot be proved against him.
\nHowever, to the aforesaid rule of Sections 25 to 26 of the Evidence Act,
\nthere is an exception carved out by Section 27 the Evidence Act providing
\nthat when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of
\ninformation received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody
\nof a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a
\nconfession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered,
\nmay be proved. Section 27 is a proviso to Sections 25 and 26. Such
\nstatements are generally termed as disclosure statements leading to the
\ndiscovery of facts which are presumably in the exclusive knowledge of the
\nmaker. Section 27 appears to be based on the view that if a fact is
\nactually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is
\nafforded thereby that the information was true and accordingly it can be
\nsafely allowed to be given in evidence.\n<\/p>\n
As the Section is alleged to be frequently misused by the police, the
\ncourts are required to be vigilant about its application. The court must
\nensure the credibility of evidence by police because this provision is
\nvulnerable to abuse. It does not, however, mean that any statement made in
\nterms of the aforesaid section should be seen with suspicion and it cannot
\nbe discarded only on the ground that it was made to a police officer during
\ninvestigation. The court has to be cautious that no effort is made by the
\nprosecution to make out a statement of accused with a simple case of
\nrecovery as a case of discovery of fact in order to attract the provisions
\nof Section 27 the Evidence Act.\n<\/p>\n
16. The position of law in relation to Section 27 of the Evidence Act was
\nelaborately made clear by Sir John Beaumont in Pulukuri Kottaya and Ors. v.
\nEmperor, AIR (1947) PC 87, wherein it was held:\n<\/p>\n
“Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the
\nprohibition imposed by the preceding section, and enables certain
\nstatements made by a person in police custody to be proved. The condition
\nnecessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact
\nin consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence
\nin the custody of a Police Officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so
\nmuch of the information as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
\ndiscovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if
\na fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some
\nguarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true, and
\naccordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence; but clearly the
\nextent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the
\nfact discovered to which such information is required to relate. Normally
\nthe section is brought into operation when a person in police custody
\nproduces from some place of concealment some object, such as a dead body, a
\nweapon, or ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the
\ninformant is accused. Mr. Megaw, for the Crown has argued that in such a
\ncase the ‘fact discovered’ is the physical object produced, and that any
\ninformation which relates distinctly to that object can be proved. Upon
\nthis view information given by a person that the body produced is that of a
\nperson murdered by him, that the weapon produced is the one used by him in
\nthe commission of a murder, or that the ornaments produced were stolen in a
\ndacoity would all be admissible. If this be the effect of section 27,
\nlittle substance would remain in the ban imposed by the two preceding
\nsections on confessions made to the police, or by persons in police
\ncustody. That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature
\nthat a person under police influence might be induced to confess by the
\nexercise of undue pressure. But if all that is required to lift the ban be
\nthe inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object
\nsubsequently produced, it seems reasonable to suppose that the persuasive
\npowers of the police will prove equal to the occasion, and that in practice
\nthe ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their
\nLordships think that the proviso to S.26, added by S.27, should not be held
\nto nullify the substance of the section. In their Lordships’ view it is
\nfallacious to treat the ‘fact discovered’ within the section as equivalent
\nto the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which
\nthe object is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to this, and the
\ninformation given must relate distinctly to this fact. Information as to
\npast user, or the past history, of the object produced is not related to
\nits discovery in the setting in which it is discovered. Information
\nsupplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in
\nthe roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife; knives
\nwere discovered many years ago. It leads to the discovery of the fact that
\na knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if
\nthe knife is proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the
\nfact discovered is very relevant. But if to the statement the words be
\nadded ‘with which I stabbed A’ these words are admissible since they do not
\nrelate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.”\n<\/p>\n
17. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Deoman Upadhyaya, AIR<\/a> (1960) SC 1125, this
\nCourt held that Sections 25 and 26 were manifestly intended to hit an evil,
\nviz., to guard against the danger of receiving in evidence testimony from
\ntainted sources about statements made by persons accused of offences. These
\nsections form part of a statute which codifies the law relating to the
\nrelevancy of evidence and proof of facts in judicial proceedings. The State
\nis as much concerned with punishing offenders who may be proved guilty of
\ncommitting of offences as it is concerned with protecting persons who may
\nbe compelled to give confessional statements. Section 27 renders
\ninformation admissible on the ground that the discovery of a fact pursuant
\nto a statement made by a person in custody is a guarantee of truth of the
\nstatement made by him and the legislature has chosen to make on that ground
\nan exception to the rule prohibiting proof of such statement. The principle
\nof admitting evidence of statements made by a person giving information
\nleading to the discovery of facts which may be used in evidence against him
\nis manifestly reasonable. In that case the High Court had acquitted the
\naccused on the ground that his statement which lad to the recovery of
\ngandasa, the weapon of offence was inadmissible. The accused Deoman had
\nmade a statement to hand over the gandasa which he stated to have thrown
\ninto a tank and got it recovered. The trial court convicted the accused for
\nthe offence of murder. The Full Bench of the High Court held that Section
\n27 of the Evidence Act which allegedly created an unjustifiable
\ndiscrimination between persons in custody and persons out of custody
\noffending Article 14 of the Constitution of India, 1950 (in short the
\n‘Constitution’) was unenforceable. After the opinion of the Full Bench a
\nDivision Bench of the Court excluded from consideration the statement made
\nby the accused in the presence of the police officer and held that the
\nstory of the accused having borrowed a gandasa on the day of occurrence was
\nunreliable. The accused was acquitted but at the instance of the State of
\nU.P., the High Court granted a certificate to file the appeal in this
\nCourt. This Court did not agree with the position of law settled by the
\nHigh Court and decided to proceed to review the evidence in the light of
\nthat statement in so far as it distinctly related to the fact thereby
\ndiscovery being admissible. Dealing with the conclusions arrived at by the
\nHigh Court and on the facts of the case, this Court observed:\n<\/p>\n
“The High Court was of the view that the mere fetching of the gandasa from
\nits hiding place did not establish that Deoman himself had put it in the
\ntank, and an inference could legitimately be raised that somebody else had
\nplaced it in the tank, or that Deoman had seen someone placing that gandasa
\nin the tank or that someone had told him about the gandasa lying in the
\ntank. But for reasons already set out the information given by Deoman is
\nprovable in so far as it distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered;
\nand his statement that he had thrown the gandasa in the tank is information
\nwhich distinctly relates to the discovery of the gandasa. Discovery from
\nits place of hiding, at the instance of Deoman of the gandasa stained with
\nhuman blood in the light of the admission by him that he had thrown it in
\nthe tank in which it was found therefore acquires significance, and
\ndestroys the theories suggested by the High Court.”\n<\/p>\n
In Mohmed Inayatullah v. The State of Maharashtra, AIR<\/a> (1976) SC 483 it was
\nheld that expression ‘fact discovered’ includes not only the physical
\nobject produced but also place from which it is produced and the knowledge
\nof the accused as to that. Interpreting the words of Section “so much of
\nthe information” as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, the
\nCourt held that the word “distinctly” means “directly”, “indubitably”,
\n“strictly”, “unmistakably”. The word has been advisedly used to limit and
\ndefine the scope of proveable information. The phrase “distinctly” relates
\n“to the fact thereby discovered”. The phrase refers to that part of
\ninformation supplied by the accused which is the direct cause of discovery
\nof a fact. The rest of the information has to be excluded.\n<\/p>\n
In Earabhadrappa alias Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka,<\/a> [1983] 2  SCR 552,
\nit was held that for the applicability of section 27 of the Evidence Act
\ntwo conditions are pre-requisite, viz., (i) information must be such as has
\ncaused discovery of the fact, and (ii) the information must ‘relate
\ndistinctly’ to the fact discovered. Under Section 27 only so much of the
\ninformation as distinctly relates to the fact really thereby discovered, is
\nadmissible. While deciding the applicability of Section 27 of the Evidence
\nAct, the Court has also to keep in mind the nature of presumption under
\nIllustration (a) to (s) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act. The Court can,
\ntherefore, presume the existence of a fact which it thinks likely to have
\nhappened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human
\nconduct and public and private business, in their relations to the facts of
\nthe particular case. In that case one of the circumstance relied upon by
\nthe prosecution against the accused was that on being arrested after a year
\nof the incident, the accused made a statement before the police leading to
\nthe recovery of some of the gold ornaments of the deceased and her six silk
\nsarees, from different places which were identified by the witness as
\nbelonging to the deceased. In that context the court observed:\n<\/p>\n
“There is no controversy that the statement made by the appellant Ex.P-35
\nis admissible under S.27 of the Evidence Act. Under S.27 only so much of
\nthe information as distinctly relates to the facts really thereby
\ndiscovered is admissible. The word ‘fact means some concrete or material
\nfact to which the information directly relates.”\n<\/p>\n
In State of Maharashtra v. Damu, S\/o Gopinath Shinde & Ors., JT<\/a> (2000) 5 SC
\n575 has held that the Section 27 the Evidence Act was based on the doctrine
\nof confirmation by subsequent events and giving the section actual and
\nexpanding meanings, held:\n<\/p>\n
“The basic idea embedded in Section 27 of the Evidence Act is the doctrine
\nof confirmation by subsequent events. The doctrine is founded on the
\nprinciple that if any fact is discovered in a search made on the strength
\nof any information obtained from a prisoner, such a discovery is guarantee
\nthat the information supplied by the prisoner is true. The information
\nmight be confessional or non-inculpatory in nature, but it results in
\ndiscovery of a fact it becomes a reliable information. Hence the
\nlegislature permitted such information to be used as evidence by
\nrestricting the admissible portion to the minimum. It is now well settled
\nthat recovery of an object is not discovery of a fact as envisaged in
\nsection. The decision of the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor,
\nAIR (1947) PC 67,  is the most quoted authority for supporting the
\ninterpretation that the ‘fact discovered’ envisaged in the section embraces
\nthe place from which the object was produced; the knowledge of the accused
\nas to it, but the information given must relate distinctly to that effect.”\n<\/p>\n
18. Besides Section 27 the Evidence Act, the courts can draw presumptions
\nunder Section 114, Illustrations (a) and Section 106 of the Evidence Act.
\nIn Gulab Chand v. State of M.P. AIR (1995) SC 1598, where ornaments of the
\ndeceased were recovered from the possession of the accused immediately
\nafter the occurrence, this Court held:\n<\/p>\n
“It is true that simply on the recovery of stolen articles, no inference
\ncan be drawn that a person in possession of the stolen articles is guilty
\nof the offence of murder and robbery. But culpability for the aforesaid
\noffences will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case and the
\nnature of evidence adduced. It has been indicated by this Court in Sanwat
\nKhan v. State of Rajasthan AIR<\/a> (1956) SC 54, that no hard and fast rule can
\nbe laid down as to what inference should be drawn from certain
\ncircumstances. It has also been indicated that where only evidence against
\nthe accused is recovery of stolen properties, then although the
\ncircumstances may indicate that the theft and murder might have been
\ncommitted at the same time, it is not safe to draw an inference that the
\nperson in possession of the stolen property had committed the murder. A
\nnote of caution has been given by this Court by indicating that suspicion
\nshould not take the place of proof. It appears that the High Court in
\npassing the impugned judgment has taken note of the said decision of this
\nCourt. But as rightly indicated by the High Court, the said decision is not
\napplicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The High
\nCourt has placed reliance on the other decision of this Court rendered in
\nTulsiram Kanu v. State, AIR (1954) SC 1 In the said decision, this court
\nhas indicated that the presumption permitted to be drawn under Section 114,
\nIllustration (a) of the Evidence Act has to be drawn under the ‘important
\ntime factor’. If the ornaments in possession of the deceased are found in
\npossession of a person soon after the murder, a presumption of guilt may be
\npermitted. But if several months had expired in the interval, the
\npresumption cannot be permitted to be drawn having regard to the
\ncircumstances of the case. In the instant case, it has been established
\nthat immediately on the next day of the murder, the accused Gulab Chand had
\nsold some of the ornaments belonging to the deceased and within 3-4 days
\nthe recovery of the said stolen articles was made from his house at the
\ninstance of the accused. Such close proximity of the recovery, which has
\nbeen indicated by this Court as an ‘important time factor’, should not be
\nlost sight of in deciding the present case. It may be indicated here that
\nin a latter decision of this Court in Earabhadrappa v. State of Karnataka,
\n[1993] 2 SCC 330,  this Court has held that the nature of the presumption
\nand Illustration (a) under Section 114 of the Evidence Act must depend upon
\nthe nature of evidence adduced. No fixed time-limit can be laid down to
\ndetermine whether possession in the recent or otherwise and each case must
\nbe judged on its own facts. The question as to what amounts to recent
\npossession sufficient to justify the presumption of guilt varies according
\nas the stolen article is or is not calculated to pass readily from hand to
\nhand. If the stolen articles were such as were not likely to pass readily
\nfrom hand to hand, the period of one year that elapsed cannot be said to be
\ntoo long particularly when the appellant had been absconding during that
\nperiod. In our view, it has been rightly held by the High Court that the
\naccused was not affluent enough to possess the said ornaments and from the
\nnature of the evidence adduced in this case and from the recovery of the
\nsaid articles from his possession and his dealing with the ornaments of the
\ndeceased immediately after the murder and robbery a reasonable inference of
\nthe commission of the said offence can be drawn against the appellant.
\nExcepting an assertion that the ornaments belonged to the family of the
\naccused which claim has been rightly discarded, no plausible explanation
\nfor lawful possession of the said ornaments immediately after the murder
\nhas been given by the accused. In the facts of this case, it appears to us
\nthat murder and robbery have been proved to have been integral parts of the
\nsame transaction and therefore the presumption arising under Illustration\n<\/p>\n
(a) of Section 114 Evidence Act is that not only the appellant committed
\nthe murder of the deceased but also committed robbery of her ornaments.”\n<\/p>\n
19. In the instant case also, the disclosure statements were made by the
\naccused persons on the next day of the commission of the offence and the
\nproperty of the deceased was recovered at their instance from the places
\nwhere they had kept such properties, on the same day. In the same affect
\nare the judgments in Mukund Alias Kundu Mishra & Anr. v. State of M.P. AIR
\n(1997) SC 2622 and Ronny Alias Ronald James Alwaris & Ors. v. State of
\nMaharashtra, AIR<\/a> (1998) SC 1251 . In the latter case the Court held:\n<\/p>\n
“Apropos the recovery of articles belonging to the Ohol family from the
\npossession of the appellants soon after the robbery and the murder of the
\ndeceased (Mr.Mohan Ohol. Mrs. Runi Ohol and Mr. Rohan Ohol) which
\npossession has remained unexplained by the appellants the presumption under
\nIllustration (a) of Section 114 of the Evidence Act will be attracted. It
\nneeds no discussion to conclude that the murder and the robbery of the
\narticles were found to be part of the same transaction. The irresistible
\nconclusion would therefore, be that the appellants and no one else had
\ncommitted the three murders and the robbery.”\n<\/p>\n
20. These aspects were illuminatingly highlighted in Sanjay @ Kaka v. State
\n(N.C.T. of Delhi) [2001] 3 SCC 190.\n<\/p>\n
21. Above being the position, the appeal is clearly without merit, deserves
\ndismissal which we direct.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Geejaganda Somaiah vs State Of Karnataka on 12 March, 2007 Author: . A Pasayat Bench: Dr. Arijit Pasayat, Lokeshwar Singh Panta CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 311 of 2007 PETITIONER: GEEJAGANDA SOMAIAH RESPONDENT: STATE OF KARNATAKA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12\/03\/2007 BENCH: Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT & LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT Dr. ARIJIT […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-197932","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nGeejaganda Somaiah vs State Of Karnataka on 12 March, 2007 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/geejaganda-somaiah-vs-state-of-karnataka-on-12-march-2007\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Geejaganda Somaiah vs State Of Karnataka on 12 March, 2007 - 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