{"id":201193,"date":"1990-02-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1990-02-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kerala-hotel-restaurant-vs-state-of-kerala-and-ors-on-21-february-1990"},"modified":"2016-05-16T07:19:59","modified_gmt":"2016-05-16T01:49:59","slug":"kerala-hotel-restaurant-vs-state-of-kerala-and-ors-on-21-february-1990","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kerala-hotel-restaurant-vs-state-of-kerala-and-ors-on-21-february-1990","title":{"rendered":"Kerala Hotel & Restaurant … vs State Of Kerala And Ors on 21 February, 1990"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Kerala Hotel & Restaurant … vs State Of Kerala And Ors on 21 February, 1990<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1990 AIR 913, \t\t 1990 SCR (1) 516<\/div>\n
Author: J S Verma<\/div>\n
Bench: Verma, Jagdish Saran (J)<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nKERALA HOTEL & RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION AND ORS.ETC. ETC.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nSTATE OF KERALA AND ORS.\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT21\/02\/1990\n\nBENCH:\nVERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)\nBENCH:\nVERMA, JAGDISH SARAN (J)\nRANGNATHAN, S.\nOJHA, N.D. (J)\n\nCITATION:\n 1990 AIR  913\t\t  1990 SCR  (1) 516\n 1990 SCC  (2) 502\t  JT 1990 (1)\t324\n 1990 SCALE  (1)252\n\n\nACT:\n    Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963: Sections 5, 9--First\nSchedule  Item\t57--Constitutional  validity--Imposition  of\nSales\tTax--Cooked   food  sold  to  affluent\t in   luxury\nhotels--Exemption    with    regard   to    modest    eating\nhouses--Whether discriminatory and violates Article 14.\n    Tamil  Nadu\t General Sales Tax Act, 1959:  Section\t3(2)\nSchedule  I Item 150--Imposition of Sales  Tax--Cooked\tfood\nsold to affluent in luxury hotels--Exemption with regard  to\nmodest\teating houses--Whether discriminatory  and  violates\nArticle 14.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\n    The Constitutional validity of similar provisions in the\nStates\tof Kerala and Tamil Nadu which result in  imposition\nof Sales Tax on cooked food sold only in luxury hotels while\nexempting  the same from sales tax in modest  eating  houses\nwas  challenged\t by  some hoteliers in both  States  on\t the\nground\tthat  this amounted to\thostile\t discrimination\t and\ntherefore violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. While\nthe Kerala High Court rejected the challenge, the High Court\nof  Madras upheld it. Consequently one set of appeals and  a\nWrit Petition under Article 32 of the Constitution have been\npreferred  by the unsuccessful hoteliers of Kerala  and\t the\nother set of appeals by the State of Tamil Nadu against\t the\ndecision  of the Madras High Court allowing the\t Writ  Peti-\ntions filed before it by the hoteliers.\n    Upholding  the constitutional validity of  the  impugned\nprovisions in both States, while dismissing the appeals\t and\nWrit  Petition filed by the hoteliers and allowing  the\t ap-\npeals by the State of Tamil Nadu, this Court,\n    HELD: It is the substance and not form alone which\tmust\nbe  seen. The difference in the cooked food classified\tdif-\nferently, taxed and taxfree, is as intelligible and real  as\nthe two types of customers to whom they are served at  these\ndifferent eating houses. This difference must also be avail-\nable  to  support  the difference in the  incidence  of\t the\nimpugned  sales tax. This classification does bear  rational\nnexus with the\n517\nobject sought to be achieved. The object clearly is to raise\nthe  needed  revenue  from this source,\t determined  by\t the\nfiscal\tpolicy,\t which\tcan be achieved by  taxing  sale  of\ncostly food on the affluent alone in the society. The  clas-\nsification  is made by grouping together only  those  places\nwhere  costly  food is sold leaving  out  the  comparatively\nmodest\tones. The classification is, therefore,\t rounded  on\nintelligible  differentia and has a rational nexus with\t the\nobject sought to be achieved. In other words, those  grouped\ntogether  possess a common characteristic  justifying  their\ninclusion  in the group, but distinguishing them from  those\nexcluded; and performance of this exercise bears a  rational\nnexus with the reason for the exercise. [526B-D]\n    The\t scope for classification permitted in\ttaxation  is\ngreater and unless the classification made can be termed  to\nbe  palpably arbitrary, it must be left to  the\t legislative\nwisdom\tto choose the yardstick for classification,  in\t the\nbackground  of\tthe fiscal policy of the  State\t to  promote\neconomic equality as well. It cannot be doubted that if\t the\nclassification\tis made with the object of taxing  only\t the\neconomically  stronger\twhile leaving out  the\teconomically\nweaker sections of society,- that would be a good reason  to\nuphold\tthe classification if it does not  otherwise  offend\nany of the accepted norms of valid classification under\t the\nequality clause. [526F-G]\n    The predominant object is to tax sale of cooked food  to\nthe  minimum extent possible, since it is a vital  need\t for\nsustenance.  Those who can afford the costlier cooked  food,\nbeing  more  affluent, would find the burden  lighter.\tThis\nobject cannot be faulted on principle and is, indeed,  laud-\nable.  In  addition, the course adopted has  the  result  of\ntaxing fewer people who are more affluent in the society for\nraising\t the  needed  revenue with the\tadded  advantage  of\ngreater administrative convenience since it involves dealing\nwith  fewer eating houses which are easier to  locate.\tThis\naccords with the principle of promoting economic equality in\nthe  society which must, undoubtedly, govern formulation  of\nthe fiscal policy of the State. [532G-H]\n    The classification is made in the present case to  bring\nwithin\tthe tax next hotels or eating houses of\t the  higher\nstatus excluding therefrom the more modest ones. A  rational\nnexus  exists  of this classification with  the\t object\t for\nwhich  it  is  made ,and the classification  is\t rounded  on\nintelligible  differentia.  This being a relevant  basis  of\nclassification related to the avowed object, the legislature\nhaving chosen an existing classification instead of  resort-\ning  to\t a fresh method of classification, it  cannot  be  a\nground of invalidity even assuming there are other better\n518\nmodes of permissible classification. The classification made\nunder the impugned provisions is neither discriminatory\t nor\narbitrary. [533F-G; 534B]\n    Ganga  Sugar Corporation Limited v. State of Uttar\tPra-\ndesh  &\t Ors., [1980] 1 SCC 223; M\/s S. Kodar  v.  State  of\nKerala,<\/a>\t [1974]\t 4 SCC 42.2; P.H. Ashwathanarayana  Setty  &\nOrs. v. State of Karnataka & Ors., [1989] Suppl. 1 SCC\t696;\nITO  v. K.N. Takim Roy Rymbai; Federation of Hotel and\tRes-\ntaurant\t Association  of India & Ors. v. Union\tof  India  &\nOrs.,  [1989] 178 ITR 97; A.R. Krishna lyer & Ors. v.  State\nof  Madras,  [1956] 7 STC 346; Kadiyala\t Chandrayya  v.\t The\nState  of  Andhra, [1957] 8 STC 33 and Budhan  Chowdhary  v.\nState of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045, referred to.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
    CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 912  to
\n20 of 1988 Etc.\n<\/p>\n
    From  the  Judgment and Order dated 23.10. 1987  of\t the
\nKerala High Court in O.P. Nos. 7976, 8543, 8385, 7712, 7761,
\n8058, 7461, 7709 & 7460\/87.\n<\/p>\n
WITH
\nCivil Appeal Nos. 4460 to 4480 of 1985.\n<\/p>\n
    (From  the Judgment and Order of the Madras\t High  Court
\ndated  31.1.  1985 in W.P. Nos. 7, 1586, 1591,\t1636,  2079,
\n2702, 5510, 5718, 5782, 5834, 6035, 6036, 6384, 6497,  7038,
\n7067, 7079\/1981 and 6479\/82, 2348\/83, 8196\/83 and 256 1985.)
\n\t AND
\nWrit Petition No. 281 of 1988.\n<\/p>\n
(Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India).
\n    T.S.  Krishnamurthy lyer, P.S. Poti, A.S. Nambiar,\tC.N.
\nSree  Kumar, Rajendra Chowdhry, V. Krishna Murthy, S.  Thana
\nJayan,\tK.R.  Nambiar, R.F. Nariman, K.J.  John\t and  Thomas
\nJoseph<\/a> for the appearing parties.\n<\/p>\n
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\n    VERMA,  J.\tThese civil appeals and the  connected\twrit
\npetition involve decision of the substantially common  ques-
\ntion  arising out of the conflicting decisions of  the\tHigh
\nCourts of Kerala and Madras regarding constitutional validi-
\nty  of similar provisions in the States of Kerala and  Tamil
\nNadu  which  result in imposition of sales tax\tin  the\t two
\nStates\ton  cooked food sold to the affluent in\t the  luxury
\nhotels while exempting the same from sales tax in the modest
\neating\thouses\tpatronised by the lesser  mortals.  In\tboth
\nthese  States  the eligibility to sales tax of\tcooked\tfood
\nsold only in luxury hotels was challenged on
\n519<\/span>
\nthe  ground that it amounted to hostile discrimination.\t The
\nKerala\tHigh Court rejected the challenge while\t the  Madras
\nHigh  Court has upheld it. This has led to filing  of  Civil
\nAppeal\tNos. 912-20 of 1988 against the Kerala High  Court’s
\ndecision  and  Writ Petition (Civil) No. 281 of\t 1988  under
\nArticle 32 of the Constitution by the unsuccessful hoteliers
\nof Kerala while Civil Appeal Nos. 4460-80 of 1985 are by the
\nState  of Tamil Nadu against the Madras High  Court’s  deci-
\nsion.  These  conflicting decisions of the two\tHigh  Courts
\ngiving\trise to these matters are: Sangu Chakra Hotels\tPvt.
\nLtd. v. State of Tamil Nadu, [1985] 60 STC 125 (Madras)\t and
\nHotel Elite v. State of Kerala, [1988] 69 STC 119 (Kerala).
\n    Shorn  of  rhetoric and bereft of the  legal  embroidery
\nwhich invariably constitute bulk of the armoury of constitu-
\ntional attack on such a statutory provision and removing the
\ngloss  of  hypertechnicality from the  arguments,  the\treal
\nquestion is: Whether imposition of sales tax on the sale  of
\ncooked food in the more costly eating places alone  violates
\nthe  guarantee of equality enshrined in the Constitution  of
\nour  ‘Socialist’  Republic in view of the fact\tthat  cooked
\nfood  sold in the modest eating places catering to the\tneed
\nof  the common man is not similarly taxed? The challenge  is
\nthat  this can be done only by taxing them equally  but\t not
\notherwise.  In other words, the contention is that this\t tax
\nburden which is ultimately borne by the consumers of  cooked
\nfood  must be shared equally by all consumers and it  cannot
\nbe  placed  only  on the more affluent in  the\tsociety\t who
\nobviously  are\tthe  ones frequenting  the  costlier  eating
\nhouses,\t sale of cooked food wherein is taxed, the  tax\t not
\nbeing  on  the income or status of the consumer but  on\t the
\nsale of food for consumption. In substance the question\t is:
\nIs this the kind of equality envisaged and guaranteed in our
\nConstitution?\n<\/p>\n
    It is well-settled that in order to tax some thing it is
\nnot necessary to tax everything. So long as those within the
\ntax  net can be legitimately classified together  indicating
\nan intelligible differentia vis-a-vis those left out and the
\nclassification\tso  made  bears a rational  nexus  with\t the
\nobject sought to be achieved, the classification is  clearly
\npermissible  and it does not violate Article 14 of the\tCon-
\nstitution.  There being obviously no controversy  with\tthis
\nsettled principle, the contention of Shri T.S. Krishnamurthy
\nIyer  who  led the attack to this  imposition  supported  by
\nother  learned counsel appearing in these matters  is,\tthat
\nthe cooked food sold in all eating houses, be it the  luxury
\nhotels\tcatering to the affluent or the wayside dhabas\tfre-
\nquented\t by the commoner, has the common  characteristic  of
\nappeasing the hunger of the consumer, the requirement of the
\naffluent as well as the commoner to appease the hunger being
\ncommon. On this basis, the main theme of
\n520<\/span>
\nthe  argument was that the common purpose of sale of  cooked
\nfood in all eating houses being to appease the hunger of the
\nconsumer, there can be no reasonable basis for its classifi-
\ncation\twith reference to the eating house in which  it\t was
\nsold  to  the customers and, therefore, for  exigibility  to
\nsales  tax  the\t cooked food could not\tbe  classified\twith
\nreference  to  the place of its sale. Is  this\tthe  correct
\napproach  to examine the reasonableness and validity of\t the
\nclassification made in the present case?\n<\/p>\n
    In case such an argument is valid, it logically  follows
\nthat  in  order to tax sale of cooked food the\tStates\tmust
\nlevy the sales tax on cooked food sold in all eating  places
\nwhether it be a luxury hotel or a roadside dhaba; or not tax
\nit at all, if it wishes to relieve the common man who is  in
\neternal\t pursuit  of adequate means of sustenance,  of\tthis
\nadditional  burden. We must frankly admit that unless it  be
\nthe clear mandate of the Constitution we would not  hesitate
\nto reject this argument which, if accepted, may lead to\t the
\ndisastrous  consequence of equating for taxation  the  haves
\nwith  the have-nots even in the matter of sustenance of\t the
\nlatter. Moreover, such a view may even tempt the legislature
\nto tax all cooked food sold anywhere and we certainly do not
\nwish  to make any contribution to a move in that  direction.
\nFortunately,  as we read the constitutional  provisions\t and
\nthe  mandate of equality enshrined therein, such a  view  is
\nnot envisaged and the indication indeed is to the contrary.
\n    The\t preamble  to the Constitution contains\t the  solemn
\nresolve to secure to all its citizens, inter alia,  economic
\nand social justice along with equality of status and  oppor-
\ntunity. The expression ‘socialist’ was intentionally  intro-
\nduced  in  the\tpreamble by  the  Constitution\t(FortySecond
\nAmendment)  Act, 1976 with the principal aim of\t eliminating
\ninequality  in income and status and standards of life.\t The
\nemphasis  on  economic\tequality in  our  socialist  welfare
\nsociety\t has  to  pervade all interpretations  made  in\t the
\ncontext of any challenge based on hostile discrimination. It
\nis  on\tthe  altar of this vibrant concept  in\tour  dynamic
\nConstitution that the attack based on hostile discrimination
\nin  the\t present case must be tested  when  the\t legislature
\nintended to rest content with placing the tax burden only on
\nthe haves excluding the havenots from the tax net for satis-
\nfying  the tax need from this source. The reasonableness  of
\nclassification\tmust  be  examined on this  basis  when\t the
\nobject\tof  the taxing provision is not to tax sale  of\t all
\ncooked\tfood  and thereby tax everyone but to  be  satisfied
\nwith the revenue raised by taxing only the sale of  costlier
\nfood consumed by those who can bear the tax burden.\n<\/p>\n
521<\/span><\/p>\n
    The\t extent\t to  which the revenue is  required  from  a
\nparticular  source is a matter of fiscal policy and  if\t the
\nlegislature chooses to be satisfied with the raising of that
\namount\talone which can be recovered from the  affluent,  it
\ncannot\tbe faulted for not dragging the impecunious also  in
\nthe tax net. Even otherwise the play at the joints permitted
\nto  the\t legislature for making classification in  a  taxing
\nprovision  is  greater and unless  the\tclassification\tmade
\ncannot satisfy the test of reasonableness in the context  of
\neconomic  equality envisaged in our society,  a\t legislative
\nenactment  which undoubtedly benefits the common man  cannot
\nbe  held discriminatory or arbitrary. The Directive  Princi-
\nples  of  State Policy also enjoin the State to\t temper\t the
\nlegislation towards securing a social order conducive to the
\npromotion  of social and economic equality,  eliminating  as
\nfar  as may be the existing inequalities  between  different
\nstrata\tin  the society. This too is a pointer in  the\tsame
\ndirection.\n<\/p>\n
    We\tare here concerned with the constitutional  validity
\nof  a legislative provision which has the effect  of  making
\nthe cooked food sold in the posh eating houses alone  exigi-
\nble  to sales tax while exempting from that levy the  cooked
\nfood  sold in the moderate eating houses. Reasonableness  to
\nthe  classification has to be decided with reference to\t the
\nrealities  of  life and not in the abstract.  A\t discernible
\ndissimilarity  between\tthose  grouped\ttogether  and  those
\nexcluded  is a pragmatic test, if there be a rational  nexus
\nof  such classification with the object to be  achieved.  in
\nthe  abstract  all  cooked food may be the  same  since\t its
\nefficacy is to appease the hunger of the consumer. But\twhen
\nthe  object is to raise only limited revenue by taxing\tonly
\nsome  category of cooked food sold in eating houses and\t not
\nall cooked food sold anywhere, it is undoubtedly  reasonable
\nto  tax only the more costly cooked food. The  taxed  cooked
\nfood  being the more costly variety constitutes\t a  distinct
\nclass with a discernible difference from the remaining\ttax-
\nfree  cooked food. A blinkered perception of  stark  reality
\nalone  can equate caviar served with champagne in  a  luxury
\nhotel  with the gruel and buttermilk in a village hamlet  on
\nthe unrealistic abstract hypothesis that both the meals have
\nthe  equal  efficacy to appease the hunger  and\t quench\t the
\nthirst\tof the consumer. Validity of a classification  under
\nour Constitution does not require such a blurred perception.
\n    The cost of meal in these two distinct classes of eating
\nhouses\tvaries\tconsiderably, the cost in  a  modest  eating
\nhouse  quite often being a mere pittance of that in  a\tposh
\neating\thouse. Not only that, the incidence of sales tax  on
\nthe cost of food served in a posh eating house
\n522<\/span>
\nquite often would not even be noticed by the customer and it
\nmay  even  exceed  the total cost of the meal  served  in  a
\nmodest\teating house. How can the two meals be then  equated
\nand  classified together by application of the\tunreal\ttest
\nthat the efficacy of both meals is to appease the consumers’
\nhunger? It is the substance and not form alone which must be
\nseen.  The difference in the cooked food classified  differ-
\nently,\ttaxed and tax-free, is as intelligible and  real  as
\nthe two types of customers to whom they are served at  these
\ndifferent eating houses. This difference must also be avail-
\nable  to  support  the difference in the  incidence  of\t the
\nimpugned sales tax. This classification does bear a rational
\nnexus  with  the object sought to be  achieved.\t The  object
\nclearly\t is  to raise the needed revenue from  this  source,
\ndetermined  by the fiscal policy, which can be\tachieved  by
\ntaxing\tsale  of costly food alone and thereby\tplacing\t the
\nburden only on the affluent in the society. The\t classifica-
\ntion  is made by grouping together only those  places  where
\ncostly\tfood  is sold leaving out the  comparatively  modest
\nones. The classification is, therefore, rounded on  intelli-
\ngible  differentia and has a rational nexus with the  object
\nto be achieved.\n<\/p>\n
    Having mentioned this broad feature of the case, we\t now
\nadvert to the specific provisions challenged and the various
\nfacets of the attack to their constitutional validity.
\n    The\t provisions of the Kerala Act may first\t be  stated.
\nThe Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 has been amended from
\ntime  to time both by the Kerala General Sales\tTax  (Amend-
\nment) Acts and also by the Kerala Finance Acts. Section 5 of
\nthe Kerala General Sales Tax Act is the charging section and
\nthe  first Schedule specifies goods subject to single  point
\ntax thereunder. Section 9 of the Act provides for  exemption
\nfrom  tax  and the goods so exempted are  specified  in\t the
\nthird schedule to the Act. Item 12 in the third schedule  as
\nit stood prior to 1.4.1976, read:\n<\/p>\n
“Item  12–Cooked food including coffee, tea and like  arti-
\ncles  served in a hotel, restaurant or any other place by  a
\ndealer whose total turnover in respect of such food is\tless
\nthan thirty-five thousand rupees in a year.”\n<\/p>\n
    The\t above provision was amended by Act 45 of 1976\tfrom
\n1.4.1976. After the said amendment, the provision read:
\n“Cooked food including coffee, tea and like articles  served
\nin a hotel, restaurant or any other place.”\n<\/p>\n
523<\/span><\/p>\n
    As\ta result of the above amendment, cooked food  speci-
\nfied in Item 12 mentioned above was exempt from sales tax by
\nvirtue of Section 9 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
    This was the position until 1987 when the Kerala Finance
\nAct,  1987 was passed, which was brought into  force  retro-
\nspectively  with effect from 1.7.1987. However, we  are\t not
\nconcerned  with its retrospective operation since an  under-
\ntaking\twas given in the High Court on behalf of  the  State
\nGovernment  that retrospective effect would not be given  to
\nthis provision.\n<\/p>\n
Item 57 in the First Schedule reads:\n<\/p>\n
   “57. Cooked food including beverages\t  At the point of
\n\tnot falling in any entry in the\t  first sale in the
\n\tfifth schedule in bar attached\t  State by a dealer
\n\thotels of restaurants and\/or\t  who is liable to
\n\thotels above the grade of two\t  tax under section
\n\tstars.\t\t\t\t  5.”\n<\/p>\n
    Item  12 in the Third Schedule was amended by the  above
\nFinance Act to read as follows:\n<\/p>\n
“12.  Cooked  food including coffee, tea and  like  articles
\nserved\tin  a hotel or a restaurant or any other  place\t not
\nfalling under Entry 57 of the First Schedule.”\n<\/p>\n
    In\tthe Fifth Schedule dealing with goods in respect  of
\nwhich tax is leviable on two points under sub-section (1) or
\nsub-section  (2) of Section 5 is included foreign liquor  as
\nItem 2.\n<\/p>\n
    As a result of the Kerala Finance Act, 1987, Writ  Peti-
\ntions  were filed in the Kerala High Court  challenging\t the
\nconstitutional\tvalidity  of  the sales tax  levied  on\t the
\ncooked food included under Item 57 of the First Schedule  of
\nthe  Act on the ground of discrimination because of Item  12
\nin the Third Schedule of the Act whereby cooked food includ-
\ning  coffee, tea and the like articles served in a hotel,  a
\nrestaurant  or any other place not falling under Item 57  of
\nthe  First  Schedule  was exempted. The\t Kerala\t High  Court
\ndismissed  the\twrit petitions. That  decision\treported  in
\nHotel Elite & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., [1988] 69\t STC
\n119 is challenged in one batch of Civil Appeals before us.\n<\/p>\n
524<\/span><\/p>\n
During\tthe pendency of these civil appeals, Kerala  Finance
\nAct,1988 was passed amending Entry 57 of the Kerala  General
\nSales Tax Act, 1963, as under:\n<\/p>\n
“For  the  entry in column (2) against Serial  No.  57,\t the
\nfollowing entry shall be substituted, namely,
\n“Cooked\t Food” including beverages not falling\tunder  entry
\n76A of this Schedule sold or served in,\n<\/p>\n
(i)  hotels and\/or restaurants, the turnover in\t respect  of
\nwhich is twenty lakhs rupees and above; and\n<\/p>\n
(ii) bar attached hotels and\/or restaurants.”\n<\/p>\n
    As a result of the above amendment, the category of star
\nhotels\thas been removed and in its place hotels or  restau-
\nrants with turnover of rupees twenty lakhs and above and bar
\nattached hotels, etc. are substituted.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t validity of the above provision was  challenged  by
\nfiling an application for amendment in this Court to  incor-
\nporate\tadditional grounds mentioned in Civil  Miscellaneous
\nPetition Nos. 7569-77 of 1988 in Civil Appeal Nos 912-20  of
\n1988.  The  application for amendment was  allowed  by\tthis
\nCourt  and it is, therefore, necessary to also consider\t the
\nvalidity of the said amendment introduced by Act 17 of 1988.
\nIn  addition, Civil Writ Petition No. 281 of 1988  has\tbeen
\nfiled directly in this Court under Article 32 of the Consti-
\ntution,\t challenging  the constitutional validity  of  these
\namendments in the Kerala Act.\n<\/p>\n
    The\t relevant provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act may\talso
\nbe noticed. It is the constitutional validity of Item 150 in
\nthe First Schedule to the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax\tAct,
\n1959  which is challenged. By an amendment with effect\tfrom
\n4.10. 1980 Item 150 reads as under:\n<\/p>\n
“Articles  of  food and drinks sold to\tcustomers  in  three
\nstar,  four  star  and five star hotels,  as  recognised  by
\nTourism\t Department, Government of India whether such  arti-
\ncles are meant to be consumed in the premises or outside.”
\nThe  effect  thereof  was to tax sales of  food\t and  drinks
\ncovered by the above item while exempting those outside\t the
\nitem. Thereafter Item
\n525<\/span>
\n150 was substituted with effect from 12.6.1981 as under:
\n“Articles  of  food and drinks other  than  those  specified
\nelsewhere  in  this schedule, sold to  customers  in  hotels
\nclassified  or approved by the Government of India,  Depart-
\nment of Tourism.”\n<\/p>\n
The  challenge to levy of sales tax on the sales covered  by
\nthese  items is substantially on the same grounds as in\t the
\nKerala case.\n<\/p>\n
\tWe  shall  now\tmention the  arguments\tadvanced  by
\nlearned\t counsel  challenging  this imposition\tin  the\t two
\nStates. The power of the State Legislature to levy sales tax
\nby virtue of Entry 54 in list II of the 7th Schedule to\t the
\nConstitution  and  the\tavailability of that  power  in\t the
\npresent\t case  to  impose sales tax on food  and  drinks  by
\nvirtue\tof Clause (29A) inserted in Article 366 of the\tCon-
\nstitution  by the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment)\tAct,
\n1982, is rightly not disputed. However, it is contended that
\nthe  classification  made of the food and drinks  taxed\t and
\nthose exempted is discriminatory and arbitrary. It was urged
\nthat the classification is not based on the goods taxed\t but
\non the status of the consumers which is not permissible.  It
\nwas  urged that the commodity taxed being the same  as\tthat
\nexempted,  the difference being only in the place  of  their
\nsale, differentiation for taxation on the basis of place  of
\nsale  is impermissible. It was argued that Article  366(29A)
\npermits imposition of tax on sale of food and drinks in\t any
\nform but it does not permit.a differentiation with reference
\nonly to the place of sale. It was also urged that the  clas-
\nsification  in\tsuch  cases based only on  turnover  may  be
\npermissible  for administrative and some other\treasons\t but
\nnot  on\t the place of sale, the status’ of the\tcustomer  or
\ndifference in the impact of such tax on the customer. It was
\nalso  contended that the classification made with  reference
\nto  the\t status\t of hotel has no nexus with  the  object  of
\nimposition  of sales tax because the approval for  the\tstar
\nstatus\tis for a different purpose relating to\ttourism\t and
\nthe  other amenities provided in the hotel. An\tattempt\t was
\nalso  made  to\tcontend that the quality of  food  need\t not
\nnecessarily be superior in a hotel of higher star status  as
\ncompared  to  an ordinary eating house and the\tcharges\t for
\nfood  served in the luxury hotels also include\tthe  service
\ncharges\t and not merely the cost of food. Similarly, it\t was
\nurged  that a distinction made on the basis of a  bar  being
\nattached to this hotel has no relevance or justification for
\nthe  classification made in this context. In reply,  it\t was
\ncontended  by Shri P.S. Poti and Shri K. Rajendra  Choudhary
\non behalf of the two State Governments that such classifica-
\ntion being permissible the mode to be
\n526<\/span>
\nadopted\t is  the  legislature’s choice which  has  chosen  a
\npragmatic  mode based on an existing classification  instead
\nof  undertaking\t the  exercise of a  new  classification  to
\nidentify  the  two categories of eating\t houses,  the  sales
\nwherein\t should\t be  taxed or exempted. It  was\t urged\tthat
\nunless the classification so made is found to be  arbitrary,
\nthere is no ground to reject the same and substitute it with
\nanother\t method\t simply because another method may  be\tmore
\ndesirable.  It was also contended that the object  being  to
\nraise only limited revenue from this source, it was  decided
\nto  tax only the sale of costlier food and  thereby  confine
\nthe burden only to fewer people on whom the burden would  be
\nlight  with  the added advantage of  greater  administrative
\nconvenience.\n<\/p>\n
    A catena of decisions was cited at the bar on the  point
\nrelating to valid classification and the test to be  applied
\nwhen hostile discrimination is alleged. It is not  necessary
\nto  refer  to all those decisions which\t state\tthe  settled
\nprinciples  not\t in dispute even before us.  The  difficulty
\nreally\tis in the application of settled principles  to\t the
\nfacts of each case. It is settled that classification round-
\ned  on\tintelligible differentia is permitted  provided\t the
\nclassification\tmade  has a rational nexus with\t the  object
\nsought to be achieved. In other words, those grouped togeth-
\ner  must  possess a common characteristic  justifying  their
\ninclusion  in the group, but distinguishing them from  those
\nexcluded;  and\tperformance  of this exercise  must  bear  a
\nrational nexus with the reason for the exercise.
\n    The\t scope for classification permitted in\ttaxation  is
\ngreater and unless the classification made can be termed  to
\nbe  palpably arbitrary, it must be left to  the\t legislative
\nwisdom\tto choose the yardstick for classification,  in\t the
\nbackground  of\tthe fiscal policy of the  State\t to  promote
\neconomic equality as well. It cannot be doubted that if\t the
\nclassification\tis made with the object of taxing  only\t the
\neconomically  stronger\twhile leaving out  the\teconomically
\nweaker\tsections of society, that would be a good reason  to
\nuphold\tthe classification if it does not  otherwise  offend
\nany of the accepted norms of valid classification under\t the
\nequality clause.\n<\/p>\n
    Broadly stated the points involved in the constitutional
\nattack\tto the validity of this classification are, in\tsub-
\nstance, only two:\n<\/p>\n
(1) Is the classification of sales of cooked food made\twith
\nreference  to the eating houses wherein the sales are  made,
\nrounded on an intelligible differentia? and
\n527<\/span>
\n(2)  If\t so, does the classification have a  rational  nexus
\nwith the object sought to be achieved?\n<\/p>\n
\t  It would be useful at this stage to refer to\tsome
\ndecisions  of this Court indicating the\t settled  principles
\nfor  determining  validity  of classification  in  a  taxing
\nstatute.  In  Ganga Sugar Corporation Limited  v.  State  of
\nUttar  Pradesh and Ors., [1980] 1 SCC 223, Krishna lyer,  J.
\nspeaking for the Constitution Bench held that a\t classifica-
\ntion based, inter alia, on “profits of business and  ability
\nto  pay tax” is constitutionally valid. Classification\tper-
\nmissible  in  a taxing statute of dealers on  the  basis  of
\ndifferent  turnovers for levying varying rates of sales\t tax
\nwas considered by the Constitution Bench in M\/s S. Kodar  v.
\nState  of Kerala,<\/a> [1974] 4 SCC 422, and Mathew,\t J.  therein
\nindicated the true perspective as under:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “As  we said, a large dealer occupies a  posi-
\ntion  of  economic superiority by reason of  his  volume  of
\nbusiness and to make the tax heavier on him both  absolutely
\nand  relatively is not arbitrary discrimination but  an\t at-
\ntempt to proportion the payment to capacity to pay and\tthus
\narrive in the end at  more genuine equality. The capacity of
\na dealer, in particular circumstances, to pay tax is not  an
\nirrelevant factor in fixing the rate of tax and one index of
\ncapacity is the quantum of turnover. The argument that while
\na dealer beyond certain limit is obliged to pay higher\ttax,
\nwhen others bear a less tax, and it is consequently discrim-
\ninatory really misses the point namely that the former\tkind
\nof  dealers  are in a position of  economic  superiority  by
\nreason\tof  their  volume of business and form\ta  class  by
\nthemselves. They cannot be treated as on a part with compar-
\natively\t small dealers. An attempt to proportion the payment
\nto  capacity to pay and thus bring about a real and  factual
\nequality cannot be ruled out as irrelevant in levy of tax on
\nthe  sale or purchase of goods. The object of a tax  is\t not
\nonly to raise revenue but also to regulate the economic life
\nof the society.”\n<\/p>\n
(emphasis supplied)
\n\t A recent decision of this Court in P.H. Ashwathana-
\nrayana Setty and Ors. v. State of Karnataka and Ors., [1989]
\nSupp. 1 SCC 696 gives a fresh look to the extent of  classi-
\nfication  held valid in a taxing statute; and the  scope  of
\njudicial review permitted while considering its validity  on
\nthe  ground of equality under Article 14. The true  position
\nhas been
\n528<\/span>
\nsuccinctly summarised by Venkatachaliah, J. speaking for the
\nCourt, as under:\n<\/p>\n
“The problem is, indeed, a complex one not free from its own
\npeculiar  difficulties.\t Though other  legislative  measures
\ndealing with economic regulation are not outside Article 14,
\nit  is\twell  recognised that the State\t enjoys\t the  widest
\nlatitude  where\t measures of economic  regulation  are\tcon-
\ncerned.\t These measures for fiscal and\teconomic  regulation
\ninvolve an evaluation of diverse and quite often conflicting
\neconomic  criteria and adjustment and balancing\t of  various
\nconflicting social and economic values and interests. It  is
\nfor  the State to decide what economic and social policy  it
\nshould pursue and what discriminations advance those  social
\nand economic policies. In view of the inherent complexity of
\nthese fiscal adjustments, courts give a larger discretion to
\nthe legislature in the matter of its preferences of economic
\nand social policies and effectuate the chosen system in\t all
\npossible  and  reasonable ways. If two or  more\t methods  of
\nadjustments of an economic measure are available, the legis-
\nlative\tpreference in favour of one of them cannot be  ques-
\ntioned\ton the ground of lack of legislative wisdom or\tthat
\nthe method adopted is not the best or that there were better
\nways  of adjusting the competing interests and\tclaims.\t The
\nlegislature   possesses\t  the  greatest\t freedom   in\tsuch
\nareas  …..  ”\n<\/p>\n
“The  legislature has to reckon with practical\tdifficulties
\nof adjustments of conflicting interests. It has to bring  to
\nbear  a pragmatic approach to the resolution of\t these\tcon-
\nflicts\tand evolve a fiscal policy it thinks is best  suited
\nto  the felt needs. The complexity of economic\tmatters\t and
\nthe  pragmatic\tsolutions to be found for them defy  and  go
\nbeyond\tconceptual mental models. Social and economic  prob-
\nlems of a policy do not accord with preconceived stereotypes
\nso as to be amenable to predetermined solutions\t …..\t”
\nThe  lack  of perfection in a legislative measure  does\t not
\nnecessarily  imply  its unconstitutionality. It\t is  rightly
\nsaid that no economic measure has yet been devised which  is
\nfree  from  all\t discriminatory impact and that\t in  such  a
\ncomplex\t arena in which no perfect alternatives\t exist,\t the
\nCourt  does  well not to impose too rigorous a\tstandard  of
\ncriti-\n<\/p>\n
529<\/span><\/p>\n
cism,  under the equal protection clause,  reviewing  fiscal
\nservices. In G.K. Krishnan v. State of Tamil Nadu<\/a> this Court
\nreferred to, with approval, the majority view in San Antonio
\nIndependent  School District v. Rodriguez  speaking  through
\nJustice Stewart:\n<\/p>\n
‘No  Scheme  of\t taxation, whether the\ttax  is\t imposed  on
\nproperty, income or purchases of goods and services, has yet
\nbeen devised which is free of all discriminatory impact.  In
\nsuch a complex arena in which no perfect alternatives exist,
\nthe Court does well not to impose too rigorous a standard of
\nscrutiny  lest all local fiscal schemes become\tsubjects  of
\ncriticism under the Equal Protection clause’
\nand  also to the dissent of Marshall, J. who summed  up\t his
\nconclusion that:\n<\/p>\n
‘In  summary,  it seems to me inescapably  clear  that\tthis
\nCourt has consistently adjusted the care with which it\twill
\nreview\tState discrimination in light of the  constitutional
\nsignificance of the interests affected and the invidiousness
\nof the particular classification. In the context of economic
\ninterests,  we\tfind  that discriminatory  State  action  is
\nalmost\talways sustained, for such interests  are  generally
\nfar removed from constitutional guarantees. Moreover, “(t)he
\nextremes to which the court has gone in dreaming up rational
\nbasis  for  State regulation in that area may  in  many\t in-
\nstances be ascribed to a healthy revulsion from the  court’s
\nearlier excesses in using the Constitution to protect inter-
\nests that have more than enough power to protect  themselves
\nin the legislative halls.”\n<\/p>\n
“The  observations  of this Court in ITO v. K.N.  Takim\t Roy
\nRymbai\tmade in the context of taxation laws are  worth\t re-
\ncalling.\n<\/p>\n
(T)he mere fact that a tax falls more heavily on some in the
\nsame  category, is not by itself a ground to render the\t law
\ninvalid. It is only when within the range of its  selection.
\nthe  law operates unequally and cannot be justified  on\t the
\nbasis  of  a  valid classification, that there\twould  be  a
\nviolation of Article 14.”\n<\/p>\n
(emphasis supplied)
\n530<\/span>
\n    In\tFederation  of Hotel and Restaurant  Association  of
\nIndia  and others v. Union of India and others<\/a>,\t [1989]\t 178
\nITR  97 Venkatachaliah, J., delivering the majority  opinion
\nof  the\t Constitution  Bench while dealing  with  a  similar
\nobjection  to  classification in a taxing statute,  held  as
\nunder:\n<\/p>\n
“The State, in the exercise of its Governmental power,\thas,
\nof necessity, to make laws operating differently in relation
\nto  different groups or class of persons to  attain  certain
\nends  and must, therefore, possess the power to\t distinguish
\nand  classify persons or things. It is also recognised\tthat
\nno  precise or set formula or doctrinaire tests\t or  precise
\nscientific  principles of exclusion or inclusion are  to  be
\napplied.  The test could only be one of palpable  arbitrari-
\nness  applied in the context of the felt needs 10 the  times
\nand societal exigencies informed by experience.
\n\t Classifications  based on differences in the  value
\nof  articles or the economic superiority of the\t persons  of
\nincidence  are well recognised. A reasonable  classification
\nis  one\t which includes all who are similarly  situated\t and
\nnone who are not. In order 10 ascertain whether persons\t are
\nsimilarly  placed, one must look beyond\t the  classification
\nand to the purposes of the law.”\n<\/p>\n
(emphasis supplied)
\n    Thus, it is clear that the test applicable for  striking
\ndown  a taxing provision on this ground is one of  ‘palpable
\narbitrariness  applied in the context of the felt  needs  of
\nthe  times and societal exigencies informed by\texperience’;
\nand  the  courts should not interfere with  the\t legislative
\nwisdom\tof making the classification unless the\t classifica-
\ntion is found to be invalid by this test.\n<\/p>\n
    In the present case, to assail the constitutional valid-
\nity  of\t the  impugned provisions reliance is  placed  on  a
\ndecision  of the Madras High Court in A.R. Krishna lyer\t and
\nOrs. v. State of Madras, [1956] 7 STC 346. However, contrary
\nview was taken by the A.P. High Court of the same  provision
\nin the Madras General Sales Tax Act, 1939 in Kadiyala  Chan-
\ndrayya\tv.  The State of Andhra Pradesh, [1957]\t 8  STC\t 33.
\nSubba Rao, C J, as his lordship then was, upheld the classi-
\nfication  in the Andhra decision on the ground that  it\t was
\nmade as a genuine attempt to adjust the, burden with a\tfair
\nand  reasonable\t degree\t of equality and  to  harmonise\t the
\ndoctrine of equality with differences
\n531<\/span>
\ninherent in the categories of persons assessed. After refer-
\nring  to  the principle\t of  classification  authoritatively
\nrestated  by  this  Court in Budban Chowdhary  v.  State  of
\nBihar,\t[1955] 1 SCR 1045 and quoting the of quoted  passage
\nfrom Willis on Constitutional Law on this point, Subba\tRao,
\nCJ., as his Lordship then was, proceeded to hold as under:
\n“The  object of the Act, as set out in the preamble.  is  to
\nprovide\t for the levy of a general tax on the sale of  goods
\nin the State of Andhra. But every taxing legislation makes a
\ngenuine attempt to adjust the burden with a fair and reason-
\nable  degree  of  equality. It also aims  to  apportion\t the
\nburden\tequitably on different categories of  properties  or
\npersons with distinct economic characteristics. It is impos-
\nsible in the nature of things to aim at absolute equality in
\nthe  matter of taxation. The State resorts to the  principle
\nof classification in an attempt to harmonise the doctrine of
\nequality  with\tdifferences inherent in\t the  categories  of
\nproperties  or\tpersons assessed. In the present  case,\t the
\nobject\tto  provide  for the levy of a general\ttax  and  to
\napportion the burden equitably between different  categories
\nof  persons has a reasonable nexus with\t the  classification
\nadopted\t by the legislature. The question can be  considered
\nfrom  the  stand-point of the citizen as well  as  from\t the
\nstand-point of the State. From the stand-point of the State,
\nthe classification can be justified on the ground of equita-
\nble apportionment of the burden and easy realisation of\t the
\ntax.  Articles\tof food and drink are more  in\tdemand\tthan
\nother  articles. Even in the case of the former, there\twill
\nbe  a  larger  demand in restaurants,  boarding\t houses\t and
\nhotels\tthan in other places like way-side shops. There\t may
\nbe  small or big dealers even in such commodities,  who\t run
\nhotels or keep boarding houses. The State also can  reasona-
\nbly  recover taxes at higher rates from\t prosperous  dealers
\nthan  from  impecunious ones. From the\tstand-point  of\t the
\ndealer\talso, there is justification for the  varied  rates.
\nThe  articles sold, the place where the business is  carried
\non and the expectation of large profits are the characteris-
\ntics of dealers who are distinct from dealers not covered by
\nthe proviso.\n<\/p>\n
\t Learned  counsel  relied upon the decision  of\t the
\nMadras\tHigh Court in Krishna lyer v. The State\t of  Madras,
\nwherein\t the learned Judges took a different view from\twhat
\nwe have taken. After pointing out that three lines of clas-\n<\/p>\n
532<\/span><\/p>\n
sification  run through the impugned provision, the  learned
\njudges\tconsidered only the second  classification,  namely,
\nthe  distinction  between dealers in articles  of  food\t and
\ndrinks\tsold in hotels, boarding houses and restaurants\t and
\nother  dealers in such articles and held that it was  suffi-
\ncient  to deny the validity of the impugned provision.\tWith
\ngreat respect we cannot agree. In our view, the characteris-
\ntics of the dealer covered by the proviso should be  cumula-
\ntively considered and, if so looked at, the said  character-
\nistics\twill  afford a reasonable  basis  of  classification
\nwhich  has  a rational nexus with the object  sought  to  be
\nachieved.  We,\ttherefore, hold that the  classification  is
\nrounded\t on intelligible differentia distinguishing  dealers
\nlike the assessee and that it has a rational relation to the
\nobject sought to be achieved.”\n<\/p>\n
(emphasis supplied)
\nThe  vision  of Subba Rao, C J, as his\tLordship  then\twas,
\nportrayed  in  the Andhra decision more than  three  decades
\nearlier, a forerunner in the field, is fully realised  being
\nconsistent  with the picture emerging from the decisions  of
\nthis  Court  already noticed and promotes the  principle  of
\neconomic  equality  governing formulation of  the  country’s
\nfiscal policy. With great respect, we fully concur with\t the
\nabove  view  taken by Subba Rao, C J, as his  Lordship\tthen
\nwas,  even prior to introduction of the word ‘socialist’  in
\nthe  Preamble of the Constitution, which further  reinforces
\nits correctness.\n<\/p>\n
    The obvious reason for making the classification in\t the
\npresent case is to group together those eating houses  alone
\nwherein\t costlier  cooked food is sold for  the\t purpose  of
\nimposition  of\tsales tax to raise the needed  revenue\tfrom
\nthis  source. The object apparently is to raise\t the  needed
\nrevenue\t from this source by taxing the sale of cooked\tfood
\nonly to the extent necessary and, therefore, tO confine\t the
\nlevy only to the costlier food. The predominant object is to
\ntax  sale  of cooked food to the  minimum  extent  possible,
\nsince  it  is  a vital need for sustenance.  Those  who\t can
\nafford the costlier cooked food, being more affluent,  would
\nfind  the burden lighter. This object cannot be\t faulted  on
\nprinciple and is, indeed, laudable. In addition, the  course
\nadopted\t has the result of taxing fewer people who are\tmore
\naffluent in the society for raising the needed revenue\twith
\nthe  added advantage of greater\t administrative\t convenience
\nsince it involves dealing with fewer eating houses which are
\neasier to locate. This accords with the principle of promot-
\ning economic equality in the society which must,  undoubted-
\nly, govern formulation of the fiscal policy of the State.\n<\/p>\n
533<\/span><\/p>\n
    The\t trend\tof the up-to-date decisions of\tthis  Court,
\nalready\t noticed  does indicate that a\tclassification\tmade
\nwhereby the tax net covers only the sale of costlier  cooked
\nfood  in the posh eating houses while exempting\t the  cooked
\nfood  sold  in the modest eating houses\t at  lesser  prices,
\nthereby\t confining  the burden to the more affluent  in\t the
\nsociety,  satisfies the requirements of a valid\t classifica-
\ntion. Moreover, the classification so made cannot be  termed
\nas arbitrary, being within the limits upto which the  legis-
\nlature\tis given a free hand for making classification in  a
\ntaxing statute.\n<\/p>\n
    It\thas not been shown that any eating house similar  to
\nthose  grouped\ttogether for purpose of\t taxation  has\tbeen
\nexcluded from the group. The classification made is to group
\ntogether  all eating houses wherein costlier cooked food  is
\nsold.  It has not been shown that the tariff of cooked\tfood
\nsold  in  any of the exempted eating houses is the  same  or
\nhigher than that of those taxed. The tax is applied  equally
\nto all those within the tax net.\n<\/p>\n
    It\twas urged that eating houses serving cooked food  of
\nthe  same  quality but not recognised with the\thigher\tstar
\nstatus\tto  bring  it within the tax net  enjoyed  an  undue
\nadvantage not available to those within the tax net. It\t was
\nalso urged that recognition of a hotel for conferment of the
\nstar status was made for a different purpose, namely, promo-
\ntion  of tourism and the other facilities available  therein
\nwhich have no relevance to the quality of food served there-
\nin.  Admittedly, such recognition entails  several  benefits
\nand seeking recognition depends on volition. In our opinion,
\nsuch   an  enquiry  is\tunwarranted  for  the\tpurpose\t  of
\nclassification in the present context. It is well-known that
\nthe  tariff in hotels depends on its star status,  it  being
\nhigher\tfor the higher star hotels. The object being to\t tax
\ncooked food sold at a higher tariff, the status of the hotel
\nwhere  it is sold is certainly relevant. The  classification
\nis  made  in the present case to bring within  the  tax\t net
\nhotels\tor  eating  houses of the  higher  status  excluding
\ntherefrom  the more modest ones. A rational nexus exists  of
\nthis classification with the object for which it is made and
\nthe  classification is rounded on intelligible\tdifferentia.
\nThis being a relevant basis of classification related to the
\navowed\tobject,\t the legislature having chosen\tan  existing
\nclassification\tinstead\t of resorting to a fresh  method  of
\nclassification,\t it  cannot be a ground of  invalidity\teven
\nassuming  there\t are  other  better  modes  of\t permissible
\nclassification.\t That  is  clearly  within  the\t domain\t  of
\nlegislative  wisdom intrusion into which of judicial  review
\nis  unwarranted.  There is no material placed before  us  to
\nindicate  that with reference to the purpose for  which\t the
\nclassification has’ been made in
\n534<\/span>
\nthe present case, there is a grouping together of dissimilar
\neating\thouses or that similar eating houses have  been\t ex-
\ncluded from the class subject to the tax burden..
\n    This  discussion  clearly shows that the attack  to\t the
\nconstitutional\tvalidity of the impugned provisions in\tboth
\nStates has no merit since the classification made is neither
\ndiscriminatory\tnor  arbitrary.\t We have  no  hesitation  in
\nrejecting  the\tchallenge on the aforesaid  grounds  on\t the
\nmaterial  produced.  The writ petitions filed in  both\tHigh
\nCourts\tas  also in this Court challenging the levy  in\t the
\nStates of Kerala and Tamil Nadu must fail.\n<\/p>\n
    Consequently,  Civil Appeal Nos 912-20 of  1988  against
\nthe  judgment of the Kerala High Court as well as  the\tcon-
\nnected\tCivil Writ Petition No. 281 of 1988 challenging\t the
\nvalidity  of the impugned provisions in the Kerala  Act\t are
\ndismissed  while Civil Appeal Nos. 4460-80 of  1985  against
\nthe  Madras  High Court decision are  allowed  resulting  in
\ndismissal of those writ petitions also. In the circumstances
\nof the case, the parties shall bear their own costs.
\nR.N.J.\n<\/p>\n
535<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Kerala Hotel & Restaurant … vs State Of Kerala And Ors on 21 February, 1990 Equivalent citations: 1990 AIR 913, 1990 SCR (1) 516 Author: J S Verma Bench: Verma, Jagdish Saran (J) PETITIONER: KERALA HOTEL & RESTAURANT ASSOCIATION AND ORS.ETC. ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF KERALA AND ORS. DATE OF […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-201193","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nKerala Hotel & Restaurant ... vs State Of Kerala And Ors on 21 February, 1990 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/kerala-hotel-restaurant-vs-state-of-kerala-and-ors-on-21-february-1990\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Kerala Hotel & Restaurant ... vs State Of Kerala And Ors on 21 February, 1990 - 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