{"id":207937,"date":"1962-04-04T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1962-04-03T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/raja-jagannath-baksh-singh-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-on-4-april-1962"},"modified":"2017-01-26T15:43:49","modified_gmt":"2017-01-26T10:13:49","slug":"raja-jagannath-baksh-singh-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-on-4-april-1962","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/raja-jagannath-baksh-singh-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-on-4-april-1962","title":{"rendered":"Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh And … on 4 April, 1962"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh And … on 4 April, 1962<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR 1563, \t\t 1963 SCR (1) 220<\/div>\n
Author: N R Ayyangar<\/div>\n
Bench: Majmudar S.B. (J), Sarkar, A.K., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala, Mudholkar, J.R.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nRAJA JAGANNATH BAKSH SINGH\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nTHE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ANOTHER\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT:\n04\/04\/1962\n\nBENCH:\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\nBENCH:\nAYYANGAR, N. RAJAGOPALA\nGAJENDRAGADKAR, P.B.\nMAJMUDAR S.B. (J)\nSARKAR, A.K.\nGUPTA, K.C. DAS\nMUDHOLKAR, J.R.\n\nCITATION:\n 1962 AIR 1563\t\t  1963 SCR  (1) 220\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF\t    1963 SC1667\t (12)\n R\t    1964 SC 925\t (44,70)\n F\t    1969 SC1094\t (15)\n R\t    1970 SC 169\t (8,11)\n R\t    1972 SC 845\t (14)\n R\t    1976 SC1742\t (7)\n R\t    1978 SC  68\t (94)\n F\t    1980 SC 271\t (41,49)\n R\t    1990 SC  85\t (22)\n\n\nACT:\nLand Holding--Notice of Assessment-- Determination of annual\nvalue-Constitutional  validity\tof enactment- U.  P.  Large,\nLand Holdings Tax Act, 1957 (U.\t P. 31 of 1957), ss. 7\t(2),\n5 (1)-Constitution of India, Arts. 14, 19 (1) (b), 31,\tSch.\nVII, List II, Entry 49.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nThis  petition challenged the constitutional validity  of  a\nnotice of assessment served under s.7 (2) of the U. P. Large\nLand  Holdings\tTax Act, 1957.\tThe 'High  Court  had  found\nagainst\t the  petitioner.  His case was\t that  the  relevant\nprovisions  of\tthe Act were unconstitutional as  the  State\nLegislature  was incompetent to pass the Act, that  the\t Act\nviolated  Arts. 14, 19 and 31 of the constitution  and\tthat\nthe rates fixed by the State Government under s. 5(1) of the\nAct  were  invalid as being contrary to that  section.\t The\nimpugned Act has since been repealed by the U. P. Imposition\nof ceiling of Land Holdings Act, 196 1, with effect from the\n30th June, 196 1.\nHeld,  that the contentions were without substance  and\t the\npetition must fail.\nThe  cardinal  rule of interpreting the words  used  by\t the\nConstitution  in conferring legislative power was that\tthey\nmust  receive the most liberal construction and if they\t are\nwords  of wide amplitude the construction must\taccord\twith\nit. If a general word was used it must be so construed as to\nextend\tto all ancillary or subsidiary matters that  can  be\nreasonably included in it.  So construed, there could be  no\ndoubt that the word land' in Entry 49, List 11, 7th Schedule\nincludes   all\t lands,\t  whether   agricultural   or\tnon-\nagricultural.\tSince the impugned Act imposed tax  on\tland\nholdings,  it  was  within  the\t competence  of\t the   State\nLegislature and its validity was beyond challenge.\nNavinchandra Nafatlal, Bombay v. Commissioner of Income-tax,\n[1955]\t1.  S.C.R. 829, and United Provinces  v.  Mt.  Atiqa\nBegum, [1940] F. C. R. 110, referred to.\nThe word 'may' in s.5(1) of the Act could not in the\n221\ncontext mean shall or must'.  While prescribing the  maximum\nlimit  of  the multiple which could not\t be  exceeded,\tthat\nsection\t rightly  left\tit to the discretion  of  the  State\nGovernment  to adjust it suitably to local  requirement\t and\nthe  quality of the land involved.  The notification  issued\nthe State Government under s. 5(1) must, therefore, be\theld\nto have complied with the statutory requirements  prescribed\ntherefor.\nIt  is now settled law that a taxing statute can be  challe-\nnged  on  the ground that it infringes a  fundamental  right\nguaranteed by the Constitution.\nMohammad Yasin v. Pown Area Committee, Jalabad,<\/a> [1952] S. C.\nR. 578, State of Bombay v. United Motors (India) Ltd.<\/a> [1953]\nS. O. R. 1069, The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd.\t V. State of\nBihar,<\/a> [1955] 2 s C. R. 603, Ch.  Pika Ramji v. State of  U.\nP.  [1956]  S. C. R. 393 and Balaji v. Income  tax  Officer,\n[1962] 2 S. C. R. 983, relied on.\nRamjilal v. Income<\/a> tax Officer, [1951]1 S. C. R. 127 and  L.\nH.  Jamkhani  v.  Union of India, [1955] 1  S.\tC.  R.\t769,\nconsidered  M.\tCullock v. Maryland, [1819] 4  L.  ed.\t579,\nreferred to.\nTherefore, a taxing statute can be challenged under Art.  14\nif  it\tpurports to impose on the same\tclass  of  property,\nsimilarly  situated an incidence of taxation which leads  to\nobvious inequality.\nThe  legislature can freely choose its objects of  taxation,\nfix  the rate and classify persons and properties  for\tthat\npurpose,  and  the classification, if  rational,  cannot  be\nchallenged  merely  because  the  rates\t are  different\t for\ndifferent  classes  or objects.\t But if\t the  taxing  status\ncontravenes  Art. 14 of the Constitution in  its  operation,\nthe Courts are free to interfere.  Similarly if it  provides\nno machinery or procedure for the recovery or assessment  of\nthe  tax, so that the- imposition partakes of the  character\nof  a  purely administrative affair, the statute can,  in  a\nproper case, be challenged under Art. 19 (1) ( f).\nA  taxing statute that affects no fundamental  rights  meets\nthe requirement of Art. 31 (1).\t Article 31 (2) can have  no\napplication  to\t such a statute even though the tax  may  be\nexcessive  and\tmay  ultimately\t lead to  the  loss  of\t the\nassessee's property.  This is evident from the provisions of\nArt 31 (2A) and 31 (5) (b) (i),\nSection\t 5  (1)\t of  the impugned  Act\tdid  not  confer  no\nunbettered power on the State Government so as to contravene\nArt. 14 and 19 (1) ( f ) of the Constitution.\n222\nNo taxing statute can be said to be a colourable legislation\nsimply because the tax it levies is excessive.\tThe plea  of\ncolourable  legislation can succeed only when  the  relevant\ncircumstance are strong enough to justify the inference that\nit is so and so it amounts to a fraud.\nK.   T. Moopil v. State of Kerala, held in applicable.\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
ORIGINAL JURISDICTION  : Petition No.327. of 1. 960.
\nUnder\tArticle\t 32  of\t the  Constitution  of\t India\t for
\nenforcement of Fundamental Rights.\n<\/p>\n
J.   P. Goyal for the Petitioner.\n<\/p>\n
K.   L.\t Misra,\t Advocate-General  for the  State  of  Uttar
\nPradesh, C. B. Aggarwala, K. S. Hajela and C.\t  P. Lal for
\nthe Respondents.\n<\/p>\n
1962.  April 4. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
\nGAJENDRAGADKAR,\t J.–The  petitioner  Raja  Jagannath  Baksb
\nSingh  was  a  Taluqadar of Rehwan Estate  in  District\t Rai
\nBareli, under the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land  Reforms
\nAct  (U.P.  Act\t 1  of\t1951),\tthe  petitioner’s  Zamindari
\nproperty vested in the State Government, and the groves\t and
\nother  agricultural land were left with the petitioner as  a
\nBhumidar under the said Act.  In 1957, the U. P. Legislature
\npassed\tthe U. P. Large Land Holdings Tax Act (No.  XXXI  of
\n1957) (hereinafter called the Act) and under section 7(2) of
\nthe Act the petitioner was served with a notice along with a
\nprovisional  assessment of the annual value of the  land  in
\nhis  possession\t for the year 1365 fasli.   Similar  notices
\nwere  served  on the petitioner subsequently for  the  years
\n1366  and 1367 fasli.  In response to the said notices,\t the
\npetitioner  filed  his returns and objected  to\t the  annual
\nvalue  of  the land calculated by the  assessing  authority.
\nAfter the petitioner received notices for the years 1365 and
\n1366 fasli,
\n\t\t\t    223<\/span>
\nhe   filed  writ  petition  in\tthe  Allahabad\tHigh   Court
\nchallenging  the validity of the said notices on the  ground
\nthat the material provisions of the.  Act on which the\tsaid
\nnotices were based ultra vires and unconstitutional.   These
\nwrit  petitions were numbered 3146 of 1958 and 1354 of\t1959
\nin  the said High Court.  Several other writ  petitions\t bad
\nalso  been filed by other assesses challenging the  validity
\nof the Act, and the whole group of these petitions was heard
\ntogether  by  the Allahabad High Court.\t In  substance,\t the
\npleas,\tmade by the petitioners challenging the validity  of
\nthe Act were rejected by the High Court and it was held that
\nthe Act was valid and constitutional, vide Oudh Sugar  Mills
\nLtd.,  Hargaon\tv. State of U. P. (1).\t This  decision\t was
\npronounced on the 12th of October, 1959.\n<\/p>\n
On  the\t 22nd  November, 1960, the  petitioner\tfiled  three
\npetitions  in this Court under Art. 32 of the  Constitution.
\nThese  petitions  were Nos. 325, 326 & 327 of  1960.   These
\nthree petitions were directed against the notices served  on
\nthe  petitioner\t for  the years 1365, 1366  and\t 1367  fasli
\nrespectively.\tOut of these petitions, the first  two\twere
\ndismissed   on\t the  ground  that  they  were\t barred\t  by
\nresjudicata.   It is common ground that after the  Allahabad
\nHigh  Court  dismissed the petitioner’s writ  petitions,  he
\napplied\t for and obtained a certificate from the  said\tHigh
\nCourt to appeal to this Court, but he failed to deposit\t the
\nnecessary  security for printing charges as required by\t the
\nrules  of the Allahabad High Court, and, in consequence,  on
\nthe  9th  August, 1960, the certificate granted to  him\t was
\ncancelled.   That  is  how  the\t two  writ  petitions  which
\npurported to challenge the validity of the notices served on
\nthe  petitioner for the two years 1365 and 1366\t fasli\twere
\nheld to be barred by res judicata.  On the petitioner’s writ
\npetition No. 327 of 1960 which is concerned
\n(1)  A.I.R. 1960 All. 136.\n<\/p>\n
224<\/span><\/p>\n
with  the  assessment  for the year  1367  fasli,  rule\t was
\nordered.  to be issued by this Court and it is on this\trule
\nthat the present petition has come for final disposal before
\nus today.  This writ petition is confined to the  assessment
\nlevied on the petitioner for the year 1367 fasli.
\nIt  appears  that for the relevant year a  notice  has\tbeen
\nserved on the petitioner under s. 7(2) of the Act and a\t tax
\nof  Rs.\t 15,838\/92 nP was assessed on his total\t holding  of
\n1152A-IIB-IB  with  a valuation of Rs.\t44,464\/88nP.   After
\nhearing the petitioner, the Assessing Authority has  decided
\nthat  the amount recoverable from the petitioner by  way  of
\ntax   for  the\trelevant  year\tis  Rs.\t 14,882\/86nP.\t The
\npetitioner contends that since the Act is  unconstitutional,
\nit  is not open to respondent No. 1, the State of U. P.\t and
\nrespondent No. 2, the assessing authority to claim the\tsaid
\ntax from him on his holding.\n<\/p>\n
The petitioner’s case is that the relevant provisions of the
\nAct  are unconstitutional because the U. P. Legislature\t was
\nnot   competent\t  to  pass  the\t Act.\tHe   also   contends
\nalternatively  that  the said Act violates  the\t fundamental
\nrights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19 and 31 and as such,  is
\nvoid.\tAccording  to  him, the rates  fixed  by  the  State
\nGovernment in pursuance of the authority conferred on it  by
\nsection\t 5(1) of the Act, are invalid because in fixing\t the
\nsaid  rates, the State Government has not complied with\t the
\nprovisions  of the said section.  Broadly stated, it  is  on
\nthese  three  grounds  that  the  validity  of\tthe  Act  is
\nchallenged.  These grounds are denied by the respondents and
\nit  has been alleged by them that the U. P. Legislature\t was
\ncompetent to pass the Act, that the Act does not violate the
\nfundamental rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19 and 31\t and
\nthat  the  rates  have been fixed  in  accordance  with\t the
\nprovisions of s. 5(1) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    225<\/span><\/p>\n
Before. dealing with these. contentions, it is necessary  to
\nconsider briefly the scheme of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
The Act has been passed because the Legis-lature thought  it
\nexpedient to provide for the imposition and collection of  a
\ntax  on large land holdings.  Section 28 of the Act  repeals
\nthe earlier U. P. Agricultural Income Tax Act, 1948.  It may
\nThe  pointed out that this Act itself has been\tsubsequently
\nrepealed  by section. 45 of the U. P. Imposition of  Ceiling
\nof Land Holdings Act 1961 (1 of 1961) as from the 30th June,
\n1961,  so that as from the 30th June, 1961, this Act  is  no
\nlonger in force.\n<\/p>\n
Under  the Act, ,land” means land, whether assessed to\tland
\nrevenue\t or  not, which is held or occupied  for  a  purpose
\nconnected with agriculture, horticulture, animal  husbandry,
\npisciculture  or poultry farming and  includes\tuncultivated
\nland  held  by a land-holder as such [s. 2 (15)];  and\tacc-
\nording\t to   s.   2(16),  ‘,land-holder”   means   (i)\t  an
\nintermediary, where the land is in his personal\t cultivation
\nor  is\theld as sir, khudkasht or grove and (ii)  any  other
\nperson\twho holds or occupies land otherwise than as-(a)  an
\nasami,\t(b)  a\tsub-tenant, (e) a tenant of sir,  or  (d)  a
\nsirtan, and includes a manager or principal officer, as\t the
\ncase  may be.  These two definitions give an idea as to\t the
\nproperty over which the Act purports to impose a tax and  as
\nto  the person from whom the tax is recoverable.  Section  4
\ndefines\t a “land-holding”.  It provides that  “land-holding”
\nmeans  the  aggregate of all land held or  occupied  on\t the
\nfirst day of July each year by a land-holder, whether in his
\nown name or in the name of any member of his family, and all
\nsuch  land shall be deemed to form part of the land  holding
\nof  such land-holder.  With the rest of the section  we\t are
\nnot  concerned\tin the present petition.  It  is  the  land-
\nholding thus defined which is the subject matter of taxation
\nimposed\t by  s. 3. Section 3(1) provides that  there  shall,
\nsave as hereinafter provided, be
\n226<\/span>
\ncharged levied and paid, for each agricultural year, on\t the
\nannual value of each land holding, a tax, hereinafter called
\nthe  “Holding Tax” at the rates specified in  the  Schedule.
\nThe proviso to s. 3 makes it clear that no such tax shall be
\ncharged\t on  , any land holding the area  whereof  does\t not
\nexceed 30 acres.  Sub-section (2) empowers the State Govern-
\nment to exempt or remit in whole or in part, for such period
\nas  it\tmay  think  fit and as\toften  as  it  may  consider
\nnecessary, the holding tax chargeable under sub-section\t (1)
\nin  respect of any class or classes of land holdings as\t may
\nbe  prescribed.\t Under sub-section (3) the land\t covered  by
\nbuilding  with the area appurtenant thereto which  does\t Dot
\nexceed\tfive acres, shall be excluded in computing the\tarea
\nof land under the proviso to sub-section (1).  The  Schedule
\nprescribes  the rates of the Holding Tax.  No tax is  levied
\nup  to\tRs. 3,600\/- of annual valuation.   When\t the  annual
\nvaluation  exceeds  Rs\t3,600\/the rate is  prescribed  on  a
\ngraded\tscale beginning with 5nP in a rupee when the  annual
\nvaluation  is between Rs. 3,600\/- to Rs. 5,000\/- and  ending
\nwith 60 napes in a rupee where the annual valuation  exceeds
\nRs. 30,000\/-.  The intermediate rates are 10 nP in a  rupee,
\n25nP in a rupee and 40nP in a rupee and they are  prescribed
\nfor where the annual valuation is between Rs. 5,001\/- to Rs.
\n10,000\/-, Rs. 10,001\/-to Rs. 20,000\/-and Rs. 20,001\/-to\t Rs.
\n30,000\/-respectively.\tThus,  reading\tsection\t 3  and\t the
\nSchedule   together,  it  follows  that\t where\tthe   annual
\nvaluation  of  the landholding exceeds Rs. 3,600\/-,  tax  is
\nleviable at a graded scale and is recoverable from the\tland
\nholder, subject to conditions (a)  &  (b) specified  in\t the
\nSchedule.\n<\/p>\n
Section\t 5(1) provides for the determination of\t the  annual
\nvalue.\tIt lays down that the annual value of a land holding
\nshall  be deemed to be an amount equal to the  rent  payable
\nfor  the land or lands included therein multiplied  by\tsuch
\nmultiple
\n 227<\/span>
\nnot  exceeding\t12-1\/2 as may be  prescribed  and  different
\nmultiples  may\tbe  prescribed for  different  districts  or
\nportions  of  districts or for different  classes  of  lands
\nincluded in a land holding.  Section 5(2) provides that\t for
\nthe  purposes of sub-section (1), the rent payable shall  be
\ndeemed\tto  be\tan  amount  calculated\tat  the\t  sanctioned
\nhereditary rates applicable to the land or lands included in
\nthe  land holding and where there are no sanctioned  heredi-
\ntary  rates,  on  such\tprinciples  as\tmay  be\t prescribed,
\nprovided  that\tthe State Government may, where\t such  rates
\nwere  sanctioned  prior\t to the first  day  of\tJuly,  1927,
\nenhance the rates by such percentage not exceeding fifty  as
\nmay be specified by notification in the Official Gazette and
\ndifferent  percentages\tmay be specified for  the  different
\nclasses\t of lands and for different areas of Uttar  Pradesh.
\nThe  scheme of taxation evidenced by sections 3, 4 and 5  is
\nthus  clear.   Where  the area covered\tby  a  land  holding
\nexceeds\t 30 acres, the tax is leviable, The tax is  leviable
\nat  the\t rates\tprescribed by the  Schedule  and  the  rates
\nprescribed  by the Schedule are fixed by a reference to\t the
\nannual\tvalue of the land determined in the manner  provided
\nby  s.\t5. That, in effect, is the result  of  the  relevant
\nprovisions  of\tChapter II of the Act which deals  with\t the
\nimposition of holding tax.\n<\/p>\n
Chapter III consists of ss. 6 to 16 which are concerned with
\nthe procedure prescribed for the assessment of holding\ttax.
\nSection\t 6  deals with the Assessing Authority.\t  Section  7
\nrequires  notice  regarding return of land  holdings  to  be
\nserved\ton the assessee.  Section 8 deals with the  levy  of
\nthe  assessment\t and  prescribes an  enquiry  in  connection
\ntherewith.  Section 9 provides that proceedings may be taken
\nagainst\t the legal representative of the assessee.   Section
\n10 deals with notice of demand.\t Section 11 allows an appeal
\nagainst the assessment of holding tax.\tSection 12 permits a
\n228<\/span>
\nrevision  to be preferred to the Board of Revenue and s.  13
\nmakes  the  order  passed by the  Board\t of  Revenue  final.
\nAccording to s. 14 the procedure prescribed by the  relevant
\nprovisions  of\tthe U.P. Land Revenue Act,  1901,  are\tmade
\napplicable  to the proceedings before the Board\t of  Revenue
\nunder  s. 12. Section 15 deals with cases of  land  holdings
\nthat  escaped assessment and s. 16 empowers the\t appropriate
\nauthority  to rectify mistakes.\t It would thus be seen\tthat
\nChapter\t III  provides\tfor the procedure which\t has  to  be
\nfollowed  before  levying  a  tax  on  the  assessee.\tThis
\nprocedure  contemplates a notice to be given to an  assessee
\nwho  would be heard, and gives the assessee a right to\tmake
\nan  appeal  and to move the Board in revision.\t Chapter  IV
\ndeals with the payment of Holding Tax, and provides that tax
\nshall  be  payable by the land-bolder and that in  case\t the
\nland-holder   dies,  it\t has  to  be  paid  by\t his   legal
\nrepresentative.\t Under a. 19, the said tax shall be  payable
\nin  four  equal installments.  The last Chapter\t deals\twith
\nmiscellaneous  provisions  to  which it\t is  unnecessary  to
\nrefer, excepts.\t    24\twhich, inter alia, bars a suit in  a
\nCivil Court to set aside or modify any assessment made under
\nthe  Act.\n<\/p>\n
The  first  contention which has been raised  by  Mr.  Goyal
\nbefore\tus  is\tthat the Act is\t unconstitutional  and\tvoid
\ninasmuch  as it is beyond the legislative competence of\t the
\nU.  P. Legislatur , and this contention raises the  question
\nabout  the  construction of Entry 49 in List II of  the\t 7th
\nSchedule  of the Constitution.\tThis Entry relates to  taxes
\nto lands and buildings.\t The argument is that ‘Lands’ in the
\ncontext\t does not include agricultural lands and so, the  U.
\nP.  Legislature\t was  not competent to\tlevy  the  tax.\t  In
\nconsidering the merits of this argument, it is necessary  to
\nbear in mind that we are interpreting the words used in\t the
\nConstitution  and  it  is an  elementary  cardinal  rule  of
\ninterpretation that the words used in the
\n\t\t\t    229<\/span>
\nConstitution  which confer legislative power.  must  receive
\nthe most liberal construction and if they are words of\twide
\namplitude, they must be interpreted so as to give effect  to
\nthat amplitude.\t It would be out of place to put a narrow or
\nrestricted  construction  on words of wide  amplitude  in  a
\nConstitution.\tA  general word used in an  entry  like\t the
\npresent one must be construed to extend to all ancillary  or
\nsubsidiary  matters which can fairly and reasonably be\theld
\nto be included in it, vide, Navinchandra Mafatlal, Bombay v.
\nCommissioner  of Income Tax<\/a> (1) and United Provinces v.\t Mt.
\nAtiqa Begum (2).  If this principle is borne in mind, it  is
\nobvious that the words “lands” cannot be interpreted in\t the
\nmanner\tsuggested  by Mr. Goyal.  The word “lands”  is\twide
\nenough\tto include all lands, whether agricultural  or\tnot,
\nand  it\t would\tbe plainly unreasonable to  assume  that  it
\nincludes   non-adricultural  lands  but\t does  not   include
\nagricultural lands.\n<\/p>\n
 It is, however, urged that since Entry 46 in list II refers
\nto   taxes   on\t agricultural  income,\t it   follows\tthat
\nagricultural  income is not included in Entry 49.  That,  no
\ndoubt, is true; if the State Legislature purports to  impose
\na tax on agricultural income, it would be referable to Entry
\n46  and not Entry 49 and in that sense, agricultural  income
\nis not covered by Entry 49.  But it must be remembered\tthat
\nboth  Entries 46 and 49 are in List II and it would make  no
\ndifference  whether the State legislation imposing taxes  on
\nagricultural  income is sustained by reference to  Entry  46
\nrather\tthan by reference to Entry 49.\tTherefore, the\tfact
\nthat  agricultural income having been specifically  provided
\nby  Entry  46 cannot be deemed to be included in  Entry\t 49,
\ndoes not Justify the argument that the word ‘,lands” in\t the
\nlatter Entry does not include agricultural lands.
\n(1) (1955) 1 S.C.R. 829, 836.\n<\/p>\n
(2) (1940) F.C.R. 110, 134.\n<\/p>\n
230<\/span><\/p>\n
It is then argued that when the Constitution wanted to refer
\nto   agricultural   land,  it  has   used   the\t  expression
\nagricultural land’ as, for instance.  Entries 86, 87 and  88
\nin List 1. This argument is entirely fallacious.  The  three
\nEntries\t in  which agricultural land has  been\tspecifically
\nmentioned clearly indicate that agricultural land had to  be
\nexcluded  from\ttheir purview and so, it  was  necessary  to
\ndescribe the land as agricultural land in the context.\t The\n<\/p>\n
-fact that the necessity of the context required the use  of
\nthe expression agricultural land, in the said three Entries,
\ncannot\tpossibly  lead to the conclusion that  wherever\t the
\nword ‘land’ is used, it should mean non-agricultural  lands.
\nWe have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting the  argument
\nthat  Entry  49\t in List II does not  take  in\tagricultural
\nlands.\t If  agricultural  lands are included  in  the\tsaid
\nEntry, the validity of the Act would be beyond challenge, as
\nin  substance and in fact, it imposes a tax on land  holding
\nand  as\t such,\tis  within  the\t competence  of\t the   State
\nLegislature.  As we have already seen the scheme of the\t Act
\nis  to impose a tax on land holdings, though the measure  of
\nthe  tax  has  to be determined by its annual  value  as  is
\nascertained  in\t the  manner prescribed by  section  5.\t The
\nobject of the tax is land holding and the extent of the\t tax
\nleviable  is determined in the light of the annual value  of
\nthe  land.   Thus  there can be no doubt that  the  Act\t was
\nwithin\tthe legislative competence of the U. P.\t Legislature
\nand so, the challenge to its validity on the ground that  it
\nhas  been  passed  without legislative\tcompetence  must  be
\nrejected.\n<\/p>\n
Mr. Goyal then contends that the multiple prescribed by\t the
\nState  Government is invalid because it has been  prescribed
\nin  a  manner contrary to the mandatory\t requirement  of  a.
\n5(1).  This argument proceeds on the assumption that s. 5(1)
\nimposes an obligation on the State Govt. to adopt different
\n231<\/span>
\nmultiples  in  different  districts  and  in  reference\t  to
\ndifferent classes of laud included in the land holding.\t Mr.
\nGoyal suggests that when s. 5 (1) provides that the rent may
\nbe  multiplied by such multiple not exceeding 12 1\/2 as\t may
\nbe prescribed and different multiples may be prescribed\t for
\ndifferent   districts  or  portions  of\t districts  or\t for
\ndifferent  classes of land included in a land  holding,\t the
\nLegislature  intended  that  different\tmultiplies  must  be
\nprescribed  as therein indicated.  In other words, “may”  in
\nthe context means “,must” and since different multiples have
\nnot been prescribed for different districts and in reference
\nto  different  classes of land, the multiple  value  of\t the
\npetitioner’s  land  holding cannot be determined  under\t the
\nuniform multiple prescribed by the State Government.  In our
\nopinion,  there\t is no substance in this  argument.   It  is
\nquite  clear that’ the word ”  may”  in the  context  cannot
\nmean  “shall” or “must”.  Section 5 (1) has  prescribed\t the
\nmaximum\t limits of the multiple which may be adopted and  it
\nhas left to the discretion of the State Government to  adopt
\nsuch  multiple\tfor different districts or by  reference  to
\ndifferent  classes of land as it may deem proper.  In  other
\nwords,\thaving\tprescribed  the\t maximum  beyond  which\t the
\nmultiple will not go, discretion has been left to the  State
\nGovernment  to\tmake suitable adjustments according  to\t the
\nrequirements  of  local condition and varying  qualities  of
\nlands.\n<\/p>\n
In fact, the notification issued by the State Government  on
\nthe  23rd April, 1958, shows that it has complied  with\t the
\nprovisions of 5 (1).  Under this notification, the  multiple
\nof  12-1\/2 has been fixed for determining the  annual  value
\nthroughout  U. P. for agricultural lands, but in respect  of
\ndifferent kinds of groves planted before 1st July, 1957, the
\nmultiple is prescribed at 5 for the whole
\n232<\/span>
\nof  the\t State.\t Then there a variation made in\t respect  of
\nKumaun\tDivision  and  the district  of\t Tehri-Garhwal.\t  In
\nrespect\t of groves planted on or after the 1st\tJuly,  1957,
\nthe multiple is prescribed at 4 for the 1st year, 2 for\t the
\nsecond\tyear and nil for the 3rd and subsequent years.\t The
\nnotification  further  provides\t for  reduced  multiples  as
\nspecified  in it in respect of ‘banjar’ or user\t land  newly
\nbrought under cultivation subject to the conditions  therein
\nspecified.   It would thus be seen that in  prescribing\t the
\nmultiple, the State Government has classified lands and\t has
\nvaried\tmultiple  accordingly.\tTherefore, there can  be  no
\ndoubt  that the notification issued by the State  Government
\nunder s. 5 (1) has complied with the statutory\trequirements
\nprescribed therefore.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.Goyalthen contends that if the word “may” is construed as
\ngiving discretion to the State Government and not  imposing,
\nan  obligation on it, then s. 5 (1) contravenes Art. 19\t (1)\n<\/p>\n
(f)  as\t well  as  Art. 14; and his  argument  is  that\t the
\ncharging  section also contravenes the said two Articles  as
\nwell  as  Art.\t31.  This  contention  raises  the  familiar
\nproblem\t as  to whether a taxing statute is subject  to\t the
\nprovisions  of Part III of the Constitution or not;  and  it
\narises in regard to a statute which has been, passed for the
\npurpose of only raising revenue.  The power of taxation\t is,
\nno doubt, the sovereign right of the State; as was  observed
\nby  Chief Justice Marshall in Mulloch v. Maryland (1):\t“The
\npower  of taxing the people and their property in  essential
\nto   the   very\t ‘existence  of\t Government,  and   may\t  be
\nlegitimately  exercised\t on  the  objects  to  which  it  is
\napplicable to the utmost extent to which the Government\t may
\nchoose to carry it”.  In that sense, it is not the  function
\nof  the Court to enquire whether the power of  taxation\t has
\nbeen  reasonably exercised either in respect of\t the  amount
\ntaxed or
\n(1)  (1819) 4 L. ed. 579. 607.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    233<\/span><\/p>\n
in  respect of the property which is made the object of\t the
\ntax’.  Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no\t tax
\nshall  be levied or collected, except by authority  of\tlaw;
\nand  so, for deciding whether a tax has been validly  levied
\nor  not, it would be necessary first to enquire whether\t the
\nLegislature  which passes the Act was Competent to  pass  it
\nor. not.  But that is not the only enquiry which is relevant
\nin  deciding  the validity of ‘a taxing\t statute.   Since  a
\ntaxing statute is a law, it is a law for the purpose of Art.
\n13 and so, its validity can be challenged on the ground that
\n‘is  contravenes one or the other of the fundamental  rights
\nguaranteed by part Ill.\t It is thus clear that a citizen can
\nchallenge  the\tvalidity of a taxing statute on\t the  ground
\nthat it offends Art. 14 of the Constitution.  At one  stage,
\nit  appears  to\t have been assumed in some  of\tthe  earlier
\ndecisions  of  this Court that Art. 31\twas  concerned\twith
\ndeprivation  of\t property otherwise than  by  imposition  or
\ncollection  of\ttax and inasmuch as the right  conferred  by
\nArt. 265 is not a right conferred by Part III of the Consti-
\ntution,\t it could not be enforced under Art. 32.   In  these
\ndecisions,  certain  general observations  were\t made  which
\nwould  indicate\t that the fundamental rights  guaranteed  in
\nPart III could not be invoked in respect of taxing statutes,
\nvide, Ramjilal v. Income-Tax Officer, Mohindergarh<\/a> (1),\t and
\nLaxmanappa Hanumantappa Jamkhandi v. The Union of India<\/a> (2).
\nBut  in recent years, there has been a consensus of  opinion
\nin  the\t decisions of this Court that the  validity  of\t the
\nlegislation imposing a tax can be challenged not only on the
\nground\tof  lack or absence of legislative  competence,\t but
\nalso  on the ground that the impugned  legislation  violates
\nthe  fundamental  right\t guaranteed  by\t Part  III  of\t the
\nConstitution,\tvide  Mohammad\tYasin  v.  The\t Town\tArea
\nCommittee, Jalalaba.<\/a>\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1951] S. C. R. 127.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1955] 1. S. C. R. 769, 772.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  [1952] S. C. R. 578,
\n234<\/span>
\nState  of  Bombay  v. The United Motors\t (India)  Ltd.\tThe,
\nBengal\tImmunity  Company Ltd.<\/a> v. The State, of\t Bihar\t(2).
\nCh.   Tika  Ramji  v. The State of Uttar  Pradesh,<\/a>  (3)\t and
\nBalaji\tv. Income Tax Officer.<\/a> (4).  Therefore, it must\t now
\nbe taken to be settled that the validity of a tax law can be
\nchallenged on the ground that it infringes one or the  other
\nof  the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III,  and\t so,
\nthe  argument  that the tax with which we are  concerned  is
\ninvalid\t because it offends against Arts. 14 and 19  (1)(f),
\ncannot be rejected as inadmissible.\n<\/p>\n
A  taxing  statute can be held to contravene Art. 14  if  it
\npurports  to impose on the same class of property  similarly
\nsituated  an  incidence of taxation which leads\t to  obvious
\ninequality.    There  is  no  doubt  that  it  is  for\t the
\nLegislature to decide on what objects to levy, what rate  of
\ntax  and it is not for the Courts to consider  whether\tsome
\nother objects should have been taxed or whether a  different
\nrate  should have been prescribed for the tax.\tIt  is\talso
\ntrue  that the legislature is competent to classify  persons
\nor  Properties\tinto  different\t categories  and  tax\tthem
\ndifferently,   and  if\tthe  classification  thus  made\t  is
\nrational,  the taxiing statute cannot be  challenged  merely
\nbecause\t different  rates  of taxation\tare  prescribed\t for
\ndifferent categories of persons or objects.  But, if in\t its
\noperation,  any taxing statute is found to  contravene\tArt.
\n14, it would be open to Courts to strike it down as  denying
\nto  the citizens the equality before the law  guaranteed  by
\nArt. 14.\n<\/p>\n
Similarly,  if a taxing statute makes no specific  provision
\nabout the machinery to recover tax and the procedure to make
\nthe  assessment\t of the tax and leaves it  entirely  to\t the
\nexecutive  to devise such machinery as it thinks fit and  to
\nprescribe  such\t procedure as appears to it to be  fair,  an
\noccasion
\n(1)  [1953] S. C. R. 1069.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  [1956] S. C. R. 393.\n<\/p>\n
(2) [1955] 2 S. C. R. 603.\n<\/p>\n
(4) (1962)2 S. C. R. 983.\n<\/p>\n
235<\/span><\/p>\n
may arise for the Courts to consider whether the failure  to
\nprovide\t for a machinery and to prescribe a  procedure\tdoes
\nnot  tend to make the imposition of the tax an\tunreasonable
\nrestriction  within  the  meaning of  Article  19  (5).\t  An
\nimposition  of\ttax  which in the absence  of  a  prescribed
\nmachinery and the prescribed procedure would partake’ of the
\ncharacter of a purely administrative affair can, in a proper
\nsense,\tbe  challenged\tas contravening\t Art.  19  (1)\t(f).
\nTherefore,  whenever  the validity of a\t taxing\t statute  is
\nchallenged on the ground that it contravenes Art. 14 or Art.
\n19,  the challenge cannot be thrown out on  the\t preliminary
\nground\tthat  a tax law is beyond such\tchallenge,  but\t its
\nmerits must be carefully examined.\n<\/p>\n
The  position, however. is different when the  challenge  is
\nmade  on the ground that the Act is inconsistent  with\tArt.\n<\/p>\n
31.   So  far  as  Art. 31 (1) is  concerned,  all  that  it
\nrequires. is that no person can be deprived of his  property
\nsave by authority of law, and as we have just observed,\t the
\nauthority of law postulated by Art. 31 (1) is obviously\t the
\nauthority  of a valid law.  If the law is not valid  because
\nit  offends  against  Art.  14 or  Art.\t 19  or\t some  other
\nfundamental right guaranteed by Part III then the imposition
\nof tax levied by it cannot be said meet the requirements  of
\nArt. 31 (1).  But if the Act in question is otherwise valid,
\nthen the Art. 31 (1) is complied with.\tArticle 31 (2) would
\nbe  inapplicable  to  a taxing statute\tbecause\t the  taxing
\nstatute\t does  not  purport to acquire\tor  requisition\t any
\nproperty.   It may be that the imposition of the tax  levied
\nby  the statute is excessive and may ultimately lead to\t the
\nloss  of the assessee’s property, but even so, it cannot  be
\nsaid  that  by\tvirtue of the Act,  the\t property  has\tbeen
\nacquired  or requisitioned.  Article 31 (2A) clearly  brings
\nout   the  limits  of  the  application\t of  Art.  31\t(2).
\nSimilarly,  Art. 31 (5) (b) (i) specifically  provides\tthat
\nnothing in Cl. (2) shall affect the
\n236<\/span>
\nprovisions of any law which the State may hereafter make for
\nthe purpose of imposing or levying any tax or penalty.\tThus
\nit  is\tclear that the provisions of Art. 31 (2)  cannot  be
\ninvoked\t in impeaching the validity of a taxing statute\t and
\nso,  we\t come back to the position that a taxing  law  which
\ndoes  not  offend  against any\tof  the\t fundamental  rights
\nguaranteed  by Part 111, would justify the imposition  of  a
\ntax  and  would\t meet  the  requirements  of  Art.  31\t(1).
\nTherefore,  in our opinion the challenge to the validity  of
\nthe Act on the ground that it contravenes Act. 31 (1) is not
\nwell-founded.\n<\/p>\n
Let us now turn to the merits of the argument that s. 5\t (1)
\ncontravenes Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f)._It is urged that  since
\ndiscretion  has\t been  left  to\t the  State  Government\t  to
\nprescribe   the\t  multiple   without   any   guidance,\t the
\nprescription   of  the\tnecessary  multiple  by\t the   State
\nGovernment   at\t its  own  sweet-will  will  amount  to\t  an
\nunreasonable  restriction under Art. 19(5) and so,  Art.  19
\n(1) (f) must be held to have been contravened.\tOn the\tsame
\nground,\t it is said that Art. 14 has also been\tcontravened.
\nWe  are not impressed by this argument.\t It is\t‘clear\tthat
\nthe  policy  of the Act is to argument the revenues  of\t the
\nState and for that purpose, the tax has been levied on\tland
\nholdings, subject to the important proviso that holdings the
\narea  whereof  does  not exceed thirty acres  would  not  be
\ntaxed.\t In other words, it is only big holders\t whose\tland
\nholdings  are  subjected to tax by this Act.  Even  so,\t the
\nbasis  adopted\tfor levying the tax is ultimately  the\trent
\npayable\t for  the land or lands in question and\t taking\t the
\nbasis  of  the said rent, the annual value of  the  land  is
\nrequired  to be determined by adopting a suitable  multiple.
\nSection 5 (1) prescribes the maximum limit of this  multiple
\nand  leaves it to the discretion of the State Government  to
\nadjust\tthe multiple as local conditions and  conditions  of
\nland  may require.  It would obviously not have\t been  prac-
\nticable for the Legislature to provide for different
\n237<\/span>
\nmultiples in respect of different districts or in regard  to
\ndifference  classes of lands.  Having laid down the  general
\npolicy\tin that behalf, the Legislature naturally  left\t the
\nadjustment  of the multiple to the discretion of  the  State
\nGovernment because the said adjustment had to be made in the
\nlight  of local conditions and by reference to the class  of
\nthe  land.  Therefore, we do not think that  the  discretion
\nleft to the State Government can be said to be unfettered or
\nuncanalised  so as to amount to an unreasonable\t restriction
\nas  contended by Mr. Goyal; as we have already\tpointed\t out
\nthe notification issued by the State Government\t prescribing
\nthe multiple has clearly complied with the requirement of s.
\n5  (1).\t We must accordingly hold that the challenge to\t the
\nvalidity  of  s.  5 (1) on the ground  that  it\t contravenes
\nArticles 14 and 19 (1) (f)must fail.\n<\/p>\n
Then  it  is  urged that the rates  fixed  by  the  Schedule
\ncontravene  Arts. 14 and 19.  It is not easy  to  appreciate
\nthis  argument.\t Section 5 (1) makes it clear that the\trent
\nis to be taken as the basis for fixing the annual value\t and
\ns.  5  (2) provides for the method of calculating  the\tsaid
\nrent.  Thus the rent being determined, the annual value\t has
\nto be ascertained by adopting a suitable multiple and it  is
\non  the\t annual\t value. thus determined\t that  the  Schedule
\nprescribes  a grading scale of rates, for Holding Tax.\t The
\ntax  being  on land holding,the measure of the tax  is\tthus
\nfixed in the light of the annual value of the land  holding.
\nIn  other words, the land holding is taxed on the  basis  of
\nits  annual value and it is difficult to understand how\t the
\nSchedule   can\t be   successfully   challenged\t  as   being
\ninconsistent with Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (f).\n<\/p>\n
That  leaves one more question to be considered.  Mr.  Goyal
\nargues\tthat the Act is confiscatory in (character and\tmust
\nbe  struck down as being a colorable piece  of\tlegislation,
\nand in support. of this argument he suggests that the  rates
\nprescribed
\n238<\/span>
\nby  the\t Schedule  are so heavy\t that  the  assessees  would
\nvirtually have to part with their properties within a  short
\ntime  in  order to bear the burden of the  tax.\t  This\tplea
\nraises\tthe question as to whether a taxing statute  can  be
\nchallenged  on the ground that the burden of tax imposed  by
\nit is unreasonably high or excessive.  We have already\tseen
\nthat  the  provisions of Art. 31 (2) cannot  be\t invoked  in
\nchallenging  the validity of a taxing statute on the  ground
\nthat  the tax levied is unreasonably high and we  have\talso
\nnoticed\t that if the taxing statute does not contravene\t any
\nother  fundamental  right guaranteed by part III,  it  would
\nnormally  be treated as a valid law by whose  authority\t tax
\ncan be collected without infringing Art. 31 (1).  Though the
\nvalidity of a taxing statute cannot be challenged merely  on
\nthe  ground that it imposes an unreasonably high burden,  it
\ndoes  not follow that a taxing statute cannot be  challenged
\non  the ground that it is a colourable piece of\t legislation
\nand  as such, is a fraud on the legislative power  conferred
\non  the\t Legislature in question. If, in fact, it  is  shown
\nthat  the  Act\twhich  purports to be  a  taxing  Act  is  a
\ncolourable   exercise  of  the\tlegislative  power  of\t the
\nLegislature,  then  that would be an independent  ground  on
\nwhich  the Act can be struck down.  Colourable\texercise  of
\nlegislative  power is not a legitimate exercise of the\tsaid
\npower and as such, it may be open to challenge.\t But such  a
\nchallenge  can\tsucceed not merely by showing that  the\t tax
\nlevied\tis  unreasonably high or excessive, but\t by  proving
\nother  relevant circumstances which justify  the  conclusion
\nthat  the  statute is colourable and as such, amounts  to  a
\nfraud.\n<\/p>\n
 As an illustration of such a colourable statute, we   As an
\nillustration of such a colourable statute, may refer to\t the
\ndecision of this Court in K.  P.  Moopil  Nair v.  State  of
\nKerala (1).  In that case, the provisions of’ Sections 4 and
\n7 of the Travancore-Cochin Land Tax Act (XV of 1955) as
\n(1)  [1961] 3. S. C R. 77.\n<\/p>\n
239<\/span><\/p>\n
amended\t  by   Act   X\tof  1957,  were\t  declared   to\t  be
\nunconstitutional  in view of the provisions ‘of Articles  14
\nand 19 (1) (f) of the Constitution.  These provisions  along
\nwith  the  provisions  of  section  5A\twhich  was  held  to
\ncontravene Art. 19 (1 ) (f), were the main provisions of the
\nAct and as such, as soon as the said provisions were  struck
\ndown  as  unconstitutional the whole Act  inevitably  became
\nvoid.\tIn dealing with the validity of the said  Act,\tthis
\nCourt  had  occasion  to  consider  also  the\tconfiscatory
\ncharacter   of\t its  operative\t  provisions.\t On   making
\ncalculations,\tit  was\t found\tthat  the   petitioner\t who
\nchallenged  the validity of the said Act in  that  case\t was
\nmaking\tan income of Rs. 3,100 per year out of\this  forests
\nand his liability for taxation in respect of the forest land
\namounted to Rs. 54,000.\t So, it was held that the provisions
\nof the Act were confiscatory.  It would thus be noticed that
\nthe main sections of the Act were found to be discriminatory
\nand   were   also  found  to   have   imposed\tunreasonable
\nrestrictions  on  the  citizens’  right\t to  hold  property.
\nBesides,  it  appeared\tthat  in  their\t effect\t they\twere
\nconfiscatory,\tin  character.\t In  other  words,   careful
\nexamination of the material provisions of the Act  disclosed
\na  design  to  impose  a discriminatory\t tax  and  make\t its
\nrealisation  amenable  to an executive\tfiat.\tConsistently
\nwith  this  design, the Act had levied an impost  which\t was
\nconfiscatory in character.  The judgment of this Court shows
\nthat  the confiscatory character of the levy imposed by\t the
\nAct  proved to be the proverbial last straw on\tthe  camel’s
\nback.\tIt is in the light of these facts that the whole  of
\nthe  Act was struck down.  This decision illustrates  how  a
\ntaxing statute though ostensibly passed in exercise ,of\t the
\nlegislative  powers  conferred on the  Legislature,  can  be
\nstruck\tdown  as  being a colourable exercise  of  the\tsaid
\npower.\tIn other words, the conclusion that a taxing statute
\nis colourable would not and cannot normally be raised merely
\non the
\n240<\/span>
\nfinding\t that the tax imposed by it is unreasonably high  or
\nheavy, because the reasonableness of the extent of the\tlevy
\nis always a matter within the competence of the Legislature.
\nSuch  a conclusion can be reached where in passing  the\t Act
\nthe  Legislature has merely adopted a device and a cloak  to
\nconfiscate the property of the citizen taxed.  If,  however,
\nsuch  a\t conclusion is reached on the consideration  of\t all
\nrelevant  facts, that is a separate and\t independent  ground
\nfor  striking  down  the Act.  There is no  doubt  that\t the
\ndecision  in  the  case\t of K. T.  Moopil  Nair\t is  not  an
\nauthority for the proposition that in testing- the  validity
\nof a taxing statute ‘, the Court can embark upon. an enquiry
\nwhether the tax imposed by the statute is unreasonably\thigh
\nand whether it should have been fixed at a lower level.
\nLet us now see what the petitioner has proved in the present
\ncase in support of his plea that the Act is confiscatory and
\nshould,\t therefore, be struck down as a colourable piece  of
\nlegislation.   It appears that when the petition  was  first
\nfiled,\tit had not clearly made out a case on  this.  point.
\nThe  petitioner\t had, no doubt, alleged\t that  approximately
\n3\/5th  of  the\tincome had to be utilised for  the  cost  of
\nproduction  in terms of raw materials, labour,\tcapital\t and
\nthe  risk  taken  by the farmer, and so,  according  to\t the
\npetitioner, only 1\/5th of the gross agricultural income\t can
\nbe  termed to be the net agricultural income of the  farmer.
\nOn this basis, the Act was described as confiscatory.  Later
\non,  an application for amendment of the petition was  filed
\non  the\t 30th January, 1961, and in this  application,\tsome
\nadditional  facts were alleged in support of the  plea\tthat
\nthe  Act is confiscatory.  In paragraph 6 of this  amendment
\npetition,  it was sought to be shown that 14% of  the  gross
\nproduce\t had  to  be  spent in\tpurchasing  seeds,  14%\t was
\nrequired  to  be  spent or irrigation  facilities,  14%\t for
\nploughing the fields and 14% for extra labour and general
\n241<\/span>
\nmanagement  and\t 15% would be needed to pay rent.   On\tthis
\ncalculation,  it was urged, that the tax levied by  the\t Act
\nwas confiscatory and as such, amounted to a colourable piece
\nof legislation.\n<\/p>\n
The allegations thus made by the petitioner have been denied
\nby   the  respondents  in  their   counter-affidavit.\t The
\ncalculations  made  in the counter affidavit show  that\t the
\ngross income of the petitioner is Rs. 1, 07,362.   According
\nto  the\t counteraffidavit,  cost of  cultivation  would\t not
\nexceed 40% and that amounts to about Rs. 42,000.   Deducting
\nthis  total cost of cultivation from the gross\tincome,\t the
\npetitioner would be left with a net income of Rs. 65;362 and
\non this net income of Rs. 65,362 he is called upon to pay  a
\ntax of Rs. 14,882\/86 nP.  If the facts stated in the counter
\naffidavit  are accepted as true, it is obvious that the\t tax
\nimposed\t  on  the  petitioner  cannot  by  any\tstretch\t  of
\nimagination be deemed to be confiscatory.
\nIn  this  connection.,\tit  is\tsignificant  that  in\this’
\namendment petition, the petitioner has not stated the extent
\nof  the\t rent  which  he is required to\t pay  for  his\tland
\nholdings.    He\t holds\tthe  lands  as\tBhumidar   and\t the
\nrespondents  contend that the rent recovered from  Bhumidars
\nis  very  low.\tIt was even suggested during the  course  of
\nargument  by Mr. Aggarwal that the rent recovered  from\t the
\nBhumidars  would  not exceed 1% of the gross income  and  in
\nsome  cases,  it  may  even  be\t less.\t Unfortunately,\t the
\npetitioner has not made any statement I about this important
\nparticular.   The operation of the rates prescribed  by\t the
\nSchedule is based on the annual valuation of the lands,\t and
\nthe said valuation is determined ultimately on the basis  of
\nthe  rent, so that unless the rent is known, the  extent  of
\nthe impost cannot be adequately judged.\t Therefore, ,in\t our
\nopinion, on the material added by the petitioner before\t us,
\nit is impossible to accept the
\n242<\/span>
\nargument  that\tthe tax levied by the Act  is  confiscatory.
\nBesides, as we have already seen, the scheme of the  present
\nAct does not disclose any constitutional infirmity either in
\nits  charging sections or in the sections providing for\t the
\nprocedure for the levy of the tax and its recovery.  That is
\nwhy  we\t feel  no hesitation in holding\t that  there  is  no
\nsubstance  in the plea that the Act is a colorable piece  of
\nlegislation.\n<\/p>\n
In  the\t result,the  petition fails and\t is  dismissed\twith
\ncosts.\n<\/p>\n
Petition dismissed.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh And … on 4 April, 1962 Equivalent citations: 1962 AIR 1563, 1963 SCR (1) 220 Author: N R Ayyangar Bench: Majmudar S.B. (J), Sarkar, A.K., Gupta, K.C. Das, Ayyangar, N. Rajagopala, Mudholkar, J.R. PETITIONER: RAJA JAGANNATH BAKSH SINGH Vs. RESPONDENT: THE […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-207937","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nRaja Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh And ... on 4 April, 1962 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/raja-jagannath-baksh-singh-vs-the-state-of-uttar-pradesh-and-on-4-april-1962\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Raja Jagannath Baksh Singh vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh And ... on 4 April, 1962 - 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