{"id":210204,"date":"1974-01-21T00:00:00","date_gmt":"1974-01-20T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974"},"modified":"2015-01-27T04:41:25","modified_gmt":"2015-01-26T23:11:25","slug":"state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974","title":{"rendered":"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, … vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974"},"content":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n
State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, … vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974<\/div>\n
Equivalent citations: 1974 AIR 994, \t\t 1974 SCC (4) 305<\/div>\n
Author: V Krishnaiyer<\/div>\n
Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R.<\/div>\n
           PETITIONER:\nSTATE OF PUNJAB (NOW HARYANA) AND, ORS.\n\n\tVs.\n\nRESPONDENT:\nAMAR SINGH AND ANOTHER\n\nDATE OF JUDGMENT21\/01\/1974\n\nBENCH:\nKRISHNAIYER, V.R.\nBENCH:\nKRISHNAIYER, V.R.\nPALEKAR, D.G.\nSARKARIA, RANJIT SINGH\n\nCITATION:\n 1974 AIR  994\t\t  1974 SCC  (4) 305\n CITATOR INFO :\n RF\t    1975 SC1952\t (6,7)\n RF\t    1992 SC 248\t (53)\n\n\nACT:\nPunjab Security of Land Tenures Act (10 of 1953) Ss.10A\t and\n18--Scope of\nInterpretation of Statutes.\n\n\n\nHEADNOTE:\nSection\t 10A(B) of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures\tAct,\n1953, provides that no transfer or other disposition of land\nwhich  is  comprised  in a surplus area [as  defined  in  s.\n2(5a)],\t at  the commencement of the Act, shall\t affect\t the\nutilization thereof for the resettlement of ejected tenants;\nand  s. 10A(C) provides that for the purpose of\t determining\nthe  surplus area, any judgment, decree or order of a  court\nor other authority,which diminishes the surplus are  a,shall\nbe  ignored.   Under the Act, land owners who  had  land  in\nexcess\t of  the  'permissible\tarea'  could   reserve\t for\nthemselves lands to the extent of the permissible area;\t and\nthe rest, excluding the permissible area of the tenants, was\nthe surplus area of the landowner.  Section 18 provides that\na tenant, who has been in continuous occupation of the\tland\ncomprised  in his tenancy for a minimum period of  6  years,\nshall  be entitled to purchase from the landowner, the\tland\nso held by him.\nAt  the\t commencement  of  the Act  on\tApril  15,  1953,  a\nlandowner  owned three items of property which did not\tform\npart  of her reserved area.  One of the items was under\t her\nself-cultivation while there were tenants on the other\ttwo.\nThose  tenants\tlater gave up possession and  abandoned\t the\nlands.\t The  landowner made a gift of the 3  items  to\t her\ndaughter, who sold them to her husband and his brother,\t the\n1st   and  2nd\trespondents  respectively.   The   Collector\n(Surplus  Area), while determining the surplus area  of\t the\nlandowner,  ignored the gifts and sales, and included the  3\nitems  in  the landowner's surplus  area.   The\t respondents\nappealed  to  the Commissioner.\t They also  applied  to\t the\nAssistant  Collector under s. 18, for purchase of the  lands\nin  their possession on the ground of continuous  occupation\nfor 6 years.  The applications were allowed on the basis  of\na  compromise between the applicants (respondents)  and\t the\nlandowner,  and\t the  respondents paid\tthe  purchase  price\ndetermined  by\tthe Assistant Collector.  On  the  basis  of\nthose purchase orders the Commissioner, set aside the  order\nof the Collector (Surplus Area) declaring the surplus\tarea\nof  the\t landowner,  and directed him to  inquire  into\t the\nmatter afresh.\tThe collector\t [the Asstt.  Collector\t who\nhad  allowed  the purchases by the respondents had  by\tthen\nbecome\tCollector (Surplus Area)] thereupon  determined\t the\nsurplus area of the landowner under s. 10A(c).\tHe, however,\nheld  that  the\t leases\t granted  to  the  respondents\twere\ncollusive  and that the orders of purchase under S. 18\twere\nineffective,   and  included  the  3  items  again  in\t the\nlandowner's surplus area.\nThe High Court allowed the Writ Petitions of the respondents\non  the\t ground that the authority acting  under  s.  10A(c)\ncould not ignore the purchase orders passed under s. 18.\nAllowing the appeals to this Court,\nHELD  :\t Per  Palekar and Krishna  lyer,  JJ.  (Sarkaria  J.\ndissenting)  :\t1(a) The public policy of S. 10A  cannot  be\noutwitted  by  consent\torders\tcalculated  to\tdefeat\t the\nprovision, and, without the statutory authority charged with\nthe  inquiry  being  satisfied about the  bonafides  of\t and\neligibility for, the purchase. [175G]\nWhen  high public policy finds expression  in  socioeconomic\nlegislation  contractual  arrangements\tbetween\t  interested\nindividuals,  sanctified into consent or compromise  decrees\nor orders cannot be binding on the instrumentalities of\t the\nState  called  upon  to enforce the  statute,  although\t the\ntribunals,  enjoined to enforce the law, may take  probative\nnote   of  the\trecitals  in  such  compromise\tor   consent\nstatements  in\tproof of facts on which\t their\tjurisdiction\ndepends.  Neither the materials on\n153\nrecord\tin  the\t present  case,\t nor  the  recitals  in\t the\ncompromise,  disclose the application of the judicial  mind.\n[174C]\n(b)  It was found by the Collector (Surplus Area)  that\t the\nleases\tin question have been collusively got up to  dwindle\nthe surplus area of the landowner and that the landowner had\nconspired with her son-in-law and big brother to retain\t the\narea  in contravention of the law.  Further, S.\t 18  applies\nonly  to  persons who are legally tenants.  In\tthe  present\ncase'  the lease was granted by the landowner after  gifting\nthe property to her daughter.  Also, the section requires  6\nyears continuous occupation by the tenant; but the Collector\nfound  that the respondents had not completed the period  at\nthe  time  of their application under S. 18.  The  order  in\nfact  is  thus\ta  nullity.   Therefore,  it  could  not  be\ncontended  that\t the  orders of purchase in  favour  of\t the\nrespondents passed by the concerned officer under S. 18\t had\nbecome\tfinal and not having been set aside bind  the  other\nauthority determining the surplus area.\n(c)  There  is no provision in s. 18 to give notice  to\t the\nCollector  who\tis to declare the surplus area and  so,\t the\nState  (represented  by\t the Collector),  which\t is  vitally\nconcerned   in\tthe  resettlement  of  ejected\ttenants\t  by\nutilising  the surplus area, has no opportunity\t to  present\nits case against the fraudulent character of the proceedings\nunder s. 18 before the Assistant Collector.  The State,\t not\nbeing a party to that order, in any case, cannot be bound by\nit,  whatever  may be the effect as between the\t parties  to\nthose proceedings.  Since the State is not a party it has no\nright of appeal or review.[172B]\n(2)  The authority under s. 10A may ignore the order of\t the\nauthority under s. 18.\n(a) There is an apparent conflict between Ss. 10 and 18\t and\nthe  basic judicial approach should be to harmonise the\t two\nsections.   The major premise of statutory  construction  is\nthat the rule of law must run close to the rule of life\t and\nthe court must read into an enactment, language\t permitting,\nthe  meaning  which promotes, the benignant  intent  of\t the\nlegislation  in\t preference to the one\twhich  perverts\t the\nscheme\tof the statute.\t The objects of the agrarian  reform\nunderlying  the Act are : (a) to impart security of  tenure;\n(b) to make the tiller the owner; and (c) to trim large land\nholdings thus creating peasant proprietorships ensuring even\ndistribution  of  land\townership.  The\t intendment  of\t the\nstatute is that reservation was to be made by a landowner to\nenable\tself-cultivation,  and so,  landowners\tcould  eject\ntenants.   But,\t since\tagrarian  reform  must\tpromote\t not\neviction but security of tenure, it became necessary for the\nState  to create surplus area of a considerable\t extent,  so\nthat,  the  evicted tenants could be rehabilitated  on\tsuch\nsurplus lands, enjoying fixity of tenure and paying. rent to\nthe owners.  The success of the scheme depends on preventing\nleakages  through private alienations, collusive awards\t and\ndecrees and the like, and so, care was taken in s. 10A(C) to\ninterdict alienations and to ignore decrees and orders which\ndiminished  the\t surplus pool.\tSuch a\tstrategic  provision\nmust  receive  a benignantly spacious  construction.  [160H,\n161F, 157H]\n(b)  There  is no force in the contention that\tthe  benefit\nunder s. 18 would be completely nullified and obliterated if\ns.  10A(c) were to prevail and apply to orders under s.\t 18.\nThough S. 10A(C) uses the words 'shall be ignored it is\t not\nevery  order under s. 18 that would have to be\tignored\t but\nonly  those orders which have the effect of diminishing\t the\nsurplus area.  The person who is entitled to purchase  under\ns. 18 is a person lawfully inducted on the land as a tenant.\nThe cases under the section would be, (i) of tenants who are\neligible  to  purchase\tby  virtue  of\t6  years  continuous\noccupation  of land in their permissible area, and  (ii)  of\ntenants resettled on surplus area of the landowner, after  6\nyears continuous occupation.  The purchase in the first case\nbeing  from  the tenant's permissible area  is\toutside\t the\nsurplus\t area of the landowner and does not have the  effect\nof diminishing the landowner's surplus area.  In the  second\ncase,  the  purchase fulfils the object of  the\t statute  of\nmaking\tthe  tiller  the  owner.   The\tprincipal   category\nadversely affected would be post statutory collusive tenants\nand  perhaps  some  bonafide tenants, who,  however  do\t not\ndeserve\t  sympathy  since  they\t damage\t the  prospects\t  of\ndisplaced  persons  to\tbe  resettled.\t Section  18(1)(iii)\napparently contemplates purchase rights for persons who\t had\nno  possession\twhen  the  Act\tcame  into  force,  but\t the\nexception  was\tmade only in case of those persons  who\t had\nbeen  deprived of their rights by unjust eviction  prior  to\nthe Act coming into force. [169H-170D]\n154\n(3)  The purchase order by the Assistant Collector under  s.\n18  was rightly ignored by the Collector (Surplus Area),  as\n'other\tauthority' in s. 10A(c) includes the officers  under\ns.  18.\t  The plain meaning of the sub-section is  that\t any\norder by any authority which shrinks the surplus area of the\nlandowner is invalid to the extent laid down in that clause,\nand  orders under s. 18, if they diminish the  surplus\tarea\nsuffer the same fate.  The High Court was wrong in inferring\nfrom  the  statement  of objects  and  reasons\tthat  'other\nauthorities'  in  s.  10A(C) are arbitrators  or  such\tlike\nagencies and not authorities under the Act.  The objects and\nreasons\t relating  to the clause of a bill may be  read\t for\nfinding\t the  object  of  the law and  not  to\tcontrol\t its\namplitude.   The  purpose as revealed in  the  statement  of\nobjects\t is  that  the\tlegislature  wanted  to\t ensure\t the\ninvulnerability of the surplus pool provision to attacks, by\nignoring  judicial and quasi-judicial orders of every  sort.\nThis  object  of s. 10A(C) cannot be  fulfilled\t unless\t the\nwidest meaning were given to the expression 'court or  other\nauthority'.  Nor is there any basis for truncating the ambit\nof  'other  authority'.\t 'Other authority'  is\tevery  other\nauthority within or without the Act. [168F, 169B, 171A-B]\n(4)  Further, the expression 'transfer or other\t disposition\nof  land'  in  s.  10A(b)  covers  leases,  which  by\tvery\ndefinition, are a species of transfer of land.\tIn the\tpre-\nsent case, the lands in dispute fell outside the landowner's\nreserved  area\tand were therefore included in\ther  surplus\narea.  The first respondent, to be entitled to be a  lessee,\nmust prima facie show that the alienation in his favour,  as\na  lessee,  does not violate s. 10A(b) which  prohibits\t all\ntransfers and other dispositions which diminish .the surplus\narea of the landowner.\tUnder s. 2(1), the word\t 'landowner'\nincludes  also\tthe lessee and the permissible area  of\t the\ntenant\tis excluded from the surplus area of the  landowner.\nMerely\tbecause of the outstanding leases in favour  of\t the\nprior tenants at the commencement of the Act, the two  items\nwhich were earlier leased to tenants do not ipso facto\tfall\noutside the surplus area of the landowner.  That would be so\nonly  if they are comprised in the permissible area  of\t the\ntenant on the relevant date but there is no evidence to that\neffect.\t In relation to the prior tenants no such claim\t has\nbeen  set  up  by  the\tfirst  respondent,  and\t the   first\nrespondent was not a transferee from the prior tenants,\t but\na  de  novo  tenant.   After  the  prior  tenants  gave\t  up\npossession the lands came into the actual possession of\t the\nlandowner  and\tthe leases were extinguished.\tIt  follows,\nthat one item was always in the possession of the  landowner\nand  other  two came into her possession subsequent  to\t the\ncoming\tinto  force of the Act, that those  three  items  of\nproperty  should  be  computed as part\tof  the\t landowner's\nsurplus area, and that s. 10A(b) operates to invalidate\t the\nalleged\t leases to the respondents, since they diminish\t the\nsurplus area of the landowner.\tThe respondents,  therefore,\nhad   no   right,   as\ttenants,  to   purchase\t  under\t  s.\n18.[167D,167H-168D]\n(5)  It\t could\tnot be contended that  even  if\t leases\t are\nprohibited  by\ts. 10A(b) the sub-section  does\t not  affect\ninvoluntary transfers and that since a purchase under  s.18,\neffects\t an  involuntary transfer it is not affected  by  s.\n10A(b).\t The three subclauses of s. 10A, read together, show\nthat  if  the  landowner,  by any act  or  omission  of\t his\nsuffered  a  diminution in the surplus area by\ta  transfer,\nvoluntary  or otherwise contrary to the right of  the  State\nGovernment to dispose of it, such a transfer is liable to be\nset  aside.   The expression 'transfer' is  wide  enough  to\ncover transfers by operation of law, as in the present case,\nunder  s. 18.  To uphold the contention of  the\t respondents\nthat  involuntary transfers are not affected would  stultify\ns.  10A\t and the scheme of the statute\taltogether  as\tthey\nwould  diminish the available surplus area of  a  landowner.\nMoreover,  special  exclusion to save transfers\t by  way  of\ninheritance  and  compulsory land acquisition by  the  State\nwould  be  supererogatory  had\tinvoluntary  transfers\tbeen\nautomatically excluded from s. 10A(b). [172H]\nThe Court expressed the hope that land reform measures would\nbe  quickly implemented, because, in the present case,\tmore\nthan  a\t score\tof years notwithstanding  the  processes  of\nfixing reserved areas and surplus areas' on the strength  of\nwhich alone confirment of proprietary rights on tenants\t and\nresettlement  of a ejected tenants could proceed, are  still\nlingering. [176C]\nMam Rai v. State of Punjab I.L.R. (1969) 2 Pun. & Har.\t680;\n682-683, over-ruled.\n155\nChari v. Seshadri [1973] 1 S.C.C. 761, Bahadur Singh v. Muni\nSubrat<\/a>\t[1969] 2 S.C.R. 432, Kaushalya Devi v. K. L.  Bansal<\/a>\n[1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048 and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal<\/a> [1970] 3\nS.C.C. 181, refeffed to.\nPer Sarkaria J. (dissenting)\n(1)  (a) The Collector (Surplus Area) would be\tentitled  to\nignore\tthe  order  of the Asstt.   Collector  under  S.  18\nindependently of s. 10A of the Act if the order based on the\ncompromise  is\tvoid  and  a nullity.  But  if\tit  is\tonly\nvoidable  or erroneous, it could be avoided only by  way  of\nappeal\treview\tor  revision or in  other  appropriate\tpro-\nceedings,  known  to law and the  Collector  (Surplus  Area)\ncould  go behind it only when it is so set aside, or if\t the\nprovisions of s. 10A entitle him to do so.\n(b) An order is null and void if the quasi-judicial tribunal\npassing it lacks inherent jurisdiction over the parties\t and\nthe  subject  matter.  In the present  case,  the  Assistant\nCollector  who made the order under s. 18 was duly  invested\nwith  jurisdiction under the section.  The respondents\twere\ntenants\t  and  merely  because-they  were  related  to\t the\nlandowner they could not be denied the rights and privileges\nunder the Act.\tThe allegations in the purchase\t application\nabout the applicants' being in continuous occupation of\t the\nlands  comprised in their tenancy for the requisite  Period,\ncoupled\t with admission by the landowner in the\t compromise,\nfurnished  sufficient  material on the basis  of  which\t the\nauthority  could have been satisfied about the existence  of\nall the facts essential for the exercise of his jurisdiction\nunder s. 18. [191F, 192E]\n(c)  It\t is  not correct to say, that on the  facts  of\t the\ninstant\t case  the  Assistant Collector\t passed\t the  orders\nsolely\ton the basis of the compromise without applying\t his\nmind  to  the  facts of the case.  Application\tof  mind  is\nevident from the circumstance that he assessed the price  to\nbe  paid  by each of the applicants who thereafter  did\t so.\nThe  mere fact that he did not record a finding in  so\tmany\nwords  that he was satisfied from such and such material  in\nregard\tto the existence of the basic  conditions  necessary\nfor making the order under s. 18 did not render his order  a\nnullity\t when  such material was otherwise  evident  on\t the\nrecord.\t Therefore, the order under s. 18 was not a  nullity\nand  it\t could not be ignored as non-est  by  the  Collector\n(Surplus Area). [192E]\nK.  K.\tChari v. R. M. Seshadri<\/a> [1973] 1 SCC  761,  Nagindas\nRamdas\tv.  Dalpatram  Ichchram\t Civil\tAppeal\tNo.<\/a>  2479\/72\ndecided\t on  30-11-1973, Smt.  Ujjam Bai v. State  of  Uttar\nPradesh,  AIR<\/a> 1962 S.C. 1621=[1963]1 SCR 778  and  Ittyavira\nMathai v. Varkey Varkey, A.I.R,<\/a> 1964 S.C. 907 (910)= [1964]1\nSCR 495, followed.\n(d)  The Collector (Surplus Area) and the  Collector  acting\nunder s. 18, are coordinate authorities exercising  separate\nand  distinct jurisdictions'.  If one feels that  a  certain\norder  passed by the other in the exercise of  his  distinct\njurisdiction  is erroneous it was open to that authority  to\nget  it rectified in the appropriate manner provided by\t the\nAct,  that  is, by way of appeal, review or  revision.\t The\nprovisions in regard to appeal, review and revision  against\nan  order of the Assistant Collector under s. 18 are,  under\nss. 24 and 25 of the Act, ss 80 to 84 of the Punjab  Tenancy\nAct, 1887.  There is nothing in the Act or the Rules  framed\nunder the Act, or in the Tenancy Act, as to who can file  an\nappeal\tor  revision against the decision or  order  of\t the\nCollector exercising jurisdiction under s. 18; and, in\tview\nof the long Practice there could be no doubt that the  State\nGovernment or its department can, if aggrieved or prejudiced\nby  such a decision, go in appeal or revision against it.  A\nperson who is not a party to a decree or order, may with the\nleave of the Appellate Court prefer an appeal and as a rule,\nleave  will not be refused to a person who might  have\tbeen\nmade a party to the proceedings.  In any case, the State  or\nthe  department could have moved the Financial\tCommissioner\nto set right the illegality or impropriety in revision.\t The\nFinancial Commissioner under the Tenancy Act has wide powers\nin  revision  to correct errors committed  by  the  inferior\nauthorities  and there is no time limit to the\texercise  of\nthe  revisional power.\tOnce the application of\t the  tenant\nunder s. 18 has been allowed and the order is not set  aside\nin  appeal or revision, it becomes final and remains  immune\nto  an attack against its validity on any ground,  including\nthat  of collusion, before the coordinate authorities  under\nthe  Act dealing with the question of the  determination  of\nsurplus\t area.\tIn the present case the\t Collector  (Surplus\nArea) could not go behind the orders under s. 18 or  himself\nsit  in\t appeal over them, especially when the\tofficer\t who\npassed\tthe  two  orders happended to be  the  same  person.\n[194C]\n156\nAmir  Chand  v. State of Haryana 1971 PLJ.  449,  Securities\nInsurance  Co. [1894] 2 Ch. 410, Province of Bombay v. W.  L\nAutomobile Association A.I.R. 1949 Dom. 141, Heera Singh  v.\nVeerka, A.I.R.\t1958 Raj. 181, Shivaraja v. Siddamma  A.I.R.\n1963  Mys. 127, Executive Officer v. Raghavan Pillai  A.I.R.\n1961 Kerala    114, B. an Infant, [1958] 1 Q.B. 12;  Govinda\nMenon  v.  Madhvan Nair A.I.R.<\/a> 1964 Kerala  235(DB),  Punjab\nState v. Dr. Iqbal Singh<\/a> [1965] Punjab Law Journal 110, Man\nRaj  and  ors v. State of Punjab I.L.R. [1969]\t2  Punj\t and\nHaryana 680 and Shyamlal v. State of Gujrat [1965] 2  S.C.R.\n457, referred to.\n(2)The\tview  taken by the High Court with regard  to  the\ninterpretation\tand  inter-relation of s. 10A and s.  18  is\nsound  and therefore s. 18 prevails over s. 10A and so,\t the\nauthority  under  s.  10A cannot ignore\t the  order  of\t the\nauthority under s.  18. [197B]\n(a)  The  two  canons of interpretation\t applicable  to\t the\nstatute\t are,  (i) if choice lies  between  two\t alternative\nconstructions,\tthat alternative is to be chosen which\twill\nbe  consistent with the smooth working of the  system  which\nthe statute purports to be regulating; and that\t alternative\nis to be rejected which will introduce uncertainty  friction\nor  confusion  into the working of the system and,  (ii)  if\nthere  is an apparent conflict between different  provisions\nof the same enactment they should be so interpreted that, if\npossible, effect may be given to both. [195E]\nKing  Emperor v. Benori Lal Sarma [1944] 49 CWN 178  (PC)=72\nIA 57, referred to.'\n(b)  Section  18 is designed to promote one of\tthe  primary\nobjects of the Act, namely of procuring ownership    of\t the\nland  to  the  tiller on easy  terms.\tThe  self  sufficing\nmachinery  of  this  section is available  for\tpurchase  of\ntheir  tenancies to the tenants inducted   before or   after\nApril  15,  1953,  by the landowner,  equally  with  tenants\nsettled\t by  the Government  on the  surplus area.  The\t Act\ndoes not takeaway  the right  of the landowner\tto  induct\ntenants\t on such area. Every sale made by the  operation  of\ns.18 in favour of a tenant admitted by the landowner on\t the\nsurplus\t area  causes  diminution of  the  surplus  area  or\naffects\t the utilisation thereof  by the  Government.  Under\ns.10A(C)  every judgment, decree or order of a court or\t the\nauthority,  which  diminishes  the  surplus  area  shall  be\nignored.If  sales  in  favour of  tenants  inducted  by\t the\nlandowner  after April 15, 1953 were to be ignored under  s.\n10A(c) then it will reduce the working of the system of\t the\nAct  to a mockery, because it will present the spectacle  of\nmanifest  contradiction\t and absurdity of an  Act  giving  a\nright  with  one hand and taking it away  by  another.\t The\nadoption  of  such  an\tinterpretation\tmay  not  completely\nobliterate.  s. 18 but it will certainly truncate  it,\twith\nreference  to  the  category  of  tenants  inducted  by\t the\nlandowner after April 15, 1953. [195G]\n(3)  The conflict between the two provisions can be  avoided\nonly if the general words 'other authority' in s. 10A(c) are\nread  ejusdem  generis with the\t specific  words  'judgment,\ndecree or order of a court' which immediately precede  them.\nThus construed, the general words 'or other authority'\twill\nnot take in an authority exercising jurisdiction under s. 18\nof the Act. [196B-C]\n(4) The lease created by the landowner in the present  case,\nceased\tto subsist as soon as the Collector made  orders  of\npurchase  under\t s.  18 in favour of  the  respondent.\t The\nquestion  whether  the\textinct\t lease\twhich  preceded\t the\npurchase  orders  was a transfer or not, did  not  therefore\nsurvive for decision. [197A]\nBhajan\tLal  v. Punjab State<\/a> [1968] 70\tI.L.R.\t664,  Bishan\nSingh  v. Punjab State<\/a> [1968]47 LLt 284 and Lakshmi  Bai  v.\nState  of Haryana [1971] LXXIII Punj.  L.R. 8 1 5,  referred\nto.\nFurther,  the  land  comprised in the  lease  of  the  prior\ntenants\t was far less than their permissible limit  and\t the\nHigh Court rightly presumed that the lands were within their\npermissible  area,  since there was. no evidence  that\tthey\nheld any other land.  Surplus area has to be determined,  as\nappears\t from s. 19F, with reference to the situation as  on\nApril 15, 1953, when the Act came into force.  The  disputed\nland held by the prior tenants was within their\t permissible\narea  and therefore it could not be included in the  surplus\narea  of  the landowner.  At the time  when  the  ,Collector\n(Surplus  Area ) took up determination of the surplus  area,\nthese lands were still comprised in a tenancy though under a\ndifferent tenant, namely the first\n157\nrespondent.  Such change of the tenant does not amount to  a\nfuture\tacquisition of land, comprised in that\ttenancy,  by\nthe landowner within the contemplation of\ns. 19A or S. 19B of the Act. [197H-198D]\nBhagwan\t Das  v.   The State of Punjab,<\/a> [1966]\t2  SCR\t511,\nfollowed.\nHarchand  Singh v. Punjab State,<\/a> (1964) 66 P.L.R. 285;\t1963\nP.L.J. 144, approved-\n(5)  The expression 'transfer and other disposition of\tland\nin s.10A(b) does not include completed sales effected  under\ns.  18.\t  The words transfer or other disposition  of  land'\nmust be restricted to voluntary dispositions of land made by\nthe  landowner and cannot be extended to  cover\t involuntary\ntransfers brought about by operation of law or circumstances\nbeyond\tthe  control  of the landowner.\t This  is  the\tonly\nreasonable  interpretation of the words 'transfer  or  other\ndisposition of land' in s. 10A (b) which is consistent\twith\ns.  18\tand  can  reconcile  and  keep\teffective  both\t the\nsections.   The two types of involuntary  transfers.  namely\ncompulsory  acquisition of land by Government or by an\their\nby inheritance are only illustrative of the intention of the\nlegislature. [196 D]\n\n\n\nJUDGMENT:\n<\/pre>\n
CIVIL  APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeals 1756 of  1967.
\nNos. 1755 and
\nFrom  the judgment and order dated the 4th October, 1966  of
\nthe Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Writ Petition No.
\n854 and 855 of 1963.\n<\/p>\n
V. C. Mahajan and R. N. Sachthey, for the appellants.
\nS. K. Dhingra for the respondents.\n<\/p>\n
The  Judgment of D. G. PALEKAR and V. R. KRISHNA  IYER,\t JJ.
\nwas delivered by Krishna lyer, J. R. S. SARKARIA, J. gave  a
\ndissenting, Opinion.\n<\/p>\n
KRISHNA IYER, J.  These two appeals by the State of  Haryana
\nchallenge the High Court’s approach to an interpretation  of
\ntwo,  crucial provisions of a land reforms law, namely,\t Ss.
\n10-A and 18 of the Punjab Security of Land Tenures Act (X Of
\n1953)  1953 (for short called “the Act”).  Counsel  for\t the
\nappellants  complains; that if the view upheld by  the\tHigh
\nCourt  of subordinating S. 10-A to S. 18 were not  upset  by
\nthis Court, large land’ holders may extricate their  surplus
\nland in excess of the ceiling set, through legal  loopholes,
\nsuch  as have been practised in the present case.  If  make-
\nbelieve\t deals\tand collusive, proceeding,  he\targues,\t may
\nmaneouvre  through the legal net cast by S. 10-A of the\t Act
\ninterdicting  alienations  and\torders\twhich  diminish\t the
\nsurplus\t pool  intended for re-settlement by  the  State  of
\nejected\t tenants,  the\tagrarian  reform  measure  would  be
\nreduced\t  to  a\t paper\ttiger  or   socioeconomic   eyewash.
\nCertainly,  land  reforms  are\tso  basic  to  the  national
\nreconstruction\t of   the  new\torder\tenvisaged   by\t the
\nConstitution that the issue raised in this case deserves our
\nanxious\t attention.  We have to bear in mind, the  activist,
\nthough inarticulate, major premise of statutory construction
\nthat the rule of law must run close to the rule of life\t and
\nthe court must read into an enactment, language\t permitting,
\nthat  meaning  which promotes the benignant  intent  of\t the
\nlegislation  in\t preference to the one which  perverts\tthe,
\nscheme of the statute
\n158<\/span>
\non  imputed  legislative presumptions  and  ‘assumed  social
\nvalues\tvalid in a prior era.  An aware court,\tinformed  of
\nthis  adaptation  in the rules of  forensic  interpretation,
\nhesitates to nullify the plain object of a land reforms\t law
\nunless compelled by its language, and the crux of this\tcase
\nis  just  that\taccent\twhen  double  possibilities  in\t the
\nchemistry of construction crop up.\n<\/p>\n
A breif survey of the relevent facts leading up to the legal
\ncontroversy  seeking resolution in these appeals  will\thelp
\nfocus forensic attention on the provisions of the Act  which
\nbear   upon  the  issue.   A  lady  by\tname  Lachhman\t had
\nconsiderable  agricultural  property, far in excess  of\t the
\nrelatively  liberal ceiling set by the Act which  came\tinto
\nforce on April 15, 1953.  She had a daughter Shanti Devi and
\nson-in-law  Amar Singh, respondent in Civil Appeal No.\t1755
\nof  1967,  whose  brother Indraj is the\t respondent  in\t the
\nconnected appeal No. 1756 of 1967.  Annexure (B) to the writ
\npetitions  is an order dated May 11, 1962 passed  under\t the
\nAct and the Rules by the Collector (Surplus Area) Sirsa.  It
\nis  this order which has been successfully attacked  in\t the
\nwrit  petitions\t and is the subject-matter  of\tthe  present
\nappeals.  The facts stated therein have not been reversed in
\nthe judgment of the High Court and we have to proceed on the
\nassumption  that  those\t statements  are  correct.   We\t are
\nconcerned  with three khasras Nos. 177, 265 and 343, in\t all
\nover  131  acres of land.  At the commencement of  the\tAct,
\nkhasra\tNo. 177 was under Mst.\tLachhman’s self\t cultivation
\nbut there were two tenants under her, Chandu and Sri  Chand,
\non other two plots.  Together, these three, plots constitute
\na  large slice out of her surplus areas and are now  claimed
\nby  the\t respondents, Amar Singh and Indraj,  as  their\t own
\nunder  a purchase ordered by the Assitant Collector  who  is
\nthe  competent authority under s. 18 of the Act (Annexure  A
\nto the writ petitions).\t Appellant’s counsel urges that\t the
\nhistory of the derivation of title of these claimants  needs
\nto  be sceptically studied, the relationship of the  parties
\nbeing  that of mother and daughter, son-in-law\tand  brother
\nand the heavy impact being slicing off a good chunk from the
\nsurplus\t area,\totherwise  available  for  re-settlement  of
\nevicted tenants.\n<\/p>\n
At  the\t outset it must be mentioned that the  two  tenants,
\nChandu\t and  Sri  Chand  who  were  on\t the  land  on\t the
\ndeterminative  date  (April 15, 1953) presumably  showed  no
\ninterest  in  claiming rights granted to tenants  under\t the
\nAct,  which  were subject, of course,  to  their  possessing
\nlands\tless  than  the\t permissible  area’.   We  have\t  no
\ninformation  in this case what the total extent of lands  in
\nthe possession of these two tenants was and whether they had
\nchosen\tto keep other lands in preference to the ones  under
\nMst.   Lachhman.  We need not speculate on how or  why\tthey
\nleft  the  suit\t plots but may note that they  were  on\t the
\nholding\t on the key date in 1953 and if later they  did\t not
\nkeep their possession (abandoned or surrendered) the tenancy
\nterminated and on the facts of this case the lands came into
\nthe actual possession of the land holder, Mst.\tLachhman, no
\nother legal inference being possible than that the
\n159<\/span>
\nleases\twere  extinguished  and the lands  reverted  to\t the
\nlandlady on general principles of law.\tIn short, we have to
\nproceed on the assumption that one plot, namely, khasra\t No.
\n177 had always. been in the self-cultivation of the landlady
\nand  that the two tenanted plots, namely, khasras  Nos.\t 265
\nand  343,  came\t into the khas possession  of  the  landlady
\nsubsequent to the crucial date.\t Apprehending the  statutory
\nperil  to  these  lands which were  admittedly\toutside\t her
\n“reserved areas” Mst.  Lachhman went through the exercise of
\nmaking\ta  gift\t of the three lands  to\t her  daughter\tSmt.
\nShanti\t(vide mutation No. 445 decided on December 24,\t1953
\nand  referred to in Annexure B).  Subsequently, it  is\tseen
\nthat  Amar Singh, husband of Shanti and Indraj,\t brother  of
\nAmar   Singh  purported\t to  apply  for\t purchase   of\t the
\nlandholders  right in these three plots under s. 18  of\t the
\nAct  making Lachhman and Shanti co-respondents and  alleging
\nthat they were tenants qualified for the statutory  benefit.
\nThe Assistant Collector before whom the application was made
\nfor  purchase under s. 18 has said in Annexure ‘A’  to\tboth
\nthe writ petitions that these two ladies “are said to be big
\nland-owners but had not got this land reserved for their own
\npurpose”.  Curiously enough, in both the purchase  petitions
\nthe  parties  avoided  even  an\t enquiry  by  the  Assistant
\nCollector  as is evident from the following  statement\tfrom
\nAnnexure ‘A’.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Before\tthe  proceedings  could\t start\t the
\n\t      parties  have  come  to terms  and  they\thave
\n\t      actually put in court a compromise deed  which
\n\t      they have backed up by their statements.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
May be, because these dubious moves if exposed to the exami-
\nnation\tof  an\tofficer\t might prove  a\t fiasco,  the  close
\nrelations  who figured as petitioner and respondents  lulled
\nthe  Assistant\tCollector into mechanically  acting  on\t the
\ncompromise  without  enquiring into any of  the\t eligibility
\nfactors before a purchase could be ordered.
\nThere  is another, set of facts which needs mention at\tthis
\nstage.\tEven before the purchase proceedings were  initiated
\nby  the\t writ petitioners, the Collector had,  as  early  as
\nApril  1961, declared the surplus area of Lachhman  ignoring
\nalienations and including the three khasra numbers.  But  on
\nappeals\t carried both by the landholder and  her  son-in-law
\nand his brother the Commissioner ordered a further  enquiry.
\nMeanwhile, purchase proceedings were started and by a  quick
\ncompromise, orders of purchase were obtained.  But all these
\nproved exercises in futility because the Collector,  Surplus
\nArea,  again ignored the leases to the writ  petitioners  as
\ncollusive  and the orders of purchase as ineffective in\t the
\nimpugned order, Annexure B. However the High Court set aside
\nAnnexure ‘B’ so that the petitioners before it, the  son-in-
\nlaw  and his brother, were restored to their purchases,\t and
\nthe  State  lost  the lands from  the  surplus.\t pool.\t The
\naggrieved   State   canvasses  the   correctness   of.\t the
\nsupersession  of s. 18 and of certain other legal  reasoning
\napproved  by the Court, as its impact on the working of\t the
\nland  reform  scheme would be disastrous.  Anyway,  the\t law
\nlaid down in this case was affirmed by a Full Bench of\tthat
\nCourt.\t Having regard to all those circumstances  a  series
\nanalysis  and  attempt\tat  harmonisation  of  the   various
\nprovisions of the Act is necessary now.\n<\/p>\n
160<\/span><\/p>\n
A  flash  back to the genetic evolution of the act  and\t the
\nlegislative  mutations by amendatory effort to make the\t law
\neffective,  and to unmake judicial decisions which  weakened
\nthe   working  of  it  will  help  understand  the   current
\nbiochemistry of the Act.  Any interpretation unaware of\t the
\nliving\taims ideology and legal anatomy of an Act will\tmiss
\nits  soul substance–a flaw which we feel, must\t be  avoided
\nparticularly  in socio-Economic legislation with  a  dynamic
\nwill  and mission.  Now to the legislation itself.  A  brief
\nintroduction  is  found in the reference order of  the\tFull
\nBench (Shamsher Bahadur, J.) in Mam Raj v. State of Punjab :\n<\/p>\n
(1)<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      “The  Act passed on 15th of April,  1953,\t was
\n\t      not  the first legislation on the subject\t and
\n\t      the  contours  of\t many of  the  concepts\t had
\n\t      already\ttaken  shape  in  the  two   earlier
\n\t      enactments on the subject, namely, the  Punjab
\n\t      Tenants  (Security of Tenure) Act,  1950\t(Act
\n\t      No.  22 of 1950) and Punjab Tenants  (Security
\n\t      of  Tenure) Amendment Act,  1951\t(President’s
\n\t      Act  5  of  1951).  The  Act,  which  at\tonce
\n\t      consolidated  and amended the existing law  on
\n\t      the subject, was designed “to provide for\t the
\n\t      security\tof land tenure and other  incidental
\n\t      matters”.\t As is clear from the preamble,\t the
\n\t      primary  object was the protection of  tenants
\n\t      whose  ejectments recently from holdings\theld
\n\t      by landowners owning vast tracts of lands, had
\n\t      taken place on a massive scale.  In  restoring
\n\t      the  rights of tenants ejected after  15th  of
\n\t      August,  1947, care was taken  that  landlords
\n\t      with  small  holdings were  not  subjected  to
\n\t      harassment by the tenants.For this reason, the
\n\t      concepts\tof “small  landowner”,\t“permissible
\n\t      area”  and “reservation” were  introduced.   A
\n\t      small  landowner\twas described  as  a  person
\n\t      whose  entire holding in the State  of  Punjab
\n\t      did  not\texceed the  permissible\t area  which
\n\t      though fixed at 100 standard acres in the\t Act
\n\t      of  1950 was reduced to 30 standard  acres  in
\n\t      the Act.\tA Landowner owning larger areas\t was
\n\t      entitled to reserve the permissible area,\t and
\n\t      many  of the provisions of the Act dealt\twith
\n\t      the manner and exercise of this right of\tres-<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      ervation.\t The right of the landowner to eject
\n\t      tenants from the reserved or permissible areas
\n\t      was recognized in the Act though under section
\n\t      9-A(introduced  by Punjab Act II of 1955)\t the
\n\t      tenants liable to ejectment on this score\t had
\n\t      to be accommodated in surplus areas, a minimum
\n\t      period  of ten years’ tenancy was fixed  under
\n\t\t\t    section  7\tin respect of tenants who
\n were  in
\n\t      occupation of land outside the reserved  areas
\n\t      and  the\tright of the tenants  who  had\tbeen
\n\t      ejected  after  the  15th\t August,  1947,\t for
\n\t      restoration  to the tenancies was\t recognised.
\n\t      Provisions  were made for the exercise of\t the
\n\t      other   rights  of  the  tenants,\t  the\tmost
\n\t      important of these being the right to purchase
\n\t      the leased lands under section 18 of the Act.”
\nThe  triple objects of the agrarian reform projected by\t the
\nAct  appear  to be (a) to impart security of tenure  (b)  to
\nmake  the  tiller  the owner, and (c)  to  trim\t large\tland
\nholdings,   setting  sober  ceilings.\tTo   convert   these
\npolitical slogans into legal realities to combat the evil of
\nmass  evictions,  to create peasant proprietorships  and  to
\nensure even dis-\n<\/p>\n
(1) I.L.R. [1969] 2 Pun. & Har. 680; 682-683.\n<\/p>\n
161<\/span><\/p>\n
tribution   of\tland  ownerships  a  statutory\tscheme\t was
\nfashioned, the cornerstone of which was the building up of a
\nreservoir  of land carved out of the large landholdings\t and
\nmade  available for utilization by the State for  re-setting
\nejected tenants.\n<\/p>\n
The  scheme of agrarian re-organisation contemplated by\t the
\nstatutes  is  simple.\tThe legislature\t fixed\ta  limit  on
\nownership expressively described as “permissible area” land-
\nowners\twho exceeded this area were allowed to\treserve\t for
\nthemselves  the\t best lands they desired to  keep  and\tthis
\nparcel\tor parcels of land was meaning fully  designated  as
\n“reserved  area”.  Of course, if he failed to  intimate\t his
\nselection within six months from the commencement of the Act
\nto  the\t Patwari  concerned, the  prescribed  authority\t was
\nempowered to select the parcel or parcels of land which such
\nperson was entitled to retain for himself.  The\t legislature
\nfound\tthat  many  land-owners\t had  failed  to  make\t the
\nreservation in time and so by the Amending Act 46 of 1957  a
\nfurther\t period of six months from the commencement  of\t the
\nlater Act was given for selecting the land\/lands they  meant
\nto  keep,  and further again gave the  prescribed  authority
\npower  to select the parcel or parcels of land on behalf  of
\nthe  defaulting landholders.  The intendment of the  statute
\nwas that the reserved area war, to be self cultivated and so
\nland-owners  were  competent  to  eject\t tenants  from\t the
\nreserved  area, although, generally speaking, evictions\t had
\nbeen barred.  As a matter of fact, landholders were directed
\nto start self cultivation within six months from the date of
\nreservation  or\t the date on which they\t got  possession  by
\neviction.  Small holders, i.e., persons who owned less\tthan
\nthe  permissible  area were not only not  disturbed  by\t the
\nstatute\t in regard to their ownership but were also  allowed
\nto evict tenants from their parcels of land so that they may
\nalso  become self-cultivators.\tThis process of\t making\t the
\nproprietor  cultivator\tnaturally would result\tin  the\t co-
\nexistence  of  possession  and\townership  at  the  cost  of
\nejectment  of tenants from their holdings.   Since  agrarian
\nreform must promote not eviction of lessees but security  of
\ntenure for them it became necessary for the State to  create
\na  considerable\t surplus pool of lands coughed up  by  large
\nowners\twho  held  beyond the permissible  areas.   All\t the
\ntenant refugees from resumed lands were to be  rehabilitated
\non surplus lands and such tenants, enjoying fixity of tenure
\n,Would continue to pay rents to the owners.  Another limb of
\nthe  peasant proprietorship plan was the conferment  of\t the
\nright  to  purchase the landlord’s  right  on  long-standing
\ntenants\t with six years continuous occupancy. if the  scheme
\nin the book had worked well on the ground the Act would have
\npaved the way for a new rural map of economic relations even
\nthough\tthe  problem of the landless poor may  perhaps\thave
\nsurvived.   Such  was  the  conspectus\tof  the\t legislative
\nscheme.\n<\/p>\n
It   is\t obvious  that\tthis  blue-print  for\ta   peaceful
\ntransformation\t  of   agrarian\t  relations   assumes\t the
\navailability of a large surplus area on which the State\t can
\nsettle\t tenants   from\t the  reserved\t areas\t and   small
\nlandholders’  holdings.\t Thus the key to the success of\t the
\nscheme\tis the maximising of the surplus land reservoir\t and
\nsealing off legal leakages
\n162<\/span>
\nthrough\t private alienations, collusive orders\tand  decrees
\nand the like, and so care was taken to interdict alienations
\nand  ignore decrees and orders which diminished the  surplus
\npool.\n<\/p>\n
At  this  stage\t it may be useful to sketch  out  the  broad
\noutlines  of  the  statute with specific  reference  to\t its
\nprovisions,  and changes.  The Act of 1953 had been  amended
\noften, for the professed reason, atleast once, that judicial
\npronouncements\t have  had  the\t effect\t of  defeating\t the
\nobjectives  with  which the law\t was  enacted.\t Substantial
\namendments  were made in 1955, 1957 and 1962.\tThe  objects
\nand  reasons  of  Punjab Act 14 of 1962,  which\t brought  in
\ncertain\t  significant\trestrictions  on   alienations\t and
\nacquisitions  of large landholders starts off in the  state-
\nment of objects thus :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Some  of the recent  judicial  pronouncements
\n\t      have  the effect of defeating  the  objectives
\n\t      with which the Punjab Security of land Tenures
\n\t      Act,  1953, was enacted and amended from\ttime
\n\t      to  time.\t  It was intended that\tthe  surplus
\n\t      area  of every land-owner recorded as such  in
\n\t      the revenue records should be made  utilisable
\n\t      for the settlement of ejected tenants.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Certain\t  specific  decisions  and  their  impact   on\t the
\nlegislative operation were mentioned, and then the statement
\nof objects proceeded :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “In  order to evade the provisions of s.\t10-A
\n\t      of  the Parent Act interested  persons,  being
\n\t      relations, have obtained decrees of courts for
\n\t      diminishing  the surplus area.  Clause (4)  of
\n\t      the  Bill seeks to provide that  such  decrees
\n\t      should  be  ignored in computing\tthe  surplus
\n\t      area.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
We. mention this only to emphasize that the legislature\t has
\nbeen  anxious to, guard against erosion of the surplus\tpool
\nby alienatory maneouvres or even decrees and orders obtained
\nthrough judicial or quasi-judicial processes.
\nThe Act defines “permissible area” “in relation to landowner
\nor a tenant as 30 standard acres and where such 30  standard
\nacres  on  being  converted into ordinary  acres  exceed  60
\nacres,\tsuch  60 acres.” (s. 2(3), The landlord\t who  has  a
\nvaster\textent\tmay utilise the specific lands he  wants  to
\nkeep for himself and this is called “reserved area.” Section
\n2(4) defines “reserved area” as “the area lawfully  reserved
\nunder the Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenures Act) 1950 (Act
\nXXII  of 1950). as amended by President’s Act  of  1951,…”
\nThe area other than the reserved area, ie. the balance\tleft
\nover, is defined as ,surplus area”.  Section 2 (5-a) defines
\n“surplus  area” a concept introduced by Act XI of 1955.\t  It
\nis useful to extract the definition which runs thus :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Surplus\tArea” means the area other than\t the
\n\t      reserved\tarea, and, where, no area  has\tbeen
\n\t      reserved,\t  the\tarea  in   excess   of\t the
\n\t      permissible area selected under section 5-B or
\n\t      the  area which is deemed to be  surplus\tarea
\n\t      under  sub-section  (1)  of  section  5-C\t and
\n\t      includes the area in excess of the permissible
\n\t      area selected under section 19-B, but it\twill
\n\t      not include a tenants permissible area
\n163<\/span>
\n\t      Provided\tthat  it will include  the  reserved
\n\t      area, or part thereof, where such area or part
\n\t      has  not been brought  under  self-cultivation
\n\t      within  six  months of reserving the  same  or
\n\t      getting  possession thereof after\t ejecting  a
\n\t      tenant from it, whichever is later, or if\t the
\n\t      land-owner  admits a new tenant, within  three
\n\t      years of the expiry of the said six months”.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
At this stage it may be mentioned that landowner is not only
\nentitled to self-cultivate his reserved area but is  obliged
\nto  do,\t so within the period stipulated in the\t proviso  to
\ns.2(5-a)  test such un-self-cultivated land  become  surplus
\narea.\tBut for fear that absentee landlords may pretend  to
\nbe self-cultivating while really leasing out their lands  to
\nclose  relations, the statute defines “self cultivation”  as
\ncultivation  by\t the’ land-owner personally or\tthrough\t his
\nwife or children or through prescribed relations.  It may be
\nnoted that a son-in-law is not one of those relations  (vide
\nrule 5 of the Punjab Security of land Tenures Rules, 1956.).
\nSections 5, 5-A and 5-B deal with the reservation of land by
\nlarge  landholders and the procedure in that behalf What  is
\nimportant to note is that in the present case the landholder
\nhas made her reservation and the properties in dispute\tfall
\noutside\t it and are therefore included in the surplus  area.
\nImmunity from eviction of tenants is conferred by s. 9 but a
\nlandlord  is  entitled\tto  eject a  tenant  from  the\tarea
\nreserved under this Act.  However, such ejectment shall\t not
\nbe  given  effect  to  by way  of  disposession\t unless\t the
\ndisplaced   tenant”is\taccommodation  surplus\tare   a\t  in
\naccordance  with  the  provisions of s.\t 10-A  or……’  Of
\ncourse,\t if the tenant is a close relation of  the  landlord
\nwithin\tthe  prescribed category this  protection  does\t not
\nenure to him as per the second proviso to s-9-A.  It is note
\nworthy\tthat a son-in law is not one such relative.   It  is
\nobvious\t that a large number of tenants would be ejected  by
\nsmall landholders and large landholders from their  reserved
\nareas under s. 9 of the Act.  Naturally, legislative concern
\nfor  their  rehabilitation found expression  in\t s.  10-A(a)
\nwhich runs thus
\n\t      10-A(a)  The State Government or\tany  officer
\n\t      empowered\t by  it\t in this  behalf,  shall  be
\n\t      competent to Utilize any surplus area for\t the
\n\t      resettlement  of\ttenants ejected,  or  to  be
\n\t      ejected,\tunder clause (i) of sub-section\t (1)
\n\t      of s. 9.”\n<\/p>\n
The success of the scheme, therefore, depends on the  extent
\nof the surplus pool.  For one thing, large landholders, when
\ndeprived of their excess area, as well as small landholders,
\nin  order to be viable, have to secure actual possession  of
\nwhat  they are eligible to keep, this being the\t legislative
\njustice\t shown to landowners by the Act.  Actual  possession
\ncould follow only if the potential for re-settlement of dis-
\npossessed   tenants  were  sufficient.\t That  is  why\t the
\nlegislature  has jealously protected the surplus pool  which
\nplays  a  pivotal  role in the whole  programme.   For\tthis
\npurpose s. 10-A(b) was brought in in 1955 and it reads
\n164<\/span>
\n\t      “10-A(b) Notwithstanding anything contained in
\n\t      any other law for the time being in force\t and
\n\t      save  in\tthe  case of land  acquired  by\t the
\n\t      ‘State  Government under any law for the\ttime
\n\t      being in force or by an heir by inheritance no
\n\t      transfer or other disposition of land which is
\n\t      comprised\t  in   a   surplus   area   at\t the
\n\t      commencement  of\tthis Act, shall\t affect\t the
\n\t      utilization there of in clause (a).”\n<\/p>\n
Plainly,  there is a wide interdict against any transfer  of
\nother disposition of land comprised in the surplus area,  if
\nit will affect the utilisation thereof for the re-settlement
\nof tenants ejected or to be ejected under cl. (i) of  sub-s.
\n(1) of s. 9. Such a strategic provision which takes care  of
\nthe  surplus  reservoir of land must receive  a\t benignantly
\nspacious  construction.\t There can, therefore, be  no  doubt
\nthat the expression “transfer or other disposition of  land”
\nmust definitely cover leases which, by very definition,\t are
\na species of transfer of land.\tIt looks as if other devices
\nwere resorted to by large land-owners to defeat the  surplus
\narea  scheme of s. 10-A.  Courts and other authorities\twere
\napproached and, through their processes, decrees and  orders
\nwere secured whereby lands out of the surplus area could  be
\nsalvaged  by the land-owner.  The legislature  finding\tthis
\nanti-ceiling  phenomenon clamped down a blanket ban  on\t the
\nadverse\t operation  of “any judgment, decree or order  of  a
\ncourt or other authority, obtained after the commencement of
\nthis Act and having the effect of diminishing” the area of a
\nperson which could have been declared a,-, his surplus area.
\nSection 10-A(c) may be usefully reproduced in this context.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “10-A(c)\tFor the purposes of determining\t the
\n\t      surplus area of any person under this section,
\n\t      any  judgment, decree or order of a  court  or
\n\t\t\t    other authority, obtained after the\t c
\nommenment
\n\t      of   this\t Act  and  having  the\t effect\t  of
\n\t      diminishing  the\tarea of\t such  person  which
\n\t      could  have been declared as his surplus\tarea
\n\t      shall be ignored.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
It  is\textremely  important to\t remember  that\t while\tthis
\nprovision   was\t enacted  in  1962  and\t while\ts.   10-A(b)
\nprohibiting  alienations  was  passed in  1955,\t both  these
\nprovisions  were  given\t retrospective effect  as  from\t the
\ndecisive date, namely, April 15, 1953.\tThe deep concern  of
\nthe legislature is clear from all this.\n<\/p>\n
Right  from the beginning one of the primary objects of\t the
\nstatute\t  had  been  to\t enable\t tenants  to  purchase\t the
\nLandlord’s  right and become full owners and in this  behalf
\nwas  enacted  S.  18  which has figured\t very  much  in\t the
\ncontroversy in these appeals, It states :
\n“18(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in
\nany  law, usage or contract, a tenant of a  landowner  other
\nthan a small land-owner-\n<\/p>\n
(i)  who  has  been in continuous  occupation  of  the\tland
\ncomprised in his tenancy for a minimum period of six  years,
\nor\n<\/p>\n
(ii)……..\n<\/p>\n
(iii)…….\n<\/p>\n
165<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      shall  be entitled to purchase from the  land-
\n\t      owner the land so held by him but not included
\n\t      in the reserved area of the landowner, in\t the
\n\t      case of a tenant falling within clause (i)  or
\n\t      clause (ii)     at  any time, and in the\tcase
\n\t      of a tenant falling within clause\t (iii)within
\n\t      a\t period\t of  one  year\tfrom  the  date\t  of
\n\t      commencement of this Act:\n<\/p>\n
\t      Provided that….\n<\/p>\n
\t      Provided further that.. . .\n<\/p>\n
The  further sub-sections of s. 18 deal with the process  of
\npurchase,  the\tAssistant  Collector  being  the   authority
\nempowered to order such purchase.\n<\/p>\n
In  the appeals before us there is an  apparent\t competition
\nfor  primacy  between  s. 18 and s.  10-A(b)  and  (c),\t and
\nperhaps\t it  may be relevant to refer to s. 23\talso.\tThis
\nlast section reads:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “No decree or order of any court or  authority
\n\t      and no notice of ejectment shall be valid save
\n\t      to  the extent to which it is consistent\twith
\n\t      the provisions of this Act.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
As we will presently see we are called upon to reconcile the
\nclaims\tand  contentions put forward by either side  on\t the
\nstrength of the provisions we have just mentioned.
\nLet  us\t interpret and apply the law to the  facts  of\tthis
\ncase.  The learned judge, Narula, J., stated at the outset:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “I  have\tto  take the fact as  found  by\t the
\n\t      Collector for the purposes of determining\t the
\n\t      surplus area of the landowner and consequently
\n\t      for determining the rights of the\t petitioners
\n\t      so  far  as they are sought to  be  interfered
\n\t      with by the impugned order.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
We  agree.   The same judge formulated the  legal  questions
\nfalling for decision in these words:\n<\/p>\n
\t      (1)  Whether  the\t expressions  “transfer”  or
\n\t      “other  disposition of land” in clause (b)  of
\n\t      section  10-A of the Act, include\t involuntary
\n\t      transfer\tof  a  part  of\t the  holding  of  a
\n\t      landowner by operation of an order forcing the
\n\t      landowner\t to sell a part of his holding to  a
\n\t      tenant under section 18 of the Act;
\n\t      (2)  Whether the order of any other  authority
\n\t      referred\tto in clause (c) of section 10-A  of
\n\t      the  Act includes an order of the\t authorities
\n\t      under  the Act itself passed under section  18
\n\t      thereof in favour of a tenant, which order has
\n\t      become  final either at its original stage  or
\n\t      at the appellate or revisional stage; and
\n\t      (3)   In case of conflict between section 10-A
\n\t      and  section 18 of the Act, which of  the\t two
\n\t      provisions has supervening effect or overrides
\n\t      the other.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
We do not wholly agree with this itemisation but it is\tgood
\nenough\tto  focus attention of the relevant  area  of  legal
\ncontroversy. one further point pressed in both courts may be
\nnoticed,  viz., that the order of purchase of the  concerned
\nofficer not having been set aside binds the other
\n166<\/span>
\nauthority  determining the surplus area and so the  question
\nis  whether one officer under the Act could ignore an  order
\nby  another officer under a different provision of the\tAct,
\nhaving\tregard\tto comity of courts and\t jurisdictions.\t  As
\nindicated already, the principal discussion in the  judgment
\nunder appeal has turned on the claim to primacy of s. 18  as
\nagainst s. 10-A and so it is as well that we state right now
\nwhat  stand  we\t propose  to  take  in\tresolving   apparent
\nconflicts in the provisions of a socially-oriented, project-
\nimplementing legislation.  Every such statute has a soul and
\nan  integrated\tpersonality-minor deformities may  mar\tthis
\nunity,\tespecially when piecemeal amendments  and  unskilled
\ndrafting  occur.   The basic judicial approach\tmust  be  to
\ndiscover  this soul of the law and strive to  harmonise\t the
\nmany limbs to subserve the pervasive spirit and advance\t the
\nsocial\tproject\t of the enactment.   Seeming  confrontations
\nbetween\t provisions must be resolved into a cooperative\t co-
\nexistence.   This  interpretative activism persuades  us  in
\nthis case to reconcile what the High Court has conceived  to
\nbe a conflict between s. 10-A and s. 18.\n<\/p>\n
Here,  there are 3 khasra nos., two of which (nos.  265\t and\n<\/p>\n
343)  were outstanding on tenancy with Chandu and Sri  Chand
\nat  the relevant date, April 15, 1953 (which admittedly,  is
\nthe  date  with\t reference  to\twhich  “Permissible   area”,
\n“reserved  area” and “surplus area” have to be fixed).\t The
\nthird  item, khasra no. 177, had on the relevant  date\tbeen
\nwith the landowner directly.  The High Court treats them  as
\ntwo ,categories, not without reason.  What was with  tenants
\non  the relevant date may well be part of their\t permissible
\narea   since  ‘landowner’  in  s.2(1)  includes\t a   lessee.
\nMoreover,  a  permissible area of a tenant  is\texcluded  by
\ndefinition from ‘surplus area’, obviously because the tenant
\ncan stabilise himself on his permissible area and it is\t not
\nintended  to  dislodge him therefrom for  re-settling  other
\ntenants under s. 10-A.\tTherefore, Narula, J., concludes:\n<\/p>\n
\t      ” A survey of the above-mentioned provision of
\n\t      the Act leave no doubt that if Chandu and\t Sri
\n\t      Chand  who  were the tenants of the  land\t now
\n\t      comprised\t in  the tenancy of  Amar  Singh  on
\n\t      April  15,  1953,\t had  continued\t to  be\t the
\n\t      tenants  of that parcel of land,\tsubsequently
\n\t      the  land\t in  their  tenancy  could  not\t  be
\n\t      included\tin  the\t permissible  area  of\t the
\n\t      landowner.   On the other hand it\t would\thave
\n\t      been  the\t right of Chandu and  Sri  Chand  to
\n\t      either get the said land declared as heir\t own
\n\t      permissible  area or to exercise\ttheir  right
\n\t      under  section 18(1) of the Act by  making  an
\n\t      application  under sub-section (2) thereof  to
\n\t      purchase the said parcel of land.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The learned Judge proceeds to negative the argument that the
\nlegal  result is different when the sitting tenants  on\t the
\nrelevant  date have quit and new tenants have been  inducted
\nsubsequently: “Surplus area and Permissible area of a  land-
\nowner  has to be determined in view of the situation  as  it
\nexisted\t  on  the  15th\t of  April,  1953   and\t  subsequent
\nalienations   have   to\t be  completely\t  ignored.    Though
\nsubsequent  acquisitions  by the landowner  may\t in  certain
\ncircumstances\tbe  included  in  the.,\t surplus   area\t  as
\naccretions,  no\t such thing can happen in  respect  of\tthat
\nparcel of land which could not be included in the sur-\n<\/p>\n
167<\/span><\/p>\n
plus area of the landowner on 15th of April, 1953, which was
\nagain not with the landowner on the date when the  Collector
\nsought\tto determine his\/her surplus area.  In other  words,
\nonce a piece of land is excluded from the surplus area of  a
\nlandowner  on account of its forming the subject  matter  of
\nthe holding of a tenant in occupation (who is not related to
\nthe  landowner\tin  the prohibited manner) on  the  15th  of
\nApril, 1953, the mere subsequent change of the holder of the
\ntenancy\t will  not make the tenancy premises revert  to\t the
\nsurplus area of the landowner.\tIt is, therefore, clear that
\nthe  land  comprised in Khasras Nos. 265  and  343  (subject
\nmatter\tof  the tenancy in favour of Amar Singh)  could\t not
\nfall  within the definition of surplus area in the hands  of
\nthe landowner and Section 10-A of the Act could not apply to
\nit.”\n<\/p>\n
We  are afraid there is a fallacy in this reasoning.  It  is
\ntrue that a mere change in tenancy by transfer of the  lease
\nas  such, as distinguished from a landlord inducting  a\t new
\ntenant\ton  land  the  prior  lease  over  which  has\tbeen
\nterminated  and possession restored to the lanlord, may\t not
\nperhaps offend s.10-A although situations may arise even  in
\nsuch  cases leading to a different conclusion.\tWe need\t not
\ninvestigate this possibility further.  In the present  case,
\nthe  exclusion\tof  the two khasras from  the  surplus\tarea
\ndepends\t on  their  being part of the  permissible  area  of
\nChandu\tand Sri Chand.\tTo salvage the lease in his  favour,
\nAmar Singh, the new tenant, must prima facie show that\tthis
\nalienation  does not violate s.10-A(b) which  prohibits\t all
\ntransfers and other dispositions which diminish the  surplus
\narea of the landowner concerned.  He has, therefore, to make
\nout  (a)  that\tthe demised lands do not form  part  of\t the
\nlandlord’s  surplus  area  or (b) that,\t as  was  vehemently
\nargued but may with little legal qualms be rejected, a lease
\nis  not a ‘transfer or other disposition of property’.\t The
\nHigh  Court has disposed of this latter submission with\t the
\nsimple\tbut  impeccable observation”that the creation  of  a
\nlease is a transfer or a demise referred to in s.105 of\t the
\nTransfer  of Property Act admits of no doubt”.\tThe  purpose
\nof   the  prohibitive  provision  is  to  strike  at   every
\nalienatory  essay and the natural meaning of  ‘transfer’  or
\nother  disposition  of\tland.  apart  from  the\t  contextual
\ncompulsion, embraces leases.  The contention that even\twide
\nwords must oblige the landlord’s plea for a narrow  meaning,
\nviz.,  absolute\t transfer  of ownership,  is  beyond  us  to
\naccept.\n<\/p>\n
Do  the\t lands,\t khasras  nos.\t265  and  343,\tbecause\t  61
\noutstanding  leases  on\t April 15, 1953,  swim\tout  of\t the
\nsurplus area ipso facto?  We think not.\t For that they\tmust
\nbe comprised in the permissible area of the tenant.  Here we
\nhave  no  information placed by him who wants  to  prove  it
\naffirmatively  that these plots lie within  the\t permissible
\narea  of 30 standard acres, by definition of Chandu and\t Sri
\nChand.\t That they did not continue in possession after\t the
\nAct  is not disputed.  If that were in possession  of  other
\nlands  either as owners or tenants, and such holding was  30
\nacres or more, it was open to them to relinquish these lands
\nbeing  in excess of their permissible area, in\twhich  case,
\nnot  being the permissible area of the tenant and  being  in
\nexcess\tof  the reserved area of the landlord,\tthese  lands
\nwould be surplus area of the landlord within the  definition
\nunder  s.2(5-a). In the absence of proof that the  lands  in
\ndispute were comprised in the permissible area of the  prior
\nit is not possible to hold that they do not come within the
\n168<\/span>
\nsurplus\t area  of  the landlord,  Mst.\t Lacchman.   On\t the
\ncontrary,   the\t  likely   inference   flowing\t from\t the
\ndisappearance  from the scene of Chandu and Sri Chand  their
\nfailure to claim to remain as tenants or to purchase is that
\nthese  were  not their permissible area.  It is\t not  as  if
\nevery bit of land that is with a tenant on the relevant date
\nis his permissible area. it has to fulfil the requirement of
\ns.2(3). No such test has been satisfied here.  Nor can it be
\nargued\tthat even if a tenant gives up his interest  in\t the
\nholding\t the statute will haunt him with  rights.   ‘Permis-
\nsible area’ is not a concept in the abstract but, as  s.2(3)
\nmentions,  is ‘in relation to a landowner or a tenant’.\t  In
\nrelation  to  Chandu and Sri Chand no claim  to\t permissible
\narea or consequential rights has been set up and Amar  Singh
\nis  not\t a transferee from them but a de  novo\ttenant.\t  It
\nfollows\t that the two khasras should be computed as part  of
\nthe surplus area of Mst.  Lacchman and s.10-A(b) operates to
\ninvalidate  the\t alleged lease to Amar Singh  as  its  clear
\nimpact is to diminish the surplus area of the landowner.  He
\nhad,  therefore, no right as a tenant to purchase  under  s.\n<\/p>\n
18.
\nThe more serious question raised turns on the effect of\t the
\npurchase  orders, Annexure A, on s.10-A(c). The\t High  Court
\nreasoned-and  this  was\t repeated  before  us  as  counsel’s
\nargument-that  while  it is true that  for  determining\t the
\nsurplus area of a person ‘any judgment, decree or order of a
\ncourt or other authority’ obtained after the commencement of
\nthe  Act  and having the effect of diminishing\this  surplus
\narea  ‘shall  be ignored’, this mandate does  not  apply  to
\norders\tof  authorities under the Act,\tlike  the  Assistant
\nCollector  exercising powers under s. 18. The learned  judge
\nquotes the object of s. 10-A(c):\n<\/p>\n
\t      “In  order to evade the provisions of  section
\n\t      10-A  of\tthe parent Act\tinterested  persons,
\n\t      being  relations,\t have  obtained\t decrees  of
\n\t      Courts  for  diminishing\tthe  surplus   area.
\n\t      Clause  4\t of the Bill seeks to  provide\tthat
\n\t      such  decrees should be ignored  in  computing
\n\t      the surplus area.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
From  this the Court infers that ‘other authorities’  in  s.
\n10-A(c)\t are  arbitrators  or such  like  agencies  and\t not
\nauthorities under the Act.  It is useful to read the objects
\nand reasons relating to the clause of a bill to illumine the
\nidea of the law not to control its amplitude.  Moreover, the
\npurpose,  as revealed in the statement of object  is  plain.
\nThe legislature wanted to insure the invulnerability of\t the
\nsurplus pool provision to attacks, by ignoring judicial\t and
\nquasi-judicial\tOrders\tof every sort.\tIn this\t behalf\t two
\nprovisions  were made namely ss. 10-A. and a. 23,  primarily
\nthe  former.  In fact, we are concerned only with  s.10-A(b)
\nand (c).\n<\/p>\n
The  High  Court has taken the view that s.  10-A(b)  cannot
\naffect\tinvoluntary transfers and since a purchase  effected
\nunder S. 18 effects an involuntary transfer it is not hit by
\ns.  10-A(b).  The further view taken is that the  expression
\n“other\tauthority” in s. 10-A(c) refers only to\t authorities
\nother than those under the Act; the Assistant Collector\t who
\nhas  ordered the purchase under s. 10 being outside  s.\t 10-
\nA(c),  his order cannot be ignored by the Collector  on\t the
\nstrength of S. 10-A (c).A third point converging to the same
\nconclusion taken by the
\n169<\/span>
\nCourt  is that when an order under s. 18 has  become  final,
\nthe Collector acting under S. 10-A(c) cannot but be bound by
\nit  until  it is set aside in appeal or\t revision  or  other
\nappropriate   proceedings   even   though   the\t   Assistant
\nCollector’s  order  under s. 18 was passed on  a  compromise
\nbetween the parties.\n<\/p>\n
We  may now consider the soundness of these grounds  separa-
\ntely.\tThe object of s. 10-A(c) cannot be fulfilled  unless
\nthe  widest meaning were given to the expression  “court  or
\nother authority”.  Nor is there any basis for truncating the
\nambit of “other authority” in the manner the High Court\t has
\ndone.  “Other authority” is every other authority within  or
\nwithout the Act.  The reason given by Narula, J., to exclude
\nthe  officer passing orders under s. 18 from  “other  autho-
\nrities” is that “the result would be that the benefit sought
\nto be conferred by s. 18 on the tenants would be  completely
\nnullified  and obliterated”.  In this connection he  further
\nobserved :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “In every case, order under section 18 of\t the
\n\t      Act,  would be passed after the Act came\tinto
\n\t      force.  If an order under section 18 has to be
\n\t      ignored  by  the operation of  clause  (c)  of
\n\t      section  10-A, every order under\tsection\t 18,
\n\t      must   be\t  ignored   while   declaring\t the
\n\t      permissible  area of the Landowner.  There  is
\n\t      no discretion in the authorities to apply\t the
\n\t      provisions of clause (c) of s. 10-A or not  to
\n\t      apply  them.  The provision is mandatory,\t if,
\n\t      therefore, clause (c) of section 10-A could be
\n\t      utilised for abrogating the effect of an order
\n\t      under section 18 of the Act, the whole  scheme
\n\t      of  the  Act of distribution of  land  to\t the
\n\t      tenants and for conferring a right on a tenant
\n\t      to  purchase  the land within  the  limits  of
\n\t      permissible area, would be flouted.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
Having\tgiven serious consideration to the pros and cons  we
\nare  not  satisfied  that this argument\t is  valid;  on\t the
\ncontrary,  if upheld it may stultify s. 10-A and the  scheme
\nof  the\t statute altogether.  Obviously, if every  order  of
\npurchase  sanctioned under s. 18 can  successfully  diminish
\nsurplus\t area of a landowner, a spate of such, orders  would
\nbe  procured by previous arrangement between  the  landowner
\nand  his  nominee tenants or even bona fide  alienees.\t The
\npresent\t case  is a capital illustration of  the  fraud\t and
\ncollusion  that\t may  follow  on  such\tan   interpretation.
\nIndeed, there is no provision in s. 18 to give notice to the
\nCollector  who\tis to declare the surplus area\tand  so\t the
\nState  which  is vitally concerned in the  re-settlement  of
\nejected\t  tenants   utilising  the  surplus  area   has\t  no
\nopportunity  to\t present  its case  against  the  fraudulent
\ncharacter  of  the  proceedings\t under\ts.  18\tbefore\t the
\nAssistant  Collector.  The State, not being a party to\tthat
\norder,\tin any case cannot be bound by it, whatever  may  be
\nthe effect as between the parties to those proceedings.\t  We
\nare  concerned\there with a challenge by the  State  to\t the
\nefficacy  of the order, Annexure A, and so we cannot  muzzle
\nthe plea of the State that the order under s. 18 is void  if
\nthere are good grounds to hold with it.\n<\/p>\n
Nor is there force in the argument that benefit under s.  18
\nwould  be “completely nullified and obliterated” if  s.\t 10-
\nA(c) were to apply to it.  It is wrong for the Court to have
\nsaid that “in every
\n170<\/span>
\ncase ” orders under s. 10 would have to be ignored.  That is
\nnot  the  result of s. 10-A.  All the three  sub-clauses  of
\nthat section read together show that if the landlord by\t any
\nact or omission of his suffered a diminution in the  surplus
\narea  by  a transfer, voluntary or otherwise, in  favour  of
\nanother,  contrary to the right of the State  Government  to
\ndispose\t of  it, such a transfer only is liable\t to  be\t set
\naside.\t The tenants described in s. 18 in whose favour\t the
\nauthority  sanctions  the  purchase  of\t the  land  are\t not
\ntransferees  whose transfers have to be set aside  as  being
\ncontrary  to the right of the State  Government.   Actually,
\nthe  bulk of the cases under s. 18 would be by\ttenants\t who
\nare eligible to purchase by virtue of six years’  continuous
\noccupation  under s. 18(1).  Their purchases would often  be
\nfrom  land  which is their permissible area.   Every  tenant
\nwith  six  years’ ending, be it before or  after  the  comm-
\nencement of the Act, will be entitled to buy the  ownership.
\nOf course. if he is within the reserved area he is liable to
\nbe evicted even before he purchases but if he is outside the
\nlandlord’s  reserved area he can move for purchase.  Such  a
\npurchase  being from the permissible area of the  tenant  is
\noutside\t the  surplus  area of the  landlord  and  does\t not
\ndiminish  “the\tarea of such person which  could  have\tbeen
\ndeclared as his surplus area”.\tEx hypothesi “surplus  area”
\nexcludes  a tenant’s permissible area.\tTherefore,  even  if
\nthat land falls outside the reserved area of the  landowner,
\nif it is within the tenant’s permissible area, its  purchase
\nby the tenant cannot diminish the landowner’s surplus  area.
\n(emphasis supplied)
\nAnother\t substantial  category,\t who may  buy  under  s.  18
\nwithout\t reducing  the\tsurplus\t area,\tis  the\t  re-settled
\ntenants.    When   the\tState  acting\tunder\ts.   10-A(c)
\naccommodates  an  ejected  tenant  the\tutilization  of\t the
\nsurplus\t land pro tanto is fulfilled.  Such a  rehabilitated
\ntenant\tof  the\t landlord, after the six  years’  term,\t can
\nqualify\t to buy under s. 18.  Such a purchase  only  fulfils
\nthe  second object of the Statute of making the\t tiller\t the
\nowner  and does not in any way diminish the-surplus area  of
\nthe  landlord.\t For, with the re-settlement of\t an  ejected
\ntenant\tthat land, for all practical purposes, is no  longer
\navailable for the only purpose for which the surplus pool is
\nmeant, viz., re-settlement of ejected tenants.\tThus, it  is
\nclear  that  s. 18 is not rendered otiose by the  view\tthat
\norders\tthereunder which diminish the surplus area  are\t bad
\nfor violation of s. 10-A(c).  Indeed, the principal category
\nadversely  affected  by\t our view  would  be  post-statutory
\ncollusive  tenants,  who  are in most  cases  likely  to  be
\nbrought in by landlords experimentally to rescue those lands
\nfrom  the surplus pool, and even in bonafide cases  they  do
\nnot  deserve  sympathy since they damage  the  prospects  of
\ndisplaced tenants from being re-settled.  It may as well  be
\nnoted here that the person who is entitled to purchase under
\ns.  18 is a tenant. i.e. a person lawfully inducted  on\t the
\nland  as  a tenant.  Once a land is held to be part  of\t the
\nsurplus\t land  of  the landlord, it  rests  with  the  State
\nGovernment for being disposed of for resettlement of tenants
\nand any disposition of the same by the landlord after  April
\n15,  1953  would be invalid against the\t State\tGovernment’s
\nclaim  to dispose of it.  That is the effect of\t s.  10-A(a)
\n&(b).  Therefore, in respect of any land to which the  State
\nGovernment makes a claim for resettlement, on the ground  of
\nits being surplus
\n171<\/span>
\nland,  any person inducted by the landlord after  April\t 15,
\n1953 would have no title to it as a tenant and, would not be
\nable to avail of s. 18. To    sum     up,     the     ‘other
\nauthorities’  in  s. 10-A(c) include  officers\tunder  s.16.
\nSecondly, the plain meaning of s. 10-A(c) is that any order
\nby   any  authority  which shrinks the surplus area  of\t the
\nlandlord is,invalid to the extent laid down in that  clause.
\nThirdly,  orders  under s. 18 if they diminish\tthe  surplus
\narea  suffer the same fate and Annexure ‘B’ fails to  shield
\nMst.   Lacchman’s lands against orders\tre-settling  ejected
\ntenants thereon.\n<\/p>\n
Shri   Dhingra\trelied\ton  Sahib  Ram\tv.  The\t   Financial
\nCommissioner, Punjab<\/a> (1) but that decision only rules that a
\ntenant,\t who  completes his 6  years  qualifying  occupation
\nrequired  by  s. 18 after April 15, 1953, is  not  excluded.
\nVaidialingam,  J.,  took  care to refer to  the\t case  under
\nappeal\tnow before us (Amar Singh’s case) and said  that  it
\ndealt  with the scope of s. 10-A and did not bear  upon\t the
\npoint before them.\n<\/p>\n
The last point urged by Shri Dhingra for the  respondent-and
\naccepted  by the High Court-is that the order,\tAnnexure  A,
\nhaving become final could not have been ignored in  Annexure
\n‘B’.   Here  it serves the discussion to remember  that\t the
\nleases in question have been found by the Collector to\thave
\nbeen  collusively got up to dwindle the surplus area of\t the
\nlandowner.  The Collector in Annexure ‘B’ finds:A
\n\t      ”\t ……and  it is crystal  clear  that\tAmar
\n\t      Singh and Indraj had not\tbeen  in  continuous
\n\t      cultivating possession of this land for  full
\n\t      six years, the other copy of Khasra  Girdawari
\n\t      put  in this case and which is to be found  at
\n\t      page 27 of the file, shows the possession over
\n\t      this  land of Indraj and Amar Singh only\tfrom
\n\t      the year 1957-58, and so their possession over
\n\t      it for full six years is not complete as yet.”
\nHe has also stated that he was convinced “that the landowner
\nhas conspired with her son-in-law Amar Singh and his brother
\nIndraj\tto retain this area in contravention of the law.”  A
\nthird pregnant fact is that the proceedings under s. 18 were
\nprima  facie  collusive, and to burke an  enquiry  into\t the
\neligibility  of the alleged tenants to purchase under s.  18
\nan expedient was resorted to.  “Before the proceedings could
\nstart”\tsays Annexure ‘A’, “the parties have come  to  terms
\nand they have actually put in court a compromise deed  which
\nthey  have backed up by their statements.” Thus, no  finding
\non  the\t basic facts of entitlement to\tpurchase  have\tbeen
\nrecorded by the authority under s. 18 because he has  merely
\nstated in Annexure ‘A’.\n<\/p>\n
\t      “As  per\tstatements of the parties,  I  allow
\n\t      Amar Singh to purchase the land in suit.”\n<\/p>\n
These  facts have to be assumed since a controversy  thereon
\nin the writ court or in this Court cannot be permitted.\t  We
\nare,  therefore, concerned to see whether on such a  factual
\nbasis any legal consequences compelling the court to  uphold
\nAnnexure’A’,  and thus judicially condoning what is a  fraud
\non the statutory scheme, follow.\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1970] 3 S.C.R. 790
\n172<\/span>
\nAn order like Annexure ‘A’ ordinarily binds the parties only
\nand  here  the\tState which is the  appellant  is  seriously
\nprejudiced  by\tthat  order  but  is  not  a  party  to\t it.
\nTherefore, it cannot bind the state proprio vigore.  It\t was
\nargued\tby Shri Dhingra that the State could have  moved  by
\nway of appeal or review and got the order set aside if there
\nwas  ground and that not having done so it was bound by\t the
\norder.\tAs a matter of fact, the State, which is not a party
\nto  the proceedings, does not have a right of  appeal.\t The
\nordinary  rule\tis  that only a party to  a  suit  adversely
\naffected  by  the decree or any of  his\t representatives-in-
\ninterest  may  file an appeal.\tUnder such  circumstances  a
\nperson\twho  is not a party may prefer an  appeal  with\t the
\nleave  of the appellate court “if he would be  prejudicially
\naffected  by the judgment and if it would be binding on\t him
\nas  res-judicata under Explanation 6 to s. 11.” (see  Mulla-
\nCivil  Procedure Code-13th edn vol. I, 421).  Section 82  of
\nthe  Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, which may perhaps be  invoked
\nby a party even under the Act, also speaks ,of\tapplications
\nby  any party interested.  Thus, no right of review  or\t ,of
\nappeal\tunder  s. 18 can be availed of by the  State  as  of
\nright.\n<\/p>\n
If the State is not precluded from proving the invalidity of
\nAnnexure   ‘A,\t it  is\t clear\tthat  the  said\t  order\t  is
\nunsustainable.\t Section 18 applies only to  tenants,  i.e.,
\nnot  anyone who\t claims to be, but legally is one.-Here\t who
\nhas  granted  the lease ? Mst.\tLacchman?   How\t could\tshe,
\nafter  gifting\taway  to her daughter?\tAnd  no\t lease\tfrom
\ndaughter Shanti is set up although obscurely both mother and
\n,daughter  are made respondents.  Secondly,  s.18  qualifies
\nfor purchase ,only those tenants who had 6 years  continuous
\noccupation.  Here, on the Collectors finding, Amar Singh and
\nIndraj came by possession ,only in 1957-58 and, as he points
\nout in Annexure ‘B’, the six year period is not complete  at
\nthe  time of application.  The reason why ,even\t before\t the
\nproceedings  began  parties  presented\ta  compromise\t,and
\navoided an enquiry is not far to seek.\tIn short, the  State
\ncould  and did make out the incompetence of the\t respondents
\nto  purchase  under  s.\t 18 and\t Annexure  ‘A’,\t being\talso
\nstricken by the vice of s. 10-A (b) and (c).
\nShri   Dhingra\turged  that  s.18(1)(iii)  did\t contemplate
\npurchase  rights for persons who had no possession when\t the
\nAct  came  into force and their purchases  must\t necessarily
\ndiminish  the  surplus area.   This  seeming  attractiveness
\nvanishes when we notice that s.18(1) (ii) ,and (iii) provide
\nfor  two classes of hard cases where unjust evictions  prior
\nto  the\t Act coming into force had deprived  them  of  their
\nrights.\t  For  all practical purposes the Act  clothes\tthem
\nwith  such  rights as they would have enjoyed had  they\t not
\nsuffered  unjust evictions.  That is why specific  provision
\nwas made in s. 18 for them.  The exception proves the  rule.
\nThe   paramountcy  of  s.  10-A\t cannot\t be   subverted\t  by
\nillegitimate use of the processes under s. 18.
\nPurchases  under s. 18 being involuntary, s.  10-A(b)  would
\nnot  be\t hit,  as it deals only\t with  voluntary  transfers,
\naccording  to  Shri  Dhingra.  While  we  need\tnot  finally
\npronounce  on this argument, it is worthy of note  that\t the
\nexpression  ‘transfer’ is wide enough to cover transfers  by
\noperation of law unless expressly excluded as
\n173<\/span>
\ns. 2(d) of the Transfer of Property Act.  Moreover,  special
\nexclusions  to\tsave  transfers by way\tof  inheritance\t and
\ncompulsory  land acquisition by State have been\t made  which
\nwould  have-been  supererogatory had  involuntary  transfers
\nautomatically gone out of the pate of s. 10-A(b).
\nAnother\t argument was suggested that the order\teven  though
\npassed\t  on  a compromise was as valid and binding  as\t one
\npassed\ton contest, May be that as a broad  proposition\t one
\nmay  assent  to it.  But where a compromise goes  against  a
\npublic\tpolicy\tprescription  of a statute  or\ta  mandatory
\ndirection  to  the  Court  to  decide  on  its\town  certain
\nfoundational  facts,  a razi cannot operate  to\t defeat\t the
\nrequirement  as,  specified or absolve the  court  from\t the
\nduty.\tThe resultant order will be ineffective.  After\t all
\nby  consent  or agreement, parties cannot  achieve  what  is
\ncontrary to law and a decree merely based on such  agreement
\ncannot\t furnish   a  judicial\tamulet\t against   statutory
\nviolation.   For,  ‘by private agreement’ converted  into  a
\ndecree,\t parties cannot empower themselves to do that  which
\nthey  could not have done by private agreement alone’.\t(see
\nMulla,\tC. P. C., vol.\tII, P 1300).  The true rule is\tthat
\n“the contract of the parties is not the less a contract, and
\nsubject\t to  the incidents of a contract, because  there  is
\nsuperadded  the command of the Judge”.\tThe learned  author,
\nMulla,\tin  his\t Commentary  on\t Order\tXXIII  r.  3  (Civil
\nProcedure   Code,  vol.\t II,  pp.  1299-1300)\tcites\tmany
\nauthorities for this proposition and observes
\n\t      “If  a decree is passed under this rule  on  a
\n\t      compromise  which\t is not\t lawful,  the  Court
\n\t      should  not  enforce the decree  in  execution
\n\t      proceedings.   Thus,  a  sale  of\t an   office
\n\t      attached to a temple is against public policy.
\n\t      Hence, if in a suit against the holder of such
\n\t      an  office a compromise is arrived at  whereby
\n\t      the  holder  of  the office  consents  to\t the
\n\t      office being sold in satisfaction of the\tdebt
\n\t      due  to the plaintiff, and a decree is  passed
\n\t      on  the  compromise,  the\t Court\tshould\t not
\n\t      withstanding the consent decree refuse to sell
\n\t      the office in execution.\tIt is clear that  if
\n\t      the  matter had rested in contract  only,\t the
\n\t      Court  could not have  enforced the sale in  a
\n\t      suit brought for that purpose.  The mere\tfact
\n\t      that the contract is embodied in a decree does
\n\t      not alter the incidents of the contract.”
\nit  may\t be right to conclude that any authority,  like\t the
\nCollector  here,  enjoined to apply s. 10-A(b) and  (c)\t may
\ndecline\t to  act on a compromise which has ripened  into  an
\norder  if  the\tagreement between the  parties\tdisposes  of
\nproperty  in violation of a statutory mandate.\tHe  can\t and
\nmust lift the veil and look the agreement of the parties  in
\nthe  face.  The vice of contravention of s. 10-A(b) is\twrit
\nlarge in Annexure ‘A.’
\nA  few decisions of this Court bearing on the efficiency  of
\nconsent\t decrees  were\tcited  at  the\tbar  and  they\t are
\nexhaustively dealt with in Chari v. Seshadri(1).  The  other
\nrulings\t of this Court-all rendered under the  Rent  Control
\nLaw-are Bahadur Singh v. Muni Subrat<\/a>(2)
\n(1) [1973] 1 S.C.C. 761.    (2) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 432.\n<\/p>\n
174<\/span><\/p>\n
Kaushalya Devi v. K.L. Bansal<\/a>(1), and Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man
\nMal<\/a>(2).\t  The  core principle or ratio that is\trevealed  in
\nthese  cases is that in cases ,where a statute,\t embodies  a
\npublic policy and consequentially prescribes the presence of
\nsome conditions for grant of reliefs,parties can not by-pass
\nthe  law by the exercise of a consent decree or\t order,\t and
\nmere  judicial imprimaturs may not validate such  decree  or
\norder  where  the  ,court or tribunal is not  seen  to\thave
\napplied\t its mind to the existence ,Of those conditions\t and
\nreached\t its affirmative conclusion thereon.  Such  mindless
\norders are a nullity but where the stage of the proceedings,
\nthe  materials\ton record and\/or the recitals  in  the\trazi
\ndisclose the application of the judicial mind, the order  is
\nbeyond\tcollateral attack merely on the score that  it\tdoes
\nnot ritualistically write into ,the judgment what is  needed
\nby the statute.\t The important facet of the law clarified in
\nthese  decisions  is  that where high  public  policy  finds
\nexpression in socioeconomic legislation contractual  arrange
\nmerits\t between  interested  individuals  sanctified\tinto
\nconsent or compromise decrees or orders cannot be binding on
\ninstrumentalities  of the State called upon to\tenforce\t the
\nstatute, although the tribunals enjoined to enforce the\t law
\nmay  take probative note of the recitals in such  compromise
\nor  consent  statements\t in proof of facts  on\twhich  their
\njurisdictions  may have to be exercised.  Further, if  there
\nis  no\tevidence  either by way\t of  admissions\t in  consent
\nstatements and razis or otherwise on the record, the reliefs
\nsanctioned  by the statute cannot be granted and  orders  or
\ndecrees which purport to grant them sans proof of the  legal
\nrequirements will be a nullity.\n<\/p>\n
In  Kaushalya  Devi  v.\t K. L.\tBansal<\/a>\t(1)  the  Court\t was
\nconcerned  with a suit for eviction under the  Rent  Control
\nlaw.   On  being satisfied about the statutory\tgrounds\t the
\nCourt  could decree possession.\t The plaintiff set  out\t two
\ngrounds both of which were, denied in the written statement.
\nWhen  the pleadings of the landlord and the tenant  were  in
\nthis  state, both parties filed a compromise memo in and  by
\nwhich  they  agreed to the passing of a decree\tof  eviction
\nagainst the tenant.  Representations to the same effect were
\nalso made by the counsel for both parties.  The court passed
\nthe following order :\n<\/p>\n
\t      ”\t In  view of the statement  of\tthe  parties
\n\t      counsel  and the written compromise, a  decree
\n\t      is passed in favour of the plaintiff.  against
\n\t      the defendant.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
The  tenant  did  not vacate the premises  within  the\ttime
\nmentioned as per the compromise memo.  On the other hand, he
\nfiled an application under s. 47, C.P.C., pleading that\t the
\ndecree\tis  void as being in contravention of s. 13  of\t the
\nDelhi  statute.\t The High Court held ‘that the decree was  a
\nnullity, as the order was passed solely on the basis of\t the
\ncompromise  without  indicating that any  of  the  statutory
\ngrounds mentioned in s. 13 existed.  Following the  decision
\nin Bahadur singh v. Muni  Subrat(supra), this  Court  upheld
\nthe order of the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
In Ferozi Lal Jain v. Man Mal(2), the landlord’s grounds for
\neviction  were\tdenied\tby  the\t tenant\t but  they  reported
\ncompromise  with  prayer for a decree  for  eviction.\tThis
\nCourt ruled
\n(1) [1969] 2 S.C.R. 1048,    (2) [1970] 3 S.C.C. 181.\n<\/p>\n
175<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      “From the facts mentioned earlier, it is\tseen
\n\t      that at no stage, the Court was called upon to
\n\t      apply  its mind to the question  wheather\t the
\n\t      alleged  ‘subletting  is true or\tnot.   Order
\n\t      made by it does not show that it was satisfied
\n\t      that  the subletting complained of  has  taken
\n\t      place,  nor  is there any\t other\tmaterial  on
\n\t      record to show that it was so satisfied. it is
\n\t      clear  from  the\trecord that  the  court\t had
\n\t      proceeded\t  solely   on  the  basis   of\t the
\n\t      compromise  arrived  at between  the  parties.
\n\t      That  being so there can be hardly  any  doubt
\n\t      that  the court was not competent to pass\t the
\n\t      impugned\tdecree.\t  Hence\t the  decree   under
\n\t      execution must be held to be a nullity.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In both these cases the decrees based solely on the razi and
\nwithout the courts applying their mind, were a nullity.\t The
\norder  of  the\tAssistant  Collector,  Annexure\t ‘A’,  bears
\nresemblance  to\t the situation in these two cases.   On\t the
\nother  hand  K.\t K.  Chari’s case  (supra)  is\ta  study  in
\ncontrast.   There  was\tplethora of evidence  to  prove\t the
\nground of eviction and the court directed eviction based  on
\nthe terms of the compromise and after making a reference  to
\nthe   provisions  for  eviction.   Vaidialingam,   J.,\t has
\nexplained this aspect elaborately.\n<\/p>\n
The order, Annexure ‘A’, was passed before evidence was\t let
\nin  because  even before the trial  began  parties  reported
\ncompromise and gave statement accordingly.  Not a word is to
\nbe  found  in  the  order   indicating,\t the  court’s\tmind
\nadverting  to  the  requirements of s. 18 of  the  Act;\t the
\ncontrary  being\t the  evidence.\t Indeed,  unlike  in  K.  K.
\nChari’s\t case,\tno material existed on record to  warrant  a
\nfinding (a) regarding the tenancy, (b) continuous occupation
\nfor  over  6 years, (c) the surplus area  being\t unaffected.
\nNor  even  recitals  amounting to  admissions  on  facts  of
\nentitlement to purchase were made.  The order was a nullity,
\ndenuded\t of  evidence  and  absent  judicial   satisfaction.
\nStrictly  speaking, collusive razis cannot affect the  State
\nwhich has the right to utilise surplus lands for re-settling
\ntenants.   Certain proceedings, e.g. election petitions\t and
\nactions\t under s. 92, C.P.C., once set in motion,  transcend
\nprivate interests and public authorities cannot pass  orders
\non  collusive  representations\twithout\t regard\t to   public
\ninterest or independent satisfaction.  Annexure ‘A’ ex facie
\nwas  a\tnullity.   It  is  unfortunate\tthat  the  Assistant
\nCollector   has,  with\tinsipient  insouciance,\t  lent\t his
\nauthority to a compromise, where care and  conscientiousness
\nwould  have  averted  the  error.   We\tare  satisfied\tthat
\nAnnexure  ‘A’  is  unavailing  against\tthe  State  and\t its
\nofficers  in accommodating ejected tenants on the  lands  in
\nquestion.  The public policy of s. 10-A cannot be  outwitted
\nby  consent  orders calculated to defeat the  provision\t and
\nwithout\t the  statutory authority charged with\tthe  enquiry
\nbeing satisfied about the bona fides of and eligibility\t for
\nthe  purchase.\tSo viewed, the respondents in these  appeals
\ncannot on the strength of the purchase orders exclude  those
\nlands from the operation of s. 10-A(a) of the Act.
\nThe legislature, charged with the constitutional mandate  of
\nart.  38 and art. 39 has passed the Act and amended it\tfrom
\ntime  to  time\tin  furtherance\t of  the  major\t purpose  of
\ndistributive  justice.\t The  judicial wing  of\t the  State,
\nviewing the law in the same wavelength,
\n176<\/span>
\ninterprets    and   applies   it.    But    the\t   Executive
\ninstrumentality of the State has an activist role to play if
\nthe arm of the law were not to hang limp and social  justice
\nis  not\t to  be a cynical phrase.   Good  laws\tand  correct
\ninterpretations\t are not enough.  Quick,  conscientious\t and
\npublic minded enforcement, of the provisions is the  respon-
\nsibility  of  Government and its officers.  In\tthe  present
\ncase  the  Assistant Collector’& order,\t Annexure  ‘A’,\t has
\nfortified an attempted fraud on the statute.  It was  stated
\nat  the\t Bar  that a score  of\tyears  notwithstanding,\t the
\nprocesses of fixing reserved areas and surplus areas on\t the
\nstrength  of which alone conferment of proprietory right  on
\ntenants and re-settlement of ejected tenants could, proceed,
\nare still lingering.  If this is true Government has much to
\nanswer for and litigation a bounds where delays in executive
\nenforcement  occur. We expect that this land reform  measure
\nwill  not  be a slow motion picture but\t a  strictand  swift
\nprocedure  so  that  parties affected may  know\t where\tthey
\nstand.\t There is an ‘executive’ dimension to  law’s  delays
\nwhich  defeats the rule of law.\t It must be remembered\tthat
\nthe third reading of a bill and the last appeal in court are
\nnot  the  final scene in the drama of law  and\tsociety.   A
\npost-audit  on\tthe enforcement of social  legislation,\t all
\nsocial scientists will agree, is a material aspect of law in
\naction, inter-alia to avoid the administrative cutting\tedge
\nof the law becoming blunt.\n<\/p>\n
With  these hopeful observations we allow the State  appeals
\nbut  we\t direct that in the circumstance parties  will\tbear
\ntheir costs throughout.\n<\/p>\n
SARKARIA J.-I have gone through the judgment prepared by  my
\nlearned\t brother,  Krishna  lyer J.  Since  I  cannot  fully
\nsubscribe  to  the reasoning and the view taken\t therein,  I
\nhave thought it fit to record my own opinion separately.
\nThese\ttwo  appeals  (Nos.  1755  and\t1756  of  1967)\t  on
\ncertificate granted under Art. 133(1)(c) of the Constitution
\nby the Punjab High Court, raise questions with regard to the
\ninterpretation\tand  interrelationship of the  provision  of
\nSections 2(5-a), 10-A and 18 of the Punjab Security of\tLand
\nTenures Act (X of 1953) (for short, the Act).  The questions
\nfor determination, as formulated by the High Court, are :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “(i)  Whether  the  expression  “transfer”  or
\n\t      “other  disposition of land” in clause (b)  of
\n\t      section 10-A of the Act., includes involuntary
\n\t      transfer of a part of the holding of a landow-
\n\t      ner  by  operation  of  anorder  forcing\t the
\n\t      landowner\t to cell a part of his holding to  a
\n\t      tenant under section 18 of the Act;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (ii)   Whether   the  order  of\tany   “other
\n\t      authority”  referred  to\tin  clause  (c)\t  of
\n\t      section  10-A of the Act includes an order  of
\n\t      the  authorities under the Act  itself  passed
\n\t      under  section  18  thereof  in  favour  of  a
\n\t      tenant, which order has become final either at
\n\t      its original stage or at the appellate or\t re-
\n\t      visional stage; and
\n177<\/span>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (iii) In case of conflict between section 10-A
\n\t      and  section 18 of the Act, which of  the\t two
\n\t      provisions has supervening effect or overrides
\n\t      the other.”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
To  the above, I may add a fourth question which  arises  in
\nAmar  Singh’s  case (C.A. 1755 of 1967) and has\t been  dealt
\nwith by the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (iv) Whether any land held by tenants on April
\n\t      15, 1953 within the permissible area of  those
\n\t      tenants, can be included in the ‘surplus area’
\n\t      of the landowner, if, at the time the  surplus
\n\t      area  collector takes up the determination  of
\n\t      the matter, that land is found to be comprised
\n\t      in  the  tenancy\tof persons  other  than\t the
\n\t      original tenants.”\n<\/p>\n
\t      The material facts are these:\n<\/p>\n
On  April  15,\t1953  when the Act  came  into\tforce,\tSmt.
\nLachhman (hereinafter referred to as the ‘landowner’)  owned
\n101 .6 standard acres, equivalent to 404.10 ordinary  acres,
\nof  land  in the revenue, estates of two  villages,  namely,
\nDarba  Kalan  and Nahran Wali.\tOut of this holding  of\t the
\nlandowner,  we are concerned only with Field Nos.  177,\t 265
\nand  343,  situate  in\tthe area of  Darba  Kalan.   On\t the
\ndeterminative date (April 15, 1953), Field No. 177 measuring
\n64 bighas and 12 biswas which is the subject matter of C. A.
\n1756\/67,  was in the personal cultivation of the  landowner,
\nwhile  Field  Nos. 265 and 343, measuring 67 bighas  and  19
\nbiswas\twere in the occupation of two tenants,\tnamely,\t Sri
\nChand and Nathu.\n<\/p>\n
It  is not clear from the record whether the  landowner\t had
\nmade the reservation or selection of her permissible area in
\nthe prescribed manner, within time.  But the learned Counsel
\nfor  the parties before us are agreed that Field  Nos.\t265,
\n343  and 177 in question do not form a part of her  reserved
\nor permissible area.\n<\/p>\n
It  appears from the Surplus Area Collector’s order that  in
\n1955  (vide mutation No. 144), the landowner tried  to\tgift
\nthis  land  in favour of her daughter Shanti Devi,  who,  in
\nturn, attempted to sell the same to her husband, Amar Singh,
\nand  the latter’s brother, Indraj.  These  alienations\twere
\nignored by the Surplus Area collector as per his order dated
\nApril  24,  1961, while declaring the surplus  area  of\t the
\nlandowner.   Against  that order, Amar\tSingh  and.   Indraj
\ncarried\t an appeal to the Commissioner.\t The landowner\talso
\npreferred a separats appeal.\n<\/p>\n
On  May 2, 1961, Amar Singh made an application under a.  18
\nof  the Act before the Assistant Collector, 1st\t Grade,\t for
\npurchase of the land comprised in Field Nos. 265 and 343, on
\nthe ground that he has been in its continuous occupation  as
\na  tenant for the requisite period.  A\tsimilar\t application
\nwas  made on the same date, by his brother, Indraj, for\t the
\npurchase  of  Field No. 177.  After serving  notice  on\t all
\nconcerned, Shri Hardyal Singh, Assistant Collector 1st Grade
\nallowed\t these\tapplications on September 15, 1961,  on\t the
\nbasis  of  a  compromise  between  the\tapplicants  and\t the
\nlandowner.   In\t compliance  with that\torder,\tAmar  Singh,
\ndeposited in the Treasury,.\n<\/p>\n
178<\/span><\/p>\n
Rs. 13,590\/- which had been determined as the purchase price
\nby  the said Collector.\t Indraj also in his  case  deposited
\nthe  price  assessed by the Collector, The effect  of  these
\nproceedings  and  the order of the Collector was  that\tAmar
\nSingh and Indraj the tenants, in the words of s. 18, itself,
\n“shall be deemed to have become the owners of the land”.
\nThe Commissioner on December 21, 1961, taking notice of\t the
\nstatutory purchases of these fields by Amar Singh and Indraj
\nunder  s. 18, allowed their appeal and remanded the case  to
\nthe  Collector\tfor de novo enquiry regarding  the  area  in
\noccupation  of\tAmar Singh and Indraj as tenants  under\t the
\nlandowner.\n<\/p>\n
After the remand, in the course of de novo enquiry, the same
\nOfficer,  Shri\tHardyal Singh, as Collector,  Surplus  Area,
\npassed\tthe impugned order, dated May 11, 1962,\t whereby  he
\ndeclared  408 .10 ordinary acres equal to 101  .61  standard
\nacres as the surplus area of Smt.  Lachhman and included  in
\nthat area the land in question (comprised in Field Nos. 265,
\n343  and 177) of which according to his earlier\t order\tAmar
\nSingh  and Indraj were deemed to have become owners by\tpur-
\nchase  under s. 18.  He ignored his order,  dated  September
\n15,  1961 on the ground that Amar Singh and Indraj  has\t not
\nbeen in continuous occupation of these fields as tenants for
\nthe full terms of six years and that “in fact the  landowner
\nhas  conspired\twith  her son-in-law, Amar  Singh,  and\t his
\nbrother, Indraj, to retain this area in contravention of the
\nlaw”.  It was added that the said order was based on a\tcom-
\npromise and was a “collusive one”.\n<\/p>\n
Amar  Singh  and Indraj filed two  separate  writ  petitions
\nunder  Art. 226 of the constitution for the grant of a\twrit
\nof certiorari for bringing up and quashing the order,  dated
\nMay  11, 1962, of the Surplus Area Collector and for a\twrit
\nof Mandamus directing the respondent State not to dispossess
\nthem from the fields purchased by them under s. 18.
\nThe  High  Court by its common Judgment,  dated\t October  4,
\n1966,  answered\t the three questions referred to  above.  as
\nunder
\n\t      “(i)  The\t expression  “transfer”\t and  “other
\n\t      disposition  of land in clause (b) of  section
\n\t      10-A  of the Panjab Security of  Land  Tenures
\n\t      Act 10 of 1953, do not include completed sales
\n\t      effected tinder s. 18 of the Act ;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (ii)  In exercise of the powers  conferred  by
\n\t      clause  (c)  of section 10-A of the  Act,\t the
\n\t      authorities under the Act cannot exclude\tfrom
\n\t      consideration\tand\torder\t  of\t the
\n\t      Assistant Collector or Collector under section
\n\t      18 of the Act, where by a part of the  holding
\n\t      of the landowner has vested absolutely in\t the
\n\t      erstwhile tenant; and\n<\/p>\n
\t      (iii)  If any conflict were  detected  between
\n\t      section  10-A and section 18 of the  Act,\t the
\n\t      special  provision  or law  contained  in\t the
\n\t      latter section would override the earlier\t and
\n\t      general provision.”\n<\/p>\n
179<\/span><\/p>\n
Regarding  Question (iv) in Amar Singh’s case, it  was\theld
\nthat  since Field Nos. 265 and 343 were, on April 15,  1953,
\ncomprised  in the tenancy of Sri Chand and Nathu as part  of
\ntheir  permissible  area,  they could not, in  view  of\t the
\ndefinition  given in s. 2 (5-a), be included in the  surplus
\narea  of  the landowner, and the subsequent  change  of\t the
\nholder\tof the tenancy did not make the tenancy land  revert
\nto the Surplus Area.  That was, according to the High Court,
\nan  additional reason why s. 10-A was not attracted in\tAmar
\nSingh’s case.\n<\/p>\n
In  order that the questions raised in these appeals may  be
\nconsidered  in\tthe proper perspective, it is  necessary  to
\nnotice\tbriefly\t the  object, the scheme  and  the  relevant
\nprovisions of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
Chronologically, the Act is not the first measure enacted by
\nthe  State  to\tgive  effect to\t its  policy  of  abolishing
\nintermediaries and regulation of agricultural tenancies with
\nthe object of securing tenure or procuring ownership of land
\nto  the\t tiller.   The first piece of  legislation  was\t the
\nPunjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Act, 1950.\tThe contours
\nof the concepts “permissible area” and “reserved area” first
\nmade  their appearance in this statute.\t Under that  Act,  a
\nlandowner was entitled to reserve 100 standard acres for his
\nself-cultivation  ; and the protection against eviction\t was
\nnot available to tenants on the reserved area.\tThe 1950 Act
\nwas amended by Punjab Tenants (Security of Tenure) Amendment
\nAct, 1951 which reduced the permissible area of a  landowner
\nto 50 standard acres, and extended the tenure of the tenants
\nfrom 4 to 5 years.\n<\/p>\n
The Acts of 1950 and 1951, were repealed and replaced by Act
\n10  of 1953 with which we are concerned.  The preamble\tsays
\nthat  the Act is a piece of legislation “to provide for\t the
\nsecurity of land tenure and other incidental matters”.\t The
\nAct classifies landowners into “small landowners” and “other
\nlandowners”.   A  “small landowner” as defined in  s.  2(2),
\nmeans  a  landowner whose entire land does  not\t exceed\t the
\n“permissible area”.  Owners other than small landowners fall
\nin the second category.\t “Landowner” means a person  defined
\nas  such in the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Act  XVII  of
\n1887)  and  also  includes an  “allottee”  and\t“lessee”  as
\ndefined in clauses (b) and (c) respectively, of section 2 of
\nthe  East Punjab Displaced Persons (Land Resettlement)\tAct,
\n1949.\tUnder  the  Explanation\t added\tto  the\t clause,   a
\nmortgagee, in respect of the land mortgaged with  possession
\nis  also  to be deemed a ‘landowner’.\t“Landowner”  is\t not
\ncomprehensively defined in the Land Revenue Act, clause\t (2)
\nof  Sec. 3 of that Act makes it clear that “landowner”\tdoes
\nnot  include a tenant.\tThus, it is to be noted that  lesses
\nfrom the landowner (being other than those falling under  s.
\n2(e) of the Land Resettlement Act, 1949) do not come  within
\nthe definition of “landowner-” given in the Act.
\nThe  fivefold object of the Act., endorsed by Subba  Rao  J.
\n(as he then-was) speaking for this Court in Gurbax Singh  v.
\nState of Punjab<\/a>(1) is to-\n<\/p>\n
(1) [1967] 1,S.C. R. 926.\n<\/p>\n
180<\/span><\/p>\n
(i)  provide  a permissible area of 30 standard acres  to  a
\nlandowner\/tenant which he can retain for self cultiation\n<\/p>\n
(ii) provide security of tenure to tenants by reducing their
\nliability to ejectment as specified in s. 9 ;\n<\/p>\n
(iii)  ascertain surplus areas and ensure  re-settlement  of
\nejected tenants on those areas ;\n<\/p>\n
(iv) fix maximum rent payable by tenants ; and\n<\/p>\n
(v) confer rights on tenants to pre-empt and purchase  their
\ntenancies in certain circumstances.\n<\/p>\n
We  are primarily concerned with the provisions relating  to\n<\/p>\n
(i),  (iii)  and (v).  What is to be borne in mind  is\tthat
\nwhile self-contained and comprehensive provisions in Section
\n17 and 18 for effective achievement of object (v) were\tmade
\nfrom  the  very inception of the Act, object (iii)  did\t not
\nassume\tshape  and contant till Punjab Act XI  of  1955\t was
\nenacted.\n<\/p>\n
The  concepts  ‘permissible area’ and ‘reserved\t area’\twere
\nreshaped  by  the  Act\tof  1953.   ‘Persmissible  area’  in
\nrelation to a landowner or a tenant has been defined to mean
\n“30  standard  acres and where such 30\tstandard  acres\t are
\nbeing converted into ordinary acres exceed 50 acres, such 60
\nacres”.\t  ‘Reserved area’ as defined in s. 2(4)\t mean  “area
\nlawfully  reserved  under the Punjab  Tenants  (Security  of
\nTenure)\t Act,  1950  (Act  XXII\t of  1950),  as\t amended  by
\nPresident’s  Act  of 1951, hereinafter referred\t to  as\t the
\n“1950-Act or under this Act”.\n<\/p>\n
“Reserved  area” is dealt with in sections 2, 5, 5-B, 9\t and
\n18 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
Section\t 5  lays down that “any landowner who owns  land  in
\nexcess of the permissible area may reserve out of the entire
\nland  held by him in the State of Punjab as  landowner,\t any
\nparcel\tor  parcels not exceeding the  permissible  area  by
\nintimating this selection in the prescribed form and  manner
\nto  the patwari of the estate in which the land reserved  is
\nsituate\t or  to such other authority as\t may  be  prescribed
\nwithin\tsix months from the date of the commencement of\t the
\nAct”.\tSince, for one reason or the other  many  landowners
\ncould  not  exercise their right of reservation\t within\t the
\nperiod\tof  six\t months originally fixed by  the  1953\tAct,
\nSections 5-A, 5-B and 5-C were inserted by the Amending\t Act
\n46  of\t1957  which came into force on\tDecember  20,  1957.
\nSection\t 5-B enacts that “a landowner who has not  exercised
\nhis  right  of reservation under this Act,  may\t select\t his
\npermissible   area  and\t intimate  the\tselection   to\t the
\nprescribed authority within the period specified in sec. 5-A
\nand  in\t such  form and manner as  may\tbe  prescribed.\t The
\nrequisite   form   was\tprescribed  by\t Punjab\t  Government
\nNotification No. 3223-LR-11-57\/1624 published in the Gazette
\nExtraordinary  of March 22, 1958, consequently, a  landowner
\ncould make the selection of his permissible area within\t six
\nmonths of date.\n<\/p>\n
In Gurbax Singh v. State of Punjab<\/a> (supra), this Court\theld
\nthat ,selection’ in s. 5-B is similar to ‘reservation’ in s.
\n5 and that, in terms,
\n181<\/span>
\ns.  5-B\t gives\tthe landowner another  chance  to  make\t the
\nreservation if he had not exercised his right of reservation
\nearlier\t under s.5. It was clarified that “reservation”\t and
\n“selection”  involve  the same process and indeed,  to\tsome
\nextent,\t they are convertible, for, one can reserve land  by
\nselection and another select land by reservation.
\nThus if the right of selection is exercised under s. 5-B, by
\nthe  landowner,\t his  permissible  area\t would\tbecome\t his
\n‘reserved  area’;  to that extent, the\ttwo  concepts  would
\nrepresent one and the same thing.\n<\/p>\n
The next provision to be noticed is in s. 9 which says inter
\nalia that ‘no landowner shall be competent to eject a tenant
\nexcept\twhen  such tenant is a tenant on the  area  reserved
\nunder  this Act or. is a tenant of a small landowner”.\t Its
\nsub-s. (2) provides that “notwithstanding anything contained
\nhereinbefore  a\t tenant shall also be liable to\t be  ejected
\nfrom  any  area which he holds in any capacity\twhatever  in
\nexcess of the permissible area.”\n<\/p>\n
Before proceeding to s. 18, it will be proper at this  stage
\nto  advert to the concept “surplus area”.  This concept\t was
\nborn  in  1955\twhen Act XI of that  year  inserted  in\t the
\nprincipal  Act general provisions including s. 2(5-a)  which
\n(as modified by a subsequent Act) runs thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “Surplus\tarea” means the area other than\t the
\n\t      reserved\tarea, and, where, no area  has\tbeen
\n\t      reserved,\t  the\tarea  in   excess   of\t the
\n\t      permissible area selected under s. 5-B or\t the
\n\t      area which is deemed to be surplus area  under
\n\t      (1)  of section 5-C (and includes the area  in
\n\t      excess of the permissible area selected  under
\n\t      section  19-B)  but  it  will  not  include  a
\n\t      tenant’s permissible area;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      Provided\tthat  it will include  the  reserved
\n\t      area, or part thereof, where such area or part
\n\t      has  not been brought  under  self-cultivation
\n\t      within  six  months of reserving the  same  or
\n\t      getting  possession thereof after\t ejecting  a
\n\t      tenant from it, whichever is later, or if\t the
\n\t      landowner\t admits a new tenant,  within  three
\n\t      years of the expiry of the said six months:
\n\t\t     (emphasis supplied).\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This  definition  will be considered further  while  dealing
\nwith proposition (iv).\tAt this place it will be  sufficient
\nto  have  a  general  idea  of\tthe  inter-relationship\t  of
\n“permissible area” and “,surplus area”, and the right of the
\nlandowner  to deal with the surplus area.  A full  Bench  of
\nPunjab and Haryana High Court in Dhaunkal v. Man Kauri,\t (1)
\nspeaking  through  Mehar Singh C. J. summed  up\t the  inter-
\nconnection between these concepts thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “According to these provisions (of sections 5,
\n\t      5-A  5-B,\t 5-C read with Rule 6  of  the\t1956
\n\t      Rules  framed under the Act) a landowner or  a
\n\t      tenant who has more than 30 standard acres  of
\n\t      land has to select or reserve his\t permissible
\n\t      area  and the excess is available\t as  surplus
\n\t      area.   The Collector attending to such  cases
\n\t      has  to  determine, therefore,  three  things;<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (a), the permissible
\n(1) (1970) LXXII PLR 882.\n<\/p>\n
182<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      area of a landowner, (b) the permissible\tarea
\n\t      of  a tenant, and (c) the surplus\t area.\t The
\n\t      details for the determination of these matters
\n\t      are to be found in 1956 Rules Rule 6 is really
\n\t      material No doubt in the Act,there is    no
\n\t      specific provision which says that a  decision
\n\t      has  to  be given by any authority  whether  a
\n\t      permissible  area has or has not been  rightly
\n\t      reserved or selected by a landowner or  tenant
\n\t      concerned, but when the provisions of the\t Act
\n\t      with  the\t rules are  considered,\t it  becomes
\n\t      plain that while determining the surplus\tarea
\n\t      with  a landowner or a tenant the question  of
\n\t      his permissible area comes to be determined so
\n\t      that, if there is a question in regard to\t the
\n\t      validity\t of  reservation  or  selection\t  of
\n\t      permissible    area,   it\t  must\t come\t for
\n\t      consideration  before  the Collector  when  he
\n\t      disposes\tof the surplus area of a  particular
\n\t      landowner or tenant…….”\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t    (Parenthesis added).\n<\/p>\n
Declaration  of ‘surplus area’ does not have the  effect  of
\nexpropriating  the landowner of that area.  The only  effect
\nof  such declaration is that the Government gets a right  to
\nutilize\t the  surplus are, if necessary, for  settlement  of
\nejected\t tenants.  The tenants, thus settled on the  surplus
\nland  become by operation of law, the tenants of  the  land-
\nowner.\t They are bound under the rules, to attorn  and\t pay
\nrent  to  the landowner.  The latter’s rights  of  ownership
\nremain\tintact,\t who is even entitled to evict\tthe  settled
\ntenants in certain contingencies specified in the Act.\t The
\nlandowner’s  right to transfer the surplus area is also\t not
\ntaken  away, but the transferee even if a small\t landowner,-
\nwill  not  be rid of the liability  to\taccommodate  evicted
\ntenants\t whom the Government may wish to resettle  under  s.
\n10-A(a).   The\tAct  does not take away\t the  right  of\t the
\nlandowner  to induct tenants on such area, or the rights  of
\nthe tenants so inducted, to purchase the land under s. 18 if
\nit has continuously remained comprised in their tenancy\t for
\nthe requisite period.\n<\/p>\n
Section 9(1) (i) provides for eviction of a tenant from\t the
\narea  of  a landowner reserved under the Act.\tSection\t 9-A
\nsafeguards  such  a  tenant  against  dispossession  of\t his
\ntenancy so long as he is not accommodated on a surplus\tarea
\nor other land by the State Government.\tThere is a  positive
\nindication in the 2nd proviso to s. 9-A that a landowner has
\na  right  to  induct  tenants on his  land  even  after\t the
\ncommencement  of  the  Act.  The Proviso  says\t“that  if  a
\ntenancy\t commences after the commencement of this  Act,\t and
\nthe  tenant is also an owner and is related to his  landlord
\nin  the manner prescribed, he shall not be entitled  to\t the
\nbenefit of this section”.-\n<\/p>\n
Now  let  us have a close look at the provisions of  s.\t 18,
\nwhich, as amended by Punjab Act 11 of 1955 runs thus:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “18   (1)\t Notwithstanding  anything  to\t the
\n\t      contrary\t contained  in\tany  law  usage\t  or
\n\t      contract,\t a tenant of a landowner other\tthan
\n\t      small landowner-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (i)  who has been in continuous occupation  of
\n\t      the  land\t comprised  in\this  tenancy  for  a
\n\t      minimum period of six years, or
\n183<\/span>\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (ii)  who\t has been restored  to\this  tenancy
\n\t      under  the  provisions of this Act  and  whose
\n\t      periods of continuous
\n\t      occupation  of  the  land\t comprised  in\t his
\n\t      tenancy\timmediately  before  ejectment\t and
\n\t      immediately  after restoration of his  tenancy
\n\t      together amount to six years or more, Or\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (iii)  who was ejected from his tenancy  after
\n\t      the  14th\t day of August 1947 and\t before\t the
\n\t      commencement  of\tthis  Act, and\twho  was  in
\n\t      continuous occupation of the land comprised in
\n\t      his tenancy for a period of six years or\tmore
\n\t      immediately before his ejectment,.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
shall be entitled to purchase from the landowner the land so
\nheld  by  him but not included in the reserved area  of\t the
\nlandowner, in the case of a tenant falling within  clause(i)
\nor clause (ii) at  any\ttime, and in the case  of  a  tenant
\nfalling within clause (iii)within a period of one year\tfrom
\nthe date of the commencement of this Act;\n<\/p>\n
Provided..\n<\/p>\n
Provided further….\n<\/p>\n
\t      (2) A tenant desirous of purchasing land under
\n\t      subsection  (1) shall make an  application  in
\n\t      writing  to  an Assistant Collector  of  First
\n\t      Grade  having jurisdiction over the land\tcon-
\n\t      cerned  , and the Assistant  Collector,  after
\n\t      giving  notice  to the landowner\tand  to\t all
\n\t      other persons interested in the land and after
\n\t      making  such inquiry as he thinks\t fit,  shall
\n\t      determine\t (formerly the word was\t ‘fix,)\t the
\n\t      average  of the prices obtaining\tfor  similar
\n\t\t\t    land   in\tthe  locality\tduring\t 1
\n0   years
\n\t      immediately  preceding the date on  which\t the
\n\t      application is made.\n<\/p>\n
\t      3.\t  xxx\t   xx\t       xx\n\t      4(a)\t xxx\t  xxx\t\t xx\n\t      (b)  On  the  purchase  price  or\t the   first\n<\/pre>\n
\t      instalment thereof, as the case may be,  being
\n\t      deposited, the tenant shall be deemed to\thave
\n\t      become   the:owner  of  the  land,   and\t the
\n\t      Assistant Collector shall where the tenant  is
\n\t      not already in possession, and subject to\t the
\n\t      provisions  of the Punjab Tenancy Act (XVI  of
\n\t      1887) put him in possession thereof..\n<\/p>\n
\t      (C)\t     x\t\t      x\n\t      (5) to (7)  x\t\tx\"\n<\/pre>\n
This  section  is  the\tkeystone of  the  arch\tof  peasant-
\nproprietors’ complex which the Act seeks to build.  The non-
\nobstante clause with which the section starts, indicates the
\noverriding operation of its provisions.\t It provides a self-
\nsufficing  machinery  enabling tenants,\t to  purchase  lands
\ncomprised   in\ttheir  tenancies.   Broadly  speaking,\t the
\nexistence of three conditions is necessary for the  exercise
\nof  this right.\t They are: (a) the landowner whose  area  is
\nsought\tto be purchased is not a ‘small landowner’ i.e.\t one
\nowning\tless  than  30 standard acres. (b) the\tland  to  be
\npurchased does not form a part of the ‘reserved
\n184<\/span>
\narea’ of the landlord which has become fixed by\t reservation
\nunder s. 5, or selection under s. 5-D; (c) the applicant has
\nbeen in continuous Occupation of the land, as a tenant,\t for
\na  period  of  six  years  or  more  on\t the.  date  of\t the
\napplication.\n<\/p>\n
For  our purpose, condition (b) is the most  important.\t  By
\nexcluding  a landowner’s reserved permissible area from\t the
\noperation of s. 18, it confines a tenant’s right of purchase
\nto that land which either falls within the ‘surplus area’ of
\nthe  landowner,\t or,  was  on  April  15,  1953\t within\t the
\n‘permissible area’ of that tenant.\n<\/p>\n
As  observed  by  this\tCourt  in  Sahib  Ram_v.   Financial
\nCommissioner Punjab and Ors.(1)
\n\t      “Under  s. 18(1) three categories\t of  tenants
\n\t      have  been given a right to purchase from\t the
\n\t      landowner the land so held by him.  They are :\n<\/p>\n
\t      (i)  a  tenant  who  has\tbeen  in  continuous
\n\t      occupation of the land for a minimum period of
\n\t      six years ;\n<\/p>\n
\t      (ii)  a tenant restored to his  tenancy  under
\n\t      the   Act\t and  whose  period  of\t  continuous
\n\t\t\t    occupation of the land comprised in hi
\ns tenancy
\n\t      immediately   before   ejectment\t and   after
\n\t      restoration amounts to six years or more and\n<\/p>\n
\t      (iii)  a\ttenant\twho  was  ejected  from\t his
\n\t      tenancy after-August 14, 1947 and before April
\n\t      15, 1953, and who was in continuous occupation
\n\t      of  the  land comprised in his tenancy  for  a
\n\t      period of six years or more immediately before
\n\t      his ejectment.”\n<\/p>\n
Category  (iii)\t has become extinct and clause (iii)  of  s.
\n18(1) has become redundant because the exercise of the right
\nof purchase by this category was limited to a period of\t one
\nyear, only, after the commencement of the Act.\tOnly a small
\nnumber\tof  cases  fall under category (ii).   Most  of\t the
\ntenant-purchasers  belong  to  category\t (i)  which  may  be
\nfurther divided into these sub-categories :\n<\/p>\n
(a)  Tenants  who  were on the land on April  15,  1953\t and
\ncontinued  to  be in occupation of their land  for  the\t re-
\nquisite period upto the date of the application ;\n<\/p>\n
(b)  Tenants  who were inducted on the surplus area  by\t the
\nlandowner  sometime  after the determinative  date  and\t who
\nthereafter remained in continuous occupation of the land for
\nthe requisite term ;\n<\/p>\n
(c)  Tenants who were resettled on the surplus area  by\t the
\nGovernment, and thereafter remained in continuous occupation
\nof  the\t land  for the requisite period.Quite  a  number  of
\ntenants who invoke s. 18, come under sub-category (b).In the
\ninstant case, Amar Singh and Indraj are tenants
\n(1)  [1970] 3 S. C. R. 796 at p. 805.\n<\/p>\n
185<\/span><\/p>\n
of  this  sub-category.\t In Sahib Ram’s case  (supra)  also,
\nthis  Court was dealing with a case of tenants of this\tsub-
\ncategory.    Vaidialingam   J.\tspeaking  for\tthe   Court,
\nenunciated the law on the point, thus
\n\t      “So   far\t as  we\t could\tsee  there   is\t  no
\n\t      prohibition   under   the\t Act   placing\t any
\n\t      restrictions   against   the  right   of\t the
\n\t      landowner\t creating  new tenancies  after\t the
\n\t      date of the Act.\tIn fact, the second  proviso
\n\t      to  s. 9-A clearly indicates to the  contrary.
\n\t      It  deals with contingency of  tenancy  coming
\n\t      into force after the commencement of the Act.
\n\t      Section  18(1)(ii) gives a right to tenant  to
\n\t      purchase\tthe  land and that right has  to  be
\n\t      examined\twhen an application under s.  18  is
\n\t      made  and cannot be deemed on the ground\tthat
\n\t      he was not a tenant for more than six years on
\n\t      April 15, 1953.  There is no limitation placed
\n\t      under  clause (i) of s. 18(1) that the  tenant
\n\t      who exercises his right should be a tenant  on
\n\t      the  date\t of the Act or that be\tshould\thave
\n\t      completed the period of six years on April 15.
\n\t      1953 and there is no warrant for reading in s.
\n\t      18(1)(i)\tclauses which it does  not  contain.
\n\t      It  is enough if the continuous period of\t six
\n\t\t\t    years  has been completed on the date
\nwhen  the
\n\t      tenant  files the application for purchase  of
\n\t      the land”.\n<\/p>\n
The  Validity  or otherwise of the orders of  purchase\tmade
\nunder  s.  18 by the Collector in favour of Amar  Singh\t and
\nIndraj will be discussed a little later, at its\t appropriate
\nplace.\t Suffice  it to say here, that in view\tof  the\t law
\nsettled\t in Sahib Ram’s case (supra), Amar Singh and  Indraj
\nprovided  the  other  conditions  were\tsatisfied-would\t  be
\nentitled  to purchase the land comprised in their  tenancies
\nnotwithstanding\t the fact that the said land was a  part  of
\nthe  surplus area of the landowner and these tenancies\twere
\ncreated by her after April 15, 1953.\n<\/p>\n
It will now be appropriate to examine s. 10-A.\tIt is one of
\nthe question.  It reads
\n\t      10–A (a) The State Government or any  Officer
\n\t      empowered\t by  it\t in this  behalf,  shall  be
\n\t      competent\t to utilise any surplus area or\t the
\n\t      resettlement  of\ttenants ejected,  or  to  be
\n\t      ejected,\tunder clause (i) of sub-section\t (1)
\n\t      of section 9.\n<\/p>\n
\t      (b) Notwithstanding anything contained in\t any
\n\t      other  law for, the time being in\t force,\t and
\n\t      (save  in\t the case of land  acquired  by\t the
\n\t      State  Government under any law for  the\ttime
\n\t      being in force or by any heir by\tinheritance)
\n\t      no transfer or other disposition of land which
\n\t      is   comprised  in  a  surplus  area  at\t the
\n\t      commencement  of\tthis Act, shall\t affect\t the
\n\t      utilization thereof in clause (a).\n<\/p>\n
\t      Explanation–Such\t utilization of any  surplus
\n\t      area   will-not  affect  the  right   of\t the
\n\t      landowner\t to receive rent from the tenant  so
\n\t      settled.\n<\/p>\n
186<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      (c)  ‘For the purposes of determining  surplus
\n\t      area  of\tany person under this  section,\t any
\n\t      judgment, decree or order of a court or  other
\n\t      authority, obtained after the commencement  of
\n\t      this  Act and having the effect of  dimnishing
\n\t      the area of such person which could have\tbeen
\n\t      declared\t as  his  surplus  area\t  shall\t  be
\n\t      ignored.”\n<\/p>\n
Section\t 10-A with its sub-clauses (a) and (b) was added  by
\nPunjab\tAct XI of 1955.\t Punjab Act 4 of 1959  inserted\t the
\nsaving\tclause (within brackets) in clause (b) Later  Punjab
\nAct  14 of 1962, inserted clause (c) and gave  retrospective
\neffect to all the provisions of s. 10-A from April 15, 1953.
\nThe Statement of Objects and Reasons published in the Punjab
\nGazette Extraordinary on April 16, 1955, lists among others,
\nthe main objects of Act XI of 1955 :\n<\/p>\n
\t      “to prevent large scale ejectment of  tenants.<\/p>\n
\t      to introduce new concepts of surplus area\t and
\n\t      its  utilization by the State  Government\t for
\n\t\t\t    the\t resettlement  of ejected tenants
\n ….  to
\n\t      coordinate the ejectment of tenants with their
\n\t      resettlement  on surplus area …. to  prevent
\n\t      sales and other dispositions of land adversely
\n\t      affecting the continuance of tenancies and the
\n\t      extent  of available surplus area ; to  reduce
\n\t      the  period (from 12 to 6 years)\tentitling  a
\n\t      tenant  to purchase the land comprised in\t his
\n\t      tenancy  and  to provide for easier  terms  of
\n\t      purchase and other incidental matters.\n<\/p>\n
The  professed object of the concept of “Surplus  area”\t and
\nresettling   ejected   tenants\ton  such  area\t finds\t its
\nmanifestation in the insertion of s.2(5-A) and S. 10-A(a)  ;
\nwhile  the  object of entitling tenants\t to  purchase  their
\ntenancy lands on easier terms is reflected in the amendments
\nmade in s. 18.\n<\/p>\n
According to the Statement of Objects and Reasons  published
\nin  Punjab Gazette Extraordinary, dated April 27, 1962,\t the
\nmain purpose the Amending Act 14, of 1962 was two-fold : the
\nFirst was to neutralize the effect of certain decisions\t and
\nto  plug the loopholes revealed in the interpretation  among
\nothers,of  sections  2(5-a), 6, 10-A (b), 18,  19-B.   Among
\nthose  decisions  was  one  of\tthe  Financial\tCommissioner
\nholding that section 6 did not protect the claim of  tenants
\nunder  section\t18  to purchase the  proprietary  rights  in
\nrespect of the land held by them in tenancy.  The second was
\nto  ignore in computing the surplus area “decrees of  courts
\nfor diminishing the surplus area” which “interested persons,
\nbeing  relatives,  have obtained.” “in order  to  evade\t the
\nprovisions  of Section 10-A the parent Act”.  That  was\t why
\nclause (c) was inserted in s. 10-A.\n<\/p>\n
I have referred in extenso to the Objects and Reasons  which
\nled  to these Amendments to show that while the\t Legislature
\nwas  anxious  to  preserve surplus area\t for  settlement  of
\nevicted tenants and for that purpose enacted S. 10A, it\t did
\nnot  in\t its wisdom, think it fit, to curtail the  ambit  of
\ns.18  so as to exclude tenants inducted by the landowner  on
\nthe surplus area from purchasing their tenancy lands through
\nthe  mechinery\tof  this section.  So far as  the  right  to
\npurchase their
\n187<\/span>
\ntenancies  is concerned, tenants inducted by  the  landowner
\nand’ tenants settled by the Government, on the surplus area,
\nremain\ton  an, equal footing.\tThe Amendments\tdid  not  in
\nrelation  to  the  new Section 10-A, relegate  s.  18  to  a
\nposition of “subordinate alliance”.. The non-obstante clause
\nof s. 18 has not been touched.\tIndeed, the amendments of s.
\n18 inter alia, by providing for easier terms of purchase and
\nreducing the qualifying period from 12 to 6 years, have made
\nthe  machinery of the section more comprehensive,  efficient
\nand  attractive\t for tenants desirous  of  purchasing  their
\ntenancies.\n<\/p>\n
The Amendments have not changed the basic scheme of the Act,
\naccording  to  which,  the jurisdiction\t of  the  Prescribed
\nAuthority  assessing the surplus area under ss. 5-B and\t 5-C
\nread  with Rule 6 of the 1956.\tRules, and acting  under  S.
\n10-A  is distinct and separate from the jurisdiction of\t the
\nAssistant  Collector 1st Grade dealing with  an\t application
\nunder s. 18.  “Collector” has been defined by Rule  2(iii-A)
\nof the 1956 Rules, to mean “the Collector of the district or
\nany other officer not below the rank of Assistant  Collector
\n1st Grade empowered in this behalf by Government”. (emphasis
\nsupplied)  Rule 4-B provides that the  Prescribed  Authority
\nfor the purposes of Section 5B(12) and Section 5-C shall  be\n<\/p>\n
(i)  the  Collector  if\t the lands  owned  or  held  by\t the
\nlandowner  or tenant are situate in one district : and\t(ii)
\nthe Special Collector-as defined in Rule 2(iv)-if the  lands
\nso  owned  or held are situated in more than  one  district.
\nSection 18(2), however, confers the jurisdiction to try\t and
\ndetermine applications for purchase made under that  section
\nspecifically, on Assistant Collector of First Grade.
\nAn  order  of  the  Prescribed\tAuthority  made\t under\t the
\naforesaid’  provisions has been made appealable\t under\tSub-
\nRule  (8)  of Rule 6 ;. whereas the provision in  regard  to
\nappeal,\t review\t and  revision\tagainst\t an  order  of\t the
\nAssistant Collector First Grade made under s. 18, by  virtue
\nof  Section 24 of the Act, the same as provided in ss.\t80,,
\n81, 83 and 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887.
\nSection 80 of the Tenancy Act provides for “Appeals”, s.  82
\nfor “Review” and s. 84 for “Revisions”.\t Sections 81 and  83
\nof  that  Act  relate  to  limitation  and  computation\t  of
\nlimitation  for Appeals and applications for review.   Under
\ns.  82 of Tenancy Act, Revenue Officers have the  powers  of
\nreversing their own orders and those of their pre-decessors,
\nif  no appeal against those orders has been filed.   In\t the
\ncase of Assistant Collectors of all Grades, the exercise  of
\nthis power is always subject to the previous sanction of the
\nCollector.   Though  a\tperiod\tof 90  days  for  making  an
\napplication for review is provided in sub-clause (b) of\t the
\nproviso\t to  s. 82(1), yet no limitation has  been  provided
\nwithin\twhich a Revenue Officer may suo moto review or\tmove
\nfor   sanction\tto  review  an\torder.\t Under\ts.  84\t the
\nCommissioner   and  the\t Financial  Commissioner  have\t the
\nconcurrent  revisional jurisdiction.  The revisional  powers
\nof the Financial Commissioner unders. 84 are in no way\tless
\nextensive than those of the High Court under 115 of the Code
\nof  Civil Procedure.  In a sense, his revisional powers\t are
\nwider.\t He has power to revise an order against  which\t an.
\nappeal lies (gee Amir Chand v. State of Haryana (1)  decided
\nby a Division
\n(1) 1971 P.L.J. 449.\n<\/p>\n
188<\/span><\/p>\n
Bench  of the Punjab and Haryana High  Court.\tNo.statutory
\nlimitation  for making an application for revision has\tbeen
\nprovided, but as a matter of practice the revision-petitions
\nare  ordinarily\t not entertained after a period of  90\tdays
\nunless\tsufficient  cause  for\tthe  delay  is\tshown.\t The
\nFinancial Commissioner can interfere in revision suo moto at
\nany time, if the circumstances of the case so warrant.
\nThere  is nothing in the Act or the Rules framed  thereunder
\nor in tie Tenancy Act saying as to who can file an appeal or
\nrevision  against  the decision or order  of  the  Collector
\nexercising  jurisdiction  under s. 18.\tBut in view  of\t the
\nlong  array  of\t judicial decisions including  that  of\t the
\nFinancial Commissioner, there can be no doubt that the State
\nGovernment   or\t its  Department  can,\tif   aggrieved,\t  or
\nprejudiced  by\tsuch a decision, go in\tappeal\tor  revision
\nagainst it.\n<\/p>\n
Firstly\t there is a catena of authorities  which,  following
\nthe  doctrine  of Lindley L.J. in  re  Securities  Insurance
\nCo.(1)\thave laid down the rule that a person who is  not  a
\nparty to a decree or order may with the leave of the  Court,
\nprefer an appeal from such decree or order if he’ “is either
\nbound by the order or is aggrieved by it or is prejudicially
\naffected  by  it.” As a rule, leave to appeal  will  not  be
\nrefused\t to a person who might have been made ex  nominee  a
\nparty-see   Province   of   Bombay  V.\t W.   1\t  Automobile
\nAssociation(2)\tHeera  Singh v. Veerka(3) and  Shivaraja  v.
\nSiddamma(4);  Executive Officer v. Raghavan Pillai(5) In  re
\nB. an Infant (6); Govinda Menon v. Madhavan.  Nair<\/a> (7).
\nSecondly, the ruling of the Financial Commissioner in Punjab
\n,State\tv. Dr. lqbal Singh (8), which is binding on all\t the
\nauthorities  and  Revenue Officers  exercising\tjurisdiction
\nunder  the Act clinches the matter.  There the\tdecision  of
\nthe Special Collector declaring surplus area was reversed by
\nthe Additional Commissioner.  The State, filed against\tthat
\ndecision of the Additional Commissioner, a revision petition
\nbefore the Financial Commissioner.  Objection was taken with
\nregard to the competency of the State to file that petition,
\non two grounds :\n<\/p>\n
(i)  that  the\torder was appealable and  the  revision\t was
\nincompetent and;\n<\/p>\n
(ii)  that  the\t State\twas not\t a  party  to  the  original
\nproceeding.\n<\/p>\n
The  Financial\tCommissioner  treated  the  revision  as  an
\nappeal, and ,overruled the objection in these terms
\n“The  argument\ton behalf of the Respondents  overlooks\t the
\nfact  that  the\t Revenue Officers act  in  a  quasi-judicial
\ncapacity  deciding  such cases and if the  Punjab  State  is
\naggrieved by their orders it is as much entitled to  contest
\nthem  through  a remedy provided under the  law\t as  private
\nparties\t arc.  In fact. there will be no  justification\t for
\ndiscrimination against the Punjab
\n(1)  [1894] 2 Ch. 410.\n<\/p>\n
(3)  A.I.R. 1958 Raj. 181.\n<\/p>\n
(5)  A.I.R. 1961 Kerala 114.\n<\/p>\n
(7)  A.I.R. 1964 Kerala 235(DB).\n<\/p>\n
(2)  A.I.R. 1949 Bom. 141.\n<\/p>\n
(4)  A.I.R. 1963 Mys. 127.\n<\/p>\n
(6)  [1958] Q.B. 12.\n<\/p>\n
(8)  [1965] Punjab Law Journal 110.\n<\/p>\n
189<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      State  in this regard and for holding that  it
\n\t      suffers  from any disability in the matter  of
\n\t      agitating\t against decisions which are  to  to
\n\t      detriment.”\n<\/p>\n
The  above  being  in accord  with  the\t general  principles
\nsettled\t by the long chain of authorities, noticed  earlier,
\nappears to be a correct exposition of the law on the point.
\nIn  the present case, neither the landowner, nor  the  State
\nmade any attempt to get the decision, dated 15-9-1961 of the
\nCollector  under  s.  18 set aside or  modified\t by  way  of
\nappeal, review or revision or other appropriate proceedings.
\nIn  a sense, therefore, that decision had become  final\t and
\nconclusive.\n<\/p>\n
The stage is now set for examining the contentions canvassed
\nat  the bar with regard to the correctness or  otherwise  of
\nthe findings of the High Court.\n<\/p>\n
Mr.   Mahajan,\tlearned\t Counsel  for  the   appellant-State
\ncontends  that\tthe  Collector,\t Surplus  Area\thad  rightly
\nignored\t the  sale orders dated September 15, 1961,  of\t the
\nCollector purportedly passed under s. 18, in favour of\tAmar
\nSingh  and Indraj and that the view taken by the High  Court
\nis wrong, because-\n<\/p>\n
\t      (a) the lease made by the landowner in  favour
\n\t      of  these Respondents, was itself a  “transfer
\n\t      of land” effecting the utilization of  surplus
\n\t      area, and as such, was Mt by clause (b) of  of
\n\t      s. 10-A, and the orders obtained on the  basis
\n\t      of  that\tlease could not stand  on  a  better
\n\t      footing;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (b) the expression “transfer” in clause (b) of
\n\t      this section includes. involuntary  transfers,
\n\t      also, brought about by operation of law,\twith
\n\t      only  two\t exceptions which  are\tspecifically
\n\t      mentioned in that clause;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (c) these orders were consent orders and\twere
\n\t      not  based on any independent finding  of\t the
\n\t      Collector\t as  to\t the existence\tof  the\t the
\n\t      essential condition viz., that the  applicants
\n\t      were  in continuous occupation of the  lands,’
\n\t      as tenants, for the requisite period, but were
\n\t      the result of compromise and collusion between
\n\t      the landlady and her relation-tenants, and  as
\n\t      such, were null and void ;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (d) these orders had the effect of diminishing
\n\t      the  surplus area and as such, were orders  of
\n\t      “other authority” bit by clause (c) of s.\t 10-
\n\t      A;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
\t      (e)   Section  18\t has to be  construed  in  a
\n\t      manner which does not defeat the object of  s.
\n\t      10-A.   These two sections can  be  reconciled
\n\t      only if the operation of s. 18 is confined  to
\n\t      those purchases which do not adversely  affect
\n\t      the extent or utilization of surplus area.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
In  reply,  Mr.\t S.  K. Dhingra,  learned  Counsel  for\t the
\nrespondents,. maintains that a “lease” cannot be regarded as
\na  “transfer or disposition of land” within the\t meaning  of
\nclause\t(b)  of s. 10-A, because according  to\tits  general
\nscheme and object, the Act not only recognise
\n190<\/span>
\nthe  right  of a landowner to create new  tenancies  on\t his
\nsurplus area after April 15, 1953, but further gives to such
\na  tenant  the right to purchase his tenancy  under  s,\t 18.
\nReliance  has been placed on this Court’s decision in  Saheb
\nRam’s  case (supra).  Laying stress on the omission  of\t the
\nword   “lease”\tfrom  clause  (b)  of  s.   10-A.    Counsel
\nhas  .referred to the use of the word”lease”in\taddition  to
\nthe word “transfer” in some what similar provision  relating
\nto  future acquisitions ins.19-A and 19-B,to show that\twhen
\never the Legislature intended to bring a “lease” within\t the
\nsweep of such a provision, it expressly did so.
\nReiterating  the  reasoning of the High Court,\tMr.  Dhingra
\nsubmits that a “sale”made in accordance with an order of the
\nCollector  under s. 18 cannot be ignored by  the  Prescribed
\nAuthority.   Surplus  Area,  either as\ta  “transfer”  under
\nclause (b) or as an order of “other authority” under  clause\n<\/p>\n
(c) of s. 10-A.\t Any other interpretation, according ,to the
\nCounsel,  will\trender\tnugatory  s.  18  which\t is  a\tself
\ncontained  provision intended to achieve one of the  primary
\nobjects of the Act.  In support of these arguments, reliance
\nhas been placed on a later Full Bench judgment of the Punjab
\nand  Haryana  High Court in Matti Rai and ors. v.  State  of
\nPunjab (1) which affirmed the propositions of law laid\tdown
\nin  the judgment under appeal Shyamlal v. State ,of  Gujarat
\n(2) was also cited.\n<\/p>\n
Replying  to Mr. Mahajan’s contention (c),  Counsel  submits
\nthat  this was not a case where the orders of the  Collector
\npassed\tunder  s.  18 could be said to be  a  nullity.\t The
\nKhasra Girdawari before the Collector with the admission  of
\nthe  landowner, superadded, was sufficient material, on\t the
\nbasis  of which the Collector making the orders of  purchase
\nin  favour  of the tenants could be satisfied  about  ,their
\nbeing  in continuous occupation of their tenancy  lands\t for
\nthe requisite period.  Great emphasis has been placed on the
\nfact  that in reply to the writ petition of Amar Singh,\t the
\nState  in their written statement had admitted Amar  Singh’s
\naverment  as  to  his being a tenant of\t the  land  for\t the
\nrequisite  period.  Even the Surplus Area Authority,  it  is
\npointed\t out, conceded in his impugned order that  according
\nto the copy of the Khasra Girdawari on the file, Amar  Singh
\nand  Indraj were in occupation of the land as tenants  since
\n1957-58, though such occupation was held to be of less\tthan
\nsix  years.  In these circumstances proceeds  the  argument,
\nthe  order dated September 15,1961, passed by the  Collector
\nunder  s.  18,\ton the basis of\t compromise,  could  not  be
\ntreated as totally void and non-est; at the most ,they\twere
\nerroneous orders passed by the Collector in the exercise  of
\nthe  distinct jurisdiction particularly conferred on him  by
\ns.\n<\/p>\n
The only remedy-adds the Counsel-of the aggrieved person  or
\nthe  ‘State was by way of appeal or revision as provided  by
\nthe  statute and since those orders were not so\t challenged,
\nthey had become final.\n<\/p>\n
The  Prescribed\t Authority, Surplus Area-it  is\t emphasised,
\nwhile assessing the surplus area, had no jurisdiction to sit
\nin  appeal  or\trevision  over\tthe  orders  of\t the  Asstt.
\nCollector, 1st Grade passed under s.18.\n<\/p>\n
(1)  I.L.R.(1969) Panj. and Haryana 680
\n(2)  [1965] 2 S.C.R. 457.\n<\/p>\n
191<\/span><\/p>\n
Reference  in this behalf has been made to ss. 24 and 25  of
\nthe  Act,  ss. 80 to 84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act  and\tR.K.
\nChari  v. Seshadri<\/a>; (1) Mohanlal v. Goenka(2);\tDhaunkal  v.
\nMan Kauri (3) and Mam Raj v. Punjab State (supra).
\nIt  will  be  appropriate to  take  contention\t(c),  first,
\ncanvassed by Mr. Mahajan because it is the linch-pin of\t the
\nentire case.\n<\/p>\n
The question is, whether the compromise order,, were  wholly
\nvoid  or merely voidable.  If they were of the former  kind,
\nthey would be a nullity which does not from its very  nature
\nneeds setting aside, and consequently, they could be treated
\nas  non-existant whenever and wherever their legality  comes
\nin  question.\tAnd, the Prescribed Authority  Surplus\tArea
\nwould\tbe  entitled  to  ignore  such\torders\tas   non-est
\nindependently of the provisions of s. 10-A.  In that view of
\nthe matter, the necessity of determining as to whether those
\norders are hit by clauses (b) and (c) of that section  would
\nnot arise.\n<\/p>\n
If  the\t orders were of the latter type,  i.e.\tvoidable  or
\nerroneous, passed by the Asstt.\t Collector acting within his
\njurisdiction   under  s.  18,  they  could  be\tavoided\t  or
\nquestioned  only  by way of appeal,’ review or\trevision  as
\nprovided by the statute or in other appropriate\t proceedings
\nknown  to  law, and the Prescribed Authority  or  Collector,
\nSurplus\t Area  would not be entitled to go behind  them\t and
\nquestion  their\t validity or propriety.\t He  shall  have  to
\naccept\tthem as they are.  In that view of the\tmatter,\t the
\nquestion  will\tstill remain whether such an  order  of\t the
\nAssistant  Collector  passed by him in the exercise  of\t his
\njurisdiction  in  favour  of a tenant under s.\t18,  can  be
\nignored as a ,,transfer” under clause (b) or as an order  of
\n“other authority” under clause (c) of s. 10-A on the  ground
\nthat  it  adversely  affects the utilization  or  extent  of
\nsurplus area.\n<\/p>\n
An  order is null and void if the  quasi-.judicial  tribunal
\npassing it lacks inherent jurisdiction over the parties\t and
\nthe  subject  matter.\tSuch was not  the  case\t here.\t The
\nAssistant Collector who made the orders dated September\t 15,
\n1961, was duly invested with the quasijudicial\tjurisdiction
\ntinder\ts. 18(2).  All the jurisdictional facts\t for  making
\nthe orders under that section existed.\tThere is no  dispute
\nthat  Smt.   Lachhman was not a “small\tlandowner”.   It  is
\ncommon\tground that Field Nos.263, 343 and 177 did not\tfall
\nwithin\ther reserved area.  It was not controverted that  in
\nMay  1961, when the purchase applications were\tmade,  Field
\nNos. 263 and 343 were comprised in the tenancy-of Amar Singh
\nand  Field  No.\t 177 in that of Indraj.\t  According  to\t the
\nobservation  of the Surplus Area Collector, the copy of\t the
\nKhasra Girdawri on the file showed that their possession  as
\ntenants\t was from 1957-58 i.e. for about 4 1\/2\tyears  only,
\npreceding  the applications and thus according to  him\tthey
\nhad  failed  to\t show their continuous\tpossession  for\t the
\nrequisite period of six years.\tIt is important
\n(1) [1968] 2 S.C.R. 848.      (2) [1953] 4 S.C.R. 377 (392).
\n(3) [1970] LXXII P.L.R. 882 (F.B.).\n<\/p>\n
192<\/span><\/p>\n
to  note  further  that Amar Singh in para  2  of  his\twrit
\npetition pleaded:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “That  on the 2nd of May 1961, the  petitioner
\n\t      having  been in continuous occupation of\tland
\n\t      comprised\t in his tenancy for a period of\t six
\n\t      years  applied under s. 18 of the.. ..Act\t for
\n\t      purchase\tof the above land, and by his  order
\n\t      dated 15th September 1961, Shri Hardial Singh,
\n\t      Assistant\t Collector 1st Grade Sirsa  District
\n\t      Hissar, allowed the petitioner to purchase the
\n\t      above land at a price of Rs. 13,590\/-.. .. ”\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
This  averment\tof Amar Singh was admitted in  the  counter-
\naffidavit filed on behalf of the State in these terms
\n“Para 2 of the petition is admitted”\n<\/p>\n
In  the written statement filed by the State–apart  from  a
\ngeneral\t statement that “in view of the facts  explained  by
\nthe  Collector\tin  his\t order\tdated  11-5-62\tthe  surplus
\narea …. has been rightly declared”it was not\tspecifically
\npleaded\t that the purchase order dated September  15,  1961,
\nmade  by  the Collector under s. 18 was collusive,  void  or
\nwithout\t jurisdiction  on  the ground that  Amar  Singh\t and
\nIndraj\thad not been in occupation of these fields  for\t the
\nfull  statutory period.\t Nor could Amar Singh and Indraj  be
\ndenied the status of ‘tenants’ and the rights and privileges
\nattaching  thereto, merely because they were related to\t the
\nlandowner,  the ‘son-in-law’ and ‘son-in-law’s brother’\t not
\nbeing among the “relatives” prescribed in Rule 5 of the 1956
\nRules, whose cultivation [in view of s. 2(9) of the Act\t may
\nbe deemed to be the “self-cultivation” of the landowner.
\nTo sum up, the allegation in the purchase applications about
\nthe  applicants’  being in continuous  occupation  of  these
\nfields\tcomprised  in  their  tenancies\t for  the  requisite
\nperiod,\t coupled  with the Khasra Girdawri on file  and\t the
\nadmissions made by the landlady in the compromise, furnish,-
\nId  sufficient material on the basis of which the  Assistant
\nCollector,  at the time of making the orders of purchase  on
\nSeptember  15,\t1961, could have been  satisfied  about\t the
\nexistence of all the facts essential for the exercise of his
\njurisdiction under s. 18.  It is not correct to say that  on
\nthe  facts  of\tthe instant case,  the\tAssistant  Collector
\npassed\tthose orders solely on the basis of the\t compromise,
\nwithout applying his mind to the case.\tApplication of\tmind
\nis   evident  from  the\t circumstance  that  the   Assistant
\nCollector  further assessed the price to be paid by each  of
\nthe  applicants\t who thereafter, deposited the same  in\t the
\nGovernment  Treasury on September 29, 1961.  And, it was  on
\nthe making of such deposits that the respondents were deemed
\nto  be the owners of those fields.  The mere fact  that\t the
\nAssistant  Collector  did not record a finding\tin  so\tmany
\nwords  that he was satisfied from such and such material  in
\nregard\tto the existence of the basic  conditions  necessary
\nfor making the order under s. 18, did not render his order a
\nnullity\t when  such material was otherwise  evident  on\t the
\nrecord.\n<\/p>\n
In  the view I take I am fortified by the decision  of\tthis
\nCourt in K. K. Chari v. R.N. Seshadri<\/a> (1).  That was a\tcase
\nof a compromise
\n(1) [1973] 1 S.C.C. 761.\n<\/p>\n
193<\/span><\/p>\n
order of eviction passed by the Rent Control Court under  s.
\n10  of\tthe Madras Building (Lease and\tRent  Control)\tAct,
\n1960.\tBut  by analogy, the ratio of that  decision  is  an
\napposite  guide\t for the present case.\tThere  the  landlord
\nbrought\t an action under said Rent Act, for eviction of\t his
\ntenant, Seshadri from a house on the ground that he required
\nit  for\t his bona fide use and occupation.   The  tenant  at
\nfirst  controverted  the landord’s claim  but  subsequently,
\nboth  the parties filed a compromise in terms of  which\t the
\ncourt passed a decree of eviction.  The tenant resisted\t the
\nexecution of that decree, on the ground that the decree\t was
\nbased  on  compromise or consent without  the  court  having
\nsatisfied  itself by an independent consideration  regarding
\nthe  bona fide requirement of the property by  the  landlord
\nfor  his own occupation; and as such the decree\t contravened
\ns. 10 of that Act, and was a nullity.  The Bench unanimously
\nrejected  this\tobjection of  the  judgement-debtor  tenant.
\nVaidialingam J. (Dua J. concurring) laid down the law thus
\n\t      The true position appears to be that an  order
\n\t      of eviction based on consent of the parties is
\n\t      not  necessarily\tvoid if\t the  juri-dictional
\n\t      fact viz., the existence of one or more of the
\n\t      conditions  mentioned in s. 10 were  shown  to
\n\t      have  existed when the Court made\t the  order.
\n\t      Satisfaction of the Court, which is no doubt a
\n\t      pre-requisite for the order of eviction,\tneed
\n\t      not  be  by the manifestation borne out  by  a
\n\t      judicial\tfinding. If at some stage the  Court
\n\t      was  called  upon\t to apply its  mind  to\t the
\n\t      question\tand  there was\tsufficient  material
\n\t      before  it, before the parties invited  it  to
\n\t      pass an order in terms of their agreement,  it
\n\t      is  possible to postulate that the  Court\t was
\n\t      satisfied. about the grounds on
\n\t      which the’. order of eviction  was Passed”.
\nThe above principle was reiterated and applied by this Court
\nin Nagindas Ramdas v. Dalpatram Ichchram<\/a> (1).
\nJudged\tby  the\t basic principle enunciated  in\t the  above’
\ndecisions,the  order dated September 15, 1961 passed by\t the
\nAssistant  Collector  under s. 18, was not a  nullity  which
\ncould  be  ignored as non-est by the  Prescribed  Authority.
\nEven if those orders were erroneous, they could be impeached
\nonly  by way of appeal etc. as provided in the\tAct  because
\nthe error was committed by the Collector within the exercise
\nof his jurisdiction. A court or any quasi-judicial  tribunal
\nacting within its jurisdiction can decide rightly as well as
\nwrongly.  To use the felicitious words of S. K. Das J.\tvide
\nSmt.  Ujjam  Bai  v.  State  of\t Uttar\tPradesh<\/a>\t (2),\tsuch
\nadministrative\t bodies\t or  officers  acting  in   judicial
\ncapacity” are deemed to have been invested with the power to
\nerr  within  the’, limits of their jurisdiction”  and  their
\ndecisions  must\t be accepted as valid unless  set  aside  in
\nappeal. This general principle was reiterated by this  Court
\nin Ittayavira Mathai v. Varkey Varkey<\/a> (3) as under
\n\t      “It  is  well  settled  that  a  court  having
\n\t      jurisdiction  over the subject matter  of\t the
\n\t      suit and over the parties thereto, though
\n(1)  civil Appeal No. 2479\/72 decided on 30.11.73.
\n(2)  A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 1621=[1963]1, SCR 778.
\n(3)  A.I.R. 1964 S.C. 907(910)=[1964]1, SCR 495.\n<\/p>\n
194<\/span><\/p>\n
\t      bound  to\t decide right may decide  wrong\t and
\n\t      that even though it decided wrong it would not
\n\t      be   doing   something   which   it   had\t  no
\n\t      jurisdiction  to do.  It had the\tjurisdiction
\n\t      over  the subjectmatter of the suit  and\tover
\n\t      the  party and, therefore, merely\t because  it
\n\t      made an error in deciding a vital issue in the
\n\t      suit,  it\t cannot be said that  it  has  acted
\n\t      beyond  its jurisdiction.\t As has\t often\tbeen
\n\t      said courts have jurisdiction to decide  right
\n\t      or to decide wrong and even though they decide
\n\t      wrong  the decrees rendered by them cannot  be
\n\t      treated  as nullifies…….. It merely  makes
\n\t      an error or law (which) can be corrected\tonly
\n\t      (on  appeal)  in the manner laid down  in\t the
\n\t      Civil Procedure Code.”\n<\/p>\n
The above principle are applicable with greater force to the
\npresent\t case.\tThe Prescribed Authority, surplus Area,\t and
\nthe  Collector\tcompetent to make an order under s.  18\t are
\nboth  Assistant\t Collectors  of\t the  1st  Grade,  that\t  is
\ncoordinate  authorities\t exercising  separate  and  distinct
\njurisdictions.\t One cannot sit in appeal or  revision\tover
\nthe orders of the other.  If one feels that a certain  order
\npassed by the other in the exercise of distinct jurisdiction
\nis  erroneous  it  is  open  to\t get  it  rectified  in\t the
\nappropriate  manner  provided  by the Act  i.e.\t by  way  of
\nappeal,\t review or revision.  As has already  been  observed
\nearlier,  the  State  or the  Department.  if  aggrieved  or
\nprejudiced by a decision of an authority under this Act\t can
\navail  of the- remedy of appeal available under the  Act  in
\nany  case,  it can move the Financial  Commissioner  to\t set
\nright  the  illegality\tor  impropriety\t in  revision.\t The
\nFinancial Commissioner it may be recalled has wide powers in
\nrevision  to correct such errors committed by  the  inferior
\nauthorities in the exercise of their jurisdiction and  there
\nis no time limit to the exercise of this revisional power by
\nthe Financial Commissioner.\n<\/p>\n
\t      Section 25 of the Act provides
\n\t      “Except  in accordance with the provisions  of
\n\t      this  Act, the validity of any proceedings  of
\n\t      order  taken or made under this Act shall\t not
\n\t      be  called in question in any court or  before
\n\t\t\t    any other authority.\n<\/p>\n
On  analysis of the section it is clear that it gives a\t two
\nfold  mandate.\ton one hand it debars  the  jurisdiction  of
\ncourts or other authorities to question the validity of\t any
\nproceeding  or order taken or made under the Act and on\t the
\nother  it  prohibits  the  impeachment\tof  such  orders  or
\nproceedings in a manner which is not in Accordance with\t the
\nprovisions  of the Act. it indicates that decisions  of\t the
\nauthorities  under the Act can be challenged only by way  of
\nappeal review or revision as provided in ss. 80, 81, 82,  83
\nand  84 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887, made applicable  by
\ns. 24 of the Act or in the Rules made under the Act.
\nThe  Punjab  and Haryana High Court has\t consistently  taken
\nthis view.  The Full Bench in Dhankel v.  Matz Kauri (supra)
\nalso  held that the Assistant Collector while  dealing\twith
\nthe  purchase application under s 18 has no jurisdiction  to
\nsit in appeal or revision over the order of the Surplus Area
\nCollector  passed in surplus area proceeding and he  has  no
\njurisdiction to ignore that order.\n<\/p>\n
195<\/span><\/p>\n
The rule equally holds good in the con, verse.\tIn the\tFull
\nBeach  decision\t in Mam Raj v. Punjab State (supra)  it\t was
\nheld that once an application of the tenant under s. 18\t has
\nbeen  allowed  and the other is not set aside in  appeal  or
\nrevision,  the same becomes final and remains immune  to  an
\nattack against its validity on any ground including that  of
\ncollusion, before the co-ordinate authorities under the\t Act
\ndealing with the question of determination of surplus  area.
\nIf  I may say so with respect this proposition laid down  by
\nthe Full Bench is unexceptionable.\n<\/p>\n
The  above being the law on the point, it is clear that\t the
\norders dated September 15, 1961 not having been impeached by
\nway of appeal, review or revision as provided by the statute
\nor in other proceedings Authority Surplus Area was bound  to
\naccept them as valid. He could not go behind them or himself
\nsit in appeal over them.  It was all the more  disconcerting
\nin  this  case because the Collector who passed\t the  orders
\nunder  s.18  and the Collector who ignored those  orders  as
\nPrescribe  Authority, Surplus Area happened to be  the\tsame
\nOfficer.\n<\/p>\n
This takes me to the next question viz, if the orders  dated
\nSeptember 15, 1961 were not a nullity could they be  ignored
\nunder s. 10 A on the around that they amounted to “transfer”
\nor orders of “other authority” affecting the utilisation  or
\ncausing the diminution of surplus area?\n<\/p>\n
Before\tembarking upon a consideration of this question,  it
\nis   necessary\tto  remember  two  fundamental\t canons\t  of
\ninterpretation\tapplicable to such statutes.  The  first  is
\nthat  if choice ties between two alternative  constructions,
\n“that  alternative is to be chosen which will be  consistent
\nwith  the  smooth working of the system\t which\tthe  statute
\npurports  to  be regulating; and that alternative is  to  be
\nrejected  which\t will  introduce  uncertainty,\tfriction  or
\nconfusion into the working of the system” (see Maxwell\t12th
\nEdn.  page 45).\t The second is that if there is an  apparent
\nconflict between different provisions of the same enactment,
\nthey should be so interpreted that, if possible, effect\t may
\nbe given to both (see King Emperor v. Behari Lal Sharma (1).
\nLet us now apply the above principles to the construction of
\nss. 10-A and 18.  It has already been noticed that s. 18  is
\ndesigned  to pro.mote one of the primary objects of the\t Act
\nviz.,  of procuring ownership of land to the tiller on\teasy
\nterms.\t It  has  also been  seen  that\t the  self-sufficing
\nmachinery of this section is available for purchase of their
\ntenancies to the tenants inducted before or after April\t 15,
\n1953,  by  the\tlandowner on land not being a  part  of\t his
\npermissible area, equally with tenants settled on such\tarea
\nby  the\t Government.   In  a way, every\t sale  made  by\t the
\noperation of s. 18 in favour of tenant admitted by the land-
\nowner on his surplus area, causes diminution of the  surplus
\narea  or affects the utilisation thereof by the\t Government.
\nIf such sales were to be ignored under s. 10-A, then it will
\nreduce\tthe working of the system of the Act to\t a  mockery.
\nIt  will  mean “war” between sections 18 and 10-A.   Such  a
\nconstruction of the Act will present a spec-
\n(1) 1944 [49] C. W. N. 178 P. C.=72 I. A. 57.\n<\/p>\n
196<\/span><\/p>\n
tacle  of  manifest contradiction and absurdity\t of  an\t Act
\ngiving\tfight  by  one\thand and taking\t away  the  same  by
\nanother.   The -adoption of such an interpretation  may\t not
\ncompletely  “obliterate” S. 18, as the High Court has  said,
\nbut   it  will\tcertainly  truncate  it.   A   ‘Potent\t and
\nsubstantial limb of s. 18, which according to the ruling  of
\nthis Court in Sahib Ram’s case (supra) entities the category
\nof tenants inducted by the landowner after April 15, 1953 to
\npurchase their tenancies, would stand-as it were-“amputated”
\nby  judicial  operation\t such  an  interpretation  will\t run
\ncounter to the fundamental principles of construction.\t The
\nconflict  between the two provisions can be avoided only  if
\nwe read the general words other authority” in cl. (c) of  s.
\n10-A,  ejusdem\tgeneris with the specific  words  “judgment,
\ndecree or order of a court”, which immediately precede them.
\nThus  construed,  these general words “or  other  authority”
\nwill not take in an authority exercising jurisdiction  under
\ns. 18(2) of the Act.\n<\/p>\n
Nor can the words “transfer or other disposition of land’ in
\nclause\t(b) of s. 10-A, be construed to include\t a  transfer
\nwhich results by the process of s. 18.\tThe meaning of these
\nwords must be restricted to volitional dispositions of\tland
\nmade  by  the  landowner, and cannot be\t extended  to  cover
\ninvoluntary  transfers brought about by operation of law  or
\ncircumstance  beyond the control of the landowner.  The\t two
\ntype  of involuntary transfers, namely, acquisition of\tland
\nby  Government\tunder  legal compulsion or  by\tan  heir  by
\ninheritance  which  were inserted by the Amending Act  4  of
\n1959  in the saving clause of this provision and were  later
\ngiven  a retrospective effect from April 15, 1953, are\tonly
\nclarificatory or illustrative of the original intent of\t the
\nLegislature.  These two instances are not exhaustive of\t the
\ninvoluntary transfers which are outside the sweep of  clause\n<\/p>\n
(b).\n<\/p>\n
This  interpretation  of “transfer”  has  been\tconsistently
\nadopted\t by  the Punjab and Haryana High  Court\t in  several
\ncases.\t Some  of them in which involuntary transfers  of  a
\nkind  other than those specifically mentioned in the  saving
\nclause of clause (b) came up for consideration are  reported
\nin Bhajan Lal v. Punjab State<\/a>(1) & BishanSingh v. State (2).
\nThis   case  decided  pretation\t of  the  same\t words\t and
\nAgricultural Lands Act,\t 10-A of the Punjab Act; Lakshmi Raj
\nv. State of Haryana (3)\t Punjab by Mahajan j. proceeds on an
\ninterused in s. 32-FF of the Pepsu Tenancy 1953, which is in
\npari material with s.\n<\/p>\n
The above is the only reasonable interpretation of the words
\n“transfer  or other disposition of land” in s.10-A(b)  which
\nis  consistent with the content and object of s.18, and\t can
\nreconsile and: keep effective both the sections.
\nThough\tthe  contention\t of  Mr.  Dhingra  that\t the   words
\n“transfer or other disposition” in the said clause(b) do not
\nembrace\t within their scope tenancies or leases ‘created  by
\nthe  landowner-because\tsuch  a right of  the  landowner  is
\nreeognised by the Act vide sahib Ram’s case (supra)-is,\t not
\naltogether without force,yet I do not think it necessary
\n(1) (1968) 70 P.L.R. 664.    (2) (1968) 47 LLT 284.
\n(3) (1971) LXXIII Punjab L. R. 815.\n<\/p>\n
197<\/span><\/p>\n
to decide that point.  The lease created by Smt.   Lachchman
\nceased\tto subsist as soon as the Collector made the  orders
\nof purchase under s. 18 in favour of the erstwhile  tenants.
\nThe  question, whether the extinct lease which preceded\t the
\npurchase   orders  was\ta  “transfer”  or  not,\t does\tnot,
\ntherefore, survive for decision.\n<\/p>\n
In the light of what has been said above, I am firmly of the
\nopinion that the view taken by the High Court with regard to
\nthe interpretation and inter-relationship of ss.10-A and  18
\nis  sound  and the answers given by it to  the\tfirst  three
\nquestions  of  law  set\t out at\t the  commencement  of\tthis
\njudgment, are correct.\tI would, therefore, uphold the same.
\nNow  I turn to question No. 4, which arises in Amar  Singh’s
\ncase only.\n<\/p>\n
It is common ground that Field Nos. 265 and 343 on April 15,
\n1953, were comprised in the tenancy of Sri Chand and  Nathu.
\nThe  total  area  of these two fields is 67  bighas  and  19
\nbiswas\tequivalent to 42 ordinary acres, approximately.\t  It
\nis  apparent  from the, record that the land  in  these\t two
\nfields is entirely Barani and has no irrigation\t facilities,
\nwhatever.  According to the scale adopted by the  Collector,
\nSurplus\t Area, for such land, these 42 ordinary\t acres\twill
\nmake 10.5 standard acres.  The total area of Smt.  Lachchman
\nwhich  has  been found surplus is about 80  standard  acres.
\nThe  land  comprised in these two fields is thus  only\tone-
\neighth of her surplus area.\n<\/p>\n
At no stage before the High Court was it contended that\t Sri
\nChand  and Nathu held or owned in the state any\t other\tland
\napart from the said fields.  In this Court, also, either  in
\nthe  grounds of appeal or otherwise, no such  allegation  or
\ncontention has been made.  The “permissiable area” which can
\nbe held or retained by a tenant under the Act is 30 standard
\nacres.\t That is to say, the permissible limit of  the\tarea
\nwhich could be held in common by Sri Chand and Nathu, was 60
\nstandard  acres.  Since it has been no-body’s case that\t Sri
\nChand and Nathu held any other area, and the land  comprised
\nin these two fields being 10.5 standard acres, was far\tless
\nthan their permissible limit, the High Court presumed-and  I
\nthink, not wrongly that Field Nos. 265 and 343 were held  by
\nthe  tenants  Sri Chand and Nathu within  their\t permissible
\narea.\n<\/p>\n
It  is well settled that surplus area has to  be  determined
\nwith reference to the situation as it obtained on April\t 15,
\n1953  when  the Act came into force.   This  proposition  is
\nclear  from  s.19-F, also, which says  that  the  Prescribed
\nAuthority shall be competent to determine the surplus  area,
\nreferred  to  in s. 10-A, of a landowner out  of  the  lands
\nowned by such land-owner immediately before the commencement
\nof  the\t Act.\tIf there still remained any  doubt  on\tthis
\npoint, the. same must be deemed to have been authoritatively
\ndispelled  by the decision of this Court in Bhagwan  Das  v.
\nThe  State of Punjab<\/a>(1).  A plain reading of the  definition
\nof  ‘surplus  area’ in s.2(5-a) which has been quoted  in  a
\nforegoing  part of this judgment, shows that land held by  a
\ntenant within
\n(1)  [1966] 2 S. C. R. 511.\n<\/p>\n
198<\/span><\/p>\n
his permissible area, cannot be included in the surplus area
\nof  the\t landowner.  Since on the  determinative  date\ti.e.
\n15-4-53,  Field\t Nos. 265 and 343, measuring  10.5  standard
\nacres  only, were held by the tenants, Sri Chand and  Nathu,
\nwithin\ttheir permissible area, these fields could  not,  in
\nview of the mandate of s. 2(5-a), be included in the surplus
\narea’  of  Smt.\t Lachchman.  At the time, when\tthe  Surplus
\nArea  Collector\t took up determination of the  surplus\tarea
\n(which\tas  pointed out in Dhannkal’s case  (supra)  implies
\nincidental  verification  of the permissible  areas  of\t the
\nlandowner  and\tthe tenants, also) these fields\t were  still
\ncomprised in a tenancy, though the holder of the tenancy was
\na  different tenant.  In these circumstances, the change  of
\nthe tenant will not make these Fields accrete to the surplus
\narea  of the landowner.\t Such change of the tenant does\t not
\namount\tto a future “acquisition of land comprised  in\tthat
\ntenancy by the landowner within the comtemplation of ss. 19-
\nA  or  19-B  of\t the Act.  Such\t a  situation  came  up\t for
\nconsideration before a Division Bench (consisting of  Sharma
\nand Khosla JJ) of the Punjab High Court in Harchand Singh v.
\nPunjab\tState.<\/a> (1) Sharma J. who spoke for the\tBench,\tmade
\nthese observations:\n<\/p>\n
\t      “There  can  be no doubt that in\tthe  instant
\n\t      case the surplus area was to be determined  on
\n\t      the  date\t the Act came into force  i.e.\t15th
\n\t      April  1953, and further that the area in\t the
\n\t      cultivating  possession of a tenant if  within
\n\t      the  prescribed limit was also to be  excluded
\n\t      from consideration.  Section 10-A governs\t the
\n\t      disposition  of land which was comprised in  a
\n\t      surplus  area at the commencement of  the\t Act
\n\t      and not the land which was not surplus on that
\n\t      date  or had become surplus after\t the  coming
\n\t      into  force of the Act.  The latter  case\t was
\n\t\t\t    evidently  covered by ss. 19-A and 19-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n
B of  the
\n\t      Act………….. the mere change in tenancies
\n\t      will  not\t attract  the  provisions  of  these
\n\t      sections\tprovided the area which\t the  tenant
\n\t      comes  to occupy there by does not exceed\t the
\n\t      permissible  area.   By changing a  tenancy  a
\n\t      landlord\talso  can  not\tbe  said,  to\thave
\n\t      acquired\tthe  land  comprising  the   tenancy
\n\t      because  the  land  (which)  belonged  to\t him
\n\t      before  hand continued to belong to him  after
\n\t      the change in tenancy.  The term “acquire” has
\n\t      not been defined in the Act and so we have  to
\n\t      accept  its  dictionary meaning as,  “To\tmake
\n\t      property one’s own.  To gain permanently.\t  It
\n\t      is regularly applied to permanent acquisition”\n<\/p>\n
\t      (Bouvier’s   Law\t Dictionary   and    Concise
\n\t      Encyclopaedia,  Eighth  Edition, Vol.   I.  P.\n<\/p>\n
\t      114)”\n<\/p>\n
(1) (1964) 66 P.L.R. 285; 1963 P.L.J. 144.\n<\/p>\n
199<\/span><\/p>\n
These  observations,  in  my  opinion,\tcontain\t a   correct
\nstatement of law on the point.\n<\/p>\n
For  the  foregoing  reasons, I would hold  that  these\t two
\nfields\tcould  not be included in the surplus  area  of\t the
\nlandowner,  Smt.  Lachman and s.10-A was not attracted to  a
\ndisposition of these fields either by an order made under s.
\n18 or otherwise.\n<\/p>\n
In  the result, I would dismiss both these appeals,  leaving
\nthe parties to bear their own costs in this Court.\n<\/p>\n
\t\t\t   ORDER
\nIn accordance with the Judgment of the majority, the appeals
\nare allowed, but in the circumstances, the parties will bear
\ntheir costs throughout.\n<\/p>\n
V.P.S.\n<\/p>\n
200<\/span><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
Supreme Court of India State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, … vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974 Equivalent citations: 1974 AIR 994, 1974 SCC (4) 305 Author: V Krishnaiyer Bench: Krishnaiyer, V.R. PETITIONER: STATE OF PUNJAB (NOW HARYANA) AND, ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: AMAR SINGH AND ANOTHER DATE OF JUDGMENT21\/01\/1974 BENCH: KRISHNAIYER, V.R. […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-210204","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"\nState Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, ... vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, ... vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:url\" content=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:site_name\" content=\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:publisher\" content=\"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:published_time\" content=\"1974-01-20T18:30:00+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"article:modified_time\" content=\"2015-01-26T23:11:25+00:00\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:image\" content=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:width\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:height\" content=\"512\" \/>\n\t<meta property=\"og:image:type\" content=\"image\/jpeg\" \/>\n<meta name=\"author\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:card\" content=\"summary_large_image\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:creator\" content=\"@legaliadmin\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:site\" content=\"@Legal_india\" \/>\n<meta name=\"twitter:label1\" content=\"Written by\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data1\" content=\"Legal India Admin\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:label2\" content=\"Est. reading time\" \/>\n\t<meta name=\"twitter:data2\" content=\"127 minutes\" \/>\n<script type=\"application\/ld+json\" class=\"yoast-schema-graph\">{\"@context\":\"https:\\\/\\\/schema.org\",\"@graph\":[{\"@type\":\"Article\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974#article\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974\"},\"author\":{\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\"},\"headline\":\"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, … vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974\",\"datePublished\":\"1974-01-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-01-26T23:11:25+00:00\",\"mainEntityOfPage\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974\"},\"wordCount\":21447,\"commentCount\":0,\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"articleSection\":[\"Supreme Court of India\"],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"CommentAction\",\"name\":\"Comment\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974#respond\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"WebPage\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974\",\"name\":\"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, ... vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"isPartOf\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\"},\"datePublished\":\"1974-01-20T18:30:00+00:00\",\"dateModified\":\"2015-01-26T23:11:25+00:00\",\"breadcrumb\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974#breadcrumb\"},\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"ReadAction\",\"target\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974\"]}]},{\"@type\":\"BreadcrumbList\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974#breadcrumb\",\"itemListElement\":[{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":1,\"name\":\"Home\",\"item\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\"},{\"@type\":\"ListItem\",\"position\":2,\"name\":\"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, … vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974\"}]},{\"@type\":\"WebSite\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#website\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"name\":\"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"description\":\"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.\",\"publisher\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\"},\"alternateName\":\"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India\",\"potentialAction\":[{\"@type\":\"SearchAction\",\"target\":{\"@type\":\"EntryPoint\",\"urlTemplate\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/?s={search_term_string}\"},\"query-input\":{\"@type\":\"PropertyValueSpecification\",\"valueRequired\":true,\"valueName\":\"search_term_string\"}}],\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\"},{\"@type\":\"Organization\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#organization\",\"name\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\",\"alternateName\":\"Legal India\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/\",\"logo\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/wp-content\\\/uploads\\\/sites\\\/5\\\/2025\\\/09\\\/legal-india-icon.jpg\",\"width\":512,\"height\":512,\"caption\":\"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India\"},\"image\":{\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/logo\\\/image\\\/\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.facebook.com\\\/LegalindiaCom\\\/\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/Legal_india\"]},{\"@type\":\"Person\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/#\\\/schema\\\/person\\\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea\",\"name\":\"Legal India Admin\",\"image\":{\"@type\":\"ImageObject\",\"inLanguage\":\"en-US\",\"@id\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"contentUrl\":\"https:\\\/\\\/secure.gravatar.com\\\/avatar\\\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g\",\"caption\":\"Legal India Admin\"},\"sameAs\":[\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\",\"https:\\\/\\\/x.com\\\/legaliadmin\"],\"url\":\"https:\\\/\\\/www.legalindia.com\\\/judgments\\\/author\\\/legal-india-admin\"}]}<\/script>\n<!-- \/ Yoast SEO plugin. -->","yoast_head_json":{"title":"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, ... vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","robots":{"index":"index","follow":"follow","max-snippet":"max-snippet:-1","max-image-preview":"max-image-preview:large","max-video-preview":"max-video-preview:-1"},"canonical":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974","og_locale":"en_US","og_type":"article","og_title":"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, ... vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","og_url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974","og_site_name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","article_publisher":"https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","article_published_time":"1974-01-20T18:30:00+00:00","article_modified_time":"2015-01-26T23:11:25+00:00","og_image":[{"width":512,"height":512,"url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg?fit=512%2C512&ssl=1","type":"image\/jpeg"}],"author":"Legal India Admin","twitter_card":"summary_large_image","twitter_creator":"@legaliadmin","twitter_site":"@Legal_india","twitter_misc":{"Written by":"Legal India Admin","Est. reading time":"127 minutes"},"schema":{"@context":"https:\/\/schema.org","@graph":[{"@type":"Article","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974#article","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974"},"author":{"name":"Legal India Admin","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea"},"headline":"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, … vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974","datePublished":"1974-01-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-01-26T23:11:25+00:00","mainEntityOfPage":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974"},"wordCount":21447,"commentCount":0,"publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"articleSection":["Supreme Court of India"],"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"CommentAction","name":"Comment","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974#respond"]}]},{"@type":"WebPage","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974","name":"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, ... vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","isPartOf":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website"},"datePublished":"1974-01-20T18:30:00+00:00","dateModified":"2015-01-26T23:11:25+00:00","breadcrumb":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974#breadcrumb"},"inLanguage":"en-US","potentialAction":[{"@type":"ReadAction","target":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974"]}]},{"@type":"BreadcrumbList","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/state-of-punjab-now-haryana-and-vs-amar-singh-and-another-on-21-january-1974#breadcrumb","itemListElement":[{"@type":"ListItem","position":1,"name":"Home","item":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/"},{"@type":"ListItem","position":2,"name":"State Of Punjab (Now Haryana) And, … vs Amar Singh And Another on 21 January, 1974"}]},{"@type":"WebSite","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#website","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","name":"Free Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","description":"Search and read the latest judgements, orders, and rulings from the Supreme Court of India and all High Courts. A comprehensive database for lawyers, advocates, and law students.","publisher":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization"},"alternateName":"Free judgements of Supreme Court & High Court of India | Legal India","potentialAction":[{"@type":"SearchAction","target":{"@type":"EntryPoint","urlTemplate":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/?s={search_term_string}"},"query-input":{"@type":"PropertyValueSpecification","valueRequired":true,"valueName":"search_term_string"}}],"inLanguage":"en-US"},{"@type":"Organization","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#organization","name":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India","alternateName":"Legal India","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/","logo":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/","url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","contentUrl":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/5\/2025\/09\/legal-india-icon.jpg","width":512,"height":512,"caption":"Judgements of Supreme Court & High Court | Legal India"},"image":{"@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/logo\/image\/"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.facebook.com\/LegalindiaCom\/","https:\/\/x.com\/Legal_india"]},{"@type":"Person","@id":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/#\/schema\/person\/0bfdffe9059fb8bb24a86d094609c5ea","name":"Legal India Admin","image":{"@type":"ImageObject","inLanguage":"en-US","@id":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","url":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","contentUrl":"https:\/\/secure.gravatar.com\/avatar\/4faa9d728ed1af3b73d52225c7f12901ac726fe6f7ea0a3348a1d51f3a930987?s=96&d=mm&r=g","caption":"Legal India Admin"},"sameAs":["https:\/\/www.legalindia.com","https:\/\/x.com\/legaliadmin"],"url":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/author\/legal-india-admin"}]}},"modified_by":null,"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack-related-posts":[],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/210204","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=210204"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/210204\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=210204"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=210204"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=210204"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}