{"id":210964,"date":"2010-11-09T00:00:00","date_gmt":"2010-11-08T18:30:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ramjas-foundation-ors-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-9-november-2010"},"modified":"2017-11-14T17:43:07","modified_gmt":"2017-11-14T12:13:07","slug":"ramjas-foundation-ors-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-9-november-2010","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ramjas-foundation-ors-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-9-november-2010","title":{"rendered":"Ramjas Foundation &amp; Ors vs Union Of India &amp; Ors on 9 November, 2010"},"content":{"rendered":"<div class=\"docsource_main\">Supreme Court of India<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_title\">Ramjas Foundation &amp; Ors vs Union Of India &amp; Ors on 9 November, 2010<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_author\">Author: G Singhvi<\/div>\n<div class=\"doc_bench\">Bench: G.S. Singhvi, Asok Kumar Ganguly<\/div>\n<pre>                                                                        REPORTABLE\n\n                   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA\n\n                   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION\n\n\n                    CIVIL APPEAL NO.6662 OF 2004\n\n\nRamjas Foundation and another                              ........Appellants\n\n                                 Versus\n\nUnion of India and others                                  .......Respondents\n\n\n\n\n                              JUDGMENT\n<\/pre>\n<p>G.S. Singhvi, J.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>1.    This appeal is directed against judgment dated 18.5.2001 of the<\/p>\n<p>Division Bench of the Delhi High Court whereby the first appeal preferred<\/p>\n<p>by the appellants against the judgment of the learned Single Judge, who<\/p>\n<p>declined to nullify the acquisition of their land was dismissed.<\/p>\n<p>2.    Rai Sahib Kedar Nath, who retired as District Judge from the Punjab<\/p>\n<p>Judicial Service started three schools in Kucha Ghasi Ram, Chandni Chowk,<\/p>\n<p>Bazar Sita Ram and Daryaganj, Delhi between 1912 and 1916 in the<\/p>\n<p>memory of his father, Lala Ramjas Mal. He purchased land measuring<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                        2<\/span><\/p>\n<p>about 1800 bighas in villages Chowkri Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd,<\/p>\n<p>which now form part of NCR Delhi from his own resources and by<\/p>\n<p>collecting money in the form of donations from other philanthropists. In a<\/p>\n<p>public function held on 25.12.1916 in Ramjas School, Kucha Ghasi Ram,<\/p>\n<p>Chandani Chowk, Rai Sahib Kedar Nath is said to have made an<\/p>\n<p>announcement that he had created a Wakf and dedicated and donated all his<\/p>\n<p>movable and immovable properties including the land in villages Chowki<\/p>\n<p>Mubarikabad and Sadhora Khurd to the said school for charitable purposes,<\/p>\n<p>namely, advancement and promotion of education to the public and poor<\/p>\n<p>students. In 1917, he formed Ramjas College Society and got the same<\/p>\n<p>registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 as a charitable<\/p>\n<p>institution. The objects of the Society were as under:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;i)    To provide school and university education for boys and<\/p>\n<p>             girls.<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      ii)    To maintain schools, colleges, boarding houses and<\/p>\n<p>             training institutes for training of teachers.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      iii)   To provide means for imparting technical and industrial<\/p>\n<p>             education in connection with the institutions under the<\/p>\n<p>             control of foundation.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      iv)    To provide means for imparting a sound moral and<\/p>\n<p>             catholic religious education free from superstitious and<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                            3<\/span><\/p>\n<p>             controversial matters and based on the Vedas and ancient<\/p>\n<p>             shastras.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      v)     To encourage and take part in Scientific Research of<\/p>\n<p>             various kinds as well as in the study translation and<\/p>\n<p>             publication of the Sanskrit literature and philosophy of<\/p>\n<p>             ancient India.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      vi)    To amalgamate with the foundation any other societies<\/p>\n<p>             having objects similar to those or any of these of the<\/p>\n<p>             Foundation.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      vii)   To give loans to the institutions aided, run managed by or<\/p>\n<p>             under the control of the Foundation and for the benefits<\/p>\n<p>             of the students studying in the said institutions, aid,<\/p>\n<p>             grants, donations, subscribe to Government and\/or semi-\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>             Government       relief   funds,       award   scholarships,<\/p>\n<p>             fellowships, stipends of any kind as also to take\/accept<\/p>\n<p>             donations, gifts and charities etc.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>3.    After some time, Rai Sahib Kedar Nath formed a managing<\/p>\n<p>committee of which he was the President. On 25.6.1936, he transferred the<\/p>\n<p>entire land to the Society by executing a release deed. In 1967, the name of<\/p>\n<p>the Society was changed from Ramjas College Society to Ramjas<\/p>\n<p>Foundation and the same was registered as such.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                        4<\/span><\/p>\n<p>4.    By notification dated 13.11.1959 issued under Section 4 of the Land<\/p>\n<p>Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, `the Act&#8217;), the Chief Commissioner of<\/p>\n<p>Delhi proposed acquisition of 34070 acres land including 872 bighas and 17<\/p>\n<p>biswas land of appellant No.1 situated at Chowkri Mubarikabad and 730<\/p>\n<p>bighas land situated at Sadhora Khurd for planned development of Delhi<\/p>\n<p>excluding the following categories of land:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      (a)   Government land and evacuee land;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      (b)   the land already notified under Section 6 of the Land<\/p>\n<p>            Acquisition Act for any Government Scheme;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      (c)   the land already notified either under Section 4 or 6 of<\/p>\n<p>            the   Land    Acquisition   Act,   for   House   Building<\/p>\n<p>            Cooperative Societies mentioned in Annexure III;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      (d)   the land under graveyards, tombs, shrines and the land<\/p>\n<p>            attached to religious institutions and Wakf property.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>5.    The objections filed on behalf of appellant No.1 under Section 5-A of<\/p>\n<p>the Act through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate were rejected by the<\/p>\n<p>competent authority. Thereafter, three different notifications were issued<\/p>\n<p>under Section 6 of the Act.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                        5<\/span><\/p>\n<p>6.    The acquisition of land vide notification dated 13.11.1959 was<\/p>\n<p>challenged in large number of petitions filed in Delhi High Court which<\/p>\n<p>were dismissed. The appeals filed against the orders of the Delhi High<\/p>\n<p>Court were dismissed by this Court in <a href=\"\/doc\/1568935\/\">Aflatoon v. Lt. Governor of Delhi<\/a><\/p>\n<p>(1975) 4 SCC 285 and Lila Ram v. Union of India (1975) 2 SCC 547.<\/p>\n<p>7.    Appellant No.1 also filed several cases in the Delhi High Court and<\/p>\n<p>this Court questioning the acquisition of its land and consequential actions<\/p>\n<p>taken by the respondents. The particulars of the cases filed by appellant<\/p>\n<p>No.1 and their result are detailed below:\n<\/p>\n<p>\nChowkri Mubarikabad<\/p>\n<p>(i)   The first writ petition bearing No.409\/1968 was filed by appellant<\/p>\n<p>No.1 in the Delhi High Court for quashing notifications dated 13.11.1959<\/p>\n<p>and 28.2.1968 issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act respectively mainly<\/p>\n<p>on the ground that its land is exempted from acquisition in terms of clause<\/p>\n<p>(d) of notification dated 13.11.1959 because it was a Wakf property. This<\/p>\n<p>assertion was contested by the respondents. They pleaded that the property<\/p>\n<p>in dispute is neither a Wakf nor it can be treated as Wakf because it had not<\/p>\n<p>been created by a Muslim. The learned Single Judge was of the view that<\/p>\n<p>the adjudication of the writ petition would need determination of<\/p>\n<p>complicated questions of fact and such questions cannot be decided under<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                              6<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Article 226 of the Constitution. Thereupon, the counsel appearing on behalf<\/p>\n<p>of appellant No.1 sought leave of the Court to withdraw the writ petition<\/p>\n<p>with liberty to file a civil suit. His prayer was granted by the Court.<\/p>\n<p>(ii)    Immediately after disposal of the writ petition, appellant No.1 filed<\/p>\n<p>Suit No.451\/1971 with the following substantive prayer:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>        &#8220;A decree for declaration be passed in favour of the plaintiffs<br \/>\n        and against the defendants to the effect that since the plaintiffs<br \/>\n        society is a charitable education institution and the land in<br \/>\n        dispute is a wakf property or in the nature of wakf property, the<br \/>\n        same is exempt from the purview of notification under Section<br \/>\n        4 of the Land Acquisition Act by virtue of clause (d) of para 2<br \/>\n        of the Notification No.F.15(iii)\/59-L.S.G dated 13.11.1959 and<br \/>\n        the impugned notifications, acquisition notices and the<br \/>\n        proceedings consequent thereon are void abinitio, without<br \/>\n        jurisdiction, discriminatory, arbitrary, vague, indefinite, ultra<br \/>\n        vires, against the principles of natural justice and the provisions<br \/>\n        of the Land Acquisition Act and are liable to be set aside and<br \/>\n        cancelled.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>(iii)   After detailed consideration of the pleadings and documents produced<\/p>\n<p>by the parties, the learned Single Judge dismissed the suit. Appellant No.2 &#8211;<\/p>\n<p>Shri Ram Kanwar Gupta joined appellant No.1 in filing appeal against the<\/p>\n<p>judgment of the learned Single Judge, which was dismissed by the Division<\/p>\n<p>Bench of the High Court vide judgment dated 18.5.2001.                Thereafter,<\/p>\n<p>notification under Section 17 of the Act was issued on 23.7.2001 and<\/p>\n<p>possession of the land was taken by the Land Acquisition Collector and<\/p>\n<p>handed over to the Delhi Development Authority.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                        7<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Sadhora Khurd<\/p>\n<p>(i)     W.P. No.213\/1973 filed by appellant No.1 challenging the acquisition<\/p>\n<p>of land situated at Sadhora Khurd was dismissed by the learned Single Judge<\/p>\n<p>as withdrawn.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>(ii)    After 5 years, appellant No.1 filed CWP No.106\/1978 for quashing<\/p>\n<p>the notifications issued under Sections 4 and 6 and notices issued under<\/p>\n<p>Sections 9 and 10 of the Act. The same was dismissed by the Division<\/p>\n<p>Bench of the High Court vide its order dated 31.1.1978.<\/p>\n<p>(iii)   Civil Appeal No. 2213 of 1978 filed by appellant No.1 against the<\/p>\n<p>order of the Division Bench was dismissed by this Court on 13.11.1972 on<\/p>\n<p>the ground of delay and blameworthy conduct of appellant No.1 &#8211;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"\/doc\/623082\/\">Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India<\/a> (1993) Supp 2 SCC 20.<\/p>\n<p>(iv)    After dismissal of the civil appeal, the Land Acquisition Collector<\/p>\n<p>passed Award No.10\/94-95 dated 7.6.1994 and supplementary Award<\/p>\n<p>Nos.10-A\/94-95, 10-B\/94-95, 10-C\/94-95 and 10-D\/94-95 all dated<\/p>\n<p>11.11.1994 in respect of 718 bighas 14 biswas land situated at Sadhora<\/p>\n<p>Khurd and took possession of 676 bighas and 8 biswas of land.<\/p>\n<p>(v)     Appellant No.1 challenged the awards in CWP No.4343\/1997 and<\/p>\n<p>prayed for quashing the action of the respondents to take possession of the<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                         8<\/span><\/p>\n<p>acquired land. It further prayed for issue of a mandamus to respondents to<\/p>\n<p>release land by issuing notification under Section 48 of the Act. Appellant<\/p>\n<p>No.1 filed another writ petition (CWP No.5493\/1999) for grant of a<\/p>\n<p>declaration that land situated in village Sadhora Khurd continues to be in its<\/p>\n<p>possession.    By an order dated 26.4.2000, the Division Bench of the High<\/p>\n<p>Court dismissed CWP No. 4343\/1997 but gave a direction to the Lt.<\/p>\n<p>Governor to pass appropriate order on the application made by appellant<\/p>\n<p>No.1 for denotification of the acquired land. Similar order appears to have<\/p>\n<p>been passed in CWP No. 5493\/1999.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>(vi)   In the meanwhile, Bhagwan Dass filed CWP No.1811\/1995 by way of<\/p>\n<p>public interest litigation and prayed for issue of a mandamus to the<\/p>\n<p>respondents to take possession of 730 bighas of land and use the same as per<\/p>\n<p>the plan of Zone B-5. That petition was disposed of by the Division Bench<\/p>\n<p>of the High Court on 26.4.2000 by taking cognizance of the statement made<\/p>\n<p>by the counsel appearing for the Delhi Development Authority that a<\/p>\n<p>decision had been taken not to release land of appellant No.1 from<\/p>\n<p>acquisition.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>(vii) The orders passed by the High Court in CWP Nos.1811\/1995,<\/p>\n<p>4343\/1997 and 5493\/1999 were challenged before this Court in S.L.P. (C)<\/p>\n<p>Nos.15017, 15216 and 19741 of 2000 on several grounds including the<\/p>\n<p>following:\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                               9<\/span><\/p>\n<blockquote><p>       &#8220;(iii) Because the petitioner society having been created by Rai<br \/>\n       Sahab Kedar Nath, Retired District Judge, Punjab thereby<br \/>\n       dedicating all his movable and immovable properties, for<br \/>\n       Charitable purposes establishing to run the schools and colleges<br \/>\n       for public charity of education covered under and\/or is waqf<br \/>\n       and property held is or in the nature of a waqf property even if<br \/>\n       the Waqf Act may not be applicable to such society being not<br \/>\n       attached to any specific caste and\/or religion.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>       (iv) Because a notification issued under the provisions of the<br \/>\n       Land Acquisition Act also being &#8220;Law&#8221; is liable to be struck<br \/>\n       down if it is contrary to the fundamental rights guaranteed<br \/>\n       under Part III of the Constitution of India, as in view of the<br \/>\n       decision of this Hon&#8217;ble Court in Indian Express Newspapers<br \/>\n       Vs Union of India, reported at [1985] 1 SCC 641, para 83 at\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>       693.<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>       (v) Because any law and\/or notification under the statute i.e.<br \/>\n       the Land Acquisition Act being discriminatory on ground of<br \/>\n       caste or religion is liable to be declared as ultra vires of the<br \/>\n       Constitution and must be quashed as a whole.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>                                                      (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>(viii) All the special leave petitions were disposed by this Court on 4.2.2002<\/p>\n<p>in the following terms:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>       &#8220;We have heard Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel,<br \/>\n       appearing for the petitioners. We are not satisfied that this<br \/>\n       petition merits further consideration by this Court. However, it<br \/>\n       is pointed out that in spite of the directions issued by the High<br \/>\n       Court that the representation filed by the petitioners before the<br \/>\n       Lt. Governor of Delhi for considering their case for<br \/>\n       denotification of the land in question has not been disposed of<br \/>\n       till date. If that be so we direct that the application so filed will<br \/>\n       be disposed of within a period of six weeks from today.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>(ix)   In compliance of the direction given by the High Court and this Court<\/p>\n<p>Lt. Governor, Delhi passed order dated 18.6.2002 and rejected the prayer of<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                               10<\/span><\/p>\n<p>appellant No.1 for denotification of its land by recording the following<\/p>\n<p>reasons:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;I have gone through all the papers on record and have<br \/>\n      considered the matter at length.          Possession of area<br \/>\n      admeasuring 563 bighas 07 biswas was taken by DDA on &#8220;as is<br \/>\n      where is&#8221; basis as land was not physically vacant. The said<br \/>\n      area is replete with factories. The Anand Parbat Industrial Area<br \/>\n      as it has come to be popularly known, has come up in a<br \/>\n      haphazard and unplanned manner and has over the years, also<br \/>\n      become degraded and decrepit. The congested and unsystematic<br \/>\n      growth of factories in the area has turned it into a veritable<br \/>\n      public hazard. Safety considerations are wanting. Most of the<br \/>\n      lanes are too narrow for a fire tender to enter. The electricity<br \/>\n      distribution system is problematic. The other infrastructure and<br \/>\n      basic services are also inadequate. Apart from being a<br \/>\n      congested and degraded cluster of factories operating in sub-<br \/>\n      optimal conditions, the area is also hazardous where public<br \/>\n      safety requirements warrant early remedial measures. The area<br \/>\n      is mentioned in the Master Plan of Delhi as &#8220;Industrial&#8221;.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      There are thus sound and compelling reasons to effect<br \/>\n      redevelopment of the area in the overall public interest. For<br \/>\n      this the entire land mass needs to be physically taken over,<br \/>\n      planned, roads and lanes straightened and widened to the extent<br \/>\n      feasible and new infrastructure laid down as per the plans.<br \/>\n      Institutional services like fire service, electricity substations etc.<br \/>\n      will have to be properly located. A redevelopment plan on<br \/>\n      these lines has, in fact, been prepared after consulting the<br \/>\n      occupants. The only possible way to achieve implementation<br \/>\n      of the redevelopment plan is through land acquisition. Without<br \/>\n      physically taking over the entire chunk of land, laying of<br \/>\n      infrastructure as per the redevelopment plans will not be<br \/>\n      possible. Nor is it desirable or safe to delay any longer<br \/>\n      redevelopment of the area, which is an imminent necessity.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      For the aforesaid considerations, I do not find it prudent,<br \/>\n      desirable or feasible to denotify the said chunk of land.<br \/>\n      Denotification of 67 bigha 14 biswas land has already been<br \/>\n      made in favour of the petitioners who have thereby received a<br \/>\n      fair degree of consideration from the government already. Any<br \/>\n      further denotification will be contrary to public interest and as<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                       11<\/span><\/p>\n<p>      such cannot be made. The petitions\/representations in this<br \/>\n      regard are hereby disposed of accordingly.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>(x)   Appellant No.1 challenged the order of the Lt. Governor in W.P.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>No.5138\/2002, which was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High<\/p>\n<p>Court by detailed judgment dated 6.2.2004. S.L.P. (C) No.7026 of 2004<\/p>\n<p>filed against that judgment was dismissed as withdrawn.<\/p>\n<p>8.    Shri R. Venkataramani, learned senior counsel for the appellants<\/p>\n<p>reiterated the argument made before the High Court that in view of clause<\/p>\n<p>(d) of notification dated 13.11.1959, the land of the appellant was liable to<\/p>\n<p>be excluded from acquisition because it was a Wakf property. Learned<\/p>\n<p>counsel argued that the dedication of land by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was for<\/p>\n<p>a charitable purpose and this, by itself, is conclusive evidence of his<\/p>\n<p>intention to create a Wakf. Learned counsel emphasized that dedication<\/p>\n<p>made by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was without any reservation in favour of any<\/p>\n<p>beneficiary as trustee or otherwise and, as such, the land in question became<\/p>\n<p>part of Wakf property and argued that the same could not be acquired in the<\/p>\n<p>name of planned development of Delhi. Learned counsel invited the Court&#8217;s<\/p>\n<p>attention to the amended definition of `Wakf&#8217; contained in Section 3(1) of<\/p>\n<p>the Wakf Act, 1954 and argued that a non-Muslim can also create Wakf.<\/p>\n<p>Learned senior counsel submitted that there is no injunction under the<\/p>\n<p>uncodified or codified Muslim Law against dedication of property to a<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                        12<\/span><\/p>\n<p>charitable purpose recognized by Muslim Law by a non-Muslim or a person<\/p>\n<p>not professing the Islamic faith. He further submitted that merely because<\/p>\n<p>Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was a Hindu and had performed havan etc. before<\/p>\n<p>renouncing the property in favour of the Society for a charitable purpose is<\/p>\n<p>not sufficient to deny benefit of exemption to appellant No.1 in terms of<\/p>\n<p>clause (d) of notification dated 13.11.1959. Learned counsel further argued<\/p>\n<p>that exemption clause contained in notification dated 13.11.1959 should be<\/p>\n<p>liberally construed in a manner which will benefit dedication made for<\/p>\n<p>charitable purpose irrespective of caste and\/or religion, else the impugned<\/p>\n<p>notification will become discriminatory and violative of Articles 14 and 15<\/p>\n<p>of the Constitution.   In support of his arguments, learned counsel produced<\/p>\n<p>three compilations of which one contains copies of the orders passed by the<\/p>\n<p>Delhi High Court, this Court as also the one passed by the Lt. Governor of<\/p>\n<p>Delhi and a copy of notification dated 4.4.2002 issued under Section 48 of<\/p>\n<p>the Act for release of 67 bighas 14 biswas of land of village Sadhora Khurd.<\/p>\n<p>The second volume contains extracts of text books and commentaries on<\/p>\n<p>Mohammadan Law\/Muslim Law and the third volume contains compilation<\/p>\n<p>of various judgments.         During the course of submissions, Shri<\/p>\n<p>Venkataramani produced a fresh compilation of the list of dates<\/p>\n<p>incorporating therein the developments which have taken place after filing<\/p>\n<p>of the special leave petition. This compilation shows that the area in which<\/p>\n<p>land of appellant No.1 is situated has developed as a residential locality and<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                        13<\/span><\/p>\n<p>is recognized as unauthorized colony for the purpose of regularization; that<\/p>\n<p>some parts of the land have also been developed as Anand Parbat Industrial<\/p>\n<p>Area and the Delhi Development Authority has invited applications and<\/p>\n<p>declarations from the residents\/unauthorized occupants of Anand Parbat<\/p>\n<p>Industrial Area for deciding the licence fee.     The appellants have also<\/p>\n<p>claimed that they are running 19 schools and one degree college and one<\/p>\n<p>Sports and Mountaineering Institute at Chowkri Mubarikabad.<\/p>\n<p>9.    Shri Amarendra Sharan, Senior Advocate and Shri Vishnu B.<\/p>\n<p>Saharya, Advocate appearing for the Delhi Development Authority and Smt.<\/p>\n<p>Gita Luthra, Senior Advocate and Shri D.N. Goburdhun, Advocate<\/p>\n<p>appearing for the Union of India supported the impugned judgment and<\/p>\n<p>argued that the appeal should be dismissed as a frivolous piece of litigation.<\/p>\n<p>Learned counsel extensively referred to the judgment in <a href=\"\/doc\/623082\/\">Ramjas<\/p>\n<p>Foundation v. Union of India<\/a> (supra), order dated 4.2.2002 passed in<\/p>\n<p>S.L.P.(C) No. 15017\/2000 and connected matters and argued that when this<\/p>\n<p>Court has already negatived the plea of appellant No.1 that the property<\/p>\n<p>situated at Sadhora Khurd is a Wakf property and is exempted from<\/p>\n<p>acquisition, the appellants cannot resurrect the same plea in respect of the<\/p>\n<p>land situated at Chowkri Mubarikabad. Learned counsel then argued that<\/p>\n<p>the appellants&#8217; claim for exemption was rightly rejected by the learned<\/p>\n<p>Single Judge and the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court because no<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                       14<\/span><\/p>\n<p>evidence was produced to prove that Rai Sahib Kedar Nath had created a<\/p>\n<p>Wakf and the property transferred to the Society became a Wakf property.<\/p>\n<p>Shri Amarendra Sharan emphasized that renouncement of property by Rai<\/p>\n<p>Sahib Kedar Nath in favour of the Society formed by him for educational<\/p>\n<p>purposes did not result in creation of a Wakf and the property did not<\/p>\n<p>become Wakf property because the dedication made by him was preceded<\/p>\n<p>by &#8220;Samarpan&#8221; and &#8220;Sankalp&#8221; which are well known concepts of Hindu<\/p>\n<p>Law. Another argument of the learned senior counsel is that clause (d) of<\/p>\n<p>notification dated 13.11.1959 cannot be interpreted as including every<\/p>\n<p>dedication of property for charitable purpose and the expression `Wakf<\/p>\n<p>property&#8217; must be given a restricted interpretation so as to include the<\/p>\n<p>property attached to the Wakf created by Muslims only.<\/p>\n<p>10.   We have considered the respective submissions. In our view, the<\/p>\n<p>appeal deserves to be dismissed because the appellants have not approached<\/p>\n<p>the Court with clean hands. <a href=\"\/doc\/623082\/\">In Ramjas Foundation v. Union of India,<\/a><\/p>\n<p>acquisition of the land situated at Sadhora Khurd was challenged on the<\/p>\n<p>ground of violation of Section 5-A of the Act and also on the ground that<\/p>\n<p>land in question is exempted from acquisition because it is a Wakf property.<\/p>\n<p>Another plea taken by appellant No.1 was that if the land belonging to<\/p>\n<p>educational and charitable institutions established by Hindus and non-<\/p>\n<p>Muslims is not treated as Wakf property, then the exemption clause (d) is<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                           15<\/span><\/p>\n<p>liable to be declared void for violation of Article 14 of the Constitution.<\/p>\n<p>While rejecting the argument that the acquisition proceedings were vitiated<\/p>\n<p>due to violation of Section 5-A of the Act, this Court noted that the<\/p>\n<p>appellants had made a patently incorrect statement on the issue of denial of<\/p>\n<p>opportunity of personal hearing and observed:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;As regards the objection of the violation of the mandatory<br \/>\n      provisions of Section 5-A of the Act in not affording an<br \/>\n      opportunity of personal hearing while deciding such objections,<br \/>\n      we granted an opportunity to the learned Additional Solicitor<br \/>\n      General to place material after examining the original record.<br \/>\n      We granted this opportunity to the respondents on account of<br \/>\n      the reason that the writ petition had been dismissed by the High<br \/>\n      Court in limine without issuing notice to the respondents and as<br \/>\n      such the respondents had not been given any opportunity before<br \/>\n      the High Court to place any material to refute the allegations<br \/>\n      made by the appellants in this regard. The Additional Solicitor<br \/>\n      General during the course of the hearing of the matter placed an<br \/>\n      order of the Land Acquisition Collector, Delhi dated February<br \/>\n      23, 1968 which has been taken on record and for the purposes<br \/>\n      of identification has been marked as Annexure `X&#8217;. A copy of<br \/>\n      the said Annexure `X&#8217; was also given to the learned counsel for<br \/>\n      the appellants. A perusal of the aforesaid order dated March 22,<br \/>\n      1968 clearly shows that the Ramjas Foundation Society was<br \/>\n      represented through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate who was<br \/>\n      given a personal hearing. From a perusal of the aforesaid<br \/>\n      document Annexure `X&#8217; dated February 23, 1968 it is clear that<br \/>\n      full opportunity of hearing through counsel was afforded to the<br \/>\n      Ramjas Foundation. It has been further mentioned in this order<br \/>\n      that the Ramjas Foundation Society was also allowed to file<br \/>\n      fresh objections if so desired, but Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, learned<br \/>\n      Advocate for the petitioner Society declined and stated that<br \/>\n      there was nothing more to add in the previous objection<br \/>\n      petition. After bringing the said document Annexure `X&#8217; to the<br \/>\n      notice of the learned counsel for the appellants, no satisfactory<br \/>\n      explanation or argument came forward on behalf of the<br \/>\n      appellants. The conduct of the appellants in raising the plea that<br \/>\n      no opportunity of personal hearing was given to the appellants<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                           16<\/span><\/p>\n<p>      in respect of the objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act<br \/>\n      was totally baseless and factually incorrect and such conduct is<br \/>\n      reprehensible. It is well settled that a person invoking an<br \/>\n      equitable extraordinary jurisdiction of the Court under Article<br \/>\n      226 of the Constitution is required to come with clean hands<br \/>\n      and should not conceal the material facts. The objection<br \/>\n      regarding not affording an opportunity of personal hearing in<br \/>\n      respect of objections filed under Section 5-A of the Act was one<br \/>\n      of the main planks of the grounds raised in the writ petition as<br \/>\n      well as in the special leave petition filed before this Court and<br \/>\n      ought we know if such ground had not been taken this Court<br \/>\n      would have entertained this appeal or not. The appellants have<br \/>\n      taken the advantage of obtaining the stay order also from this<br \/>\n      Court which is continuing for the last 14 years as the special<br \/>\n      leave petition was filed in 1978 itself.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      It may be further noted that a common objection petition under<br \/>\n      Section 5-A of the Act in respect of both the lands situated in<br \/>\n      Mubarikabad as well as in Sadhurakhurd was filed on<br \/>\n      December 11, 1959 through Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate.<br \/>\n      The said objections were heard in the presence of Shri Ratan<br \/>\n      Lal Gupta, Advocate and disposed of by one common order<br \/>\n      Annexure `X&#8217; and we cannot believe an ipse dixit explanation<br \/>\n      made orally during the course of arguments on behalf of the<br \/>\n      appellants that they had no knowledge of any personal hearing<br \/>\n      being given to Shri Ratan Lal Gupta, Advocate. It is also<br \/>\n      important to note that no such objection was taken in respect of<br \/>\n      land in Mubarikabad.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>                                                   (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<p>The Court also criticized appellant No.1 for playing a game of hide and<\/p>\n<p>seek and observed:\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;It may be noted that the reference with regard to suit No. 451<br \/>\n      of 1971 decided on March 21, 1977 is in respect of the land of<br \/>\n      petitioners situated in Mubarikabad. It is surprising that though<br \/>\n      the opportunity was sought for filing a fresh suit, the appellants<br \/>\n      again filed a Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 in the High Court<br \/>\n      on January 7, 1978 which was ultimately dismissed by the High<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                       17<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Court in limine on January 31, 1978 by a Division Bench<br \/>\ncomprising T.P.S. Chawla and Awadh Behari, JJ. In this Writ<br \/>\nPetition No. 106 of 1978 the appellants conveniently omitted to<br \/>\nmention that the permission to withdraw the Petition No. 213 of<br \/>\n1973 was granted on the statement of Shri M.C. Gupta that his<br \/>\nclients reserved the liberty to file a fresh suit and not writ. Thus<br \/>\nno liberty was sought or given for filing a fresh writ petition. In<br \/>\nany case there were no fresh ground or circumstances available<br \/>\nto the appellants to file a fresh Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978 on<br \/>\nJanuary 7, 1978 on identical grounds when the earlier Writ<br \/>\nPetition No. 213 of 1973 had been dismissed as withdrawn on<br \/>\nMarch 30, 1977. Nothing had happened between March 30,<br \/>\n1977 and January 7, 1978 for giving a fresh cause of action to<br \/>\nthe appellants to file the Writ Petition No. 106 of 1978. Awadh<br \/>\nBehari, J. had dismissed the suit No. 451 of 1971 by order dated<br \/>\nMarch 21, 1977 in regard to the lands in Mubarikabad and he<br \/>\nwas also one of the Judges of the Division Bench who passed<br \/>\nthe impugned order dated January 31, 1978 dismissing the writ<br \/>\npetition in limine as he was fully aware of the entire<br \/>\nbackground of this litigation. The appellants are themselves<br \/>\nresponsible for creating confusion in initiating separate<br \/>\nproceedings at different periods of time in respect of the lands<br \/>\nsituated in Mubarikabad and Sadhurakhurd though challenge to<br \/>\nthe acquisition proceedings was on common grounds. Learned<br \/>\ncounsel for the appellants was unable to satisfy in respect of<br \/>\nsuch conduct of hide and seek on the part of the appellants. In<br \/>\ncase, as sought to be explained by Mr. Tarkunde, learned senior<br \/>\ncounsel for the appellants, the appellants were depending on the<br \/>\nresult of the civil suit filed in respect of the lands situated in<br \/>\nMubarikabad there was no justification for filing the Writ<br \/>\nPetition No. 213 of 1973 in respect of the land situated in<br \/>\nSadhurakhurd as the suit was not decided in 1973 but was in<br \/>\nfact dismissed on March 21, 1977. We find no justification for<br \/>\nfiling the writ petition in respect of the land situated in<br \/>\nSadhurakhurd in 1973 and subsequently withdrawing the writ<br \/>\npetition on March 30, 1977 reserving the liberty to file a fresh<br \/>\nsuit but thereafter again filing the writ petition on January 7,<br \/>\n1978 instead of suit.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>                                           (emphasis supplied)<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                          18<\/span><\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>11.   In S.L.P.(C) No. 15017\/2000 and connected matters, appellant No.1<\/p>\n<p>had specifically raised a plea that its property is exempted from acquisition<\/p>\n<p>because it is a Wakf property, but failed to convince the Court to nullify the<\/p>\n<p>acquisition proceedings on that ground.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>12.   A careful reading of the judgment in the <a href=\"\/doc\/623082\/\">Ramjas Foundation v.<\/p>\n<p>Union of India<\/a> (supra) and the order passed in the special leave petitions<\/p>\n<p>clearly shows that even though the question whether the land belonging to<\/p>\n<p>appellant No.1 is exempted from acquisition in terms of clause (d) of<\/p>\n<p>notification dated 13.11.1959 was not decided in the first case and the appeal<\/p>\n<p>was dismissed mainly on the ground of delay and contumacious conduct of<\/p>\n<p>the appellants, that question will be deemed to have been answered in<\/p>\n<p>negative in the second case because in the special leave petitions it was<\/p>\n<p>specifically pleaded that the land belonging to appellant No.1 is exempted<\/p>\n<p>from acquisition being Wakf property and this Court held that there was no<\/p>\n<p>merit in the appellant&#8217;s case. It is true that the Court did not record detailed<\/p>\n<p>reasons for not entertaining the special leave petitions but use of the<\/p>\n<p>expression &#8220;we are not satisfied that this petition merits further consideration<\/p>\n<p>by this Court&#8221; clearly shows that the claim of exemption was turned down<\/p>\n<p>by this Court.    If appellant No.1 did not feel satisfied with order dated<\/p>\n<p>4.2.2002 and felt that its claim for exemption under clause (d) of notification<\/p>\n<p>dated 13.11.1959 was on firm footing, then it could have applied for review<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                          19<\/span><\/p>\n<p>of that order.    However, as the subsequent events reveal, instead of<\/p>\n<p>questioning correctness of order dated 4.2.2002, appellant No.1 accepted the<\/p>\n<p>negation of its claim based on clause (d) of the notification and vigorously<\/p>\n<p>pursued the case for denotification of the land and partially succeeded<\/p>\n<p>inasmuch as vide notification dated 4.4.2002 issued under Section 48 of the<\/p>\n<p>Act, the Lt. Governor released 67 bighas 14 biswas of the acquired land.<\/p>\n<p>13.   Strangely, in the list of dates of the special leave petition out of which<\/p>\n<p>this appeal arises, there is not even a whisper about large number of cases<\/p>\n<p>filed by appellant No.1 challenging the acquisition of land situated at village<\/p>\n<p>Sadhora Khurd, the grounds on which the challenge was founded and the<\/p>\n<p>orders passed by the High Court and this Court.           The appellants also<\/p>\n<p>suppressed the fact that after dismissal of the first appeal by the Division<\/p>\n<p>Bench of the High Court, possession of the land was taken by the Land<\/p>\n<p>Acquisition Collector on 13.7.2001 and transferred to the Delhi<\/p>\n<p>Development Authority.      What could be the possible reason for these<\/p>\n<p>omissions? Any person of reasonable prudence will at once respond to this<\/p>\n<p>question by saying that sole object of not disclosing the facts relating to<\/p>\n<p>other cases was to keep the Court in dark about rejection of challenge to the<\/p>\n<p>acquisition of a portion of land which the appellants are claiming to be Wakf<\/p>\n<p>property. We have no doubt that the appellants did so for the purpose of<\/p>\n<p>persuading this Court to pass an interim order and they succeeded in this<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                         20<\/span><\/p>\n<p>venture because while issuing notice on 26.11.2001, this Court directed that<\/p>\n<p>there shall be stay of dispossession.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>14.   The principle that a person who does not come to the Court with clean<\/p>\n<p>hands is not entitled to be heard on the merits of his grievance and, in any<\/p>\n<p>case, such person is not entitled to any relief is applicable not only to the<\/p>\n<p>petitions filed under Articles 32, 226 and 136 of the Constitution but also to<\/p>\n<p>the cases instituted in others courts and judicial forums.         The object<\/p>\n<p>underlying the principle is that every Court is not only entitled but is duty<\/p>\n<p>bound to protect itself from unscrupulous litigants who do not have any<\/p>\n<p>respect for truth and who try to pollute the stream of justice by resorting to<\/p>\n<p>falsehood or by making misstatement or by suppressing facts which have<\/p>\n<p>bearing on adjudication of the issue(s) arising in the case. In Dalglish v.<\/p>\n<p>Jarvie 2 Mac. &amp; G. 231, 238, Lord Langdale and Rolfe B. observed: &#8220;It is<\/p>\n<p>the duty of a party asking for an injunction to bring under the notice of the<\/p>\n<p>Court all facts material to the determination of his right to that injunction;<\/p>\n<p>and it is no excuse for him to say that he was not aware of the importance of<\/p>\n<p>any fact which he has omitted to bring forward. In Castelli v. Cook (1849)<\/p>\n<p>7 Hare, 89, 94 Wigram V.C. stated the rule in the following words: &#8220;A<\/p>\n<p>plaintiff applying ex parte comes under a contract with the Court that he will<\/p>\n<p>state the whole case fully and fairly to the Court. If he fails to do that, and<\/p>\n<p>the Court finds, when other party applies to dissolve the injunction, that any<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                           21<\/span><\/p>\n<p>material fact has been suppressed or not property brought forward, the<\/p>\n<p>plaintiff is told the Court will not decide on the merits, and that, as he has<\/p>\n<p>broken faith with the Court, the injunction must go.&#8221; In Republic of Peru<\/p>\n<p>v. Dreyfus Brothers &amp; Company 55 L.T. 802, 803, Kay J. held as under:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;I have always maintained, and I think it most important to<br \/>\n      maintain most strictly, the rule that, in ex parte applications to<br \/>\n      this Court, the utmost good faith must be observed. If there is<br \/>\n      an important misstatement, speaking for myself, I have never<br \/>\n      hesitated, and never shall hesitate until the rule is altered, to<br \/>\n      discharge the order at once, so as to impress upon all persons<br \/>\n      who are suitors in this Court the importance of dealing in good<br \/>\n      faith in the Court when ex parte applications are made.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>The same rule was restated by Scrutton L., J in R. v. Kensington Income<\/p>\n<p>Tax Commissioner (1917) 1 K.B. 486. The facts of that case were that in<\/p>\n<p>April, 1916, the General Commissioners for the Purposes of the Income Tax<\/p>\n<p>Acts for the district of Kensington made an additional assessment upon the<\/p>\n<p>applicant for the year ending April 5, 1913, in respect of profits arising from<\/p>\n<p>foreign possessions. On May 16, 1916, the applicant obtained a rule nisi<\/p>\n<p>directed to the Commissioners calling upon them to show cause why a writ<\/p>\n<p>of prohibition should not be awarded to prohibit them from proceeding upon<\/p>\n<p>the assessment upon the ground that the applicant was not a subject of the<\/p>\n<p>King nor resident within the United Kingdom and had not been in the United<\/p>\n<p>Kingdom, except for temporary purposes, nor with any view or intent of<\/p>\n<p>establishing her residence therein, nor for a period equal to six months in<\/p>\n<p>any one year. In the affidavit on which the rule was obtained the applicant<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                         22<\/span><\/p>\n<p>stated that she was a French subject and resident in France and was not and<\/p>\n<p>had not been a subject of the United Kingdom nor a resident in the United<\/p>\n<p>Kingdom; that during the year ending April 5, 1913, she was in the United<\/p>\n<p>Kingdom for temporary purposes on visits for sixty-eight days; that she<\/p>\n<p>spent about twenty of these days in London at her brother&#8217;s house, 213,<\/p>\n<p>King&#8217;s Road, Chelsea, generally in company with other guests of her<\/p>\n<p>brother; that she was also in the United Kingdom during the year ending<\/p>\n<p>April 5, 1914, for temporary purposes on visits, and spent part of the time at<\/p>\n<p>213, King&#8217;s Road aforesaid; and that since the month of November, 1914,<\/p>\n<p>she had not been in the United Kingdom. From the affidavits filed on behalf<\/p>\n<p>of the Commissioners and of the surveyor of taxes, who showed cause<\/p>\n<p>against the rule nisi, and from the affidavit of the applicant in reply, it<\/p>\n<p>appeared that in February, 1909, a leasehold house, 213, King&#8217;s Road,<\/p>\n<p>Chelsea, had been taken in the name of the applicant&#8217;s brother.            The<\/p>\n<p>purchase-money for the lease of the house and the furniture amounted to<\/p>\n<p>4000l., and this was paid by the applicant out of her own money. The<\/p>\n<p>accounts of household expenses were paid by the brother and subsequently<\/p>\n<p>adjusted between him and the applicant. The Divisional Court without<\/p>\n<p>dealing with the merits of the case discharged the rule on the ground that the<\/p>\n<p>applicant had suppressed or misrepresented the facts material to her<\/p>\n<p>application. The Divisional Court observed that the Court, for its own<\/p>\n<p>protection is entitled to say &#8220;we refuse this writ of prohibition without going<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                             23<\/span><\/p>\n<p>into the merits of the case on the ground of the conduct of the applicant in<\/p>\n<p>bringing the case before us&#8221;. On appeal, Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. and<\/p>\n<p>Warrington L.J. approved the view taken by the Divisional Court. Scrutton<\/p>\n<p>L.,J. who agreed that the appeal should be dismissed observed:<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;and it has been for many years the rule of the Court, and one<br \/>\n      which it is of the greatest importance to maintain, that when an<br \/>\n      applicant comes to the Court to obtain relief on an ex parte<br \/>\n      statement he should make a full and fair disclosure of all the<br \/>\n      material facts &#8211; facts, not law. He must not misstate the law if<br \/>\n      he can help it &#8211; the court is supposed to know the law. But it<br \/>\n      knows nothing about the facts, and the applicant must state<br \/>\n      fully and fairly the facts, and the penalty by which the Court<br \/>\n      enforces that obligation is that if it finds out that the facts have<br \/>\n      not been fully and fairly stated to it, the Court will set aside any<br \/>\n      action which it has taken on the faith of the imperfect<br \/>\n      statement.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>15.   The above noted rules have been applied by this Court in large<\/p>\n<p>number of cases for declining relief to a party whose conduct is<\/p>\n<p>blameworthy and who has not approached the Court with clean hands &#8211;<\/p>\n<p><a href=\"\/doc\/413368\/\">Hari Narain v. Badri Das AIR<\/a> 1963 SC 1558, Welcome Hotel v. State of<\/p>\n<p>A.P. (1983) 4 SCC 575, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Government of<\/p>\n<p>Karnataka (1991) 3 SCC 261, <a href=\"\/doc\/1151521\/\">S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath<\/a><\/p>\n<p>(1994) 1 SCC 1, <a href=\"\/doc\/1154981\/\">A.V. Papayya Sastry v. Government of A.P.<\/a> (2007) 4<\/p>\n<p>SCC 221, Prestige Lights Limited v. SBI (2007) 8 SCC 449, <a href=\"\/doc\/290974\/\">Sunil<\/p>\n<p>Poddar v. Union Bank of India<\/a> (2008) 2 SCC 326, K.D. Sharma v. SAIL<\/p>\n<p>(2008) 12 SCC 481, <a href=\"\/doc\/1393462\/\">G. Jayashree v. Bhagwandas S. Patel<\/a> (2009) 3 SCC<\/p>\n<p>141 and <a href=\"\/doc\/198000498\/\">Dalip Singh v. State of U.P.<\/a> (2010) 2 SCC 114. In the last<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                          24<\/span><\/p>\n<p>mentioned judgment, the Court lamented on the increase in the number of<\/p>\n<p>cases in which the parties have tried to misuse the process of Court by<\/p>\n<p>making false and\/or misleading statements or by suppressing the relevant<\/p>\n<p>facts or by trying to mislead the Court in passing order in their favour and<\/p>\n<p>observed:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;For many centuries Indian society cherished two basic values<br \/>\n      of life i.e. &#8220;satya&#8221; (truth) and &#8220;ahimsa&#8221; (non-violence).<br \/>\n      Mahavir, Gautam Buddha and Mahatma Gandhi guided the<br \/>\n      people to ingrain these values in their daily life. Truth<br \/>\n      constituted an integral part of the justice-delivery system which<br \/>\n      was in vogue in the pre-Independence era and the people used<br \/>\n      to feel proud to tell truth in the courts irrespective of the<br \/>\n      consequences. However, post-Independence period has seen<br \/>\n      drastic changes in our value system. The materialism has<br \/>\n      overshadowed the old ethos and the quest for personal gain has<br \/>\n      become so intense that those involved in litigation do not<br \/>\n      hesitate to take shelter of falsehood, misrepresentation and<br \/>\n      suppression of facts in the court proceedings.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>      In the last 40 years, a new creed of litigants has cropped<br \/>\n      up. Those who belong to this creed do not have any respect for<br \/>\n      truth. They shamelessly resort to falsehood and unethical means<br \/>\n      for achieving their goals. In order to meet the challenge posed<br \/>\n      by this new creed of litigants, the courts have, from time to<br \/>\n      time, evolved new rules and it is now well established that a<br \/>\n      litigant, who attempts to pollute the stream of justice or who<br \/>\n      touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted hands, is not<br \/>\n      entitled to any relief, interim or final.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>                                                  (emphasis supplied)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n<blockquote><p>16.   In our view, the appellants are not entitled to any relief because<\/p>\n<p>despite strong indictment by this Court in <a href=\"\/doc\/623082\/\">Ramjas Foundation v. Union of<\/p>\n<p>India, the<\/a>y deliberately refrained from mentioning details of the cases<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                          25<\/span><\/p>\n<p>instituted by them in respect of the land situated at Sadhora Khurd and<\/p>\n<p>rejection of their claim for exemption under clause (d) of notification dated<\/p>\n<p>13.11.1959 by the High Court and this Court.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>17.   Notwithstanding the above noted conclusion, we have thought it<\/p>\n<p>proper to deal with the issue raised in the appeal on merits. The institution of<\/p>\n<p>Wakf owes its origin to a rule laid down by the prophet of Islam. It means<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;the tying up of property in the ownership of God the Almighty and the<\/p>\n<p>devotion of the profits for the benefit of human beings. When once it is<\/p>\n<p>declared that a particular property is Wakf, or any such expression is used as<\/p>\n<p>implies Wakf, or the tenor of the document shows, if there is a wakf-nama<\/p>\n<p>that a dedication to pious or charitable purpose is meant, the right of Wakif<\/p>\n<p>is extinguished and the ownership is transferred to the Almighty. In his<\/p>\n<p>book on Mohammadan Law (Fourth Edition) Volume I, Ammer Ali has said<\/p>\n<p>&#8220;Any person or whatever creed may create Wakf, but the law requires that<\/p>\n<p>the object for which the dedication is made should be lawful according to<\/p>\n<p>the creed of the dedicator as well as the Islamic doctrines.            Divine<\/p>\n<p>approbation being the essential in the constitution of a Wakf if the object for<\/p>\n<p>which a dedication is made is sinful, either according to the laws of Islam or<\/p>\n<p>to the creed of the dedicator it would not be valid.&#8221; This shows that a non<\/p>\n<p>Muslim can also create a Wakf for any purpose which is religious under the<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                        26<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Mohammedan Law.        However, the object of the Wakf must be lawful<\/p>\n<p>according to the religious creed of the maker as well.<\/p>\n<p>18.   While dealing with the question whether the land belonging to<\/p>\n<p>appellant No.1 is Wakf property and is exempted from acquisition, the<\/p>\n<p>learned Single Judge analysed the pleadings and documents produced by the<\/p>\n<p>parties, referred to the concept of `Wakf&#8217; propounded by Ammer Ali,<\/p>\n<p>outlines of Mohammadan Law by Prof. A.A.A. Fayzee (Chapter IX pg.274-<\/p>\n<p>275), the judgments of the Privy Council and various High Courts in Vidya<\/p>\n<p>Viruthi v. Baluswami AIR 1922 PC 123, Mami v. Kallandar Ammal 54<\/p>\n<p>I.A. 23, Motishah v. Abdul Gaffar AIR 1956 Nagpur 38, Arur Singh v.<\/p>\n<p>Badar Din AIR 1940 Lahore 119, Fuzlur Rahaman v. Anath Bandhu Pal<\/p>\n<p>(1911) 16 Cal. WN 114, Misra Hidavat Beg v. Seth Behari Lal AIR 1941<\/p>\n<p>All. 225 and Jai Dayal v. Dewan Ram Saran Das AIR 1939 Lahore 686<\/p>\n<p>and observed:\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>      &#8220;I cannot read the term `wakf&#8217; property as embracing property<br \/>\n      impressed with the character of a charitable trust amongst the<br \/>\n      Hindus. A property burdened with the obligation of a charitable<br \/>\n      trust as understood in Hindu law cannot be called a wakf<br \/>\n      property in a legal sense. In a non-legal, popular sense it may<br \/>\n      be possible to use the expression wakf indiscriminately for and<br \/>\n      in relation to any property set apart for charity. But in legal<br \/>\n      technology the word `wakf&#8217; has a definite and accepted<br \/>\n      connotation. It is in that sense that the word has to be<br \/>\n      understood. For the true interpretation of the word one must<br \/>\n      turn to Mohammadan law and see what it means.\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                    27<\/span><\/p>\n<p>Now the question is was Rai Kedar Nath making a wakf of his<br \/>\nproperties when in the meeting of 1916 he made a declaration<br \/>\nin favour of charity. The answer to this question is in a<br \/>\nresounding negative. This is on the assumption that a Hindu<br \/>\ncan create a wakf though such cases are rare.\n<\/p>\n<p>The function held at that meeting shows that Rai Kedar Nath<br \/>\ndid two things. He renounced his interest in his private<br \/>\nproperty. He dedicated everything to the institution he founded.<br \/>\nThese are known as Samarpan and Sankalp in Hindu Law.\n<\/p>\n<p>There was a clear and unequivocal declaration of intention to<br \/>\ncreate trust and vesting of the same in the doner as a Trustee.<br \/>\nThere was clear proof of dedication in the ceremony he<br \/>\nperformed. He divested himself of the property dedicated.<\/p>\n<p>There was a Hawan ceremony. This shows that Rai Kedar Nath<br \/>\nwas an orthodox Hindu. He was a believer in religious<br \/>\nceremonies. What he wanted to do was to found a charitable<br \/>\ntrust of which he himself was the founder trustee, apart from<br \/>\nbeing the Manager of the school and the President of the<br \/>\nSociety. He created a Foundation as the name of the plaintiff<br \/>\nnow shows. He established an institution together with<br \/>\nprovision for its perpetual maintenance.\n<\/p>\n<p>In evidence this trust has been called by the Secretary as<br \/>\n`Educational Charitable Institution&#8217;. In the deed of settlement<br \/>\ndated November 26, 1946, it was described by the British<br \/>\nGovernment as &#8220;a public educational charity&#8221;. All in all it<br \/>\ncomes to a charitable endowment. It can be properly called a<br \/>\ncharitable trust. The Indian Trust Act will not govern it, as<br \/>\nsection 1 of that Act lays down what Rai Kedar Nath created<br \/>\nwas a charitable trust as known to Hindu Law. Reading the<br \/>\nnotification as a whole it appears to me that the wakf property<br \/>\nas known to Muslim Law has been excepted from the<br \/>\nacquisition proceedings.       This has been done by the<br \/>\nGovernment in exercise of its powers of eminent domain. I do<br \/>\nnot think that it will be proper to call the lands in question as<br \/>\nwakf property. This is not the sense which the word bears in<br \/>\nthe notification. In my opinion, the Chief Commissioner&#8217;s<br \/>\nnotification uses the expression `Wakf property&#8217; in the sense in<br \/>\nwhich wakf is understood in Mohammadan Law.\n<\/p>\n<p><span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                         28<\/span><\/p>\n<p>     The Chief Commissioner&#8217;s notification under Section 4 Land<br \/>\n     Acquisition Act is in the nature of a statutory instrument. It<br \/>\n     uses the expression `wakf property&#8217;. How do we interpret those<br \/>\n     words? I think these words must be construed according to the<br \/>\n     legal and technical meaning given to them by Muslim Law.<br \/>\n     They are not to be given the more popular, non-legal or<br \/>\n     ordinary dictionary meaning of the words. These words must<br \/>\n     be taken in their legal sense.&#8221;\n<\/p>\n<p>\n     The Division Bench agreed with the learned Single Judge and<\/p>\n<p>observed:\n<\/p>\n<blockquote><p>     &#8220;In view of the aforesaid legal exposition of the `waqf&#8217; it<br \/>\n     cannot be said that the property of appellants, which may be<br \/>\n     Hindu charitable trust, would be termed as `waqf property&#8217;. The<br \/>\n     learned Single Judge, to our mind, rightly held that while using<br \/>\n     his expression in the impugned Notification issued by the<br \/>\n     statutory authority under Section 4 of the Act the statutory<br \/>\n     authority would be presumed to be aware of the legal<br \/>\n     implication of the term `waqf property&#8217;. Therefore, this term<br \/>\n     cannot be read as to embrace property impressed with the<br \/>\n     character of a charitable trust amongst the Hindus. Once the<br \/>\n     meaning of the words `waqf property&#8217; is clear, it is difficult to<br \/>\n     accept the argument of the learned counsel for the appellants<br \/>\n     that `popular&#8217; meaning should be given or that statutory<br \/>\n     authority loosely used the expression `waqf&#8217; and `trust&#8217;. If the<br \/>\n     interpretation suggested by the appellants of the term `waqf<br \/>\n     property&#8217; is accepted, it would amount to obliterating the<br \/>\n     distinction otherwise statutorily recognized by the Indian Trusts<br \/>\n     Act. No such interpretation can be given which nullifies the<br \/>\n     effect of the Provision of a Statute. While interpreting such a<br \/>\n     Notification like the one issued under Section 4 of the Act, the<br \/>\n     connotation of the word `waqf&#8217; as legally accepted is to be<br \/>\n     preferred to a non-legal connotation. After all the Notification<br \/>\n     passed under Sections 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is in<br \/>\n     exercise of statutory powers and may have the effect of<br \/>\n     subordinate legislation.       Such Notification has serious<br \/>\n     ramifications. It cannot be inferred, therefore, that framers of<br \/>\n     the Notification did not know the technical or legal meaning of<br \/>\n     the word `waqf property&#8217; or used the expression loosely. It also<br \/>\n     cannot be presumed that authors of such statutory Notification<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                        29<\/span><\/p>\n<p>      were not aware of other religious charitable institutions and<br \/>\n      intended to include the same by the expression `waqf property&#8217;.<br \/>\n      It appears that exclusion of `Waqf property&#8217; was intentional<br \/>\n      knowing fully well the meaning thereof in Muslim Law with no<br \/>\n      intention to cover other religious charitable institutions.&#8221;\n<\/p><\/blockquote>\n<p>19.   The Division Bench also rejected the argument that if Wakf created<\/p>\n<p>by non-Muslims is excluded from clause (d) then the same would be<\/p>\n<p>violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution by observing that the said<\/p>\n<p>plea was not pressed before the learned Single Judge and even in the<\/p>\n<p>grounds of appeal, this plea was not taken. In the opinion of the Division<\/p>\n<p>Bench, by omitting to press the point before the learned Single Judge and<\/p>\n<p>not taking a ground in the memo of appeal, the appellants will be deemed to<\/p>\n<p>have abandoned this part of challenge to the acquisition proceedings.<\/p>\n<p>20.   The argument of Shri R. Venkataramani that by dedicating the land<\/p>\n<p>for a charitable purpose Rai Sahib Kedar Nath intended to create a Wakf<\/p>\n<p>lacks merit and deserves to be rejected.      In the function organized on<\/p>\n<p>25.12.1916 in Ramjas School, Kucha Ghasi Ram, Chandani Chowk, the<\/p>\n<p>dedicator is said to have made an announcement that he had created a Wakf<\/p>\n<p>and donated all his moveable and immoveable properties to the Society for<\/p>\n<p>charitable purposes but no evidence was produced before the learned Single<\/p>\n<p>Judge to prove this. Rather, the evidence produced before the learned Single<\/p>\n<p>Judge shows that even after the so called dedication of land for charitable<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                       30<\/span><\/p>\n<p>purposes, the same continued in the name of Rai Sahib Kedar Nath till 1936<\/p>\n<p>when he executed the release deed in favour of the Trust of which he himself<\/p>\n<p>was the founder trustee apart from being the Manager of the school and the<\/p>\n<p>President of the Society. The hawan ceremony performed by Rai Sahib<\/p>\n<p>Kedar Nath which was preceded by Samarpan and Sankalp also shows that<\/p>\n<p>he did not intend to create a Wakf. This is the reason why the objects of<\/p>\n<p>Ramjas College Society formed in 1917 do not make a mention of the Wakf<\/p>\n<p>allegedly created by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath.        In the deed of settlement<\/p>\n<p>executed by the British Government, the institution was described as a<\/p>\n<p>public educational charity and not as a Wakf. Therefore, the concurrent<\/p>\n<p>finding recorded by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench that<\/p>\n<p>what was created by Rai Sahib Kedar Nath was a public charitable trust and<\/p>\n<p>not a Wakf and the property acquired vide notification dated 13.11.1959 was<\/p>\n<p>not a Wakf property does not call for interference.\n<\/p>\n<\/p>\n<p>21.   In the result, the appeal is dismissed. We would have saddled the<\/p>\n<p>appellants with exemplary costs but keeping in view the fact that they are<\/p>\n<p>running educational institutions for benefit of the community, we refrain<\/p>\n<p>from passing an order to that effect and leave the parties to bear their own<\/p>\n<p>costs. However, it is made clear that henceforth the respondents shall be<\/p>\n<p>free to use the acquired land for the purpose of planned development of<\/p>\n<p>Delhi and the appellant shall not be entitled to obstruct the proceedings<br \/>\n<span class=\"hidden_text\">                                                                            31<\/span><\/p>\n<p>which may be taken by the respondents for utilization of land for the<\/p>\n<p>purpose for which it was acquired or for any other public purpose.<\/p>\n<p>                                               &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;.J.\n<\/p>\n<p>                                              [G.S. Singhvi]<\/p>\n<p>                                                   &#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;&#8230;\n<\/p>\n<p>                                                                           &#8230;..J.\n<\/p>\n<p>                                              [Asok Kumar Ganguly]<br \/>\nNew Delhi<br \/>\nNovember 9, 2010.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Supreme Court of India Ramjas Foundation &amp; Ors vs Union Of India &amp; Ors on 9 November, 2010 Author: G Singhvi Bench: G.S. Singhvi, Asok Kumar Ganguly REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6662 OF 2004 Ramjas Foundation and another &#8230;&#8230;..Appellants Versus Union of India and others &#8230;&#8230;.Respondents JUDGMENT [&hellip;]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_lmt_disableupdate":"","_lmt_disable":"","_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-210964","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-supreme-court-of-india"],"yoast_head":"<!-- This site is optimized with the Yoast SEO plugin v27.3 - https:\/\/yoast.com\/product\/yoast-seo-wordpress\/ -->\n<title>Ramjas Foundation &amp; Ors vs Union Of India &amp; Ors on 9 November, 2010 - Free Judgements of Supreme Court &amp; High Court | Legal India<\/title>\n<meta name=\"robots\" content=\"index, follow, max-snippet:-1, max-image-preview:large, max-video-preview:-1\" \/>\n<link rel=\"canonical\" href=\"https:\/\/www.legalindia.com\/judgments\/ramjas-foundation-ors-vs-union-of-india-ors-on-9-november-2010\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:locale\" content=\"en_US\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:type\" content=\"article\" \/>\n<meta property=\"og:title\" content=\"Ramjas Foundation &amp; 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